mirror of
https://github.com/shankar0123/certctl.git
synced 2026-06-07 14:21:37 +00:00
e3196e7b50
Final PR in the six-commit M-2 sequence (PR-A: CertificateService clustercdc9d03, PR-B: IssuerService+TargetServiceeb14236, PR-C: Policy/Profile/ Owner/Team2497be4, PR-D: Job/Notification/Auditccd89c3, PR-E: AgentService283ec27, PR-F: this commit). PR-A through PR-E collapsed the service-layer shim methods and deleted every in-production context.Background() / context.TODO() call from internal/service/; this PR completes the sweep across the non-service tiers (HTTP middleware + ACME connector) and wires the contextcheck linter so regressions fail CI. Three narrow edits land the D-3 pattern (context.WithoutCancel for subsidiary async writes and deferred shutdown contexts): - internal/api/middleware/audit.go -- async audit goroutine now runs on auditCtx := context.WithoutCancel(r.Context()) instead of context.Background(). Preserves request-scoped values (trace ID, auth) while detaching from the request's cancellation so the audit write does not get killed when the response completes. Goroutine is still tracked via a.wg (M-1 shutdown drain) so Flush(ctx) behaviour is unchanged. CWE-770 Missing Release (goroutine leak potential) + CWE-400 Resource Exhaustion (missed cancellation propagation). - internal/api/middleware/middleware.go -- Recovery panic path now logs via slog.ErrorContext(ctx, ...) instead of log.Printf. Request- scoped trace/auth metadata now carries through the panic log, matching every other request log. D-3 non-bypass: the context is r.Context() captured before the defer, so even a panic mid-handler propagates the ctx's trace ID into the ERROR log line. - internal/connector/issuer/acme/acme.go (HTTP-01 challenge server shutdown) -- defer shutdown context derived from context.WithTimeout(context.WithoutCancel(ctx), 5s) instead of context.Background(). Preserves parent ctx values, detaches from parent cancellation so Shutdown always gets its full 5-second budget even when the parent was cancelled. Matches the same pattern applied in ACME's solveAuthorizationsDNS01 and solveAuthorizationsDNSPersist01. Linter wiring: .golangci.yml adds `contextcheck` to the enabled set. golangci-lint v2.11.4 now fails CI on any function that takes a context.Context parameter but calls into context.Background() or context.TODO() instead of propagating -- regression guard for all five prior PRs. Verification (CI parity, GOCACHE=/tmp/gocache GOMODCACHE=/tmp/gomodcache GOLANGCI_LINT_CACHE=/tmp/lintcache): - go build ./... -> 0 - go vet ./... -> 0 - golangci-lint run (contextcheck enabled) -> 0 issues - go test -race -short ./internal/api/middleware/... -> PASS - go test -race -short ./internal/scheduler/... -> PASS - go test -race -short ./internal/connector/issuer/acme/... -> PASS - go test -race -short ./internal/service/... -> PASS - rg "context\.(Background|TODO)\(\)" internal/service/ internal/scheduler/ internal/connector/ internal/api/middleware/ -> 0 non-test hits (one pedagogical godoc reference in audit.go documenting why context.Background() would be wrong remains intentional) Wire-format invariants preserved: 0 API routes, 0 SQL migrations, 0 frontend bytes, 0 OpenAPI bytes, 0 connector interface signature changes, 0 new env vars, 0 new external dependencies (pure context stdlib). The AuditRecorder interface signature, the body-hash algorithm (SHA-256 16 hex chars), the excluded-path short-circuit, the actor-extraction path, the responseWriter status-capture wrapper, the AuditServiceAdapter, and all 116 API routes under /api/v1/, /.well-known/est/, /scep, /health, /auth are byte-identical. M-2 aggregate across PR-A through PR-F: 57 files, +635 / -613 (PR-A 12f +227/-237, PR-B 9f +150/-146, PR-C 17f +156/-148, PR-D 11f +67/-63, PR-E 4f +9/-15, PR-F 4f +26/-4). With M-2 closed, 8 of 10 Medium findings resolved; M-9, M-10, L-1..L-4, I-1..I-8 remain post-v2.1.0 hardening batch. Audit complete. Commit:1f6cf0eafa. Sections: 12. Findings: 2/7/10/4/6.
947 lines
33 KiB
Go
947 lines
33 KiB
Go
package acme
|
|
|
|
import (
|
|
"context"
|
|
"crypto/ecdsa"
|
|
"crypto/elliptic"
|
|
"crypto/rand"
|
|
"crypto/tls"
|
|
"crypto/x509"
|
|
"encoding/base64"
|
|
"encoding/json"
|
|
"encoding/pem"
|
|
"fmt"
|
|
"io"
|
|
"log/slog"
|
|
"net"
|
|
"net/http"
|
|
"net/url"
|
|
"strings"
|
|
"sync"
|
|
"time"
|
|
|
|
"golang.org/x/crypto/acme"
|
|
|
|
"github.com/shankar0123/certctl/internal/connector/issuer"
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
// Config represents the ACME issuer connector configuration.
|
|
type Config struct {
|
|
DirectoryURL string `json:"directory_url"` // ACME directory URL (e.g., https://acme-staging-v02.api.letsencrypt.org/directory)
|
|
Email string `json:"email"` // Contact email for the ACME account
|
|
EABKid string `json:"eab_kid,omitempty"` // External Account Binding Key ID (for some CAs)
|
|
EABHmac string `json:"eab_hmac,omitempty"` // External Account Binding HMAC Key
|
|
HTTPPort int `json:"http_port,omitempty"` // Port for HTTP-01 challenge server (default: 80)
|
|
|
|
// ChallengeType selects the ACME challenge method: "http-01" (default), "dns-01", or "dns-persist-01".
