mirror of
https://github.com/shankar0123/certctl.git
synced 2026-06-07 17:31:30 +00:00
fix(security): close BUNDLE 2 — safe first run, demo mode, agent bootstrap
Bundle 2 closure (2026-05-12 acquisition diligence audit). Closes the
"docker compose up == accidental production" hazard: pre-Bundle-2 the
base deploy/docker-compose.yml WAS the demo path (AUTH_TYPE=none +
DEMO_MODE_ACK=true + KEYGEN_MODE=server + DEMO_SEED=true + literal
change-me-... placeholder creds), the README claimed "drop the demo
overlay for a clean install", and ENVIRONMENTS.md table documented
auth-type default as api-key — three contradictory stories layered on
the same compose file.
Source findings closed:
R2 R3 C1 D9 finding-2 S9 (repo audit)
SEC-H2 SEC-M1 SEC-M3 OPS-M3 LOW-5 HIGH-6 (cowork audit)
Compose split (deploy/docker-compose.yml + deploy/docker-compose.demo.yml):
The base now ships production-shaped — no AUTH_TYPE override, no
KEYGEN_MODE override, no DEMO_MODE_ACK, no DEMO_SEED, no literal
placeholder fallbacks. POSTGRES_PASSWORD / CERTCTL_AUTH_SECRET /
CERTCTL_CONFIG_ENCRYPTION_KEY / CERTCTL_API_KEY / CERTCTL_AGENT_ID
must come from deploy/.env (sample template in deploy/.env.example +
root .env.example). The demo overlay carries the full demo posture
(every env var + every placeholder credential) so the
`-f docker-compose.demo.yml` one-flag flip remains a zero-config
populated-dashboard path.
Fail-closed startup guards (internal/config/config.go::Validate):
Three new gates layered on the existing HIGH-12 demo-mode listen-bind
guard. All three exempt CERTCTL_DEMO_MODE_ACK=true so the demo overlay
keeps working:
• HIGH-6: AUTH_SECRET = "change-me-in-production" → refuse
• HIGH-6: CONFIG_ENCRYPTION_KEY = "change-me-32-char..." → refuse
• LOW-5: CORS_ORIGINS contains "*" (CWE-942 + CWE-352) → refuse
Visible DEMO MODE banner (cmd/server/main.go): every boot under
DEMO_MODE_ACK=true now emits a prominent WARN line with a 6-step
production-promotion checklist. The 2026-04-19 incident (a screenshot
run that kept running for three days) drove this; the per-startup
banner makes the posture unmissable in any log scraper.
Agent enrollment doc alignment:
• docs/reference/configuration.md L83: corrected the non-existent
URL `POST /api/v1/agents/register` to the real route
`POST /api/v1/agents`; added the bootstrap-token note and the
install-agent.sh handoff sequence.
• docs/reference/architecture.md L154: replaced "agents register
themselves at first heartbeat" (false — cmd/agent/main.go fail-
fasts when CERTCTL_AGENT_ID is unset) with the actual two-step
operator-driven flow (REST or GUI registration first, returned ID
fed to install-agent.sh second).
Tests + CI guard:
• 9 new TestValidate_Bundle2_* cases in internal/config/config_test.go
covering: placeholder-secret refused + demo-ack exempt; placeholder
encryption-key refused + demo-ack exempt; real key not mistaken for
placeholder; wildcard CORS refused + demo-ack exempt; wildcard mixed
into a concrete allowlist still refused; concrete allowlist accepted.
• scripts/ci-guards/B2-compose-base-no-demo-env.sh: greps the base
compose for any of the demo-mode env vars + placeholder credentials.
Comments stripped before checking so the narrative header in the
base file can still reference the overlay's posture in prose.
Cold-DB CI smoke (.github/workflows/ci.yml::cold-db-compose-smoke):
Switched to layering -f docker-compose.demo.yml on top of the base —
the new production base requires real env vars the smoke doesn't have,
and the smoke's purpose (catch migration-on-cold-DB regressions + the
bootstrap-token mint path) is orthogonal to which auth posture the
boot lands in.
Receipts:
• Current first-run truth table
compose flag → posture
-f docker-compose.yml (production)
→ requires .env;
fail-fasts on
missing AUTH_SECRET
/ CONFIG_ENCRYPTION
_KEY / POSTGRES
_PASSWORD; agent
fail-fasts on
missing AGENT_ID
-f docker-compose.yml -f docker-compose.demo.yml (demo)
→ zero-config;
AUTH_TYPE=none +
DEMO_MODE_ACK=true
+ KEYGEN=server +
DEMO_SEED=true;
boot banner WARN
-f docker-compose.yml -f docker-compose.dev.yml (dev)
→ base + PgAdmin
+ debug logging
-f docker-compose.test.yml (test, standalone)
→ production-shape
posture, real CA
backends
• Verification (PATH=/tmp/go/bin export GO* paths to /tmp):
gofmt -l # clean (no diffs)
go vet ./internal/config ./cmd/server # clean
go test -short -count=1 ./internal/config/... # PASS (cumulative +
all 9 new Bundle 2
cases green)
go test -short -count=1 # PASS (no regression
./internal/connector/target/configcheck in the Bundle 1 -
closure tests)
go build ./cmd/server ./cmd/agent # clean
./cmd/cli ./cmd/mcp-server
bash scripts/ci-guards/B2-compose-base-no-demo-env.sh # clean
bash scripts/ci-guards/H-1-encryption-key-min-length.sh # clean
bash scripts/ci-guards/G-3-env-docs-drift.sh # clean
Remaining operator warnings (not blocking; tracked in CLAUDE.md
"Open decisions"):
• The first `docker compose -f docker-compose.yml up -d` against a
pre-Bundle-2 .env (placeholder values still in place) will now
fail-fast. This is the intended posture but operators upgrading
from v2.0.x via .env-from-old-master need to rotate before
upgrading. The CHANGELOG note for the v2.1.0 release should
call this out alongside Auth Bundle 2's other breaking changes.
Audit-Closes: BUNDLE-2 R2 R3 C1 D9 S9 SEC-H2 SEC-M1 SEC-M3 OPS-M3 LOW-5 HIGH-6
This commit is contained in:
shankar0123
+30
-7
@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@
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# ==============================================================================
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POSTGRES_DB=certctl
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POSTGRES_USER=certctl
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POSTGRES_PASSWORD=change-me-in-production
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POSTGRES_PASSWORD=replace-with-openssl-rand-hex-32
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# ==============================================================================
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# Certctl Server
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@@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ POSTGRES_PASSWORD=change-me-in-production
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# seeds pg_authid on first boot of an empty volume. See docs/quickstart.md
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# "Warning" callout and `internal/repository/postgres/db.go::wrapPingError`
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# for the SQLSTATE 28P01 diagnostic that fires when the two drift.
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CERTCTL_DATABASE_URL=postgres://certctl:change-me-in-production@postgres:5432/certctl?sslmode=disable
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CERTCTL_DATABASE_URL=postgres://certctl:replace-with-openssl-rand-hex-32@postgres:5432/certctl?sslmode=disable
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CERTCTL_SERVER_HOST=0.0.0.0
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CERTCTL_SERVER_PORT=8443
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CERTCTL_LOG_LEVEL=info
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@@ -42,10 +42,27 @@ CERTCTL_LOG_FORMAT=json
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# option (no JWT middleware shipped - silent auth downgrade); see
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# docs/upgrade-to-v2-jwt-removal.md if you previously set
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# CERTCTL_AUTH_TYPE=jwt.
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CERTCTL_AUTH_TYPE=none
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# Required when CERTCTL_AUTH_TYPE is "api-key".
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# Generate with: openssl rand -base64 32
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# CERTCTL_AUTH_SECRET=change-me-in-production
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#
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# Bundle 2 closure (2026-05-12): the docker-compose base file no longer
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# defaults to AUTH_TYPE=none. The base ships production-shaped; the demo
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# overlay (deploy/docker-compose.demo.yml) flips this baseline into the
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# populated-dashboard demo path.
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CERTCTL_AUTH_TYPE=api-key
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# Required when CERTCTL_AUTH_TYPE is "api-key". Generate with:
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# openssl rand -base64 32
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# The Bundle 2 fail-closed Validate() REFUSES TO START if this value
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# equals the placeholder string "change-me-in-production" outside of
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# demo mode (CERTCTL_DEMO_MODE_ACK=true).
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CERTCTL_AUTH_SECRET=replace-with-openssl-rand-base64-32
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# Bundle 2 closure: AES-256-GCM key for encrypting issuer/target config
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# secrets at rest. Required for any deployment that uses the dynamic
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# config GUI to store issuer credentials. Generate with:
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# openssl rand -base64 32
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# Minimum 32 bytes. The Bundle 2 fail-closed Validate() REFUSES TO
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# START if this value equals the placeholder string
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# "change-me-32-char-encryption-key" outside of demo mode.
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CERTCTL_CONFIG_ENCRYPTION_KEY=replace-with-openssl-rand-base64-32
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# ==============================================================================
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# Certctl Agent
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@@ -54,8 +71,14 @@ CERTCTL_AUTH_TYPE=none
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# startup. Use the docker-compose self-signed bootstrap CA bundle from
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# `deploy/test/certs/ca.crt` or supply your own via CERTCTL_SERVER_CA_BUNDLE_PATH.
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CERTCTL_SERVER_URL=https://localhost:8443
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CERTCTL_API_KEY=change-me-in-production
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# Matches one of the server's CERTCTL_AUTH_SECRET rotation values. The
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# placeholder is rejected outside demo mode (Bundle 2 fail-closed guard).
