Files
certctl/internal/api/handler/validation.go
T
Shankar dfa9faa426 fix(policies): close the D-006 loop — TitleCase seed canonicals + severity-aware, config-consuming rule engine (D-008)
D-008 was a three-part drift in the policy engine that made the
D-005/D-006 remediation cosmetic below the DB layer:

  (a) migrations/seed.sql INSERTed rules with pre-D-005 lowercase
      types ('ownership', 'environment', 'lifetime', 'renewal_window')
      that the handler validator rejects on Create/Update but that
      raw SQL INSERTs bypassed entirely. At runtime evaluateRule's
      switch fell through to the default "unknown policy rule type"
      error branch on every demo rule × every cert × every cycle,
      flooding logs while emitting zero violations.

  (b) migrations/seed_demo.sql persisted lowercase severity values
      ('critical', 'error', 'warning') on policy_violations rows.
      INSERT succeeded because that column had no CHECK, but any
      frontend comparing against the canonical PolicySeverity enum
      mis-categorized every seeded violation.

  (c) evaluateRule hardcoded Severity: PolicySeverityWarning on
      every emitted violation and ignored rule.Config entirely —
      so the D-006 per-rule severity column (000013) and every
      per-arm Config JSON ({allowed_issuer_ids, allowed_domains,
      required_keys, allowed, lead_time_days, max_days}) was dead
      data below the evaluation layer.

This commit lands (a)+(b)+(c) atomically. Shipping any subset
leaves the feature half-working.

## Changes

Domain (internal/domain/policy.go):
  * Add PolicyTypeCertificateLifetime as the 6th TitleCase canonical.
    Pre-D-008 the seeded "max-certificate-lifetime" rule had no engine
    arm — routing it through RenewalLeadTime would conflate "how
    close to expiry before we renew" with "how long can the cert
    possibly be", two distinct semantics. The new type accepts
    config {"max_days": int} and flags certs whose
    NotAfter - NotBefore exceeds the cap.

Handler validator (internal/api/handler/validation.go):
  * ValidatePolicyType allowlist grown to 6 canonicals
    (AllowedIssuers, AllowedDomains, RequiredMetadata,
    AllowedEnvironments, RenewalLeadTime, CertificateLifetime).

OpenAPI (api/openapi.yaml):
  * PolicyType enum grown to match domain.

Frontend (web/src/api/types.ts, types.test.ts):
  * POLICY_TYPES tuple gains CertificateLifetime; pin test asserts
    all 6 canonicals and rejects casing drift.

Migration 000014 (policy_violations severity CHECK):
  * Named CHECK constraint (policy_violations_severity_check)
    mirroring 000013's allowlist, defense-in-depth at the DB layer
    against future drift from bypassed writes (migrations, psql
    sessions, future callers). Symmetric down migration drops by
    name.

Seed data:
  * migrations/seed.sql rewritten to emit TitleCase canonicals with
    per-arm config JSON that actually exercises the config-consuming
    paths (not the missing-field backstops):
      - pr-require-owner         → RequiredMetadata     {"required_keys":["owner"]}                        Warning
      - pr-allowed-environments  → AllowedEnvironments  {"allowed":["production","staging","development"]} Error
      - pr-max-certificate-lifetime → CertificateLifetime {"max_days":90}                                   Critical
      - pr-min-renewal-window    → RenewalLeadTime      {"lead_time_days":14}                              Warning
    Severities are now differentiated per rule (D-006 intent).
  * migrations/seed_demo.sql violation rows flipped to TitleCase
    severity ('Critical', 'Error', 'Warning') so migration 000014
    applies cleanly on upgrade paths.

Engine rewrite (internal/service/policy.go):
  * evaluateRule rewritten. All six arms now:
      1. Parse rule.Config into the per-arm typed struct.
      2. Bad JSON → log at ValidateCertificate boundary and skip
         this rule (no co-located poisoning of other rules in the
         same batch).
      3. Empty/null Config → emit the pre-D-008 missing-field
         violation (backwards compat invariant — operators who
         haven't reconfigured still see the same output).
      4. Violations emitted carry rule.Severity (no more hardcoded
         Warning); D-006 column is now load-bearing.
  * CertificateLifetime arm reads NotBefore/NotAfter from the
    certificate's latest version via CertRepo. Injected via
    PolicyService.SetCertRepo() setter — avoids churning ~36
    NewPolicyService call sites while keeping the lifetime arm
    optional (degrades to a log+skip if the setter is not wired).

Server wiring (cmd/server/main.go):
  * policyService.SetCertRepo(certRepo) wired after construction.

Tests (internal/service/policy_test.go):
  * 25 new subtests across 5 groups:
      - TestEvaluateRule_SeverityPassThrough (6): every rule type
        emits violations carrying rule.Severity, not hardcoded.
      - TestEvaluateRule_ConfigConsumed (12): every per-arm Config
        path exercised positive + negative.
      - TestEvaluateRule_EmptyConfig_BackCompat (3): empty/null
        Config still emits pre-D-008 missing-field violations.
      - TestEvaluateRule_BadConfig_SkipsRule: malformed JSON logs
        and skips cleanly without poisoning neighbors.
      - TestEvaluateRule_CertificateLifetime_RepoScenarios (3):
        ok when repo wired, log+skip when not, handles missing
        NotBefore/NotAfter edges.