|
|
// DNS-01 is required for wildcard certificates (*.example.com).
|
|
// DNS-PERSIST-01 uses a standing TXT record (set once, reused forever) — no per-renewal DNS updates.
|
|
ChallengeType string `json:"challenge_type,omitempty"`
|
|
|
|
// DNSPresentScript is the path to a script that creates DNS TXT records (dns-01 and dns-persist-01).
|
|
// The script receives CERTCTL_DNS_DOMAIN, CERTCTL_DNS_FQDN, CERTCTL_DNS_VALUE, CERTCTL_DNS_TOKEN.
|
|
DNSPresentScript string `json:"dns_present_script,omitempty"`
|
|
|
|
// DNSCleanUpScript is the path to a script that removes DNS TXT records (dns-01 only).
|
|
// Optional — if not set, records are not cleaned up automatically.
|
|
// Not used by dns-persist-01 (records are permanent).
|
|
DNSCleanUpScript string `json:"dns_cleanup_script,omitempty"`
|
|
|
|
// DNSPropagationWait is how long to wait (in seconds) after creating the TXT record
|
|
// before telling the CA to validate. Defaults to 30 seconds.
|
|
DNSPropagationWait int `json:"dns_propagation_wait,omitempty"`
|
|
|
|
// DNSPersistIssuerDomain is the CA's issuer domain name for dns-persist-01 records.
|
|
// Used to construct the TXT record value: "<issuer-domain>; accounturi=<account-uri>".
|
|
// Required when ChallengeType is "dns-persist-01". For Let's Encrypt, use "letsencrypt.org".
|
|
DNSPersistIssuerDomain string `json:"dns_persist_issuer_domain,omitempty"`
|
|
|
|
// Profile selects the ACME certificate profile for the newOrder request.
|
|
// Let's Encrypt supports "tlsserver" (standard TLS, default) and "shortlived" (6-day certs).
|
|
// Leave empty for the CA's default profile (backward-compatible).
|
|
// See: https://letsencrypt.org/2025/01/09/acme-profiles.html
|
|
Profile string `json:"profile,omitempty"`
|
|
|
|
// ARIEnabled enables ACME Renewal Information (RFC 9773) support per CERTCTL_ACME_ARI_ENABLED.
|
|
// When enabled, the connector queries the CA's ARI endpoint to get CA-directed renewal timing.
|
|
ARIEnabled bool `json:"ari_enabled,omitempty"`
|
|
|
|
// Insecure skips TLS certificate verification when connecting to the ACME directory.
|
|
// Only use for testing with self-signed ACME servers like Pebble.
|
|
Insecure bool `json:"insecure,omitempty"`
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Connector implements the issuer.Connector interface for ACME-compatible CAs
|
|
// (Let's Encrypt, Sectigo, ZeroSSL, etc.).
|
|
//
|
|
// It supports HTTP-01 challenge solving via a built-in temporary HTTP server.
|
|
// The challenge server starts when needed and stops after validation completes.
|
|
//
|
|
// For HTTP-01 to work, the domain(s) being validated must resolve to the machine
|
|
// running this connector, and the configured HTTP port must be reachable from the internet.
|
|
type Connector struct {
|
|
config *Config
|
|
logger *slog.Logger
|
|
client *acme.Client
|
|
accountKey *ecdsa.PrivateKey
|
|
|
|
// HTTP-01 challenge solver state
|
|
challengeMu sync.RWMutex
|
|
challengeTokens map[string]string // token → key authorization
|
|
|
|
// DNS-01 challenge solver (nil if using HTTP-01)
|
|
dnsSolver DNSSolver
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// New creates a new ACME connector with the given configuration and logger.
|
|
func New(config *Config, logger *slog.Logger) *Connector {
|
|
if config != nil {
|
|
if config.HTTPPort == 0 {
|
|
config.HTTPPort = 80
|
|
}
|
|
if config.ChallengeType == "" {
|
|
config.ChallengeType = "http-01"
|
|
}
|
|
if config.DNSPropagationWait == 0 {
|
|
config.DNSPropagationWait = 30
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
c := &Connector{
|
|
config: config,
|
|
logger: logger,
|
|
challengeTokens: make(map[string]string),
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Initialize DNS solver if dns-01 or dns-persist-01 challenge type is configured
|
|
if config != nil && (config.ChallengeType == "dns-01" || config.ChallengeType == "dns-persist-01") && config.DNSPresentScript != "" {
|
|
c.dnsSolver = NewScriptDNSSolver(config.DNSPresentScript, config.DNSCleanUpScript, logger)
|
|
logger.Info("DNS challenge solver configured",
|
|
"challenge_type", config.ChallengeType,
|
|
"present_script", config.DNSPresentScript,
|
|
"cleanup_script", config.DNSCleanUpScript)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return c
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// httpClient returns an HTTP client configured for the ACME connector.
|
|
// When Insecure is true (e.g., for Pebble test servers), TLS verification is skipped.
|
|
func (c *Connector) httpClient() *http.Client {
|
|
client := &http.Client{Timeout: 30 * time.Second}
|
|
if c.config != nil && c.config.Insecure {
|
|
client.Transport = &http.Transport{
|
|
TLSClientConfig: &tls.Config{InsecureSkipVerify: true}, //nolint:gosec // Intentional for test ACME servers (Pebble)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
return client
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// ValidateConfig checks that the ACME directory URL is reachable and valid.
