Files
certctl/docs/README.md
T
shankar0123 c03d18bb1c auth-bundle-2 Phase 16: docs updates (security.md OIDC + sessions + break-glass + auditor split sections; new migration/oidc-enable.md; CHANGELOG.md v2.1.0 Bundle 2 release notes)
Closes Phase 16 of cowork/auth-bundle-2-prompt.md. Three operator-
facing docs updated, one new migration guide ships, README nav row
added.

Files
=====

docs/operator/security.md (MODIFIED, Last reviewed bumped to 2026-05-10):
* Added 5 new Bundle 2 subsections under '## Authentication
  surface' after the Bundle 1 approval-bypass-closure entry:
  - 'OIDC federation (Bundle 2 Phases 1-7)' — alg allow-list,
    IdP-downgrade defense, iss/aud/azp/at_hash, single-use
    state+nonce, PKCE-S256 mandatory, JWKS rotation handling,
    encrypted client_secret at rest with the v3 blob format
    pinned by an integration test, pointer to oidc-runbooks/
    for per-IdP setup.
  - 'Sessions + back-channel logout (Bundle 2 Phases 4-6)' —
    length-prefixed HMAC cookie wire format, HttpOnly + Secure
    + SameSite cookie hardening, idle/absolute timeouts, CSRF
    defense, signing-key rotation primitive, fail-fatal
    EnsureInitialSigningKey at server boot, OpenID Connect
    Back-Channel Logout 1.0 (NOT RFC 8414).
  - 'OIDC first-admin bootstrap (Bundle 2 Phase 7)' — coexists
    with Bundle 1's env-var-token bootstrap, group-scoped via
    CERTCTL_BOOTSTRAP_ADMIN_GROUPS + CERTCTL_BOOTSTRAP_OIDC_PROVIDER_ID,
    one-shot per tenant.
  - 'Break-glass admin (Bundle 2 Phase 7.5)' — default-OFF,
    surface invisibility via 404-not-403, Argon2id with OWASP
    2024 params, lockout state machine, constant-time-via-
    verifyDummy, WARN log at boot, runbook pointer for
    operator drill.
  - 'Migrating an existing deployment to OIDC' — pointer to
    the new migration/oidc-enable.md walkthrough.

docs/migration/oidc-enable.md (NEW, Last reviewed 2026-05-10):
* Step-by-step migration guide for an operator on a Bundle-1-merged
  deployment to enable OIDC SSO. Pre-reqs (CERTCTL_CONFIG_ENCRYPTION_KEY,
  admin actor with auth.oidc.create + auth.oidc.edit, IdP tenant)
  + 7 numbered steps (pin encryption key, complete IdP-side per
  runbook, configure certctl-side OIDCProvider, add group→role
  mappings with fail-closed warning, optional first-admin bootstrap,
  verify with single test user, announce SSO endpoint).
* Rollback section covering the 4-step disable flow + the 409
  Conflict on provider-delete-while-sessions-exist + the
  existing-sessions-keep-working-until-expiry semantics.
* Troubleshooting section pinning 8 most-common failure modes
  (discovery doc fetch fails / IdP downgrade defense rejects /
  no roles assigned / iss mismatch / pre-login expired / state
  mismatch / sessions revoked but user can hit API / JWKS
  rotation breaks login).
* Database row count drift documented so operators know what to
  expect after OIDC is live (10 Bundle 2 tables enumerated).
* Cross-references to oidc-runbooks/ + security.md +
  auth-threat-model.md + auth-benchmarks.md + auth-standards-implemented.md.

