mirror of
https://github.com/shankar0123/certctl.git
synced 2026-06-07 16:11:29 +00:00
4dc8d3fa5b
Closes the RFC 8555 + RFC 9773 surface beyond the issuance happy-path:
- POST /acme/profile/<id>/key-change (RFC 8555 §7.3.5)
- POST /acme/profile/<id>/revoke-cert (RFC 8555 §7.6)
- GET /acme/profile/<id>/renewal-info/<cert-id> (RFC 9773 ARI)
After this commit, ACME clients can rotate account keys, revoke certs
through the ACME surface (rather than only via the certctl GUI/API),
and fetch ARI for proactive renewal scheduling.
Architecture:
- Key rollover: outer JWS verified against the registered account key
(existing kid path); the inner JWS — embedded as the outer's payload
— verified against the embedded NEW jwk in a new dedicated routine
(ParseAndVerifyKeyChangeInner) that enforces RFC 8555 §7.3.5
inner-only invariants: MUST use jwk + MUST NOT use kid, payload
.account == outer.kid, payload.oldKey thumbprint-equals registered.
A single WithinTx swaps the stored thumbprint+pem and writes the
audit row. Concurrent-rollover safety via SELECT…FOR UPDATE on the
conflicting account row in UpdateAccountJWKWithTx; the loser
observes the winner's new thumbprint and is told to retry (409).
- Revocation: two auth paths. kid → AccountOwnsCertificate single-
indexed COUNT lookup over acme_orders. jwk → constant-time RFC 7638
thumbprint compare against the cert's pubkey. Both paths route
through service.RevocationSvc.RevokeCertificateWithActor so the
existing CRL/OCSP refresh + audit + metrics pipeline applies. RFC
5280 §5.3.1 numeric reason codes clamp to certctl's
domain.ValidRevocationReasons; codes 8 (removeFromCRL) + 10
(aACompromise) clamp to 'unspecified' since they aren't in the set.
- ARI is GET-only and unauth per RFC 9773 §4. Cert-id wire shape is
base64url(AKI).base64url(serial); ParseARICertID strict-decodes,
SerialHex emits the canonical certctl-shape lowercase-no-leading-
zeros hex used in certificate_versions.serial_number.
ComputeRenewalWindow has 3 branches: bound RenewalPolicy →
[notAfter - days, notAfter - days/2]; no policy → last 33% of
validity; past expiry → [now, now + 1d] (renew immediately).
Retry-After honors CERTCTL_ACME_SERVER_ARI_POLL_INTERVAL.
What ships:
- internal/api/acme/{keychange,ari}.go (+ phase4_test.go: 15 tests).
- internal/api/acme/order.go: RevokeCertRequest wire shape.
- internal/api/handler/acme.go: KeyChange, RevokeCert, RenewalInfo
+ 11 new writeServiceError mappings.
- internal/repository/postgres/acme.go: UpdateAccountJWKWithTx (FOR
UPDATE + expectedOldThumbprint precondition; ErrACMEAccountKey-
ConcurrentUpdate sentinel) + AccountOwnsCertificate.
- internal/service/acme.go: RotateAccountKey + RevokeCert +
RenewalInfo; CertificateRevoker + RenewalPolicyLookup interfaces;
SetRevocationDelegate + SetRenewalPolicyLookup wiring; 11 new
sentinels; 6 new metrics.
- internal/service/acme_phase4_test.go: service-layer tests for
RotateAccountKey (happy + duplicate-key) + RevokeCert (kid mismatch
+ jwk mismatch + jwk happy + already-revoked + reason-clamping) +
RenewalInfo (disabled + bad cert-id).
- internal/api/router/router.go: 6 new register calls (3 per-profile
+ 3 shorthand). Router parity exceptions extended in lockstep
(in-tree SpecParityExceptions + CI-only openapi-handler-exceptions
.yaml).
- cmd/server/main.go: SetRevocationDelegate(revocationSvc) +
SetRenewalPolicyLookup(renewalPolicyRepo) at startup.
- internal/config/config.go: CERTCTL_ACME_SERVER_ARI_ENABLED (default
true) + CERTCTL_ACME_SERVER_ARI_POLL_INTERVAL (default 6h);
BuildDirectory's ariEnabled flag now flips on under
cfg.ARIEnabled.
- docs/acme-server.md: phase status flipped to Phase 4; endpoints
table grows 6 rows (3 per-profile + 3 shorthand); FAQ section
appended explaining how to rotate keys, revoke certs, and consume
ARI.
Tests:
- 'go vet ./...' clean across the repo.
- 'go test -short -count=1 ./...' green across every package.
- phase4_test.go covers: keychange happy-path + 5 negatives +
MapKeyChangeErrorToProblem coverage; ARI cert-id round-trip + 6
malformed cases + BuildARICertID from a generated cert; window-
math 3 branches.
- service-layer tests confirm: RotateAccountKey atomically swaps the
thumbprint (verifies persisted state) and rejects duplicate keys;
RevokeCert routes through the stub RevocationSvc with the right
actor string + reason on the jwk path, rejects mismatched keys,
rejects already-revoked certs, clamps reason codes correctly;
RenewalInfo respects ARIEnabled + cert-id format.
