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# Phase 6 — day-0 admin bootstrap * internal/auth/bootstrap/ (new package): Strategy interface + EnvTokenStrategy with constant-time compare, one-shot consumption via sync.Mutex, optional admin-existence probe. Bundle 2's OIDC- first-admin will plug in alongside as an alternate Strategy. * BootstrapService.ValidateAndMint: validates the operator's CERTCTL_BOOTSTRAP_TOKEN, mints a 32-byte (64-hex-char) random API key value, persists the SHA-256 hash to api_keys, grants r-admin via actor_roles, AddHashed's the runtime keystore so the just- minted key authenticates the next request without restart, and records bootstrap.consume to the audit trail with category=auth. * internal/auth/keystore.go (new): KeyStore interface + StaticKeyStore (immutable env-var-only path) + MutableKeyStore (env-var keys + DB-loaded api_keys + runtime AddHashed). The auth middleware now consumes a KeyStore so the bootstrap path can extend the lookup table at runtime. * migrations/000031_api_keys.up/down.sql: api_keys table with (id, name UNIQUE, key_hash UNIQUE, tenant_id, admin, created_by, created_at, expires_at, last_used_at). Idempotent. * /v1/auth/bootstrap GET (probe) + POST (mint) — auth-exempt. Both routes documented in api/openapi.yaml + AuthExemptRouterRoutes allowlist updated. The token never leaves internal/auth/bootstrap; the minted plaintext key flows only into the HTTP response body. * Startup warning emitted when CERTCTL_BOOTSTRAP_TOKEN is set AND admin actors already exist (config drift signal). * Tests: 4 strategy invariants (empty token born disabled, wrong token=ErrInvalidToken without consumption, one-shot consumption, admin-exists closes path), 5 service tests (happy path + actor- name validation + propagation of strategy errors + nil-deps guard + 32-byte entropy budget), 8 HTTP-handler tests (status 201/410/401/400 mapping + token-leak hygiene scan of slog + audit details + Location header). Token-leak test redirects slog.Default to a buffer for the test scope. # Phase 7 — API-key migration + scope-down CLI * GET /v1/auth/keys handler + service method ListKeys backed by ActorRoleRepository.ListDistinctActors. Returns one row per (actor_id, actor_type) pair with the slice of role IDs they hold. Permission: auth.role.list. * internal/cli/auth_scope_down.go: AuthListKeys, AuthScopeDown (interactive), AuthScopeDownNonInteractive (JSON config), AuthScopeDownSuggest (--suggest with optional --apply). The synthetic actor-demo-anon is filtered out of every interactive / bulk path; non-interactive flow logs and skips it explicitly. * SuggestRoleFromAuditEvents (pure function): walks 30 days of audit events per actor and returns the narrowest matching role (admin / mcp / viewer / agent / operator) plus a one-line reason. Classification: any admin-shaped action wins; otherwise all-MCP → mcp; all-read-only → viewer; all-agent-shaped → agent; otherwise operator. Test table pins all six classifications. * CLI subcommand tree extended: 'auth keys list' + 'auth keys scope-down [--non-interactive <cfg>] [--suggest [--apply]]'. * CHANGELOG.md leads v2.1.0 with the SECURITY: AUDIT YOUR API KEYS call-out + four flow examples. # Phase 8 — auditor role + event_category column * migrations/000032_audit_category.up/down.sql: ALTER TABLE audit_events ADD COLUMN event_category TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT 'cert_lifecycle' + CHECK constraint (cert_lifecycle/auth/config) + (event_category) and (event_category, timestamp DESC) indexes for the auditor-filter query path. WORM trigger from migration 000018 continues to enforce append-only at the DB layer (DDL is not blocked). * domain.AuditEvent gains EventCategory string (omitempty); domain.EventCategoryCertLifecycle / Auth / Config constants. * AuditService.RecordEventWithCategory sibling of RecordEvent; legacy callers stay on RecordEvent (defaults to cert_lifecycle). Auth callers (RoleService, ActorRoleService, BootstrapService) switched to RecordEventWithCategory(..., 'auth', ...). * GET /v1/audit?category=<cat>: handler accepts the optional query param, validates against the enum (400 on invalid value), dispatches through ListAuditEventsByCategory. OpenAPI updated with the new query param + AuditEvent.event_category schema. * Postgres AuditRepository.Create now writes event_category; AuditRepository.List filters on it; AuditFilter.EventCategory gates the WHERE clause. * Tests: 5 audit-category-filter HTTP tests (dispatch routing, back-compat fallback, 400 for invalid values, all 3 enum values accepted, page+category combine, JSON output surfaces the field). 3 auditor-role invariants (auditor holds exactly audit.read+audit.export, no mutating perms, disjoint from viewer except audit.read). # Cross-phase wiring * HandlerRegistry.Bootstrap field added; cmd/server/main.go wires the bootstrap service ahead of RegisterHandlers (extracted assembleNamedAPIKeys helper into auth_backfill.go, moved the keystore + bootstrap construction up alongside the auth repos). * AuthCheckResolver / AuthActorRoleService extended with ListKeys to satisfy the Phase 7 surface; existing fakes updated. * fakeAudit + mockAuditService stubs in tests gain RecordEventWithCategory + ListAuditEventsByCategory; existing tests untouched. # Verifications * gofmt -l: clean across every modified file. * go vet ./...: clean. * staticcheck across internal/auth + handler + router + cli + service + repository + cmd + domain: clean. * go test -short -count=1: green across every Bundle-1-touched package — internal/auth (incl. bootstrap), internal/api/handler, internal/api/router, internal/cli, internal/service/auth, internal/service, internal/domain/auth, internal/repository/postgres, cmd/server, cmd/cli, plus internal/scheduler, internal/api/middleware, cmd/agent, internal/mcp.
84 lines
2.6 KiB
Go
84 lines
2.6 KiB
Go
package auth
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import "testing"
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// =============================================================================
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// Bundle 1 Phase 8 — auditor role invariants. Pin the seeded permission
