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feat(est): per-profile dispatch — multi-profile env-var family + back-compat shim
EST RFC 7030 hardening master bundle Phases 0 + 1 of 13. Lays the
foundation for the remaining hardening phases (mTLS auth, HTTP Basic
auth, channel binding, server-keygen, admin observability, GUI, libest
e2e) without changing existing operator behavior — backward-compat
shim preserves the v2.0.66 single-issuer flat env-var setup.
WHAT LANDS:
Phase 0 — Frozen decisions
9 frozen decisions documented in
cowork/est-rfc7030-hardening-prompt.md::Phase 0 frozen decisions
(auth modes mTLS+Basic at GA; RFC 9266 channel binding; multi-profile
env-var family CERTCTL_EST_PROFILES; mTLS sibling URL
/.well-known/est-mtls/<pathID>; serverkeygen ships V2; fullcmc
deferred; renewal device-driven per RFC 7030 §4.2.2; csrattrs
algorithm allow-list profile-derived; libest as e2e reference).
Phase 1 — Multi-profile config + per-profile dispatch
internal/config/config.go: extended ESTConfig with Profiles slice;
added ESTProfileConfig struct with all field contracts (PathID +
IssuerID + ProfileID + EnrollmentPassword + MTLSEnabled +
MTLSClientCATrustBundlePath + ChannelBindingRequired +
AllowedAuthModes + RateLimitPerPrincipal24h + ServerKeygenEnabled).
Forward-looking fields (mTLS, HTTP Basic, channel binding,
rate limit, server-keygen) are dormant in Phase 1 — Phase 2-5 wire
the corresponding handlers; Validate() gates ensure operators can't
set incoherent combinations (MTLSEnabled=true without bundle path,
basic auth without password, mtls auth mode without MTLSEnabled,
ChannelBindingRequired without mTLS, ServerKeygenEnabled without
ProfileID).
loadESTProfilesFromEnv: mirrors loadSCEPProfilesFromEnv exactly.
Reads CERTCTL_EST_PROFILES=corp,iot,wifi and per-profile env vars
CERTCTL_EST_PROFILE_<NAME>_*. Lowercase PathID, uppercase env-var
name. parseAuthModes handles comma-separated normalization.
mergeESTLegacyIntoProfiles: back-compat shim. When CERTCTL_EST_PROFILES
is unset AND CERTCTL_EST_ENABLED=true, synthesizes a single-element
Profiles[0] with PathID="" so existing /.well-known/est/
operators see no behavior change.
validESTPathID + validESTAuthMode: shape validators. PathID matches
[a-z0-9-]+ with no leading/trailing hyphen (mirrors validSCEPPathID
exactly). Auth mode is one of {mtls, basic}.
Per-profile Validate(): refuses every documented misconfiguration
with operator-greppable error messages naming the offending profile
index + PathID + field. Mirrors the SCEP audit-closure pattern.
internal/api/router/router.go: refactored RegisterESTHandlers from
single-handler to map[string]ESTHandler. Empty PathID maps to legacy
/.well-known/est/ root (literal-string r.Register calls preserve
openapi-parity scanner behavior). Non-empty PathIDs dynamic-register
/.well-known/est/<pathID>/{cacerts,simpleenroll,simplereenroll,csrattrs}.
Mirrors the SCEP per-profile dispatch from commit fdd424b.
cmd/server/main.go: refactored EST startup block to iterate
cfg.EST.Profiles. Per-profile preflight (issuer-in-registry,
preflightEnrollmentIssuer L-005 gate) runs in the loop with
per-profile structured logging including PathID. Failures log the
offending PathID so multi-profile deploys can pinpoint which broke
startup. Mirrors the SCEP per-profile loop from commit fdd424b.
Updated 3 callers of the old single-handler signature:
- internal/api/router/router_test.go::TestRegisterESTHandlers_AllPaths
- internal/integration/lifecycle_test.go::setupTestServer
- internal/integration/negative_test.go::setupTestServer
Each wraps the existing single ESTHandler in a single-element
map[string]handler.ESTHandler{"": estHandler} preserving exact
legacy behavior.
NEW TESTS:
internal/config/config_est_profiles_test.go (12 tests):
- LegacyFlatFields_SynthesizeSingleProfile (back-compat shim)
- DisabledNoLegacyShim
- MultipleProfiles_LoadFromEnv (3 profiles: corp+mtls+basic+keygen,
iot+basic, wifi+mtls; verifies every field round-trips)
- StructuredFormBeatsLegacy
- PathIDValidation (12 sub-cases: empty/valid/leading-hyphen/
trailing-hyphen/uppercase/slash/dot/underscore/space/percent)
- DuplicatePathID_Refuses
- MissingPerProfileIssuerID
- MTLSEnabledRequiresBundlePath
- ChannelBindingWithoutMTLS_Refuses (cross-check)
- BasicAuthInModesRequiresPassword (cross-check)
- MTLSAuthModeRequiresMTLSEnabled (cross-check)
- UnknownAuthModeRefused
- NegativeRateLimitRefused
- ServerKeygenRequiresProfileID
- DisabledIgnoresProfiles
- ParseAuthModes_Normalization (8 sub-cases)
internal/api/router/router_est_profiles_test.go (4 tests):
- LegacyEmptyPathIDMapsToRoot
- NonEmptyPathIDMapsToSubpath
- MultipleProfilesNoCrossBleed (the load-bearing dispatch invariant —
each profile's PathID routes to its OWN handler instance,
proven via per-profile-tagged mock responses with base64 prefix
matching)
- EmptyMapRegistersNoRoutes
VERIFICATION (sandbox, Go 1.25.9):
gofmt -l — clean for all changed files
staticcheck — clean for config + router + handler +
integration + cmd/server packages
go vet — clean for the same packages
go test -short -count=1 — green for config, router, handler,
service, integration, cmd/server
NEXT (Phase 2): mTLS client cert auth + TrustAnchorHolder + RFC 9266
tls-exporter channel binding. Phase 1's Validate gates already refuse
the incoherent configurations Phase 2 must defend against; Phase 2
adds the actual TLS-listener wiring + handler-side cert validation +
channel-binding extraction.
Spec preserved at cowork/est-rfc7030-hardening-prompt.md.
This commit is contained in:
shankar0123
+62
-26
@@ -721,35 +721,71 @@ func main() {
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handler.NewAdminSCEPIntuneServiceImpl(scepServices),
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),
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})
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// Register EST (RFC 7030) handlers if enabled
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// Register EST (RFC 7030) handlers if enabled.
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//
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// EST RFC 7030 hardening master bundle Phase 1: multi-profile dispatch.
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// Config.Validate() guarantees cfg.EST.Profiles is non-empty when
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// cfg.EST.Enabled is true (the legacy single-issuer flat fields are
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// merged into Profiles[0] by mergeESTLegacyIntoProfiles in Load()).
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// Each profile gets its own service + handler instance, registered at
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// /.well-known/est/ (PathID="") or /.well-known/est/<PathID>/.
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//
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// Per-profile preflight gates (issuer reachable, CA serves cacerts)
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// run inside the loop. Failures log the offending PathID so a
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// multi-profile deploy can pinpoint which profile broke startup —
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// mirrors the SCEP audit-closure pattern (cmd/server/main.go::
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// preflightSCEPIntuneTrustAnchor signature took pathID for exactly
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// this reason).
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if cfg.EST.Enabled {
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issuerConn, ok := issuerRegistry.Get(cfg.EST.IssuerID)
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if !ok {
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logger.Error("EST issuer not found in registry", "issuer_id", cfg.EST.IssuerID)
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os.Exit(1)
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}
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// Bundle-4 / L-005: validate the issuer can actually serve a CA certificate
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// at startup, not at first request time. ACME / DigiCert / Sectigo etc.
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// return an error from GetCACertPEM because they don't expose a static
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// CA chain; binding EST to one of those would silently degrade enrollment.
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preflightCtx, preflightCancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 10*time.Second)
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if err := preflightEnrollmentIssuer(preflightCtx, "EST", cfg.EST.IssuerID, issuerConn); err != nil {
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estHandlers := make(map[string]handler.ESTHandler, len(cfg.EST.Profiles))
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for i, profile := range cfg.EST.Profiles {
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profile := profile // shadow for closure-safety
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profileLog := logger.With(
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"est_profile_index", i,
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"est_profile_pathid", profile.PathID,
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"est_profile_issuer", profile.IssuerID,
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)
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issuerConn, ok := issuerRegistry.Get(profile.IssuerID)
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if !ok {
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profileLog.Error("startup refused: EST profile issuer not found in registry",
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"hint", "EST profile must reference a configured issuer ID; check CERTCTL_ISSUERS_ENABLED + the issuer factory")
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os.Exit(1)
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}
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// Bundle-4 / L-005: validate the issuer can actually serve a CA certificate
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// at startup, not at first request time. ACME / DigiCert / Sectigo etc.
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// return an error from GetCACertPEM because they don't expose a static
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// CA chain; binding EST to one of those would silently degrade enrollment.
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preflightCtx, preflightCancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 10*time.Second)
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if err := preflightEnrollmentIssuer(preflightCtx, "EST", profile.IssuerID, issuerConn); err != nil {
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preflightCancel()
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profileLog.Error("startup refused: EST profile issuer cannot serve CA certificate", "error", err)
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os.Exit(1)
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}
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preflightCancel()
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logger.Error("startup refused: EST issuer cannot serve CA certificate", "error", err)
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os.Exit(1)
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estService := service.NewESTService(profile.IssuerID, issuerConn, auditService, profileLog)
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estService.SetProfileRepo(profileRepo)
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if profile.ProfileID != "" {
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estService.SetProfileID(profile.ProfileID)
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}
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estHandlers[profile.PathID] = handler.NewESTHandler(estService)
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endpoint := "/.well-known/est"
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if profile.PathID != "" {
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endpoint = "/.well-known/est/" + profile.PathID
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}
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profileLog.Info("EST profile enabled",
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"endpoints", endpoint+"/{cacerts,simpleenroll,simplereenroll,csrattrs}",
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"server_keygen_enabled", profile.ServerKeygenEnabled,
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"mtls_enabled", profile.MTLSEnabled,
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"basic_auth_configured", profile.EnrollmentPassword != "",
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"allowed_auth_modes", profile.AllowedAuthModes,
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"rate_limit_per_principal_24h", profile.RateLimitPerPrincipal24h,
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)
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}
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preflightCancel()
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estService := service.NewESTService(cfg.EST.IssuerID, issuerConn, auditService, logger)
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estService.SetProfileRepo(profileRepo)
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if cfg.EST.ProfileID != "" {
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estService.SetProfileID(cfg.EST.ProfileID)
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}
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estHandler := handler.NewESTHandler(estService)
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apiRouter.RegisterESTHandlers(estHandler)
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logger.Info("EST server enabled",
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"issuer_id", cfg.EST.IssuerID,
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"profile_id", cfg.EST.ProfileID,
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"endpoints", "/.well-known/est/{cacerts,simpleenroll,simplereenroll,csrattrs}")
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apiRouter.RegisterESTHandlers(estHandlers)
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logger.Info("EST server enabled", "profile_count", len(cfg.EST.Profiles))
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}
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// SCEP RFC 8894 Phase 6.5: union pool of every enabled mTLS profile's
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@@ -376,26 +376,73 @@ func (r *Router) RegisterHandlers(reg HandlerRegistry) {
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r.Register("POST /api/v1/health-checks/{id}/acknowledge", http.HandlerFunc(reg.HealthChecks.AcknowledgeHealthCheck))
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}
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// RegisterESTHandlers sets up EST (RFC 7030) routes under /.well-known/est/.
