Files
certctl/internal/api/handler/adversarial_query_test.go
T
certctl-bot a86816451a refactor(handler,repo): replace strings.Contains error dispatch with typed sentinels (S-2)
Closes one 2026-04-24 audit finding (P2):

  - cat-s6-efc7f6f6bd50: 30 strings.Contains(err.Error(), ...) sites
    in internal/api/handler/ — brittle to repository-layer message
    changes, untyped against the actual failure mode.

Approach (Option B from prompt design notes):
  - New typed sentinels in internal/repository/errors.go:
      ErrNotFound, ErrForeignKeyConstraint
      IsForeignKeyError(err) helper (the only place substring
      matching at the lib/pq boundary is allowed; isolates the
      DB-driver string knowledge to one function).
  - New typed sentinel in internal/domain/errors.go:
      ErrValidation (reserved for future per-entity validation
      wrappers; not yet used by all handlers).
  - 49 sites in internal/repository/postgres/*.go updated to wrap
    sql.ErrNoRows-derived errors via fmt.Errorf("...: %w",
    repository.ErrNotFound).
  - 18 not-found handler sites + 2 FK-constraint handler sites
    refactored to errors.Is(err, repository.ErrNotFound) /
    repository.IsForeignKeyError(err).
  - 23 inline `fmt.Errorf("X not found")` test fixtures across
    handler tests rewrapped to wrap repository.ErrNotFound.
  - test_utils.go::ErrMockNotFound rewrapped to wrap
    repository.ErrNotFound; renewal_policy.go closure docblock
    updated to reflect the new convention.
  - integration test mockJobRepository.Get wraps repository.ErrNotFound.

CI regression guardrail:
- .github/workflows/ci.yml::"Forbidden strings.Contains(err.Error())
  regression guard (S-2)" greps for the three patterns ("not found",
  "violates foreign key", "RESTRICT") under internal/api/handler/
  and fails the build on regression.

Verification:
- go build ./... — clean
- go vet ./... — clean
- go test ./... -short -count=1 — all packages pass (handler +
  repository + service + integration)
- golangci-lint v2.11.4 run ./... — 0 issues
- S-2 guardrail dry-run on post-fix tree → empty (good)
- All sibling guardrails (S-1, G-3, D-1+D-2, B-1, L-1, H-1, C-1, F-1, P-1) pass

Audit findings closed:
- cat-s6-efc7f6f6bd50 (P2)

Deferred follow-ups:
- 6 domain-specific substring patterns still inline in handlers
  ("cannot approve", "cannot reject", "cannot be parsed",
  "no certificates found", "challenge password", "invalid"/
  "required" validation chains in profiles + agent_groups). Each
  needs its own typed sentinel, scoped per service. Documented
  by the S-2 CI guardrail's allowlist for closure-comments only.
- Per-entity not-found sentinels (Option A — ErrCertificateNotFound,
  ErrAgentNotFound, etc.) deferred. Generic ErrNotFound covers the
  current dispatch needs; per-entity precision would let handlers
  return entity-aware error bodies without a domain.Type field,
  but not blocking.
2026-04-25 17:54:14 +00:00

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package handler
// Adversarial query-parameter, request-body, and revocation-reason tests.
//
// These tests exercise the second boundary of the certificate handler:
//
// * Numeric pagination parsing (page, per_page, page_size)
// * Sort direction and field whitelist
// * Time-range filters (expires_before, expires_after, created_after, updated_after)
// * Cursor pagination
// * Sparse-field projection (?fields=...)
