Files
certctl/internal/api/handler/scep_handler_test.go
T
shankar0123 a546a1bbef feat(scep): EnvelopedData decrypt + signerInfo POPO verify (RFC 8894 §3.2)
SCEP RFC 8894 + Intune master bundle — Phase 2 of 14.

Implements the new RFC 8894 PKIMessage parse path: EnvelopedData parser
+ decryptor, signerInfo parser + signature verifier, handler dispatch
that tries the RFC 8894 path FIRST and falls through to the legacy MVP
raw-CSR path on any parse failure. Backward compat with lightweight SCEP
clients is preserved by design — no behavior change for any existing
deploy that doesn't set CERTCTL_SCEP_RA_*.

internal/pkcs7/envelopeddata.go (new, ~330 LoC)
  * ParseEnvelopedData: parses CMS EnvelopedData per RFC 5652 §6.1, with
    optional outer ContentInfo unwrapping. Handles SET OF RecipientInfo
    + IssuerAndSerial form rid (RFC 8894 §3.2.2).
  * EnvelopedData.Decrypt: RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 key-trans + AES-CBC (128/192/
    256) or DES-EDE3-CBC content decryption with **constant-time PKCS#7
    padding strip** (no branch on padding-byte values; closes the
    padding-oracle leak surface). Recipient mismatch is BadMessageCheck
    per RFC 8894 §3.3.2.2 (NOT BadCertID); every failure mode returns
    the same ErrEnvelopedDataDecrypt sentinel to close timing-leak legs
    of Bleichenbacher attacks.
  * Equivalent to micromdm/scep's cryptoutil/cryptoutil.go::DecryptPKCS-
    Envelope (cited in code comments; not vendored — fuzz-target
    ownership stays in this sub-package per the operating rule).

internal/pkcs7/signedinfo.go (new, ~370 LoC)
  * ParseSignedData / ParseSignerInfos: parses CMS SignedData per RFC
    5652 §5.3. Resolves each SignerInfo's SID (IssuerAndSerial v1 OR
    [0] SubjectKeyId v3) against the SignedData certificates SET to
    pluck the device's transient signing cert.
  * SignerInfo.VerifySignature: re-serialises signedAttrs as the
    canonical SET OF Attribute (the RFC 5652 §5.4 quirk every CMS
    implementation hits — wire form is [0] IMPLICIT but the signature
    is over EXPLICIT SET OF). Hashes with SHA-1/SHA-256/SHA-512 +
    verifies via RSA PKCS1v15 or ECDSA per the cert's pubkey type.
  * Auth-attr extractors: GetMessageType (PrintableString-decimal),
    GetTransactionID, GetSenderNonce, GetMessageDigest. SCEP attr OIDs
    pinned (RFC 8894 §3.2.1.4).

internal/pkcs7/{envelopeddata,signedinfo}_fuzz_test.go (new)
  * FuzzParseEnvelopedData / FuzzParseSignedData / FuzzParseSignerInfos
    / FuzzVerifySignerInfoSignature — every parser certctl adds gets a
    panic-safety fuzzer (the fuzz-target-ownership rule from
    cowork/CLAUDE.md::Operating Rules). Local 5s runs hit ~270k
    executions per parser without panic. Errors are expected for
    arbitrary inputs; only panics are bugs.

internal/pkcs7/{envelopeddata,signedinfo}_test.go (new)
  * Round-trip tests that materialise real RSA/ECDSA pairs, hand-build
    the wire bytes, parse + decrypt + verify, and assert plaintext /
    auth-attr equality. The build helpers use this package's ASN1Wrap
    primitives directly (asn1.Marshal of structs containing nested
    asn1.RawValue is finicky for mixed Class/Tag); gives byte-level
    control matching what real SCEP clients emit.
  * Negative tests: tampered ciphertext / tampered auth-attrs / wrong
    RA / wrong key / mismatched recipients / random garbage all return
    the appropriate sentinel error without panic.

