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EST RFC 7030 hardening master bundle Phases 0 + 1 of 13. Lays the
foundation for the remaining hardening phases (mTLS auth, HTTP Basic
auth, channel binding, server-keygen, admin observability, GUI, libest
e2e) without changing existing operator behavior — backward-compat
shim preserves the v2.0.66 single-issuer flat env-var setup.
WHAT LANDS:
Phase 0 — Frozen decisions
9 frozen decisions documented in
cowork/est-rfc7030-hardening-prompt.md::Phase 0 frozen decisions
(auth modes mTLS+Basic at GA; RFC 9266 channel binding; multi-profile
env-var family CERTCTL_EST_PROFILES; mTLS sibling URL
/.well-known/est-mtls/<pathID>; serverkeygen ships V2; fullcmc
deferred; renewal device-driven per RFC 7030 §4.2.2; csrattrs
algorithm allow-list profile-derived; libest as e2e reference).
Phase 1 — Multi-profile config + per-profile dispatch
internal/config/config.go: extended ESTConfig with Profiles slice;
added ESTProfileConfig struct with all field contracts (PathID +
IssuerID + ProfileID + EnrollmentPassword + MTLSEnabled +
MTLSClientCATrustBundlePath + ChannelBindingRequired +
AllowedAuthModes + RateLimitPerPrincipal24h + ServerKeygenEnabled).
Forward-looking fields (mTLS, HTTP Basic, channel binding,
rate limit, server-keygen) are dormant in Phase 1 — Phase 2-5 wire
the corresponding handlers; Validate() gates ensure operators can't
set incoherent combinations (MTLSEnabled=true without bundle path,
basic auth without password, mtls auth mode without MTLSEnabled,
ChannelBindingRequired without mTLS, ServerKeygenEnabled without
ProfileID).
loadESTProfilesFromEnv: mirrors loadSCEPProfilesFromEnv exactly.
Reads CERTCTL_EST_PROFILES=corp,iot,wifi and per-profile env vars
CERTCTL_EST_PROFILE_<NAME>_*. Lowercase PathID, uppercase env-var
name. parseAuthModes handles comma-separated normalization.
mergeESTLegacyIntoProfiles: back-compat shim. When CERTCTL_EST_PROFILES
is unset AND CERTCTL_EST_ENABLED=true, synthesizes a single-element
Profiles[0] with PathID="" so existing /.well-known/est/
operators see no behavior change.
validESTPathID + validESTAuthMode: shape validators. PathID matches
[a-z0-9-]+ with no leading/trailing hyphen (mirrors validSCEPPathID
exactly). Auth mode is one of {mtls, basic}.
Per-profile Validate(): refuses every documented misconfiguration
with operator-greppable error messages naming the offending profile
index + PathID + field. Mirrors the SCEP audit-closure pattern.
internal/api/router/router.go: refactored RegisterESTHandlers from
single-handler to map[string]ESTHandler. Empty PathID maps to legacy
/.well-known/est/ root (literal-string r.Register calls preserve
openapi-parity scanner behavior). Non-empty PathIDs dynamic-register
/.well-known/est/<pathID>/{cacerts,simpleenroll,simplereenroll,csrattrs}.
Mirrors the SCEP per-profile dispatch from commit fdd424b.
cmd/server/main.go: refactored EST startup block to iterate
cfg.EST.Profiles. Per-profile preflight (issuer-in-registry,
preflightEnrollmentIssuer L-005 gate) runs in the loop with
per-profile structured logging including PathID. Failures log the
offending PathID so multi-profile deploys can pinpoint which broke
startup. Mirrors the SCEP per-profile loop from commit fdd424b.
Updated 3 callers of the old single-handler signature:
- internal/api/router/router_test.go::TestRegisterESTHandlers_AllPaths
- internal/integration/lifecycle_test.go::setupTestServer
- internal/integration/negative_test.go::setupTestServer
Each wraps the existing single ESTHandler in a single-element
map[string]handler.ESTHandler{"": estHandler} preserving exact
legacy behavior.
NEW TESTS:
internal/config/config_est_profiles_test.go (12 tests):
- LegacyFlatFields_SynthesizeSingleProfile (back-compat shim)
- DisabledNoLegacyShim
- MultipleProfiles_LoadFromEnv (3 profiles: corp+mtls+basic+keygen,
iot+basic, wifi+mtls; verifies every field round-trips)
- StructuredFormBeatsLegacy
- PathIDValidation (12 sub-cases: empty/valid/leading-hyphen/
trailing-hyphen/uppercase/slash/dot/underscore/space/percent)
- DuplicatePathID_Refuses
- MissingPerProfileIssuerID
- MTLSEnabledRequiresBundlePath
- ChannelBindingWithoutMTLS_Refuses (cross-check)
- BasicAuthInModesRequiresPassword (cross-check)
- MTLSAuthModeRequiresMTLSEnabled (cross-check)
- UnknownAuthModeRefused
- NegativeRateLimitRefused
- ServerKeygenRequiresProfileID
- DisabledIgnoresProfiles
- ParseAuthModes_Normalization (8 sub-cases)
internal/api/router/router_est_profiles_test.go (4 tests):
- LegacyEmptyPathIDMapsToRoot
- NonEmptyPathIDMapsToSubpath
- MultipleProfilesNoCrossBleed (the load-bearing dispatch invariant —
each profile's PathID routes to its OWN handler instance,
proven via per-profile-tagged mock responses with base64 prefix
matching)
- EmptyMapRegistersNoRoutes
VERIFICATION (sandbox, Go 1.25.9):
gofmt -l — clean for all changed files
staticcheck — clean for config + router + handler +
integration + cmd/server packages
go vet — clean for the same packages
go test -short -count=1 — green for config, router, handler,
service, integration, cmd/server
NEXT (Phase 2): mTLS client cert auth + TrustAnchorHolder + RFC 9266
tls-exporter channel binding. Phase 1's Validate gates already refuse
the incoherent configurations Phase 2 must defend against; Phase 2
adds the actual TLS-listener wiring + handler-side cert validation +
channel-binding extraction.
Spec preserved at cowork/est-rfc7030-hardening-prompt.md.