// * Request-body JSON parsing (create/update) — null, malformed, deep nesting,
// unicode, oversized
// * Revocation reason abuse
//
// The handler silently ignores malformed pagination values (it falls back to
// defaults) and ignores invalid RFC3339 time values. These tests lock in that
// behaviour so a future "fail-closed" change has to be deliberate.
import (
"bytes"
"context"
"fmt"
"net/http"
"net/http/httptest"
"net/url"
"strings"
"testing"
"github.com/shankar0123/certctl/internal/domain"
"github.com/shankar0123/certctl/internal/repository"
)
// buildListRequest constructs a GET /api/v1/certificates request with the
// given raw query string. We use raw query strings (not url.Values.Encode)
// so adversarial inputs like "page=abc&page=-1" or "%00" pass through
// unchanged.
func buildListRequest(rawQuery string) *http.Request {
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/api/v1/certificates", nil)
req.URL.RawQuery = rawQuery
return req.WithContext(contextWithRequestID())
}
// TestListCertificates_PaginationAbuse verifies adversarial pagination values
// never produce a 500 and the handler always falls back to sane defaults.
func TestListCertificates_PaginationAbuse(t *testing.T) {
cases := []struct {
name string
rawQuery string
}{
{"negative_page", "page=-1"},
{"zero_page", "page=0"},
{"non_numeric_page", "page=abc"},
{"huge_page", "page=99999999999"},
{"int_overflow_page", "page=9223372036854775808"}, // int64 max + 1
{"negative_per_page", "per_page=-1"},
{"zero_per_page", "per_page=0"},
{"per_page_cap_at_500", "per_page=500"},
{"per_page_above_cap", "per_page=501"},
{"per_page_absurd", "per_page=1000000"},
{"non_numeric_per_page", "per_page=xyz"},
{"mixed_numeric_per_page", "per_page=10abc"},
{"negative_page_size", "page_size=-1"},
{"page_size_above_cap", "page_size=501"},
{"float_page", "page=1.5"},
{"exponent_page", "page=1e10"},
{"hex_page", "page=0xff"},
{"unicode_digits_page", "page=\u0661\u0662\u0663"}, // Arabic-Indic digits
}
for _, tc := range cases {
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
defer func() {
if r := recover(); r != nil {
t.Fatalf("panicked on %q: %v", tc.rawQuery, r)
}
}()
handler, mock := newCertHandlerWithMock()
mock.ListCertificatesWithFilterFn = func(_ context.Context, filter *repository.CertificateFilter) ([]domain.ManagedCertificate, int, error) {
// Sanity: page/perPage on the filter must never be negative
// and perPage must never exceed 500 after parsing.
if filter.Page < 1 {
t.Errorf("filter.Page=%d (must be >=1)", filter.Page)
}
if filter.PerPage < 1 || filter.PerPage > 500 {
t.Errorf("filter.PerPage=%d (must be in [1,500])", filter.PerPage)
}
return []domain.ManagedCertificate{}, 0, nil
}
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
handler.ListCertificates(w, buildListRequest(tc.rawQuery))
assertSafeResponse(t, w, "ListCertificates/"+tc.name)
if w.Code != http.StatusOK {
t.Errorf("%s: expected 200, got %d (body=%q)", tc.name, w.Code, w.Body.String())
}
})
}
}
// TestListCertificates_SortAbuse verifies the sort field (which feeds into a
// whitelist in the repository layer) handles adversarial input safely at the
// handler boundary. The handler accepts the raw value and forwards it; the
// repository is expected to whitelist it, but at THIS layer we just verify
// we don't crash or leak.
func TestListCertificates_SortAbuse(t *testing.T) {
cases := []struct {
name string
rawQuery string
}{
{"sql_injection_sort", "sort=notAfter;DROP TABLE managed_certificates--"},
{"sql_injection_or", "sort=notAfter' OR '1'='1"},
{"path_traversal_sort", "sort=../../etc/passwd"},
{"null_byte_sort", "sort=notAfter%00"},
{"unicode_sort", "sort=notAfter\u2010desc"},
{"leading_dash_only", "sort=-"},
{"leading_dashes", "sort=---notAfter"},
{"empty_sort", "sort="},
{"very_long_sort", "sort=" + strings.Repeat("a", 5000)},
{"sort_desc_flag", "sort=notAfter&sort_desc=true"},
{"conflicting_sort_desc", "sort=-notAfter&sort_desc=false"},
{"unknown_field", "sort=gibberish"},
{"shell_metacharacters_sort", "sort=notAfter;rm -rf /"},
}
for _, tc := range cases {
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
defer func() {
if r := recover(); r != nil {
t.Fatalf("panicked on %q: %v", tc.rawQuery, r)
}
}()
handler, mock := newCertHandlerWithMock()
mock.ListCertificatesWithFilterFn = func(_ context.Context, filter *repository.CertificateFilter) ([]domain.ManagedCertificate, int, error) {
return []domain.ManagedCertificate{}, 0, nil
}
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
handler.ListCertificates(w, buildListRequest(tc.rawQuery))
assertSafeResponse(t, w, "ListCertificates/"+tc.name)
})
}
}
// TestListCertificates_FieldsAbuse verifies sparse field projection handles
// adversarial field lists safely.