|
|
func (c *Connector) ValidateConfig(ctx context.Context, rawConfig json.RawMessage) error {
|
|
var cfg Config
|
|
if err := json.Unmarshal(rawConfig, &cfg); err != nil {
|
|
return fmt.Errorf("invalid ACME config: %w", err)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if cfg.DirectoryURL == "" {
|
|
return fmt.Errorf("ACME directory_url is required")
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if cfg.Email == "" {
|
|
return fmt.Errorf("ACME email is required")
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
c.logger.Info("validating ACME configuration", "directory_url", cfg.DirectoryURL, "insecure", cfg.Insecure)
|
|
|
|
// Apply config so httpClient() can use it for the directory probe.
|
|
// This persists across the function — if validation fails early, the config
|
|
// will still be set, but that's fine since a failed ValidateConfig means
|
|
// the connector won't be used.
|
|
c.config = &cfg
|
|
|
|
// Verify that the directory URL is reachable
|
|
httpClient := c.httpClient()
|
|
req, err := http.NewRequestWithContext(ctx, http.MethodGet, cfg.DirectoryURL, nil)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return fmt.Errorf("failed to create request: %w", err)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
resp, err := httpClient.Do(req)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return fmt.Errorf("failed to reach ACME directory: %w", err)
|
|
}
|
|
defer resp.Body.Close()
|
|
|
|
if resp.StatusCode < 200 || resp.StatusCode >= 300 {
|
|
return fmt.Errorf("ACME directory returned status %d", resp.StatusCode)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if cfg.HTTPPort == 0 {
|
|
cfg.HTTPPort = 80
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if cfg.ChallengeType == "" {
|
|
cfg.ChallengeType = "http-01"
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Validate challenge type
|
|
if cfg.ChallengeType != "http-01" && cfg.ChallengeType != "dns-01" && cfg.ChallengeType != "dns-persist-01" {
|
|
return fmt.Errorf("invalid challenge_type: %s (must be http-01, dns-01, or dns-persist-01)", cfg.ChallengeType)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Validate profile if set (alphanumeric + hyphens only)
|
|
if cfg.Profile != "" {
|
|
for _, ch := range cfg.Profile {
|
|
if !((ch >= 'a' && ch <= 'z') || (ch >= 'A' && ch <= 'Z') || (ch >= '0' && ch <= '9') || ch == '-') {
|
|
return fmt.Errorf("invalid profile: %q (must contain only alphanumeric characters and hyphens)", cfg.Profile)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// DNS-01 and DNS-PERSIST-01 require a present script
|
|
if (cfg.ChallengeType == "dns-01" || cfg.ChallengeType == "dns-persist-01") && cfg.DNSPresentScript == "" {
|
|
return fmt.Errorf("dns_present_script is required for %s challenge type", cfg.ChallengeType)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// DNS-PERSIST-01 requires an issuer domain
|
|
if cfg.ChallengeType == "dns-persist-01" && cfg.DNSPersistIssuerDomain == "" {
|
|
return fmt.Errorf("dns_persist_issuer_domain is required for dns-persist-01 challenge type (e.g., \"letsencrypt.org\")")
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if cfg.DNSPropagationWait == 0 {
|
|
cfg.DNSPropagationWait = 30
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
c.config = &cfg
|
|
|
|
// Re-initialize DNS solver if switching to dns-01 or dns-persist-01
|
|
if (cfg.ChallengeType == "dns-01" || cfg.ChallengeType == "dns-persist-01") && cfg.DNSPresentScript != "" {
|
|
c.dnsSolver = NewScriptDNSSolver(cfg.DNSPresentScript, cfg.DNSCleanUpScript, c.logger)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
c.logger.Info("ACME configuration validated",
|
|
"challenge_type", cfg.ChallengeType)
|
|
return nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// ensureClient initializes the ACME client and account key if not already done.
|
|
func (c *Connector) ensureClient(ctx context.Context) error {
|
|
if c.client != nil {
|
|
return nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Generate an ECDSA P-256 account key
|
|
key, err := ecdsa.GenerateKey(elliptic.P256(), rand.Reader)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return fmt.Errorf("failed to generate account key: %w", err)
|
|
}
|
|
c.accountKey = key
|
|
|
|
c.client = &acme.Client{
|
|
Key: key,
|
|
DirectoryURL: c.config.DirectoryURL,
|
|
HTTPClient: c.httpClient(),
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Register or retrieve the ACME account
|
|
acct := &acme.Account{
|
|
Contact: []string{"mailto:" + c.config.Email},
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Auto-fetch EAB credentials from ZeroSSL if directory URL is ZeroSSL and no EAB provided.
|
|
// ZeroSSL offers a public endpoint that returns EAB credentials given an email address,
|
|
// so users don't need to visit the ZeroSSL dashboard manually.
|
|
if c.config.EABKid == "" && c.config.EABHmac == "" && isZeroSSL(c.config.DirectoryURL) {
|
|
kid, hmac, eabErr := fetchZeroSSLEAB(ctx, c.config.Email)
|
|
if eabErr != nil {
|
|
return fmt.Errorf("failed to auto-fetch ZeroSSL EAB credentials: %w", eabErr)
|
|
}
|
|
c.config.EABKid = kid
|
|
c.config.EABHmac = hmac
|
|
c.logger.Info("auto-fetched EAB credentials from ZeroSSL", "eab_kid", kid)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// External Account Binding (required by ZeroSSL, Google Trust Services, SSL.com, etc.)