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CERTCTL_API_KEY=replace-with-openssl-rand-base64-32
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CERTCTL_AGENT_NAME=local-agent
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# Returned from `POST /api/v1/agents` during agent enrollment. The agent
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# fail-fasts at startup with "agent-id flag or CERTCTL_AGENT_ID env var
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# is required" if this is unset.
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# CERTCTL_AGENT_ID=agent-from-registration-response
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# ==============================================================================
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# Optional: Scheduler Tuning (defaults are usually fine)
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@@ -322,21 +322,36 @@ jobs:
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curl "${args[@]}"
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}
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# Bundle 2 closure (2026-05-12): the base compose is now
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# production-shaped — auth=api-key + agent-keygen + fail-closed
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# placeholder guards. The cold-DB smoke layers in the demo
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# overlay so the boot path remains zero-config: the overlay
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# supplies AUTH_TYPE=none + DEMO_MODE_ACK=true + the matching
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# placeholder creds the fail-closed guards accept under
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# DEMO_MODE_ACK. The agent service in the overlay also
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# pre-seeds CERTCTL_AGENT_ID=agent-demo-1 so the bundled
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# agent doesn't restart-loop. The smoke's purpose (catch
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# migration-on-cold-DB regressions + verify bootstrap-token
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# endpoint mints a day-0 admin against a freshly migrated
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# schema) is orthogonal to whether the auth posture is
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# demo-mode or api-key, so the overlay is acceptable here.
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COMPOSE_FILES=(-f docker-compose.yml -f docker-compose.demo.yml)
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log "1/4 down -v --remove-orphans"
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docker compose down -v --remove-orphans 2>&1 | tail -3 || true
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docker compose "${COMPOSE_FILES[@]}" down -v --remove-orphans 2>&1 | tail -3 || true
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log "2/4 up -d (cold boot)"
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docker compose up -d 2>&1 | tail -3
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docker compose "${COMPOSE_FILES[@]}" up -d 2>&1 | tail -3
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log "3/4 wait for healthchecks"
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wait_for_service_healthy postgres
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wait_for_service_healthy certctl-server
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wait_for_service_healthy certctl-agent || log " (agent skipped — non-demo compose)"
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wait_for_service_healthy certctl-agent || log " (agent skipped)"
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log "4/4 minting day-0 admin (proves migration ladder + bootstrap path)"
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TOKEN="$(openssl rand -base64 32 | tr -d '\n')"
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echo "CERTCTL_BOOTSTRAP_TOKEN=$TOKEN" > /tmp/_smoke.env
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docker compose --env-file /tmp/_smoke.env up -d --force-recreate certctl-server 2>&1 | tail -2
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docker compose "${COMPOSE_FILES[@]}" --env-file /tmp/_smoke.env up -d --force-recreate certctl-server 2>&1 | tail -2
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sleep 5
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wait_for_service_healthy certctl-server
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BODY="$(http_call POST /api/v1/auth/bootstrap "{\"token\":\"$TOKEN\",\"actor_name\":\"smoke-admin\"}")"
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@@ -345,7 +360,7 @@ jobs:
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log "PASS — cold boot + force-recreate + admin bootstrap all green"
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log "tearing down"
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docker compose down -v 2>&1 | tail -2
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docker compose "${COMPOSE_FILES[@]}" down -v 2>&1 | tail -2
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- name: Dump compose logs on failure
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if: failure()
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@@ -353,7 +368,7 @@ jobs:
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run: |
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for svc in postgres certctl-server certctl-agent certctl-tls-init; do
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echo "==== $svc ===="
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docker compose logs --no-color --tail 200 "$svc" || true
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docker compose -f docker-compose.yml -f docker-compose.demo.yml logs --no-color --tail 200 "$svc" || true
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done
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frontend-build:
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@@ -88,15 +88,27 @@ Security: three authentication paths — API keys (SHA-256 hashed + constant-tim
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### Docker Compose (recommended)
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**Demo path — zero config, populated dashboard:**
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```bash
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git clone https://github.com/certctl-io/certctl.git
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cd certctl
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docker compose -f deploy/docker-compose.yml -f deploy/docker-compose.demo.yml up -d --build
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```
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Wait ~30 seconds, then open **https://localhost:8443** in your browser. The shipped demo overlay seeds 180 days of realistic history across 13 issuers, 8 agents, managed + discovered certs, jobs, deploys, audit, and notification events. The `certctl-tls-init` init container self-signs an ECDSA-P256 cert on first boot — accept the browser warning for the demo, or feed the generated `ca.crt` to your client.
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Wait ~30 seconds, then open **https://localhost:8443** in your browser. The demo overlay flips the base into demo-mode auth (every request served as the synthetic admin actor `actor-demo-anon` — the server emits a prominent ⚠ DEMO MODE banner at boot reminding you this posture is for evaluation only) and seeds 180 days of realistic history across 13 issuers, 8 agents, managed + discovered certs, jobs, deploys, audit, and notification events. The `certctl-tls-init` init container self-signs an ECDSA-P256 cert on first boot — accept the browser warning for the demo, or feed the generated `ca.crt` to your client.
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For a clean install without demo data, drop the `-f deploy/docker-compose.demo.yml` flag and run `docker compose -f deploy/docker-compose.yml up -d --build`. The four compose files (`docker-compose.yml` base, `docker-compose.demo.yml` overlay, `docker-compose.dev.yml` for PgAdmin + debug logging, `docker-compose.test.yml` for integration tests) are documented at [`deploy/ENVIRONMENTS.md`](deploy/ENVIRONMENTS.md).
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**Production path — `.env` required, fail-closed on placeholders:**
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```bash
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cp .env.example deploy/.env # or root .env if running outside compose
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$EDITOR deploy/.env # set POSTGRES_PASSWORD, CERTCTL_AUTH_SECRET,
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# CERTCTL_API_KEY, CERTCTL_CONFIG_ENCRYPTION_KEY,
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# CERTCTL_AGENT_ID — all via openssl rand
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docker compose -f deploy/docker-compose.yml up -d --build
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```
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The base compose alone (no demo overlay) ships production-shaped: default `auth-type=api-key`, default `keygen-mode=agent`, no demo seed, no demo-mode synthetic admin. The fail-closed startup guards in `internal/config/config.go::Validate` refuse to boot when any of the change-me-... placeholder credentials reach config outside of demo mode (Bundle 2 closure, 2026-05-12). The four compose files (`docker-compose.yml` base, `docker-compose.demo.yml` overlay, `docker-compose.dev.yml` for PgAdmin + debug logging, `docker-compose.test.yml` for integration tests) are documented at [`deploy/ENVIRONMENTS.md`](deploy/ENVIRONMENTS.md).
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```bash
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curl --cacert $(docker compose -f deploy/docker-compose.yml exec -T certctl-server cat /etc/certctl/tls/ca.crt) https://localhost:8443/health
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@@ -102,6 +102,19 @@ func main() {
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"server_host", cfg.Server.Host,
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"server_port", cfg.Server.Port)
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// Bundle 2 (2026-05-12) — visible demo-mode banner at boot.
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//
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// When CERTCTL_DEMO_MODE_ACK=true the HIGH-12 startup guard already
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// passed and the server is about to serve every request as the
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// synthetic admin actor `actor-demo-anon`. Operators have lost
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// production deploys to this posture more than once (last incident:
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// 2026-04-19, a screenshot run that kept running for three days);
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// the per-startup banner makes the posture unmissable in any log
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// scraper, dashboard, or `journalctl --since boot` review.
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if cfg.Auth.DemoModeAck {
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logger.Warn("⚠ DEMO MODE ACTIVE — CERTCTL_DEMO_MODE_ACK=true is set; every request is served as the synthetic admin actor `actor-demo-anon` (no authentication enforced). This deployment MUST NOT hold production keys, certificates, or audit history. To promote to production: (1) unset CERTCTL_DEMO_MODE_ACK; (2) set CERTCTL_AUTH_TYPE=api-key or oidc; (3) set CERTCTL_AUTH_SECRET to a fresh `openssl rand -base64 32`; (4) set CERTCTL_KEYGEN_MODE=agent; (5) rotate CERTCTL_CONFIG_ENCRYPTION_KEY to a fresh `openssl rand -base64 32` (≥ 32 bytes, not the change-me placeholder); (6) restart the server. See docs/operator/security.md for the full posture.")
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}
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// Bundle-5 / Audit H-007: deprecation WARN when the agent bootstrap
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// token is unset. Pre-Bundle-5 there was no token at all; the v2.0.x
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// default keeps the warn-mode pass-through so existing demo deploys
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+37
-6
@@ -1,8 +1,39 @@
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# certctl Docker Compose environment variables
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# Copy this file to .env and customize for your deployment
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# certctl Docker Compose environment variables (Bundle 2 — 2026-05-12)
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#
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# Copy this file to deploy/.env and customize. The production-shaped base
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# compose (docker-compose.yml) requires every variable below to be set;
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# the Bundle 2 fail-closed startup guards REFUSE TO BOOT if any value
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# remains at a "change-me-..." or "replace-with-..." placeholder outside
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# demo mode (CERTCTL_DEMO_MODE_ACK=true).
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#
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# DEMO PATH (zero-config, populated dashboard, demo-mode auth):
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# docker compose -f deploy/docker-compose.yml \
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# -f deploy/docker-compose.demo.yml up -d --build
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# The demo overlay supplies its own placeholder values plus DEMO_MODE_ACK
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# so this .env is NOT needed.
