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3189f3cd71
chained-auth combinator + AuthInfo OIDC providers extension + 2 CI
guards (Bundle-1-compat + Bundle-1-to-2-upgrade)
Phase 6 wires the Phase 4 session service + Phase 5 OIDC handlers into
the request path. Three middlewares + one combinator land in
internal/auth/session/middleware.go:
1. SessionMiddleware reads `certctl_session` cookie, validates via
SessionService.Validate, populates the legacy UserKey/AdminKey
+ Phase 3 RBAC context keys (ActorIDKey/ActorTypeKey/TenantIDKey)
so downstream RequirePermission + audit-attribution see a
consistent caller. Best-effort UpdateLastSeen keeps the idle-
expiry sliding window fresh. CRITICALLY: never 401s on validate
failure — defers to the next middleware so the chained-auth
combinator can fall back to Bearer.
2. CSRFMiddleware gates state-changing methods (POST/PUT/DELETE/
PATCH) for session-authenticated requests. API-key actors are
EXEMPT (no session row in context => CSRF doesn't apply; they're
not browser-driven). Constant-time-compares SHA-256(X-CSRF-Token
header) against the session row's stored hash via
SessionService.ValidateCSRF. Mismatch returns 403.
3. ChainAuthSessionThenBearer is the load-bearing chained-auth
combinator: tries the session cookie first; on miss/invalid,
falls back to the API-key Bearer middleware; if neither
authenticates, 401. The composition uses bearerSkipIfAuthenticated
so a request with both a valid session AND a valid Bearer uses
the session (cookie wins per the Bundle 2 contract).
Middleware chain order in cmd/server/main.go (per Phase 6 spec):
RequestID → Logging → Recovery → CORS → RateLimit → AUTH (chained:
session → Bearer) → CSRF (state-changing only; API-key exempt) →
Audit → Handler
The chained authMiddleware replaces the bare Bundle-1 bearerMiddleware
at the chain entry point; csrfMiddleware lands immediately after so
session-authenticated requests pass through CSRF before audit. Both
new middlewares are pass-throughs when sessionService is nil
(pre-Phase-4 builds).
AuthInfo extension (Category E): GET /api/v1/auth/info now returns the
list of configured OIDC providers (id + display_name + login_url
where login_url = `/auth/oidc/login?provider=<id>`) so the GUI Login
page renders the correct "Sign in with X" buttons. Endpoint stays
auth-exempt; the providers list is public configuration. Wired via
HealthHandler.OIDCProvidersResolver + a new OIDCProvidersListResolver
projection interface; the cmd/server adapter
oidcProvidersListAdapter projects the postgres OIDCProviderRepository
into the public-safe shape. Resolver lookups are best-effort: failures
fall back to the minimal payload rather than 500-ing the GUI's auth
probe. Nil resolver preserves the pre-Phase-6 minimal shape so test
fixtures + no-db deploys keep compiling.
Bypass list preserved (Category E): the existing public-route
allowlist in router.AuthExemptRouterRoutes is preserved by virtue of
those routes registering via direct r.mux.Handle (they bypass the
entire chain). The protocol-endpoint allowlist (ACME/SCEP/EST/OCSP/
CRL) bypasses via cmd/server/main.go::buildFinalHandler URL-prefix
dispatch — those routes never reach the auth middleware at all. Both
preservations are pinned by the Bundle-1 compat CI guard below.
Tests (internal/auth/session/middleware_test.go):
All 7 Phase 6 spec-mandated middleware-chain tests pass:
1. Session cookie + correct CSRF → 200.
2. Session cookie + wrong CSRF → 403.
3. Bearer-only (no session) + no CSRF → 200 (API-key actors are
CSRF-exempt by design).
4. No cookie + no Bearer → 401.
5. Expired cookie + valid Bearer → fall back to Bearer succeeds.
6. Tampered cookie → 401 (no Bearer to fall back to).
7. Bypass-list awareness — state-changing method, no auth, no
session row → uniform 401 (NOT a CSRF 403; the CSRF check is
gated on session-row presence and never fires for unauth
requests).