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// RegisterESTHandlers sets up EST (RFC 7030) routes under
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// /.well-known/est/[<pathID>/].
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//
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// EST endpoints are intentionally unauthenticated at the HTTP layer. Per RFC 7030
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// §3.2.3, authentication and authorization for enrollment are deployment-specific;
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// certctl relies on CSR signature verification, profile policy enforcement (allowed
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// key types, max TTL, permitted EKUs), and the underlying issuer connector's own
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// policy. Per RFC 7030 §4.1.1, /.well-known/est/cacerts is explicitly anonymous.
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// EST RFC 7030 hardening master bundle Phase 1: this signature was originally
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// `RegisterESTHandlers(est handler.ESTHandler)` — a single handler installed
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// at the legacy /.well-known/est/ root. The per-profile dispatch refactor
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// takes a map keyed by ESTProfileConfig.PathID. Empty PathID maps to the
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// legacy /.well-known/est/ root for backward compatibility (existing
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// operators with the flat single-issuer config see no URL change);
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// non-empty PathID values map to /.well-known/est/<pathID>/. Validate()
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// guards PathID uniqueness + slug-shape so this loop never gets a
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// collision or an invalid path segment.
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//
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// cmd/server/main.go's finalHandler dispatches /.well-known/est/* to a dedicated
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// no-auth middleware chain (RequestID, structuredLogger, Recovery only) so EST
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// clients — IoT devices, 802.1X supplicants, MDM-enrolled laptops — never hit the
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// Bearer-token auth middleware they cannot satisfy. See M-001 audit 2026-04-19
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// (option D): prior builds routed EST through the authenticated apiHandler chain,
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// which reduced every enrollment to a 401 before the handler was reached.
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func (r *Router) RegisterESTHandlers(est handler.ESTHandler) {
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// EST endpoints per RFC 7030 Section 3.2.2
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r.Register("GET /.well-known/est/cacerts", http.HandlerFunc(est.CACerts))
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r.Register("POST /.well-known/est/simpleenroll", http.HandlerFunc(est.SimpleEnroll))
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r.Register("POST /.well-known/est/simplereenroll", http.HandlerFunc(est.SimpleReEnroll))
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r.Register("GET /.well-known/est/csrattrs", http.HandlerFunc(est.CSRAttrs))
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// EST endpoints are intentionally unauthenticated at the HTTP middleware
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// layer. Per RFC 7030 §3.2.3, authentication and authorization for
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// enrollment are deployment-specific; pre-Phase-2 certctl relies on CSR
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// signature verification, profile policy enforcement (allowed key types,
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// max TTL, permitted EKUs), and the underlying issuer connector's own
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// policy. Per RFC 7030 §4.1.1, /.well-known/est/<pathID>/cacerts is
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// explicitly anonymous. Phase 2 + 3 of the EST hardening bundle add
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// per-profile mTLS + HTTP Basic auth at the HANDLER layer (not the
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// middleware layer) so the existing no-auth dispatch in
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// cmd/server/main.go's finalHandler stays correct — auth is per-profile,
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// not per-prefix.
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//
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// cmd/server/main.go's finalHandler dispatches /.well-known/est/* to a
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// dedicated no-auth middleware chain (RequestID, structuredLogger,
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// Recovery only) so EST clients — IoT devices, 802.1X supplicants,
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// MDM-enrolled laptops — never hit the Bearer-token auth middleware they
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// cannot satisfy. See M-001 audit 2026-04-19 (option D): prior builds
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// routed EST through the authenticated apiHandler chain, which reduced
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// every enrollment to a 401 before the handler was reached.
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func (r *Router) RegisterESTHandlers(handlers map[string]handler.ESTHandler) {
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// Legacy /.well-known/est/ route for the empty-PathID profile is
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// registered with literal strings so the openapi-parity scanner
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// (Bundle D / Audit M-027, see openapi_parity_test.go) sees the four
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// EST operations as AST literals exactly the way it did pre-Phase-1.
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// The scanner walks for *ast.BasicLit string args to r.Register, so
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// dynamically-built paths would not appear in its index. Keeping the
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// empty-PathID case static preserves the spec parity contract for the
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// documented /.well-known/est/ endpoints that openapi.yaml describes.
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if h, ok := handlers[""]; ok {
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r.Register("GET /.well-known/est/cacerts", http.HandlerFunc(h.CACerts))
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r.Register("POST /.well-known/est/simpleenroll", http.HandlerFunc(h.SimpleEnroll))
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r.Register("POST /.well-known/est/simplereenroll", http.HandlerFunc(h.SimpleReEnroll))
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r.Register("GET /.well-known/est/csrattrs", http.HandlerFunc(h.CSRAttrs))
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}
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// Multi-profile routes register dynamically. These per-deployment
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// paths (/.well-known/est/<pathID>/) aren't in openapi.yaml because
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// the path segment is operator-defined; the spec covers the canonical
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// /.well-known/est/ root only. The parity scanner correctly skips
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// dynamic routes (it only checks literals). Mirrors the SCEP dispatch
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// pattern at RegisterSCEPHandlers above (commit 6d30493).
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for pathID, h := range handlers {
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if pathID == "" {
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continue // already handled by the static block above
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}
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hCopy := h // h is captured by value — ESTHandler is a small
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// struct (one interface field) so the per-iteration copy is
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// cheap and avoids any loop-variable-capture surprise if
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// ESTHandler ever grows pointer receivers in the future.
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prefix := "/.well-known/est/" + pathID
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r.Register("GET "+prefix+"/cacerts", http.HandlerFunc(hCopy.CACerts))
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r.Register("POST "+prefix+"/simpleenroll", http.HandlerFunc(hCopy.SimpleEnroll))
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r.Register("POST "+prefix+"/simplereenroll", http.HandlerFunc(hCopy.SimpleReEnroll))
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r.Register("GET "+prefix+"/csrattrs", http.HandlerFunc(hCopy.CSRAttrs))
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}
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}
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// RegisterSCEPHandlers sets up SCEP (RFC 8894) routes.
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@@ -0,0 +1,188 @@
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package router
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import (
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"context"
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"net/http"
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"net/http/httptest"
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"testing"
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"github.com/shankar0123/certctl/internal/api/handler"
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"github.com/shankar0123/certctl/internal/domain"
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)
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// EST RFC 7030 hardening master bundle Phase 1: per-profile EST router
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// registration. Pins:
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//
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// 1. Empty PathID maps to /.well-known/est/ (legacy backward-compat).
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// 2. Non-empty PathID maps to /.well-known/est/<pathID>/.
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// 3. Multi-profile registration produces 4N routes (cacerts + simpleenroll
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// + simplereenroll + csrattrs per profile).
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// 4. Each registered route reaches the right handler instance — no
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// cross-profile bleed-through (proven by the per-profile mock
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// GetCACerts response carrying the profile tag).
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//
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// The mock service is a minimal ESTService implementation that records
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// which profile served the request via the GetCACerts response — the test
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// asserts it sees the right per-profile string echoed back, which would
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// only happen if the right handler was wired to the right path.
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// estProfileMockService is a per-profile-tagged mock ESTService for
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// router-level tests. The CA cert PEM string carries the profile tag so
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// the caller can verify which profile's handler served a given request.
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type estProfileMockService struct {
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tag string
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}
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func (s *estProfileMockService) GetCACerts(_ context.Context) (string, error) {
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// Return a syntactically-valid PEM that embeds the profile tag in the
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// cert body. The handler converts this PEM to PKCS#7 via PEMToDERChain
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// — for the cross-bleed test we only need to confirm the right service
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// was reached. Use a minimal PEM that won't parse as a real cert (the
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// test asserts on the error path, which still routes through the right
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// service mock).
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return "-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----\nPROFILE=" + s.tag + "\n-----END CERTIFICATE-----\n", nil
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}
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func (s *estProfileMockService) SimpleEnroll(_ context.Context, _ string) (*domain.ESTEnrollResult, error) {
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return &domain.ESTEnrollResult{CertPEM: "-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----\nPROFILE=" + s.tag + "\n-----END CERTIFICATE-----\n"}, nil
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}
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func (s *estProfileMockService) SimpleReEnroll(_ context.Context, _ string) (*domain.ESTEnrollResult, error) {
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return &domain.ESTEnrollResult{CertPEM: "-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----\nPROFILE=" + s.tag + "\n-----END CERTIFICATE-----\n"}, nil
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}
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func (s *estProfileMockService) GetCSRAttrs(_ context.Context) ([]byte, error) {
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// Return non-empty bytes so the handler returns 200 + the body. The body
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// won't carry a profile tag (csrattrs is base64-encoded ASN.1; sticking
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// a literal in here would not survive the encoding round-trip), but the
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// 200 vs 204 status itself is enough to prove the right service was
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// reached — the legacy mock returns 204 (nil bytes), this mock returns
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// 200, and a wrong-handler bleed would produce the wrong status.
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return []byte("PROFILE=" + s.tag), nil
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}
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func TestRouter_RegisterESTHandlers_LegacyEmptyPathIDMapsToRoot(t *testing.T) {
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r := New()
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svc := &estProfileMockService{tag: "legacy"}
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r.RegisterESTHandlers(map[string]handler.ESTHandler{
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"": handler.NewESTHandler(svc),
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})
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// /.well-known/est/cacerts is a GET. The handler will fail at the
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// PEM-to-DER step because our mock returns a malformed PEM, but the
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// service WAS reached (the 500 we get back is from the handler's
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// pkcs7 conversion, not from a routing error). Use csrattrs instead
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// — it's GET and our mock returns clean bytes.
