Files
certctl/.github/workflows/ci.yml
T
shankar0123 a849c8b8cf fix(security): close BUNDLE 2 — safe first run, demo mode, agent bootstrap
Bundle 2 closure (2026-05-12 acquisition diligence audit). Closes the
"docker compose up == accidental production" hazard: pre-Bundle-2 the
base deploy/docker-compose.yml WAS the demo path (AUTH_TYPE=none +
DEMO_MODE_ACK=true + KEYGEN_MODE=server + DEMO_SEED=true + literal
change-me-... placeholder creds), the README claimed "drop the demo
overlay for a clean install", and ENVIRONMENTS.md table documented
auth-type default as api-key — three contradictory stories layered on
the same compose file.

Source findings closed:
  R2 R3 C1 D9 finding-2 S9               (repo audit)
  SEC-H2 SEC-M1 SEC-M3 OPS-M3 LOW-5 HIGH-6 (cowork audit)

Compose split (deploy/docker-compose.yml + deploy/docker-compose.demo.yml):
The base now ships production-shaped — no AUTH_TYPE override, no
KEYGEN_MODE override, no DEMO_MODE_ACK, no DEMO_SEED, no literal
placeholder fallbacks. POSTGRES_PASSWORD / CERTCTL_AUTH_SECRET /
CERTCTL_CONFIG_ENCRYPTION_KEY / CERTCTL_API_KEY / CERTCTL_AGENT_ID
must come from deploy/.env (sample template in deploy/.env.example +
root .env.example). The demo overlay carries the full demo posture
(every env var + every placeholder credential) so the
`-f docker-compose.demo.yml` one-flag flip remains a zero-config
populated-dashboard path.

Fail-closed startup guards (internal/config/config.go::Validate):
Three new gates layered on the existing HIGH-12 demo-mode listen-bind
guard. All three exempt CERTCTL_DEMO_MODE_ACK=true so the demo overlay
keeps working:
  • HIGH-6:  AUTH_SECRET = "change-me-in-production"        → refuse
  • HIGH-6:  CONFIG_ENCRYPTION_KEY = "change-me-32-char..." → refuse
  • LOW-5:   CORS_ORIGINS contains "*"  (CWE-942 + CWE-352) → refuse

Visible DEMO MODE banner (cmd/server/main.go): every boot under
DEMO_MODE_ACK=true now emits a prominent WARN line with a 6-step
production-promotion checklist. The 2026-04-19 incident (a screenshot
run that kept running for three days) drove this; the per-startup
banner makes the posture unmissable in any log scraper.

Agent enrollment doc alignment:
  • docs/reference/configuration.md L83: corrected the non-existent
    URL `POST /api/v1/agents/register` to the real route
    `POST /api/v1/agents`; added the bootstrap-token note and the
    install-agent.sh handoff sequence.
  • docs/reference/architecture.md L154: replaced "agents register
    themselves at first heartbeat" (false — cmd/agent/main.go fail-
    fasts when CERTCTL_AGENT_ID is unset) with the actual two-step
    operator-driven flow (REST or GUI registration first, returned ID
    fed to install-agent.sh second).

Tests + CI guard:
  • 9 new TestValidate_Bundle2_* cases in internal/config/config_test.go
    covering: placeholder-secret refused + demo-ack exempt; placeholder
    encryption-key refused + demo-ack exempt; real key not mistaken for
    placeholder; wildcard CORS refused + demo-ack exempt; wildcard mixed
    into a concrete allowlist still refused; concrete allowlist accepted.
  • scripts/ci-guards/B2-compose-base-no-demo-env.sh: greps the base
    compose for any of the demo-mode env vars + placeholder credentials.
    Comments stripped before checking so the narrative header in the
    base file can still reference the overlay's posture in prose.

Cold-DB CI smoke (.github/workflows/ci.yml::cold-db-compose-smoke):
Switched to layering -f docker-compose.demo.yml on top of the base —
the new production base requires real env vars the smoke doesn't have,
and the smoke's purpose (catch migration-on-cold-DB regressions + the
bootstrap-token mint path) is orthogonal to which auth posture the
boot lands in.

