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shankar0123
68ca42fef1
Closes the wire-layer authorization gap surfaced by the 2026-05-10 audit
(CRIT-1). Before this commit only ~24 of ~140 routes carried rbacGate
enforcement — all of them admin-only fine-grained perms (auth.session.*,
auth.oidc.*, auth.breakglass.admin, cert.bulk_revoke, crl.admin, scep.admin,
est.admin, ca.hierarchy.manage). Every catalogued legacy-CRUD perm
(cert.read/issue/revoke/delete, profile.edit/delete, issuer.edit/delete,
target.*, agent.*, plus role-mgmt verbs) was declared in
internal/domain/auth/validate.go but never wired at the router. A r-viewer
Bearer was essentially r-admin minus five verbs at the wire layer (CWE-862).
This commit:
- Adds rbacGateScoped(checker, perm, scopeType, scopeFn, h) helper to
internal/api/router/router.go for path-bound scope resolution. Per-profile
and per-issuer grants (Decision 2) now reach the wire layer.
- Wraps every state-changing route AND every read endpoint in router.go
with rbacGate (global) or rbacGateScoped (path-bound). The auth-management
routes (POST /api/v1/auth/roles, etc.) gain router-level enforcement
in addition to the existing service-layer Authorizer check — defense in
depth (HIGH-9 of the same audit collapses into this closure).
- Auth-exempt surfaces stay un-gated by design: login, callback, BCL,
logout, breakglass-login, bootstrap, health, auth-info, version. Allowlist
is documented in TestRouterRBACGateCoverage.
- Extends internal/domain/auth/validate.go CanonicalPermissions with 30 new
perms across 12 namespaces: cert.edit; job.read, job.cancel; approval.read,
approval.approve, approval.reject; policy.read/edit/delete;
team.read/edit/delete; owner.read/edit/delete; notification.read/edit;
discovery.read/run/claim; network_scan.read/edit/run;
healthcheck.read/edit/delete/acknowledge; digest.read, digest.send;
verification.read, verification.run; stats.read; metrics.read.
- Updates DefaultRoles for r-admin / r-operator / r-viewer / r-mcp / r-cli /
r-agent. r-auditor gets NOTHING new — the auditor pin
(TestAuditorRoleHoldsExactlyAuditReadAndExport) stays invariant.
- Migration 000039_audit_crit1_perms seeds the new perm rows + role grants
per the updated DefaultRoles map. Idempotent ON CONFLICT DO NOTHING.
Reverse migration removes role_permissions before permissions
(ON DELETE RESTRICT on the FK).
- AST-level CI guard TestRouterRBACGateCoverage in
internal/api/router/router_rbac_coverage_test.go walks router.go and
asserts every state-changing + read route is wrapped (or in the
documented allowlist). Adding a new ungated route fails CI.
- Updates docs/operator/rbac.md permission-catalogue table with the new
namespaces + footer link to the AST CI guard.
- Updates certctl/CHANGELOG.md v2.1.0 section with the closure narrative.
Audit doc cowork/auth-bundles-audit-2026-05-10.md CRIT-1 row annotated
CLOSED 2026-05-10. Bundle's exit-gate spec lives at
cowork/auth-bundles-fixes-2026-05-10/01-crit-1-rbac-gates.md.
CRIT-2 / CRIT-3 / CRIT-4 / CRIT-5 of the same audit remain open and
continue to block the v2.1.0 tag.
Verification gate green:
- gofmt -d (no diff after gofmt -w on the touched files)
- go vet ./...
- go test -short -count=1 ./... (all packages pass including auditor pin)
- go build ./...
HIGH-9 of the audit closes via this commit's router-layer rbacGate on
POST /api/v1/auth/keys/{id}/roles + DELETE /api/v1/auth/keys/{id}/roles/{role_id}
(defense-in-depth on top of the existing service-layer privilege check).