Engineering history: cowork/WORKSPACE-CHANGELOG.md 'ACME-Server-4'.
778 lines
26 KiB
Go
778 lines
26 KiB
Go
// Copyright (c) certctl
|
|
// SPDX-License-Identifier: BSL-1.1
|
|
|
|
package postgres
|
|
|
|
import (
|
|
"context"
|
|
"database/sql"
|
|
"encoding/json"
|
|
"errors"
|
|
"fmt"
|
|
"time"
|
|
|
|
"github.com/lib/pq"
|
|
"github.com/shankar0123/certctl/internal/domain"
|
|
"github.com/shankar0123/certctl/internal/repository"
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
// ACMERepository implements the ACME server's persistence layer
|
|
// (RFC 8555 + RFC 9773 ARI). Phase 1a wires only nonce operations
|
|
// (IssueNonce + ConsumeNonce); Phase 1b extends with account CRUD,
|
|
// Phase 2 with order/authz/challenge CRUD, Phase 4 with the
|
|
// key-rollover atomic update path.
|
|
type ACMERepository struct {
|
|
db *sql.DB
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// NewACMERepository constructs an ACMERepository wrapping the supplied
|
|
// *sql.DB. The constructor is symmetric with NewAuditRepository,
|
|
// NewProfileRepository, etc. — main.go owns the lifecycle.
|
|
func NewACMERepository(db *sql.DB) *ACMERepository {
|
|
return &ACMERepository{db: db}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// IssueNonce inserts a new ACME nonce row with the given TTL. The
|
|
// caller (typically ACMEService.IssueNonce) is responsible for
|
|
// generating the nonce string itself via acme.GenerateNonce; this
|
|
// method is the persistence write.
|
|
//
|
|
// RFC 8555 §6.5: nonces issued by the server can be redeemed exactly
|
|
// once. The PRIMARY KEY guarantees insertion uniqueness; ConsumeNonce
|
|
// flips the `used` column atomically so a replay sees `used=true`.
|
|
func (r *ACMERepository) IssueNonce(ctx context.Context, nonce string, ttl time.Duration) error {
|
|
_, err := r.db.ExecContext(ctx, `
|
|
INSERT INTO acme_nonces (nonce, issued_at, expires_at, used)
|
|
VALUES ($1, NOW(), $2, FALSE)
|
|
`, nonce, time.Now().Add(ttl))
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return fmt.Errorf("acme: insert nonce: %w", err)
|
|
}
|
|
return nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// ConsumeNonce flips the nonce's `used` column to true atomically.
|
|
// Returns sql.ErrNoRows if:
|
|
//
|
|
// - the nonce was never issued (caller's payload was forged or
|
|
// truncated)
|
|
// - the nonce was already consumed (replay attempt)
|
|
// - the nonce has expired (CERTCTL_ACME_SERVER_NONCE_TTL window
|
|
// elapsed since issuance)
|
|
//
|
|
// All three failure modes are mapped by the JWS verifier (Phase 1b)
|
|
// to urn:ietf:params:acme:error:badNonce per RFC 8555 §6.5.1. Phase
|
|
// 1a does not yet call ConsumeNonce — the JWS-authenticated POST
|
|
// path arrives in Phase 1b.
|
|
//
|
|
// The single UPDATE statement is the atomic primitive: a concurrent
|
|
// second consume races for the same row, but only one of them flips
|
|
// `used` from false → true. Postgres's row-level locking serializes
|
|
// the writes; the loser's UPDATE matches zero rows (because used is
|
|
// already true) and returns sql.ErrNoRows.
|
|
func (r *ACMERepository) ConsumeNonce(ctx context.Context, nonce string) error {
|
|
res, err := r.db.ExecContext(ctx, `
|
|
UPDATE acme_nonces
|
|
SET used = TRUE
|
|
WHERE nonce = $1
|
|
AND used = FALSE
|
|
AND expires_at > NOW()
|
|
`, nonce)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return fmt.Errorf("acme: consume nonce: %w", err)
|
|
}
|
|
n, err := res.RowsAffected()
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return fmt.Errorf("acme: consume nonce rows affected: %w", err)
|
|
}
|
|
if n == 0 {
|
|
return sql.ErrNoRows
|
|
}
|
|
return nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// ErrACMEAccountDuplicateThumbprint is the sentinel returned by
|
|
// CreateAccount[WithTx] when the (profile_id, jwk_thumbprint) UNIQUE
|
|
// constraint fires. Callers (the new-account flow) translate this
|
|
// into "an account already exists for this JWK" — RFC 8555 §7.3.1
|
|
// idempotent-semantics path.
|
|
var ErrACMEAccountDuplicateThumbprint = errors.New("acme: account already exists for this profile + JWK thumbprint")
|
|
|
|
// CreateAccount inserts a new acme_accounts row. Use CreateAccountWithTx
|
|
// when the insert must be atomic with an audit row.
