Files
certctl/internal/api/acme/challenge.go
T
shankar0123 9bc845304e acme-server: HTTP-01 + DNS-01 + TLS-ALPN-01 challenge validation (Phase 3/7)
Wires up the actual challenge-validation machinery so profiles in
acme_auth_mode='challenge' resolve end-to-end. After this commit,
cert-manager 1.15+ with `solver: http01: ingress` against a
challenge-mode profile completes a real HTTP-01 flow and gets a cert.
DNS-01 + TLS-ALPN-01 share the same code path with the appropriate
validator selection.

Architecture (the load-bearing parts):
  - 3 separate semaphore-bounded worker pools (one per challenge type),
    so HTTP-01 and DNS-01 can't starve each other under load. Default
    weight 10 per type; tunable via CERTCTL_ACME_SERVER_HTTP01_CONCURRENCY,
    DNS01_CONCURRENCY, TLSALPN01_CONCURRENCY.
  - 30s per-challenge timeout (configurable via PoolConfig.PerChallengeTimeout).
  - HTTP-01 validator runs validation.IsReservedIPForDial (newly
    exported wrapper preserving the existing private impl byte-for-byte
    for the network scanner + ValidateSafeURL paths) on the resolved
    IP — both at the initial dial and every redirect hop. SSRF probes
    into private IP space are refused before the connect.
  - DNS-01 validator uses a dedicated resolver pointed at
    CERTCTL_ACME_SERVER_DNS01_RESOLVER (default 8.8.8.8:53) — does
    NOT use the system resolver to keep behavior deterministic across
    deployments. Wildcard handling: `*.example.com` queries
    _acme-challenge.example.com.
  - TLS-ALPN-01 validator (RFC 8737) connects with ALPN `acme-tls/1`,
    inspects the id-pe-acmeIdentifier extension (OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.1.31),
    asserts the ASN.1 OCTET STRING value equals SHA-256 of the key
    authorization. Cert chain is intentionally NOT validated
    (InsecureSkipVerify=true is correct per RFC 8737 — the proof is
    in the extension, not the chain). Documented in docs/tls.md L-001
    table + the //nolint:gosec comment carries the justification.
    SSRF guard: same posture as HTTP-01.
  - Validation is asynchronous: handler accepts the POST and returns
    200 immediately with status=processing; the worker-pool fires a
    callback that updates challenge → authz → order in a fresh
    background-context WithinTx. The order auto-promotes to `ready`
    when ALL authzs become valid; auto-fails to `invalid` when ANY
    authz becomes invalid.

What ships:
  - internal/api/acme/challenge.go: KeyAuthorization (RFC 8555 §8.1) +
    DNS01TXTRecordValue (§8.4) + TLSALPN01ExtensionValue (RFC 8737 §3)
    helpers; IDPEAcmeIdentifierOID; ChallengeProblemFromError mapper
    (4-way: connection / dns / tls / incorrectResponse); 9 sentinel
    errors covering every named failure mode.
  - internal/api/acme/validators.go: ChallengeValidator interface;
    Pool dispatcher with 3 semaphores + per-type in-flight + peak
    gauges; HTTP01Validator + DNS01Validator + TLSALPN01Validator
    implementations; Drain method called from cmd/server/main.go's
    shutdown sequence.
  - internal/api/acme/validators_test.go: KeyAuthorization round-trip,
    DNS01 / TLS-ALPN-01 helper tests, SSRF rejection, bounded-
    concurrency saturation test (peak-in-flight ≤ cap), type-isolation
    test (HTTP-01 saturation doesn't block DNS-01), UnknownType test,
    7-case ChallengeProblemFromError mapping.
  - internal/repository/postgres/acme.go: GetChallengeByID +
    UpdateChallengeWithTx + UpdateAuthzStatusWithTx.
  - internal/service/acme.go: SetValidatorPool wires the *acme.Pool;
    RespondToChallenge dispatches with account-ownership assertion +
    KeyAuthorization computation + processing-status transition (atomic
    + audit); recordChallengeOutcome callback persists the final
    challenge + cascading authz + order-promote/-fail in one WithinTx +
    audit row. 4 new metrics.
  - internal/api/handler/acme.go: Challenge handler; round-trips
    account.JWKPEM through ParseJWKFromPEM to recover the *jose.JSONWebKey
    the validator pool needs.
  - internal/api/router/router.go + openapi_parity_test.go +
    api/openapi-handler-exceptions.yaml: 2 new routes (per-profile +
    shorthand for challenge/{chall_id}) with parity exceptions.
  - cmd/server/main.go: constructs the Pool at startup with the
    per-type concurrency caps from cfg.ACMEServer; ACMEService.ValidatorPool()
    accessor exposed for the shutdown drain sequence.
  - internal/validation/ssrf.go: exported IsReservedIPForDial wrapper
    (private impl unchanged; network scanner + ValidateSafeURL paths
    byte-identical with prior behavior).
  - docs/tls.md: L-001 InsecureSkipVerify table extended with the
    TLS-ALPN-01 validator justification (RFC 8737 §3).
  - docs/acme-server.md: phase status updated; endpoints table grows
    the challenge row; phases-cross-reference flips Phase 3 → live.

Tests:
  - 80%+ coverage on the new files.
  - BoundedConcurrency test: 10 challenges submitted against an
    HTTP-01 pool of weight 3; observed peak-in-flight ≤ 3, all 10
    eventually complete, post-Drain in-flight returns to 0.
  - TypeIsolation test: HTTP-01 saturation does NOT block a DNS-01
    submission; DNS-01 callback fires within 2s.
  - SSRF rejection test: a Validate against `localhost` is refused
    before the dial (ErrChallengeReservedIP or ErrChallengeConnection).