Receipts:
  • Current first-run truth table
        compose flag                                  → posture
        -f docker-compose.yml                          (production)
                                                       → requires .env;
                                                       fail-fasts on
                                                       missing AUTH_SECRET
                                                       / CONFIG_ENCRYPTION
                                                       _KEY / POSTGRES
                                                       _PASSWORD; agent
                                                       fail-fasts on
                                                       missing AGENT_ID
        -f docker-compose.yml -f docker-compose.demo.yml  (demo)
                                                       → zero-config;
                                                       AUTH_TYPE=none +
                                                       DEMO_MODE_ACK=true
                                                       + KEYGEN=server +
                                                       DEMO_SEED=true;
                                                       boot banner WARN
        -f docker-compose.yml -f docker-compose.dev.yml   (dev)
                                                       → base + PgAdmin
                                                       + debug logging
        -f docker-compose.test.yml                     (test, standalone)
                                                       → production-shape
                                                       posture, real CA
                                                       backends
  • Verification (PATH=/tmp/go/bin export GO* paths to /tmp):
        gofmt -l                                      # clean (no diffs)
        go vet ./internal/config ./cmd/server         # clean
        go test -short -count=1 ./internal/config/... # PASS (cumulative +
                                                       all 9 new Bundle 2
                                                       cases green)
        go test -short -count=1                       # PASS (no regression
            ./internal/connector/target/configcheck    in the Bundle 1 -
                                                       closure tests)
        go build ./cmd/server ./cmd/agent             # clean
            ./cmd/cli ./cmd/mcp-server
        bash scripts/ci-guards/B2-compose-base-no-demo-env.sh  # clean
        bash scripts/ci-guards/H-1-encryption-key-min-length.sh # clean
        bash scripts/ci-guards/G-3-env-docs-drift.sh           # clean

Remaining operator warnings (not blocking; tracked in CLAUDE.md
"Open decisions"):
  • The first `docker compose -f docker-compose.yml up -d` against a
    pre-Bundle-2 .env (placeholder values still in place) will now
    fail-fast. This is the intended posture but operators upgrading
    from v2.0.x via .env-from-old-master need to rotate before
    upgrading. The CHANGELOG note for the v2.1.0 release should
    call this out alongside Auth Bundle 2's other breaking changes.

Audit-Closes: BUNDLE-2 R2 R3 C1 D9 S9 SEC-H2 SEC-M1 SEC-M3 OPS-M3 LOW-5 HIGH-6
2026-05-13 00:14:59 +00:00

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name: CI
on:
push:
branches:
- master
- v2-dev
pull_request:
branches:
- master
jobs:
go-build-and-test:
name: Go Build & Test
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v4
- name: Set up Go
uses: actions/setup-go@v5
with:
go-version: '1.25.10'
- name: Go Build
run: |
go build ./cmd/server/...
go build ./cmd/agent/...
go build ./cmd/mcp-server/...
go build ./cmd/cli/...
- name: gofmt drift (Makefile::verify parity)
# ci-pipeline-cleanup Phase 4 / frozen decision 0.13: Makefile::verify
# checks gofmt + vet + golangci-lint + go test. CI runs vet, lint, test
# already — but NOT gofmt. This step closes the parity gap.
# Mirrors the Makefile::verify shape: any gofmt output means the
# source needs reformatting.
run: |
out=$(gofmt -l .)
if [ -n "$out" ]; then
echo "::error::gofmt would reformat these files (run 'gofmt -w' locally):"
echo "$out"
exit 1
fi
- name: go mod tidy drift
# ci-pipeline-cleanup Phase 4: catches PRs that import a package
# without committing the go.mod / go.sum update. Standard Go-CI
# gate; absent before this bundle.
run: |
go mod tidy
git diff --exit-code go.mod go.sum
- name: Go Vet
run: go vet ./...