|
|
func (r *ACMERepository) CreateAccount(ctx context.Context, acct *domain.ACMEAccount) error {
|
|
return r.CreateAccountWithTx(ctx, r.db, acct)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// CreateAccountWithTx inserts using the supplied Querier (typically
|
|
// *sql.Tx from postgres.WithinTx). Returns
|
|
// ErrACMEAccountDuplicateThumbprint on the (profile_id, jwk_thumbprint)
|
|
// UNIQUE collision per migration 000025.
|
|
func (r *ACMERepository) CreateAccountWithTx(ctx context.Context, q repository.Querier, acct *domain.ACMEAccount) error {
|
|
if acct.AccountID == "" || acct.JWKThumbprint == "" || acct.JWKPEM == "" || acct.ProfileID == "" {
|
|
return fmt.Errorf("acme: create account: missing required field")
|
|
}
|
|
if acct.Status == "" {
|
|
acct.Status = domain.ACMEAccountStatusValid
|
|
}
|
|
now := time.Now().UTC()
|
|
if acct.CreatedAt.IsZero() {
|
|
acct.CreatedAt = now
|
|
}
|
|
acct.UpdatedAt = now
|
|
|
|
contact := pq.Array(acct.Contact)
|
|
var ownerID interface{}
|
|
if acct.OwnerID != "" {
|
|
ownerID = acct.OwnerID
|
|
}
|
|
_, err := q.ExecContext(ctx, `
|
|
INSERT INTO acme_accounts (
|
|
account_id, jwk_thumbprint, jwk_pem, contact, status,
|
|
profile_id, owner_id, created_at, updated_at
|
|
) VALUES ($1, $2, $3, $4, $5, $6, $7, $8, $9)
|
|
`,
|
|
acct.AccountID, acct.JWKThumbprint, acct.JWKPEM, contact,
|
|
string(acct.Status), acct.ProfileID, ownerID,
|
|
acct.CreatedAt, acct.UpdatedAt,
|
|
)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
// Postgres SQLSTATE 23505 = unique_violation. lib/pq wraps the
|
|
// raw error in *pq.Error; decode and translate to the
|
|
// repository sentinel.
|
|
var pqErr *pq.Error
|
|
if errors.As(err, &pqErr) && pqErr.Code == "23505" {
|
|
return ErrACMEAccountDuplicateThumbprint
|
|
}
|
|
return fmt.Errorf("acme: insert account: %w", err)
|
|
}
|
|
return nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// GetAccountByID returns the account row for an account ID.
|
|
// Returns sql.ErrNoRows wrapped via repository.ErrNotFound when
|
|
// no row matches (callers branch on errors.Is(err, repository.ErrNotFound)).
|
|
func (r *ACMERepository) GetAccountByID(ctx context.Context, accountID string) (*domain.ACMEAccount, error) {
|
|
row := r.db.QueryRowContext(ctx, `
|
|
SELECT account_id, jwk_thumbprint, jwk_pem, contact, status,
|
|
profile_id, COALESCE(owner_id, ''), created_at, updated_at
|
|
FROM acme_accounts
|
|
WHERE account_id = $1
|
|
`, accountID)
|
|
return scanACMEAccount(row)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// GetAccountByThumbprint returns the account row for a (profile_id,
|
|
// jwk_thumbprint) pair. Same sentinel semantics as GetAccountByID.
|
|
// The new-account idempotency path queries by thumbprint to detect a
|
|
// re-registration of an existing JWK (RFC 8555 §7.3.1).
|
|
func (r *ACMERepository) GetAccountByThumbprint(ctx context.Context, profileID, thumbprint string) (*domain.ACMEAccount, error) {
|
|
row := r.db.QueryRowContext(ctx, `
|
|
SELECT account_id, jwk_thumbprint, jwk_pem, contact, status,
|
|
profile_id, COALESCE(owner_id, ''), created_at, updated_at
|
|
FROM acme_accounts
|
|
WHERE profile_id = $1 AND jwk_thumbprint = $2
|
|
`, profileID, thumbprint)
|
|
return scanACMEAccount(row)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// UpdateAccountContact replaces the account's contact list. Use the
|
|
// WithTx variant when the update must be atomic with an audit row.
|
|
func (r *ACMERepository) UpdateAccountContact(ctx context.Context, accountID string, contact []string) error {
|
|
return r.UpdateAccountContactWithTx(ctx, r.db, accountID, contact)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// UpdateAccountContactWithTx writes the new contact list using the
|
|
// supplied Querier. Returns sql.ErrNoRows-wrapped repository.ErrNotFound
|
|
// on missing account.
|
|
func (r *ACMERepository) UpdateAccountContactWithTx(ctx context.Context, q repository.Querier, accountID string, contact []string) error {
|
|
res, err := q.ExecContext(ctx, `
|
|
UPDATE acme_accounts
|
|
SET contact = $2, updated_at = NOW()
|
|
WHERE account_id = $1
|
|
`, accountID, pq.Array(contact))
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return fmt.Errorf("acme: update account contact: %w", err)
|
|
}
|
|
n, err := res.RowsAffected()
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return fmt.Errorf("acme: update account contact rows affected: %w", err)
|
|
}
|
|
if n == 0 {
|
|
return fmt.Errorf("account not found: %w", repository.ErrNotFound)
|
|
}
|
|
return nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// UpdateAccountStatus is the persistence path for account
|
|
// deactivation. Phase 1b accepts only the "valid" → "deactivated"
|
|
// transition (RFC 8555 §7.3.6); operator-initiated revocation is a
|
|
// future phase.