internal/service/scep.go
  * PKCSReqWithEnvelope: RFC 8894 envelope-aware variant. Returns
    *SCEPResponseEnvelope (not error + *SCEPEnrollResult) because RFC
    8894 §3.3 mandates a CertRep PKIMessage on every response, even
    failures — the handler shouldn't translate Go errors into SCEP
    failInfo codes. Returns nil to signal 'invalid challenge password'
    so the caller can translate to HTTP 403 (matches MVP path's wire
    shape; RFC 8894 §3.3.1 is silent on this case).
  * mapServiceErrorToFailInfo: exact mapping table from the prompt
    (CSR parse → BadRequest, CSR sig → BadMessageCheck, crypto policy
    → BadAlg, default → BadRequest).

internal/api/handler/scep.go
  * SCEPService interface gains PKCSReqWithEnvelope.
  * SCEPHandler now optionally carries an RA cert + key pair. SetRAPair
    upgrades the handler to the RFC 8894 path; without that call the
    handler stays MVP-only (the v2.0.x behavior).
  * pkiOperation: tries the RFC 8894 path FIRST when the RA pair is
    set. tryParseRFC8894 helper does the full pipeline (ParseSignedData
    → VerifySignature → extract auth-attrs → ParseEnvelopedData → Decrypt
    → x509.ParseCertificateRequest the recovered bytes). On any failure
    it falls through to the legacy extractCSRFromPKCS7 MVP path —
    backward compat is non-negotiable.
  * Phase 2 emits the legacy certs-only response on RFC 8894 success;
    Phase 3 (next commit) swaps in writeCertRepPKIMessage with the
    proper status / failInfo / nonce-echo wire shape.

cmd/server/main.go
  * Per-profile loop now calls loadSCEPRAPair after preflight to load
    the cert + key + inject via SetRAPair. crypto + crypto/tls imports
    added.
  * loadSCEPRAPair helper: tls.X509KeyPair-based parse + leaf cert
    extraction. Failures here indicate TOCTOU between preflight + load.

internal/api/handler/scep_handler_test.go +
internal/api/router/router_scep_profiles_test.go
  * mockSCEPService / scepProfileMockService gain PKCSReqWithEnvelope
    stubs to satisfy the extended interface. Existing test cases
    unchanged (they exercise the MVP path; RA pair is unset).

Verification:
  * gofmt + go vet clean for the files I touched.
  * go test -short -count=1 green across pkcs7 / api/handler /
    api/router / service / cmd/server.
  * Coverage: pkcs7 78.4% (was 100% — drops because new code includes
    paths the round-trip tests don't yet hit, like decryption alg
    fall-through and v3 SubjectKeyId SID matching).
  * Fuzz-target seed-corpus runs (5s each, ~270k execs/parser): no
    panic. Pre-merge fuzz-time bumps to 30s per the prompt's
    verification gate.

Phase 2 of 14 in SCEP RFC 8894 + Intune master bundle.
Living progress at cowork/scep-rfc8894-intune/progress.md.
2026-04-29 12:36:27 +00:00

