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# Phase 6 — day-0 admin bootstrap * internal/auth/bootstrap/ (new package): Strategy interface + EnvTokenStrategy with constant-time compare, one-shot consumption via sync.Mutex, optional admin-existence probe. Bundle 2's OIDC- first-admin will plug in alongside as an alternate Strategy. * BootstrapService.ValidateAndMint: validates the operator's CERTCTL_BOOTSTRAP_TOKEN, mints a 32-byte (64-hex-char) random API key value, persists the SHA-256 hash to api_keys, grants r-admin via actor_roles, AddHashed's the runtime keystore so the just- minted key authenticates the next request without restart, and records bootstrap.consume to the audit trail with category=auth. * internal/auth/keystore.go (new): KeyStore interface + StaticKeyStore (immutable env-var-only path) + MutableKeyStore (env-var keys + DB-loaded api_keys + runtime AddHashed). The auth middleware now consumes a KeyStore so the bootstrap path can extend the lookup table at runtime. * migrations/000031_api_keys.up/down.sql: api_keys table with (id, name UNIQUE, key_hash UNIQUE, tenant_id, admin, created_by, created_at, expires_at, last_used_at). Idempotent. * /v1/auth/bootstrap GET (probe) + POST (mint) — auth-exempt. Both routes documented in api/openapi.yaml + AuthExemptRouterRoutes allowlist updated. The token never leaves internal/auth/bootstrap; the minted plaintext key flows only into the HTTP response body. * Startup warning emitted when CERTCTL_BOOTSTRAP_TOKEN is set AND admin actors already exist (config drift signal). * Tests: 4 strategy invariants (empty token born disabled, wrong token=ErrInvalidToken without consumption, one-shot consumption, admin-exists closes path), 5 service tests (happy path + actor- name validation + propagation of strategy errors + nil-deps guard + 32-byte entropy budget), 8 HTTP-handler tests (status 201/410/401/400 mapping + token-leak hygiene scan of slog + audit details + Location header). Token-leak test redirects slog.Default to a buffer for the test scope. # Phase 7 — API-key migration + scope-down CLI * GET /v1/auth/keys handler + service method ListKeys backed by ActorRoleRepository.ListDistinctActors. Returns one row per (actor_id, actor_type) pair with the slice of role IDs they hold. Permission: auth.role.list. * internal/cli/auth_scope_down.go: AuthListKeys, AuthScopeDown (interactive), AuthScopeDownNonInteractive (JSON config), AuthScopeDownSuggest (--suggest with optional --apply). The synthetic actor-demo-anon is filtered out of every interactive / bulk path; non-interactive flow logs and skips it explicitly. * SuggestRoleFromAuditEvents (pure function): walks 30 days of audit events per actor and returns the narrowest matching role (admin / mcp / viewer / agent / operator) plus a one-line reason. Classification: any admin-shaped action wins; otherwise all-MCP → mcp; all-read-only → viewer; all-agent-shaped → agent; otherwise operator. Test table pins all six classifications. * CLI subcommand tree extended: 'auth keys list' + 'auth keys scope-down [--non-interactive <cfg>] [--suggest [--apply]]'. * CHANGELOG.md leads v2.1.0 with the SECURITY: AUDIT YOUR API KEYS call-out + four flow examples. # Phase 8 — auditor role + event_category column * migrations/000032_audit_category.up/down.sql: ALTER TABLE audit_events ADD COLUMN event_category TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT 'cert_lifecycle' + CHECK constraint (cert_lifecycle/auth/config) + (event_category) and (event_category, timestamp DESC) indexes for the auditor-filter query path. WORM trigger from migration 000018 continues to enforce append-only at the DB layer (DDL is not blocked). * domain.AuditEvent gains EventCategory string (omitempty); domain.EventCategoryCertLifecycle / Auth / Config constants. * AuditService.RecordEventWithCategory sibling of RecordEvent; legacy callers stay on RecordEvent (defaults to cert_lifecycle). Auth callers (RoleService, ActorRoleService, BootstrapService) switched to RecordEventWithCategory(..., 'auth', ...). * GET /v1/audit?category=<cat>: handler accepts the optional query param, validates against the enum (400 on invalid value), dispatches through ListAuditEventsByCategory. OpenAPI updated with the new query param + AuditEvent.event_category schema. * Postgres AuditRepository.Create now writes event_category; AuditRepository.List filters on it; AuditFilter.EventCategory gates the WHERE clause. * Tests: 5 audit-category-filter HTTP tests (dispatch routing, back-compat fallback, 400 for invalid values, all 3 enum values accepted, page+category combine, JSON output surfaces the field). 3 auditor-role invariants (auditor holds exactly audit.read+audit.export, no mutating perms, disjoint from viewer except audit.read). # Cross-phase wiring * HandlerRegistry.Bootstrap field added; cmd/server/main.go wires the bootstrap service ahead of RegisterHandlers (extracted assembleNamedAPIKeys helper into auth_backfill.go, moved the keystore + bootstrap construction up alongside the auth repos). * AuthCheckResolver / AuthActorRoleService extended with ListKeys to satisfy the Phase 7 surface; existing fakes updated. * fakeAudit + mockAuditService stubs in tests gain RecordEventWithCategory + ListAuditEventsByCategory; existing tests untouched. # Verifications * gofmt -l: clean across every modified file. * go vet ./...: clean. * staticcheck across internal/auth + handler + router + cli + service + repository + cmd + domain: clean. * go test -short -count=1: green across every Bundle-1-touched package — internal/auth (incl. bootstrap), internal/api/handler, internal/api/router, internal/cli, internal/service/auth, internal/service, internal/domain/auth, internal/repository/postgres, cmd/server, cmd/cli, plus internal/scheduler, internal/api/middleware, cmd/agent, internal/mcp.