- name: Install golangci-lint
run: |
curl -sSfL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/golangci/golangci-lint/master/install.sh | sh -s -- -b $(go env GOPATH)/bin v2.11.4
- name: Run golangci-lint
run: golangci-lint run ./... --timeout 5m
- name: Install govulncheck
run: go install golang.org/x/vuln/cmd/govulncheck@latest
- name: Run govulncheck (M-024 hard gate)
# Bundle-7 / D-001 partial: govulncheck distinguishes called-vs-uncalled
# advisories. Default exit code is non-zero only when YOUR code calls
# the vulnerable function — deferred-call advisories show up in the
# output but don't fail the gate.
#
# Bundle F / Audit M-024 (NIST SSDF PW.7.2): the govulncheck step
# is now a hard CI gate (no `continue-on-error`). Bundle E's
# transitive bumps (x/net 0.42→0.47, x/crypto 0.41→0.45) cleared
# the 5 deferred-call advisories that were previously on the
# exception list, so the carve-out the original Bundle F prompt
# designed is unnecessary — a clean `govulncheck ./...` is the
# right gate. If a future advisory lands in a function our code
# does call, this step fails the build until either upstream
# ships a fix OR we cut the dep. Deferred-call advisories that
# legitimately can't be remediated yet should be added to the
# NIST SSDF deviation log in docs/operator/security.md, not silenced here.
run: govulncheck ./...
- name: Install staticcheck (Bundle-7 / D-001)
run: go install honnef.co/go/tools/cmd/staticcheck@latest
- name: Run staticcheck
# Bundle-7 / D-001: Go static analysis additive to vet. Suppressed
# rules live in staticcheck.conf with documented justifications;
# adding a new entry requires an explicit security review.
#
# ci-pipeline-cleanup Phase 3 / frozen decision 0.7: HARD gate.
# M-028 SA1019 sites verified closed at HEAD 1de61e91:
# - middleware.NewAuth: zero callers (all migrated to
# NewAuthWithNamedKeys in cmd/server/{main,main_test}.go)
# - csr.Attributes (internal/api/handler/scep.go × 2): inline
# //lint:ignore SA1019 with load-bearing rationale (RFC 2985
# challengePassword has no non-deprecated stdlib API)
# - elliptic.Marshal: only in bundle9_coverage_test.go × 1 as
# deliberate byte-equivalence regression oracle, suppressed
# with //lint:ignore SA1019
run: staticcheck ./...
- name: Race Detection
run: go test -race ./internal/service/... ./internal/api/handler/... ./internal/api/middleware/... ./internal/scheduler/... ./internal/connector/... ./internal/crypto/... ./internal/domain/... ./internal/validation/... ./internal/tlsprobe/... -count=1 -timeout 300s
- name: Go Test with Coverage
# internal/ciparity/... — post-v2.1.0 anti-rot item 2 surface-
# parity tests; stdlib-only so they always pass in this job.
run: |
go test ./internal/service/... ./internal/api/handler/... ./internal/api/middleware/... ./internal/api/router/... ./internal/auth/... ./internal/integration/... ./internal/connector/issuer/... ./internal/connector/target/... ./internal/connector/notifier/... ./internal/connector/discovery/... ./internal/crypto/... ./internal/mcp/... ./internal/cli/... ./internal/domain/... ./internal/validation/... ./internal/tlsprobe/... ./internal/ciparity/... -count=1 -cover -coverprofile=coverage.out
- name: Check Coverage Thresholds
# ci-pipeline-cleanup Phase 2: per-package floors moved to
# .github/coverage-thresholds.yml. Each entry has `floor:` +
# `why:` (load-bearing context). Logic in
# scripts/check-coverage-thresholds.sh — operator runs the same
# script locally via `make verify`-equivalent loop.
run: bash scripts/check-coverage-thresholds.sh
- name: Upload Coverage Report
uses: actions/upload-artifact@v4
with:
name: go-coverage
path: coverage.out
retention-days: 30
- name: Coverage PR comment
# ci-pipeline-cleanup Phase 10 / frozen decision 0.9: self-hosted
# alternative to Codecov / Coveralls. Posts a per-package coverage
# delta as a PR comment; updates in place on subsequent pushes.
if: github.event_name == 'pull_request'
env:
GH_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}
PR_NUMBER: ${{ github.event.number }}
GITHUB_REPOSITORY: ${{ github.repository }}
run: bash scripts/coverage-pr-comment.sh
# Bundle P / Strengthening #6 — QA-doc seed-count drift guard. Forces
# every PR that adds a seed row to migrations/seed_demo.sql to keep
# docs/contributor/qa-test-suite.md::Seed Data Reference in sync.
#
# Phase 5 of the 2026-05-04 docs overhaul (commit c64777f) deleted
# docs/testing-guide.md (its content dispersed across the new
# audience-organized doc tree); the previous QA-doc Part-count drift
# guard tracked Part counts between testing-guide.md and the old
# qa-test-guide.md headline. With testing-guide.md gone, that guard's
# premise is dead and it has been removed. The seed-count drift class
# is still live: qa-test-suite.md::Seed Data Reference enumerates
# certs/issuers and seed_demo.sql is the source of truth.
- name: QA-doc seed-count drift guard
run: |
set -e
DOC=docs/contributor/qa-test-suite.md
# Seed-cert count: agnostic to documented header format. The current
# documented count lives in `### Certificates (32 total in ...` —
# extract the first integer in that header.
DOC_CERTS=$(grep -oE '### Certificates \([0-9]+' "$DOC" | grep -oE '[0-9]+' | head -1)
# Authoritative count: unique mc-* IDs in seed_demo.sql.
SEED_CERTS=$(grep -oE 'mc-[a-z0-9_-]+' migrations/seed_demo.sql | sort -u | wc -l | tr -d ' ')
if [ -z "$DOC_CERTS" ]; then
echo "::warning::Could not extract documented cert count from $DOC."
echo " Skipping cert-count drift check (header format may have changed)."
elif [ "$DOC_CERTS" != "$SEED_CERTS" ]; then
echo "::error::DRIFT — $DOC says $DOC_CERTS certs; seed_demo.sql has $SEED_CERTS unique mc-* IDs."
echo " Update $DOC::Seed Data Reference to match."
exit 1
fi
# Issuers: seed-table count vs doc claim.
DOC_ISS=$(grep -oE '### Issuers \([0-9]+' "$DOC" | grep -oE '[0-9]+' | head -1)
# Authoritative: unique iss-* IDs (close enough proxy; the issuers
# table count IS the unique-ID count for this prefix).
SEED_ISS=$(grep -oE 'iss-[a-z0-9_-]+' migrations/seed_demo.sql | sort -u | wc -l | tr -d ' ')
if [ -z "$DOC_ISS" ]; then
echo "::warning::Could not extract documented issuer count."
elif [ "$DOC_ISS" != "$SEED_ISS" ] && [ "$((SEED_ISS - DOC_ISS))" -gt 5 ]; then
# Allow up to 5pp slack — iss-* IDs appear in audit_events and
# other reference tables that aren't issuer-table rows. Drift
# only flags when the spread grows large.
echo "::error::DRIFT — $DOC says $DOC_ISS issuers; seed_demo.sql has $SEED_ISS unique iss-* IDs (spread > 5)."
exit 1
fi
echo "QA-doc seed-count drift guard: clean."
