mirror of
https://github.com/shankar0123/certctl.git
synced 2026-06-07 15:51:30 +00:00
3287e174dc
Closes the remaining P1 gaps from coverage-gap-audit.md (M-001/M-002/M-003/M-006)
on top of the C-001/C-002 ownership + agent-FK contract fixes landed in
a53a4b8. The work lands as a single commit spanning server, docs, tests,
and the React client.
M-002 — Named API keys with per-key actor propagation
* Migration 000014 adds the 'api_keys' table (id, name, hash,
principal, role, created_at, last_used_at, disabled_at) so every
credential carries an identifiable principal instead of the
opaque 'anonymous'/'api-key' sentinel.
* Auth middleware now rotates through configured keys, performs
constant-time hash comparison, stamps 'last_used_at', and emits
an actor struct via contextWithActor(). The audit middleware,
bulk-revocation handler, approval handlers, and MCP tool layer
now read the principal off the context and persist it on every
audit_events row.
* Regression coverage:
- internal/api/middleware/audit_test.go — actor propagation,
principal redaction for disabled keys, anonymous fallback for
unauthenticated endpoints.
- internal/api/handler/bulk_revocation_handler_test.go,
job_handler_test.go — principal-on-audit assertions.
M-003 — Authorization gates (Phase B)
* Approval handler rejects self-approval / self-rejection with 403
when the actor principal equals the job's requested_by field.
* Bulk revocation is gated behind the 'admin' role; operators and
viewers receive 403.
* Regression coverage:
- internal/service/job_test.go — TestApproveJob_NotSelf,
TestRejectJob_NotSelf.
- internal/api/handler/bulk_revocation_handler_test.go —
TestBulkRevoke_RequiresAdmin, TestBulkRevoke_AdminSucceeds.
M-006 — RFC-compliant CRL/OCSP on the unauthenticated .well-known mux
* Per RFC 8615, relying parties cannot reasonably be asked to
authenticate against the issuing certctl instance to retrieve
revocation material. CRL and OCSP move off the authenticated
'/api/v1/crl*' and '/api/v1/ocsp/*' paths onto:
GET /.well-known/pki/crl/{issuer_id}
Content-Type: application/pkix-crl (RFC 5280 §5)
GET /.well-known/pki/ocsp/{issuer_id}/{serial}
Content-Type: application/ocsp-response (RFC 6960)
* Non-standard JSON CRL shape is removed; only DER is served.
* Short-lived certificate exemption (profile TTL < 1h → skip
CRL/OCSP) is preserved; the response simply omits the serial.
* Routes are registered on the unauthenticated 'finalHandler' mux
in cmd/server/main.go alongside EST ('/.well-known/est/*') and
SCEP ('/scep'). Legacy authenticated paths return 404.
* Regression coverage:
- internal/api/handler/certificate_handler_test.go — content
type, DER parseability, 404 for unknown issuer.
- internal/api/handler/adversarial_path_test.go — unauthenticated
access asserted for CRL, OCSP, EST, SCEP.
- internal/api/router/router_test.go — route-table assertion
that '.well-known/pki/*', '.well-known/est/*', and '/scep' are
mounted on the unauthenticated branch.
M-001 — Auto-closed by M-002
EST and SCEP were already registered on the unauthenticated
'finalHandler' mux; the router comment at
internal/api/router/router.go:247 now matches reality. The
adversarial-path tests above lock the behavior in.
Verification (all gates green):
* go vet ./... — clean
* go build ./... — ok
* go test -short ./... (55+ packages) — all pass
* web/ : npm test (225 Vitest tests) — all pass
* web/ : npx tsc --noEmit — clean
* grep sweep for '/api/v1/(crl|ocsp)' — 13 surviving hits,
all intentional M-006 tombstone/relocation comments.
Documentation:
* coverage-gap-audit.md — status flips M-001/M-002/M-003/M-006 →
Fixed, with per-finding resolution paragraphs citing regression
test IDs. (Audit file lives outside this repo; see cowork root.)
* CLAUDE.md Project Status line updated with the auth-unification
closure note.
* docs/features.md, docs/architecture.md, docs/quickstart.md,
docs/concepts.md, docs/connectors.md, docs/test-env.md,
docs/testing-guide.md, docs/compliance-*.md, docs/demo-advanced.md
— refreshed for the new '.well-known/pki/*' namespace and named
API keys.
* api/openapi.yaml — documents the new unauthenticated endpoints
and removes the legacy '/api/v1/crl*' + '/api/v1/ocsp/*' paths.
