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https://github.com/shankar0123/certctl.git
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36885da2da
(Profiles + Recent Activity + Trust Bundle tabs) + CLI subcommand
family `certctl-cli est {cacerts,csrattrs,enroll,reenroll,
serverkeygen,test}` + 6 MCP tools.
Phase 8 — ESTAdminPage tabbed GUI:
- web/src/pages/ESTAdminPage.tsx mirrors SCEPAdminPage's three-tab
surface. Profiles tab renders per-profile cards with auth-mode
badges (mTLS / Basic / ServerKeygen), mTLS trust-anchor expiry
countdown (good ≥30d / warn 7-30d / bad <7d / EXPIRED), 12-cell
counter grid (success_simpleenroll/.../internal_error), and the
admin-gated "Reload trust anchor" action. Recent Activity tab
merges the four EST audit actions (est_simple_enroll +
est_simple_reenroll + est_server_keygen + est_auth_failed) across
four parallel useQuery calls with chip filters for All/Enrollment/
Re-enrollment/ServerKeygen/AuthFailure. Trust Bundle tab renders
per-mTLS-profile cert subjects + expiries.
- M-009 useTrackedMutation guard: every mutation routes through
the tracked hook so audit/progress hooks fire.
- Page-level admin gate renders "Admin access required" banner for
non-admin callers + skips underlying API requests so the server
never sees a 403-prone request. Server-side enforcement is the
M-008 admin gate; this is a UX hint.
- Wired into web/src/main.tsx at /est; nav link added to Layout.tsx.
- New web/src/api/types.ts types ESTStatsSnapshot +
ESTTrustAnchorInfo + ESTProfilesResponse + ESTReloadTrustResponse
mirror service.ESTStatsSnapshot 1:1.
- New web/src/api/client.ts helpers getAdminESTProfiles +
reloadAdminESTTrust.
- 14 Vitest cases (admin gate non-admin / non-auth-required deploy /
default tab / tab switch / deep-link tab / per-profile card render
+ counter cells / reload-button mTLS-only / trust-expiry badge
band / reload modal Confirm-Cancel-Error paths / Trust Bundle
empty-state / Activity filter chip toggle).
Phase 9.1 — CLI subcommands:
- internal/cli/est.go adds 6 subcommands: cacerts / csrattrs /
enroll / reenroll / serverkeygen / test. CSR input via --csr
with file-path or '-' for stdin; multipart serverkeygen response
is parsed by stdlib mime/multipart and split into <prefix>.cert.pem
+ <prefix>.key.enveloped so the operator can decrypt the key with
openssl smime. EST `test` smoke-tests cacerts + csrattrs + emits
one-line OK/FAIL diagnostics.
- cmd/cli/main.go grows the `est` dispatch + Usage entries.
Phase 9.2 — MCP tools:
- internal/mcp/tools_est.go adds 6 tools mapped to the EST endpoints
+ admin observability: est_list_profiles + est_admin_stats (alias)
+ est_get_cacerts + est_get_csrattrs + est_enroll + est_reenroll.
Tool count grew from 87 → 93 (verified via the registered-vs-
covered guard in tools_per_tool_test.go); the per-tool happy/error-
path table grew with 6 matching entries so the future-tool-no-test
CI guard stays green.
- internal/mcp/client.go grows PostRaw — non-JSON POST helper that
the EST enroll/reenroll tools use to ship raw application/pkcs10
CSR bytes through the MCP fence-wrapped response.
- estRawResultJSON wraps the raw response body in a JSON envelope
the MCP consumer can structurally consume (content_type +
body_base64 + body_size_bytes). Mirrors the CRL/OCSP MCP tools'
binary-DER envelope.
Phase 9.3 — Tests:
- internal/cli/est_test.go: 8 cases pinning the wire-shape contract
on the CLI side without dragging the full ESTHandler into the
test build.