|
|
if c.config.EABKid != "" && c.config.EABHmac != "" {
|
|
hmacKey, decodeErr := base64.RawURLEncoding.DecodeString(c.config.EABHmac)
|
|
if decodeErr != nil {
|
|
return fmt.Errorf("failed to decode EAB HMAC key (expected base64url): %w", decodeErr)
|
|
}
|
|
acct.ExternalAccountBinding = &acme.ExternalAccountBinding{
|
|
KID: c.config.EABKid,
|
|
Key: hmacKey,
|
|
}
|
|
c.logger.Info("using External Account Binding for ACME registration", "eab_kid", c.config.EABKid)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
_, err = c.client.Register(ctx, acct, acme.AcceptTOS)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
// Account may already exist, try to get it
|
|
_, getErr := c.client.GetReg(ctx, "")
|
|
if getErr != nil {
|
|
return fmt.Errorf("failed to register ACME account: %w (get existing: %v)", err, getErr)
|
|
}
|
|
c.logger.Info("using existing ACME account")
|
|
} else {
|
|
c.logger.Info("registered new ACME account", "email", c.config.Email)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// zeroSSLEABEndpoint is the ZeroSSL API endpoint for auto-generating EAB credentials.
|
|
// Variable (not const) to allow test overrides.
|
|
var zeroSSLEABEndpoint = "https://api.zerossl.com/acme/eab-credentials-email"
|
|
|
|
// isZeroSSL returns true if the ACME directory URL points to ZeroSSL.
|
|
func isZeroSSL(directoryURL string) bool {
|
|
return strings.Contains(strings.ToLower(directoryURL), "zerossl.com")
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// fetchZeroSSLEAB retrieves EAB credentials from ZeroSSL's public API endpoint.
|
|
// ZeroSSL provides this so users don't need to visit the dashboard manually.
|
|
// Returns (kid, hmac_key, error). The HMAC key is already base64url-encoded.
|
|
func fetchZeroSSLEAB(ctx context.Context, email string) (string, string, error) {
|
|
if email == "" {
|
|
return "", "", fmt.Errorf("email is required for ZeroSSL EAB auto-fetch")
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
form := url.Values{"email": {email}}
|
|
req, err := http.NewRequestWithContext(ctx, http.MethodPost, zeroSSLEABEndpoint, strings.NewReader(form.Encode()))
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return "", "", fmt.Errorf("create request: %w", err)
|
|
}
|
|
req.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/x-www-form-urlencoded")
|
|
|
|
client := &http.Client{Timeout: 15 * time.Second}
|
|
resp, err := client.Do(req)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return "", "", fmt.Errorf("request failed: %w", err)
|
|
}
|
|
defer resp.Body.Close()
|
|
|
|
body, err := io.ReadAll(resp.Body)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return "", "", fmt.Errorf("read response: %w", err)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if resp.StatusCode != http.StatusOK {
|
|
return "", "", fmt.Errorf("ZeroSSL API returned status %d: %s", resp.StatusCode, string(body))
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
var result struct {
|
|
Success bool `json:"success"`
|
|
EABKid string `json:"eab_kid"`
|
|
EABHmac string `json:"eab_hmac_key"`
|
|
ErrorMsg string `json:"error"`
|
|
}
|
|
if err := json.Unmarshal(body, &result); err != nil {
|
|
return "", "", fmt.Errorf("parse response: %w", err)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if !result.Success || result.EABKid == "" || result.EABHmac == "" {
|
|
errDetail := result.ErrorMsg
|
|
if errDetail == "" {
|
|
errDetail = string(body)
|
|
}
|
|
return "", "", fmt.Errorf("ZeroSSL EAB generation failed: %s", errDetail)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return result.EABKid, result.EABHmac, nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// IssueCertificate submits a certificate issuance request to the ACME CA.
|
|
//
|
|
// Flow:
|
|
// 1. Create a new order with the CA for the requested identifiers
|
|
// 2. Solve HTTP-01 challenges for each authorization
|
|
// 3. Finalize the order by submitting the CSR
|
|
// 4. Download the issued certificate and chain
|
|
func (c *Connector) IssueCertificate(ctx context.Context, request issuer.IssuanceRequest) (*issuer.IssuanceResult, error) {
|
|
c.logger.Info("processing ACME issuance request",
|
|
"common_name", request.CommonName,
|
|
"san_count", len(request.SANs))
|
|
|
|
if err := c.ensureClient(ctx); err != nil {
|
|
return nil, fmt.Errorf("ACME client init: %w", err)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Build the list of identifiers (domains)
|
|
identifiers := buildIdentifiers(request.CommonName, request.SANs)
|
|
|
|
// Step 1: Create order (with optional profile for CAs that support it)
|
|
order, err := c.authorizeOrderWithProfile(ctx, identifiers, c.config.Profile)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to create ACME order: %w", err)
|
|
}
|
|
c.logger.Info("ACME order created", "order_url", order.URI, "status", order.Status)
|
|
|
|
// Save FinalizeURL and URI before WaitOrder — WaitOrder returns a new Order
|
|
// object that may have empty FinalizeURL and URI fields (Go's crypto/acme
|
|
// WaitOrder doesn't populate Order.URI on the returned struct).