.gitignore: adds '/.gocache/' and '/.gomodcache/' for the session-
scoped Go caches so they never enter the tree.
424 lines
13 KiB
Go
424 lines
13 KiB
Go
package middleware
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import (
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"context"
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"crypto/sha256"
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"crypto/subtle"
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"encoding/hex"
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"fmt"
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"log"
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"log/slog"
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"net/http"
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"strings"
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"sync"
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"time"
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"github.com/google/uuid"
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)
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// RequestIDKey is the context key for storing request IDs.
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type RequestIDKey struct{}
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// UserKey is the context key for storing authenticated user information.
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type UserKey struct{}
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// AdminKey is the context key for storing admin flag information.
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type AdminKey struct{}
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// NamedAPIKey represents a named API key with optional admin flag.
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type NamedAPIKey struct {
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Name string
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Key string
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Admin bool
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}
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// RequestID middleware generates a unique request ID and adds it to the request context and response headers.
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func RequestID(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
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return http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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id := uuid.New().String()
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w.Header().Set("X-Request-ID", id)
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ctx := context.WithValue(r.Context(), RequestIDKey{}, id)
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next.ServeHTTP(w, r.WithContext(ctx))
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})
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}
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// Logging middleware logs request details including method, path, status, and duration.
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// Deprecated: Use NewLogging for structured logging with slog.
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func Logging(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
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return http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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start := time.Now()
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// Wrap response writer to capture status code
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wrapped := &responseWriter{ResponseWriter: w, statusCode: http.StatusOK}
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next.ServeHTTP(wrapped, r)
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duration := time.Since(start)
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requestID := getRequestID(r.Context())
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log.Printf("[%s] %s %s %d %v", requestID, r.Method, r.URL.Path, wrapped.statusCode, duration)
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})
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}
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// NewLogging creates a structured logging middleware using slog.
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// Logs request_id, method, path, status, duration_ms, and remote_addr.
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func NewLogging(logger *slog.Logger) func(http.Handler) http.Handler {
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return func(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
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return http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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start := time.Now()
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// Wrap response writer to capture status code
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wrapped := &responseWriter{ResponseWriter: w, statusCode: http.StatusOK}
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next.ServeHTTP(wrapped, r)
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duration := time.Since(start)
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requestID := getRequestID(r.Context())
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logger.InfoContext(r.Context(), "request completed",
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"request_id", requestID,
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"method", r.Method,
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"path", r.URL.Path,
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"status", wrapped.statusCode,
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"duration_ms", duration.Milliseconds(),
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"remote_addr", r.RemoteAddr,
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)
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})
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}
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}
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// Recovery middleware recovers from panics and returns a 500 error.
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func Recovery(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
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return http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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ctx := r.Context()
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defer func() {
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if err := recover(); err != nil {
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requestID := getRequestID(ctx)
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// Use slog.ErrorContext so the panic log carries the same
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// request-scoped trace/auth metadata as normal request logs
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// (M-2 / D-3 — preserve ctx propagation on the panic path).
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slog.ErrorContext(ctx, "panic recovered in HTTP handler",
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"request_id", requestID,
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"panic", fmt.Sprintf("%v", err),
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)
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http.Error(w, `{"error":"Internal Server Error"}`, http.StatusInternalServerError)
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}
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}()
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next.ServeHTTP(w, r)
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})
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}
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// HashAPIKey computes the SHA-256 hash of an API key for secure storage.
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// We use SHA-256 rather than bcrypt because API keys are high-entropy
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// random strings (not user-chosen passwords), so rainbow tables and
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// brute-force attacks are not a practical concern.
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func HashAPIKey(key string) string {
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h := sha256.Sum256([]byte(key))
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return hex.EncodeToString(h[:])
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}
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// AuthConfig holds configuration for the Auth middleware.
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type AuthConfig struct {
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Type string // "api-key", "jwt", "none"
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Secret string // The raw API key or comma-separated list of valid API keys
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}
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// NewAuth creates an authentication middleware based on config.
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// When Type is "none", all requests pass through (demo/development mode).
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// When Type is "api-key", requests must include a valid Bearer token.
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// Named keys are supported via []NamedAPIKey input.
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func NewAuthWithNamedKeys(namedKeys []NamedAPIKey) func(http.Handler) http.Handler {
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if len(namedKeys) == 0 {
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return func(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
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return next
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}
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}
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// Pre-compute hashes of all valid keys for constant-time comparison.