# Bundle Q / I-001 closure — test-naming convention guard (informational).
# The convention is `Test<Func>_<Scenario>_<ExpectedResult>`. This step
# prints any non-conformant tests but does NOT fail the build until the
# Bundle I-001-extended (2026-04-27) — promoted from informational
# to hard-fail. The convention is now: every `func TestXxx(...)` MUST
# match Go's standard test-runner pattern (`^func Test[A-Z]`). Tests
# whose name starts with `func Test<lowercase>` are silently SKIPPED
# by `go test` (Go only runs `Test[A-Z]...`) — those are the real
# bugs this guard catches.
#
# The original audit's `Test<Func>_<Scenario>_<ExpectedResult>` triple-
# token prescription has been relaxed: single-function pin tests like
# `TestNewAgent` or `TestSplitPEMChain` are valid Go convention, with
# internal scenarios expressed via `t.Run` subtests. Requiring the
# underscore-Scenario-Result triple repo-wide would mean renaming
# 167 legitimate tests for no observable behavior change. The
# Test<Func>_<Scenario>_<ExpectedResult> form remains documented as
# the recommended pattern for parameterized scenarios in
# docs/contributor/qa-test-suite.md, but is not gated.
- name: Regression guards (extracted to scripts/ci-guards/)
# All named regression guards live at scripts/ci-guards/<id>.sh per
# ci-pipeline-cleanup bundle Phase 1. Each guard is callable locally:
# bash scripts/ci-guards/G-3-env-docs-drift.sh
# Adding a new guard: drop a new <id>.sh; this loop auto-picks it up.
# Contract: each guard MUST exit 0 on clean repo, non-zero with
# ::error:: prefix on regression. See scripts/ci-guards/README.md.
#
run: |
set -e
fail=0
for g in scripts/ci-guards/*.sh; do
echo "::group::$(basename "$g")"
if ! bash "$g"; then
fail=1
fi
echo "::endgroup::"
done
exit $fail
cold-db-compose-smoke:
# Per post-v2.1.0 anti-rot item 6 (Auditable Codebase Bundle).
#
# Catches migration-on-cold-DB regressions: wipe the postgres
# volume, bring the stack up cold, mint a day-0 admin, issue +
# renew + revoke a test certificate, assert audit rows, tear down.
# Targets the bug class that the warm-DB integration suite misses
# (canonical case: 2026-05-09 migration 000045 broken INSERT,
# fixed in commit 6444e13).
name: Cold-DB compose smoke
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
needs: go-build-and-test
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v4
- name: Show Docker versions
run: |
docker --version
docker compose version
- name: Cold-DB compose smoke
# The smoke deliberately focuses on the bug class that ONLY a
# cold boot can catch: stack-startup correctness against a
# blank database. It is intentionally NOT a functional API
# walkthrough — the integration test suite under
# 'Go Test with Coverage' already covers issue / renew /
# revoke / audit-row plumbing against a warm DB.
#
# The bugs this gate is uniquely positioned to catch:
# - Missing required env vars that fail Config.Validate()
# at startup (e.g. CERTCTL_DEMO_MODE_ACK gap, 2026-05-12).
# - Non-idempotent migrations that crash on the second boot
# (e.g. migration 000043 CHECK constraint, 2026-05-12).
# - Documented manual flows that don't work end-to-end on
# a clean compose (e.g. CERTCTL_BOOTSTRAP_TOKEN
# interpolation gap, 2026-05-12).
#
# Bugs OUTSIDE the scope of this smoke (covered elsewhere):
# - API request/response contract changes (integration suite).
# - Cert lifecycle correctness (integration suite + handler
# tests).
# - Audit row plumbing (handler tests).
#
# 10-min wall-clock cap covers cold image pull + compose-up +
# force-recreate + admin bootstrap + teardown. Increase only
# if the underlying steps legitimately grow.
#
# The smoke is inlined here on purpose — it is NOT a script in
# scripts/ci-guards/, because there is no value in a developer
# running this locally. The whole point of the gate is that CI
# owns the cold-DB state; the operator never has to remember to
# run it.
timeout-minutes: 10
working-directory: deploy
env:
STARTUP_TIMEOUT_SECONDS: 300
run: |
set -e
set -o pipefail
SERVER_URL="https://localhost:8443"
CACERT_PATH="${GITHUB_WORKSPACE}/deploy/test/certs/ca.crt"
log() { echo "[cold-db-smoke] $*"; }
wait_for_service_healthy() {
local svc="$1" deadline=$(( $(date +%s) + STARTUP_TIMEOUT_SECONDS ))
while [ "$(date +%s)" -lt "$deadline" ]; do
local state
state="$(docker compose ps --format json "$svc" 2>/dev/null | python3 -c '
import json, sys
try:
line = sys.stdin.read().strip()
if not line:
print("not-up"); sys.exit(0)
rows = json.loads(line) if line.startswith("[") else [json.loads(l) for l in line.splitlines() if l.strip()]
if not rows:
print("not-up")
else:
print(rows[0].get("Health", rows[0].get("State", "?")))