- internal/mcp/tools_est_test.go: path-builder + JSON-envelope unit
tests + end-to-end tool exercise that pins all 5 captured request
paths through a fake API.
Pre-commit verification (sandbox): gofmt clean, go vet clean
(excluding repository/postgres which the sandbox can't build —
pre-existing testcontainers limit), staticcheck clean across
cli/mcp/cmd/cli, go test -short -count=1 green for every non-
postgres Go package, Vitest green for ESTAdminPage (14) +
SCEPAdminPage (20) — 34 page tests total. G-3 docs-drift guard
reproduced locally clean (Phases 8-9 added zero new env vars).
Spec preserved at cowork/est-rfc7030-hardening-prompt.md. Phases
10-13 (libest sidecar e2e / bulk revocation + audit codes /
docs/est.md / release prep + tag) remain — post-2.1.0 work.
349 lines
13 KiB
Go
349 lines
13 KiB
Go
package cli
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// EST RFC 7030 hardening master bundle Phase 9.1 — CLI subcommands.
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//
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// The EST endpoints live under /.well-known/est/[<PathID>/]; they are
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// HTTPS-only (the certctl control plane is HTTPS-only as of v2.2) and
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// per-profile dispatched. The CLI subcommands here mirror what an
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// operator would do via libest or curl + base64 + openssl, but with a
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// fixed --profile flag + the existing CLI's TLS-pinning semantics.
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//
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// Subcommands:
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//
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// certctl-cli est cacerts --profile corp
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// certctl-cli est csrattrs --profile corp
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// certctl-cli est enroll --profile corp --csr <path-or-stdin>
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// certctl-cli est reenroll --profile corp --csr <path-or-stdin>
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// certctl-cli est serverkeygen --profile corp --csr <path> --out <prefix>
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// certctl-cli est test --profile corp
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//
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// All write operations stream the issued cert (PEM) to stdout by default
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// or to --out when provided. Server-keygen writes <prefix>.cert.pem +
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// <prefix>.key.enveloped (the EnvelopedData blob) so the operator can
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// decrypt with openssl smime.
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import (
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"bytes"
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"encoding/base64"
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"encoding/pem"
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"flag"
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"fmt"
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"io"
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"mime"
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"mime/multipart"
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"net/http"
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"net/url"
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"os"
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"strings"
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)
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// estPath builds the per-profile EST URL fragment. PathID="" maps to
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// the legacy /.well-known/est/ root for backward compat with v2.0.x
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// single-profile deploys.
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func (c *Client) estPath(profile, op string) string {
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if profile == "" {
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return "/.well-known/est/" + op
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}
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return "/.well-known/est/" + profile + "/" + op
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}
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// estPostBody POSTs the given body bytes to the EST endpoint with the
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// EST-required Content-Type. Returns the raw response body so the
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// caller can write the PEM/PKCS#7/multipart bytes through to disk
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// without further decoding (the CLI is the device's smime/openssl
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// pipeline; we don't second-guess the wire format).
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func (c *Client) estPostBody(path, contentType string, body []byte) ([]byte, http.Header, error) {
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u, err := url.JoinPath(c.baseURL, path)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("invalid URL: %w", err)
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}
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req, err := http.NewRequest("POST", u, strings.NewReader(string(body)))
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if err != nil {
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return nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("creating request: %w", err)
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}
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req.Header.Set("Content-Type", contentType)
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if c.apiKey != "" {
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req.Header.Set("Authorization", "Bearer "+c.apiKey)
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}
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resp, err := c.httpClient.Do(req)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("request failed: %w", err)
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}
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defer resp.Body.Close()
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respBody, err := io.ReadAll(resp.Body)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("reading response: %w", err)
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}
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if resp.StatusCode >= 400 {
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return nil, resp.Header, fmt.Errorf("EST error (HTTP %d): %s", resp.StatusCode, string(respBody))
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}
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return respBody, resp.Header, nil
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}
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// estGet performs a GET against the EST endpoint and returns the raw
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// response body. Used by cacerts (HTTP 200) and csrattrs (HTTP 200 or
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// 204 — both are valid contracts).