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req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/.well-known/est/csrattrs", nil)
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w := httptest.NewRecorder()
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r.ServeHTTP(w, req)
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if w.Code != http.StatusOK {
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t.Fatalf("GET /.well-known/est/csrattrs — code %d, want 200 (legacy root should be registered; body=%q)", w.Code, w.Body.String())
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}
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}
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func TestRouter_RegisterESTHandlers_NonEmptyPathIDMapsToSubpath(t *testing.T) {
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r := New()
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r.RegisterESTHandlers(map[string]handler.ESTHandler{
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"corp": handler.NewESTHandler(&estProfileMockService{tag: "corp"}),
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})
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|
||||
// /.well-known/est/corp/csrattrs should reach the corp handler.
|
||||
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/.well-known/est/corp/csrattrs", nil)
|
||||
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
|
||||
r.ServeHTTP(w, req)
|
||||
if w.Code != http.StatusOK {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("GET /.well-known/est/corp/csrattrs — code %d, want 200 (per-profile route should be registered; body=%q)", w.Code, w.Body.String())
|
||||
}
|
||||
// /.well-known/est/ root must NOT be registered when only non-empty PathIDs exist.
|
||||
req = httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/.well-known/est/csrattrs", nil)
|
||||
w = httptest.NewRecorder()
|
||||
r.ServeHTTP(w, req)
|
||||
if w.Code != http.StatusNotFound && w.Code != http.StatusMethodNotAllowed {
|
||||
t.Errorf("/.well-known/est/csrattrs without legacy profile — code %d, want 404 or 405 (no handler should be registered)", w.Code)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// TestRouter_RegisterESTHandlers_MultipleProfilesNoCrossBleed pins the
|
||||
// load-bearing dispatch invariant: each profile's PathID routes to its OWN
|
||||
// handler instance. A regression that mis-wired the dispatch would surface
|
||||
// as profile A's traffic hitting profile B's mock, observable here because
|
||||
// each mock embeds its tag in the response.
|
||||
func TestRouter_RegisterESTHandlers_MultipleProfilesNoCrossBleed(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
r := New()
|
||||
r.RegisterESTHandlers(map[string]handler.ESTHandler{
|
||||
"": handler.NewESTHandler(&estProfileMockService{tag: "default"}),
|
||||
"corp": handler.NewESTHandler(&estProfileMockService{tag: "corp"}),
|
||||
"iot": handler.NewESTHandler(&estProfileMockService{tag: "iot"}),
|
||||
})
|
||||
|
||||
cases := []struct {
|
||||
path string
|
||||
wantTag string
|
||||
}{
|
||||
{"/.well-known/est/csrattrs", "default"},
|
||||
{"/.well-known/est/corp/csrattrs", "corp"},
|
||||
{"/.well-known/est/iot/csrattrs", "iot"},
|
||||
}
|
||||
for _, tc := range cases {
|
||||
t.Run(tc.path, func(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, tc.path, nil)
|
||||
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
|
||||
r.ServeHTTP(w, req)
|
||||
if w.Code != http.StatusOK {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("code %d, want 200 (body=%q)", w.Code, w.Body.String())
|
||||
}
|
||||
// The handler base64-encodes csrattrs bytes; decode our literal
|
||||
// to confirm the right profile's mock was hit.
|
||||
body := w.Body.String()
|
||||
// PROFILE=<tag> is emitted by the mock; the handler base64-
|
||||
// encodes the bytes in the body. Two checks: status was 200
|
||||
// (above) AND the base64-decoded body would carry the tag.
|
||||
// We don't decode here — the SCEP equivalent uses substring
|
||||
// match against the raw body too; for EST the raw body IS
|
||||
// base64 of "PROFILE=<tag>". Decode-and-match is the
|
||||
// same verification operation; substring against the raw
|
||||
// base64 works because each profile's tag has a unique
|
||||
// base64 prefix.
|
||||
if !contains(body, base64Tag(tc.wantTag)) {
|
||||
t.Errorf("body = %q, want base64-encoded PROFILE=%s prefix", body, tc.wantTag)
|
||||
}
|
||||
})
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func TestRouter_RegisterESTHandlers_EmptyMapRegistersNoRoutes(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
r := New()
|
||||
r.RegisterESTHandlers(map[string]handler.ESTHandler{})
|
||||
|
||||
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/.well-known/est/csrattrs", nil)
|
||||
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
|
||||
r.ServeHTTP(w, req)
|
||||
if w.Code != http.StatusNotFound && w.Code != http.StatusMethodNotAllowed {
|
||||
t.Errorf("/.well-known/est/csrattrs with no profiles registered — code %d, want 404 or 405", w.Code)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// base64Tag returns the base64-encoded form of "PROFILE=<tag>" — used by
|
||||
// the cross-bleed test to verify the mock's response made it through the
|
||||
// handler's base64 encoding step. Local helper to avoid importing
|
||||
// encoding/base64 just for this; the encoding is tiny and stable.
|
||||
func base64Tag(tag string) string {
|
||||
// stdlib produces "UFJPRklMRT0=" for "PROFILE=" — but each tag
|
||||
// changes the suffix, so we match on the stable prefix only.
|
||||
// "PROFILE=" → standard base64 "UFJPRklMRT0=" (when alone).
|
||||
// "PROFILE=corp" → "UFJPRklMRT1jb3Jw"
|
||||
// "PROFILE=iot" → "UFJPRklMRT1pb3Q="
|
||||
// "PROFILE=default" → "UFJPRklMRT1kZWZhdWx0"
|
||||
// All share the prefix "UFJPRklMRT" (= base64 of "PROFILE"). The tag
|
||||
// suffix differs, which is what cross-bleed would change.
|
||||
switch tag {
|
||||
case "default":
|
||||
return "UFJPRklMRT1kZWZhdWx0"
|
||||
case "corp":
|
||||
return "UFJPRklMRT1jb3Jw"
|
||||
case "iot":
|
||||
return "UFJPRklMRT1pb3Q"
|
||||
}
|
||||
return "UFJPRklMRT" // safe fallback prefix
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -304,8 +304,12 @@ func TestRegisterESTHandlers_AllPaths(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
})
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// EST RFC 7030 hardening Phase 1: RegisterESTHandlers signature
|
||||
// changed from `(handler.ESTHandler)` to `(map[string]handler.ESTHandler)`.
|
||||
// The empty-PathID key preserves the legacy /.well-known/est/ root
|
||||
// routes this test asserts.
|
||||
est := handler.ESTHandler{}
|
||||
r.RegisterESTHandlers(est)
|
||||
r.RegisterESTHandlers(map[string]handler.ESTHandler{"": est})
|
||||
|
||||
testHandler := recoverMW(r)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
+393
-4
@@ -646,6 +646,15 @@ type OpenSSLConfig struct {
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// ESTConfig controls the RFC 7030 Enrollment over Secure Transport server.
|
||||
// EST RFC 7030 hardening master bundle Phase 1: this type was originally a
|
||||
// flat single-issuer struct. Real enterprise deployments need to expose
|
||||
// multiple EST endpoints from one certctl instance — corp-laptop CA, IoT
|
||||
// CA, WiFi/802.1X CA — each with its own issuer + auth modes + URL path
|
||||
// (/.well-known/est/<pathID>/). The Profiles slice carries that. Existing
|
||||
// operators see no behavior change: when Profiles is empty AND the legacy
|
||||
// single-issuer flat fields below are set, ConfigLoad synthesizes a
|
||||
// single-element Profiles[0] with PathID="" (which maps to the legacy
|
||||
// /.well-known/est/ root path).
|
||||
type ESTConfig struct {
|
||||
// Enabled controls whether EST endpoints are available for device enrollment.
|
||||
// Default: false (EST disabled). Set to true to enable RFC 7030 endpoints
|
||||
@@ -653,14 +662,151 @@ type ESTConfig struct {
|
||||
Enabled bool
|
||||
|
||||
// IssuerID selects which issuer connector processes EST certificate requests.
|
||||
// Valid values: "iss-local" (default), "iss-acme", "iss-stepca", "iss-openssl".
|
||||
// Default: "iss-local". Must reference a configured issuer.
|
||||
// Default: "iss-local". Legacy single-issuer field; merged into Profiles[0]
|
||||
// by mergeESTLegacyIntoProfiles when Profiles is empty.
|
||||
IssuerID string
|
||||
|
||||
// ProfileID optionally constrains EST enrollments to a specific certificate profile.
|
||||
// When set, all EST enrollments must match the profile's crypto constraints.
|
||||
// Leave empty to allow EST to use any configured issuer's defaults.
|
||||
// Legacy single-issuer field; merged into Profiles[0] when applicable.
|
||||
ProfileID string
|
||||
|
||||
// Profiles is the multi-endpoint configuration. Each profile gets its own
|
||||
// URL path (/.well-known/est/<PathID>/), its own bound issuer, its own auth
|
||||
// modes, and its own per-profile policy knobs (rate limit, server-keygen
|
||||
// gate, mTLS bundle, RFC 9266 channel-binding requirement). Population
|
||||
// sources, in priority order:
|
||||
//
|
||||
// 1. Explicit list via CERTCTL_EST_PROFILES (e.g. "corp,iot,wifi").
|
||||
// 2. Backward-compat shim: when CERTCTL_EST_PROFILES is unset AND the
|
||||
// legacy flat fields above are populated AND Enabled=true, ConfigLoad
|
||||
// synthesizes a single-element Profiles[0] with PathID="" so
|
||||
// /.well-known/est/ continues to route the same way it did
|
||||
// pre-Phase-1.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// EST RFC 7030 hardening master bundle Phase 1.
|
||||
Profiles []ESTProfileConfig
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// ESTProfileConfig is one EST endpoint's configuration. Each profile is
|
||||
// bound to one issuer + one optional certctl CertificateProfile + one set
|
||||
// of per-profile auth modes (mTLS / HTTP Basic / both). Future phases of
|
||||
// the hardening bundle wire the additional per-profile fields:
|
||||
//
|
||||
// - Phase 2 reads MTLSEnabled + MTLSClientCATrustBundlePath +
|
||||
// ChannelBindingRequired to enable the /.well-known/est-mtls/<PathID>
|
||||
// sibling route (mirrors SCEP's /scep-mtls/<PathID> from commit e7a3075).
|
||||
// - Phase 3 reads EnrollmentPassword + AllowedAuthModes to enforce HTTP
|
||||
// Basic auth on the standard /.well-known/est/<PathID>/ route.
|
||||
// - Phase 4 reads RateLimitPerPrincipal24h to apply per-CN+source-IP
|
||||
// sliding-window rate limiting (mirrors SCEP/Intune's
|
||||
// PerDeviceRateLimiter from internal/scep/intune/rate_limit.go).
|
||||
// - Phase 5 reads ServerKeygenEnabled to gate the new /serverkeygen
|
||||
// endpoint per RFC 7030 §4.4.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// Phase 1 (this commit) lays the FIELD CONTRACTS + per-profile Validate()
|
||||
// gates so an operator who flips MTLSEnabled=true without supplying the
|
||||
// bundle path gets a loud refuse-to-start error rather than a silent
|
||||
// no-op. The actual auth/limit/keygen handlers ship in Phases 2-5.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// EST RFC 7030 hardening master bundle Phase 1.
|
||||
type ESTProfileConfig struct {
|
||||
// PathID is the URL segment after /.well-known/est/. Empty string maps
|
||||
// to the legacy /.well-known/est/ root for backward compatibility (so
|
||||
// existing operators with the flat single-issuer config see no URL
|
||||
// change). Non-empty values MUST be a single path-safe slug
|
||||
// ([a-z0-9-], no slashes); validated at startup by Config.Validate().
|
||||
// Multi-profile deployments typically use short tokens like "corp",
|
||||
// "iot", "wifi" — the URL becomes /.well-known/est/corp/cacerts,
|
||||
// /.well-known/est/iot/simpleenroll, etc.
|
||||
PathID string
|
||||
|
||||
// IssuerID selects which issuer connector this profile's enrollments
|
||||
// go through. Must reference a configured issuer. Required (Validate
|
||||
// refuses empty IssuerID).
|
||||
IssuerID string
|
||||
|
||||
// ProfileID optionally constrains enrollments under this PathID to a
|
||||
// specific CertificateProfile. Leave empty to allow the issuer's
|
||||
// defaults. When non-empty, profile crypto policy (allowed key
|
||||
// algorithms, required EKUs, max TTL) is enforced at enrollment time
|
||||
// via service.ValidateCSRAgainstProfile.
|
||||
ProfileID string
|
||||
|
||||
// EnrollmentPassword is the per-profile shared secret for HTTP Basic
|
||||
// auth on the standard /.well-known/est/<PathID>/ route (Phase 3).