|
|
func (r *ACMERepository) UpdateAccountStatus(ctx context.Context, accountID string, status domain.ACMEAccountStatus) error {
|
|
return r.UpdateAccountStatusWithTx(ctx, r.db, accountID, status)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// UpdateAccountStatusWithTx writes the status transition using the
|
|
// supplied Querier. Same sentinel semantics as UpdateAccountContactWithTx.
|
|
func (r *ACMERepository) UpdateAccountStatusWithTx(ctx context.Context, q repository.Querier, accountID string, status domain.ACMEAccountStatus) error {
|
|
res, err := q.ExecContext(ctx, `
|
|
UPDATE acme_accounts
|
|
SET status = $2, updated_at = NOW()
|
|
WHERE account_id = $1
|
|
`, accountID, string(status))
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return fmt.Errorf("acme: update account status: %w", err)
|
|
}
|
|
n, err := res.RowsAffected()
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return fmt.Errorf("acme: update account status rows affected: %w", err)
|
|
}
|
|
if n == 0 {
|
|
return fmt.Errorf("account not found: %w", repository.ErrNotFound)
|
|
}
|
|
return nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// --- Phase 2 — order / authz / challenge CRUD --------------------------
|
|
|
|
// CreateOrderWithTx inserts an acme_orders row. Used by ACMEService.CreateOrder
|
|
// during new-order processing; the transaction also creates the per-identifier
|
|
// authz + challenge rows + audit row in the same WithinTx.
|
|
func (r *ACMERepository) CreateOrderWithTx(ctx context.Context, q repository.Querier, order *domain.ACMEOrder) error {
|
|
if order.OrderID == "" || order.AccountID == "" {
|
|
return fmt.Errorf("acme: create order: missing required field")
|
|
}
|
|
now := time.Now().UTC()
|
|
if order.CreatedAt.IsZero() {
|
|
order.CreatedAt = now
|
|
}
|
|
order.UpdatedAt = now
|
|
identifiersJSON, err := jsonMarshalACME(order.Identifiers)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return fmt.Errorf("acme: marshal identifiers: %w", err)
|
|
}
|
|
var (
|
|
notBefore, notAfter interface{}
|
|
errBlob interface{}
|
|
certID interface{}
|
|
)
|
|
if order.NotBefore != nil {
|
|
notBefore = *order.NotBefore
|
|
}
|
|
if order.NotAfter != nil {
|
|
notAfter = *order.NotAfter
|
|
}
|
|
if order.Error != nil {
|
|
b, err := jsonMarshalACME(order.Error)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return fmt.Errorf("acme: marshal error: %w", err)
|
|
}
|
|
errBlob = b
|
|
}
|
|
if order.CertificateID != "" {
|
|
certID = order.CertificateID
|
|
}
|
|
_, err = q.ExecContext(ctx, `
|
|
INSERT INTO acme_orders (
|
|
order_id, account_id, identifiers, status, expires_at,
|
|
not_before, not_after, error, csr_pem, certificate_id,
|
|
created_at, updated_at
|
|
) VALUES ($1, $2, $3, $4, $5, $6, $7, $8, $9, $10, $11, $12)
|
|
`,
|
|
order.OrderID, order.AccountID, identifiersJSON, string(order.Status),
|
|
order.ExpiresAt, notBefore, notAfter, errBlob, order.CSRPEM, certID,
|
|
order.CreatedAt, order.UpdatedAt,
|
|
)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return fmt.Errorf("acme: insert order: %w", err)
|
|
}
|
|
return nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// GetOrderByID retrieves an order. Returns sql.ErrNoRows-wrapped
|
|
// repository.ErrNotFound on miss.
|
|
func (r *ACMERepository) GetOrderByID(ctx context.Context, orderID string) (*domain.ACMEOrder, error) {
|
|
row := r.db.QueryRowContext(ctx, `
|
|
SELECT order_id, account_id, identifiers, status, expires_at,
|
|
not_before, not_after, error, COALESCE(csr_pem, ''),
|
|
COALESCE(certificate_id, ''), created_at, updated_at
|
|
FROM acme_orders
|
|
WHERE order_id = $1
|
|
`, orderID)
|
|
return scanACMEOrder(row)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// UpdateOrderWithTx persists changes to an order's mutable fields.
|
|
// Used by FinalizeOrder to transition status / set csr_pem /
|
|
// certificate_id / error.