286 lines
7.7 KiB
Go

package handler
import (
"context"
"encoding/pem"
"errors"
"net/http"
"net/http/httptest"
"strings"
"testing"
"github.com/shankar0123/certctl/internal/domain"
)
// mockSCEPService implements SCEPService for testing.
type mockSCEPService struct {
CACaps string
CACertPEM string
CACertErr error
EnrollResult *domain.SCEPEnrollResult
EnrollErr error
}
func (m *mockSCEPService) GetCACaps(ctx context.Context) string {
if m.CACaps != "" {
return m.CACaps
}
return "POSTPKIOperation\nSHA-256\nAES\nSCEPStandard\n"
}
func (m *mockSCEPService) GetCACert(ctx context.Context) (string, error) {
return m.CACertPEM, m.CACertErr
}
func (m *mockSCEPService) PKCSReq(ctx context.Context, csrPEM string, challengePassword string, transactionID string) (*domain.SCEPEnrollResult, error) {
return m.EnrollResult, m.EnrollErr
}
// PKCSReqWithEnvelope is the RFC 8894 envelope-aware variant added in SCEP
// RFC 8894 + Intune master bundle Phase 2.4. The MVP-only handler tests
// don't exercise this path (RA pair is unset), so this stub is only here
// to satisfy the interface; behavior mirrors PKCSReq's success/failure
// based on the same EnrollResult / EnrollErr fields the existing tests
// already populate.
func (m *mockSCEPService) PKCSReqWithEnvelope(ctx context.Context, csrPEM string, challengePassword string, envelope *domain.SCEPRequestEnvelope) *domain.SCEPResponseEnvelope {
if m.EnrollErr != nil {
return &domain.SCEPResponseEnvelope{
Status: domain.SCEPStatusFailure,
FailInfo: domain.SCEPFailBadRequest,
TransactionID: envelope.TransactionID,
RecipientNonce: envelope.SenderNonce,
}
}
return &domain.SCEPResponseEnvelope{
Status: domain.SCEPStatusSuccess,
Result: m.EnrollResult,
TransactionID: envelope.TransactionID,
RecipientNonce: envelope.SenderNonce,
}
}
func TestSCEP_GetCACaps_Success(t *testing.T) {
svc := &mockSCEPService{}
h := NewSCEPHandler(svc)
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/scep?operation=GetCACaps", nil)
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
h.HandleSCEP(w, req)
if w.Code != http.StatusOK {
t.Errorf("expected 200, got %d: %s", w.Code, w.Body.String())
}
ct := w.Header().Get("Content-Type")
if ct != "text/plain" {
t.Errorf("expected text/plain, got %s", ct)
}
body := w.Body.String()
if !strings.Contains(body, "POSTPKIOperation") {
t.Errorf("expected POSTPKIOperation in response, got: %s", body)
}
if !strings.Contains(body, "SHA-256") {
t.Errorf("expected SHA-256 in response, got: %s", body)
}
}
func TestSCEP_GetCACaps_MethodNotAllowed(t *testing.T) {
svc := &mockSCEPService{}
h := NewSCEPHandler(svc)
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, "/scep?operation=GetCACaps", nil)
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
h.HandleSCEP(w, req)
if w.Code != http.StatusMethodNotAllowed {
t.Errorf("expected 405, got %d", w.Code)
}
}
func TestSCEP_GetCACert_Success_SingleCert(t *testing.T) {
certPEM := generateTestCertPEM(t)
svc := &mockSCEPService{
CACertPEM: certPEM,
}
h := NewSCEPHandler(svc)
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/scep?operation=GetCACert", nil)
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
h.HandleSCEP(w, req)
if w.Code != http.StatusOK {
t.Errorf("expected 200, got %d: %s", w.Code, w.Body.String())
}
ct := w.Header().Get("Content-Type")
if ct != "application/x-x509-ca-cert" {
t.Errorf("expected application/x-x509-ca-cert, got %s", ct)
}
if w.Body.Len() == 0 {
t.Error("expected non-empty body")
}
}
func TestSCEP_GetCACert_MethodNotAllowed(t *testing.T) {
svc := &mockSCEPService{}
h := NewSCEPHandler(svc)
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, "/scep?operation=GetCACert", nil)
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
h.HandleSCEP(w, req)
if w.Code != http.StatusMethodNotAllowed {
t.Errorf("expected 405, got %d", w.Code)
}
}
func TestSCEP_GetCACert_ServiceError(t *testing.T) {
svc := &mockSCEPService{
CACertErr: errors.New("CA unavailable"),
}
h := NewSCEPHandler(svc)
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/scep?operation=GetCACert", nil)