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func (c *Client) estGet(path string) ([]byte, int, http.Header, error) {
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u, err := url.JoinPath(c.baseURL, path)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, 0, nil, fmt.Errorf("invalid URL: %w", err)
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}
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req, err := http.NewRequest("GET", u, nil)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, 0, nil, fmt.Errorf("creating request: %w", err)
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}
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if c.apiKey != "" {
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req.Header.Set("Authorization", "Bearer "+c.apiKey)
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}
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resp, err := c.httpClient.Do(req)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, 0, nil, fmt.Errorf("request failed: %w", err)
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}
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defer resp.Body.Close()
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body, err := io.ReadAll(resp.Body)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, resp.StatusCode, resp.Header, fmt.Errorf("reading response: %w", err)
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}
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if resp.StatusCode >= 400 {
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return nil, resp.StatusCode, resp.Header, fmt.Errorf("EST error (HTTP %d): %s", resp.StatusCode, string(body))
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}
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return body, resp.StatusCode, resp.Header, nil
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}
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// readCSRBytes resolves --csr to actual CSR bytes. "-" reads from
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// stdin (so the operator can pipe `openssl req -new …` directly into
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// us); otherwise it's a filesystem path.
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func readCSRBytes(path string) ([]byte, error) {
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if path == "-" {
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return io.ReadAll(os.Stdin)
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}
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return os.ReadFile(path)
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}
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// EstCacerts implements `certctl-cli est cacerts --profile <p>`.
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// Writes the base64-wrapped PKCS#7 certs-only response to stdout (the
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// canonical EST §4.1.3 wire shape).
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func (c *Client) EstCacerts(args []string) error {
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fs := flag.NewFlagSet("est cacerts", flag.ContinueOnError)
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profile := fs.String("profile", "", "EST profile PathID (empty = legacy root)")
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out := fs.String("out", "-", "output file path; '-' = stdout")
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if err := fs.Parse(args); err != nil {
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return err
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}
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body, _, _, err := c.estGet(c.estPath(*profile, "cacerts"))
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if err != nil {
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return err
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}
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return writeOutput(*out, body)
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}
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// EstCsrattrs implements `certctl-cli est csrattrs --profile <p>`.
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// Writes the base64-encoded ASN.1 SEQUENCE OF OID body to stdout. The
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// 204-No-Content case (no profile-derived hints) prints an empty
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// payload + a STDERR diagnostic so an operator running the smoke-test
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// case knows the endpoint succeeded.
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func (c *Client) EstCsrattrs(args []string) error {
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fs := flag.NewFlagSet("est csrattrs", flag.ContinueOnError)
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profile := fs.String("profile", "", "EST profile PathID (empty = legacy root)")
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out := fs.String("out", "-", "output file path; '-' = stdout")
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if err := fs.Parse(args); err != nil {
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return err
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}
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body, status, _, err := c.estGet(c.estPath(*profile, "csrattrs"))
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if err != nil {
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return err
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}
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if status == http.StatusNoContent {
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fmt.Fprintln(os.Stderr, "no csrattrs hints configured (HTTP 204)")
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return nil
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}
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return writeOutput(*out, body)
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}
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// EstEnroll implements `certctl-cli est enroll --profile <p> --csr <path>`.
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// POSTs the CSR to /simpleenroll. The CSR body is sent as-is (whether
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// PEM or base64-DER); the server's readCSRFromRequest handles either.
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func (c *Client) EstEnroll(args []string) error {
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return c.estEnrollOp("simpleenroll", "est enroll", args)
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}
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// EstReEnroll implements `certctl-cli est reenroll --profile <p> --csr <path>`.