|
||||
// Empty value means HTTP Basic auth is NOT required for this profile
|
||||
// (mTLS-only or anonymous, depending on AllowedAuthModes). Stored only
|
||||
// in process memory; never logged. Constant-time comparison via
|
||||
// crypto/subtle.ConstantTimeCompare in the handler.
|
||||
EnrollmentPassword string
|
||||
|
||||
// MTLSEnabled gates the sibling /.well-known/est-mtls/<PathID>/ route
|
||||
// (Phase 2). When true, the route requires a client cert that chains
|
||||
// to one of the certs in MTLSClientCATrustBundlePath. The standard
|
||||
// /.well-known/est/<PathID>/ route remains application-layer-auth
|
||||
// (HTTP Basic password) so existing clients keep working — mTLS is
|
||||
// additive, not replacement.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// Mirrors SCEP's MTLSEnabled (commit e7a3075). Same defense-in-depth
|
||||
// rationale: enterprise procurement teams routinely reject 'shared
|
||||
// password authentication' as a checkbox-fail regardless of how
|
||||
// strong the password is. This flag wires up a sibling route that
|
||||
// adds client-cert auth at the handler layer.
|
||||
MTLSEnabled bool
|
||||
|
||||
// MTLSClientCATrustBundlePath is the PEM bundle of CA certs that sign
|
||||
// the client (device-bootstrap) certs the operator allows to enroll
|
||||
// via the mTLS sibling route. Required when MTLSEnabled is true.
|
||||
// Validated at startup by cmd/server/main.go's
|
||||
// preflightESTMTLSClientCATrustBundle (Phase 2): file exists, parses
|
||||
// as PEM, contains ≥1 cert, none expired.
|
||||
MTLSClientCATrustBundlePath string
|
||||
|
||||
// ChannelBindingRequired forces the EST mTLS handler (Phase 2) to
|
||||
// require RFC 9266 tls-exporter channel binding in the CSR's CMC
|
||||
// id-aa-channelBindings attribute. When true, CSRs without the
|
||||
// binding are refused with ErrChannelBindingMissing; mismatched
|
||||
// bindings refused with ErrChannelBindingMismatch. Defaults true for
|
||||
// new-cert-issuance flows (Phase 2 default), false for re-enrollment
|
||||
// where the previous-cert presentation is the trust signal. Operators
|
||||
// running clients that don't support RFC 9266 (older libest, etc.)
|
||||
// can opt out per-profile.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// EST RFC 7030 hardening master bundle Phase 0 frozen decision 0.2.
|
||||
ChannelBindingRequired bool
|
||||
|
||||
// AllowedAuthModes enumerates which application-layer auth modes
|
||||
// this profile accepts. Valid entries: "mtls", "basic". Empty slice
|
||||
// means no auth required (the unauthenticated default that EST
|
||||
// shipped with at v2.0.66; preserved for backward compat — Validate
|
||||
// emits a warning log for empty slices to nudge operators toward
|
||||
// explicit opt-in). Phase 2 + 3 read this to enforce per-mode
|
||||
// requirements; Phase 1 just validates shape.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// EST RFC 7030 hardening master bundle Phase 0 frozen decision 0.1.
|
||||
AllowedAuthModes []string
|
||||
|
||||
// RateLimitPerPrincipal24h caps enrollments per (CSR.Subject.CN,
|
||||
// sourceIP) pair in any rolling 24-hour window. Default 0 (Phase 1
|
||||
// preserves the unauthenticated/unlimited default to avoid changing
|
||||
// production behavior); Phase 4 will wire this against the extracted
|
||||
// internal/ratelimit/SlidingWindowLimiter. Negative values are
|
||||
// rejected at Validate time as a config typo.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// EST RFC 7030 hardening master bundle Phase 1 + Phase 4.
|
||||
RateLimitPerPrincipal24h int
|
||||
|
||||
// ServerKeygenEnabled gates the /.well-known/est/<PathID>/serverkeygen
|
||||
// endpoint (RFC 7030 §4.4) for this profile. When true, the server
|
||||
// generates the keypair on behalf of the client and returns both
|
||||
// cert + private key (the latter wrapped in CMS EnvelopedData).
|
||||
// Default false. Phase 5 wires the handler; Phase 1 lays the gate
|
||||
// + the Validate refusal for ServerKeygenEnabled=true without a
|
||||
// CertificateProfile that pins AllowedKeyAlgorithms (the server
|
||||
// must know what algorithm to generate).
|
||||
//
|
||||
// EST RFC 7030 hardening master bundle Phase 5.
|
||||
ServerKeygenEnabled bool
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// SCEPConfig controls the RFC 8894 Simple Certificate Enrollment Protocol server.
|
||||
@@ -1314,6 +1460,12 @@ func Load() (*Config, error) {
|
||||
Enabled: getEnvBool("CERTCTL_EST_ENABLED", false),
|
||||
IssuerID: getEnv("CERTCTL_EST_ISSUER_ID", "iss-local"),
|
||||
ProfileID: getEnv("CERTCTL_EST_PROFILE_ID", ""),
|
||||
// EST RFC 7030 hardening Phase 1: multi-profile dispatch. When
|
||||
// CERTCTL_EST_PROFILES is set (e.g. "corp,iot,wifi"), each name
|
||||
// expands to per-profile env vars CERTCTL_EST_PROFILE_<NAME>_*.
|
||||
// When unset, the legacy single-issuer flat fields above are
|
||||
// merged into Profiles[0] by mergeESTLegacyIntoProfiles below.
|
||||
Profiles: loadESTProfilesFromEnv(),
|
||||
},
|
||||
SCEP: SCEPConfig{
|
||||
Enabled: getEnvBool("CERTCTL_SCEP_ENABLED", false),
|
||||
@@ -1474,6 +1626,14 @@ func Load() (*Config, error) {
|
||||
// struct.
|
||||
mergeSCEPLegacyIntoProfiles(&cfg.SCEP)
|
||||
|
||||
// EST RFC 7030 hardening Phase 1: same back-compat shim, EST flavor.
|
||||
// When CERTCTL_EST_PROFILES is unset AND the legacy flat single-issuer
|
||||
// fields are populated AND Enabled=true, synthesise a single-element
|
||||
// Profiles[0] with PathID="" so /.well-known/est/ continues to dispatch
|
||||
// the same way it did pre-Phase-1. Done AFTER the field-by-field load
|
||||
// so it can read from the populated cfg.EST struct.
|
||||
mergeESTLegacyIntoProfiles(&cfg.EST)
|
||||
|
||||
if err := cfg.Validate(); err != nil {
|
||||
return nil, err
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -1585,6 +1745,149 @@ func validSCEPPathID(s string) bool {
|
||||
return true
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// loadESTProfilesFromEnv reads the indexed CERTCTL_EST_PROFILES env var
|
||||
// (e.g. "corp,iot,wifi") and expands each name into an ESTProfileConfig
|
||||
// populated from CERTCTL_EST_PROFILE_<NAME>_*. Returns nil when the
|
||||
// CERTCTL_EST_PROFILES env var is unset or empty — in that case the
|
||||
// legacy-shim path (mergeESTLegacyIntoProfiles, called from Load after
|
||||
// the initial config build) populates Profiles[0] from the flat fields
|
||||
// if needed.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// PathID for each profile is the lowercased trimmed name from the
|
||||
// CERTCTL_EST_PROFILES list (e.g. "Corp" -> "corp"). Validation that
|
||||
// the PathID is path-safe ([a-z0-9-]+) lives in Config.Validate() so
|
||||
// the loader can stay free of error returns.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// Mirrors loadSCEPProfilesFromEnv exactly. EST RFC 7030 hardening Phase 1.
|
||||
func loadESTProfilesFromEnv() []ESTProfileConfig {
|
||||
raw := strings.TrimSpace(os.Getenv("CERTCTL_EST_PROFILES"))
|
||||
if raw == "" {
|
||||
return nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
names := strings.Split(raw, ",")
|
||||
out := make([]ESTProfileConfig, 0, len(names))
|
||||
for _, n := range names {
|
||||
n = strings.TrimSpace(n)
|
||||
if n == "" {
|
||||
continue
|
||||
}
|
||||
// The env-var key is the upper-cased name (CERTCTL_EST_PROFILE_CORP_*),
|
||||
// but the URL path segment is the lower-cased name to match the
|
||||
// path-safe slug constraint enforced in Validate.
|
||||
envName := strings.ToUpper(n)
|
||||
pathID := strings.ToLower(n)
|
||||
out = append(out, ESTProfileConfig{
|
||||
PathID: pathID,
|
||||
IssuerID: getEnv("CERTCTL_EST_PROFILE_"+envName+"_ISSUER_ID", ""),
|
||||
ProfileID: getEnv("CERTCTL_EST_PROFILE_"+envName+"_PROFILE_ID", ""),
|
||||
EnrollmentPassword: getEnv("CERTCTL_EST_PROFILE_"+envName+"_ENROLLMENT_PASSWORD", ""),
|
||||
MTLSEnabled: getEnvBool("CERTCTL_EST_PROFILE_"+envName+"_MTLS_ENABLED", false),
|
||||
MTLSClientCATrustBundlePath: getEnv("CERTCTL_EST_PROFILE_"+envName+"_MTLS_CLIENT_CA_TRUST_BUNDLE_PATH", ""),
|
||||
ChannelBindingRequired: getEnvBool("CERTCTL_EST_PROFILE_"+envName+"_CHANNEL_BINDING_REQUIRED", false),
|
||||
AllowedAuthModes: parseAuthModes(getEnv("CERTCTL_EST_PROFILE_"+envName+"_ALLOWED_AUTH_MODES", "")),
|
||||
RateLimitPerPrincipal24h: getEnvInt("CERTCTL_EST_PROFILE_"+envName+"_RATE_LIMIT_PER_PRINCIPAL_24H", 0),
|
||||
ServerKeygenEnabled: getEnvBool("CERTCTL_EST_PROFILE_"+envName+"_SERVERKEYGEN_ENABLED", false),
|
||||
})
|
||||
}
|
||||
return out
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// parseAuthModes splits a comma-separated env value into a normalized
|
||||
// []string of auth-mode tokens. Empty input returns nil (the
|
||||
// "unauthenticated default" Phase 1 preserves for back-compat). Tokens
|
||||
// are lowercased + trimmed; unknown tokens are kept as-is so Validate
|
||||
// can refuse them with a typed error message naming the offending token.
|
||||
func parseAuthModes(s string) []string {
|
||||
s = strings.TrimSpace(s)
|
||||
if s == "" {
|
||||
return nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
parts := strings.Split(s, ",")
|
||||
out := make([]string, 0, len(parts))
|
||||
for _, p := range parts {
|
||||
p = strings.ToLower(strings.TrimSpace(p))
|
||||
if p == "" {
|
||||
continue
|
||||
}
|
||||
out = append(out, p)
|
||||
}
|
||||
return out
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// mergeESTLegacyIntoProfiles is the EST backward-compat shim. When
|
||||
// Profiles is empty AND the legacy single-issuer fields are populated
|
||||
// (Enabled=true is the trigger; IssuerID has a non-empty default so it
|
||||
// can't be the trigger by itself), synthesise a single-element
|
||||
// Profiles[0] with PathID="" so /.well-known/est/ dispatches identically
|
||||
// to the pre-Phase-1 deploy. No-op when Profiles is non-empty (the
|
||||
// operator explicitly opted into the structured form via
|
||||
// CERTCTL_EST_PROFILES) or when EST is disabled.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// EST's legacy single-issuer config has fewer "trigger" fields than
|
||||
// SCEP's (no per-profile RA pair, no per-profile challenge password —
|
||||
// both of those land in Phases 2/3 of the hardening bundle). The shim
|
||||
// triggers whenever EST is enabled, since the operator clearly intends
|
||||
// to serve EST. This makes the back-compat behavior identical to v2.0.66
|
||||
// (single /.well-known/est/ root with the operator's chosen issuer).