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#
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# PRODUCTION PATH (this .env is required):
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# docker compose -f deploy/docker-compose.yml up -d
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# PostgreSQL password (change in production!)
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POSTGRES_PASSWORD=certctl
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# PostgreSQL password — openssl rand -hex 32
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POSTGRES_PASSWORD=replace-with-openssl-rand-hex-32
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# Agent API key (change in production! Generate with: openssl rand -hex 32)
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CERTCTL_API_KEY=change-me-in-production
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# Server API-key secret — openssl rand -base64 32
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CERTCTL_AUTH_SECRET=replace-with-openssl-rand-base64-32
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# Bundled-agent API key (matches one of the server's AUTH_SECRET rotation
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# values). Generate with: openssl rand -base64 32
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CERTCTL_API_KEY=replace-with-openssl-rand-base64-32
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# AES-256-GCM key for encrypting issuer/target config secrets at rest.
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# Minimum 32 bytes. Generate with: openssl rand -base64 32
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CERTCTL_CONFIG_ENCRYPTION_KEY=replace-with-openssl-rand-base64-32
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# Agent ID returned from `POST /api/v1/agents` during agent enrollment.
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# Without this the bundled certctl-agent service fail-fasts at startup.
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# CERTCTL_AGENT_ID=agent-from-registration-response
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# Day-0 admin bootstrap token (optional — generate with: openssl rand -hex 32).
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# When set, POST /api/v1/auth/bootstrap mints the first admin actor + API
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# key. When unset (default), that endpoint returns 410 Gone.
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# CERTCTL_BOOTSTRAP_TOKEN=
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+40
-15
@@ -62,7 +62,9 @@ A compose file defines **services** (containers), **networks** (how they talk to
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## Base Environment
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**File:** `docker-compose.yml`
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**When to use:** Production deployments, first-time setup, or any time you want a clean dashboard with the onboarding wizard.
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**When to use:** Production deployments and any time you want a clean, production-shaped stack with real authentication enforced.
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**Bundle 2 closure (2026-05-12):** the base compose was split from the demo overlay. Pre-Bundle-2 this file IS the demo path (auth=none, keygen=server, demo-seed=true, change-me placeholder credentials baked in). Operators reading "drop the demo overlay for a clean install" were not getting a clean install — they were getting a demo stack with the overlay's data layer stripped off. Post-Bundle-2 the base ships production-shaped: `CERTCTL_AUTH_TYPE` defaults to `api-key`, `CERTCTL_KEYGEN_MODE` defaults to `agent`, demo-mode + demo-seed default to false, and every credential placeholder is rejected at startup. The demo path is now a single overlay flag away (`-f deploy/docker-compose.demo.yml`).
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### What it runs
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@@ -79,9 +81,20 @@ Three services on a private bridge network:
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```bash
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git clone https://github.com/certctl-io/certctl.git
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cd certctl
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# Required: provide real credentials. Without this step the server fail-fasts
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# at startup on the Bundle 2 placeholder-credential guards.
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cp .env.example deploy/.env
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$EDITOR deploy/.env
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# Set: POSTGRES_PASSWORD, CERTCTL_AUTH_SECRET, CERTCTL_API_KEY,
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# CERTCTL_CONFIG_ENCRYPTION_KEY (all via `openssl rand -base64 32`),
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# CERTCTL_AGENT_ID (returned from `POST /api/v1/agents`).
|
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|
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docker compose -f deploy/docker-compose.yml up -d --build
|
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```
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If you just want to kick the tires without writing a `.env`, use the demo overlay instead — see [Demo Overlay](#demo-overlay) below.
|
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`--build` compiles the Go server and agent from source, including the React frontend. Without it, Docker may reuse a stale image from a previous build.
|
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|
||||
`-d` runs in detached mode (background). Omit it to see logs in your terminal.
|
||||
@@ -132,14 +145,16 @@ certctl-server:
|
||||
postgres:
|
||||
condition: service_healthy
|
||||
environment:
|
||||
CERTCTL_DATABASE_URL: postgres://certctl:${POSTGRES_PASSWORD:-certctl}@postgres:5432/certctl?sslmode=disable
|
||||
CERTCTL_DATABASE_URL: postgres://certctl:${POSTGRES_PASSWORD}@postgres:5432/certctl?sslmode=disable
|
||||
CERTCTL_SERVER_HOST: 0.0.0.0
|
||||
CERTCTL_SERVER_PORT: 8443
|
||||
CERTCTL_LOG_LEVEL: info
|
||||
CERTCTL_AUTH_TYPE: none
|
||||
CERTCTL_KEYGEN_MODE: server
|
||||
# Bundle 2 (2026-05-12): no auth-type / keygen-mode override here.
|
||||
# Code defaults (api-key + agent) take effect; the demo overlay flips
|
||||
# both to demo-mode (none + server).
|
||||
CERTCTL_AUTH_SECRET: ${CERTCTL_AUTH_SECRET}
|
||||
CERTCTL_NETWORK_SCAN_ENABLED: "true"
|
||||
CERTCTL_CONFIG_ENCRYPTION_KEY: ${CERTCTL_CONFIG_ENCRYPTION_KEY:-change-me-32-char-encryption-key}
|
||||
CERTCTL_CONFIG_ENCRYPTION_KEY: ${CERTCTL_CONFIG_ENCRYPTION_KEY}
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
The server is the control plane. It serves the REST API, the React dashboard, runs 7 background scheduler loops (renewal, job processing, health checks, notifications, short-lived cert expiry, network scanning, digest emails), and manages the issuer/target registry.
|
||||
@@ -147,9 +162,10 @@ The server is the control plane. It serves the REST API, the React dashboard, ru
|
||||
Key environment variables explained:
|
||||
|
||||
- `CERTCTL_DATABASE_URL` references the `postgres` service by hostname. Docker's internal DNS resolves `postgres` to the container's IP on the bridge network. `sslmode=disable` is appropriate because traffic stays on the private Docker network.
|
||||
- `CERTCTL_AUTH_TYPE: none` disables API key authentication so you can explore immediately. For production, set `api-key` and configure `CERTCTL_AUTH_SECRET`.
|
||||
- `CERTCTL_KEYGEN_MODE: server` means the server generates private keys. This is convenient for demos but insecure for production. In production, set `agent` so keys are generated on agent machines and never transmitted.
|
||||
- `CERTCTL_CONFIG_ENCRYPTION_KEY` enables AES-256-GCM encryption for issuer and target configurations stored in the database (credentials, API keys). Without this, the dynamic configuration GUI (adding issuers/targets from the dashboard) won't encrypt sensitive fields. For production, generate a strong random key.
|
||||
- `CERTCTL_AUTH_TYPE` defaults to `api-key` in the code (`internal/config/config.go`); the base compose does NOT override it. To run demo-mode auth (every request served as the synthetic admin actor), layer the demo overlay on top.
|
||||
- `CERTCTL_AUTH_SECRET` is the API-key value the server accepts. The Bundle 2 fail-closed guard rejects the literal placeholder `change-me-in-production` outside demo mode. Generate with `openssl rand -base64 32`.
|
||||
- `CERTCTL_KEYGEN_MODE` defaults to `agent` in the code (the base compose does NOT override it). Production deploys leave it there so private keys stay on agent infrastructure; the demo overlay flips it to `server` so the demo can issue + hold the key on the server box without an agent dance.
|
||||
- `CERTCTL_CONFIG_ENCRYPTION_KEY` enables AES-256-GCM encryption for issuer and target configurations stored in the database (credentials, API keys). Required for any deploy that adds issuers via the GUI. The Bundle 2 fail-closed guard rejects the literal placeholder `change-me-32-char-encryption-key` outside demo mode. Generate with `openssl rand -base64 32` (≥ 32 bytes).
|
||||
- `CERTCTL_NETWORK_SCAN_ENABLED` activates the scheduler loop that probes TLS endpoints on your network to discover certificates you might not be managing.
|
||||
|
||||
**Expert note:** The healthcheck hits `GET /health` every 10 seconds with 5 retries. The `depends_on: condition: service_healthy` on the agent means Docker holds agent startup until this check passes. Resource limits (`cpus: '1.0'`, `memory: 512M`) prevent the server from consuming unbounded resources in shared environments.
|
||||
@@ -162,8 +178,12 @@ certctl-agent:
|
||||
certctl-server:
|
||||
condition: service_healthy
|
||||
environment:
|
||||
CERTCTL_SERVER_URL: http://certctl-server:8443
|
||||
CERTCTL_API_KEY: ${CERTCTL_API_KEY:-change-me-in-production}
|
||||
CERTCTL_SERVER_URL: https://certctl-server:8443
|
||||
# Bundle 2 (2026-05-12): no placeholder fallbacks. Operators MUST
|
||||
# set CERTCTL_API_KEY + CERTCTL_AGENT_ID in deploy/.env. The agent
|
||||
# binary fail-fasts at startup when CERTCTL_AGENT_ID is unset.
|
||||
CERTCTL_API_KEY: ${CERTCTL_API_KEY}
|
||||
CERTCTL_AGENT_ID: ${CERTCTL_AGENT_ID}
|
||||
CERTCTL_AGENT_NAME: docker-agent
|
||||
CERTCTL_LOG_LEVEL: info
|
||||
CERTCTL_DISCOVERY_DIRS: /var/lib/certctl/keys
|
||||
@@ -194,13 +214,18 @@ docker compose -f deploy/docker-compose.yml down -v
|
||||
## Demo Overlay
|
||||
|
||||
**File:** `docker-compose.demo.yml`
|
||||
**When to use:** Demos, screenshots, stakeholder presentations, or any time you want a populated dashboard on first boot.
