Files
certctl/internal/api/handler/auth_session_oidc_crud.go
shankar0123 cd374b243e refactor(handler): split auth_session_oidc.go by handler-section (Phase 9, 11 of N)
Phase 9 ARCH-M2 closure Sprint 11. Splits
internal/api/handler/auth_session_oidc.go (was 1577 LOC, the
fifth-largest backend hotspot from the original audit) via the
Option B sibling-file pattern — new files stay in `package handler`
so every external caller of
`handler.AuthSessionOIDCHandler.{LoginInitiate, LoginCallback,
BackChannelLogout, Logout, ListSessions, RevokeSession,
RevokeAllExceptCurrent, ListProviders, CreateProvider,
UpdateProvider, DeleteProvider, TestProvider, RefreshProvider,
ListGroupMappings, AddGroupMapping, RemoveGroupMapping}` and
`handler.{DefaultBCLVerifier, NewDefaultBCLVerifier,
DefaultBCLVerifierMaxAge}` resolves the same way. Pure mechanical
relocation; no signature, no behavior, no import-graph change.

Section-based split (Option B + audit's verb prescription)
==========================================================
The audit's Tasks-Deferred row prescribed splitting "per handler
verb (login / callback / refresh / logout / backchannel)." The
file itself documents a three-section layout in its package
doc-comment:

  1. Public OIDC handshake (auth-exempt)
  2. Session management (RBAC-gated)
  3. OIDC provider + group-mapping CRUD (RBAC-gated)

Going strictly verb-by-verb would have:
  - mis-grouped RefreshProvider (which is an ADMIN op on a
    provider's signing-key cache, not a session refresh — same
    auth.oidc.edit permission as Update/Delete);
  - split LoginInitiate + LoginCallback into separate files
    despite them sharing the state cookie + pre-login row flow;
  - left the other 9 handlers (Sessions, Provider CRUD, Group
    Mappings) with no obvious home.

Sprint 11 follows the file's own self-described section split
plus a fourth file for the DefaultBCLVerifier, which the original
file already kept under a separate banner.

What moved
==========

New `internal/api/handler/auth_session_oidc_handshake.go` (391 LOC)
— Section 1 / Public OIDC handshake handlers (auth-exempt):
  - LoginInitiate (GET /auth/oidc/login?provider=<id>)
  - LoginCallback (GET /auth/oidc/callback?code=...&state=...)
  - BackChannelLogout (POST /auth/oidc/back-channel-logout)
  - Logout (POST /auth/logout)

New `internal/api/handler/auth_session_oidc_sessions.go` (208 LOC)
— Section 2 / Session-management handlers (RBAC-gated):
  - sessionResponse projection type + sessionToResponse mapper
  - ListSessions (GET /api/v1/auth/sessions)
  - RevokeSession (DELETE /api/v1/auth/sessions/{id})
  - RevokeAllExceptCurrent
    (DELETE /api/v1/auth/sessions/all-except-current)

New `internal/api/handler/auth_session_oidc_crud.go` (470 LOC) —
Section 3 / OIDC provider + group-mapping CRUD (RBAC-gated):
  - oidcProviderResponse + oidcProviderRequest projection types,
    providerToResponse mapper
  - ListProviders / CreateProvider / UpdateProvider /
    DeleteProvider / TestProvider / RefreshProvider
  - groupMappingResponse + groupMappingRequest projection types,
    mappingToResponse mapper
  - ListGroupMappings / AddGroupMapping / RemoveGroupMapping

New `internal/api/handler/auth_session_oidc_bcl.go` (225 LOC) —
DefaultBCLVerifier (handler's default implementation of the
BackChannelLogoutVerifier interface declared in
auth_session_oidc.go):
  - DefaultBCLVerifierMaxAge constant
  - DefaultBCLVerifier struct + NewDefaultBCLVerifier
  - WithMaxAge builder
  - Verify (the OpenID Connect Back-Channel Logout 1.0 §2.6
    verification: events claim, iat window, algorithm allowlist,
    audience match, sub/sid/jti decode)
  - peekIssuer unexported helper

What stays in auth_session_oidc.go (452 LOC, down from 1577)
============================================================
  - Package + import block.
  - Service-layer interface projections (OIDCAuthHandshaker,
    SessionMinter, BackChannelLogoutVerifier) — declared once and
    consumed by every section.
  - SessionCookieAttrs config struct.
  - AuthSessionOIDCHandler struct + permissionChecker /
    BCLReplayConsumer / AuditRecorder interfaces + NewAuthSession-
    OIDCHandler constructor + the WithPermissionChecker /
    WithBCLReplayConsumer builder methods.
  - The shared helpers consumed across multiple sections:
    encryptClientSecret, recordAudit, clearPreLoginCookie,
    clearSessionCookies, clientIPFromRequest, classifyOIDCFailure,
    randomB64URLForHandler, defaultIfBlank, defaultIntIfZero.