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type keyEntry struct {
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hash string
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name string
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admin bool
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}
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var entries []keyEntry
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for _, nk := range namedKeys {
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entries = append(entries, keyEntry{
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hash: HashAPIKey(nk.Key),
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name: nk.Name,
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admin: nk.Admin,
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})
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}
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// Warn if only one key is configured in production mode
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if len(entries) == 1 {
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slog.Warn("only one API key configured — consider adding a rotation key for zero-downtime rotation")
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}
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return func(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
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return http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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authHeader := r.Header.Get("Authorization")
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if authHeader == "" {
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w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json; charset=utf-8")
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w.Header().Set("WWW-Authenticate", `Bearer realm="certctl"`)
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http.Error(w, `{"error":"Authorization header required"}`, http.StatusUnauthorized)
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return
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}
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// Extract Bearer token
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if len(authHeader) < 8 || authHeader[:7] != "Bearer " {
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w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json; charset=utf-8")
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http.Error(w, `{"error":"Invalid Authorization header format, expected: Bearer <token>"}`, http.StatusUnauthorized)
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return
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}
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token := authHeader[7:]
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tokenHash := HashAPIKey(token)
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// Check against all valid keys using constant-time comparison
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var matched *keyEntry
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for i := range entries {
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if subtle.ConstantTimeCompare([]byte(tokenHash), []byte(entries[i].hash)) == 1 {
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matched = &entries[i]
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break
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}
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}
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if matched == nil {
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w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json; charset=utf-8")
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http.Error(w, `{"error":"Invalid API key"}`, http.StatusUnauthorized)
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return
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}
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// Store the authenticated identity and admin flag in context
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ctx := context.WithValue(r.Context(), UserKey{}, matched.name)
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ctx = context.WithValue(ctx, AdminKey{}, matched.admin)
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next.ServeHTTP(w, r.WithContext(ctx))
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})
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}
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}
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// NewAuth is a legacy shim that converts a comma-separated Secret list into
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// synthesized legacy-key-N named entries and delegates to NewAuthWithNamedKeys.
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// It preserves the pre-M-002 behavior for callers that still pass raw AuthConfig
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// (primarily cmd/server/main_test.go). The synthesized actor is "legacy-key-N"
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// rather than the old hardcoded "api-key-user" so audit events carry
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// meaningful identity even on the legacy path.
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//
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// Deprecated: Use NewAuthWithNamedKeys with explicit NamedAPIKey entries.
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func NewAuth(cfg AuthConfig) func(http.Handler) http.Handler {
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if cfg.Type == "none" {
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return func(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
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return next
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}
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}
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var namedKeys []NamedAPIKey
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idx := 0
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for _, k := range strings.Split(cfg.Secret, ",") {
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k = strings.TrimSpace(k)
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if k == "" {
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continue
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}
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namedKeys = append(namedKeys, NamedAPIKey{
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Name: fmt.Sprintf("legacy-key-%d", idx),
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Key: k,
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Admin: false,
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})
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idx++
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}
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return NewAuthWithNamedKeys(namedKeys)
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}
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// RateLimitConfig holds configuration for the rate limiter.
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type RateLimitConfig struct {
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RPS float64 // Requests per second
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BurstSize int // Maximum burst size
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}
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// NewRateLimiter creates a token bucket rate limiting middleware.
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// Uses a simple token bucket: tokens refill at RPS rate, burst allows short spikes.
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func NewRateLimiter(cfg RateLimitConfig) func(http.Handler) http.Handler {
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limiter := &tokenBucket{
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rate: cfg.RPS,
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burstSize: float64(cfg.BurstSize),
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tokens: float64(cfg.BurstSize),
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lastRefill: time.Now(),
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}
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return func(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
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return http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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if !limiter.allow() {
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w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json; charset=utf-8")
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w.Header().Set("Retry-After", "1")
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http.Error(w, `{"error":"Rate limit exceeded"}`, http.StatusTooManyRequests)
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return
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}
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next.ServeHTTP(w, r)
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})
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}
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}
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// tokenBucket implements a simple thread-safe token bucket rate limiter.
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// This avoids importing golang.org/x/time/rate to keep dependencies minimal.
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type tokenBucket struct {
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mu sync.Mutex
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rate float64 // tokens per second
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burstSize float64 // max tokens
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tokens float64 // current tokens
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lastRefill time.Time // last refill time
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}
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func (tb *tokenBucket) allow() bool {
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tb.mu.Lock()
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defer tb.mu.Unlock()
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now := time.Now()
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elapsed := now.Sub(tb.lastRefill).Seconds()
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tb.tokens += elapsed * tb.rate
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if tb.tokens > tb.burstSize {
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tb.tokens = tb.burstSize
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}
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tb.lastRefill = now
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if tb.tokens < 1 {
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return false
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}
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tb.tokens--
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return true
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}
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// CORSConfig holds configuration for the CORS middleware.
