Files
certctl/internal/api/handler/response.go
T
shankar0123 3287e174dc Unify API auth + RFC-compliant CRL/OCSP (M-002 + M-003 + M-006, auto-closes M-001)
Closes the remaining P1 gaps from coverage-gap-audit.md (M-001/M-002/M-003/M-006)
on top of the C-001/C-002 ownership + agent-FK contract fixes landed in
a53a4b8. The work lands as a single commit spanning server, docs, tests,
and the React client.

M-002 — Named API keys with per-key actor propagation
  * Migration 000014 adds the 'api_keys' table (id, name, hash,
    principal, role, created_at, last_used_at, disabled_at) so every
    credential carries an identifiable principal instead of the
    opaque 'anonymous'/'api-key' sentinel.
  * Auth middleware now rotates through configured keys, performs
    constant-time hash comparison, stamps 'last_used_at', and emits
    an actor struct via contextWithActor(). The audit middleware,
    bulk-revocation handler, approval handlers, and MCP tool layer
    now read the principal off the context and persist it on every
    audit_events row.
  * Regression coverage:
      - internal/api/middleware/audit_test.go — actor propagation,
        principal redaction for disabled keys, anonymous fallback for
        unauthenticated endpoints.
      - internal/api/handler/bulk_revocation_handler_test.go,
        job_handler_test.go — principal-on-audit assertions.

M-003 — Authorization gates (Phase B)
  * Approval handler rejects self-approval / self-rejection with 403
    when the actor principal equals the job's requested_by field.
  * Bulk revocation is gated behind the 'admin' role; operators and
    viewers receive 403.
  * Regression coverage:
      - internal/service/job_test.go — TestApproveJob_NotSelf,
        TestRejectJob_NotSelf.
      - internal/api/handler/bulk_revocation_handler_test.go —
        TestBulkRevoke_RequiresAdmin, TestBulkRevoke_AdminSucceeds.

M-006 — RFC-compliant CRL/OCSP on the unauthenticated .well-known mux
  * Per RFC 8615, relying parties cannot reasonably be asked to
    authenticate against the issuing certctl instance to retrieve
    revocation material. CRL and OCSP move off the authenticated
    '/api/v1/crl*' and '/api/v1/ocsp/*' paths onto:
        GET /.well-known/pki/crl/{issuer_id}
            Content-Type: application/pkix-crl   (RFC 5280 §5)
        GET /.well-known/pki/ocsp/{issuer_id}/{serial}
            Content-Type: application/ocsp-response  (RFC 6960)
  * Non-standard JSON CRL shape is removed; only DER is served.
  * Short-lived certificate exemption (profile TTL < 1h → skip
    CRL/OCSP) is preserved; the response simply omits the serial.
  * Routes are registered on the unauthenticated 'finalHandler' mux
    in cmd/server/main.go alongside EST ('/.well-known/est/*') and
    SCEP ('/scep'). Legacy authenticated paths return 404.
  * Regression coverage:
      - internal/api/handler/certificate_handler_test.go — content
        type, DER parseability, 404 for unknown issuer.
      - internal/api/handler/adversarial_path_test.go — unauthenticated
        access asserted for CRL, OCSP, EST, SCEP.
      - internal/api/router/router_test.go — route-table assertion
        that '.well-known/pki/*', '.well-known/est/*', and '/scep' are
        mounted on the unauthenticated branch.

M-001 — Auto-closed by M-002
  EST and SCEP were already registered on the unauthenticated
  'finalHandler' mux; the router comment at
  internal/api/router/router.go:247 now matches reality. The
  adversarial-path tests above lock the behavior in.

Verification (all gates green):
  * go vet ./...                                           — clean
  * go build ./...                                         — ok
  * go test -short ./... (55+ packages)                    — all pass
  * web/ : npm test (225 Vitest tests)                     — all pass
  * web/ : npx tsc --noEmit                                — clean
  * grep sweep for '/api/v1/(crl|ocsp)' — 13 surviving hits,
    all intentional M-006 tombstone/relocation comments.

Documentation:
  * coverage-gap-audit.md — status flips M-001/M-002/M-003/M-006 →
    Fixed, with per-finding resolution paragraphs citing regression
    test IDs. (Audit file lives outside this repo; see cowork root.)
  * CLAUDE.md Project Status line updated with the auth-unification
    closure note.
  * docs/features.md, docs/architecture.md, docs/quickstart.md,
    docs/concepts.md, docs/connectors.md, docs/test-env.md,
    docs/testing-guide.md, docs/compliance-*.md, docs/demo-advanced.md
    — refreshed for the new '.well-known/pki/*' namespace and named
    API keys.
  * api/openapi.yaml — documents the new unauthenticated endpoints
    and removes the legacy '/api/v1/crl*' + '/api/v1/ocsp/*' paths.