|
||||
**When to use:** Demos, screenshots, stakeholder presentations, or any time you want a one-command zero-config evaluation stack with a populated dashboard.
|
||||
|
||||
### What it adds
|
||||
|
||||
One env var: `CERTCTL_DEMO_SEED=true` on the `certctl-server` service. The server applies `migrations/seed_demo.sql` at boot via `postgres.RunDemoSeed` AFTER the baseline migrations + `seed.sql` are in place. The demo seed file inserts 180 days of simulated operational history: teams, owners, certificates across multiple issuers, agents on different platforms, jobs with realistic timestamps, discovery scan results, audit events, policies, and profiles.
|
||||
Bundle 2 closure (2026-05-12) moved every demo-mode env var out of the base compose into this overlay. The overlay now carries:
|
||||
|
||||
Pre-U-3 the overlay used to mount `seed_demo.sql` into PostgreSQL's `/docker-entrypoint-initdb.d/` and rely on initdb-time application. That worked only because the production stack also mounted the migrations there, so the schema existed when initdb ran. Once U-3 dropped the production initdb mounts (single source of truth: server runs `RunMigrations` + `RunSeed` at boot), the demo seed could no longer be applied at initdb time — the tables it references wouldn't exist yet. Post-U-3 the overlay is a 27-line override file with no `image:` / `build:` of its own; it MUST be passed alongside the base, or compose errors with `service "certctl-server" has neither an image nor a build context specified`.
|
||||
- `CERTCTL_AUTH_TYPE=none` + `CERTCTL_DEMO_MODE_ACK=true` — demo-mode synthetic admin actor (`actor-demo-anon`). The server emits a prominent ⚠ DEMO MODE WARN banner at boot with a production-promotion checklist (`cmd/server/main.go`).
|
||||
- `CERTCTL_KEYGEN_MODE=server` — demo-only server-side keygen.
|
||||
- `CERTCTL_DEMO_SEED=true` — the server applies `migrations/seed_demo.sql` at boot via `postgres.RunDemoSeed`, inserting 180 days of simulated operational history (teams, owners, certificates, agents, jobs, discovery results, audit events, policies, profiles).
|
||||
- Fixed weak `POSTGRES_PASSWORD=certctl`, `CERTCTL_AUTH_SECRET=change-me-in-production`, `CERTCTL_CONFIG_ENCRYPTION_KEY=change-me-32-char-encryption-key`, `CERTCTL_API_KEY=change-me-in-production`, `CERTCTL_AGENT_ID=agent-demo-1` — placeholder credentials the Bundle 2 fail-closed `Validate()` rejects outside demo mode, but the demo overlay's `DEMO_MODE_ACK=true` unlocks them.
|
||||
|
||||
Pre-U-3 the overlay used to mount `seed_demo.sql` into PostgreSQL's `/docker-entrypoint-initdb.d/` and rely on initdb-time application. That worked only because the production stack also mounted the migrations there, so the schema existed when initdb ran. Once U-3 dropped the production initdb mounts (single source of truth: server runs `RunMigrations` + `RunSeed` at boot), the demo seed could no longer be applied at initdb time — the tables it references wouldn't exist yet. Post-U-3 the overlay is an override file with no `image:` / `build:` of its own; it MUST be passed alongside the base, or compose errors with `service "certctl-server" has neither an image nor a build context specified`.
|
||||
|
||||
### Starting it
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -382,7 +407,7 @@ Every `CERTCTL_*` environment variable is read by the server's `internal/config/
|
||||
| `CERTCTL_SERVER_HOST` | `0.0.0.0` | Listen address |
|
||||
| `CERTCTL_SERVER_PORT` | `8443` | Listen port |
|
||||
| `CERTCTL_LOG_LEVEL` | `info` | Log verbosity: `debug`, `info`, `warn`, `error` |
|
||||
| `CERTCTL_AUTH_TYPE` | `api-key` | Auth mode: `api-key` or `none` |
|
||||
| `CERTCTL_AUTH_TYPE` | `api-key` | Auth mode: `api-key`, `none`, or `oidc` (Auth Bundle 2). |
|
||||
| `CERTCTL_AUTH_SECRET` | (none) | API key(s), comma-separated for rotation |
|
||||
| `CERTCTL_KEYGEN_MODE` | `agent` | Key generation: `agent` (production) or `server` (demo) |
|
||||
| `CERTCTL_CONFIG_ENCRYPTION_KEY` | (none) | AES-256-GCM key for encrypting issuer/target configs in DB |
|
||||
@@ -400,7 +425,7 @@ Every `CERTCTL_*` environment variable is read by the server's `internal/config/
|
||||
| `CERTCTL_SERVER_URL` | (required) | Server API URL |
|
||||
| `CERTCTL_API_KEY` | (none) | API key for authenticating with server |
|
||||
| `CERTCTL_AGENT_NAME` | (hostname) | Display name in dashboard |
|
||||
| `CERTCTL_AGENT_ID` | (auto-generated) | Stable agent identifier |
|
||||
| `CERTCTL_AGENT_ID` | (none — required) | Stable agent identifier returned from `POST /api/v1/agents`. The agent binary fail-fasts at startup if unset. |
|
||||
| `CERTCTL_KEYGEN_MODE` | `agent` | Must match server setting |
|
||||
| `CERTCTL_LOG_LEVEL` | `info` | Log verbosity |
|
||||
| `CERTCTL_KEY_DIR` | `/var/lib/certctl/keys` | Directory for private key storage (0600 perms) |
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1,26 +1,88 @@
|
||||
# Demo mode: pre-populated dashboard with 32 certificates, 8 agents, 10 issuers, etc.
|
||||
# Use this to showcase certctl's dashboard with realistic data.
|
||||
# =============================================================================
|
||||
# certctl DEMO overlay — Bundle 2 (2026-05-12)
|
||||
# =============================================================================
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Usage:
|
||||
# docker compose -f docker-compose.yml -f docker-compose.demo.yml up --build
|
||||
# Layered on top of the production-shaped base (docker-compose.yml) to give
|
||||
# operators a one-command, zero-config demo path:
|
||||
#
|
||||
# To start fresh (wipe previous data):
|
||||
# docker compose -f docker-compose.yml -f docker-compose.demo.yml down -v
|
||||
# docker compose -f docker-compose.yml -f docker-compose.demo.yml up --build
|
||||
# docker compose -f deploy/docker-compose.yml \
|
||||
# -f deploy/docker-compose.demo.yml up -d --build
|
||||
#
|
||||
# U-3 (P1, cat-u-seed_initdb_schema_drift): pre-U-3 this overlay mounted
|
||||
# `seed_demo.sql` into postgres `/docker-entrypoint-initdb.d/`. That worked
|
||||
# only because the production stack also mounted the migrations there, so
|
||||
# the schema existed at initdb time. Once U-3 dropped the production
|
||||
# What this overlay does:
|
||||
#
|
||||
# 1. Flips CERTCTL_AUTH_TYPE=none + CERTCTL_DEMO_MODE_ACK=true. Every
|
||||
# request is served as the synthetic admin actor `actor-demo-anon`;
|
||||
# the server emits a prominent ⚠ DEMO MODE WARN banner at boot with
|
||||
# a production-promotion checklist (cmd/server/main.go::emitDemoBanner).
|
||||
#
|
||||
# 2. Flips CERTCTL_KEYGEN_MODE=server (the demo issues + holds the key on
|
||||
# the server to keep the dashboard populated; production deploys must
|
||||
# use the default `agent` mode where keys never leave the agent box).
|
||||
#
|
||||
# 3. Flips CERTCTL_DEMO_SEED=true. The server applies migrations/seed_demo.sql
|
||||
# at boot via postgres.RunDemoSeed AFTER baseline migrations + seed.sql,
|
||||
# pre-seeding 180 days of simulated history across 13 issuers + 8 agents.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# 4. Supplies the change-me-... placeholder values for POSTGRES_PASSWORD,
|
||||
# CERTCTL_API_KEY, CERTCTL_CONFIG_ENCRYPTION_KEY, and CERTCTL_AGENT_ID
|
||||
# so the demo runs without a deploy/.env file. The Bundle 2 fail-closed
|
||||
# Validate() rejects these placeholders outside demo mode, so this only
|
||||
# works alongside DEMO_MODE_ACK=true.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# U-3 history: pre-U-3 this overlay mounted seed_demo.sql into postgres
|
||||
# `/docker-entrypoint-initdb.d/`. That worked only because the production
|
||||
# stack also mounted the migrations there. Once U-3 dropped the production
|
||||
# initdb mounts (single source of truth: server runs RunMigrations + RunSeed
|
||||
# at boot), the demo seed could no longer be applied at initdb time — the
|
||||
# tables it references wouldn't exist yet.
|
||||
# tables it references wouldn't exist yet. Post-U-3 the overlay just sets
|
||||
# CERTCTL_DEMO_SEED=true; the server applies seed_demo.sql at boot via
|
||||
# postgres.RunDemoSeed AFTER baseline migrations + seed.sql.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Post-U-3 the demo overlay just sets CERTCTL_DEMO_SEED=true; the server