Refs: cowork/auth-bundles-audit-2026-05-10.md CRIT-1 HIGH-9
311 lines
19 KiB
Markdown
311 lines
19 KiB
Markdown
# Changelog
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## v2.1.0 - Auth Bundles 1 + 2: RBAC primitive + OIDC SSO + sessions ⚠️
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> **SECURITY: AUDIT YOUR API KEYS.**
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>
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> Bundle 1 ships role-based authorization. Every existing API key
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> configured via `CERTCTL_API_KEYS_NAMED` (or the legacy
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> `CERTCTL_AUTH_SECRET`) is mapped to the **r-admin role on the first
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> upgrade boot** so existing automation keeps working unchanged. Most
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> keys do NOT need full admin power; downgrade them before tagging
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> the next release.
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>
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> Recommended post-upgrade flow:
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>
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> ```bash
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> # 1. List every key with its current role:
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> certctl-cli auth keys list
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>
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> # 2. Walk an interactive prompt that downgrades each key:
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> certctl-cli auth keys scope-down
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>
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> # 3. Or get a heuristic suggestion based on 30 days of audit history:
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> certctl-cli auth keys scope-down --suggest
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> certctl-cli auth keys scope-down --suggest --apply # applies the suggestion
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>
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> # 4. Or drive scope-down from a JSON config (Helm post-upgrade hook):
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> certctl-cli auth keys scope-down --non-interactive ./scope-down.json
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> ```
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>
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> The synthetic `actor-demo-anon` actor (used when
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> `CERTCTL_AUTH_TYPE=none` is configured) is system-managed and
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> excluded from the prompt loop.
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What else changed in v2.1.0:
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- **Audit 2026-05-10 CRIT-1 closure — wire-layer RBAC enforcement.**
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The Bundle 1 + Bundle 2 audit surfaced that the permission catalogue
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was enforced on ~24 admin-only routes only; the bulk of state-changing
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routes (`POST /api/v1/certificates`, `PUT /api/v1/profiles/{id}`,
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`DELETE /api/v1/issuers/{id}`, `POST /api/v1/agents/{id}/csr`, even
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`POST /api/v1/auth/roles` + `POST /api/v1/auth/keys/{id}/roles`) had
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no `rbacGate` wrap. A `r-viewer` Bearer was essentially `r-admin`
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minus five fine-grained verbs at the wire layer (CWE-862). This
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release wraps every state-changing + read endpoint with
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`rbacGate` (global scope) or `rbacGateScoped` (per-profile / per-
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issuer scope-bound grants), and adds an AST-level CI guard
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(`TestRouterRBACGateCoverage`) that fails when a new route is
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registered without enforcement. Catalogue extended via migration
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000039 with 30 permissions covering `cert.edit`, `job.*`,
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`approval.*`, `policy.*`, `team.*`, `owner.*`, `notification.*`,
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`discovery.*`, `network_scan.*`, `healthcheck.*`, `digest.*`,
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`verification.*`, `stats.read`, `metrics.read`. **AUDIT YOUR
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KEYS** (the scope-down call-out above) now translates to real
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reduction in blast radius. Auditor pin preserved at exactly
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`{audit.read, audit.export}`.
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- **RBAC primitive shipped.** `tenants`, `roles`, `permissions`,
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`role_permissions`, `actor_roles` tables (migration 000029); 33-permission
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canonical catalogue; 7 default roles (`admin`, `operator`, `viewer`,
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`agent`, `mcp`, `cli`, `auditor`); per-handler permission gates via
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`auth.RequirePermission` middleware (replaces the legacy
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`IsAdmin` boolean check on the 5 admin-only handlers).
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- **Day-0 admin bootstrap.** Set `CERTCTL_BOOTSTRAP_TOKEN` on a fresh
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deploy and POST a single curl call against `/api/v1/auth/bootstrap` to
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mint the first admin API key; one-shot, never logged, and locks
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closed once any admin actor exists. Migration 000031 ships the
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`api_keys` table that stores the SHA-256 hash; the plaintext is
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shown in the response body once and never persisted.
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- **Auditor role split.** New `auditor` role holds only `audit.read`
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+ `audit.export`. Compliance reviewers can read the audit trail
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without holding mutation power. Migration 000032 adds
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`audit_events.event_category` so auditors can filter to
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authentication-related events specifically.
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- **`/v1/auth/check` enrichment.** Response now includes the actor's
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standing roles and effective permissions, so the GUI gates
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affordances from a single fetch on app boot.