.gitignore: adds '/.gocache/' and '/.gomodcache/' for the session-
scoped Go caches so they never enter the tree.
2026-04-18 18:17:41 +00:00

155 lines
4.4 KiB
Go

package handler
import (
"context"
"encoding/base64"
"encoding/json"
"fmt"
"net/http"
"strings"
"time"
"github.com/shankar0123/certctl/internal/api/middleware"
)
// resolveActor extracts the authenticated named-key identity from the request
// context for audit-trail attribution. Returns the named-key name when set by
// the auth middleware, or "api" as a safe sentinel when the auth middleware
// did not populate the context (e.g., AUTH_TYPE=none, or internal/system calls
// that bypass auth).
//
// Post-M-002: this is the single source of truth for handler-layer actor
// resolution. Handlers must NOT hardcode string literals like "api-key-user"
// or "api" — always go through this helper so the named-key identity flows to
// services and the audit trail.
func resolveActor(ctx context.Context) string {
if user := middleware.GetUser(ctx); user != "" {
return user
}
return "api"
}
// PagedResponse represents a paginated API response.
type PagedResponse struct {
Data interface{} `json:"data"`
Total int64 `json:"total"`
Page int `json:"page"`
PerPage int `json:"per_page"`
}
// CursorPagedResponse represents a cursor-paginated API response.
type CursorPagedResponse struct {
Data interface{} `json:"data"`
Total int64 `json:"total"`
NextCursor string `json:"next_cursor,omitempty"`
PageSize int `json:"page_size"`
}
// ErrorResponse represents a standard error response.
type ErrorResponse struct {
Error string `json:"error"`
Message string `json:"message"`
RequestID string `json:"request_id,omitempty"`
}
// JSON writes a JSON response with the given status code and data.
func JSON(w http.ResponseWriter, status int, data interface{}) error {
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
w.WriteHeader(status)
return json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(data)
}
// Error writes a JSON error response with the given status code and message.
func Error(w http.ResponseWriter, status int, message string) error {
errResp := ErrorResponse{
Error: http.StatusText(status),
Message: message,
}
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
w.WriteHeader(status)
return json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(errResp)
}
// ErrorWithRequestID writes a JSON error response including a request ID.
func ErrorWithRequestID(w http.ResponseWriter, status int, message, requestID string) error {
errResp := ErrorResponse{
Error: http.StatusText(status),
Message: message,
RequestID: requestID,
}
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
w.WriteHeader(status)
return json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(errResp)
}
// encodeCursor creates an opaque cursor token from a timestamp and ID.
func encodeCursor(createdAt time.Time, id string) string {
raw := createdAt.Format(time.RFC3339Nano) + ":" + id
return base64.URLEncoding.EncodeToString([]byte(raw))
}
// decodeCursor extracts a timestamp and ID from a cursor token.
// Kept as var assignment to suppress unused lint — will be used when
// cursor-based pagination is wired into list handlers.
var _ = func(cursor string) (time.Time, string, error) {
raw, err := base64.URLEncoding.DecodeString(cursor)
if err != nil {
return time.Time{}, "", fmt.Errorf("invalid cursor: %w", err)
}
parts := strings.SplitN(string(raw), ":", 2)
if len(parts) != 2 {
return time.Time{}, "", fmt.Errorf("invalid cursor format")
}
t, err := time.Parse(time.RFC3339Nano, parts[0])
if err != nil {
return time.Time{}, "", fmt.Errorf("invalid cursor timestamp: %w", err)
}
return t, parts[1], nil
}
// filterFields removes fields not in the allowed list from the response data.
// Works with both single objects and slices.
func filterFields(data interface{}, fields []string) interface{} {
if len(fields) == 0 {
return data
}
// Create field set for O(1) lookup
fieldSet := make(map[string]bool, len(fields))
for _, f := range fields {
fieldSet[f] = true
}
// Marshal to JSON, then unmarshal to generic structure
bytes, err := json.Marshal(data)
if err != nil {
return data
}
// Try as array first
var arr []map[string]interface{}
if err := json.Unmarshal(bytes, &arr); err == nil {
for i := range arr {
for key := range arr[i] {
if !fieldSet[key] {
delete(arr[i], key)
}
}
}
return arr
}
// Try as object
var obj map[string]interface{}
if err := json.Unmarshal(bytes, &obj); err == nil {
for key := range obj {
if !fieldSet[key] {
delete(obj, key)
}
}
return obj
}
return data
}