|
|
func (r *ACMERepository) UpdateOrderWithTx(ctx context.Context, q repository.Querier, order *domain.ACMEOrder) error {
|
|
order.UpdatedAt = time.Now().UTC()
|
|
var (
|
|
errBlob interface{}
|
|
certID interface{}
|
|
)
|
|
if order.Error != nil {
|
|
b, err := jsonMarshalACME(order.Error)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return fmt.Errorf("acme: marshal error: %w", err)
|
|
}
|
|
errBlob = b
|
|
}
|
|
if order.CertificateID != "" {
|
|
certID = order.CertificateID
|
|
}
|
|
res, err := q.ExecContext(ctx, `
|
|
UPDATE acme_orders SET
|
|
status = $2,
|
|
error = $3,
|
|
csr_pem = $4,
|
|
certificate_id = $5,
|
|
updated_at = $6
|
|
WHERE order_id = $1
|
|
`, order.OrderID, string(order.Status), errBlob, order.CSRPEM, certID, order.UpdatedAt)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return fmt.Errorf("acme: update order: %w", err)
|
|
}
|
|
n, err := res.RowsAffected()
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return fmt.Errorf("acme: update order rows: %w", err)
|
|
}
|
|
if n == 0 {
|
|
return fmt.Errorf("order not found: %w", repository.ErrNotFound)
|
|
}
|
|
return nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// CreateAuthzWithTx inserts an acme_authorizations row.
|
|
func (r *ACMERepository) CreateAuthzWithTx(ctx context.Context, q repository.Querier, authz *domain.ACMEAuthorization) error {
|
|
if authz.AuthzID == "" || authz.OrderID == "" {
|
|
return fmt.Errorf("acme: create authz: missing required field")
|
|
}
|
|
now := time.Now().UTC()
|
|
if authz.CreatedAt.IsZero() {
|
|
authz.CreatedAt = now
|
|
}
|
|
authz.UpdatedAt = now
|
|
idJSON, err := jsonMarshalACME(authz.Identifier)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return fmt.Errorf("acme: marshal identifier: %w", err)
|
|
}
|
|
_, err = q.ExecContext(ctx, `
|
|
INSERT INTO acme_authorizations (
|
|
authz_id, order_id, identifier, status, expires_at, wildcard,
|
|
created_at, updated_at
|
|
) VALUES ($1, $2, $3, $4, $5, $6, $7, $8)
|
|
`,
|
|
authz.AuthzID, authz.OrderID, idJSON, string(authz.Status),
|
|
authz.ExpiresAt, authz.Wildcard, authz.CreatedAt, authz.UpdatedAt,
|
|
)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return fmt.Errorf("acme: insert authz: %w", err)
|
|
}
|
|
return nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// GetAuthzByID returns the authz row + its child challenges.
|
|
func (r *ACMERepository) GetAuthzByID(ctx context.Context, authzID string) (*domain.ACMEAuthorization, error) {
|
|
row := r.db.QueryRowContext(ctx, `
|
|
SELECT authz_id, order_id, identifier, status, expires_at, wildcard, created_at, updated_at
|
|
FROM acme_authorizations WHERE authz_id = $1
|
|
`, authzID)
|
|
authz, err := scanACMEAuthz(row)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return nil, err
|
|
}
|
|
chs, err := r.ListChallengesByAuthz(ctx, authzID)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return nil, fmt.Errorf("acme: list challenges: %w", err)
|
|
}
|
|
authz.Challenges = chs
|
|
return authz, nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// ListAuthzsByOrder returns the per-order authz rows (without challenges
|
|
// — callers needing challenges call GetAuthzByID per entry).
|
|
func (r *ACMERepository) ListAuthzsByOrder(ctx context.Context, orderID string) ([]*domain.ACMEAuthorization, error) {
|
|
rows, err := r.db.QueryContext(ctx, `
|
|
SELECT authz_id, order_id, identifier, status, expires_at, wildcard, created_at, updated_at
|
|
FROM acme_authorizations WHERE order_id = $1
|
|
ORDER BY created_at ASC
|
|
`, orderID)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return nil, fmt.Errorf("acme: list authzs: %w", err)
|
|
}
|
|
defer rows.Close()
|
|
var out []*domain.ACMEAuthorization
|
|
for rows.Next() {
|
|
a, err := scanACMEAuthz(rows)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return nil, err
|
|
}
|
|
out = append(out, a)
|
|
}
|
|
return out, rows.Err()
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// CreateChallengeWithTx inserts an acme_challenges row.
|
|
func (r *ACMERepository) CreateChallengeWithTx(ctx context.Context, q repository.Querier, ch *domain.ACMEChallenge) error {
|
|
if ch.ChallengeID == "" || ch.AuthzID == "" || ch.Type == "" || ch.Token == "" {
|
|
return fmt.Errorf("acme: create challenge: missing required field")
|
|
}
|
|
if ch.CreatedAt.IsZero() {
|
|
ch.CreatedAt = time.Now().UTC()
|
|
}
|
|
var (
|
|
validatedAt interface{}
|
|
errBlob interface{}
|
|
)
|
|
if ch.ValidatedAt != nil {
|
|
validatedAt = *ch.ValidatedAt
|
|
}
|
|
if ch.Error != nil {
|
|
b, err := jsonMarshalACME(ch.Error)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return fmt.Errorf("acme: marshal error: %w", err)
|
|
}
|
|
errBlob = b
|
|
}
|
|
_, err := q.ExecContext(ctx, `
|
|
INSERT INTO acme_challenges (
|
|
challenge_id, authz_id, type, status, token, validated_at, error, created_at
|
|
) VALUES ($1, $2, $3, $4, $5, $6, $7, $8)
|
|
`,
|
|
ch.ChallengeID, ch.AuthzID, string(ch.Type), string(ch.Status), ch.Token,
|
|
validatedAt, errBlob, ch.CreatedAt,
|
|
)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return fmt.Errorf("acme: insert challenge: %w", err)
|
|
}
|
|
return nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// ListChallengesByAuthz returns the challenge rows for an authz.