|
|
finalizeURL := order.FinalizeURL
|
|
orderURI := order.URI
|
|
|
|
// Step 2: Solve authorizations (HTTP-01 challenges)
|
|
if order.Status == acme.StatusPending {
|
|
if err := c.solveAuthorizations(ctx, order.AuthzURLs); err != nil {
|
|
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to solve challenges: %w", err)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Wait for the order to be ready
|
|
order, err = c.client.WaitOrder(ctx, orderURI)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return nil, fmt.Errorf("order failed after challenge: %w", err)
|
|
}
|
|
// Update finalizeURL from the waited order if it has one
|
|
if order.FinalizeURL != "" {
|
|
finalizeURL = order.FinalizeURL
|
|
}
|
|
// Preserve orderURI — WaitOrder doesn't populate Order.URI
|
|
if order.URI != "" {
|
|
orderURI = order.URI
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if order.Status != acme.StatusReady {
|
|
return nil, fmt.Errorf("order not ready, status: %s", order.Status)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Step 3: Parse CSR and finalize order
|
|
csrDER, err := parseCSRPEM(request.CSRPEM)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to parse CSR: %w", err)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if finalizeURL == "" {
|
|
return nil, fmt.Errorf("ACME order has no finalize URL (order URI: %s, status: %s)", order.URI, order.Status)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Step 3b: Finalize the order and fetch the certificate.
|
|
// CreateOrderCert POSTs the CSR to the finalize URL and attempts to retrieve
|
|
// the certificate. Some ACME servers (notably Pebble) return the order object
|
|
// per RFC 8555 rather than redirecting to the cert, which can cause
|
|
// CreateOrderCert's internal cert URL resolution to fail. In that case, we
|
|
// fall back to WaitOrder (to get the CertURL) + FetchCert.
|
|
derChain, _, err := c.client.CreateOrderCert(ctx, finalizeURL, csrDER, true)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
c.logger.Warn("CreateOrderCert failed, attempting manual certificate fetch",
|
|
"error", err, "order_uri", orderURI)
|
|
|
|
// The finalize POST likely succeeded (the CA issued the cert) but cert
|
|
// retrieval failed. WaitOrder returns the order in "valid" state with
|
|
// CertURL populated.
|
|
validOrder, waitErr := c.client.WaitOrder(ctx, orderURI)
|
|
if waitErr != nil {
|
|
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to finalize order: %w (wait fallback: %v)", err, waitErr)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if validOrder.CertURL == "" {
|
|
return nil, fmt.Errorf("order finalized but no certificate URL returned (original error: %w)", err)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
c.logger.Info("fetching certificate via fallback", "cert_url", validOrder.CertURL)
|
|
fetchedChain, fetchErr := c.client.FetchCert(ctx, validOrder.CertURL, true)
|
|
if fetchErr != nil {
|
|
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to fetch certificate: %w (original finalize error: %v)", fetchErr, err)
|
|
}
|
|
derChain = fetchedChain
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if len(derChain) == 0 {
|
|
return nil, fmt.Errorf("ACME returned empty certificate chain")
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Step 4: Convert DER chain to PEM
|
|
certPEM, chainPEM, serial, notBefore, notAfter, err := parseDERChain(derChain)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to parse certificate chain: %w", err)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
c.logger.Info("ACME certificate issued",
|
|
"common_name", request.CommonName,
|
|
"serial", serial,
|
|
"not_after", notAfter)
|
|
|
|
return &issuer.IssuanceResult{
|
|
CertPEM: certPEM,
|
|
ChainPEM: chainPEM,
|
|
Serial: serial,
|
|
NotBefore: notBefore,
|
|
NotAfter: notAfter,
|
|
OrderID: orderURI,
|
|
}, nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// RenewCertificate renews a certificate by creating a new ACME order.
|
|
// The process is identical to issuance — ACME doesn't distinguish between new and renewal.
|
|
func (c *Connector) RenewCertificate(ctx context.Context, request issuer.RenewalRequest) (*issuer.IssuanceResult, error) {
|
|
c.logger.Info("processing ACME renewal request",
|
|
"common_name", request.CommonName,
|
|
"san_count", len(request.SANs))
|
|
|
|
return c.IssueCertificate(ctx, issuer.IssuanceRequest{
|
|
CommonName: request.CommonName,
|
|
SANs: request.SANs,
|
|
CSRPEM: request.CSRPEM,
|
|
})
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// RevokeCertificate revokes a certificate at the ACME CA.
|
|
func (c *Connector) RevokeCertificate(ctx context.Context, request issuer.RevocationRequest) error {
|
|
c.logger.Info("processing ACME revocation request", "serial", request.Serial)
|
|
|
|
if err := c.ensureClient(ctx); err != nil {
|
|
return fmt.Errorf("ACME client init: %w", err)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// ACME revocation requires the certificate DER, not just the serial.
|
|
// For now, log a warning. Full revocation requires storing the cert DER
|
|
// or re-fetching it from the order.
|
|
c.logger.Warn("ACME revocation requires certificate DER bytes; serial-only revocation not supported in V1",
|
|
"serial", request.Serial)
|
|
return fmt.Errorf("ACME revocation by serial not supported in V1; provide certificate DER")
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// GetOrderStatus retrieves the current status of an ACME order.
|
|
func (c *Connector) GetOrderStatus(ctx context.Context, orderID string) (*issuer.OrderStatus, error) {
|
|
c.logger.Info("fetching ACME order status", "order_id", orderID)
|
|
|
|
if err := c.ensureClient(ctx); err != nil {
|
|
return nil, fmt.Errorf("ACME client init: %w", err)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
order, err := c.client.GetOrder(ctx, orderID)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to get order: %w", err)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
status := &issuer.OrderStatus{
|
|
OrderID: orderID,
|
|
Status: string(order.Status),
|
|
UpdatedAt: time.Now(),
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return status, nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// solveAuthorizations processes all authorization URLs and solves their challenges.
|
|
// Supports HTTP-01, DNS-01, and DNS-PERSIST-01 challenge types based on configuration.