except Exception as e:
print(f"err: {e}")
')"
if [ "$state" = "healthy" ] || [ "$state" = "running" ]; then
log " $svc → $state"; return 0
fi
sleep 2
done
log " $svc did NOT reach healthy within ${STARTUP_TIMEOUT_SECONDS}s (last: $state)"
return 1
}
http_call() {
local method="$1" path="$2" data="${3:-}"
local args=(--silent --show-error --max-time 30 -X "$method" "$SERVER_URL$path")
[ -f "$CACERT_PATH" ] && args+=(--cacert "$CACERT_PATH") || args+=(--insecure)
[ -n "$data" ] && args+=(-H "Content-Type: application/json" -d "$data")
curl "${args[@]}"
}
# Bundle 2 closure (2026-05-12): the base compose is now
# production-shaped — auth=api-key + agent-keygen + fail-closed
# placeholder guards. The cold-DB smoke layers in the demo
# overlay so the boot path remains zero-config: the overlay
# supplies AUTH_TYPE=none + DEMO_MODE_ACK=true + the matching
# placeholder creds the fail-closed guards accept under
# DEMO_MODE_ACK. The agent service in the overlay also
# pre-seeds CERTCTL_AGENT_ID=agent-demo-1 so the bundled
# agent doesn't restart-loop. The smoke's purpose (catch
# migration-on-cold-DB regressions + verify bootstrap-token
# endpoint mints a day-0 admin against a freshly migrated
# schema) is orthogonal to whether the auth posture is
# demo-mode or api-key, so the overlay is acceptable here.
COMPOSE_FILES=(-f docker-compose.yml -f docker-compose.demo.yml)
log "1/4 down -v --remove-orphans"
docker compose "${COMPOSE_FILES[@]}" down -v --remove-orphans 2>&1 | tail -3 || true
log "2/4 up -d (cold boot)"
docker compose "${COMPOSE_FILES[@]}" up -d 2>&1 | tail -3
log "3/4 wait for healthchecks"
wait_for_service_healthy postgres
wait_for_service_healthy certctl-server
wait_for_service_healthy certctl-agent || log " (agent skipped)"
log "4/4 minting day-0 admin (proves migration ladder + bootstrap path)"
TOKEN="$(openssl rand -base64 32 | tr -d '\n')"
echo "CERTCTL_BOOTSTRAP_TOKEN=$TOKEN" > /tmp/_smoke.env
docker compose "${COMPOSE_FILES[@]}" --env-file /tmp/_smoke.env up -d --force-recreate certctl-server 2>&1 | tail -2
sleep 5
wait_for_service_healthy certctl-server
BODY="$(http_call POST /api/v1/auth/bootstrap "{\"token\":\"$TOKEN\",\"actor_name\":\"smoke-admin\"}")"
KEY="$(echo "$BODY" | python3 -c 'import json,sys; print(json.load(sys.stdin)["key_value"])')"
[ -n "$KEY" ] || { log "bootstrap failed: $BODY"; exit 1; }
log "PASS — cold boot + force-recreate + admin bootstrap all green"
log "tearing down"
docker compose "${COMPOSE_FILES[@]}" down -v 2>&1 | tail -2
- name: Dump compose logs on failure
if: failure()
working-directory: deploy
run: |
for svc in postgres certctl-server certctl-agent certctl-tls-init; do
echo "==== $svc ===="
docker compose -f docker-compose.yml -f docker-compose.demo.yml logs --no-color --tail 200 "$svc" || true
done
frontend-build:
name: Frontend Build
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v4
- name: Set up Node.js
uses: actions/setup-node@v4
with:
node-version: '22'
- name: Install Dependencies
working-directory: web
run: npm ci
- name: TypeScript Check
working-directory: web
run: npx tsc --noEmit
- name: Run Frontend Tests
working-directory: web
run: npx vitest run
- name: Build Frontend
working-directory: web
run: npx vite build
- name: Regression guards (extracted to scripts/ci-guards/)
# All named regression guards live at scripts/ci-guards/<id>.sh per
# ci-pipeline-cleanup bundle Phase 1. Each guard is callable locally:
# bash scripts/ci-guards/G-3-env-docs-drift.sh
# Adding a new guard: drop a new <id>.sh; this loop auto-picks it up.
# Contract: each guard MUST exit 0 on clean repo, non-zero with
# ::error:: prefix on regression. See scripts/ci-guards/README.md.
run: |
set -e
fail=0
for g in scripts/ci-guards/*.sh; do
echo "::group::$(basename "$g")"
if ! bash "$g"; then
fail=1
fi
echo "::endgroup::"
done
exit $fail
helm-lint:
name: Helm Chart Validation
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v4
- name: Install Helm
uses: azure/setup-helm@v4
with:
version: '3.13.0'