|
|
func (r *ACMERepository) ListChallengesByAuthz(ctx context.Context, authzID string) ([]domain.ACMEChallenge, error) {
|
|
rows, err := r.db.QueryContext(ctx, `
|
|
SELECT challenge_id, authz_id, type, status, token, validated_at, error, created_at
|
|
FROM acme_challenges WHERE authz_id = $1
|
|
ORDER BY created_at ASC
|
|
`, authzID)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return nil, fmt.Errorf("acme: list challenges: %w", err)
|
|
}
|
|
defer rows.Close()
|
|
var out []domain.ACMEChallenge
|
|
for rows.Next() {
|
|
ch, err := scanACMEChallenge(rows)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return nil, err
|
|
}
|
|
out = append(out, *ch)
|
|
}
|
|
return out, rows.Err()
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// GetChallengeByID retrieves a challenge row by ID.
|
|
func (r *ACMERepository) GetChallengeByID(ctx context.Context, challengeID string) (*domain.ACMEChallenge, error) {
|
|
row := r.db.QueryRowContext(ctx, `
|
|
SELECT challenge_id, authz_id, type, status, token, validated_at, error, created_at
|
|
FROM acme_challenges WHERE challenge_id = $1
|
|
`, challengeID)
|
|
return scanACMEChallenge(row)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// UpdateChallengeWithTx persists changes to a challenge's mutable
|
|
// fields (status, validated_at, error). Used by the Phase 3 validator
|
|
// callback after a challenge attempt completes.
|
|
func (r *ACMERepository) UpdateChallengeWithTx(ctx context.Context, q repository.Querier, ch *domain.ACMEChallenge) error {
|
|
var (
|
|
validatedAt interface{}
|
|
errBlob interface{}
|
|
)
|
|
if ch.ValidatedAt != nil {
|
|
validatedAt = *ch.ValidatedAt
|
|
}
|
|
if ch.Error != nil {
|
|
b, err := jsonMarshalACME(ch.Error)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return fmt.Errorf("acme: marshal challenge error: %w", err)
|
|
}
|
|
errBlob = b
|
|
}
|
|
res, err := q.ExecContext(ctx, `
|
|
UPDATE acme_challenges
|
|
SET status = $2, validated_at = $3, error = $4
|
|
WHERE challenge_id = $1
|
|
`, ch.ChallengeID, string(ch.Status), validatedAt, errBlob)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return fmt.Errorf("acme: update challenge: %w", err)
|
|
}
|
|
n, err := res.RowsAffected()
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return fmt.Errorf("acme: update challenge rows: %w", err)
|
|
}
|
|
if n == 0 {
|
|
return fmt.Errorf("challenge not found: %w", repository.ErrNotFound)
|
|
}
|
|
return nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// UpdateAuthzStatusWithTx persists an authz status transition. Used
|
|
// by the Phase 3 validator callback to flip an authz to valid or
|
|
// invalid based on the challenge outcome.
|
|
func (r *ACMERepository) UpdateAuthzStatusWithTx(ctx context.Context, q repository.Querier, authzID string, status domain.ACMEAuthzStatus) error {
|
|
res, err := q.ExecContext(ctx, `
|
|
UPDATE acme_authorizations
|
|
SET status = $2, updated_at = NOW()
|
|
WHERE authz_id = $1
|
|
`, authzID, string(status))
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return fmt.Errorf("acme: update authz status: %w", err)
|
|
}
|
|
n, err := res.RowsAffected()
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return fmt.Errorf("acme: update authz status rows: %w", err)
|
|
}
|
|
if n == 0 {
|
|
return fmt.Errorf("authz not found: %w", repository.ErrNotFound)
|
|
}
|
|
return nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// scanACMEOrder parses an acme_orders row.
|
|
func scanACMEOrder(row interface{ Scan(...interface{}) error }) (*domain.ACMEOrder, error) {
|
|
var (
|
|
o domain.ACMEOrder
|
|
identifiers []byte
|
|
statusStr string
|
|
notBefore sql.NullTime
|
|
notAfter sql.NullTime
|
|
errBlob sql.NullString
|
|
)
|
|
err := row.Scan(
|
|
&o.OrderID, &o.AccountID, &identifiers, &statusStr, &o.ExpiresAt,
|
|
¬Before, ¬After, &errBlob, &o.CSRPEM, &o.CertificateID,
|
|
&o.CreatedAt, &o.UpdatedAt,
|
|
)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
if errors.Is(err, sql.ErrNoRows) {
|
|
return nil, fmt.Errorf("order not found: %w", repository.ErrNotFound)
|
|
}
|
|
return nil, fmt.Errorf("acme: scan order: %w", err)
|
|
}
|
|
o.Status = domain.ACMEOrderStatus(statusStr)
|
|
if err := jsonUnmarshalACME(identifiers, &o.Identifiers); err != nil {
|
|
return nil, fmt.Errorf("acme: unmarshal identifiers: %w", err)
|
|
}
|
|
if notBefore.Valid {
|
|
t := notBefore.Time
|
|
o.NotBefore = &t
|
|
}
|
|
if notAfter.Valid {
|
|
t := notAfter.Time
|
|
o.NotAfter = &t
|
|
}
|
|
if errBlob.Valid && errBlob.String != "" {
|
|
var p domain.ACMEProblem
|
|
if err := jsonUnmarshalACME([]byte(errBlob.String), &p); err == nil {
|
|
o.Error = &p
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
return &o, nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// scanACMEAuthz parses an acme_authorizations row.