CHANGELOG.md (MODIFIED):
* v2.1.0 section title bumped from 'Auth Bundle 1: RBAC primitive'
  to 'Auth Bundles 1 + 2: RBAC primitive + OIDC SSO + sessions'.
* Replaced the Bundle 1 closing-bullet ('Bundle 2 starts after
  Bundle 1 lands on master') with 18 new Bundle 2 entries:
  - OIDC + sessions + back-channel logout + break-glass overview.
  - OIDC token validation pinned at three layers (alg allow-list,
    IdP-downgrade defense, OIDC Core §3.1.3.7 re-verification).
  - Length-prefixed HMAC session cookies.
  - CSRF double-submit + hashed-token-on-row.
  - OIDC client_secret AES-256-GCM v3 blob at rest +
    integration-test invariant.
  - OIDC first-admin bootstrap.
  - Default-OFF break-glass admin (Argon2id + lockout +
    constant-time + surface invisibility).
  - GUI: 4 new pages + login-page IdP buttons + sidebar logout.
  - 11 new MCP tools for OIDC + session management.
  - 6 per-IdP runbooks (Keycloak / Authentik / Okta / Auth0 /
    Entra ID / Google Workspace).
  - Threat model extended with 5 new defense subsections + 8 new
    threat-catalogue subsections.
  - Performance baselines documented (4 benchmarks; 3 measured
    + 1 operator-runs).
  - Standards-and-RFC implementation table (13 RFCs + 14 CWEs;
    NOT a compliance-mapping doc).
  - Coverage gates held at floor 90 across all 4 Bundle 2
    packages (anti-Bundle-1-mistake invariant).
  - Multi-tenant query CI guard (ratchet baseline 32).
  - Phase 10 Keycloak testcontainers integration test + optional
    Okta smoke test.
  - OpenAPI cookieAuth security scheme + 13 new endpoints + 4
    break-glass endpoints.
  - Bundle-1-only compat regression CI guard +
    Bundle-1-to-2-upgrade regression CI guard.
* Final paragraph updated to point at oidc-enable.md alongside
  api-keys-to-rbac.md as the two migration walkthroughs.

docs/README.md (MODIFIED):
* Added the new oidc-enable.md migration row under '## Migration'
  alongside the existing api-keys-to-rbac.md entry, with a
  one-line description flagging it as the Bundle 2 OIDC
  onboarding walkthrough.

Verification
============

* Last-reviewed on security.md + oidc-enable.md: 2026-05-10.
* Internal-link sweep on oidc-enable.md: 0 broken (every relative
  link resolves via shell-loop verification).
* Internal-link sweep on docs/README.md: 0 broken (all .md
  references resolve).
* No Go-side impact, make verify gate unchanged.

Bundle 2 documentation deliverables now complete: security.md +
auth-threat-model.md + oidc-runbooks/ + auth-benchmarks.md +
auth-standards-implemented.md + api-keys-to-rbac.md + oidc-enable.md
+ CHANGELOG.md v2.1.0. The full Bundle 2 surface is operator-
discoverable from docs/README.md root nav.
2026-05-10 17:07:27 +00:00