# HTTPS-Everywhere (v2.0.47): the chart fails render when no TLS source is
# configured. Every lint/template invocation below must pick exactly one
# provisioning mode — see deploy/helm/certctl/templates/_helpers.tpl
# (certctl.tls.required) and docs/operator/tls.md.
- name: Lint Helm Chart
run: |
helm lint deploy/helm/certctl/ \
--set server.tls.existingSecret=certctl-tls-ci
- name: Template Helm Chart (existingSecret mode)
run: |
helm template certctl deploy/helm/certctl/ \
--set server.tls.existingSecret=certctl-tls-ci \
> /dev/null
- name: Template Helm Chart (cert-manager mode)
run: |
helm template certctl deploy/helm/certctl/ \
--set server.tls.certManager.enabled=true \
--set server.tls.certManager.issuerRef.name=letsencrypt-prod \
> /dev/null
- name: Template Helm Chart (guard fails without TLS)
run: |
# Inverse test: the chart MUST refuse to render when no TLS source is
# configured. If this ever renders successfully, the fail-loud guard
# in certctl.tls.required has regressed.
if helm template certctl deploy/helm/certctl/ > /dev/null 2>&1; then
echo "::error::Helm chart rendered without a TLS source — fail-loud guard regressed"
exit 1
fi
# =============================================================================
# deploy-vendor-e2e — single-job (collapsed from 12-job matrix)
# =============================================================================
# Per ci-pipeline-cleanup bundle Phase 5 / frozen decision 0.4 (revises
# Bundle II decision 0.9): the per-vendor matrix produced 12 status-check
# rows for ~1 real assertion (115/116 vendor-edge tests are t.Log
# placeholders). Collapsed to one job that brings up all 11 sidecars
# at once and runs the full VendorEdge_ test set.
#
# Skip-detection guard (scripts/vendor-e2e-skip-check.sh)
# enforces that no test SKIPs except the documented allowlist
# (windows-iis-requiring tests on Linux). If a sidecar fails to come
# up, requireSidecar() in deploy/test/vendor_e2e_helpers.go calls
# t.Skipf() — the guard catches that.
#
# RAM headroom on ubuntu-latest (16 GB ceiling) — operator-confirmed
# in Phase 0 / frozen decision 0.14 prototype-branch run. If RAM
# regresses, fall back to bucketed matrix per
# the project's frozen-decisions log.
#
# The Windows matrix (deploy-vendor-e2e-windows) was deleted entirely
# per Phase 6 / frozen decision 0.5 (revises Bundle II decision 0.4).
# IIS + WinCertStore validation moved to the operator playbook at
# docs/connector-iis.md::Operator validation playbook.
deploy-vendor-e2e:
name: deploy-vendor-e2e
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
needs: [go-build-and-test]
timeout-minutes: 30
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v5
- name: Set up Go
uses: actions/setup-go@v5
with:
go-version: '1.25.10'
cache: true
- name: Build f5-mock-icontrol sidecar
# The only sidecar without a published image; built from the in-tree
# Go server at deploy/test/f5-mock-icontrol/.
run: docker compose --profile deploy-e2e -f deploy/docker-compose.test.yml build f5-mock-icontrol
- name: Bring up all vendor sidecars
# Brings up the 11 deploy-e2e sidecars (apache-test, haproxy-test,
# traefik-test, caddy-test, envoy-test, postfix-test, dovecot-test,
# openssh-test, f5-mock-icontrol, k8s-kind-test, windows-iis-test
# which is gated by a separate windows-only profile and won't
# actually start) plus the always-on legacy nginx.
run: |
docker compose --profile deploy-e2e -f deploy/docker-compose.test.yml up -d
sleep 15
- name: Run all vendor-edge e2e
# Captures test output for skip-count enforcement (next step).
env:
INTEGRATION: "1"
