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Closes Phase 11 of cowork/auth-bundle-2-prompt.md. Operators can now configure each major IdP against certctl's OIDC SSO surface with documented steps, no guessing. Files ===== docs/operator/oidc-runbooks/index.md (NEW): * Index page linking all six per-IdP runbooks. * Comparison matrix (free vs paid, group-claim shape, special quirks) so operators pick the right runbook in <30 seconds. * "Common shape" section pinning the consistent five-section layout every runbook follows. * "Cross-IdP recurring concepts" section consolidating the redirect-URI / client-secret-rotation / JWKS-cache-TTL / fail-closed- group-mapping / PKCE-S256 / IdP-downgrade-attack-defense behaviors so each per-IdP runbook can stay focused on what differs. docs/operator/oidc-runbooks/keycloak.md (NEW): * Canonical reference. Mirrors the testfixtures/keycloak-realm.json shape from Phase 10's integration test fixture so the operator's hand-config matches the CI-verified config exactly. * Step-by-step IdP-side: realm → client → groups → group-mapper → user. Cites the exact Keycloak admin-console paths (Clients → certctl → Client scopes → certctl-dedicated → Add mapper, etc.). * GUI + API + MCP equivalents for the certctl-side configuration. * JWKS-rotation drill mapped to the Phase 10 integration test that exercises the same flow. * 6 most-common troubleshooting paths mapped to certctl service- layer sentinel errors (ErrIssuerMismatch / ErrGroupsUnmapped / ErrPreLoginNotFound / ErrStateMismatch / IdP-downgrade-defense rejection / clock-skew on iat). docs/operator/oidc-runbooks/authentik.md (NEW): * Authentik-specific deltas vs Keycloak: provider/application split, property-mapping abstraction, explicit `groups` scope requirement, hashed-vs-email subject mode, signing-key rotation via Crypto/Tokens. docs/operator/oidc-runbooks/okta.md (NEW): * Okta-specific deltas: Org server vs custom auth server distinction, the load-bearing "Define groups claim" step (Okta does NOT emit groups by default), group-filter regex on the claim definition, access-policy gotcha, optional Okta smoke test pointer to Phase 10's integration_okta_smoke_test.go. docs/operator/oidc-runbooks/auth0.md (NEW): * Auth0's namespaced-custom-claim quirk documented up front: any Action-emitted claim MUST use a URL-shape namespaced key (e.g. https://your-namespace/groups), and certctl's hand-rolled groupclaim resolver recognizes URL-shape paths as a single literal key (no path-walking through `/`). Walks operators through writing the Login Action that emits groups from app_metadata. Three alternative group-modeling options (app_metadata vs Authorization Extension vs Roles+Permissions) with tradeoffs. docs/operator/oidc-runbooks/azure-ad.md (NEW): * The big Entra ID quirk documented up front: groups claim emits GROUP OBJECT IDs (GUIDs), NOT human-readable names. Certctl group→ role mappings MUST be configured against the GUIDs. The cloud-only-display-names alternative is documented but not recommended for hybrid AD environments. Covers the >200 groups truncation case (Microsoft's `hasgroups: true` claim) + the v1.0 vs v2.0 endpoint distinction (certctl supports v2.0 only). docs/operator/oidc-runbooks/google-workspace.md (NEW): * The big Google Workspace quirk documented up front: Google does NOT emit a groups claim in the ID token. Recommended pattern is to broker through Keycloak (or Authentik) as a federated identity provider — the user authenticates at Google but certctl talks to Keycloak. Walks operators through wiring Google as a federated IdP in Keycloak, four group-assignment options (manual vs default-group vs claim-derived vs SCIM), and the end-to-end browser flow. The "direct integration without groups" anti-pattern is documented at the bottom with explicit "NOT RECOMMENDED" framing so operators understand why the broker pattern is the right call. docs/README.md (MODIFIED): * Adds the OIDC / SSO runbooks index to the operator-facing docs nav table, between "Auth threat model" and "Control plane TLS". Conventions held ================ * Every runbook carries `> Last reviewed: 2026-05-10` per the docs convention. * Every runbook follows the prompt-mandated five-section layout: Prerequisites → IdP-side configuration → certctl-side configuration → Verification → Troubleshooting → Validation checklist (with operator sign-off line). * Internal-link sweep clean — every relative link resolves to an existing file (verified via shell loop checking each `](../...)` and `](*.md)` reference). External links to IdP vendor sites are the canonical https URLs. * No leakage of cowork/ workspace paths as Markdown links — the azure-ad.md initially had a `[auth-bundles-index.md](../../../../cowork/...)` reference; replaced with prose-only mention to match the existing convention from rbac.md + migration/api-keys-to-rbac.md. * The 7 files share a "Validation checklist" footer with operator sign-off line; per the prompt's exit criterion, each runbook must be validated end-to-end by either the operator or an external tester before Bundle 2 ships. Verification ============ * Last-reviewed dates: 7/7 runbooks dated 2026-05-10. * Internal-link sweep: 0 broken (every `]( ...)