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func (c *Client) EstReEnroll(args []string) error {
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return c.estEnrollOp("simplereenroll", "est reenroll", args)
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}
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// estEnrollOp shares the body of EstEnroll + EstReEnroll. The only
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// difference between the two is the URL suffix (simpleenroll vs
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// simplereenroll); the audit-action distinction is server-side.
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func (c *Client) estEnrollOp(op, helpName string, args []string) error {
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fs := flag.NewFlagSet(helpName, flag.ContinueOnError)
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profile := fs.String("profile", "", "EST profile PathID (empty = legacy root)")
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csrPath := fs.String("csr", "", "path to PKCS#10 CSR (PEM or base64-DER); '-' = stdin")
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out := fs.String("out", "-", "output file path; '-' = stdout")
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if err := fs.Parse(args); err != nil {
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return err
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}
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if *csrPath == "" {
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return fmt.Errorf("--csr is required (path to a PKCS#10 CSR file or '-' for stdin)")
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}
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csrBytes, err := readCSRBytes(*csrPath)
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if err != nil {
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return fmt.Errorf("read CSR: %w", err)
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}
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// EST §4.2.1: client MAY send PEM or base64-DER. The server's
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// readCSRFromRequest handles either; we forward what the operator
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// supplied. Content-Type is application/pkcs10 per RFC 7030.
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body, _, err := c.estPostBody(c.estPath(*profile, op), "application/pkcs10", csrBytes)
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if err != nil {
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return err
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}
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return writeOutput(*out, body)
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}
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// EstServerKeygen implements `certctl-cli est serverkeygen --profile <p>
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// --csr <path> --out <prefix>`. The server returns multipart/mixed; we
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// split into the cert part and the encrypted-key part, write each to
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// <prefix>.cert.pem + <prefix>.key.enveloped so the operator can pipe
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// the latter into `openssl smime -decrypt -inkey <client-priv>`.
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func (c *Client) EstServerKeygen(args []string) error {
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fs := flag.NewFlagSet("est serverkeygen", flag.ContinueOnError)
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profile := fs.String("profile", "", "EST profile PathID (empty = legacy root)")
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csrPath := fs.String("csr", "", "path to PKCS#10 CSR (PEM or base64-DER); '-' = stdin")
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outPrefix := fs.String("out", "keypair", "output file prefix; produces <prefix>.cert.pem + <prefix>.key.enveloped")
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if err := fs.Parse(args); err != nil {
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return err
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}
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if *csrPath == "" {
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return fmt.Errorf("--csr is required")
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}
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csrBytes, err := readCSRBytes(*csrPath)
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if err != nil {
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return fmt.Errorf("read CSR: %w", err)
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}
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body, hdr, err := c.estPostBody(c.estPath(*profile, "serverkeygen"), "application/pkcs10", csrBytes)
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if err != nil {
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return err
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}
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// Parse the multipart body so we can write each part to its own
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// file. The handler emits two parts: certs-only PKCS#7 and
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// EnvelopedData PKCS#7. We don't decrypt the key here — the
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// operator's smime client owns the recipient private key.
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contentType := hdr.Get("Content-Type")
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certPart, keyPart, err := splitServerKeygenMultipart(body, contentType)
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if err != nil {
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return fmt.Errorf("parse multipart response: %w", err)
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}
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certFile := *outPrefix + ".cert.pem"
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keyFile := *outPrefix + ".key.enveloped"
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if err := os.WriteFile(certFile, certPart, 0o600); err != nil {
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return fmt.Errorf("write cert: %w", err)
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}
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if err := os.WriteFile(keyFile, keyPart, 0o600); err != nil {
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return fmt.Errorf("write key: %w", err)
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}
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fmt.Fprintf(os.Stderr, "wrote %s + %s\n", certFile, keyFile)
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return nil
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}
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// EstTest is a smoke-test that hits cacerts + csrattrs in sequence and
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// prints a one-line OK/FAIL per endpoint. Useful for operator post-
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// deploy validation: `certctl-cli est test --profile corp` returns
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// exit-0 when both endpoints respond successfully.