Engineering history: cowork/WORKSPACE-CHANGELOG.md "ACME-Server-3".
2026-05-03 14:09:00 +00:00

108 lines
4.6 KiB
Go

// Copyright (c) certctl
// SPDX-License-Identifier: BSL-1.1
package acme
import (
"crypto"
"crypto/sha256"
"encoding/asn1"
"encoding/base64"
"errors"
"fmt"
jose "github.com/go-jose/go-jose/v4"
)
// KeyAuthorization computes the canonical RFC 8555 §8.1 key authorization
// string: <token> + "." + base64url(JWK-thumbprint).
//
// The thumbprint is RFC 7638 SHA-256 of the canonicalized JWK; same
// helper Phase 1b uses to derive account IDs. Phase 3's HTTP-01 +
// DNS-01 + TLS-ALPN-01 validators all consume this string.
func KeyAuthorization(token string, jwk *jose.JSONWebKey) (string, error) {
if jwk == nil {
return "", errors.New("acme: nil jwk for key authorization")
}
thumb, err := jwk.Thumbprint(crypto.SHA256)
if err != nil {
return "", fmt.Errorf("acme: thumbprint: %w", err)
}
return token + "." + base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(thumb), nil
}
// DNS01TXTRecordValue computes the value an authoritative DNS server
// must serve for `_acme-challenge.<domain>` per RFC 8555 §8.4.
//
// The DNS-01 record is base64url(SHA-256(keyAuthorization)) — NOT the
// raw key authorization (that's HTTP-01's behavior).
func DNS01TXTRecordValue(keyAuthorization string) string {
h := sha256.Sum256([]byte(keyAuthorization))
return base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(h[:])
}
// TLSALPN01ExtensionValue computes the SHA-256 hash of the key
// authorization that the validator looks for in the responding TLS
// cert's id-pe-acmeIdentifier extension (RFC 8737 §3).
//
// The ASN.1 wrapping (OCTET STRING containing the 32 raw bytes) is the
// caller's responsibility; this helper returns the inner 32 bytes.
func TLSALPN01ExtensionValue(keyAuthorization string) []byte {
h := sha256.Sum256([]byte(keyAuthorization))
return h[:]
}
// IDPEAcmeIdentifierOID is the ObjectIdentifier RFC 8737 §3 mandates for
// the id-pe-acmeIdentifier extension carried in the responding TLS
// cert during TLS-ALPN-01 validation. Exported so the validator can
// .Equal() it against incoming cert extensions; the value is fixed
// per-spec and never changes.
var IDPEAcmeIdentifierOID = asn1.ObjectIdentifier{1, 3, 6, 1, 5, 5, 7, 1, 31}
// ChallengeProblemFromError maps a validator error into the RFC 7807
// Problem the challenge row's `error` column should record. Centralized
// so each per-type validator returns plain errors and the dispatcher
// translates uniformly.
//
// The Problem types align with RFC 8555 §6.7:
// - connection / TCP-level → urn:ietf:params:acme:error:connection
// - DNS / TXT mismatch → urn:ietf:params:acme:error:dns
// - TLS handshake / cert mismatch → urn:ietf:params:acme:error:tls
// - all others → urn:ietf:params:acme:error:incorrectResponse (the
// RFC-canonical "challenge response was wrong" type)
func ChallengeProblemFromError(challengeType string, err error) *Problem {
if err == nil {
return nil
}
switch {
case errors.Is(err, ErrChallengeConnection):
return &Problem{Type: "urn:ietf:params:acme:error:connection", Detail: err.Error(), Status: 400}
case errors.Is(err, ErrChallengeDNS):
return &Problem{Type: "urn:ietf:params:acme:error:dns", Detail: err.Error(), Status: 400}
case errors.Is(err, ErrChallengeTLS):
return &Problem{Type: "urn:ietf:params:acme:error:tls", Detail: err.Error(), Status: 400}
default:
return &Problem{
Type: "urn:ietf:params:acme:error:incorrectResponse",
Detail: fmt.Sprintf("%s validation failed: %s", challengeType, err.Error()),
Status: 403,
}
}
}
// Validator-side sentinel errors. Each one maps to a specific RFC 8555
// §6.7 problem type via ChallengeProblemFromError above. Per-validator
// implementations wrap their failures with these.
var (
ErrChallengeConnection = errors.New("acme: connection-level failure during challenge validation")
ErrChallengeDNS = errors.New("acme: DNS-level failure during challenge validation")
ErrChallengeTLS = errors.New("acme: TLS-level failure during challenge validation")
ErrChallengeMismatch = errors.New("acme: challenge response did not match expected key authorization")
ErrChallengeReservedIP = errors.New("acme: HTTP-01 target resolves to a reserved IP (SSRF guard)")
ErrChallengeRedirect = errors.New("acme: HTTP-01 target redirected too many times")
ErrChallengeBodyTooBig = errors.New("acme: HTTP-01 response body exceeded 16 KiB cap")
ErrChallengeNoCert = errors.New("acme: TLS-ALPN-01 target presented no certificate")
ErrChallengeWrongALPN = errors.New("acme: TLS-ALPN-01 target did not negotiate the acme-tls/1 protocol")
ErrChallengeExtMissing = errors.New("acme: TLS-ALPN-01 target's certificate did not carry the id-pe-acmeIdentifier extension")
)