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
h.HandleSCEP(w, req)
if w.Code != http.StatusInternalServerError {
t.Errorf("expected 500, got %d", w.Code)
}
}
func TestSCEP_PKIOperation_MethodNotAllowed(t *testing.T) {
svc := &mockSCEPService{}
h := NewSCEPHandler(svc)
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/scep?operation=PKIOperation", nil)
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
h.HandleSCEP(w, req)
if w.Code != http.StatusMethodNotAllowed {
t.Errorf("expected 405, got %d", w.Code)
}
}
func TestSCEP_PKIOperation_EmptyBody(t *testing.T) {
svc := &mockSCEPService{}
h := NewSCEPHandler(svc)
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, "/scep?operation=PKIOperation", strings.NewReader(""))
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
h.HandleSCEP(w, req)
if w.Code != http.StatusBadRequest {
t.Errorf("expected 400, got %d", w.Code)
}
}
func TestSCEP_PKIOperation_InvalidBody(t *testing.T) {
svc := &mockSCEPService{}
h := NewSCEPHandler(svc)
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, "/scep?operation=PKIOperation", strings.NewReader("not-valid-asn1-or-csr"))
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
h.HandleSCEP(w, req)
if w.Code != http.StatusBadRequest {
t.Errorf("expected 400, got %d: %s", w.Code, w.Body.String())
}
}
func TestSCEP_PKIOperation_ServiceError(t *testing.T) {
svc := &mockSCEPService{
EnrollErr: errors.New("enrollment failed"),
}
h := NewSCEPHandler(svc)
// Generate a valid raw CSR DER to send as body (fallback path)
csrPEM := generateTestCSRPEM(t)
block, _ := pem.Decode([]byte(csrPEM))
if block == nil {
t.Fatal("failed to decode CSR PEM")
}
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, "/scep?operation=PKIOperation", strings.NewReader(string(block.Bytes)))
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
h.HandleSCEP(w, req)
if w.Code != http.StatusInternalServerError {
t.Errorf("expected 500, got %d: %s", w.Code, w.Body.String())
}
}
func TestSCEP_PKIOperation_Success_RawCSR(t *testing.T) {
certPEM := generateTestCertPEM(t)
svc := &mockSCEPService{
EnrollResult: &domain.SCEPEnrollResult{
CertPEM: certPEM,
ChainPEM: "",
},
}
h := NewSCEPHandler(svc)
csrPEM := generateTestCSRPEM(t)
block, _ := pem.Decode([]byte(csrPEM))
if block == nil {
t.Fatal("failed to decode CSR PEM")
}
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, "/scep?operation=PKIOperation", strings.NewReader(string(block.Bytes)))
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
h.HandleSCEP(w, req)
if w.Code != http.StatusOK {
t.Errorf("expected 200, got %d: %s", w.Code, w.Body.String())
}
ct := w.Header().Get("Content-Type")
if ct != "application/x-pki-message" {
t.Errorf("expected application/x-pki-message, got %s", ct)
}
}
func TestSCEP_PKIOperation_ChallengePasswordRejected(t *testing.T) {
svc := &mockSCEPService{
EnrollErr: errors.New("invalid challenge password"),
}
h := NewSCEPHandler(svc)
csrPEM := generateTestCSRPEM(t)
block, _ := pem.Decode([]byte(csrPEM))
if block == nil {
t.Fatal("failed to decode CSR PEM")
}
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, "/scep?operation=PKIOperation", strings.NewReader(string(block.Bytes)))
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
h.HandleSCEP(w, req)
if w.Code != http.StatusForbidden {
t.Errorf("expected 403, got %d: %s", w.Code, w.Body.String())
}
}
func TestSCEP_UnknownOperation(t *testing.T) {
svc := &mockSCEPService{}
h := NewSCEPHandler(svc)
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/scep?operation=UnknownOp", nil)
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
h.HandleSCEP(w, req)
if w.Code != http.StatusBadRequest {
t.Errorf("expected 400, got %d", w.Code)
}
}
func TestSCEP_MissingOperation(t *testing.T) {
svc := &mockSCEPService{}
h := NewSCEPHandler(svc)
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/scep", nil)
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
h.HandleSCEP(w, req)
if w.Code != http.StatusBadRequest {
t.Errorf("expected 400, got %d", w.Code)
}
}