Side-effect import cleanup
==========================
Four imports drop from auth_session_oidc.go as a clean side effect
of the cut:
  - "encoding/json" (used only in CRUD + BCL — moved out)
  - "fmt" (used only in BCL — moved out)
  - gooidc "github.com/coreos/go-oidc/v3/oidc"
    (used only in BCL — moved out)
  - oidcdomain "github.com/certctl-io/certctl/internal/auth/oidc/domain"
    (used in handshake + CRUD + BCL — moved out)
Per-import audit on every new sibling file is in the commit's diff:
each carries only the imports its extracted code actually consumes.

Net effect
==========
auth_session_oidc.go: 1577 → 452 LOC (-1,125 = -71.3%). Four new
sibling files at 1,294 LOC total (1,125 moved + ~169 of header +
Phase 9 doc-comment overhead). The original hotspot drops below
the cmd/agent/main.go target for Sprint 12 (1489 LOC).

Cumulative Phase 9 progress (top 5 hotspots)
============================================
  config.go         3403 → 1342 (-60.6%, Sprints 1-7)
  cmd/server/main.go  2966 → 2260 (-23.8%, Sprints 8 + 8b)
  service/acme.go   1965 → 1162 (-40.9%, Sprints 9 + 9b)
  mcp/tools.go      1867 →  109 (-94.2%, Sprint 10)
  auth_session_oidc 1577 →  452 (-71.3%, Sprint 11)
  TOTAL across 5 files: 11,778 → 5,325 LOC = -6,453 (-54.8%)

Behavior preservation contract
==============================
1. gofmt -l clean across all 5 affected files.
2. go vet ./internal/api/handler/... — no findings.
3. staticcheck ./internal/api/handler/... — no findings.
4. go test -short -count=1 ./internal/api/handler/... — green
   (includes the 1,439-line auth_session_oidc_test.go suite that
   pins every moved handler's behavior including BCL replay,
   CSRF rotation, audit emission, and the Phase-5 RBAC path).
5. Broader-importer build green: go build ./... .
6. Broader-importer tests green: go test -short -count=1
   ./cmd/server/... ./internal/api/router/... .

cmd/server/main.go consumes handler.DefaultBCLVerifier +
handler.NewDefaultBCLVerifier + handler.DefaultBCLVerifierMaxAge
across three call sites; all three resolve unchanged through Go's
same-package public-export mechanism (the type + constructor
moved to a sibling file in the same `handler` package). The
mcp/tools_auth_bundle2.go comment string referencing
"oidcProviderRequest" is descriptive prose, not an import.

What remains for Phase 9
========================
One sibling-file split queued:
  - Sprint 12: cmd/agent/main.go (1489 LOC) → main + poll +
    deploy + register sibling files in same cmd/agent package
    (mirrors the cmd/server pattern from Sprints 8 + 8b).

Refs: ARCH-M2 (god-files), Phase 9 audit. Sprint 11 closes the
auth-session-OIDC handler hotspot from the audit's top-5 list.
2026-05-14 10:22:33 +00:00