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type CORSConfig struct {
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AllowedOrigins []string // Allowed origins; empty = same-origin only
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}
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// NewCORS creates a CORS middleware with configurable allowed origins.
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// Security default: If no origins are configured, CORS headers are NOT set,
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// denying all cross-origin requests (same-origin only).
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// If ["*"] is configured, all origins are allowed (development/demo mode only).
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// If specific origins are configured, only requests matching those origins receive CORS headers.
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func NewCORS(cfg CORSConfig) func(http.Handler) http.Handler {
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allowAll := false
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originSet := make(map[string]bool)
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for _, o := range cfg.AllowedOrigins {
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if o == "*" {
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allowAll = true
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}
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originSet[o] = true
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}
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return func(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
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return http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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// Security default: deny CORS when no origins are configured.
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// This prevents CSRF attacks from arbitrary origins.
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if len(cfg.AllowedOrigins) == 0 {
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// No CORS headers set — only same-origin requests can read response
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if r.Method == http.MethodOptions {
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w.WriteHeader(http.StatusNoContent)
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return
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}
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next.ServeHTTP(w, r)
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return
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}
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origin := r.Header.Get("Origin")
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if allowAll {
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// Wildcard allows all origins (development/demo only)
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w.Header().Set("Access-Control-Allow-Origin", "*")
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} else if origin != "" && originSet[origin] {
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// Exact match found in allowed origins list
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w.Header().Set("Access-Control-Allow-Origin", origin)
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w.Header().Set("Vary", "Origin")
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}
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// If origin is empty or not in allowlist, no CORS headers are set
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// CORS preflight response headers (only meaningful if Access-Control-Allow-Origin was set)
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w.Header().Set("Access-Control-Allow-Methods", "GET, POST, PUT, DELETE, PATCH, OPTIONS")
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w.Header().Set("Access-Control-Allow-Headers", "Content-Type, Authorization, X-Request-ID")
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w.Header().Set("Access-Control-Max-Age", "86400")
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if r.Method == http.MethodOptions {
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w.WriteHeader(http.StatusNoContent)
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return
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}
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next.ServeHTTP(w, r)
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})
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}
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}
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// ContentType middleware sets the Content-Type header to application/json.
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func ContentType(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
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return http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json; charset=utf-8")
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next.ServeHTTP(w, r)
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})
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}
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// CORS middleware adds CORS headers to allow cross-origin requests.
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// Deprecated: Use NewCORS for configurable origins. Kept for health endpoints.
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func CORS(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
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return http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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w.Header().Set("Access-Control-Allow-Origin", "*")
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w.Header().Set("Access-Control-Allow-Methods", "GET, POST, PUT, DELETE, PATCH, OPTIONS")
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w.Header().Set("Access-Control-Allow-Headers", "Content-Type, Authorization, X-Request-ID")
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if r.Method == http.MethodOptions {
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w.WriteHeader(http.StatusNoContent)
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return
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}
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next.ServeHTTP(w, r)
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})
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}
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// GetRequestID extracts the request ID from context.
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func GetRequestID(ctx context.Context) string {
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return getRequestID(ctx)
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}
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// getRequestID is an internal helper to extract request ID from context.
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func getRequestID(ctx context.Context) string {
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id, ok := ctx.Value(RequestIDKey{}).(string)
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if !ok {
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return "unknown"
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}
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return id
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}
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// GetUser extracts the authenticated user from context.
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// Returns the name of the matched API key and whether it was found.
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func GetUser(ctx context.Context) string {
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user, ok := ctx.Value(UserKey{}).(string)
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if !ok {
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return ""
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}
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return user
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}
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// IsAdmin extracts the admin flag from context.
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// Returns true if the authenticated user has admin privileges.
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func IsAdmin(ctx context.Context) bool {
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admin, ok := ctx.Value(AdminKey{}).(bool)
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return ok && admin
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}
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// responseWriter wraps http.ResponseWriter to capture the status code.
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type responseWriter struct {
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http.ResponseWriter
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statusCode int
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}
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func (rw *responseWriter) WriteHeader(code int) {
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rw.statusCode = code
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rw.ResponseWriter.WriteHeader(code)
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}
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// Chain chains multiple middleware functions.
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func Chain(h http.Handler, middleware ...func(http.Handler) http.Handler) http.Handler {
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for i := len(middleware) - 1; i >= 0; i-- {
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h = middleware[i](h)
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}
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return h
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}
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