` reference resolves). * docs/README.md → operator/oidc-runbooks/index.md link resolves. * No backend / frontend / Go-test impact — pure docs commit. The pre-commit `make verify` gate is unchanged; this commit doesn't touch any Go file. Phase 11 deviation note ======================= The merge-gate criterion's "≥ 2 external testers" requirement is operator-driven and post-tag — Phase 11 ships the runbooks; the operator runs each end-to-end against a real production-tier IdP and fills in the sign-off footers before flipping Bundle 2 to "merged." Sandbox cannot exercise live Keycloak / Okta / Auth0 / Entra ID / Google Workspace tenants; the Phase 10 testcontainers Keycloak integration is the load-bearing automated test on the Keycloak axis, and the per-IdP runbooks document the manual-validation matrix the operator runs against the other five IdPs.
133 lines
9.9 KiB
Markdown
133 lines
9.9 KiB
Markdown
# certctl Documentation
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> Last reviewed: 2026-05-05
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The full docs index, organized by audience. Pick the section that matches what you need to do; each link below opens a focused doc rather than a wall of text.
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For the elevator pitch and quickstart commands, see the repo `README.md` at the root. For the marketing site, see [certctl.io](https://certctl.io).
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---
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## Getting Started
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You're new to certctl, just cloned the repo, or want to understand what it does before installing.
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| Doc | What it covers |
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| [Concepts](getting-started/concepts.md) | TLS certificates explained for beginners — CAs, ACME, EST, private keys, the full glossary |
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| [Quickstart](getting-started/quickstart.md) | Five-minute setup with Docker Compose, dashboard tour, API tour |
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| [Examples](getting-started/examples.md) | Five turnkey scenarios — ACME+NGINX, wildcard DNS-01, private CA+Traefik, step-ca+HAProxy, multi-issuer |
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| [Advanced demo](getting-started/advanced-demo.md) | End-to-end certificate lifecycle with technical depth at each step |
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| [Why certctl](getting-started/why-certctl.md) | Positioning vs ACME clients, agent-based SaaS, enterprise platforms; when to look elsewhere |
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## Reference
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You're operating certctl in production or building integrations and need authoritative technical detail.
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| Doc | What it covers |
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| [Architecture](reference/architecture.md) | System design, data flow, security model, deployment topologies |
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| [Profiles](reference/profiles.md) | CertificateProfile policy object — issuer wiring, EKUs, RequiresApproval gate (Phase 9 closure) |
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| [API](reference/api.md) | OpenAPI 3.1 spec, integration patterns, client SDK generation |
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| [CLI](reference/cli.md) | certctl-cli command reference and CI/CD integration patterns |
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| [Configuration](reference/configuration.md) | `CERTCTL_*` environment variable reference (scheduler, rate limits, deploy verify, audit, agent) |
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| [MCP server](reference/mcp.md) | Model Context Protocol integration for AI assistants |
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| [Release verification](reference/release-verification.md) | Cosign / SLSA / SBOM verification procedure |
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| [Intermediate CA hierarchy](reference/intermediate-ca-hierarchy.md) | Multi-level CA tree management — RFC 5280 §3.2/§4.2.1.9/§4.2.1.10 enforcement |
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| [Deployment model](reference/deployment-model.md) | Atomic write, post-deploy verify, rollback semantics across all targets |
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| [Vendor matrix](reference/vendor-matrix.md) | Tested vendor versions per target connector |
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### Connectors
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The [connector index](reference/connectors/index.md) is the canonical catalog (interfaces, registry, scanners, plus an inline reference per built-in). Per-connector deep-dive siblings cover operator-grade material — vendor edges, troubleshooting, rotation playbooks, when-to-use vs alternatives.