470 lines
18 KiB
Go

// Copyright 2026 certctl LLC. All rights reserved.
// SPDX-License-Identifier: BUSL-1.1
package handler
import (
"context"
"encoding/json"
"errors"
"net/http"
"strings"
"time"
oidcsvc "github.com/certctl-io/certctl/internal/auth/oidc"
oidcdomain "github.com/certctl-io/certctl/internal/auth/oidc/domain"
"github.com/certctl-io/certctl/internal/repository"
)
// Phase 9 ARCH-M2 closure Sprint 11 (2026-05-14): extracted from
// internal/api/handler/auth_session_oidc.go via the Option B
// sibling-file pattern.
//
// This file holds Section 3 of the original three-section layout:
// OIDC PROVIDER + GROUP-MAPPING CRUD (RBAC-gated). Eight
// endpoints across two related resources:
//
// GET /api/v1/auth/oidc/providers -> auth.oidc.list
// POST /api/v1/auth/oidc/providers -> auth.oidc.create
// PUT /api/v1/auth/oidc/providers/{id} -> auth.oidc.edit
// DELETE /api/v1/auth/oidc/providers/{id} -> auth.oidc.delete
// POST /api/v1/auth/oidc/providers/{id}/test -> auth.oidc.edit
// POST /api/v1/auth/oidc/providers/{id}/refresh -> auth.oidc.edit
// GET /api/v1/auth/oidc/group-mappings -> auth.oidc.list
// POST /api/v1/auth/oidc/group-mappings -> auth.oidc.edit
// DELETE /api/v1/auth/oidc/group-mappings/{id} -> auth.oidc.edit
//
// The four request/response projection types (oidcProviderRequest,
// oidcProviderResponse, groupMappingRequest, groupMappingResponse)
// move with their handler callers. The encryptClientSecret +
// recordAudit + randomB64URLForHandler + defaultIfBlank +
// defaultIntIfZero helpers stay in auth_session_oidc.go — they're
// also consumed elsewhere (recordAudit is used by every section)
// or are generic utilities that don't have a single owner.
//
// NOTE: the audit's verb-based prescription (login / callback /
// refresh / logout / backchannel) named "refresh" as a separate
// sibling file. The RefreshProvider handler here is the only
// "refresh" in this file, but operationally it's an ADMIN
// operation on a provider's signing-key cache, not a session
// refresh. Sprint 11 keeps it grouped with the rest of the
// provider CRUD where it belongs by call-graph + permission scope
// (auth.oidc.edit, the same RBAC permission as Update/Delete).
// =============================================================================
// 3. OIDC provider + group-mapping CRUD.
// =============================================================================
type oidcProviderResponse struct {
ID string `json:"id"`
TenantID string `json:"tenant_id"`
Name string `json:"name"`
IssuerURL string `json:"issuer_url"`
ClientID string `json:"client_id"`
RedirectURI string `json:"redirect_uri"`
GroupsClaimPath string `json:"groups_claim_path"`
GroupsClaimFormat string `json:"groups_claim_format"`
FetchUserinfo bool `json:"fetch_userinfo"`
Scopes []string `json:"scopes"`
AllowedEmailDomains []string `json:"allowed_email_domains"`
IATWindowSeconds int `json:"iat_window_seconds"`
JWKSCacheTTLSeconds int `json:"jwks_cache_ttl_seconds"`
CreatedAt string `json:"created_at"`
UpdatedAt string `json:"updated_at"`
}
func providerToResponse(p *oidcdomain.OIDCProvider) oidcProviderResponse {
return oidcProviderResponse{
ID: p.ID, TenantID: p.TenantID, Name: p.Name,
IssuerURL: p.IssuerURL, ClientID: p.ClientID, RedirectURI: p.RedirectURI,
GroupsClaimPath: p.GroupsClaimPath, GroupsClaimFormat: p.GroupsClaimFormat,
FetchUserinfo: p.FetchUserinfo, Scopes: p.Scopes, AllowedEmailDomains: p.AllowedEmailDomains,
IATWindowSeconds: p.IATWindowSeconds, JWKSCacheTTLSeconds: p.JWKSCacheTTLSeconds,
CreatedAt: p.CreatedAt.UTC().Format(time.RFC3339),
UpdatedAt: p.UpdatedAt.UTC().Format(time.RFC3339),
}
}
type oidcProviderRequest struct {
Name string `json:"name"`
IssuerURL string `json:"issuer_url"`
ClientID string `json:"client_id"`
ClientSecret string `json:"client_secret"` // plaintext on the wire ONLY at create/update; encrypted at rest
RedirectURI string `json:"redirect_uri"`
GroupsClaimPath string `json:"groups_claim_path"`
GroupsClaimFormat string `json:"groups_claim_format"`
FetchUserinfo bool `json:"fetch_userinfo"`
Scopes []string `json:"scopes"`
AllowedEmailDomains []string `json:"allowed_email_domains"`
IATWindowSeconds int `json:"iat_window_seconds"`
JWKSCacheTTLSeconds int `json:"jwks_cache_ttl_seconds"`
}
// ListProviders handles GET /api/v1/auth/oidc/providers.