127 lines
3.6 KiB
Go
127 lines
3.6 KiB
Go
package handler
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import (
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"context"
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"net/http"
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"strconv"
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"strings"
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"github.com/certctl-io/certctl/internal/api/middleware"
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"github.com/certctl-io/certctl/internal/domain"
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)
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// AuditService defines the service interface for audit event operations.
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type AuditService interface {
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ListAuditEvents(ctx context.Context, page, perPage int) ([]domain.AuditEvent, int64, error)
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GetAuditEvent(ctx context.Context, id string) (*domain.AuditEvent, error)
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// ListAuditEventsByCategory (Bundle 1 Phase 8) returns audit
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// rows whose event_category column matches eventCategory.
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// eventCategory is one of "cert_lifecycle", "auth", "config";
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// empty string returns all categories. Used by the auditor role
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// (filtered to "auth" via /v1/audit?category=auth).
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ListAuditEventsByCategory(ctx context.Context, eventCategory string, page, perPage int) ([]domain.AuditEvent, int64, error)
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}
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// AuditHandler handles HTTP requests for audit event operations.
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type AuditHandler struct {
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svc AuditService
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}
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// NewAuditHandler creates a new AuditHandler with a service dependency.
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func NewAuditHandler(svc AuditService) AuditHandler {
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return AuditHandler{svc: svc}
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}
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// ListAuditEvents lists audit events.
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// GET /api/v1/audit?page=1&per_page=50&category=auth
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//
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// Bundle 1 Phase 8 adds the optional `category` query parameter for
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// auditor-role filtering. Allowed values: cert_lifecycle, auth, config.
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// Unknown values surface 400 so misuse is caught loud (instead of
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// silently returning all rows).
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func (h AuditHandler) ListAuditEvents(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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if r.Method != http.MethodGet {
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Error(w, http.StatusMethodNotAllowed, "Method not allowed")
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return
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}
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requestID := middleware.GetRequestID(r.Context())
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page := 1
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perPage := 50
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query := r.URL.Query()
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if p := query.Get("page"); p != "" {
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if parsed, err := strconv.Atoi(p); err == nil && parsed > 0 {
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page = parsed
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}
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}
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if pp := query.Get("per_page"); pp != "" {
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if parsed, err := strconv.Atoi(pp); err == nil && parsed > 0 && parsed <= 500 {
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perPage = parsed
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}
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}
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category := query.Get("category")
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if category != "" {
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switch category {
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case domain.EventCategoryCertLifecycle, domain.EventCategoryAuth, domain.EventCategoryConfig:
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// ok
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default:
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ErrorWithRequestID(w, http.StatusBadRequest,
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"Invalid category — allowed: cert_lifecycle, auth, config",
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requestID)
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return
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}
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}
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var (
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events []domain.AuditEvent
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total int64
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err error
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)
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if category != "" {
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events, total, err = h.svc.ListAuditEventsByCategory(r.Context(), category, page, perPage)
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} else {
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events, total, err = h.svc.ListAuditEvents(r.Context(), page, perPage)
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}
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if err != nil {
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ErrorWithRequestID(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "Failed to list audit events", requestID)
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return
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}
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response := PagedResponse{
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Data: events,
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Total: total,
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Page: page,
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PerPage: perPage,
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}
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JSON(w, http.StatusOK, response)
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}
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// GetAuditEvent retrieves a single audit event by ID.
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// GET /api/v1/audit/{id}
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func (h AuditHandler) GetAuditEvent(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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if r.Method != http.MethodGet {
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Error(w, http.StatusMethodNotAllowed, "Method not allowed")
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return
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}
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requestID := middleware.GetRequestID(r.Context())
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id := strings.TrimPrefix(r.URL.Path, "/api/v1/audit/")
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parts := strings.Split(id, "/")
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if len(parts) == 0 || parts[0] == "" {
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ErrorWithRequestID(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "Audit event ID is required", requestID)
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return
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}
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id = parts[0]
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event, err := h.svc.GetAuditEvent(r.Context(), id)
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if err != nil {
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ErrorWithRequestID(w, http.StatusNotFound, "Audit event not found", requestID)
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return
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}
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JSON(w, http.StatusOK, event)
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}
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