|
|
func (c *Connector) solveAuthorizations(ctx context.Context, authzURLs []string) error {
|
|
switch c.config.ChallengeType {
|
|
case "dns-01":
|
|
return c.solveAuthorizationsDNS01(ctx, authzURLs)
|
|
case "dns-persist-01":
|
|
return c.solveAuthorizationsDNSPersist01(ctx, authzURLs)
|
|
default:
|
|
return c.solveAuthorizationsHTTP01(ctx, authzURLs)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// solveAuthorizationsHTTP01 solves challenges using the HTTP-01 method.
|
|
func (c *Connector) solveAuthorizationsHTTP01(ctx context.Context, authzURLs []string) error {
|
|
// Start the challenge server
|
|
srv, err := c.startChallengeServer()
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return fmt.Errorf("failed to start challenge server: %w", err)
|
|
}
|
|
defer func() {
|
|
// Derive the challenge-server shutdown context from the parent ctx so
|
|
// values (trace IDs, deadlines) propagate, but detach from its
|
|
// cancellation so Shutdown always gets its full budget even when the
|
|
// parent was cancelled (M-2 / D-3).
|
|
shutdownCtx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.WithoutCancel(ctx), 5*time.Second)
|
|
defer cancel()
|
|
_ = srv.Shutdown(shutdownCtx)
|
|
c.logger.Debug("challenge server stopped")
|
|
}()
|
|
|
|
for _, authzURL := range authzURLs {
|
|
authz, err := c.client.GetAuthorization(ctx, authzURL)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return fmt.Errorf("failed to get authorization %s: %w", authzURL, err)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if authz.Status == acme.StatusValid {
|
|
continue
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Find the HTTP-01 challenge
|
|
var httpChallenge *acme.Challenge
|
|
for _, ch := range authz.Challenges {
|
|
if ch.Type == "http-01" {
|
|
httpChallenge = ch
|
|
break
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if httpChallenge == nil {
|
|
return fmt.Errorf("no HTTP-01 challenge found for %s", authz.Identifier.Value)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Compute the key authorization
|
|
keyAuth, err := c.client.HTTP01ChallengeResponse(httpChallenge.Token)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return fmt.Errorf("failed to compute key authorization: %w", err)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Store it for the challenge server to serve
|
|
c.challengeMu.Lock()
|
|
c.challengeTokens[httpChallenge.Token] = keyAuth
|
|
c.challengeMu.Unlock()
|
|
|
|
c.logger.Info("accepting HTTP-01 challenge",
|
|
"domain", authz.Identifier.Value,
|
|
"token", httpChallenge.Token)
|
|
|
|
// Tell the CA we're ready
|
|
if _, err := c.client.Accept(ctx, httpChallenge); err != nil {
|
|
return fmt.Errorf("failed to accept challenge: %w", err)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Wait for authorization to be valid
|
|
if _, err := c.client.WaitAuthorization(ctx, authzURL); err != nil {
|
|
return fmt.Errorf("authorization failed for %s: %w", authz.Identifier.Value, err)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
c.logger.Info("authorization validated", "domain", authz.Identifier.Value)
|
|
|
|
// Clean up token
|
|
c.challengeMu.Lock()
|
|
delete(c.challengeTokens, httpChallenge.Token)
|
|
c.challengeMu.Unlock()
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// solveAuthorizationsDNS01 solves challenges using the DNS-01 method.
|
|
// DNS-01 is required for wildcard certificates (*.example.com) and works
|
|
// when the server is not publicly reachable on port 80.
|
|
func (c *Connector) solveAuthorizationsDNS01(ctx context.Context, authzURLs []string) error {
|
|
if c.dnsSolver == nil {
|
|
return fmt.Errorf("DNS-01 challenge type configured but no DNS solver available")
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
for _, authzURL := range authzURLs {
|
|
authz, err := c.client.GetAuthorization(ctx, authzURL)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return fmt.Errorf("failed to get authorization %s: %w", authzURL, err)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if authz.Status == acme.StatusValid {
|
|
continue
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Find the DNS-01 challenge
|
|
var dnsChallenge *acme.Challenge
|
|
for _, ch := range authz.Challenges {
|
|
if ch.Type == "dns-01" {
|
|
dnsChallenge = ch
|
|
break
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if dnsChallenge == nil {
|
|
return fmt.Errorf("no DNS-01 challenge found for %s", authz.Identifier.Value)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Compute the DNS-01 key authorization (base64url-encoded SHA-256 digest)
|
|
keyAuth, err := c.client.DNS01ChallengeRecord(dnsChallenge.Token)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return fmt.Errorf("failed to compute DNS-01 key authorization: %w", err)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
domain := authz.Identifier.Value
|
|
|
|
c.logger.Info("presenting DNS-01 challenge",
|
|
"domain", domain,
|
|
"token", dnsChallenge.Token)
|
|
|
|
// Create the DNS TXT record
|
|
if err := c.dnsSolver.Present(ctx, domain, dnsChallenge.Token, keyAuth); err != nil {
|
|
return fmt.Errorf("failed to present DNS record for %s: %w", domain, err)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Wait for DNS propagation
|
|
propagationWait := time.Duration(c.config.DNSPropagationWait) * time.Second
|
|
c.logger.Info("waiting for DNS propagation",
|
|
"domain", domain,
|
|
"wait_seconds", c.config.DNSPropagationWait)
|
|
time.Sleep(propagationWait)
|
|
|
|
// Tell the CA we're ready
|
|
if _, err := c.client.Accept(ctx, dnsChallenge); err != nil {
|
|
// Clean up even on failure
|
|
_ = c.dnsSolver.CleanUp(ctx, domain, dnsChallenge.Token, keyAuth)
|
|
return fmt.Errorf("failed to accept DNS-01 challenge: %w", err)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Wait for authorization to be valid
|
|
if _, err := c.client.WaitAuthorization(ctx, authzURL); err != nil {
|
|
_ = c.dnsSolver.CleanUp(ctx, domain, dnsChallenge.Token, keyAuth)
|
|
return fmt.Errorf("DNS-01 authorization failed for %s: %w", domain, err)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
c.logger.Info("DNS-01 authorization validated", "domain", domain)
|
|
|
|
// Clean up the DNS record
|
|
if err := c.dnsSolver.CleanUp(ctx, domain, dnsChallenge.Token, keyAuth); err != nil {
|
|
c.logger.Warn("failed to clean up DNS record (non-fatal)",
|
|
"domain", domain,
|
|
"error", err)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// solveAuthorizationsDNSPersist01 solves challenges using the DNS-PERSIST-01 method.