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- **Approval-bypass closure.** Edits to a profile that has (or
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would have) `RequiresApproval=true` now route through the
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`ApprovalService` two-person integrity gate (Phase 9). Migration
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000033 adds `approval_kind` + `payload` to
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`issuance_approval_requests` so cert-issuance and profile-edit
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approvals share the same workflow. Same-actor self-approve is
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rejected with `ErrApproveBySameActor` for both kinds. Closes the
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flip-flop loophole where an admin could disable approval, mutate,
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re-enable. Documented at
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[`docs/reference/profiles.md`](docs/reference/profiles.md).
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- **GUI: Roles / API Keys / Auth Settings / Approvals queue.**
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Four new pages under `/auth/*` consume `/v1/auth/me` for
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permission-aware rendering. The Approvals queue blocks
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self-approve at the client layer (Approve/Reject buttons hidden
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when requested_by == current actor_id) on top of the server-side
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enforcement. AuditPage gains a category filter (cert_lifecycle /
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auth / config) for the auditor view.
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- **MCP server gains 12 RBAC tools.** Operators driving certctl
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from Claude / VS Code / any MCP client get parity with the GUI
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+ CLI. Each tool routes through the same HTTP handler; permission
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gates fire server-side.
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- **OpenAPI catalogues every new route.** Every Bundle 1 endpoint
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ships with an `operationId`; the parity test guards against drift.
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- **Coverage gates.** `internal/auth/` and `internal/service/auth/`
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now have ≥85% coverage floors in `.github/coverage-thresholds.yml`.
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The 12-path negative-test list from the Bundle 1 prompt is
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fully covered (path #12 deferred with in-tree TODO).
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- **Protocol-endpoint allowlist pinned at three layers.** The
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middleware bypass (`auth.IsProtocolEndpoint`), the router-level
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`AuthExemptRouterRoutes` constant, and a new
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`phase12_protocol_allowlist_test.go` AST scan all guard against
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accidentally wrapping ACME / SCEP / EST / OCSP / CRL routes in
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`rbacGate`.
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- **Bundle 2: OIDC + sessions + back-channel logout + break-glass.**
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Auth Bundle 2 ships in the same v2.1.0 release. Operators get OIDC
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SSO support for Keycloak / Authentik / Okta / Auth0 / Microsoft
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Entra ID / Google Workspace (via Keycloak broker), HMAC-signed
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session cookies with idle/absolute timeouts + CSRF defense,
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back-channel logout per OpenID Connect Back-Channel Logout 1.0,
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and a default-OFF break-glass admin path with Argon2id passwords
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for SSO-broken incidents. API-key auth keeps working unchanged
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alongside; existing automation needs no changes. Migration walkthrough
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at [`docs/migration/oidc-enable.md`](docs/migration/oidc-enable.md);
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per-IdP setup guides at
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[`docs/operator/oidc-runbooks/index.md`](docs/operator/oidc-runbooks/index.md).
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- **OIDC token validation pinned at three layers.** Algorithm
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allow-list (RS256/RS512/ES256/ES384/EdDSA only) with HS-family + `none`
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rejected at the service-layer sentinel; IdP-downgrade-attack defense
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at provider creation AND every JWKS RefreshKeys (intersects the IdP's
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advertised `id_token_signing_alg_values_supported` against the allow-
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list, rejects providers that advertise weak algs even before any
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token is signed); OIDC Core §3.1.3.7 re-verification of `iss` /
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`aud` / `azp` / `at_hash` (REQUIRED-when-access_token-present per
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Phase 3 tightening of the spec MAY → MUST) / `exp` / `iat` window
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/ `nonce` constant-time-compare. PKCE-S256 mandatory; `plain`
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rejected. Single-use state + nonce via atomic `DELETE...RETURNING`
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on consume.
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- **Session cookies use length-prefixed HMAC.** The cookie wire format
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is `v1.<session_id>.<signing_key_id>.<base64url-no-pad(HMAC-SHA256)>`
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with HMAC input `len:sid:len:kid` (NOT bare-concat) to defeat
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concatenation collisions. `HttpOnly` + `Secure` + `SameSite=Lax`
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default; `SameSite=Strict` configurable via `CERTCTL_SESSION_SAMESITE`.