func TestListCertificates_FieldsAbuse(t *testing.T) {
cases := []struct {
name string
rawQuery string
}{
{"sql_injection_fields", "fields=id,name' OR 1=1--"},
{"path_traversal_fields", "fields=../../etc/passwd"},
{"empty_fields", "fields="},
{"single_comma", "fields=,"},
{"trailing_comma", "fields=id,name,"},
{"leading_comma", "fields=,id,name"},
{"whitespace_fields", "fields= id , name "},
{"duplicate_fields", "fields=id,id,id,id,id"},
{"unknown_fields", "fields=totally_not_a_field"},
{"many_fields", "fields=" + strings.Repeat("x,", 200) + "id"},
{"unicode_fields", "fields=id,n\u00e4me"},
{"null_byte_fields", "fields=id%00name"},
}
for _, tc := range cases {
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
defer func() {
if r := recover(); r != nil {
t.Fatalf("panicked on %q: %v", tc.rawQuery, r)
}
}()
handler, mock := newCertHandlerWithMock()
mock.ListCertificatesWithFilterFn = func(_ context.Context, filter *repository.CertificateFilter) ([]domain.ManagedCertificate, int, error) {
return []domain.ManagedCertificate{}, 0, nil
}
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
handler.ListCertificates(w, buildListRequest(tc.rawQuery))
assertSafeResponse(t, w, "ListCertificates/"+tc.name)
})
}
}
// TestListCertificates_TimeRangeAbuse verifies RFC3339 time-range filters
// handle malformed input by silently falling back to no filter (current
// behaviour).
func TestListCertificates_TimeRangeAbuse(t *testing.T) {
cases := []struct {
name string
rawQuery string
}{
{"invalid_expires_before", "expires_before=not-a-date"},
{"empty_expires_before", "expires_before="},
{"garbage_expires_before", "expires_before=%00%00"},
{"sql_injection_time", "expires_before=2026-01-01T00:00:00Z';DROP TABLE managed_certificates--"},
{"year_zero", "expires_before=0000-01-01T00:00:00Z"},
{"year_negative", "expires_before=-0001-01-01T00:00:00Z"},
{"year_huge", "expires_before=99999-12-31T23:59:59Z"},
{"invalid_month", "expires_before=2026-13-01T00:00:00Z"},
{"invalid_day", "expires_before=2026-02-30T00:00:00Z"},
{"valid_utc", "expires_before=2026-06-15T12:00:00Z"},
{"valid_with_offset", "expires_before=2026-06-15T12:00:00-07:00"},
{"unix_seconds_not_rfc3339", "expires_before=1767225600"},
{"all_four_filters", "expires_before=garbage&expires_after=garbage&created_after=garbage&updated_after=garbage"},
}
for _, tc := range cases {
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
defer func() {
if r := recover(); r != nil {
t.Fatalf("panicked on %q: %v", tc.rawQuery, r)
}
}()
handler, mock := newCertHandlerWithMock()
mock.ListCertificatesWithFilterFn = func(_ context.Context, filter *repository.CertificateFilter) ([]domain.ManagedCertificate, int, error) {
return []domain.ManagedCertificate{}, 0, nil
}
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
handler.ListCertificates(w, buildListRequest(tc.rawQuery))
assertSafeResponse(t, w, "ListCertificates/"+tc.name)
if w.Code != http.StatusOK {
t.Errorf("%s: expected 200, got %d", tc.name, w.Code)
}
})
}
}
// TestListCertificates_CursorAbuse exercises cursor-based pagination with
// adversarial cursor tokens. The handler forwards the cursor to the
// repository; we verify no 500 at the boundary and that the response type
// switches correctly.
