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shankar0123 7e4d423561 feat(scep-intune): parser + validator for Microsoft Intune Connector challenge format
Phase 7 of the SCEP RFC 8894 + Intune master bundle. Adds the
internal/scep/intune package that validates Microsoft Intune Certificate
Connector signed challenges embedded in SCEP CSR challengePassword
attributes. This is the parsing/validation foundation; Phase 8 wires it
into the SCEP service dispatcher.

What's included:

  * doc.go — package architecture (Intune cloud → Connector → certctl
    SCEP server) + 'what this package is NOT' guard rails. We do NOT
    implement full JOSE: no JKU / kid / x5c trust, no JWKS fetch.
    Trust anchor is operator-supplied at startup and pinned. The
    package does NOT call Microsoft's API directly — the Connector
    already did that; we validate its signed attestation.

  * trust_anchor.go — LoadTrustAnchor(path) reads a PEM bundle of
    Intune Connector signing certs. Skips non-CERTIFICATE PEM blocks
    (operators sometimes paste chains with the priv key by mistake).
    Rejects empty bundles + expired certs at startup with an
    operator-actionable message including the cert subject. SIGHUP
    reload lands in Phase 8.5; today it's load-once-at-boot.

  * claim.go — ChallengeClaim struct + DeviceMatchesCSR helper.
    Set-equality semantics for SAN-DNS/SAN-RFC822/SAN-UPN: the CSR
    must carry EXACTLY the claim's elements, no extras and no missing.
    Empty claim slice = no constraint on that dimension.
    Per-dimension typed errors (ErrClaimCNMismatch /
    ErrClaimSANDNSMismatch / ErrClaimSANRFC822Mismatch /
    ErrClaimSANUPNMismatch) so audit logs surface the failure
    dimension without string-matching. extractUPNSans is stubbed to
    return nil with documented fail-closed behavior — non-empty UPN
    claims fail the equalSets check (correct behavior; the rare deploy
    that pins UPN SANs hot-fixes the ASN.1 walker per the inline
    comment).

  * replay.go — ReplayCache: bounded in-memory cache of seen nonces
    with TTL. Sized for 100,000 entries (60-min Connector validity ×
    25 RPS Intune fleet steady-state ≈ 90,000 challenges/hour with
    headroom). sync.Map for concurrent read/write; janitor goroutine
    wakes every TTL/4 to evict expired entries; at-cap O(N)
    oldest-eviction (rarely fires; janitor keeps the cache below
    cap). Redis-backed variant deferred to V3-Pro.

  * challenge.go — the load-bearing piece:

    - ParseChallenge(raw) splits the JWT-like compact serialization
      into header/payload/signature and base64url-decodes each.
      Tolerates both padded + unpadded encodings (some Connector
      builds emit padded; RFC 7515 §2 says unpadded; we accept both).
      Validates the header parses as JSON before returning so the
      malformed-signal lands earlier in the pipeline.

    - ValidateChallenge(raw, trust, expectedAudience, now):
        1. ParseChallenge
        2. JWS signature verify over (segment0 || '.' || segment1)
           — re-derived from the raw on-wire bytes, NOT
           re-base64-encoded, per RFC 7515 §3.1 (re-encoding could
           produce a byte-different input than what was signed)
        3. Signature alg dispatch:
             RS256: rsa.VerifyPKCS1v15(SHA-256)
             ES256: tries fixed-width r||s (JOSE-canonical) first,
                    falls back to ASN.1 DER (older Connectors)
             alg=none: explicit reject with audit-log-friendly
                       message (RFC 7515 §3.6 attack vector)
             HS*/PS*: rejected as 'unsupported alg' (no shared
                      secret in our threat model)
        4. Version-detection prelude (versionedChallenge struct +
           versionUnmarshalers map). Today's format is v1 (no
           explicit version field; absence IS the v1 signal). Adding
           v2 = adding a parser + a registration line; v1 path stays
           untouched. Defends against the inevitable Microsoft format
           change at ~30 LoC + 2 tests cost vs. a P0 incident.
        5. Time bounds (iat / exp); audience pin (skipped when
           expectedAudience == "").

      Replay protection is the CALLER's job (handler glues parser +
      cache; validator stays stateless + testable).

  * Typed errors: ErrChallengeMalformed / ErrChallengeSignature /
    ErrChallengeExpired / ErrChallengeNotYetValid /
    ErrChallengeWrongAudience / ErrChallengeReplay /
    ErrChallengeUnknownVersion. errors.Is-friendly so the handler
    can audit failure dimension.