Provenance: D-008 surfaced during D-005/D-006 remediation review
in 7a0ea35. That commit added persistence and CI pins for the
severity field but did not re-verify the evaluation layer
consumed it; this finding and fix close the audit-process gap.
2026-04-18 14:55:56 +00:00

146 lines
4.4 KiB
Go

package handler
import (
"fmt"
"net"
"net/mail"
"strings"
)
// ValidationError represents a validation error with field-level details.
type ValidationError struct {
Field string
Message string
}
// ValidateCommonName validates a certificate common name.
// Accepts hostnames (TLS), IP addresses, and email addresses (S/MIME).
func ValidateCommonName(cn string) error {
if cn == "" {
return ValidationError{Field: "common_name", Message: "common_name is required"}
}
if len(cn) > 253 {
return ValidationError{Field: "common_name", Message: "common_name must be 253 characters or fewer"}
}
// If CN contains @, validate as email address (S/MIME certificates)
if strings.Contains(cn, "@") {
if _, err := mail.ParseAddress(cn); err != nil {
return ValidationError{Field: "common_name", Message: fmt.Sprintf("invalid email format for S/MIME common name: %v", err)}
}
return nil
}
// Basic hostname validation: allow alphanumeric, dots, hyphens
if err := isValidHostname(cn); err != nil {
return ValidationError{Field: "common_name", Message: fmt.Sprintf("invalid hostname format: %v", err)}
}
return nil
}
// ValidateRequired checks if a string field is present and non-empty.
func ValidateRequired(field, value string) error {
if value == "" {
return ValidationError{Field: field, Message: fmt.Sprintf("%s is required", field)}
}
return nil
}
// ValidateStringLength checks if a string is within acceptable length bounds.
func ValidateStringLength(field, value string, maxLen int) error {
if len(value) > maxLen {
return ValidationError{Field: field, Message: fmt.Sprintf("%s must be %d characters or fewer", field, maxLen)}
}
return nil
}
// ValidateCSRPEM validates a certificate signing request PEM block.
func ValidateCSRPEM(csrPEM string) error {
if csrPEM == "" {
return ValidationError{Field: "csr_pem", Message: "csr_pem is required"}
}
if !strings.HasPrefix(strings.TrimSpace(csrPEM), "-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE REQUEST-----") {
return ValidationError{Field: "csr_pem", Message: "csr_pem must be a valid PEM-encoded certificate request"}
}
return nil
}
// ValidatePolicyType checks if a policy rule type is valid.
func ValidatePolicyType(policyType interface{}) error {
validTypes := map[string]bool{
"AllowedIssuers": true,
"AllowedDomains": true,
"RequiredMetadata": true,
"AllowedEnvironments": true,
"RenewalLeadTime": true,
"CertificateLifetime": true,
}
typeStr := fmt.Sprintf("%v", policyType)
if !validTypes[typeStr] {
return ValidationError{Field: "type", Message: "type must be one of: AllowedIssuers, AllowedDomains, RequiredMetadata, AllowedEnvironments, RenewalLeadTime, CertificateLifetime"}
}
return nil
}
// ValidatePolicySeverity checks if a severity level is valid.
func ValidatePolicySeverity(severity interface{}) error {
validSeverities := map[string]bool{
"Warning": true,
"Error": true,
"Critical": true,
}
sevStr := fmt.Sprintf("%v", severity)
if !validSeverities[sevStr] {
return ValidationError{Field: "severity", Message: "severity must be one of: Warning, Error, Critical"}
}
return nil
}
// isValidHostname performs basic validation on a hostname.
func isValidHostname(hostname string) error {
// Use net.SplitHostPort-compatible check
// Hostname can be an IP or domain name
if ip := net.ParseIP(hostname); ip != nil {
return nil // Valid IP address
}
// For domain names, check basic format
if len(hostname) == 0 || len(hostname) > 253 {
return fmt.Errorf("hostname length invalid")
}
// Check for invalid characters (very basic)
for _, char := range hostname {
if !isValidHostnameChar(char) {
return fmt.Errorf("hostname contains invalid character: %c", char)
}
}
// Labels must not start or end with hyphen
labels := strings.Split(hostname, ".")
for _, label := range labels {
if len(label) == 0 {
return fmt.Errorf("hostname has empty label")
}
if strings.HasPrefix(label, "-") || strings.HasSuffix(label, "-") {
return fmt.Errorf("hostname labels cannot start or end with hyphen")
}
}
return nil
}
// isValidHostnameChar checks if a character is valid in a hostname.
func isValidHostnameChar(r rune) bool {
return (r >= 'a' && r <= 'z') ||
(r >= 'A' && r <= 'Z') ||
(r >= '0' && r <= '9') ||
r == '.' ||
r == '-' ||
r == '_' || // Underscores are sometimes allowed
r == '*' // Wildcard support
}
// Error method makes ValidationError satisfy the error interface.
func (e ValidationError) Error() string {
return e.Message
}