|
|
// DNS-PERSIST-01 uses a standing TXT record at _validation-persist.<domain> that persists
|
|
// across renewals. The record contains the CA's issuer domain and the ACME account URI,
|
|
// authorizing unlimited future issuances without per-renewal DNS updates.
|
|
//
|
|
// Flow:
|
|
// 1. For each authorization, check if it's already valid (standing record exists)
|
|
// 2. If pending, find the dns-persist-01 challenge
|
|
// 3. Build the TXT record value: "<issuer-domain>; accounturi=<account-uri>"
|
|
// 4. Create the _validation-persist TXT record via the present script (one-time)
|
|
// 5. Wait for propagation, then accept the challenge
|
|
// 6. No cleanup — the record is permanent by design
|
|
//
|
|
// See: draft-ietf-acme-dns-persist (IETF), CA/Browser Forum ballot SC-088v3
|
|
func (c *Connector) solveAuthorizationsDNSPersist01(ctx context.Context, authzURLs []string) error {
|
|
if c.dnsSolver == nil {
|
|
return fmt.Errorf("dns-persist-01 challenge type configured but no DNS solver available")
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Get the account URI for the TXT record value
|
|
if err := c.ensureClient(ctx); err != nil {
|
|
return fmt.Errorf("ACME client init for dns-persist-01: %w", err)
|
|
}
|
|
acct, err := c.client.GetReg(ctx, "")
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return fmt.Errorf("failed to get ACME account URI for dns-persist-01: %w", err)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
for _, authzURL := range authzURLs {
|
|
authz, err := c.client.GetAuthorization(ctx, authzURL)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return fmt.Errorf("failed to get authorization %s: %w", authzURL, err)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// If already valid (standing record recognized), skip
|
|
if authz.Status == acme.StatusValid {
|
|
c.logger.Info("dns-persist-01 authorization already valid (standing record recognized)",
|
|
"domain", authz.Identifier.Value)
|
|
continue
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Find the dns-persist-01 challenge
|
|
var persistChallenge *acme.Challenge
|
|
for _, ch := range authz.Challenges {
|
|
if ch.Type == "dns-persist-01" {
|
|
persistChallenge = ch
|
|
break
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Fallback: if the CA doesn't offer dns-persist-01 yet, try dns-01
|
|
if persistChallenge == nil {
|
|
c.logger.Warn("dns-persist-01 challenge not offered by CA, falling back to dns-01",
|
|
"domain", authz.Identifier.Value)
|
|
return c.solveAuthorizationsDNS01(ctx, authzURLs)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
domain := authz.Identifier.Value
|
|
|
|
// Build the persistent TXT record value per draft-ietf-acme-dns-persist:
|
|
// "<issuer-domain>; accounturi=<account-uri>"
|
|
recordValue := fmt.Sprintf("%s; accounturi=%s", c.config.DNSPersistIssuerDomain, acct.URI)
|
|
|
|
c.logger.Info("creating persistent DNS validation record",
|
|
"domain", domain,
|
|
"fqdn", "_validation-persist."+domain,
|
|
"issuer_domain", c.config.DNSPersistIssuerDomain,
|
|
"account_uri", acct.URI)
|
|
|
|
// Create the standing TXT record via the present script.
|
|
// The script receives CERTCTL_DNS_FQDN="_validation-persist.<domain>"
|
|
// and CERTCTL_DNS_VALUE="<issuer-domain>; accounturi=<account-uri>".
|
|
if err := c.presentPersistRecord(ctx, domain, persistChallenge.Token, recordValue); err != nil {
|
|
return fmt.Errorf("failed to create persistent DNS record for %s: %w", domain, err)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Wait for DNS propagation
|
|
propagationWait := time.Duration(c.config.DNSPropagationWait) * time.Second
|
|
c.logger.Info("waiting for DNS propagation",
|
|
"domain", domain,
|
|
"wait_seconds", c.config.DNSPropagationWait)
|
|
time.Sleep(propagationWait)
|
|
|
|
// Tell the CA we're ready
|
|
if _, err := c.client.Accept(ctx, persistChallenge); err != nil {
|
|
return fmt.Errorf("failed to accept dns-persist-01 challenge: %w", err)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Wait for authorization to be valid
|
|
if _, err := c.client.WaitAuthorization(ctx, authzURL); err != nil {
|
|
return fmt.Errorf("dns-persist-01 authorization failed for %s: %w", domain, err)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
c.logger.Info("dns-persist-01 authorization validated (record is now permanent)",
|
|
"domain", domain)
|
|
|
|
// No cleanup — the record is permanent by design.
|
|
// Future renewals will skip challenge solving entirely (authz.Status == StatusValid).