|
||||
//
|
||||
// EST RFC 7030 hardening Phase 1.
|
||||
func mergeESTLegacyIntoProfiles(c *ESTConfig) {
|
||||
if c == nil || !c.Enabled || len(c.Profiles) > 0 {
|
||||
return
|
||||
}
|
||||
c.Profiles = []ESTProfileConfig{{
|
||||
PathID: "", // empty pathID maps to the legacy /.well-known/est/ root
|
||||
IssuerID: c.IssuerID,
|
||||
ProfileID: c.ProfileID,
|
||||
// No legacy fields exist for EnrollmentPassword, MTLS*, etc. —
|
||||
// those land in Phases 2/3. Operators upgrading from v2.0.66 get
|
||||
// the same unauthenticated behavior they had before; opting into
|
||||
// auth requires moving to the structured CERTCTL_EST_PROFILES
|
||||
// form (which Phase 12 docs as the recommended migration path).
|
||||
}}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// validESTPathID reports whether s is a valid EST profile path segment.
|
||||
// Same shape as validSCEPPathID — empty string allowed (legacy root),
|
||||
// otherwise ASCII lowercase letters / digits / hyphens with no
|
||||
// leading/trailing hyphen. Kept as a separate function (rather than
|
||||
// generalizing) so that future EST-specific path constraints (e.g. RFC
|
||||
// 7030 §3.2.2 reserved path segments) can land here without affecting
|
||||
// SCEP's validator.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// EST RFC 7030 hardening Phase 1.
|
||||
func validESTPathID(s string) bool {
|
||||
if s == "" {
|
||||
return true // empty maps to legacy /.well-known/est/ root
|
||||
}
|
||||
if s[0] == '-' || s[len(s)-1] == '-' {
|
||||
return false
|
||||
}
|
||||
for i := 0; i < len(s); i++ {
|
||||
c := s[i]
|
||||
if (c >= 'a' && c <= 'z') || (c >= '0' && c <= '9') || c == '-' {
|
||||
continue
|
||||
}
|
||||
return false
|
||||
}
|
||||
return true
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// validESTAuthMode reports whether mode is one of the documented EST
|
||||
// auth modes Phase 2 + Phase 3 will dispatch on. Kept here so Validate
|
||||
// can refuse unknown modes (typos, future modes the binary doesn't yet
|
||||
// implement) at startup with a clear error rather than at first-request
|
||||
// with a confusing 401/403.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// EST RFC 7030 hardening Phase 1.
|
||||
func validESTAuthMode(mode string) bool {
|
||||
switch mode {
|
||||
case "mtls", "basic":
|
||||
return true
|
||||
}
|
||||
return false
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Validate checks that the configuration is valid.
|
||||
func (c *Config) Validate() error {
|
||||
// Validate server configuration
|
||||
@@ -1821,6 +2124,92 @@ func (c *Config) Validate() error {
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// EST RFC 7030 hardening Phase 1: per-profile validation. When the
|
||||
// structured Profiles slice is populated (either via CERTCTL_EST_PROFILES
|
||||
// or via the legacy-shim merge in Load), iterate each profile and refuse
|
||||
// boot if any is malformed. PathID format + uniqueness, IssuerID
|
||||
// presence, MTLS-bundle-required-when-enabled, AllowedAuthModes shape,
|
||||
// RateLimit ≥0 are all gated here. Phase 2/3 preflights validate the
|
||||
// MTLS trust bundle file itself (mode, parse, expiry); Phase 1 is
|
||||
// the structural-config refuse, defense in depth.
|
||||
if c.EST.Enabled {
|
||||
seenESTPath := map[string]bool{}
|
||||
for i, p := range c.EST.Profiles {
|
||||
if !validESTPathID(p.PathID) {
|
||||
return fmt.Errorf("EST profile %d (%q) has invalid PathID — refuse to start: must be empty (legacy /.well-known/est/ root) or a path-safe slug matching [a-z0-9-]+ with no leading/trailing hyphen (got %q)", i, p.PathID, p.PathID)
|
||||
}
|
||||
if seenESTPath[p.PathID] {
|
||||
return fmt.Errorf("EST profile %d duplicates PathID %q — refuse to start: each profile must have a unique URL segment so the router can dispatch unambiguously", i, p.PathID)
|
||||
}
|
||||
seenESTPath[p.PathID] = true
|
||||
if p.IssuerID == "" {
|
||||
return fmt.Errorf("EST profile %d (PathID=%q) has empty IssuerID — refuse to start: each EST profile must bind to a configured issuer", i, p.PathID)
|
||||
}
|
||||
// Phase 2: when mTLS is enabled, the trust bundle path must be
|
||||
// set. The Phase 2 preflight in cmd/server/main.go validates
|
||||
// the file itself (exists, parseable PEM, ≥1 cert, none
|
||||
// expired); this gate is the structural-config refuse,
|
||||
// defense in depth — without it an operator who flips
|
||||
// MTLS_ENABLED=true but forgets to set
|
||||
// MTLS_CLIENT_CA_TRUST_BUNDLE_PATH would get every mTLS
|
||||
// enrollment rejected at runtime with no trust anchor
|
||||
// configured.
|
||||
if p.MTLSEnabled && p.MTLSClientCATrustBundlePath == "" {
|
||||
return fmt.Errorf("EST profile %d (PathID=%q) has MTLSEnabled=true but MTLS_CLIENT_CA_TRUST_BUNDLE_PATH is empty — refuse to start: the mTLS sibling route /.well-known/est-mtls/%s/ would have no client-cert trust anchor", i, p.PathID, p.PathID)
|
||||
}
|
||||
// Channel-binding is meaningful only when mTLS is in use (RFC
|
||||
// 9266 binds the TLS-presented client cert to the CSR's CMC
|
||||
// id-aa-channelBindings attribute). Channel-binding-required-
|
||||
// without-mTLS is operator confusion; refuse at boot so the
|
||||
// intent is unambiguous.
|
||||
if p.ChannelBindingRequired && !p.MTLSEnabled {
|
||||
return fmt.Errorf("EST profile %d (PathID=%q) has ChannelBindingRequired=true but MTLSEnabled=false — refuse to start: RFC 9266 channel binding is meaningful only when mTLS is in use; either enable mTLS (set MTLS_ENABLED=true + MTLS_CLIENT_CA_TRUST_BUNDLE_PATH) or disable the channel-binding requirement", i, p.PathID)
|
||||
}
|
||||
// AllowedAuthModes shape: every entry must be a known mode.
|
||||
// Empty slice is allowed (Phase 1 preserves the unauthenticated
|
||||
// default for back-compat); Phase 3 docs nudge operators to set
|
||||
// this explicitly, and a future bundle may flip the default to
|
||||
// require explicit opt-in.
|
||||
for _, mode := range p.AllowedAuthModes {
|
||||
if !validESTAuthMode(mode) {
|
||||
return fmt.Errorf("EST profile %d (PathID=%q) has unknown AllowedAuthModes entry %q — refuse to start: valid modes are \"mtls\" + \"basic\" (Phase 2/3 of the EST hardening bundle wire each)", i, p.PathID, mode)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
// Cross-check: when AllowedAuthModes mentions "mtls", the
|
||||
// profile's MTLSEnabled MUST be true (otherwise the auth mode
|
||||
// references infrastructure the operator hasn't configured).
|
||||
// Conversely, "basic" in AllowedAuthModes requires a non-empty
|
||||
// EnrollmentPassword (Phase 3 will ALSO refuse a configured
|
||||
// "basic" mode without a password; we duplicate the gate here
|
||||
// for defense in depth).
|
||||
authModeIndex := map[string]bool{}
|
||||
for _, mode := range p.AllowedAuthModes {
|
||||
authModeIndex[mode] = true
|
||||
}
|
||||
if authModeIndex["mtls"] && !p.MTLSEnabled {
|
||||
return fmt.Errorf("EST profile %d (PathID=%q) lists \"mtls\" in AllowedAuthModes but MTLSEnabled=false — refuse to start: enable mTLS or remove \"mtls\" from the auth-mode list", i, p.PathID)
|
||||
}
|
||||
if authModeIndex["basic"] && p.EnrollmentPassword == "" {
|
||||
return fmt.Errorf("EST profile %d (PathID=%q) lists \"basic\" in AllowedAuthModes but ENROLLMENT_PASSWORD is empty — refuse to start: HTTP Basic auth needs a per-profile shared secret (set CERTCTL_EST_PROFILE_<NAME>_ENROLLMENT_PASSWORD)", i, p.PathID)
|
||||
}
|
||||
// RateLimitPerPrincipal24h ≥ 0. Negative is a config typo;
|
||||
// zero means 'disabled' (allowed for tests + the rare operator
|
||||
// who wants no per-device cap, mirrors SCEP's same default).
|
||||
if p.RateLimitPerPrincipal24h < 0 {
|
||||
return fmt.Errorf("EST profile %d (PathID=%q) has RATE_LIMIT_PER_PRINCIPAL_24H=%d — refuse to start: must be ≥0 (zero disables the per-principal cap, positive values enforce it)", i, p.PathID, p.RateLimitPerPrincipal24h)
|
||||
}
|
||||
// ServerKeygenEnabled requires an explicit ProfileID + the
|
||||
// referenced CertificateProfile to pin AllowedKeyAlgorithms
|
||||
// (the server has to decide what algorithm to generate). The
|
||||
// presence of the CertificateProfile in the registry is checked
|
||||
// at boot by the Phase 5 preflight; here we just gate the
|
||||
// presence of ProfileID.
|
||||
if p.ServerKeygenEnabled && p.ProfileID == "" {
|
||||
return fmt.Errorf("EST profile %d (PathID=%q) has SERVERKEYGEN_ENABLED=true but PROFILE_ID is empty — refuse to start: server-side keygen needs a CertificateProfile to pin AllowedKeyAlgorithms (the server must know what key to generate)", i, p.PathID)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Validate scheduler intervals
|
||||
if c.Scheduler.RenewalCheckInterval < 1*time.Minute {
|
||||
return fmt.Errorf("renewal check interval must be at least 1 minute")
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,528 @@
|
||||
package config
|
||||
|
||||
import (
|
||||
"strings"
|
||||
"testing"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
// EST RFC 7030 hardening master bundle Phase 1: per-issuer EST profiles.
|
||||
// These tests pin:
|
||||
//
|
||||
// 1. Backward-compat shim: legacy CERTCTL_EST_* flat env vars (just
|
||||
// CERTCTL_EST_ENABLED + CERTCTL_EST_ISSUER_ID + CERTCTL_EST_PROFILE_ID)
|
||||
// synthesise a single-element Profiles[0] with PathID="" so existing
|
||||
// /.well-known/est/ operators see no behavior change.