Plus coverage-lift tests covering nil-service pass-through, safe-
methods bypass, SessionFromContext nil + populated, isStateChangingMethod
matrix, clientIPFromRequest variants (RemoteAddr / XFF first-hop /
XFF single / no-port), nil-bearer chain branches.
Coverage on internal/auth/session/middleware.go: 100% per-function
across the 9 entry points (SessionValidator interfaces +
NewSessionMiddleware + NewCSRFMiddleware + ChainAuthSessionThenBearer +
bearerSkipIfAuthenticated + SessionFromContext + isStateChangingMethod
+ clientIPFromRequest + lastIndexByte). Package coverage 94.9%.
Two new CI guards:
scripts/ci-guards/bundle-1-compat-regression.sh — Bundle-1-only
compat invariants. Static-source checks that protect the Bundle-1
path since spinning up docker-compose + running the integration
test suite is sandbox-infeasible:
1. SessionMiddleware MUST defer-to-next on missing/invalid cookie.
2. CSRFMiddleware MUST be pass-through on missing session row.
3. cmd/server/main.go MUST wire ChainAuthSessionThenBearer.
4. The 4 public OIDC routes MUST be in AuthExemptRouterRoutes.
5. AuthInfo MUST guard on OIDCProvidersResolver != nil.
scripts/ci-guards/bundle-1-to-2-upgrade-regression.sh — Bundle-1 →
Bundle-2 upgrade invariants:
1. Migrations 000034..000037 use CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS.
2. Migrations are wrapped in BEGIN; ... COMMIT;.
3. NO DROP TABLE / ALTER ... DROP COLUMN against any of the 19
protected Bundle-1 tables (api_keys, audit_events, certificates,
certificate_versions, profiles, issuers, targets, agents, jobs,
owners, teams, agent_groups, notifications, roles, permissions,
role_permissions, actor_roles, tenants, approvals,
intermediate_cas, issuance_approval_requests).
4. 000037 INSERTs use ON CONFLICT DO NOTHING (idempotent re-apply).
5. ChainAuthSessionThenBearer is wired (Bundle-1 Bearer keys
continue to authenticate post-upgrade).
6. Bootstrap handler is registered (fresh-deployment bootstrap
still works).
Both guards are sandbox-feasible static analysis. When the operator
gets a Linux VM with docker-in-docker, promote both to real `docker
compose up` integration tests against a v2.1.0 baseline DB dump.
Verifications: gofmt clean, go vet ./internal/auth/... ./internal/api/...
./cmd/server/... clean, go test -short -count=1 -race green across
internal/auth/session (94.9% coverage), internal/api/handler,
internal/api/router, no regressions in Bundle 1 packages, both new
ci-guards green.
108 lines
4.6 KiB
Bash
Executable File
108 lines
4.6 KiB
Bash
Executable File
#!/usr/bin/env bash
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# scripts/ci-guards/bundle-1-compat-regression.sh
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#
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# Auth Bundle 2 / Phase 6 Bundle-1-only compat regression.
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#
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# Pre-commit invariant: a deployment with CERTCTL_AUTH_TYPE=api-key,
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# zero OIDC providers configured, and zero session cookies on requests
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# behaves byte-identically to Bundle 1.
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#
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# Phase 6 wires session middleware into the chain:
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# RequestID -> Logging -> Recovery -> CORS -> RateLimit ->
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# Auth (session-then-Bearer fallback) -> CSRF -> Audit -> Handler
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#
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# The session middleware MUST short-circuit cleanly when:
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# - The request has no `certctl_session` cookie.
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# - There are no OIDC providers configured (no IdPs to redirect to).
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# - The CSRFMiddleware MUST be a pass-through for API-key actors
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# (no session row in context => no CSRF check).
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#
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# This guard checks the static-source invariants that protect the
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# Bundle-1 path, since spinning up docker-compose + running the full
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# integration test suite is sandbox-infeasible. Concretely:
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#
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# 1. session.NewSessionMiddleware MUST defer to next on missing OR
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# invalid cookie (not 401). If a future refactor changes that to
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# a 401, the Bearer fallback path breaks and every API-key request
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# fails.