136 lines
10 KiB
Markdown

# certctl Documentation
> Last reviewed: 2026-05-05
The full docs index, organized by audience. Pick the section that matches what you need to do; each link below opens a focused doc rather than a wall of text.
For the elevator pitch and quickstart commands, see the repo `README.md` at the root. For the marketing site, see [certctl.io](https://certctl.io).
---
## Getting Started
You're new to certctl, just cloned the repo, or want to understand what it does before installing.
| Doc | What it covers |
|---|---|
| [Concepts](getting-started/concepts.md) | TLS certificates explained for beginners — CAs, ACME, EST, private keys, the full glossary |
| [Quickstart](getting-started/quickstart.md) | Five-minute setup with Docker Compose, dashboard tour, API tour |
| [Examples](getting-started/examples.md) | Five turnkey scenarios — ACME+NGINX, wildcard DNS-01, private CA+Traefik, step-ca+HAProxy, multi-issuer |
| [Advanced demo](getting-started/advanced-demo.md) | End-to-end certificate lifecycle with technical depth at each step |
| [Why certctl](getting-started/why-certctl.md) | Positioning vs ACME clients, agent-based SaaS, enterprise platforms; when to look elsewhere |
## Reference
You're operating certctl in production or building integrations and need authoritative technical detail.
| Doc | What it covers |
|---|---|
| [Architecture](reference/architecture.md) | System design, data flow, security model, deployment topologies |
| [Profiles](reference/profiles.md) | CertificateProfile policy object — issuer wiring, EKUs, RequiresApproval gate (Phase 9 closure) |
| [API](reference/api.md) | OpenAPI 3.1 spec, integration patterns, client SDK generation |
| [CLI](reference/cli.md) | certctl-cli command reference and CI/CD integration patterns |
| [Configuration](reference/configuration.md) | `CERTCTL_*` environment variable reference (scheduler, rate limits, deploy verify, audit, agent) |
| [MCP server](reference/mcp.md) | Model Context Protocol integration for AI assistants |
| [Release verification](reference/release-verification.md) | Cosign / SLSA / SBOM verification procedure |
| [Intermediate CA hierarchy](reference/intermediate-ca-hierarchy.md) | Multi-level CA tree management — RFC 5280 §3.2/§4.2.1.9/§4.2.1.10 enforcement |
| [Auth standards implemented](reference/auth-standards-implemented.md) | RFC + CWE evidence for the Auth Bundle 1 + 2 surface (NOT a compliance-mapping doc) |
| [Deployment model](reference/deployment-model.md) | Atomic write, post-deploy verify, rollback semantics across all targets |
| [Vendor matrix](reference/vendor-matrix.md) | Tested vendor versions per target connector |
### Connectors
The [connector index](reference/connectors/index.md) is the canonical catalog (interfaces, registry, scanners, plus an inline reference per built-in). Per-connector deep-dive siblings cover operator-grade material — vendor edges, troubleshooting, rotation playbooks, when-to-use vs alternatives.
**Issuers** (13 deep-dives): [ACME](reference/connectors/acme.md) · [ADCS](reference/connectors/adcs.md) · [AWS ACM Private CA](reference/connectors/aws-acm-pca.md) · [DigiCert](reference/connectors/digicert.md) · [EJBCA / Keyfactor](reference/connectors/ejbca.md) · [Entrust](reference/connectors/entrust.md) · [GlobalSign Atlas HVCA](reference/connectors/globalsign.md) · [Google CAS](reference/connectors/google-cas.md) · [Local CA](reference/connectors/local-ca.md) · [OpenSSL / Custom CA](reference/connectors/openssl.md) · [Sectigo SCM](reference/connectors/sectigo.md) · [step-ca / Smallstep](reference/connectors/step-ca.md) · [Vault PKI](reference/connectors/vault.md)
**Targets** (15 deep-dives): [Apache](reference/connectors/apache.md) · [AWS Certificate Manager](reference/connectors/aws-acm.md) · [Azure Key Vault](reference/connectors/azure-kv.md) · [Caddy](reference/connectors/caddy.md) · [Envoy](reference/connectors/envoy.md) · [F5 BIG-IP](reference/connectors/f5.md) · [HAProxy](reference/connectors/haproxy.md) · [IIS](reference/connectors/iis.md) · [Java Keystore](reference/connectors/jks.md) · [Kubernetes Secrets](reference/connectors/k8s.md) · [NGINX](reference/connectors/nginx.md) · [Postfix / Dovecot](reference/connectors/postfix.md) · [SSH (agentless)](reference/connectors/ssh.md) · [Traefik](reference/connectors/traefik.md) · [Windows Certificate Store](reference/connectors/wincertstore.md)
### Protocols
| Doc | What it covers |
|---|---|
| [ACME server](reference/protocols/acme-server.md) | Run certctl as an RFC 8555 + RFC 9773 ARI ACME server |
| [ACME server threat model](reference/protocols/acme-server-threat-model.md) | Security posture for the ACME server endpoint |
| [SCEP server](reference/protocols/scep-server.md) | RFC 8894 native SCEP server — RA cert config, multi-profile dispatch, must-staple, mTLS sibling route |
| [SCEP for Microsoft Intune](reference/protocols/scep-intune.md) | Intune-specific deployment guide — NDES replacement playbook |
| [EST server](reference/protocols/est.md) | RFC 7030 EST server — 802.1X / Wi-Fi enrollment, IoT bootstrap, channel binding |
| [CRL & OCSP](reference/protocols/crl-ocsp.md) | RFC 5280 CRL + RFC 6960 OCSP responder for relying parties |