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func (c *Client) EstTest(args []string) error {
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fs := flag.NewFlagSet("est test", flag.ContinueOnError)
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profile := fs.String("profile", "", "EST profile PathID (empty = legacy root)")
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if err := fs.Parse(args); err != nil {
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return err
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}
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if _, _, _, err := c.estGet(c.estPath(*profile, "cacerts")); err != nil {
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fmt.Fprintf(os.Stderr, "FAIL cacerts: %v\n", err)
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return err
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}
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fmt.Fprintln(os.Stderr, "OK cacerts")
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if _, status, _, err := c.estGet(c.estPath(*profile, "csrattrs")); err != nil {
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fmt.Fprintf(os.Stderr, "FAIL csrattrs: %v\n", err)
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return err
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} else {
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fmt.Fprintf(os.Stderr, "OK csrattrs (HTTP %d)\n", status)
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}
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return nil
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}
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// writeOutput writes to disk or stdout depending on --out. Centralises
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// the open-truncate-permission semantics so every subcommand uses the
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// same shape.
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func writeOutput(path string, body []byte) error {
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if path == "-" || path == "" {
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_, err := os.Stdout.Write(body)
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return err
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}
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return os.WriteFile(path, body, 0o600)
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}
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// splitServerKeygenMultipart cracks the RFC 7030 §4.4.2 multipart body
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// into its two PKCS#7 parts. The caller hands us the response body +
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// the Content-Type header value (which carries the boundary parameter
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// produced by handler.newMultipartBoundary).
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//
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// Light-weight on purpose — we use stdlib mime/multipart but keep the
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// helper self-contained here so the test can swap in fixture bytes
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// without spinning up the full ESTHandler.
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func splitServerKeygenMultipart(body []byte, contentType string) ([]byte, []byte, error) {
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_, params, err := mime.ParseMediaType(contentType)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("parse Content-Type %q: %w", contentType, err)
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}
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boundary := params["boundary"]
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if boundary == "" {
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return nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("multipart Content-Type %q missing boundary parameter", contentType)
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}
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mr := multipart.NewReader(bytes.NewReader(body), boundary)
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var cert, key []byte
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for {
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part, err := mr.NextPart()
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if err == io.EOF {
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break
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}
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if err != nil {
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return nil, nil, err
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}
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ct := part.Header.Get("Content-Type")
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// The handler wraps each part body in base64 (see writeBase64Wrapped).
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raw, _ := io.ReadAll(part)
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decoded, decErr := decodeBase64Wrapped(raw)
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if decErr != nil {
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// Some clients want the base64 verbatim; fall through to raw.
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decoded = raw
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}
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switch {
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case strings.Contains(ct, "smime-type=certs-only"):
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cert = decoded
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case strings.Contains(ct, "smime-type=enveloped-data"):
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key = decoded
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}
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}
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if len(cert) == 0 || len(key) == 0 {
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return nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("multipart response missing required parts (cert=%d bytes, key=%d bytes)", len(cert), len(key))
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}
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return cert, key, nil
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}
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// decodeBase64Wrapped strips CRLF wrapping then base64-decodes. The
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// EST handler emits the body as base64 with CRLF every 76 chars per
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// RFC 2045; client-side decode is "rip the whitespace, base64-decode
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// the rest".
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func decodeBase64Wrapped(in []byte) ([]byte, error) {
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stripped := strings.Map(func(r rune) rune {
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if r == '\r' || r == '\n' || r == ' ' || r == '\t' {
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return -1
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}
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return r
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}, string(in))
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return base64.StdEncoding.DecodeString(stripped)
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}
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// _ = pem.Decode is referenced by est_test.go to verify the cacerts
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// + enroll responses are parseable PEM. Keep the import live without
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// growing the public API.
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var _ = pem.Decode
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