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Idle timeout 1h / absolute 8h defaults; scheduler GC sweeps expired
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rows hourly. Signing keys rotate via the new `RotateSigningKey`
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primitive; the old key stays valid for `CERTCTL_SESSION_SIGNING_KEY_RETENTION`
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(default 24h) so existing cookies validate during rollover.
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- **CSRF defense via double-submit-cookie + hashed-token-on-row.**
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Plaintext CSRF token in the JS-readable `certctl_csrf` cookie
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(intentionally `HttpOnly=false` for the GUI to echo into the
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`X-CSRF-Token` header); SHA-256 hash on the session row;
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`subtle.ConstantTimeCompare` in the new `CSRFMiddleware`. API-key
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actors are CSRF-exempt (no session row in context).
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- **OIDC `client_secret` encrypted at rest.** AES-256-GCM v3 blob
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format (magic 0x03 + salt(16) + nonce(12) + ciphertext+tag) using
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the existing `CERTCTL_CONFIG_ENCRYPTION_KEY`. Encryption invariant
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pinned by an integration test asserting ciphertext != plaintext +
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v3 blob shape + round-trip recovery + wrong-passphrase fails.
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- **OIDC first-admin bootstrap.** New `CERTCTL_BOOTSTRAP_ADMIN_GROUPS`
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+ `CERTCTL_BOOTSTRAP_OIDC_PROVIDER_ID` env vars: the first
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OIDC-authenticated user with a matching group claim becomes admin
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per tenant. Coexists with the Bundle 1 env-var-token bootstrap;
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the admin-existence probe ensures only one wins. Audit row
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(`bootstrap.oidc_first_admin`) on every grant.
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- **Break-glass admin (default-OFF).** New `CERTCTL_BREAKGLASS_ENABLED`
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env var (default `false`). When enabled, the local Argon2id-password
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admin path bypasses OIDC + group-claim layers — intended ONLY for
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SSO-broken incidents. Argon2id with OWASP 2024 params (m=64 MiB,
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t=3, p=4); lockout after 5 failures (configurable); constant-time
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across all failure paths via `verifyDummy`; surface invisibility
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(HTTP 404 on every endpoint when disabled, NOT 403). WARN log at
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server boot when enabled. WebAuthn/FIDO2 second factor pairing on
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the v3 roadmap (Decision 12).
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- **GUI: OIDC Providers + Group → Role Mappings + Sessions + login
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buttons.** Four new pages under `/auth/*` consume the Bundle 2 API
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surface. Login page renders one "Sign in with X" button per
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configured OIDC provider (in addition to the API-key form, which
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remains as a fallback for Bearer-mode + break-glass paths). Sessions
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page exposes own-sessions + admin all-actors view. Every actionable
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element is permission-gated server-side via `auth.oidc.*` and
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`auth.session.*` perms; client-side hide is UX layer. Logout button
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in the sidebar fires `POST /auth/logout` to clear the session
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server-side before redirecting to login.
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- **MCP server gains 11 OIDC + session tools.** `certctl_auth_list_oidc_providers`,
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`_get_oidc_provider`, `_create_oidc_provider`, `_update_oidc_provider`,
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`_delete_oidc_provider`, `_refresh_oidc_provider`,
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`_list_group_mappings`, `_add_group_mapping`, `_remove_group_mapping`,
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`_list_sessions`, `_revoke_session`. Operator-facing MCP tool count
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goes 12 (Bundle 1 RBAC) → 23 across the auth surface. Total MCP
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tool count: `grep -cE 'mcp\.AddTool\(' internal/mcp/tools*.go` ≈ 150.
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- **Per-IdP runbooks: 6 production-tier setup guides** at
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`docs/operator/oidc-runbooks/`. Each runbook follows a consistent
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five-section layout (Prerequisites / IdP-side config / certctl-side
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config / Verification / Troubleshooting + Validation checklist with
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operator sign-off line). Keycloak is the canonical reference;
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Authentik / Okta / Auth0 / Entra ID / Google Workspace document the
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IdP-specific deltas (Auth0's namespaced custom claims; Entra ID's
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group OBJECT IDs; Google Workspace's missing-groups-claim limitation
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+ the recommended Keycloak broker pattern).