| [Async CA polling](reference/protocols/async-ca-polling.md) | Bounded polling for async-CA issuer connectors |
## Operator
You're running certctl in production and need operational guidance.
| Doc | What it covers |
|---|---|
| [Security posture](operator/security.md) | Auth, rate limits, encryption at rest, key rotation, RBAC primitive (Bundle 1), bootstrap |
| [RBAC operator reference](operator/rbac.md) | Roles, permissions, scopes, scope-down + bootstrap flow (Bundle 1) |
| [Auth threat model](operator/auth-threat-model.md) | API-key compromise, role-grant abuse, bootstrap-token leak, audit-mutation, compliance mapping (Bundle 1) |
| [OIDC / SSO runbooks](operator/oidc-runbooks/index.md) | Per-IdP setup guides — Keycloak, Authentik, Okta, Auth0, Entra ID, Google Workspace (Bundle 2) |
| [Control plane TLS](operator/tls.md) | Self-signed bootstrap, operator-supplied Secret, cert-manager Certificate CR |
| [Database TLS](operator/database-tls.md) | PostgreSQL transport encryption |
| [Approval workflow](operator/approval-workflow.md) | Two-person integrity gate for high-stakes issuance + Phase 9 profile-edit closure |
| [Helm deployment](operator/helm-deployment.md) | Kubernetes installation via the bundled chart |
| [Performance baselines](operator/performance-baselines.md) | Operator-runnable benchmarks for regression spot checks |
| [Auth benchmarks](operator/auth-benchmarks.md) | Session + OIDC validation p99 targets and measured baselines (Bundle 2 Phase 14) |
| [Legacy clients (TLS 1.2)](operator/legacy-clients-tls-1.2.md) | Reverse-proxy runbook for embedded EST/SCEP clients on TLS 1.2 |
### Runbooks
| Runbook | When |
|---|---|
| [Cloud targets](operator/runbooks/cloud-targets.md) | AWS ACM + Azure Key Vault deployment, debugging, rollback |
| [Expiry alerts](operator/runbooks/expiry-alerts.md) | Per-policy multi-channel routing matrix, severity tiers |
| [Disaster recovery](operator/runbooks/disaster-recovery.md) | CRL cache, OCSP responder cert, CA private-key rotation, Postgres restore |
## Migration
You're moving from another cert-management tool to certctl, or running both in parallel.
| From | Doc |
|---|---|
| Certbot | [migration/from-certbot.md](migration/from-certbot.md) |
| acme.sh | [migration/from-acmesh.md](migration/from-acmesh.md) |
| cert-manager (coexistence, not replacement) | [migration/cert-manager-coexistence.md](migration/cert-manager-coexistence.md) |
| Caddy ACME (point Caddy at certctl) | [migration/acme-from-caddy.md](migration/acme-from-caddy.md) |
| cert-manager ACME (point cert-manager at certctl) | [migration/acme-from-cert-manager.md](migration/acme-from-cert-manager.md) |
| Traefik ACME (point Traefik at certctl) | [migration/acme-from-traefik.md](migration/acme-from-traefik.md) |
| **API keys → RBAC (v2.0.x → v2.1.0)** | [migration/api-keys-to-rbac.md](migration/api-keys-to-rbac.md) — **AUDIT YOUR API KEYS** post-upgrade |
| **Enable OIDC SSO on a Bundle-1-merged deployment** | [migration/oidc-enable.md](migration/oidc-enable.md) — step-by-step Bundle 2 OIDC onboarding |
## Contributor
You're contributing to certctl, running tests locally, or trying to understand the CI pipeline.
| Doc | What it covers |
|---|---|
| [Testing strategy](contributor/testing-strategy.md) | What we test and why; per-PR fast gates vs daily deep-scan |
| [Test environment](contributor/test-environment.md) | Local environment with real CAs (Pebble, step-ca, etc.) |
| [QA prerequisites](contributor/qa-prerequisites.md) | Before running QA: stack boot, demo data baseline, env vars |
| [QA test suite](contributor/qa-test-suite.md) | qa_test.go reference for release QA |
| [GUI QA checklist](contributor/gui-qa-checklist.md) | Manual GUI verification pass for release |
| [Release sign-off](contributor/release-sign-off.md) | Release-day checklist — code state, automated gates, manual QA, artefact verification |
| [CI pipeline](contributor/ci-pipeline.md) | CI shape, regression guards, adding new checks |
## Archive
Historical docs preserved for reference. Most operators don't need these.
| Doc | Why archived |
|---|---|
| [Upgrade to TLS (v2.2)](archive/upgrades/to-tls-v2.2.md) | Pre-v2.2 HTTPS-everywhere upgrade procedure |
| [Upgrade past v2 JWT removal](archive/upgrades/to-v2-jwt-removal.md) | G-1 milestone JWT auth removal procedure |
---
## Reading order by role
**First-time operator:** [Concepts](getting-started/concepts.md) → [Quickstart](getting-started/quickstart.md) → [Examples](getting-started/examples.md). About 90 minutes end to end.
**Production operator:** [Architecture](reference/architecture.md) → [Security posture](operator/security.md) → [Control plane TLS](operator/tls.md) → [Disaster recovery runbook](operator/runbooks/disaster-recovery.md). About 4 hours end to end.
**PKI engineer:** [ACME server](reference/protocols/acme-server.md) → [SCEP server](reference/protocols/scep-server.md) → [EST server](reference/protocols/est.md) → [Intermediate CA hierarchy](reference/intermediate-ca-hierarchy.md). About 6 hours end to end.
**Contributor:** [Architecture](reference/architecture.md) → [Testing strategy](contributor/testing-strategy.md) → [Test environment](contributor/test-environment.md) → [CI pipeline](contributor/ci-pipeline.md). About 3 hours end to end.