func TestListCertificates_CursorAbuse(t *testing.T) {
cases := []struct {
name string
cursor string
}{
{"empty_not_set", ""}, // special-cased: should return PagedResponse
{"garbage_cursor", "not-a-valid-cursor"},
{"base64_garbage", "dGhpcyBpcyBub3QgYSB2YWxpZCBjdXJzb3I="},
{"sql_injection_cursor", "2026-01-01T00:00:00Z:mc-001';DROP TABLE--"},
{"path_traversal_cursor", "../../etc/passwd"},
{"null_byte_cursor", "valid%00cursor"},
{"very_long_cursor", strings.Repeat("A", 8192)},
{"unicode_cursor", "2026-01-01T00:00:00Z:mc\u20100001"},
{"valid_looking_cursor", "2026-01-01T00:00:00.000000000Z:mc-001"},
}
for _, tc := range cases {
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
defer func() {
if r := recover(); r != nil {
t.Fatalf("panicked on %q: %v", tc.cursor, r)
}
}()
handler, mock := newCertHandlerWithMock()
mock.ListCertificatesWithFilterFn = func(_ context.Context, filter *repository.CertificateFilter) ([]domain.ManagedCertificate, int, error) {
return []domain.ManagedCertificate{}, 0, nil
}
rawQuery := "cursor=" + url.QueryEscape(tc.cursor) + "&page_size=50"
if tc.cursor == "" {
rawQuery = "page=1&per_page=50"
}
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
handler.ListCertificates(w, buildListRequest(rawQuery))
assertSafeResponse(t, w, "ListCertificates/"+tc.name)
if w.Code != http.StatusOK {
t.Errorf("%s: expected 200, got %d", tc.name, w.Code)
}
})
}
}
// TestListCertificates_FilterInjection verifies the basic string filters
// (status, environment, owner_id, team_id, issuer_id, agent_id, profile_id)
// are forwarded as-is without causing any handler-layer failures. These go
// into parameterized SQL at the repo layer.
func TestListCertificates_FilterInjection(t *testing.T) {
filters := []string{
"status", "environment", "owner_id", "team_id",
"issuer_id", "agent_id", "profile_id",
}
payloads := []string{
"' OR 1=1--",
"'; DROP TABLE managed_certificates;--",
"../../etc/passwd",
strings.Repeat("A", 5000),
"\u2010hyphen",
"%00null",
}
for _, f := range filters {
for _, p := range payloads {
name := f + "__" + p
if len(name) > 80 {
name = name[:80]
}
t.Run(name, func(t *testing.T) {
defer func() {
if r := recover(); r != nil {
t.Fatalf("panicked: %v", r)
}
}()
handler, mock := newCertHandlerWithMock()
mock.ListCertificatesWithFilterFn = func(_ context.Context, filter *repository.CertificateFilter) ([]domain.ManagedCertificate, int, error) {
return []domain.ManagedCertificate{}, 0, nil
}
rawQuery := f + "=" + url.QueryEscape(p)
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
handler.ListCertificates(w, buildListRequest(rawQuery))
assertSafeResponse(t, w, "ListCertificates/"+f)
})
}
}
}
// ---------- Request body abuse (Tier 1D) ----------
// TestCreateCertificate_BodyAbuse sends adversarial JSON bodies to
// POST /api/v1/certificates. Every case must respond with 400 (not 500,
// not 200). This proves we reject malformed input before reaching the
// service layer.