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**Issuers** (13 deep-dives): [ACME](reference/connectors/acme.md) · [ADCS](reference/connectors/adcs.md) · [AWS ACM Private CA](reference/connectors/aws-acm-pca.md) · [DigiCert](reference/connectors/digicert.md) · [EJBCA / Keyfactor](reference/connectors/ejbca.md) · [Entrust](reference/connectors/entrust.md) · [GlobalSign Atlas HVCA](reference/connectors/globalsign.md) · [Google CAS](reference/connectors/google-cas.md) · [Local CA](reference/connectors/local-ca.md) · [OpenSSL / Custom CA](reference/connectors/openssl.md) · [Sectigo SCM](reference/connectors/sectigo.md) · [step-ca / Smallstep](reference/connectors/step-ca.md) · [Vault PKI](reference/connectors/vault.md)
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**Targets** (15 deep-dives): [Apache](reference/connectors/apache.md) · [AWS Certificate Manager](reference/connectors/aws-acm.md) · [Azure Key Vault](reference/connectors/azure-kv.md) · [Caddy](reference/connectors/caddy.md) · [Envoy](reference/connectors/envoy.md) · [F5 BIG-IP](reference/connectors/f5.md) · [HAProxy](reference/connectors/haproxy.md) · [IIS](reference/connectors/iis.md) · [Java Keystore](reference/connectors/jks.md) · [Kubernetes Secrets](reference/connectors/k8s.md) · [NGINX](reference/connectors/nginx.md) · [Postfix / Dovecot](reference/connectors/postfix.md) · [SSH (agentless)](reference/connectors/ssh.md) · [Traefik](reference/connectors/traefik.md) · [Windows Certificate Store](reference/connectors/wincertstore.md)
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### Protocols
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| Doc | What it covers |
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| [ACME server](reference/protocols/acme-server.md) | Run certctl as an RFC 8555 + RFC 9773 ARI ACME server |
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| [ACME server threat model](reference/protocols/acme-server-threat-model.md) | Security posture for the ACME server endpoint |
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| [SCEP server](reference/protocols/scep-server.md) | RFC 8894 native SCEP server — RA cert config, multi-profile dispatch, must-staple, mTLS sibling route |
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| [SCEP for Microsoft Intune](reference/protocols/scep-intune.md) | Intune-specific deployment guide — NDES replacement playbook |
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| [EST server](reference/protocols/est.md) | RFC 7030 EST server — 802.1X / Wi-Fi enrollment, IoT bootstrap, channel binding |
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| [CRL & OCSP](reference/protocols/crl-ocsp.md) | RFC 5280 CRL + RFC 6960 OCSP responder for relying parties |
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| [Async CA polling](reference/protocols/async-ca-polling.md) | Bounded polling for async-CA issuer connectors |
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## Operator
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You're running certctl in production and need operational guidance.
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| Doc | What it covers |
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| [Security posture](operator/security.md) | Auth, rate limits, encryption at rest, key rotation, RBAC primitive (Bundle 1), bootstrap |
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| [RBAC operator reference](operator/rbac.md) | Roles, permissions, scopes, scope-down + bootstrap flow (Bundle 1) |
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| [Auth threat model](operator/auth-threat-model.md) | API-key compromise, role-grant abuse, bootstrap-token leak, audit-mutation, compliance mapping (Bundle 1) |
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| [OIDC / SSO runbooks](operator/oidc-runbooks/index.md) | Per-IdP setup guides — Keycloak, Authentik, Okta, Auth0, Entra ID, Google Workspace (Bundle 2) |
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| [Control plane TLS](operator/tls.md) | Self-signed bootstrap, operator-supplied Secret, cert-manager Certificate CR |
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| [Database TLS](operator/database-tls.md) | PostgreSQL transport encryption |
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| [Approval workflow](operator/approval-workflow.md) | Two-person integrity gate for high-stakes issuance + Phase 9 profile-edit closure |
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| [Helm deployment](operator/helm-deployment.md) | Kubernetes installation via the bundled chart |
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| [Performance baselines](operator/performance-baselines.md) | Operator-runnable benchmarks for regression spot checks |
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| [Legacy clients (TLS 1.2)](operator/legacy-clients-tls-1.2.md) | Reverse-proxy runbook for embedded EST/SCEP clients on TLS 1.2 |
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### Runbooks
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| Runbook | When |
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| [Cloud targets](operator/runbooks/cloud-targets.md) | AWS ACM + Azure Key Vault deployment, debugging, rollback |
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| [Expiry alerts](operator/runbooks/expiry-alerts.md) | Per-policy multi-channel routing matrix, severity tiers |
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| [Disaster recovery](operator/runbooks/disaster-recovery.md) | CRL cache, OCSP responder cert, CA private-key rotation, Postgres restore |
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## Migration
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You're moving from another cert-management tool to certctl, or running both in parallel.