|
||||
# applies seed_demo.sql at boot via postgres.RunDemoSeed AFTER baseline
|
||||
# migrations + seed.sql are in place. Same single source of truth, no
|
||||
# initdb mounts, no schema-vs-seed drift.
|
||||
# Bundle 2 history: pre-Bundle-2 the base compose IS this demo path; this
|
||||
# overlay was a single-flag thin shim. Bundle 2 split the demo env vars
|
||||
# out of the base so `docker compose -f deploy/docker-compose.yml up`
|
||||
# (no overlay) boots production-shaped — which is what every operator
|
||||
# reading the README quickstart line "drop the demo overlay for a clean
|
||||
# install" expected. The overlay carries the full demo posture now.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# To start fresh (wipe previous data):
|
||||
# docker compose -f deploy/docker-compose.yml \
|
||||
# -f deploy/docker-compose.demo.yml down -v
|
||||
# docker compose -f deploy/docker-compose.yml \
|
||||
# -f deploy/docker-compose.demo.yml up -d --build
|
||||
|
||||
services:
|
||||
postgres:
|
||||
# Fixed weak password is intentional for the no-setup demo path.
|
||||
# See docker-compose.yml for the production override pattern.
|
||||
environment:
|
||||
POSTGRES_PASSWORD: certctl
|
||||
|
||||
certctl-server:
|
||||
environment:
|
||||
# Demo-mode auth: every request served as the synthetic
|
||||
# `actor-demo-anon` admin. The server's HIGH-12 startup guard
|
||||
# requires DEMO_MODE_ACK=true to allow this combination on a
|
||||
# non-loopback bind; the boot-time WARN banner (cmd/server/main.go)
|
||||
# reminds the operator on every start.
|
||||
CERTCTL_AUTH_TYPE: none
|
||||
CERTCTL_DEMO_MODE_ACK: "true"
|
||||
# Server-side keygen so the demo can populate the dashboard with
|
||||
# full lifecycle history. Production deploys leave this at the
|
||||
# code default `agent` (CertctlAgent generates ECDSA P-256 keys
|
||||
# locally and submits CSRs only).
|
||||
CERTCTL_KEYGEN_MODE: server
|
||||
# Demo creds — the Bundle 2 fail-closed Validate() rejects these
|
||||
# sentinels outside demo mode, but DEMO_MODE_ACK=true unlocks them.
|
||||
CERTCTL_CONFIG_ENCRYPTION_KEY: change-me-32-char-encryption-key
|
||||
CERTCTL_AUTH_SECRET: change-me-in-production
|
||||
# 180-day simulated history seed applied at boot.
|
||||
CERTCTL_DEMO_SEED: "true"
|
||||
|
||||
certctl-agent:
|
||||
environment:
|
||||
# Pre-seeded by migrations/seed_demo.sql; the bundled agent
|
||||
# connects with these creds and the demo-mode synthetic admin
|
||||
# accepts every request regardless of API key.
|
||||
CERTCTL_API_KEY: change-me-in-production
|
||||
CERTCTL_AGENT_ID: agent-demo-1
|
||||
|
||||
+84
-36
@@ -1,3 +1,49 @@
|
||||
# =============================================================================
|
||||
# certctl base compose — PRODUCTION-SHAPED (Bundle 2, 2026-05-12)
|
||||
# =============================================================================
|
||||
#
|
||||
# This base file ships a SAFE-BY-DEFAULT control plane:
|
||||
#
|
||||
# - CERTCTL_AUTH_TYPE defaults to api-key (the code default; not overridden
|
||||
# here). The server REFUSES to start with auth=none on a non-loopback
|
||||
# bind unless CERTCTL_DEMO_MODE_ACK=true (Audit 2026-05-10 HIGH-12 +
|
||||
# Bundle 2 closure: see internal/config/config.go::Validate).
|
||||
# - CERTCTL_KEYGEN_MODE defaults to agent (the code default).
|
||||
# - CERTCTL_DEMO_SEED defaults to false (the code default; the 180-day
|
||||
# simulated history seed only runs under the demo overlay).
|
||||
# - Default placeholder credentials (`change-me-...` sentinels) are NOT
|
||||
# interpolated by this compose. The server REFUSES to start when those
|
||||
# placeholder strings reach config (Bundle 2 fail-closed guards) unless
|
||||
# DEMO_MODE_ACK=true. Operators MUST set:
|
||||
# POSTGRES_PASSWORD (openssl rand -hex 32)
|
||||
# CERTCTL_AUTH_SECRET (openssl rand -hex 32)
|
||||
# CERTCTL_CONFIG_ENCRYPTION_KEY (openssl rand -base64 32)
|
||||
# CERTCTL_API_KEY (matches CERTCTL_AUTH_SECRET or one
|
||||
# of its rotation siblings)
|
||||
# CERTCTL_AGENT_ID (returned from POST /api/v1/agents)
|
||||
# in deploy/.env or the shell environment. See deploy/.env.example.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# USAGE
|
||||
# -----
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Production-shaped (this base alone):
|
||||
# docker compose -f deploy/docker-compose.yml up -d
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Bundled demo (zero-config, populated dashboard, demo-mode auth):
|
||||
# docker compose -f deploy/docker-compose.yml \
|
||||
# -f deploy/docker-compose.demo.yml up -d
|
||||
#
|
||||
# The demo overlay (docker-compose.demo.yml) layers in the demo-mode env
|
||||
# vars (AUTH_TYPE=none + DEMO_MODE_ACK=true + KEYGEN_MODE=server +
|
||||
# DEMO_SEED=true + the change-me placeholder creds). It exists so the
|
||||
# `docker compose up` smoke + screenshot path stays one command — but it
|
||||
# ALSO carries the operator-visible warning banner the server emits at
|
||||
# boot when DEMO_MODE_ACK=true.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Pre-Bundle-2 this base file WAS the demo path. The split happened in
|
||||
# 2026-05-12; the README quickstart, deploy/ENVIRONMENTS.md, and the
|
||||
# cold-DB compose smoke in .github/workflows/ci.yml were updated in the
|
||||
# same commit to point at the new layout.
|
||||
services:
|
||||
# HTTPS-Everywhere Phase 3 — self-signed TLS bootstrap (init container).
|
||||
# Generates a CN=certctl-server ECDSA-P256 (SHA-256 signature) cert with
|
||||
@@ -82,7 +128,12 @@ services:
|
||||
environment:
|
||||
POSTGRES_DB: certctl
|
||||
POSTGRES_USER: certctl
|
||||
POSTGRES_PASSWORD: ${POSTGRES_PASSWORD:-certctl}
|
||||
# Bundle 2 closure: no `:-certctl` fallback. Operators MUST set
|
||||
# POSTGRES_PASSWORD in deploy/.env or the shell environment. The
|
||||
# demo overlay (docker-compose.demo.yml) supplies a fixed weak
|
||||
# default for screenshot/demo use; production deploys never
|
||||
# depend on that fallback.
|
||||
POSTGRES_PASSWORD: ${POSTGRES_PASSWORD}
|
||||
ports:
|
||||
- "5432:5432"
|
||||
volumes:
|
||||
@@ -123,34 +174,30 @@ services:
|
||||
# on the docker bridge network keeps sslmode=disable acceptable; for
|
||||
# external/managed Postgres operators MUST override CERTCTL_DATABASE_URL
|
||||
# with sslmode=verify-full and provide the CA bundle. See docs/database-tls.md.
|
||||
CERTCTL_DATABASE_URL: ${CERTCTL_DATABASE_URL:-postgres://certctl:${POSTGRES_PASSWORD:-certctl}@postgres:5432/certctl?sslmode=disable}
|
||||
CERTCTL_DATABASE_URL: ${CERTCTL_DATABASE_URL:-postgres://certctl:${POSTGRES_PASSWORD}@postgres:5432/certctl?sslmode=disable}
|
||||
CERTCTL_SERVER_HOST: 0.0.0.0
|
||||
CERTCTL_SERVER_PORT: 8443
|
||||
CERTCTL_SERVER_TLS_CERT_PATH: /etc/certctl/tls/server.crt
|
||||
CERTCTL_SERVER_TLS_KEY_PATH: /etc/certctl/tls/server.key
|
||||
CERTCTL_LOG_LEVEL: info
|
||||
CERTCTL_AUTH_TYPE: none
|
||||
# Audit 2026-05-10 HIGH-12 closure: when AUTH_TYPE=none AND the
|
||||
# server binds to a non-loopback address (SERVER_HOST=0.0.0.0
|
||||
# above), every request is served as the synthetic actor
|
||||
# `actor-demo-anon`. The server fail-fasts at startup unless
|
||||
# DEMO_MODE_ACK=true acknowledges that posture. This compose IS
|
||||
# the bundled demo path (see DEMO_SEED comment below), so the
|
||||
# ACK is correct here. Production deploys override AUTH_TYPE +
|
||||
# KEYGEN_MODE + DEMO_SEED + DEMO_MODE_ACK via their own compose.
|
||||
CERTCTL_DEMO_MODE_ACK: "true"
|
||||
CERTCTL_KEYGEN_MODE: server # Demo uses server-side keygen; production should use "agent"
|
||||
CERTCTL_NETWORK_SCAN_ENABLED: "true" # Enable network scan GUI with seeded demo targets
|
||||
CERTCTL_CONFIG_ENCRYPTION_KEY: ${CERTCTL_CONFIG_ENCRYPTION_KEY:-change-me-32-char-encryption-key} # AES-256-GCM for dynamic issuer/target config