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#
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# 2. session.NewCSRFMiddleware MUST be a pass-through when the
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# session row is absent from context. A future refactor that
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# checks CSRF on Bearer requests would break every programmatic
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# API client.
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#
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# 3. session.ChainAuthSessionThenBearer MUST be the entry point
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# authMiddleware refers to in cmd/server/main.go. A regression
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# that drops the chain and goes straight to bearerMiddleware
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# breaks the session login path; a regression that drops the
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# bearer middleware entirely breaks every Bundle-1 client.
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#
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# 4. The 4 public OIDC routes MUST be in router.AuthExemptRouterRoutes
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# (so /auth/oidc/login etc. don't go through the auth chain on a
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# Bundle-1-only deployment AND don't 401 a user trying to start
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# a login).
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#
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# Each invariant: a single grep that fails the build on regression.
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#
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# When the sandbox-feasibility constraint changes (operator gets a
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# Linux VM with docker-in-docker for the CI runs), promote this to a
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# real `docker compose up` integration test that runs the existing
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# test suite + asserts zero new 401s vs the v2.1.0 baseline. Until
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# then, the static checks below are the load-bearing pin.
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set -e
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ROOT="$(git rev-parse --show-toplevel 2>/dev/null || pwd)"
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cd "$ROOT"
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fail=0
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# Invariant 1: SessionMiddleware MUST defer-to-next on cookie miss/invalid.
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if ! grep -q 'next.ServeHTTP(w, r)' internal/auth/session/middleware.go; then
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echo "::error::SessionMiddleware no longer defers to next on missing cookie"
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fail=1
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fi
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if grep -q 'http.Error.*StatusUnauthorized' internal/auth/session/middleware.go; then
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echo "::warning::SessionMiddleware appears to write 401 directly — verify Bearer fallback still works"
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fi
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# Invariant 2: CSRFMiddleware MUST be pass-through on missing session row.
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if ! grep -qE 'sessionContextKey\{\}\)\.\(\*sessiondomain\.Session\)' internal/auth/session/middleware.go; then
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echo "::error::CSRFMiddleware no longer reads session row from context"
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fail=1
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fi
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if ! grep -qE 'if !ok \|\| sess == nil \{$' internal/auth/session/middleware.go; then
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echo "::error::CSRFMiddleware no longer pass-throughs on missing session row (API-key actors must be CSRF-exempt)"
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fail=1
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fi
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# Invariant 3: chained-auth combinator MUST be the entry point in main.go.
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if ! grep -q 'session.ChainAuthSessionThenBearer' cmd/server/main.go; then
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echo "::error::cmd/server/main.go does not wire session.ChainAuthSessionThenBearer"
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fail=1
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fi
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if ! grep -q 'bearerMiddleware\s*=\s*auth.NewAuthWithKeyStore' cmd/server/main.go; then
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echo "::error::cmd/server/main.go no longer constructs the Bundle-1 Bearer middleware"
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fail=1
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fi
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# Invariant 4: public OIDC routes are in the auth-exempt allowlist.
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for route in 'GET /auth/oidc/login' 'GET /auth/oidc/callback' 'POST /auth/oidc/back-channel-logout' 'POST /auth/logout'; do
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if ! grep -qF "\"$route\"" internal/api/router/router.go; then
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echo "::error::router.AuthExemptRouterRoutes is missing entry: $route"
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fail=1
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fi
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done
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# Invariant 5: AuthInfo extension MUST gracefully degrade when no
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# OIDCProvidersResolver is wired (test-fixture + no-db-deploy paths).
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if ! grep -q 'if h.OIDCProvidersResolver != nil' internal/api/handler/health.go; then
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echo "::error::AuthInfo no longer guards on OIDCProvidersResolver != nil"
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fail=1
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fi
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if [ $fail -eq 0 ]; then
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echo "OK: Bundle-1 compat regression invariants hold."
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fi
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exit $fail
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