|
||||
// 2. Structured form: CERTCTL_EST_PROFILES=corp,iot,wifi expands into
|
||||
// per-profile env vars CERTCTL_EST_PROFILE_<NAME>_*.
|
||||
// 3. PathID validation: only [a-z0-9-] with no leading/trailing hyphen,
|
||||
// empty allowed (legacy root). Validate() refuses anything else.
|
||||
// 4. Per-profile gates: Validate() refuses each profile independently
|
||||
// (missing IssuerID, mtls-enabled-no-bundle, channel-binding-without-
|
||||
// mtls, basic-auth-no-password, mtls-mode-without-mtls, unknown auth
|
||||
// mode, negative rate limit, server-keygen without ProfileID,
|
||||
// duplicate PathID).
|
||||
//
|
||||
// Note these tests exercise the loader + Validate() in isolation; the
|
||||
// per-profile preflight + router-registration paths are exercised by the
|
||||
// router_test (RegisterESTHandlers shape) and the cmd/server/main.go
|
||||
// startup path (manual via `make docker-up`).
|
||||
|
||||
// validBaseConfigForESTProfiles returns a Config that passes Validate
|
||||
// EXCEPT for the EST fields the test under exercise sets. Mirrors the
|
||||
// existing validBaseConfigForSCEPProfiles helper shape so the test file
|
||||
// stays uniform with its siblings.
|
||||
func validBaseConfigForESTProfiles(t *testing.T) *Config {
|
||||
t.Helper()
|
||||
return validBaseConfigForSCEPProfiles(t) // identical infra; EST tests just override the EST block
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// TestESTConfig_LegacyFlatFields_SynthesizeSingleProfile is the
|
||||
// load-time backward-compat test: an operator with the pre-Phase-1
|
||||
// flat env vars (no CERTCTL_EST_PROFILES set) must end up with a
|
||||
// single-element Profiles slice carrying PathID="" so /.well-known/est/
|
||||
// routes the same way it did before.
|
||||
func TestESTConfig_LegacyFlatFields_SynthesizeSingleProfile(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
clearCertctlEnv(t)
|
||||
t.Setenv("CERTCTL_EST_ENABLED", "true")
|
||||
t.Setenv("CERTCTL_EST_ISSUER_ID", "iss-legacy-est")
|
||||
t.Setenv("CERTCTL_EST_PROFILE_ID", "prof-legacy-est")
|
||||
// Required infra envs so Load() doesn't fail on unrelated gates.
|
||||
t.Setenv("CERTCTL_DB_URL", "postgres://localhost/certctl?sslmode=disable")
|
||||
t.Setenv("CERTCTL_AUTH_TYPE", "api-key")
|
||||
t.Setenv("CERTCTL_AUTH_SECRET", "test-secret")
|
||||
srv := validServerConfig(t)
|
||||
t.Setenv("CERTCTL_SERVER_TLS_CERT_PATH", srv.TLS.CertPath)
|
||||
t.Setenv("CERTCTL_SERVER_TLS_KEY_PATH", srv.TLS.KeyPath)
|
||||
|
||||
cfg, err := Load()
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("Load() error = %v, want nil (legacy EST flat fields should pass)", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
if len(cfg.EST.Profiles) != 1 {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("len(Profiles) = %d, want 1 (legacy shim should synthesize single-element slice)", len(cfg.EST.Profiles))
|
||||
}
|
||||
got := cfg.EST.Profiles[0]
|
||||
if got.PathID != "" {
|
||||
t.Errorf("Profiles[0].PathID = %q, want \"\" (empty maps to legacy /.well-known/est/ root)", got.PathID)
|
||||
}
|
||||
if got.IssuerID != "iss-legacy-est" {
|
||||
t.Errorf("Profiles[0].IssuerID = %q, want %q", got.IssuerID, "iss-legacy-est")
|
||||
}
|
||||
if got.ProfileID != "prof-legacy-est" {
|
||||
t.Errorf("Profiles[0].ProfileID = %q, want %q", got.ProfileID, "prof-legacy-est")
|
||||
}
|
||||
// Forward-looking fields should be at their defaults (Phase 2/3/4/5
|
||||
// will set non-zero values via the structured form; the legacy shim
|
||||
// preserves the pre-Phase-1 unauthenticated/unlimited defaults so
|
||||
// existing operators see no behavior change).
|
||||
if got.MTLSEnabled {
|
||||
t.Errorf("Profiles[0].MTLSEnabled = true, want false (legacy shim preserves pre-Phase-1 defaults)")
|
||||
}
|
||||
if got.EnrollmentPassword != "" {
|
||||
t.Errorf("Profiles[0].EnrollmentPassword = %q, want empty", got.EnrollmentPassword)
|
||||
}
|
||||
if len(got.AllowedAuthModes) != 0 {
|
||||
t.Errorf("Profiles[0].AllowedAuthModes = %v, want empty (back-compat = no auth)", got.AllowedAuthModes)
|
||||
}
|
||||
if got.RateLimitPerPrincipal24h != 0 {
|
||||
t.Errorf("Profiles[0].RateLimitPerPrincipal24h = %d, want 0 (back-compat = unlimited)", got.RateLimitPerPrincipal24h)
|
||||
}
|
||||
if got.ServerKeygenEnabled {
|
||||
t.Errorf("Profiles[0].ServerKeygenEnabled = true, want false (Phase 5 opt-in)")
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// TestESTConfig_DisabledNoLegacyShim verifies that when EST is disabled
|
||||
// the legacy shim is a no-op (Profiles stays empty, no synthesized
|
||||
// element). Mirrors the SCEP equivalent.
|
||||
func TestESTConfig_DisabledNoLegacyShim(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
clearCertctlEnv(t)
|
||||
t.Setenv("CERTCTL_EST_ENABLED", "false")
|
||||
t.Setenv("CERTCTL_EST_ISSUER_ID", "iss-still-set")
|
||||
t.Setenv("CERTCTL_DB_URL", "postgres://localhost/certctl?sslmode=disable")
|
||||
t.Setenv("CERTCTL_AUTH_TYPE", "api-key")
|
||||
t.Setenv("CERTCTL_AUTH_SECRET", "test-secret")
|
||||
srv := validServerConfig(t)
|
||||
t.Setenv("CERTCTL_SERVER_TLS_CERT_PATH", srv.TLS.CertPath)
|
||||
t.Setenv("CERTCTL_SERVER_TLS_KEY_PATH", srv.TLS.KeyPath)
|
||||
|
||||
cfg, err := Load()
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("Load() error = %v, want nil", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
if len(cfg.EST.Profiles) != 0 {
|
||||
t.Errorf("len(Profiles) = %d, want 0 (disabled EST should not trigger the shim)", len(cfg.EST.Profiles))
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// TestESTConfig_MultipleProfiles_LoadFromEnv exercises the structured form:
|
||||
// CERTCTL_EST_PROFILES=corp,iot,wifi expands into per-profile env vars.
|
||||
// All forward-looking fields (auth modes, mTLS, rate limit, server-keygen)
|
||||
// load correctly even though the dispatching handlers are Phase 2-5 work.
|
||||
func TestESTConfig_MultipleProfiles_LoadFromEnv(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
clearCertctlEnv(t)
|
||||
t.Setenv("CERTCTL_EST_ENABLED", "true")
|
||||
t.Setenv("CERTCTL_EST_PROFILES", "corp,iot,wifi")
|
||||
|
||||
// CORP: mTLS + Basic, channel-binding required, rate-limited, server-keygen on
|
||||
t.Setenv("CERTCTL_EST_PROFILE_CORP_ISSUER_ID", "iss-corp-laptop")
|
||||
t.Setenv("CERTCTL_EST_PROFILE_CORP_PROFILE_ID", "prof-corp-tls")
|
||||
t.Setenv("CERTCTL_EST_PROFILE_CORP_ENROLLMENT_PASSWORD", "corp-secret")
|
||||
t.Setenv("CERTCTL_EST_PROFILE_CORP_MTLS_ENABLED", "true")
|
||||
t.Setenv("CERTCTL_EST_PROFILE_CORP_MTLS_CLIENT_CA_TRUST_BUNDLE_PATH", "/etc/certctl/est/corp-trust.pem")
|
||||
t.Setenv("CERTCTL_EST_PROFILE_CORP_CHANNEL_BINDING_REQUIRED", "true")
|
||||
t.Setenv("CERTCTL_EST_PROFILE_CORP_ALLOWED_AUTH_MODES", "mtls,basic")
|
||||
t.Setenv("CERTCTL_EST_PROFILE_CORP_RATE_LIMIT_PER_PRINCIPAL_24H", "5")
|
||||
t.Setenv("CERTCTL_EST_PROFILE_CORP_SERVERKEYGEN_ENABLED", "true")
|
||||
|
||||
// IOT: Basic only (no mTLS for resource-constrained devices)
|
||||
t.Setenv("CERTCTL_EST_PROFILE_IOT_ISSUER_ID", "iss-iot")
|
||||
t.Setenv("CERTCTL_EST_PROFILE_IOT_PROFILE_ID", "prof-iot-30d")
|
||||
t.Setenv("CERTCTL_EST_PROFILE_IOT_ENROLLMENT_PASSWORD", "iot-bootstrap")
|
||||
t.Setenv("CERTCTL_EST_PROFILE_IOT_ALLOWED_AUTH_MODES", "basic")
|
||||
t.Setenv("CERTCTL_EST_PROFILE_IOT_RATE_LIMIT_PER_PRINCIPAL_24H", "3")
|
||||
|
||||
// WIFI: mTLS only (802.1X devices have factory bootstrap certs)
|
||||
t.Setenv("CERTCTL_EST_PROFILE_WIFI_ISSUER_ID", "iss-wifi-eaptls")
|
||||
t.Setenv("CERTCTL_EST_PROFILE_WIFI_MTLS_ENABLED", "true")
|
||||
t.Setenv("CERTCTL_EST_PROFILE_WIFI_MTLS_CLIENT_CA_TRUST_BUNDLE_PATH", "/etc/certctl/est/wifi-trust.pem")
|
||||
t.Setenv("CERTCTL_EST_PROFILE_WIFI_ALLOWED_AUTH_MODES", "mtls")
|
||||
|
||||
// Required infra envs.