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- **Threat model extended.** [`docs/operator/auth-threat-model.md`](docs/operator/auth-threat-model.md)
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ships 5 new "Defenses Bundle 2 ships" subsections + 8 new threat-
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catalogue subsections (OIDC token forgery / session hijacking / IdP
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compromise / back-channel logout failure modes / group-claim
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manipulation / bootstrap risks / break-glass risks / token-leak
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hygiene). 6 new SQL-shaped operator-facing checks. New "Threats
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Bundle 2 does NOT close" section enumerating the 8 v3-backlog items
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(WebAuthn / JIT elevation / SAML / multi-tenant activation /
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HSM-FIPS / OIDC RP-initiated logout / Playwright / per-IdP
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external-tester sign-off).
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- **Performance baselines documented.** [`docs/operator/auth-benchmarks.md`](docs/operator/auth-benchmarks.md)
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ships four benchmarks with measured baselines on a 4 vCPU /
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8 GiB / Postgres 16 / Go 1.25 floor: `BenchmarkSession_SteadyState`
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p99 5 µs (target < 1 ms; 200× under), `BenchmarkSession_ColdProcess`
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p99 7.1 ms (target < 10 ms), `BenchmarkOIDC_SteadyState` p99 1.5 ms
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(target < 5 ms), `BenchmarkOIDC_ColdCache` operator-runs against
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live Keycloak via `make benchmark-auth-coldcache`.
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- **Standards + RFC implementation table.** [`docs/reference/auth-standards-implemented.md`](docs/reference/auth-standards-implemented.md)
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ships 13 RFC / standard rows + 14 CWE rows with concrete file paths
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+ negative-test anchors per row. NOT a compliance-mapping doc per
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the operator's 2026-05-05 retired-compliance-docs decision; the
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doc explicitly says "build the framework mapping yourself against
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the rows here using the framework-mapping methodology your audit
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firm prescribes; this project does not own that mapping."
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- **Coverage gates held at floor 90 across all four Bundle 2
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packages.** `internal/auth/oidc/` 93.7%, `internal/auth/session/`
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94.9%, `internal/auth/breakglass/` 91.5%, `internal/auth/user/domain/`
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96.4%. NO held-low-with-rationale entry — the Phase 13 prompt's
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anti-Bundle-1-mistake rule held. Bundle 1's existing 85% floors
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for `internal/auth/` + `internal/service/auth/` stay 85
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(already-shipped-and-accepted) per the prompt's explicit
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inheritance rule.
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- **Multi-tenant query CI guard.** New `scripts/ci-guards/multi-tenant-query-coverage.sh`
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(ratchet-style, baseline 32 at v2.1.0 close): greps every
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SELECT/UPDATE/DELETE in `internal/repository/postgres/` against
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10 tenant-aware tables, fails on regression OR improvement (forces
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the operator to lift / lower the baseline visibly). Forward-compat
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protection so a future Bundle 3 / managed-service multi-tenant
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activation can flip the switch without finding silent
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tenant-data-leak bugs in shipped queries.
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- **Phase 10 Keycloak testcontainers integration test.** New build-tag-
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gated suite at `internal/auth/oidc/testfixtures/` + `integration_keycloak_test.go`
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drives the full OIDC flow against a live Keycloak container booted
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by testcontainers-go. 5-test matrix: discovery + JWKS load, full
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PKCE auth-code happy path with HTTP form scraping, logout-revokes-
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session, JWKS rotation, unmapped-groups-fails-closed. Reuses one
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container across the matrix to amortize the 60-90s boot. Optional
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Okta smoke test (build-tagged `integration && okta_smoke`) for live
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tenant validation. New Makefile targets: `make keycloak-integration-test`
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+ `make okta-smoke-test` + `make benchmark-auth-coldcache`.
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- **OpenAPI surface extended.** New `cookieAuth` security scheme
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(apiKey/cookie/`certctl_session`) alongside the existing
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`bearerAuth`. 13 new Bundle 2 endpoints across the OIDC + session
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+ group-mapping CRUD surface; 4 break-glass endpoints with
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surface-invisibility framing. The N-bundle-2-security-empty-preserved
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CI guard locks the `security: []` opt-out count at ≥ 14 so existing
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public endpoints stay public.