run: |
go test -tags integration -race -count=1 -run 'VendorEdge_' \
./deploy/test/... 2>&1 | tee test-output.log
- name: Skip-count enforcement
# ci-pipeline-cleanup Phase 5 / frozen decision 0.6:
# requireSidecar uses t.Skipf (not t.Fatal) when a sidecar isn't
# reachable — collapsing the per-vendor matrix removes the implicit
# guard each per-job matrix entry provided. This step counts SKIP
# lines in the test output and fails the build if it exceeds the
# allowlist (windows-iis-requiring tests; legitimately skipped
# on Linux per Phase 6 / frozen decision 0.5).
run: bash scripts/vendor-e2e-skip-check.sh test-output.log
- name: Diagnostic dump on failure
# Prints container status + last 200 log lines from the certctl-server
# and base-stack containers when ANY previous step in this job fails.
# The matrix-collapse (Phase 5) brings up ~18 containers concurrently
# (vs 1 vendor sidecar at a time pre-collapse); transient failures
# surface most often as "container certctl-test-server is unhealthy"
# without any visible reason because compose only reports the
# dependency-chain symptom, not the root cause. Dumping logs here
# makes the underlying error (DB migration crash, port bind failure,
# entrypoint stall, OOM kill) visible in the GitHub Actions log
# without requiring a workstation reproduction.
if: failure()
run: |
echo "=== docker compose ps -a ==="
docker compose --profile deploy-e2e -f deploy/docker-compose.test.yml ps -a || true
echo ""
echo "=== certctl-test-server logs (last 200 lines) ==="
docker logs --tail 200 certctl-test-server 2>&1 || true
echo ""
echo "=== certctl-test-tls-init logs ==="
docker logs certctl-test-tls-init 2>&1 || true
echo ""
echo "=== certctl-test-postgres logs (last 100 lines) ==="
docker logs --tail 100 certctl-test-postgres 2>&1 || true
echo ""
echo "=== certctl-test-stepca logs (last 100 lines) ==="
docker logs --tail 100 certctl-test-stepca 2>&1 || true
echo ""
echo "=== certctl-test-pebble logs (last 50 lines) ==="
docker logs --tail 50 certctl-test-pebble 2>&1 || true
echo ""
echo "=== certctl-test-agent logs (last 100 lines) ==="
docker logs --tail 100 certctl-test-agent 2>&1 || true
- name: Tear down sidecars
if: always()
run: docker compose --profile deploy-e2e -f deploy/docker-compose.test.yml down -v
# =============================================================================
# image-and-supply-chain — digest validity + Docker build smoke + OpenAPI parity
# =============================================================================
# Per ci-pipeline-cleanup bundle Phases 7-9 / frozen decision 0.8.
# Three checks bundled into one job (parallel to go-build-and-test):
# 1. Digest validity — every @sha256 ref in deploy/* + Dockerfiles must
# resolve on its registry. Closes the H-001 lying-field gap (H-001
# verifies digest *presence* but not *resolution* — Bundle II shipped
# 11 fabricated digests that passed H-001 and failed `docker pull`).
# 2. Docker build smoke — all 4 Dockerfiles in the repo must build.
# Catches syntax errors / COPY path drift before tag-time release.yml.
# 3. OpenAPI ↔ handler parity — every router route has a matching
# operationId or is documented in api/openapi-handler-exceptions.yaml.
image-and-supply-chain:
name: image-and-supply-chain
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
timeout-minutes: 15
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v5
- name: Set up Go
uses: actions/setup-go@v5
with:
go-version: '1.25.10'
cache: true
- name: Digest validity (every @sha256 ref must resolve)
run: bash scripts/ci-guards/digest-validity.sh
- name: Docker build smoke (all 4 Dockerfiles)
# Per frozen decision 0.10: build all 4 Dockerfiles in the repo,
# not just production server + agent. The test-sidecar Dockerfiles
# are load-bearing for vendor-e2e — a syntax error there silently
# breaks the e2e suite.
run: |
set -e
docker build -f Dockerfile -t certctl:smoke .
docker build -f Dockerfile.agent -t certctl-agent:smoke .
docker build -f deploy/test/f5-mock-icontrol/Dockerfile -t f5-mock:smoke .
docker build -f deploy/test/libest/Dockerfile -t libest:smoke .
echo "All 4 Dockerfiles build clean."
- name: OpenAPI ↔ handler operationId parity
run: bash scripts/ci-guards/openapi-handler-parity.sh