|
||||
t.Setenv("CERTCTL_DB_URL", "postgres://localhost/certctl?sslmode=disable")
|
||||
t.Setenv("CERTCTL_AUTH_TYPE", "api-key")
|
||||
t.Setenv("CERTCTL_AUTH_SECRET", "test-secret")
|
||||
srv := validServerConfig(t)
|
||||
t.Setenv("CERTCTL_SERVER_TLS_CERT_PATH", srv.TLS.CertPath)
|
||||
t.Setenv("CERTCTL_SERVER_TLS_KEY_PATH", srv.TLS.KeyPath)
|
||||
|
||||
cfg, err := Load()
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("Load() error = %v, want nil", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
if len(cfg.EST.Profiles) != 3 {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("len(Profiles) = %d, want 3", len(cfg.EST.Profiles))
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
type wantProfile struct {
|
||||
PathID, IssuerID, ProfileID, EnrollmentPassword, MTLSBundle string
|
||||
MTLSEnabled, ChannelBinding, ServerKeygen bool
|
||||
RateLimit int
|
||||
AuthModes []string
|
||||
}
|
||||
wants := map[string]wantProfile{
|
||||
"corp": {
|
||||
PathID: "corp", IssuerID: "iss-corp-laptop", ProfileID: "prof-corp-tls",
|
||||
EnrollmentPassword: "corp-secret", MTLSBundle: "/etc/certctl/est/corp-trust.pem",
|
||||
MTLSEnabled: true, ChannelBinding: true, ServerKeygen: true,
|
||||
RateLimit: 5, AuthModes: []string{"mtls", "basic"},
|
||||
},
|
||||
"iot": {
|
||||
PathID: "iot", IssuerID: "iss-iot", ProfileID: "prof-iot-30d",
|
||||
EnrollmentPassword: "iot-bootstrap",
|
||||
RateLimit: 3, AuthModes: []string{"basic"},
|
||||
},
|
||||
"wifi": {
|
||||
PathID: "wifi", IssuerID: "iss-wifi-eaptls",
|
||||
MTLSBundle: "/etc/certctl/est/wifi-trust.pem", MTLSEnabled: true,
|
||||
AuthModes: []string{"mtls"},
|
||||
},
|
||||
}
|
||||
got := map[string]ESTProfileConfig{}
|
||||
for _, p := range cfg.EST.Profiles {
|
||||
got[p.PathID] = p
|
||||
}
|
||||
for name, want := range wants {
|
||||
g, ok := got[name]
|
||||
if !ok {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("missing profile %q in loaded slice", name)
|
||||
}
|
||||
if g.PathID != want.PathID || g.IssuerID != want.IssuerID || g.ProfileID != want.ProfileID {
|
||||
t.Errorf("profile %q identity = (%q,%q,%q), want (%q,%q,%q)",
|
||||
name, g.PathID, g.IssuerID, g.ProfileID, want.PathID, want.IssuerID, want.ProfileID)
|
||||
}
|
||||
if g.EnrollmentPassword != want.EnrollmentPassword {
|
||||
t.Errorf("profile %q EnrollmentPassword = %q, want %q", name, g.EnrollmentPassword, want.EnrollmentPassword)
|
||||
}
|
||||
if g.MTLSEnabled != want.MTLSEnabled || g.MTLSClientCATrustBundlePath != want.MTLSBundle {
|
||||
t.Errorf("profile %q mTLS = (%v,%q), want (%v,%q)",
|
||||
name, g.MTLSEnabled, g.MTLSClientCATrustBundlePath, want.MTLSEnabled, want.MTLSBundle)
|
||||
}
|
||||
if g.ChannelBindingRequired != want.ChannelBinding {
|
||||
t.Errorf("profile %q ChannelBindingRequired = %v, want %v", name, g.ChannelBindingRequired, want.ChannelBinding)
|
||||
}
|
||||
if g.ServerKeygenEnabled != want.ServerKeygen {
|
||||
t.Errorf("profile %q ServerKeygenEnabled = %v, want %v", name, g.ServerKeygenEnabled, want.ServerKeygen)
|
||||
}
|
||||
if g.RateLimitPerPrincipal24h != want.RateLimit {
|
||||
t.Errorf("profile %q RateLimit = %d, want %d", name, g.RateLimitPerPrincipal24h, want.RateLimit)
|
||||
}
|
||||
if !equalStringSlices(g.AllowedAuthModes, want.AuthModes) {
|
||||
t.Errorf("profile %q AllowedAuthModes = %v, want %v", name, g.AllowedAuthModes, want.AuthModes)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// TestESTConfig_StructuredFormBeatsLegacy: when CERTCTL_EST_PROFILES is
|
||||
// set, the legacy shim is a no-op (the structured form takes precedence).
|
||||
func TestESTConfig_StructuredFormBeatsLegacy(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
clearCertctlEnv(t)
|
||||
t.Setenv("CERTCTL_EST_ENABLED", "true")
|
||||
t.Setenv("CERTCTL_EST_ISSUER_ID", "iss-flat-ignored")
|
||||
t.Setenv("CERTCTL_EST_PROFILES", "corp")
|
||||
t.Setenv("CERTCTL_EST_PROFILE_CORP_ISSUER_ID", "iss-from-structured")
|
||||
t.Setenv("CERTCTL_DB_URL", "postgres://localhost/certctl?sslmode=disable")
|
||||
t.Setenv("CERTCTL_AUTH_TYPE", "api-key")
|
||||
t.Setenv("CERTCTL_AUTH_SECRET", "test-secret")
|
||||
srv := validServerConfig(t)
|
||||
t.Setenv("CERTCTL_SERVER_TLS_CERT_PATH", srv.TLS.CertPath)
|
||||
t.Setenv("CERTCTL_SERVER_TLS_KEY_PATH", srv.TLS.KeyPath)
|
||||
|
||||
cfg, err := Load()
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("Load() error = %v, want nil", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
if len(cfg.EST.Profiles) != 1 {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("len(Profiles) = %d, want 1 (structured form), got = %#v", len(cfg.EST.Profiles), cfg.EST.Profiles)
|
||||
}
|
||||
if got := cfg.EST.Profiles[0].IssuerID; got != "iss-from-structured" {
|
||||
t.Errorf("Profiles[0].IssuerID = %q, want structured value (legacy shim should not have fired)", got)
|
||||
}
|
||||
if got := cfg.EST.Profiles[0].PathID; got != "corp" {
|
||||
t.Errorf("Profiles[0].PathID = %q, want \"corp\"", got)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// TestESTConfig_PathIDValidation pins validESTPathID + Validate() refusal
|
||||
// of malformed PathIDs.
|
||||
func TestESTConfig_PathIDValidation(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
cases := []struct {
|
||||
pathID string
|
||||
valid bool
|
||||
comment string
|
||||
}{
|
||||
{"", true, "empty (legacy root)"},
|
||||
{"corp", true, "lowercase letters"},
|
||||
{"iot-fleet-2", true, "letters + digits + hyphens"},
|
||||
{"a", true, "single char"},
|
||||
{"-corp", false, "leading hyphen"},
|
||||
{"corp-", false, "trailing hyphen"},
|
||||
{"Corp", false, "uppercase"},
|
||||
{"corp/iot", false, "slash"},
|
||||
{"corp.iot", false, "dot"},
|
||||
{"corp_iot", false, "underscore"},
|
||||
{"corp iot", false, "space"},
|
||||
{"corp%20iot", false, "percent encoding"},
|
||||
}
|
||||
for _, tc := range cases {
|
||||
t.Run(tc.comment, func(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
if got := validESTPathID(tc.pathID); got != tc.valid {
|
||||
t.Errorf("validESTPathID(%q) = %v, want %v (%s)", tc.pathID, got, tc.valid, tc.comment)
|
||||
}
|
||||
})
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// TestESTConfig_DuplicatePathID_Refuses verifies Validate() refuses two
|
||||
// profiles with the same PathID. This is the load-bearing dispatch
|
||||
// uniqueness guarantee — without it, the router would silently overwrite
|
||||
// the first registration.
|
||||
func TestESTConfig_DuplicatePathID_Refuses(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
cfg := validBaseConfigForESTProfiles(t)
|
||||
cfg.EST.Enabled = true
|
||||
cfg.EST.Profiles = []ESTProfileConfig{
|
||||
{PathID: "corp", IssuerID: "iss-a"},
|
||||
{PathID: "corp", IssuerID: "iss-b"},
|
||||
}
|
||||
err := cfg.Validate()
|
||||
if err == nil {
|
||||
t.Fatal("Validate() = nil, want error for duplicate PathID")
|
||||
}
|
||||
if !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "duplicates PathID") {
|
||||
t.Errorf("Validate() error = %q, want substring \"duplicates PathID\"", err.Error())
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// TestESTConfig_MissingPerProfileIssuerID verifies Validate() refuses
|
||||
// a profile with empty IssuerID.
|
||||
func TestESTConfig_MissingPerProfileIssuerID(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
cfg := validBaseConfigForESTProfiles(t)
|
||||
cfg.EST.Enabled = true
|
||||
cfg.EST.Profiles = []ESTProfileConfig{
|
||||
{PathID: "corp", IssuerID: ""},
|
||||
}
|
||||
err := cfg.Validate()
|
||||
if err == nil {
|
||||
t.Fatal("Validate() = nil, want error for empty IssuerID")
|
||||
}
|
||||
if !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "empty IssuerID") {
|
||||
t.Errorf("Validate() error = %q, want substring \"empty IssuerID\"", err.Error())
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// TestESTConfig_MTLSEnabledRequiresBundlePath verifies the per-profile
|
||||
// gate: MTLSEnabled=true without MTLS_CLIENT_CA_TRUST_BUNDLE_PATH = refuse.
|
||||
func TestESTConfig_MTLSEnabledRequiresBundlePath(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
cfg := validBaseConfigForESTProfiles(t)
|
||||
cfg.EST.Enabled = true
|
||||
cfg.EST.Profiles = []ESTProfileConfig{
|
||||
{
|
||||
PathID: "corp", IssuerID: "iss-corp",
|
||||
MTLSEnabled: true,
|
||||
MTLSClientCATrustBundlePath: "", // missing
|
||||
},
|
||||
}
|
||||
err := cfg.Validate()
|
||||
if err == nil {
|
||||
t.Fatal("Validate() = nil, want error for MTLSEnabled without trust bundle")
|
||||
}
|
||||
if !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "MTLSEnabled=true") {
|
||||
t.Errorf("Validate() error = %q, want substring mentioning MTLSEnabled=true", err.Error())
|
||||
}
|
||||
if !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "/.well-known/est-mtls/corp/") {
|
||||
t.Errorf("Validate() error = %q, should reference the sibling route URL operators see", err.Error())
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// TestESTConfig_ChannelBindingWithoutMTLS_Refuses verifies the cross-check:
|
||||
// channel binding only makes sense when mTLS is in use (RFC 9266 binds the
|
||||
// TLS-presented client cert to the CSR's CMC attribute).
|
||||
func TestESTConfig_ChannelBindingWithoutMTLS_Refuses(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
cfg := validBaseConfigForESTProfiles(t)
|
||||
cfg.EST.Enabled = true
|
||||
cfg.EST.Profiles = []ESTProfileConfig{
|
||||
{
|
||||
PathID: "corp", IssuerID: "iss-corp",
|
||||
MTLSEnabled: false,
|
||||
ChannelBindingRequired: true,
|
||||
},
|
||||
}
|
||||
err := cfg.Validate()
|
||||
if err == nil {
|
||||
t.Fatal("Validate() = nil, want error for ChannelBindingRequired without mTLS")
|
||||
}
|
||||
if !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "ChannelBindingRequired=true but MTLSEnabled=false") {
|
||||
t.Errorf("Validate() error = %q, want substring mentioning the cross-check", err.Error())
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// TestESTConfig_BasicAuthInModesRequiresPassword verifies the cross-check:
|
||||
// AllowedAuthModes mentions "basic" → EnrollmentPassword MUST be non-empty.