Tests (94.8% coverage):

  * challenge_test.go (18 tests): happy-path RS256 + ES256
    fixed-width + ES256 DER; TamperedSignature; TamperedPayload;
    Expired; NotYetValid; WrongAudience; EmptyExpectedAudience
    disables check; RotatedTrustAnchor; EmptyTrustBundle;
    AlgNoneRejected; UnsupportedAlg (HS256); MissingAlg;
    VersionV1ExplicitOK; VersionUnknownRejected;
    MixedTrustBundle iter (skip key-type mismatches without
    surfacing as Signature err); NonJSONPayloadButValidSignature;
    Malformed cases (empty, missing dots, bad base64, non-JSON
    header — 9 sub-cases); PaddedBase64Tolerated.

  * claim_test.go (13 tests): per-dimension matching across CN +
    SAN-DNS + SAN-RFC822 + SAN-UPN; nil guards; case-insensitive DNS
    (RFC 4343); dedupe set-equality; empty claim = no constraint;
    UPN stub canary; normaliseSet edge cases; equalSets length
    mismatch.

  * replay_test.go (11 tests): first-fresh; duplicate-rejected;
    past-TTL-fresh; Sweep-evicts-expired; empty-nonce
    short-circuits; at-cap LRU eviction; default-cap=100k;
    Close-idempotent; TTL=0 disables janitor; concurrent-race-free
    (50 goroutines × 200 inserts); empty-nonce twice is fresh both
    times (we don't cache empties).

  * trust_anchor_test.go: HappyPath single + multi cert; SkipsNonCertBlocks
    (priv key + cert mix); EmptyBundleRejected; OnlyKeyBlocksRejected;
    ExpiredCertRejected (with subject CN in error); MalformedCertRejected;
    LoadTrustAnchor disk + EmptyPath + MissingFile.

  * fuzz_test.go: FuzzParseChallenge with seed corpus covering both
    the well-formed and the obvious-malformed shapes. Survived 187k
    execs in 21s without panic on the local burst; CI runs 5 min.

Verification:

  * gofmt -l ./internal/scep/intune: clean
  * go vet ./internal/scep/intune/...: clean
  * staticcheck ./internal/scep/intune/...: clean
  * go test -count=1 -cover ./internal/scep/intune/...: 94.8%
    (target was ≥85%)
  * go vet ./internal/... ./cmd/...: clean (no rest-of-repo regressions)
  * No new CERTCTL_* env vars (those land in Phase 8 with the
    config gate); G-3 docs-drift CI guard not triggered.
  * No new HTTP routes; openapi-parity guard not triggered.

Phase 8 will:
  - Add SCEPProfileConfig.Intune* env vars + preflight gate
  - Wire the validator into the SCEP service dispatcher
    (Intune-shaped challenges → validator; static → existing path)
  - Trust-anchor SIGHUP reload mirroring cmd/server/tls.go::watchSIGHUP
  - Per-claim rate limit + audit metrics

Refs: cowork/scep-rfc8894-intune-master-prompt.md::Phase 7
      cowork/scep-rfc8894-intune/progress.md
2026-04-29 14:38:35 +00:00