func TestCreateCertificate_BodyAbuse(t *testing.T) {
cases := []struct {
name string
body string
}{
{"null_body", "null"},
{"empty_body", ""},
{"not_json", "not json at all"},
{"truncated_json", `{"common_name":"exa`},
{"unclosed_object", `{"common_name":"example.com"`},
{"array_not_object", `["example.com"]`},
{"number_not_object", `42`},
{"string_not_object", `"hello"`},
{"boolean_not_object", `true`},
{"duplicate_keys", `{"common_name":"evil.com","common_name":"example.com"}`},
{"unicode_bom", "\ufeff{\"common_name\":\"example.com\"}"},
{"deep_nesting", strings.Repeat("{\"x\":", 100) + "null" + strings.Repeat("}", 100)},
{"nested_array_bomb", `{"common_name":"x","sans":[[[[[[[[[[]]]]]]]]]]}`},
{"sql_injection_cn", `{"common_name":"'; DROP TABLE managed_certificates;--"}`},
{"empty_cn", `{"common_name":""}`},
{"null_cn", `{"common_name":null}`},
{"whitespace_cn", `{"common_name":" "}`},
{"cn_too_long", fmt.Sprintf(`{"common_name":%q}`, strings.Repeat("a", 500))},
{"cn_path_traversal", `{"common_name":"../../etc/passwd"}`},
{"cn_null_byte", "{\"common_name\":\"example\\u0000.com\"}"},
{"cn_newline", "{\"common_name\":\"example\\n.com\"}"},
{"cn_only_missing_others", `{"common_name":"example.com"}`},
{"extra_unknown_fields", `{"common_name":"example.com","__proto__":{"polluted":true},"eval":"alert(1)"}`},
{"unicode_homoglyph_cn", "{\"common_name\":\"ex\u0430mple.com\"}"}, // Cyrillic а
}
for _, tc := range cases {
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
defer func() {
if r := recover(); r != nil {
t.Fatalf("panicked on %q: %v", tc.name, r)
}
}()
handler, mock := newCertHandlerWithMock()
mock.CreateCertificateFn = func(_ context.Context, cert domain.ManagedCertificate) (*domain.ManagedCertificate, error) {
// If we ever reach this, the handler accepted a malformed
// body. Return a sentinel that passes but flag it.
c := cert
c.ID = "mc-accepted"
return &c, nil
}
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, "/api/v1/certificates", bytes.NewBufferString(tc.body))
req.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
req = req.WithContext(contextWithRequestID())
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
handler.CreateCertificate(w, req)
assertSafeResponse(t, w, "CreateCertificate/"+tc.name)
// Must NOT be 201 — all these bodies should be rejected.
if w.Code == http.StatusCreated {
t.Errorf("%s: handler accepted malformed body (201) body=%q", tc.name, w.Body.String())
}
})
}
}
// TestCreateCertificate_HugeBody sends a 2 MiB JSON body. The body-limit
// middleware is not in this handler-unit test, so we just verify the handler
// doesn't OOM/panic on a large but well-formed body.
func TestCreateCertificate_HugeBody(t *testing.T) {
defer func() {
if r := recover(); r != nil {
t.Fatalf("panicked on huge body: %v", r)
}
}()
// 2 MiB of SANs — well-formed JSON, technically valid, just huge.
var sb strings.Builder
sb.WriteString(`{"common_name":"example.com","owner_id":"o","team_id":"t","issuer_id":"iss","name":"n","renewal_policy_id":"rp","sans":[`)
for i := 0; i < 20000; i++ {
if i > 0 {
sb.WriteByte(',')
}
fmt.Fprintf(&sb, `"host%d.example.com"`, i)
}
sb.WriteString(`]}`)
handler, mock := newCertHandlerWithMock()
mock.CreateCertificateFn = func(_ context.Context, cert domain.ManagedCertificate) (*domain.ManagedCertificate, error) {
c := cert
c.ID = "mc-huge"
return &c, nil
}
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, "/api/v1/certificates", strings.NewReader(sb.String()))
req.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
req = req.WithContext(contextWithRequestID())
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
handler.CreateCertificate(w, req)
assertSafeResponse(t, w, "CreateCertificate/huge_body")
}
// ---------- Revocation reason abuse (Tier 1E) ----------
// TestRevokeCertificate_ReasonAbuse sends adversarial revocation reasons to
// POST /api/v1/certificates/{id}/revoke. The handler forwards the reason
// string to the service layer, which validates against RFC 5280. Errors
// from the service containing "invalid revocation reason" must map to 400,
// never 500.