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| From | Doc |
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| Certbot | [migration/from-certbot.md](migration/from-certbot.md) |
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| acme.sh | [migration/from-acmesh.md](migration/from-acmesh.md) |
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| cert-manager (coexistence, not replacement) | [migration/cert-manager-coexistence.md](migration/cert-manager-coexistence.md) |
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| Caddy ACME (point Caddy at certctl) | [migration/acme-from-caddy.md](migration/acme-from-caddy.md) |
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| cert-manager ACME (point cert-manager at certctl) | [migration/acme-from-cert-manager.md](migration/acme-from-cert-manager.md) |
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| Traefik ACME (point Traefik at certctl) | [migration/acme-from-traefik.md](migration/acme-from-traefik.md) |
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| **API keys → RBAC (v2.0.x → v2.1.0)** | [migration/api-keys-to-rbac.md](migration/api-keys-to-rbac.md) — **AUDIT YOUR API KEYS** post-upgrade |
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## Contributor
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You're contributing to certctl, running tests locally, or trying to understand the CI pipeline.
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| Doc | What it covers |
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| [Testing strategy](contributor/testing-strategy.md) | What we test and why; per-PR fast gates vs daily deep-scan |
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| [Test environment](contributor/test-environment.md) | Local environment with real CAs (Pebble, step-ca, etc.) |
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| [QA prerequisites](contributor/qa-prerequisites.md) | Before running QA: stack boot, demo data baseline, env vars |
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| [QA test suite](contributor/qa-test-suite.md) | qa_test.go reference for release QA |
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| [GUI QA checklist](contributor/gui-qa-checklist.md) | Manual GUI verification pass for release |
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| [Release sign-off](contributor/release-sign-off.md) | Release-day checklist — code state, automated gates, manual QA, artefact verification |
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| [CI pipeline](contributor/ci-pipeline.md) | CI shape, regression guards, adding new checks |
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## Archive
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Historical docs preserved for reference. Most operators don't need these.
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| Doc | Why archived |
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| [Upgrade to TLS (v2.2)](archive/upgrades/to-tls-v2.2.md) | Pre-v2.2 HTTPS-everywhere upgrade procedure |
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| [Upgrade past v2 JWT removal](archive/upgrades/to-v2-jwt-removal.md) | G-1 milestone JWT auth removal procedure |
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---
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## Reading order by role
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**First-time operator:** [Concepts](getting-started/concepts.md) → [Quickstart](getting-started/quickstart.md) → [Examples](getting-started/examples.md). About 90 minutes end to end.
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**Production operator:** [Architecture](reference/architecture.md) → [Security posture](operator/security.md) → [Control plane TLS](operator/tls.md) → [Disaster recovery runbook](operator/runbooks/disaster-recovery.md). About 4 hours end to end.
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**PKI engineer:** [ACME server](reference/protocols/acme-server.md) → [SCEP server](reference/protocols/scep-server.md) → [EST server](reference/protocols/est.md) → [Intermediate CA hierarchy](reference/intermediate-ca-hierarchy.md). About 6 hours end to end.
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**Contributor:** [Architecture](reference/architecture.md) → [Testing strategy](contributor/testing-strategy.md) → [Test environment](contributor/test-environment.md) → [CI pipeline](contributor/ci-pipeline.md). About 3 hours end to end.
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