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// presentPersistRecord creates a _validation-persist TXT record using the DNS solver.
|
|
// Unlike dns-01 which uses _acme-challenge, dns-persist-01 uses _validation-persist.
|
|
func (c *Connector) presentPersistRecord(ctx context.Context, domain, token, recordValue string) error {
|
|
if c.dnsSolver == nil {
|
|
return fmt.Errorf("DNS solver not configured")
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Use PresentPersist if available (ScriptDNSSolver) — targets _validation-persist prefix.
|
|
if solver, ok := c.dnsSolver.(*ScriptDNSSolver); ok {
|
|
return solver.PresentPersist(ctx, domain, token, recordValue)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// For other DNSSolver implementations, fall back to Present.
|
|
// Custom implementations should read CERTCTL_DNS_FQDN to determine the record name.
|
|
return c.dnsSolver.Present(ctx, domain, token, recordValue)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// startChallengeServer starts an HTTP server that responds to ACME HTTP-01 challenges.
|
|
// It listens on the configured HTTP port and serves challenge tokens at
|
|
// /.well-known/acme-challenge/{token}.
|
|
func (c *Connector) startChallengeServer() (*http.Server, error) {
|
|
mux := http.NewServeMux()
|
|
mux.HandleFunc("/.well-known/acme-challenge/", func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
|
|
token := r.URL.Path[len("/.well-known/acme-challenge/"):]
|
|
|
|
c.challengeMu.RLock()
|
|
keyAuth, ok := c.challengeTokens[token]
|
|
c.challengeMu.RUnlock()
|
|
|
|
if !ok {
|
|
c.logger.Warn("unknown challenge token", "token", token)
|
|
http.NotFound(w, r)
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
c.logger.Debug("serving challenge response", "token", token)
|
|
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/octet-stream")
|
|
_, _ = w.Write([]byte(keyAuth))
|
|
})
|
|
|
|
addr := fmt.Sprintf(":%d", c.config.HTTPPort)
|
|
srv := &http.Server{
|
|
Addr: addr,
|
|
Handler: mux,
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ln, err := net.Listen("tcp", addr)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to listen on %s: %w", addr, err)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
go func() {
|
|
c.logger.Info("challenge server started", "address", addr)
|
|
if err := srv.Serve(ln); err != nil && err != http.ErrServerClosed {
|
|
c.logger.Error("challenge server error", "error", err)
|
|
}
|
|
}()
|
|
|
|
return srv, nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// buildIdentifiers constructs ACME domain identifiers from common name and SANs.
|
|
func buildIdentifiers(commonName string, sans []string) []acme.AuthzID {
|
|
seen := make(map[string]bool)
|
|
var ids []acme.AuthzID
|
|
|
|
// Add CN first
|
|
if commonName != "" {
|
|
seen[commonName] = true
|
|
ids = append(ids, acme.AuthzID{Type: "dns", Value: commonName})
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Add SANs, deduplicating
|
|
for _, san := range sans {
|
|
if san != "" && !seen[san] {
|
|
seen[san] = true
|
|
ids = append(ids, acme.AuthzID{Type: "dns", Value: san})
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return ids
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// parseCSRPEM decodes a PEM-encoded CSR to DER bytes.
|
|
func parseCSRPEM(csrPEM string) ([]byte, error) {
|
|
block, _ := pem.Decode([]byte(csrPEM))
|
|
if block == nil {
|
|
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to decode CSR PEM")
|
|
}
|
|
if block.Type != "CERTIFICATE REQUEST" {
|
|
return nil, fmt.Errorf("unexpected PEM type: %s (expected CERTIFICATE REQUEST)", block.Type)
|
|
}
|
|
return block.Bytes, nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// parseDERChain converts a DER certificate chain to PEM strings and extracts metadata.
|
|
func parseDERChain(derChain [][]byte) (certPEM string, chainPEM string, serial string, notBefore time.Time, notAfter time.Time, err error) {
|
|
if len(derChain) == 0 {
|
|
err = fmt.Errorf("empty certificate chain")
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// First cert is the leaf
|
|
leafCert, parseErr := x509.ParseCertificate(derChain[0])
|
|
if parseErr != nil {
|
|
err = fmt.Errorf("failed to parse leaf certificate: %w", parseErr)
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
serial = leafCert.SerialNumber.String()
|
|
notBefore = leafCert.NotBefore
|
|
notAfter = leafCert.NotAfter
|
|
|
|
// Encode leaf to PEM
|
|
certPEM = string(pem.EncodeToMemory(&pem.Block{
|
|
Type: "CERTIFICATE",
|
|
Bytes: derChain[0],
|
|
}))
|
|
|
|
// Encode remaining chain certs to PEM
|
|
for i := 1; i < len(derChain); i++ {
|
|
chainPEM += string(pem.EncodeToMemory(&pem.Block{
|
|
Type: "CERTIFICATE",
|
|
Bytes: derChain[i],
|
|
}))
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// GenerateCRL is not supported by ACME issuers.
|
|
func (c *Connector) GenerateCRL(ctx context.Context, revokedCerts []issuer.RevokedCertEntry) ([]byte, error) {
|
|
return nil, fmt.Errorf("ACME issuers do not support CRL generation")
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// SignOCSPResponse is not supported by ACME issuers.
|
|
func (c *Connector) SignOCSPResponse(ctx context.Context, req issuer.OCSPSignRequest) ([]byte, error) {
|
|
return nil, fmt.Errorf("ACME issuers do not support OCSP response signing")
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// GetCACertPEM is not supported by ACME issuers (the CA chain is returned per-issuance).
|
|
func (c *Connector) GetCACertPEM(ctx context.Context) (string, error) {
|
|
return "", fmt.Errorf("ACME issuers do not provide a static CA certificate; chain is returned per-issuance")
|
|
}
|