|
|
func scanACMEAuthz(row interface{ Scan(...interface{}) error }) (*domain.ACMEAuthorization, error) {
|
|
var (
|
|
a domain.ACMEAuthorization
|
|
identifier []byte
|
|
statusStr string
|
|
)
|
|
err := row.Scan(
|
|
&a.AuthzID, &a.OrderID, &identifier, &statusStr,
|
|
&a.ExpiresAt, &a.Wildcard, &a.CreatedAt, &a.UpdatedAt,
|
|
)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
if errors.Is(err, sql.ErrNoRows) {
|
|
return nil, fmt.Errorf("authz not found: %w", repository.ErrNotFound)
|
|
}
|
|
return nil, fmt.Errorf("acme: scan authz: %w", err)
|
|
}
|
|
a.Status = domain.ACMEAuthzStatus(statusStr)
|
|
if err := jsonUnmarshalACME(identifier, &a.Identifier); err != nil {
|
|
return nil, fmt.Errorf("acme: unmarshal authz identifier: %w", err)
|
|
}
|
|
return &a, nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// scanACMEChallenge parses an acme_challenges row.
|
|
func scanACMEChallenge(row interface{ Scan(...interface{}) error }) (*domain.ACMEChallenge, error) {
|
|
var (
|
|
ch domain.ACMEChallenge
|
|
typeStr string
|
|
statusStr string
|
|
validatedAt sql.NullTime
|
|
errBlob sql.NullString
|
|
)
|
|
err := row.Scan(
|
|
&ch.ChallengeID, &ch.AuthzID, &typeStr, &statusStr,
|
|
&ch.Token, &validatedAt, &errBlob, &ch.CreatedAt,
|
|
)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
if errors.Is(err, sql.ErrNoRows) {
|
|
return nil, fmt.Errorf("challenge not found: %w", repository.ErrNotFound)
|
|
}
|
|
return nil, fmt.Errorf("acme: scan challenge: %w", err)
|
|
}
|
|
ch.Type = domain.ACMEChallengeType(typeStr)
|
|
ch.Status = domain.ACMEChallengeStatus(statusStr)
|
|
if validatedAt.Valid {
|
|
t := validatedAt.Time
|
|
ch.ValidatedAt = &t
|
|
}
|
|
if errBlob.Valid && errBlob.String != "" {
|
|
var p domain.ACMEProblem
|
|
if err := jsonUnmarshalACME([]byte(errBlob.String), &p); err == nil {
|
|
ch.Error = &p
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
return &ch, nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// jsonMarshalACME wraps encoding/json.Marshal — kept as a named
|
|
// helper so future per-column custom encoding is a one-line change.
|
|
func jsonMarshalACME(v interface{}) ([]byte, error) { return json.Marshal(v) }
|
|
|
|
// jsonUnmarshalACME tolerates empty input as a no-op (NULL JSONB
|
|
// columns scan into zero-length []byte; we treat that as "field
|
|
// absent" rather than an unmarshal error).
|
|
func jsonUnmarshalACME(data []byte, v interface{}) error {
|
|
if len(data) == 0 {
|
|
return nil
|
|
}
|
|
return json.Unmarshal(data, v)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// --- Phase 4 — key rollover + revocation auth helper ------------------
|
|
|
|
// ErrACMEAccountKeyConcurrentUpdate is returned by UpdateAccountJWKWithTx
|
|
// when the row's stored thumbprint no longer matches expectedOldThumbprint.
|
|
// This is the "concurrent rollover" race signal: two requests both
|
|
// pre-validated their inner JWS against the SAME current key, but only
|
|
// one of them got into the WithinTx first. The loser's expectedOldThumb-
|
|
// print is now stale → the row's current thumbprint is the WINNER's NEW
|
|
// thumbprint. Caller maps to RFC 8555 §7.3.5 "key already exists".
|
|
var ErrACMEAccountKeyConcurrentUpdate = errors.New("acme: account key was rotated concurrently; re-fetch and retry")
|
|
|
|
// UpdateAccountJWKWithTx atomically swaps an account row's JWK
|
|
// (thumbprint + PEM) using a SELECT … FOR UPDATE guard plus an
|
|
// expectedOldThumbprint precondition.