func (h *AuthSessionOIDCHandler) ListProviders(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
if _, err := callerFromRequest(r); err != nil {
writeAuthError(w, err)
return
}
provs, err := h.providerRepo.List(r.Context(), h.tenantID)
if err != nil {
Error(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "could not list providers")
return
}
out := make([]oidcProviderResponse, 0, len(provs))
for _, p := range provs {
out = append(out, providerToResponse(p))
}
writeJSON(w, http.StatusOK, map[string]interface{}{"providers": out})
}
// CreateProvider handles POST /api/v1/auth/oidc/providers.
func (h *AuthSessionOIDCHandler) CreateProvider(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
caller, err := callerFromRequest(r)
if err != nil {
writeAuthError(w, err)
return
}
var req oidcProviderRequest
if derr := json.NewDecoder(r.Body).Decode(&req); derr != nil {
Error(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "invalid JSON body")
return
}
if strings.TrimSpace(req.ClientSecret) == "" {
Error(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "client_secret is required")
return
}
encrypted, eerr := h.encryptClientSecret([]byte(req.ClientSecret))
if eerr != nil {
Error(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "could not encrypt client secret")
return
}
prov := &oidcdomain.OIDCProvider{
ID: "op-" + randomB64URLForHandler(16),
TenantID: h.tenantID,
Name: req.Name,
IssuerURL: req.IssuerURL,
ClientID: req.ClientID,
ClientSecretEncrypted: encrypted,
RedirectURI: req.RedirectURI,
GroupsClaimPath: defaultIfBlank(req.GroupsClaimPath, oidcdomain.DefaultGroupsClaimPath),
GroupsClaimFormat: defaultIfBlank(req.GroupsClaimFormat, oidcdomain.GroupsClaimFormatStringArray),
FetchUserinfo: req.FetchUserinfo,
Scopes: req.Scopes,
AllowedEmailDomains: req.AllowedEmailDomains,
IATWindowSeconds: defaultIntIfZero(req.IATWindowSeconds, oidcdomain.DefaultIATWindowSeconds),
JWKSCacheTTLSeconds: defaultIntIfZero(req.JWKSCacheTTLSeconds, oidcdomain.DefaultJWKSCacheTTLSeconds),
}
if verr := prov.Validate(); verr != nil {
Error(w, http.StatusBadRequest, verr.Error())
return
}
if cerr := h.providerRepo.Create(r.Context(), prov); cerr != nil {
if errors.Is(cerr, repository.ErrOIDCProviderDuplicateName) {
Error(w, http.StatusConflict, "provider name already exists")
return
}
Error(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "could not create provider")
return
}
h.recordAudit(r.Context(), "auth.oidc_provider_created", caller.ActorID, caller.ActorType, prov.ID,
map[string]interface{}{"provider_id": prov.ID, "name": prov.Name, "issuer_url": prov.IssuerURL})
writeJSON(w, http.StatusCreated, providerToResponse(prov))
}
// UpdateProvider handles PUT /api/v1/auth/oidc/providers/{id}.
func (h *AuthSessionOIDCHandler) UpdateProvider(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
caller, err := callerFromRequest(r)
if err != nil {
writeAuthError(w, err)
return
}
id := r.PathValue("id")
if id == "" {
Error(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "missing provider id")
return
}
existing, gerr := h.providerRepo.Get(r.Context(), id)
if gerr != nil {
if errors.Is(gerr, repository.ErrOIDCProviderNotFound) {
Error(w, http.StatusNotFound, "provider not found")
return
}
Error(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "could not load provider")
return
}
var req oidcProviderRequest
if derr := json.NewDecoder(r.Body).Decode(&req); derr != nil {
Error(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "invalid JSON body")
return
}
// Mutable fields only (id / tenant_id / created_at preserved).
existing.Name = req.Name
existing.IssuerURL = req.IssuerURL
existing.ClientID = req.ClientID
existing.RedirectURI = req.RedirectURI
existing.GroupsClaimPath = defaultIfBlank(req.GroupsClaimPath, existing.GroupsClaimPath)
existing.GroupsClaimFormat = defaultIfBlank(req.GroupsClaimFormat, existing.GroupsClaimFormat)
existing.FetchUserinfo = req.FetchUserinfo
existing.Scopes = req.Scopes
existing.AllowedEmailDomains = req.AllowedEmailDomains
if req.IATWindowSeconds != 0 {
existing.IATWindowSeconds = req.IATWindowSeconds
}
if req.JWKSCacheTTLSeconds != 0 {
existing.JWKSCacheTTLSeconds = req.JWKSCacheTTLSeconds
}
// Re-encrypt client_secret only if a new one is supplied; empty
// preserves the existing ciphertext.
if strings.TrimSpace(req.ClientSecret) != "" {
encrypted, eerr := h.encryptClientSecret([]byte(req.ClientSecret))