160 lines
5.5 KiB
Go

package intune
import (
"crypto/x509"
"crypto/x509/pkix"
"errors"
"testing"
)
// Each TestDeviceMatchesCSR_* covers a single dimension (CN / SAN-DNS /
// SAN-RFC822 / SAN-UPN) with both happy-path and mismatch fixtures so the
// per-dimension typed errors stay wired up over future refactors.
func newCSRFixture(cn string, dns, email []string) *x509.CertificateRequest {
return &x509.CertificateRequest{
Subject: pkix.Name{CommonName: cn},
DNSNames: dns,
EmailAddresses: email,
}
}
func TestDeviceMatchesCSR_HappyPath_AllDimensions(t *testing.T) {
csr := newCSRFixture("DEVICE-001", []string{"a.example.com", "b.example.com"},
[]string{"alice@example.com"})
c := &ChallengeClaim{
DeviceName: "DEVICE-001",
SANDNS: []string{"b.example.com", "a.example.com"}, // reversed; set-equality
SANRFC822: []string{"alice@example.com"},
}
if err := c.DeviceMatchesCSR(csr); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("happy-path match should succeed: %v", err)
}
}
func TestDeviceMatchesCSR_NilGuards(t *testing.T) {
var nilClaim *ChallengeClaim
if err := nilClaim.DeviceMatchesCSR(&x509.CertificateRequest{}); err == nil {
t.Errorf("nil claim should error")
}
c := &ChallengeClaim{}
if err := c.DeviceMatchesCSR(nil); err == nil {
t.Errorf("nil CSR should error")
}
}
func TestDeviceMatchesCSR_CNMismatch(t *testing.T) {
csr := newCSRFixture("ATTACKER-DEVICE", nil, nil)
c := &ChallengeClaim{DeviceName: "DEVICE-001"}
if err := c.DeviceMatchesCSR(csr); !errors.Is(err, ErrClaimCNMismatch) {
t.Fatalf("got %v, want ErrClaimCNMismatch", err)
}
}
func TestDeviceMatchesCSR_EmptyClaimCN_NoConstraint(t *testing.T) {
csr := newCSRFixture("any-cn-is-fine", nil, nil)
c := &ChallengeClaim{} // no DeviceName pinned
if err := c.DeviceMatchesCSR(csr); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("empty claim CN must impose no constraint: %v", err)
}
}
func TestDeviceMatchesCSR_SANDNSMismatch_Missing(t *testing.T) {
csr := newCSRFixture("d", []string{"a.example.com"}, nil) // missing b
c := &ChallengeClaim{SANDNS: []string{"a.example.com", "b.example.com"}}
if err := c.DeviceMatchesCSR(csr); !errors.Is(err, ErrClaimSANDNSMismatch) {
t.Fatalf("got %v, want ErrClaimSANDNSMismatch", err)
}
}
func TestDeviceMatchesCSR_SANDNSMismatch_Extra(t *testing.T) {
csr := newCSRFixture("d", []string{"a.example.com", "evil.example.com"}, nil)
c := &ChallengeClaim{SANDNS: []string{"a.example.com"}}
if err := c.DeviceMatchesCSR(csr); !errors.Is(err, ErrClaimSANDNSMismatch) {
t.Fatalf("got %v, want ErrClaimSANDNSMismatch (CSR carries extra SAN)", err)
}
}
func TestDeviceMatchesCSR_SANDNSMatch_CaseInsensitive(t *testing.T) {
csr := newCSRFixture("d", []string{"A.Example.COM"}, nil)
c := &ChallengeClaim{SANDNS: []string{"a.example.com"}}
if err := c.DeviceMatchesCSR(csr); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("DNS comparison must be case-insensitive (RFC 4343): %v", err)
}
}
func TestDeviceMatchesCSR_SANDNSDedupe(t *testing.T) {
// CSR with duplicate SAN entries should still match a claim that
// only lists each unique value once. The "set" in set-equality is
// the cert's effective SAN set, not the multiset.
csr := newCSRFixture("d", []string{"a.example.com", "a.example.com"}, nil)
c := &ChallengeClaim{SANDNS: []string{"a.example.com"}}
if err := c.DeviceMatchesCSR(csr); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("dedup-equality must hold: %v", err)
}
}
func TestDeviceMatchesCSR_EmptyClaimSAN_NoConstraint(t *testing.T) {
csr := newCSRFixture("d", []string{"any.example.com"}, nil)
c := &ChallengeClaim{} // no SANDNS pinned
if err := c.DeviceMatchesCSR(csr); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("empty claim SANDNS must impose no constraint: %v", err)
}
}
func TestDeviceMatchesCSR_SANRFC822Mismatch(t *testing.T) {
csr := newCSRFixture("d", nil, []string{"bob@example.com"})
c := &ChallengeClaim{SANRFC822: []string{"alice@example.com"}}
if err := c.DeviceMatchesCSR(csr); !errors.Is(err, ErrClaimSANRFC822Mismatch) {
t.Fatalf("got %v, want ErrClaimSANRFC822Mismatch", err)
}
}
func TestDeviceMatchesCSR_SANUPNMismatch_NoExtractor(t *testing.T) {
// extractUPNSans currently returns nil; any non-empty SANUPN claim
// is therefore a guaranteed mismatch (correct fail-closed behavior).
csr := newCSRFixture("d", nil, nil)
c := &ChallengeClaim{SANUPN: []string{"alice@corp.example.com"}}
if err := c.DeviceMatchesCSR(csr); !errors.Is(err, ErrClaimSANUPNMismatch) {
t.Fatalf("got %v, want ErrClaimSANUPNMismatch (UPN extractor stubbed)", err)
}
}
func TestNormaliseSet_EdgeCases(t *testing.T) {
cases := []struct {
name string
in []string
want []string
}{
{"empty", nil, []string{}},
{"trim space", []string{" hello "}, []string{"hello"}},
{"drop empty after trim", []string{" ", "x"}, []string{"x"}},
{"lowercase", []string{"HELLO", "World"}, []string{"hello", "world"}},
{"dedupe", []string{"a", "a", "b"}, []string{"a", "b"}},
{"sort", []string{"c", "a", "b"}, []string{"a", "b", "c"}},
}
for _, tc := range cases {
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
got := normaliseSet(tc.in)
if !equalSets(got, tc.want) {
t.Errorf("normaliseSet(%v) = %v, want %v", tc.in, got, tc.want)
}
})
}
}
func TestEqualSets_LengthMismatch(t *testing.T) {
if equalSets([]string{"a", "b"}, []string{"a"}) {
t.Errorf("different-length sets must not compare equal")
}
}
func TestExtractUPNSans_StubReturnsEmpty(t *testing.T) {
// Pin the documented stub behavior. If/when ExtractUPNSans is
// implemented for real, this test is the canary that flags the
// behavioral change.
if got := extractUPNSans(&x509.CertificateRequest{}); len(got) != 0 {
t.Errorf("extractUPNSans stub must return empty slice; got %v", got)
}
}