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// set so a future refactor that accidentally widens it gets caught.
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// =============================================================================
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// TestAuditorRoleHoldsExactlyAuditReadAndExport pins the load-bearing
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// invariant that the auditor role has read-only audit access AND
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// nothing else. Any drift here breaks the SOC 2 / FedRAMP separation
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// the prompt requires.
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func TestAuditorRoleHoldsExactlyAuditReadAndExport(t *testing.T) {
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got, ok := DefaultRoles[RoleIDAuditor]
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if !ok {
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t.Fatalf("auditor role missing from DefaultRoles")
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}
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want := map[string]bool{
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"audit.read": true,
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"audit.export": true,
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}
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if len(got) != len(want) {
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t.Errorf("auditor permission count = %d, want %d (auditor role widened?)", len(got), len(want))
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}
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for _, p := range got {
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if !want[p] {
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t.Errorf("auditor holds %q but should not — auditor must be read-only", p)
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}
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}
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for w := range want {
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found := false
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for _, p := range got {
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if p == w {
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found = true
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break
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}
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}
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if !found {
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t.Errorf("auditor role missing %q", w)
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}
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}
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}
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// TestAuditorRoleDoesNotHoldMutatingOrReadingNonAuditPerms pins that
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// the auditor role grants ZERO mutating perms (cert.*, profile.*,
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// issuer.*, target.*, agent.*) AND zero non-audit read perms. The
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// auditor is "audit-only", not "read-only across everything".
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func TestAuditorRoleDoesNotHoldMutatingOrReadingNonAuditPerms(t *testing.T) {
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got := DefaultRoles[RoleIDAuditor]
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for _, p := range got {
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switch p {
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case "audit.read", "audit.export":
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// allowed
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default:
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t.Errorf("auditor holds non-audit permission %q — should be audit-only", p)
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}
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}
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}
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// TestAuditorRoleSeparateFromViewer pins that auditor and viewer
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// permission sets are disjoint EXCEPT for nothing — viewer gets
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// resource-read perms (cert/profile/issuer/target/agent) which auditor
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// must NOT inherit. Closes the "auditor sees customer cert data" leg.
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func TestAuditorRoleSeparateFromViewer(t *testing.T) {
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auditorSet := map[string]bool{}
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for _, p := range DefaultRoles[RoleIDAuditor] {
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auditorSet[p] = true
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}
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viewerSet := map[string]bool{}
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for _, p := range DefaultRoles[RoleIDViewer] {
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viewerSet[p] = true
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}
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for v := range viewerSet {
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if v == "audit.read" {
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// shared by design (viewer can read audit)
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continue
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}
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if auditorSet[v] {
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t.Errorf("auditor inherits viewer permission %q — must be disjoint except audit.read", v)
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}
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}
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}
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