|
||||
# Bundle 1 follow-on: this compose IS the bundled demo path
|
||||
# (CERTCTL_AUTH_TYPE=none + KEYGEN_MODE=server above), so the
|
||||
# demo seed runs by default. seed_demo.sql pre-seeds the
|
||||
# agent-demo-1 row that the bundled certctl-agent below needs
|
||||
# to authenticate. The docker-compose.demo.yml overlay still
|
||||
# works (it sets the same flag) and remains for backward
|
||||
# compat. Production deploys override CERTCTL_AUTH_TYPE +
|
||||
# KEYGEN_MODE + DEMO_SEED via their own compose.
|
||||
CERTCTL_DEMO_SEED: "true"
|
||||
# Bundle 2 closure (compose split). The base compose no longer
|
||||
# sets CERTCTL_AUTH_TYPE / CERTCTL_KEYGEN_MODE / DEMO_MODE_ACK /
|
||||
# DEMO_SEED — the code defaults take over (auth-type api-key,
|
||||
# keygen agent, demo-mode false, demo-seed false). The demo
|
||||
# overlay (docker-compose.demo.yml) is what flips this baseline
|
||||
# into the populated-dashboard demo path; without that overlay
|
||||
# the server boots production-shaped and refuses to start unless
|
||||
# the operator has supplied CERTCTL_AUTH_SECRET +
|
||||
# CERTCTL_CONFIG_ENCRYPTION_KEY.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Audit 2026-05-10 HIGH-12: when DEMO_MODE_ACK=true (set by the
|
||||
# demo overlay) AND the listener binds to a non-loopback address,
|
||||
# every request is served as the synthetic admin actor
|
||||
# `actor-demo-anon`. The server emits a prominent boot-time WARN
|
||||
# banner with a production-promotion checklist in that case.
|
||||
CERTCTL_AUTH_SECRET: ${CERTCTL_AUTH_SECRET}
|
||||
CERTCTL_NETWORK_SCAN_ENABLED: "true" # Enable network scan GUI
|
||||
CERTCTL_CONFIG_ENCRYPTION_KEY: ${CERTCTL_CONFIG_ENCRYPTION_KEY} # AES-256-GCM for dynamic issuer/target config
|
||||
# Bootstrap token interpolation surface (Auditable Codebase Bundle
|
||||
# cold-DB smoke closure, 2026-05-12). Pre-fix, the `env-file +
|
||||
# --force-recreate certctl-server` pattern documented in
|
||||
@@ -214,18 +261,19 @@ services:
|
||||
environment:
|
||||
CERTCTL_SERVER_URL: https://certctl-server:8443
|
||||
CERTCTL_SERVER_CA_BUNDLE_PATH: /etc/certctl/tls/ca.crt
|
||||
CERTCTL_API_KEY: ${CERTCTL_API_KEY:-change-me-in-production}
|
||||
# Bundle 1 follow-on: pre-Bundle-1 the bundled agent had no
|
||||
# CERTCTL_AGENT_ID set, hit cmd/agent/main.go's fail-fast guard
|
||||
# ("agent-id flag or CERTCTL_AGENT_ID env var is required"), and
|
||||
# restart-looped silently on every fresh `docker compose up`.
|
||||
# Latent since 2026-03-14 (commit d395776). seed_demo.sql now
|
||||
# pre-seeds the matching agents row; the demo runs with
|
||||
# CERTCTL_AUTH_TYPE=none on the server so the api_key Bearer
|
||||
# token is irrelevant here. Production deploys override
|
||||
# CERTCTL_AGENT_ID with the value returned from
|
||||
# POST /api/v1/agents during registration.
|
||||
CERTCTL_AGENT_ID: ${CERTCTL_AGENT_ID:-agent-demo-1}
|
||||
# Bundle 2 closure (compose split). No placeholder fallbacks.
|
||||
# Operators MUST set CERTCTL_API_KEY (matching one of the server's
|
||||
# CERTCTL_AUTH_SECRET rotation values) and CERTCTL_AGENT_ID
|
||||
# (returned from `POST /api/v1/agents` during agent enrollment).
|
||||
# Without an agent ID, cmd/agent/main.go fails fast at startup
|
||||
# with "agent-id flag or CERTCTL_AGENT_ID env var is required" —
|
||||
# the cold-DB compose smoke in .github/workflows/ci.yml tolerates
|
||||
# the agent restart loop because the smoke targets server boot
|
||||
# only. The demo overlay (docker-compose.demo.yml) supplies a
|
||||
# pre-seeded agent-demo-1 row + matching env vars so the demo
|
||||
# path stays one-command.
|
||||
CERTCTL_API_KEY: ${CERTCTL_API_KEY}
|
||||
CERTCTL_AGENT_ID: ${CERTCTL_AGENT_ID}
|
||||
CERTCTL_AGENT_NAME: docker-agent
|
||||
CERTCTL_LOG_LEVEL: info
|
||||
CERTCTL_DISCOVERY_DIRS: /var/lib/certctl/keys # Agent scans this directory for existing certificates
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -151,7 +151,12 @@ The agent runs two background loops: a heartbeat (every 60 seconds) to signal it
|
||||
|
||||
Retired agents receive `410 Gone` on subsequent heartbeats (`service.ErrAgentRetired`). `cmd/agent` treats 410 as a terminal signal and exits cleanly so retired agents stop phoning home. Migration `000015` flipped `deployment_targets.agent_id` from `ON DELETE CASCADE` to `ON DELETE RESTRICT`, making the old hard-delete path a schema error and forcing all retirement through this contract.
|
||||
|
||||
**Registration is by-design pull-only (C-1 closure, cat-b-6177f36636fb).** Agents register themselves at first heartbeat via `install-agent.sh` + `cmd/agent/main.go` — never via the GUI. The `web/src/api/client.ts::registerAgent` client function is intentionally orphan in the dashboard for this reason. It's preserved in `client.ts` (rather than deleted) so future features that want to drive registration from the GUI — for example, a one-click "register proxy agent" panel for network-appliance topologies where the agent runs in a different network zone from the device it manages — can reach the endpoint without a `client.ts` edit. Operators looking to scale agent enrollment use `install-agent.sh` against a config-management system (Ansible, Salt, Puppet) or a baked-in cloud-init script, not the dashboard.
|
||||
**Registration is a two-step operator-driven flow (C-1 closure, cat-b-6177f36636fb).** Agent enrollment is intentionally NOT auto-driven by the agent binary — the agent fail-fasts at startup if `CERTCTL_AGENT_ID` is unset (`cmd/agent/main.go`: "agent-id flag or CERTCTL_AGENT_ID env var is required"). Operators register an agent in one of two ways before starting it:
|
||||
|
||||
1. **Programmatic** — `POST /api/v1/agents` with the agent's metadata payload and (when configured) an `Authorization: Bearer <CERTCTL_AGENT_BOOTSTRAP_TOKEN>` header. The response carries the `id` field; that string goes into `CERTCTL_AGENT_ID` for the agent process. Suitable for config-management (Ansible, Salt, Puppet) or cloud-init flows.
|
||||
2. **GUI** — the dashboard's Agents page exposes the same endpoint via `web/src/api/client.ts::registerAgent`. The function is kept reachable rather than deleted so the eventual "register proxy agent" panel for network-appliance topologies can land without a `client.ts` edit; today the panel is not yet wired into the page.
|
||||
|
||||
Once registered, the operator passes the returned ID to `install-agent.sh` via `--agent-id` (or sets the env var directly) and starts the agent. The pull-only deployment model (the server never initiates outbound connections to agents) means this asymmetric flow is by-design: only the agent's network reach matters, and registration always crosses that boundary outbound from the agent's side once the agent boots with a valid ID.
|
||||
|
||||
### Web Dashboard
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -80,7 +80,7 @@ For the full deploy contract see
|
||||
|
||||
| Variable | Default | Description |
|
||||
|---|---|---|
|
||||
| `CERTCTL_AGENT_ID` | (none — required) | The agent's unique ID, issued by `POST /api/v1/agents/register` and bundled into the agent's registration response. Pass via this env var when the agent runs as a systemd unit / container without the `-agent-id` CLI flag. |
|
||||
| `CERTCTL_AGENT_ID` | (none — required) | The agent's unique ID, issued by `POST /api/v1/agents` (requires `CERTCTL_AGENT_BOOTSTRAP_TOKEN` when configured) and returned in the registration response body. Pass via this env var when the agent runs as a systemd unit / container without the `-agent-id` CLI flag. The bundled `install-agent.sh` does NOT auto-register — operators pre-register an agent via the REST endpoint (or the dashboard), then pass the returned ID to the script via `--agent-id`. |
|
||||
|
||||
## Auth (RBAC + OIDC + sessions + break-glass)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -2633,6 +2633,70 @@ func (c *Config) Validate() error {
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Bundle 2 (2026-05-12) — fail-closed startup guards for placeholder
|
||||
// credentials shipped by the demo overlay (docker-compose.demo.yml).
|
||||
//
|
||||
// Rationale: pre-Bundle-2 the base docker-compose.yml file interpolated
|
||||
// these strings as the default value when an operator didn't set
|
||||
// CERTCTL_AUTH_SECRET / CERTCTL_API_KEY / CERTCTL_CONFIG_ENCRYPTION_KEY
|
||||
// in deploy/.env. The result: `docker compose up` produced a working
|
||||
// stack with documented "weak" credentials that nobody actually
|
||||
// remembered to rotate before going to production. The Bundle 2 compose
|
||||
// split moved those defaults into the demo overlay; the guards below
|
||||
// catch any path that still surfaces them in a non-demo deploy (e.g.
|
||||
// the .env-example was committed unedited, or a custom compose copied
|
||||
// the placeholder verbatim).