if eerr != nil {
Error(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "could not encrypt client secret")
return
}
existing.ClientSecretEncrypted = encrypted
}
if verr := existing.Validate(); verr != nil {
Error(w, http.StatusBadRequest, verr.Error())
return
}
if uerr := h.providerRepo.Update(r.Context(), existing); uerr != nil {
Error(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "could not update provider")
return
}
h.recordAudit(r.Context(), "auth.oidc_provider_updated", caller.ActorID, caller.ActorType, existing.ID,
map[string]interface{}{"provider_id": existing.ID, "name": existing.Name})
writeJSON(w, http.StatusOK, providerToResponse(existing))
}
// DeleteProvider handles DELETE /api/v1/auth/oidc/providers/{id}.
// Refused when at least one user has authenticated via this provider.
func (h *AuthSessionOIDCHandler) DeleteProvider(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
caller, err := callerFromRequest(r)
if err != nil {
writeAuthError(w, err)
return
}
id := r.PathValue("id")
if id == "" {
Error(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "missing provider id")
return
}
if derr := h.providerRepo.Delete(r.Context(), id); derr != nil {
switch {
case errors.Is(derr, repository.ErrOIDCProviderNotFound):
Error(w, http.StatusNotFound, "provider not found")
case errors.Is(derr, repository.ErrOIDCProviderInUse):
Error(w, http.StatusConflict, "provider has authenticated users; revoke all sessions before delete")
default:
Error(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "could not delete provider")
}
return
}
h.recordAudit(r.Context(), "auth.oidc_provider_deleted", caller.ActorID, caller.ActorType, id,
map[string]interface{}{"provider_id": id})
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusNoContent)
}
// TestProvider handles POST /api/v1/auth/oidc/test.
//
// Audit 2026-05-10 MED-5 closure. Dry-run validator for an OIDC
// provider config: runs OIDC discovery, the alg-downgrade defense,
// the RFC 9207 iss-parameter detection, and a JWKS fetch — without
// persisting anything. Body: `{issuer_url, client_id, scopes}`
// (client_secret accepted but ignored — discovery + JWKS don't
// require it). Response: TestDiscoveryResult; HTTP 200 even when
// individual checks fail (the response Errors field carries them so
// the GUI can render per-check status rows).
//
// Permission gate: `auth.oidc.create` (the operator is dry-running a
// provider they're about to create; the lookup endpoints have their
// own .list gate so this can't be used as a roundabout reconnaissance
// vector beyond what those already permit).
func (h *AuthSessionOIDCHandler) TestProvider(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
caller, err := callerFromRequest(r)
if err != nil {
writeAuthError(w, err)
return
}
var req struct {
IssuerURL string `json:"issuer_url"`
ClientID string `json:"client_id"`
ClientSecret string `json:"client_secret"`
Scopes []string `json:"scopes"`
}
if derr := json.NewDecoder(r.Body).Decode(&req); derr != nil {
Error(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "invalid JSON body")
return
}
if strings.TrimSpace(req.IssuerURL) == "" {
Error(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "issuer_url is required")
return
}
// Type-assert to the concrete service so we can reach the
// TestDiscovery method. The OIDCAuthHandshaker interface is
// intentionally narrow; rather than widening it (which would force
// every test stub to implement TestDiscovery) we accept the
// concrete reference for this single endpoint. Production code
// always supplies *oidcsvc.Service.
type discoveryTester interface {
TestDiscovery(ctx context.Context, issuerURL string) (*oidcsvc.TestDiscoveryResult, error)
}
tester, ok := h.oidcSvc.(discoveryTester)
if !ok {
Error(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "OIDC service does not support discovery test")
return
}
res, terr := tester.TestDiscovery(r.Context(), strings.TrimSpace(req.IssuerURL))
if terr != nil {
Error(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "discovery test execution failed")
return
}
h.recordAudit(r.Context(), "auth.oidc_provider_tested", caller.ActorID, caller.ActorType, "",
map[string]interface{}{
"issuer_url": req.IssuerURL,
"discovery_succeeded": res.DiscoverySucceeded,
"jwks_reachable": res.JWKSReachable,
"iss_param_supported": res.IssParamSupported,