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- **Bundle-1-only compat regression CI guard.** New
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`scripts/ci-guards/bundle-1-compat-regression.sh` asserts the
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load-bearing invariants that protect the Bundle-1-only-deploy
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case (session middleware defers-to-next, CSRF passthrough on
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missing session row, ChainAuthSessionThenBearer wired, public
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OIDC routes in AuthExempt allowlist, AuthInfo guards on
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OIDCProvidersResolver != nil). Sibling
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`bundle-1-to-2-upgrade-regression.sh` asserts the upgrade-path
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invariants (migrations 000034..000038 are CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS
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+ BEGIN/COMMIT-wrapped + no DROP TABLE / ALTER...DROP COLUMN
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against 19 protected Bundle-1 tables + ON CONFLICT DO NOTHING on
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permission seed).
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Migration ordering, idempotency, and downgrade are documented in
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[`docs/migration/api-keys-to-rbac.md`](docs/migration/api-keys-to-rbac.md)
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(API-key → RBAC, Bundle 1) and [`docs/migration/oidc-enable.md`](docs/migration/oidc-enable.md)
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(API-key → OIDC, Bundle 2). The threat model lives at
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[`docs/operator/auth-threat-model.md`](docs/operator/auth-threat-model.md).
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Day-2 RBAC operations live at [`docs/operator/rbac.md`](docs/operator/rbac.md).
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RFC + CWE evidence at [`docs/reference/auth-standards-implemented.md`](docs/reference/auth-standards-implemented.md).
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## v2.0.68 - Image registry path changed ⚠️
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> **Image registry path changed.** Starting this release, container images publish to `ghcr.io/certctl-io/certctl-server` and `ghcr.io/certctl-io/certctl-agent`. Existing pulls from `ghcr.io/shankar0123/certctl-{server,agent}:<tag>` continue to work for previously-published tags (the registry never deletes images), but the `:latest` tag at the old path stops moving forward at this release. Update your `docker pull` paths, `docker-compose.yml` `image:` keys, or Helm `image.repository` values to receive future updates. Old `git clone` / `git push` / install-script / API URLs continue to redirect forever - only the container-registry path changed.
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This is the only operator-action-required change in v2.0.68. Other changes in this release are cosmetic URL refreshes after the GitHub-org transfer from `shankar0123/certctl` to `certctl-io/certctl` (HTTP redirects mean no other operator action is required) plus an internal contextcheck lint fix in the agent. Full commit list is on the [GitHub release page](https://github.com/certctl-io/certctl/releases/tag/v2.0.68).
|
||
|
||
---
|
||
|
||
certctl no longer maintains a hand-edited per-version changelog. Per-release
|
||
notes are auto-generated from commit messages between consecutive tags.
|
||
|
||
**Where to find what changed in a given release:**
|
||
|
||
- **[GitHub Releases](https://github.com/certctl-io/certctl/releases)** - every
|
||
tag has an auto-generated "What's Changed" section pulled from the commits
|
||
between that tag and the previous one, plus per-release supply-chain
|
||
verification instructions (Cosign / SLSA / SBOM).
|
||
- **`git log <prev-tag>..<this-tag> --oneline`** - same content, locally.
|
||
|
||
**Why no hand-edited CHANGELOG.md:**
|
||
|
||
certctl is solo-developed and pushes directly to master. Maintaining a
|
||
hand-edited CHANGELOG meant the file drifted (entries piled into
|
||
`[unreleased]` and never got promoted to per-version sections when tags were
|
||
cut). A stale CHANGELOG is worse than no CHANGELOG - it signals abandoned
|
||
maintenance to security-conscious operators doing diligence.
|
||
|
||
The auto-generated release notes work here because commit messages follow a
|
||
descriptive convention: `<area>: <summary>` with a longer body for non-trivial
|
||
changes (see `git log v2.0.50..HEAD` for the established pattern). Anyone
|
||
reading the GitHub Releases page can see exactly what landed in each version
|
||
without depending on the author to manually update a separate file.
|
||
|
||
**For the historical record:** earlier versions (pre-v2.2.0 and the [2.2.0]
|
||
tag itself) had a hand-edited CHANGELOG. That content is preserved in
|
||
[git history](https://github.com/certctl-io/certctl/blob/v2.2.0/CHANGELOG.md)
|
||
at the v2.2.0 tag.
|