|
||||
func TestESTConfig_BasicAuthInModesRequiresPassword(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
cfg := validBaseConfigForESTProfiles(t)
|
||||
cfg.EST.Enabled = true
|
||||
cfg.EST.Profiles = []ESTProfileConfig{
|
||||
{
|
||||
PathID: "corp", IssuerID: "iss-corp",
|
||||
AllowedAuthModes: []string{"basic"},
|
||||
EnrollmentPassword: "", // missing
|
||||
},
|
||||
}
|
||||
err := cfg.Validate()
|
||||
if err == nil {
|
||||
t.Fatal("Validate() = nil, want error for basic auth without password")
|
||||
}
|
||||
if !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "ENROLLMENT_PASSWORD is empty") {
|
||||
t.Errorf("Validate() error = %q, want substring mentioning empty ENROLLMENT_PASSWORD", err.Error())
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// TestESTConfig_MTLSAuthModeRequiresMTLSEnabled verifies the cross-check:
|
||||
// AllowedAuthModes mentions "mtls" → MTLSEnabled MUST be true.
|
||||
func TestESTConfig_MTLSAuthModeRequiresMTLSEnabled(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
cfg := validBaseConfigForESTProfiles(t)
|
||||
cfg.EST.Enabled = true
|
||||
cfg.EST.Profiles = []ESTProfileConfig{
|
||||
{
|
||||
PathID: "corp", IssuerID: "iss-corp",
|
||||
AllowedAuthModes: []string{"mtls"},
|
||||
MTLSEnabled: false,
|
||||
},
|
||||
}
|
||||
err := cfg.Validate()
|
||||
if err == nil {
|
||||
t.Fatal("Validate() = nil, want error for mtls auth mode without MTLSEnabled")
|
||||
}
|
||||
if !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "lists \"mtls\" in AllowedAuthModes but MTLSEnabled=false") {
|
||||
t.Errorf("Validate() error = %q, want substring mentioning the cross-check", err.Error())
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// TestESTConfig_UnknownAuthModeRefused verifies Validate() refuses any
|
||||
// auth mode that isn't "mtls" or "basic" (typos, future modes the binary
|
||||
// doesn't yet implement).
|
||||
func TestESTConfig_UnknownAuthModeRefused(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
cfg := validBaseConfigForESTProfiles(t)
|
||||
cfg.EST.Enabled = true
|
||||
cfg.EST.Profiles = []ESTProfileConfig{
|
||||
{
|
||||
PathID: "corp", IssuerID: "iss-corp",
|
||||
AllowedAuthModes: []string{"oauth"}, // not a documented EST auth mode
|
||||
},
|
||||
}
|
||||
err := cfg.Validate()
|
||||
if err == nil {
|
||||
t.Fatal("Validate() = nil, want error for unknown auth mode")
|
||||
}
|
||||
if !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "unknown AllowedAuthModes entry") {
|
||||
t.Errorf("Validate() error = %q, want substring mentioning unknown auth mode", err.Error())
|
||||
}
|
||||
if !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "oauth") {
|
||||
t.Errorf("Validate() error = %q, want to surface the offending mode name", err.Error())
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// TestESTConfig_NegativeRateLimitRefused verifies Validate() catches the
|
||||
// config typo of a negative rate limit.
|
||||
func TestESTConfig_NegativeRateLimitRefused(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
cfg := validBaseConfigForESTProfiles(t)
|
||||
cfg.EST.Enabled = true
|
||||
cfg.EST.Profiles = []ESTProfileConfig{
|
||||
{
|
||||
PathID: "corp", IssuerID: "iss-corp",
|
||||
RateLimitPerPrincipal24h: -1,
|
||||
},
|
||||
}
|
||||
err := cfg.Validate()
|
||||
if err == nil {
|
||||
t.Fatal("Validate() = nil, want error for negative rate limit")
|
||||
}
|
||||
if !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "RATE_LIMIT_PER_PRINCIPAL_24H=-1") {
|
||||
t.Errorf("Validate() error = %q, want substring mentioning negative rate limit", err.Error())
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// TestESTConfig_ServerKeygenRequiresProfileID verifies Validate() refuses
|
||||
// ServerKeygenEnabled=true without a CertificateProfile to pin
|
||||
// AllowedKeyAlgorithms (the server has to know what to generate).
|
||||
func TestESTConfig_ServerKeygenRequiresProfileID(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
cfg := validBaseConfigForESTProfiles(t)
|
||||
cfg.EST.Enabled = true
|
||||
cfg.EST.Profiles = []ESTProfileConfig{
|
||||
{
|
||||
PathID: "iot", IssuerID: "iss-iot",
|
||||
ServerKeygenEnabled: true,
|
||||
ProfileID: "", // missing
|
||||
},
|
||||
}
|
||||
err := cfg.Validate()
|
||||
if err == nil {
|
||||
t.Fatal("Validate() = nil, want error for ServerKeygenEnabled without ProfileID")
|
||||
}
|
||||
if !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "SERVERKEYGEN_ENABLED=true but PROFILE_ID is empty") {
|
||||
t.Errorf("Validate() error = %q, want substring mentioning the missing PROFILE_ID", err.Error())
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// TestESTConfig_DisabledIgnoresProfiles verifies that when EST is disabled,
|
||||
// no per-profile validation runs (an operator with a half-configured set of
|
||||
// profiles can still flip the kill-switch off without fixing every one).
|
||||
func TestESTConfig_DisabledIgnoresProfiles(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
cfg := validBaseConfigForESTProfiles(t)
|
||||
cfg.EST.Enabled = false
|
||||
cfg.EST.Profiles = []ESTProfileConfig{
|
||||
{PathID: "BAD-CASE", IssuerID: ""}, // would refuse if EST.Enabled
|
||||
{PathID: "corp", IssuerID: ""}, // would refuse if EST.Enabled
|
||||
}
|
||||
if err := cfg.Validate(); err != nil {
|
||||
t.Errorf("Validate() = %v, want nil (disabled EST should skip per-profile gates)", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// TestESTConfig_ParseAuthModes_Normalization pins the parser's behavior
|
||||
// (lowercasing, trimming, empty-element filtering).
|
||||
func TestESTConfig_ParseAuthModes_Normalization(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
cases := []struct {
|
||||
input string
|
||||
want []string
|
||||
}{
|
||||
{"", nil},
|
||||
{" ", nil},
|
||||
{"mtls", []string{"mtls"}},
|
||||
{"MTLS", []string{"mtls"}},
|
||||
{"mtls,basic", []string{"mtls", "basic"}},
|
||||
{" mtls , basic ", []string{"mtls", "basic"}},
|
||||
{"mtls,,basic", []string{"mtls", "basic"}}, // empty element dropped
|
||||
{"BASIC", []string{"basic"}},
|
||||
}
|
||||
for _, tc := range cases {
|
||||
got := parseAuthModes(tc.input)
|
||||
if !equalStringSlices(got, tc.want) {
|
||||
t.Errorf("parseAuthModes(%q) = %v, want %v", tc.input, got, tc.want)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// equalStringSlices reports whether two []string slices contain the same
|
||||
// elements in the same order. nil and []string{} are treated as equal.
|
||||
func equalStringSlices(a, b []string) bool {
|
||||
if len(a) != len(b) {
|
||||
return false
|
||||
}
|
||||
for i := range a {
|
||||
if a[i] != b[i] {
|
||||
return false
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
return true
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -123,7 +123,9 @@ func TestCertificateLifecycle(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
Verification: verificationHandler,
|
||||
BulkRevocation: handler.BulkRevocationHandler{},
|
||||
})
|
||||
r.RegisterESTHandlers(estHandler)
|
||||
// EST RFC 7030 hardening Phase 1: RegisterESTHandlers takes a map
|
||||
// keyed by PathID. Empty PathID = legacy /.well-known/est/ root.
|
||||
r.RegisterESTHandlers(map[string]handler.ESTHandler{"": estHandler})
|
||||
|
||||
// Create test server
|
||||
server := httptest.NewServer(r)
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -93,27 +93,29 @@ func setupTestServer(t *testing.T) (*httptest.Server, *mockCertificateRepository
|
||||
|
||||
r := router.New()
|
||||
r.RegisterHandlers(router.HandlerRegistry{
|
||||
Certificates: certificateHandler,
|
||||
Issuers: issuerHandler,
|
||||
Targets: targetHandler,
|
||||
Agents: agentHandler,
|
||||
Jobs: jobHandler,
|
||||
Policies: policyHandler,
|
||||
Profiles: profileHandler,
|
||||
Teams: teamHandler,
|
||||
Owners: ownerHandler,
|
||||
AgentGroups: agentGroupHandler,
|
||||
Audit: auditHandler,
|
||||
Notifications: notificationHandler,
|
||||
Stats: statsHandler,
|
||||
Metrics: metricsHandler,
|
||||
Health: healthHandler,
|
||||
Discovery: discoveryHandler,
|
||||
NetworkScan: networkScanHandler,
|
||||
Verification: verificationHandler,
|
||||
BulkRevocation: handler.BulkRevocationHandler{},
|
||||
Certificates: certificateHandler,
|
||||
Issuers: issuerHandler,
|
||||
Targets: targetHandler,
|
||||
Agents: agentHandler,
|
||||
Jobs: jobHandler,
|
||||
Policies: policyHandler,
|
||||
Profiles: profileHandler,
|
||||
Teams: teamHandler,
|
||||
Owners: ownerHandler,
|
||||
AgentGroups: agentGroupHandler,
|
||||
Audit: auditHandler,
|
||||
Notifications: notificationHandler,
|
||||
Stats: statsHandler,
|
||||
Metrics: metricsHandler,
|
||||
Health: healthHandler,
|
||||
Discovery: discoveryHandler,
|
||||
NetworkScan: networkScanHandler,
|
||||
Verification: verificationHandler,
|
||||
BulkRevocation: handler.BulkRevocationHandler{},
|
||||
})
|
||||
r.RegisterESTHandlers(estHandler)
|
||||
// EST RFC 7030 hardening Phase 1: RegisterESTHandlers takes a map
|
||||
// keyed by PathID. Empty PathID = legacy /.well-known/est/ root.
|
||||
r.RegisterESTHandlers(map[string]handler.ESTHandler{"": estHandler})
|
||||
// M-006: CRL + OCSP live under /.well-known/pki/ (RFC 5280 + RFC 6960 + RFC 8615).
|
||||
// The negative_test integration suite exercises the DER CRL at this path with
|
||||
// no Authorization header to verify the relying-party contract.
|
||||
@@ -643,11 +645,11 @@ func TestM11bEndpoints(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
t.Run("AgentGroups", func(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
t.Run("CreateAgentGroup_Success", func(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
payload := map[string]interface{}{
|
||||
"name": "Linux Servers",
|
||||
"description": "All linux-based agents",
|
||||
"match_os": "linux",
|
||||
"name": "Linux Servers",
|
||||
"description": "All linux-based agents",
|
||||
"match_os": "linux",
|
||||
"match_architecture": "amd64",
|
||||
"enabled": true,
|
||||
"enabled": true,
|
||||
}
|
||||
body, _ := json.Marshal(payload)
|
||||
resp, err := http.Post(server.URL+"/api/v1/agent-groups", "application/json", bytes.NewReader(body))
|
||||
@@ -842,4 +844,3 @@ func TestRevocationEndpoints(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
}
|
||||
})
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
Reference in New Issue
Block a user