func TestRevokeCertificate_ReasonAbuse(t *testing.T) {
cases := []struct {
name string
body string
}{
{"empty_reason", `{"reason":""}`},
{"null_reason", `{"reason":null}`},
{"nonexistent_reason", `{"reason":"totally made up"}`},
{"case_variant", `{"reason":"KEYCOMPROMISE"}`},
{"with_spaces", `{"reason":"key compromise"}`},
{"with_dashes", `{"reason":"key-compromise"}`},
{"mixed_case", `{"reason":"KeyCompromise"}`},
{"lowercase_valid", `{"reason":"keycompromise"}`},
{"unicode_homoglyph", "{\"reason\":\"keyCompr\u043emise\"}"},
{"sql_injection", `{"reason":"keyCompromise';DROP TABLE revocations--"}`},
{"very_long", fmt.Sprintf(`{"reason":%q}`, strings.Repeat("a", 10000))},
{"integer_reason", `{"reason":1}`},
{"array_reason", `{"reason":["keyCompromise"]}`},
{"object_reason", `{"reason":{"code":1}}`},
{"extra_fields", `{"reason":"keyCompromise","admin":true,"bypass":true}`},
{"no_body", ``},
{"malformed_json", `{"reason":`},
}
for _, tc := range cases {
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
defer func() {
if r := recover(); r != nil {
t.Fatalf("panicked on %q: %v", tc.name, r)
}
}()
handler, mock := newCertHandlerWithMock()
// The mock always returns "invalid revocation reason" so we
// verify the handler's errMsg→status mapping turns it into a 400.
mock.RevokeCertificateFn = func(_ context.Context, id string, reason string, _ string) error {
// The service uses domain.IsValidRevocationReason. If we got
// through to here with something bogus, simulate a real
// service error.
return fmt.Errorf("invalid revocation reason: %q", reason)
}
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, "/api/v1/certificates/mc-001/revoke", bytes.NewBufferString(tc.body))
req.URL.Path = "/api/v1/certificates/mc-001/revoke"
req.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
req = req.WithContext(contextWithRequestID())
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
handler.RevokeCertificate(w, req)
assertSafeResponse(t, w, "RevokeCertificate/"+tc.name)
})
}
}
// TestRevokeCertificate_AlreadyRevoked locks in the specific error->status
// mapping for "already revoked". The handler uses substring matching on the
// service error message, which is fragile — this test catches regressions.
func TestRevokeCertificate_AlreadyRevoked(t *testing.T) {
handler, mock := newCertHandlerWithMock()
mock.RevokeCertificateFn = func(_ context.Context, id string, reason string, _ string) error {
return fmt.Errorf("cannot revoke: certificate is already revoked")
}
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, "/api/v1/certificates/mc-001/revoke", strings.NewReader(`{"reason":"keyCompromise"}`))
req.URL.Path = "/api/v1/certificates/mc-001/revoke"
req.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
req = req.WithContext(contextWithRequestID())
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
handler.RevokeCertificate(w, req)
if w.Code != http.StatusBadRequest {
t.Errorf("expected 400 for already-revoked, got %d (body=%q)", w.Code, w.Body.String())
}
assertSafeResponse(t, w, "RevokeCertificate/already_revoked")
}
// TestRevokeCertificate_NotFound verifies 404 mapping.
func TestRevokeCertificate_NotFound(t *testing.T) {
handler, mock := newCertHandlerWithMock()
mock.RevokeCertificateFn = func(_ context.Context, id string, reason string, _ string) error {
return fmt.Errorf("certificate not found: %w", ErrMockNotFound)
}
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, "/api/v1/certificates/mc-missing/revoke", strings.NewReader(`{"reason":"keyCompromise"}`))
req.URL.Path = "/api/v1/certificates/mc-missing/revoke"
req.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
req = req.WithContext(contextWithRequestID())
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
handler.RevokeCertificate(w, req)
if w.Code != http.StatusNotFound {
t.Errorf("expected 404 for not-found, got %d (body=%q)", w.Code, w.Body.String())
}
assertSafeResponse(t, w, "RevokeCertificate/not_found")
}