|
||||
//
|
||||
// All three sentinels exactly match the literal strings shipped in
|
||||
// deploy/docker-compose.demo.yml. The demo overlay also sets
|
||||
// DemoModeAck=true, so the demo path itself is exempt and these
|
||||
// strings only fail in production.
|
||||
const (
|
||||
placeholderAPISecret = "change-me-in-production"
|
||||
placeholderEncryptionKey = "change-me-32-char-encryption-key"
|
||||
)
|
||||
if !c.Auth.DemoModeAck {
|
||||
// HIGH-6 closure (Audit Bundle 2): placeholder API-key secret.
|
||||
if c.Auth.Type == string(AuthTypeAPIKey) && c.Auth.Secret == placeholderAPISecret {
|
||||
return fmt.Errorf(
|
||||
"CERTCTL_AUTH_SECRET is set to the demo placeholder %q — refuse to start. "+
|
||||
"Generate a real value with: openssl rand -base64 32. "+
|
||||
"This guard exempts demo mode (CERTCTL_DEMO_MODE_ACK=true); production "+
|
||||
"deploys MUST rotate.",
|
||||
placeholderAPISecret)
|
||||
}
|
||||
// HIGH-6 closure (Audit Bundle 2): placeholder encryption key.
|
||||
if c.Encryption.ConfigEncryptionKey == placeholderEncryptionKey {
|
||||
return fmt.Errorf(
|
||||
"CERTCTL_CONFIG_ENCRYPTION_KEY is set to the demo placeholder %q — refuse to start. "+
|
||||
"Generate a real value with: openssl rand -base64 32 (must be ≥ 32 bytes). "+
|
||||
"This guard exempts demo mode (CERTCTL_DEMO_MODE_ACK=true); production "+
|
||||
"deploys MUST rotate before any issuer/target credentials are encrypted at rest "+
|
||||
"with the placeholder passphrase.",
|
||||
placeholderEncryptionKey)
|
||||
}
|
||||
// LOW-5 closure (Audit Bundle 2): CORS wildcard in non-demo mode.
|
||||
// Wildcard CORS combined with credentialed cookies (the session
|
||||
// auth Bundle 2 ships) is a CSRF cross-origin escalation channel
|
||||
// (CWE-942 + CWE-352). The auth-exempt routes already route through
|
||||
// middleware.NewCORS with the operator's allowlist; "*" in the
|
||||
// allowlist short-circuits the entire defense. Demo mode is
|
||||
// exempt because the demo synthetic actor has no real credentials
|
||||
// worth stealing, and demo screencaps frequently want to exercise
|
||||
// the dashboard from a Mermaid-rendered URL or whatever.
|
||||
for _, origin := range c.CORS.AllowedOrigins {
|
||||
if origin == "*" {
|
||||
return fmt.Errorf(
|
||||
"CERTCTL_CORS_ORIGINS contains \"*\" wildcard — refuse to start. " +
|
||||
"Wildcard CORS combined with credentialed cookies is a cross-origin " +
|
||||
"CSRF / session-theft channel (CWE-942 + CWE-352). Set a concrete " +
|
||||
"allowlist (e.g. CERTCTL_CORS_ORIGINS=https://dashboard.example.com) " +
|
||||
"or set CERTCTL_DEMO_MODE_ACK=true if this is a demo deploy that " +
|
||||
"has no real session credentials worth defending.")
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Validate keygen mode
|
||||
validKeygenModes := map[string]bool{
|
||||
"agent": true,
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1526,3 +1526,159 @@ func TestValidate_SCEPDisabled_EmptyRAPair_Accepts(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
t.Errorf("Validate() = %v, want nil for SCEP disabled with empty RA pair", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Bundle 2 closure (2026-05-12) — fail-closed startup guards against
|
||||
// placeholder credentials shipped by the demo overlay
|
||||
// (deploy/docker-compose.demo.yml). The literal strings below MUST stay
|
||||
// in sync with the sentinels in internal/config/config.go::Validate; the
|
||||
// demo overlay also writes these exact values into its env block, so any
|
||||
// drift between the three locations would silently break the closure.
|
||||
|
||||
// TestValidate_Bundle2_PlaceholderAuthSecret_Refused pins the contract
|
||||
// that the placeholder string "change-me-in-production" in
|
||||
// CERTCTL_AUTH_SECRET hard-fails Validate() outside demo mode.
|
||||
func TestValidate_Bundle2_PlaceholderAuthSecret_Refused(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
cfg := validBaseConfigForEncryption(t)
|
||||
cfg.Auth.Type = "api-key"
|
||||
cfg.Auth.Secret = "change-me-in-production"
|
||||
cfg.Auth.DemoModeAck = false
|
||||
|
||||
err := cfg.Validate()
|
||||
if err == nil {
|
||||
t.Fatal("Validate() returned nil; expected refusal on placeholder CERTCTL_AUTH_SECRET")
|
||||
}
|
||||
for _, want := range []string{"CERTCTL_AUTH_SECRET", "change-me-in-production", "openssl rand"} {
|
||||
if !strings.Contains(err.Error(), want) {
|
||||
t.Errorf("Validate() error = %q; missing operator guidance substring %q", err, want)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// TestValidate_Bundle2_PlaceholderAuthSecret_DemoAckExempt pins that
|
||||
// the demo overlay (which sets the placeholder + DemoModeAck=true) is
|
||||
// exempt — without this exemption the demo path would fail to boot.
|
||||
func TestValidate_Bundle2_PlaceholderAuthSecret_DemoAckExempt(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
cfg := validBaseConfigForEncryption(t)
|
||||
// Demo overlay sets AUTH_TYPE=none (so the placeholder doesn't even
|
||||
// hit the api-key branch), but cover the api-key + ack edge case too
|
||||
// in case an operator manually flips the demo overlay's AUTH_TYPE.
|
||||
cfg.Auth.Type = "api-key"
|
||||
cfg.Auth.Secret = "change-me-in-production"
|
||||
cfg.Auth.DemoModeAck = true
|
||||
|
||||
if err := cfg.Validate(); err != nil {
|
||||
t.Errorf("Validate() returned %v with DemoModeAck=true; demo path must accept placeholder secret", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// TestValidate_Bundle2_PlaceholderEncryptionKey_Refused pins the
|
||||
// contract that "change-me-32-char-encryption-key" hard-fails Validate()
|
||||
// outside demo mode. Note: this string is exactly 32 bytes, so it
|
||||
// passes the H-1 length floor; the only thing catching it is the
|
||||
// Bundle 2 value-equality guard.
|
||||
func TestValidate_Bundle2_PlaceholderEncryptionKey_Refused(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
cfg := validBaseConfigForEncryption(t)
|
||||
cfg.Encryption.ConfigEncryptionKey = "change-me-32-char-encryption-key"
|
||||
cfg.Auth.DemoModeAck = false
|
||||
|
||||
err := cfg.Validate()
|
||||
if err == nil {
|
||||
t.Fatal("Validate() returned nil; expected refusal on placeholder CERTCTL_CONFIG_ENCRYPTION_KEY")
|
||||
}
|
||||
for _, want := range []string{"CERTCTL_CONFIG_ENCRYPTION_KEY", "change-me-32-char-encryption-key", "openssl rand"} {
|
||||
if !strings.Contains(err.Error(), want) {
|
||||
t.Errorf("Validate() error = %q; missing operator guidance substring %q", err, want)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// TestValidate_Bundle2_PlaceholderEncryptionKey_DemoAckExempt covers
|
||||
// the demo overlay's posture (placeholder + DemoModeAck=true).
|
||||
func TestValidate_Bundle2_PlaceholderEncryptionKey_DemoAckExempt(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
cfg := validBaseConfigForEncryption(t)
|
||||
cfg.Encryption.ConfigEncryptionKey = "change-me-32-char-encryption-key"
|
||||
cfg.Auth.DemoModeAck = true
|
||||
|
||||
if err := cfg.Validate(); err != nil {
|
||||
t.Errorf("Validate() returned %v with DemoModeAck=true; demo path must accept placeholder encryption key", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// TestValidate_Bundle2_RealEncryptionKey_NotMistakenForPlaceholder
|
||||
// pins that a real `openssl rand -base64 32` output sails through.
|
||||
// Defense against an over-broad match (e.g. accidentally rejecting any
|
||||
// key starting with "change-me-").
|
||||
func TestValidate_Bundle2_RealEncryptionKey_NotMistakenForPlaceholder(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
cfg := validBaseConfigForEncryption(t)
|
||||
// 44-char base64 sample — same shape `openssl rand -base64 32` produces.
|
||||
cfg.Encryption.ConfigEncryptionKey = "Tc1hZ4n3Ph5gC8e2zR0qV6jX9mYwL1pK4wB7uE3nQ5o="
|
||||
cfg.Auth.DemoModeAck = false
|
||||
|
||||
if err := cfg.Validate(); err != nil {
|
||||
t.Errorf("Validate() returned %v; want nil for realistic operator key", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// TestValidate_Bundle2_CORSWildcard_Refused pins the LOW-5 closure:
|
||||
// CERTCTL_CORS_ORIGINS containing "*" hard-fails Validate() outside
|
||||
// demo mode. Wildcard CORS + session cookies = CWE-942 + CWE-352.