|
|
//
|
|
// The row is locked for update; the precondition check then runs
|
|
// against the locked row inside the same tx. If a concurrent rollover
|
|
// committed first, this caller observes the new thumbprint and returns
|
|
// ErrACMEAccountKeyConcurrentUpdate (caller maps to 409). Postgres's
|
|
// row-level lock guarantees the two concurrent transactions serialize.
|
|
//
|
|
// Returns repository.ErrNotFound when the account row is missing.
|
|
func (r *ACMERepository) UpdateAccountJWKWithTx(
|
|
ctx context.Context,
|
|
q repository.Querier,
|
|
accountID string,
|
|
expectedOldThumbprint, newThumbprint, newJWKPEM string,
|
|
) error {
|
|
// SELECT … FOR UPDATE serializes concurrent rollovers on the same
|
|
// row. The lock is released when the surrounding tx commits / rolls
|
|
// back; the second concurrent caller blocks here until the first
|
|
// commits + then sees the new thumbprint on its read.
|
|
var current string
|
|
err := q.QueryRowContext(ctx, `
|
|
SELECT jwk_thumbprint
|
|
FROM acme_accounts
|
|
WHERE account_id = $1
|
|
FOR UPDATE
|
|
`, accountID).Scan(¤t)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
if errors.Is(err, sql.ErrNoRows) {
|
|
return fmt.Errorf("account not found: %w", repository.ErrNotFound)
|
|
}
|
|
return fmt.Errorf("acme: lock account for key rollover: %w", err)
|
|
}
|
|
if current != expectedOldThumbprint {
|
|
return ErrACMEAccountKeyConcurrentUpdate
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
res, err := q.ExecContext(ctx, `
|
|
UPDATE acme_accounts
|
|
SET jwk_thumbprint = $2, jwk_pem = $3, updated_at = NOW()
|
|
WHERE account_id = $1 AND jwk_thumbprint = $4
|
|
`, accountID, newThumbprint, newJWKPEM, expectedOldThumbprint)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
// Postgres SQLSTATE 23505 = unique_violation on
|
|
// (profile_id, jwk_thumbprint). RFC 8555 §7.3.5 says the
|
|
// server SHOULD return 409 Conflict in that case.
|
|
var pqErr *pq.Error
|
|
if errors.As(err, &pqErr) && pqErr.Code == "23505" {
|
|
return ErrACMEAccountDuplicateThumbprint
|
|
}
|
|
return fmt.Errorf("acme: update account jwk: %w", err)
|
|
}
|
|
n, err := res.RowsAffected()
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return fmt.Errorf("acme: update account jwk rows affected: %w", err)
|
|
}
|
|
if n == 0 {
|
|
// SELECT … FOR UPDATE found the row but the UPDATE WHERE
|
|
// jwk_thumbprint=$4 did not. That means the thumbprint changed
|
|
// between the SELECT result + the UPDATE — should be impossible
|
|
// under the row lock. Treat defensively as a concurrency error.
|
|
return ErrACMEAccountKeyConcurrentUpdate
|
|
}
|
|
return nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// AccountOwnsCertificate returns true when there is at least one
|
|
// acme_orders row with (account_id = accountID, certificate_id =
|
|
// certificateID). Used by ACMEService.RevokeCert (kid path) to confirm
|
|
// the requesting account had an order that produced the cert. The
|
|
// query is a single indexed lookup; we don't materialize the full row.
|
|
func (r *ACMERepository) AccountOwnsCertificate(ctx context.Context, accountID, certificateID string) (bool, error) {
|
|
if accountID == "" || certificateID == "" {
|
|
return false, nil
|
|
}
|
|
var count int
|
|
err := r.db.QueryRowContext(ctx, `
|
|
SELECT COUNT(1)
|
|
FROM acme_orders
|
|
WHERE account_id = $1 AND certificate_id = $2
|
|
`, accountID, certificateID).Scan(&count)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return false, fmt.Errorf("acme: account-owns-certificate: %w", err)
|
|
}
|
|
return count > 0, nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// scanACMEAccount is the shared shape for the SELECT-by-X account
|
|
// queries above. Returns sql.ErrNoRows-wrapped repository.ErrNotFound
|
|
// on miss; any other scan failure surfaces verbatim.
|
|
func scanACMEAccount(row interface{ Scan(...interface{}) error }) (*domain.ACMEAccount, error) {
|
|
var (
|
|
acct domain.ACMEAccount
|
|
contact pq.StringArray
|
|
statusStr string
|
|
)
|
|
err := row.Scan(
|
|
&acct.AccountID, &acct.JWKThumbprint, &acct.JWKPEM, &contact,
|
|
&statusStr, &acct.ProfileID, &acct.OwnerID,
|
|
&acct.CreatedAt, &acct.UpdatedAt,
|
|
)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
if errors.Is(err, sql.ErrNoRows) {
|
|
return nil, fmt.Errorf("account not found: %w", repository.ErrNotFound)
|
|
}
|
|
return nil, fmt.Errorf("acme: scan account: %w", err)
|
|
}
|
|
acct.Contact = []string(contact)
|
|
acct.Status = domain.ACMEAccountStatus(statusStr)
|
|
return &acct, nil
|
|
}
|