Files
certctl/internal/auth/protocol_endpoints.go
shankar0123 21aeed4f4e legal: addlicense headers + normalize legacy variants (Phase 0 RED-4)
Phase 0 closure (Path B2, post-rewrite):

addlicense sweep — adds the canonical certctl LLC copyright + BUSL-1.1
SPDX header to every production Go file. Template:

  // Copyright 2026 certctl LLC. All rights reserved.
  // SPDX-License-Identifier: BUSL-1.1

Coverage: 338 / 338 production Go files (cmd/ + internal/, excluding
*_test.go and **/testdata/**). Pre-sweep coverage was 22 / 338 (6.5%);
post-sweep is 338 / 338 (100%).

Normalized 22 pre-existing legacy headers (`// Copyright (c) certctl`
+ `// SPDX-License-Identifier: BSL-1.1`) and 1 file using a
`Certctl Contributors` attribution. The legacy SPDX ID `BSL-1.1`
is non-standard; the official SPDX identifier for Business Source
License 1.1 is `BUSL-1.1` (capital U). All 338 files now share the
canonical form.

Generated via:
  addlicense -c "certctl LLC" -y 2026 \
    -f cowork/legal/copyright-header.tpl \
    -ignore '**/testdata/**' -ignore '**/*_test.go' \
    cmd/ internal/

Verification:
  find cmd internal -name '*.go' -not -name '*_test.go' \
    -not -path '*/testdata/*' \
    -exec grep -L '^// Copyright 2026 certctl LLC' {} \; | wc -l

  Returns: 0

gofmt clean. Header additions are comments only, no compile impact.

Closes: cowork/certctl-architecture-diligence-audit.html#fix-RED-4
2026-05-13 21:23:35 +00:00

64 lines
2.7 KiB
Go

// Copyright 2026 certctl LLC. All rights reserved.
// SPDX-License-Identifier: BUSL-1.1
package auth
import "strings"
// ProtocolEndpointPrefixes lists the URL path prefixes that authenticate
// via the protocol itself rather than via certctl's Bearer / cookie
// stack. Bundle 1 Phase 3 uses this allowlist as the explicit "do NOT
// wrap with RequirePermission" set: the RBAC middleware applies only to
// admin handlers replacing legacy IsAdmin checks plus any new
// permission-gated routes; the endpoints below keep their existing
// protocol-level auth.
//
// Adding a new protocol endpoint that doesn't take a Bearer token MUST
// also add the prefix here and a parallel test in Phase 12 asserting
// the route is unwrapped.
//
// Per the Phase 3 audit:
//
// ACME server : /acme/profile/<id>/* + /acme/* (JWS-signed, RFC 8555).
// SCEP server : /scep (challenge password +
// signed CSR, RFC 8894).
// EST server : /.well-known/est/* (mTLS client cert,
// RFC 7030).
// OCSP responder : /.well-known/pki/ocsp (RFC 6960, public).
// CRL distrib. : /.well-known/pki/crl/* (RFC 5280, public).
//
// Plus the existing public-route bypass list at internal/api/router
// (router.go:69-72): /health, /ready, /api/v1/auth/info. Those bypass
// EVERY middleware stack, not just RBAC, so they're not in this
// allowlist; they're handled in router.go directly.
// Audit 2026-05-10 LOW-7 closure — this slice is the canonical
// source of truth for "do NOT gate via RBAC" surfaces. The router's
// AuthExemptDispatchPrefixes had drifted (carrying /scep-mtls and
// /.well-known/est-mtls that weren't in this list); both are now
// included so the two slices stay in lockstep. A CI guard
// (scripts/ci-guards/protocol-endpoint-prefix-sync.sh) is queued
// against the two slices for future drift detection — meanwhile the
// Phase 12 TestPhase12_IsProtocolEndpoint_CoversCanonicalPrefixes
// regression pins the canonical set against this var.
var ProtocolEndpointPrefixes = []string{
"/acme",
"/scep",
"/scep-mtls", // SCEP + mTLS sibling route (Phase 6.5)
"/.well-known/est",
"/.well-known/est-mtls", // EST + mTLS sibling route (EST hardening Phase 2)
"/.well-known/pki/ocsp",
"/.well-known/pki/crl",
}
// IsProtocolEndpoint reports whether the request path is in the
// "do not gate" allowlist. Phase 3 RequirePermission check bails out
// early for these paths so the protocol surface is preserved.
func IsProtocolEndpoint(path string) bool {
for _, p := range ProtocolEndpointPrefixes {
if path == p || strings.HasPrefix(path, p+"/") {
return true
}
}
return false
}