|
||||
func TestValidate_Bundle2_CORSWildcard_Refused(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
cfg := validBaseConfigForEncryption(t)
|
||||
cfg.CORS.AllowedOrigins = []string{"*"}
|
||||
cfg.Auth.DemoModeAck = false
|
||||
|
||||
err := cfg.Validate()
|
||||
if err == nil {
|
||||
t.Fatal("Validate() returned nil; expected refusal on wildcard CORS")
|
||||
}
|
||||
for _, want := range []string{"CERTCTL_CORS_ORIGINS", "wildcard", "CSRF"} {
|
||||
if !strings.Contains(err.Error(), want) {
|
||||
t.Errorf("Validate() error = %q; missing operator guidance substring %q", err, want)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// TestValidate_Bundle2_CORSWildcard_DemoAckExempt covers the demo
|
||||
// posture (operators frequently want unrestricted CORS for dashboard
|
||||
// screencaps + curl-from-any-origin diagnostics).
|
||||
func TestValidate_Bundle2_CORSWildcard_DemoAckExempt(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
cfg := validBaseConfigForEncryption(t)
|
||||
cfg.CORS.AllowedOrigins = []string{"*"}
|
||||
cfg.Auth.DemoModeAck = true
|
||||
|
||||
if err := cfg.Validate(); err != nil {
|
||||
t.Errorf("Validate() returned %v with DemoModeAck=true; demo path must accept wildcard CORS", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// TestValidate_Bundle2_CORSWildcard_MixedAllowlistStillRefused pins
|
||||
// that "*" mixed into an otherwise-concrete allowlist still trips the
|
||||
// guard. The wildcard short-circuits the entire allowlist in
|
||||
// middleware.NewCORS, so leaving "*" alongside legit origins is just
|
||||
// as dangerous as "*" alone.
|
||||
func TestValidate_Bundle2_CORSWildcard_MixedAllowlistStillRefused(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
cfg := validBaseConfigForEncryption(t)
|
||||
cfg.CORS.AllowedOrigins = []string{"https://dashboard.example.com", "*", "https://other.example.com"}
|
||||
cfg.Auth.DemoModeAck = false
|
||||
|
||||
err := cfg.Validate()
|
||||
if err == nil {
|
||||
t.Fatal("Validate() returned nil; expected refusal on wildcard mixed into allowlist")
|
||||
}
|
||||
if !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "wildcard") {
|
||||
t.Errorf("Validate() error = %q; want wildcard mention", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// TestValidate_Bundle2_CORSConcreteAllowlist_Accepted pins that a real
|
||||
// operator allowlist sails through (no false-positive on substring match
|
||||
// or similar over-broad matching).
|
||||
func TestValidate_Bundle2_CORSConcreteAllowlist_Accepted(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
cfg := validBaseConfigForEncryption(t)
|
||||
cfg.CORS.AllowedOrigins = []string{"https://dashboard.example.com", "https://admin.example.com"}
|
||||
cfg.Auth.DemoModeAck = false
|
||||
|
||||
if err := cfg.Validate(); err != nil {
|
||||
t.Errorf("Validate() returned %v; want nil for concrete CORS allowlist", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
+101
@@ -0,0 +1,101 @@
|
||||
#!/usr/bin/env bash
|
||||
# scripts/ci-guards/B2-compose-base-no-demo-env.sh
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Bundle 2 closure (2026-05-12) — base compose must stay production-shaped.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Pre-Bundle-2 the base file `deploy/docker-compose.yml` shipped with the
|
||||
# demo-mode env vars baked in (CERTCTL_AUTH_TYPE=none + DEMO_MODE_ACK=true +
|
||||
# KEYGEN_MODE=server + DEMO_SEED=true + literal change-me placeholder
|
||||
# credentials). The README, ENVIRONMENTS.md, and operator intuition all
|
||||
# said "drop the demo overlay for a clean install" — but dropping the
|
||||
# overlay still produced a demo-shape stack because the demo posture
|
||||
# lived in the base. The Bundle 2 closure (cowork/bundle-2-prompt.md)
|
||||
# moved every demo-mode env var out of the base into the demo overlay.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# This guard catches any future regression that would re-introduce a
|
||||
# demo-mode env var into the base file. The signals checked map 1:1 to
|
||||
# the env vars the overlay now owns:
|
||||
#
|
||||
# CERTCTL_AUTH_TYPE: none — demo-mode synthetic admin
|
||||
# CERTCTL_DEMO_MODE_ACK: "true" — the HIGH-12 bypass acknowledgment
|
||||
# CERTCTL_KEYGEN_MODE: server — demo-only server-side keygen
|
||||
# CERTCTL_DEMO_SEED: "true" — 180-day simulated history seeder
|
||||
# change-me-in-production — literal placeholder API secret
|
||||
# change-me-32-char-encryption-key — literal placeholder encryption key
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Per the contract documented in scripts/ci-guards/README.md:
|
||||
# bare callable, no args, no env, exit 0 on clean.
|
||||
|
||||
set -e
|
||||
|
||||
GUARD_NAME="B2-compose-base-no-demo-env"
|
||||
BASE="deploy/docker-compose.yml"
|
||||
|
||||
if [ ! -f "$BASE" ]; then
|
||||
echo "${GUARD_NAME}: ${BASE} not found — refuse to skip silently."
|
||||
exit 1
|
||||
fi
|
||||
|
||||
# The patterns below match the literal Bundle-2-overlay-owned env values
|
||||
# anywhere in the base compose file. Comments are excluded so the same
|
||||
# strings can still appear in documentation-style # comments inside the
|
||||
# file (which is exactly what we want — the base file still references
|
||||
# the overlay's name and posture in its header).
|
||||
|
||||
# grep helpers: -E for ERE, -v '^\s*#' to drop YAML comments, -F to
|
||||
# match literal strings (no regex meta-chars in sentinels). The base
|
||||
# compose still has narrative-comment references to the overlay's
|
||||
# posture (CERTCTL_AUTH_TYPE=none ... etc.) so we can't grep the file
|
||||
# raw — strip comments first.
|
||||
|
||||
stripped=$(sed -E 's/^\s*#.*$//' "$BASE" \
|
||||
| sed -E 's/^([^#]*)#.*$/\1/')
|
||||
|
||||
failed=0
|
||||
|
||||
# Pattern 1: CERTCTL_AUTH_TYPE: none (with the YAML "key: value" shape).
|
||||
if echo "$stripped" | grep -qE '^\s*CERTCTL_AUTH_TYPE\s*:\s*none\s*$'; then
|
||||
echo "::error file=${BASE}::CERTCTL_AUTH_TYPE: none belongs in deploy/docker-compose.demo.yml (the demo overlay), not the base compose. Bundle 2 closure: the base must boot production-shaped. See cowork/bundle-2-prompt.md."
|
||||
failed=1
|
||||
fi
|
||||
|
||||
# Pattern 2: CERTCTL_DEMO_MODE_ACK: "true" (the HIGH-12 bypass ACK).
|
||||
if echo "$stripped" | grep -qE '^\s*CERTCTL_DEMO_MODE_ACK\s*:\s*"?true"?\s*$'; then
|
||||
echo "::error file=${BASE}::CERTCTL_DEMO_MODE_ACK: \"true\" belongs in deploy/docker-compose.demo.yml. Setting it in the base disables the HIGH-12 fail-closed guard on every deploy that uses the base alone."
|
||||
failed=1
|
||||
fi
|
||||
|
||||
# Pattern 3: CERTCTL_KEYGEN_MODE: server (demo-only setting).
|
||||
if echo "$stripped" | grep -qE '^\s*CERTCTL_KEYGEN_MODE\s*:\s*server\s*$'; then
|
||||
echo "::error file=${BASE}::CERTCTL_KEYGEN_MODE: server belongs in deploy/docker-compose.demo.yml. Production deploys must use the code default 'agent' so private keys never leave agent infrastructure."
|
||||
failed=1
|
||||
fi
|
||||
|
||||
# Pattern 4: CERTCTL_DEMO_SEED: "true" (180-day simulated history seeder).
|
||||
if echo "$stripped" | grep -qE '^\s*CERTCTL_DEMO_SEED\s*:\s*"?true"?\s*$'; then
|
||||
echo "::error file=${BASE}::CERTCTL_DEMO_SEED: \"true\" belongs in deploy/docker-compose.demo.yml. The 180-day demo-history seeder must not run on the production-shaped base."
|
||||
failed=1
|
||||
fi
|
||||
|
||||
# Pattern 5+6: literal change-me placeholder credentials.
|
||||
# Use fgrep against the stripped (no-comment) content so the narrative
|
||||
# header in deploy/docker-compose.yml can still mention the sentinels.
|
||||
if echo "$stripped" | grep -qF 'change-me-in-production'; then
|
||||
echo "::error file=${BASE}::literal \"change-me-in-production\" placeholder belongs in deploy/docker-compose.demo.yml. The base compose Validate() now refuses to start with this placeholder outside demo mode."
|
||||
failed=1
|
||||
fi
|
||||
|
||||
if echo "$stripped" | grep -qF 'change-me-32-char-encryption-key'; then
|
||||
echo "::error file=${BASE}::literal \"change-me-32-char-encryption-key\" placeholder belongs in deploy/docker-compose.demo.yml. The base compose Validate() now refuses to start with this placeholder outside demo mode."
|
||||
failed=1
|
||||
fi
|
||||
|
||||
if [ "$failed" -ne 0 ]; then
|
||||
echo ""
|
||||
echo "${GUARD_NAME}: FAILED — base compose has regressed into demo-mode territory."
|
||||
echo " Move the offending env vars into deploy/docker-compose.demo.yml and"
|
||||
echo " re-run: bash scripts/ci-guards/${GUARD_NAME}.sh"
|
||||
exit 1
|
||||
fi
|
||||
|
||||
echo "${GUARD_NAME}: clean."
|
||||
Reference in New Issue
Block a user