"error_count": len(res.Errors),
})
writeJSON(w, http.StatusOK, res)
}
// RefreshProvider handles POST /api/v1/auth/oidc/providers/{id}/refresh.
// Forces re-fetch of the IdP discovery doc + JWKS, re-runs the IdP
// downgrade-attack defense.
func (h *AuthSessionOIDCHandler) RefreshProvider(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
caller, err := callerFromRequest(r)
if err != nil {
writeAuthError(w, err)
return
}
id := r.PathValue("id")
if id == "" {
Error(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "missing provider id")
return
}
if rerr := h.oidcSvc.RefreshKeys(r.Context(), id); rerr != nil {
if errors.Is(rerr, repository.ErrOIDCProviderNotFound) {
Error(w, http.StatusNotFound, "provider not found")
return
}
Error(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "refresh failed: "+rerr.Error())
return
}
h.recordAudit(r.Context(), "auth.oidc_provider_refreshed", caller.ActorID, caller.ActorType, id,
map[string]interface{}{"provider_id": id})
writeJSON(w, http.StatusOK, map[string]interface{}{"refreshed": true})
}
type groupMappingResponse struct {
ID string `json:"id"`
ProviderID string `json:"provider_id"`
GroupName string `json:"group_name"`
RoleID string `json:"role_id"`
TenantID string `json:"tenant_id"`
CreatedAt string `json:"created_at"`
}
func mappingToResponse(m *oidcdomain.GroupRoleMapping) groupMappingResponse {
return groupMappingResponse{
ID: m.ID, ProviderID: m.ProviderID, GroupName: m.GroupName,
RoleID: m.RoleID, TenantID: m.TenantID,
CreatedAt: m.CreatedAt.UTC().Format(time.RFC3339),
}
}
type groupMappingRequest struct {
ProviderID string `json:"provider_id"`
GroupName string `json:"group_name"`
RoleID string `json:"role_id"`
}
// ListGroupMappings handles GET /api/v1/auth/oidc/group-mappings?provider_id=<id>.
func (h *AuthSessionOIDCHandler) ListGroupMappings(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
if _, err := callerFromRequest(r); err != nil {
writeAuthError(w, err)
return
}
providerID := strings.TrimSpace(r.URL.Query().Get("provider_id"))
if providerID == "" {
Error(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "missing required query parameter `provider_id`")
return
}
mappings, lerr := h.mappingRepo.ListByProvider(r.Context(), providerID)
if lerr != nil {
Error(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "could not list mappings")
return
}
out := make([]groupMappingResponse, 0, len(mappings))
for _, m := range mappings {
out = append(out, mappingToResponse(m))
}
writeJSON(w, http.StatusOK, map[string]interface{}{"mappings": out})
}
// AddGroupMapping handles POST /api/v1/auth/oidc/group-mappings.
func (h *AuthSessionOIDCHandler) AddGroupMapping(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
caller, err := callerFromRequest(r)
if err != nil {
writeAuthError(w, err)
return
}
var req groupMappingRequest
if derr := json.NewDecoder(r.Body).Decode(&req); derr != nil {
Error(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "invalid JSON body")
return
}
mapping := &oidcdomain.GroupRoleMapping{
ID: "grm-" + randomB64URLForHandler(16),
ProviderID: req.ProviderID,
GroupName: req.GroupName,
RoleID: req.RoleID,
TenantID: h.tenantID,
}
if verr := mapping.Validate(); verr != nil {
Error(w, http.StatusBadRequest, verr.Error())
return
}
if aerr := h.mappingRepo.Add(r.Context(), mapping); aerr != nil {
if errors.Is(aerr, repository.ErrGroupRoleMappingDuplicate) {
Error(w, http.StatusConflict, "mapping already exists")
return
}
Error(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "could not add mapping")
return
}
h.recordAudit(r.Context(), "auth.group_mapping_added", caller.ActorID, caller.ActorType, mapping.ID,
map[string]interface{}{
"mapping_id": mapping.ID, "provider_id": mapping.ProviderID,
"group_name": mapping.GroupName, "role_id": mapping.RoleID,
})
writeJSON(w, http.StatusCreated, mappingToResponse(mapping))
}
// RemoveGroupMapping handles DELETE /api/v1/auth/oidc/group-mappings/{id}.
func (h *AuthSessionOIDCHandler) RemoveGroupMapping(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
caller, err := callerFromRequest(r)
if err != nil {
writeAuthError(w, err)
return
}
id := r.PathValue("id")
if id == "" {
Error(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "missing mapping id")
return
}
if rerr := h.mappingRepo.Remove(r.Context(), id); rerr != nil {
if errors.Is(rerr, repository.ErrGroupRoleMappingNotFound) {
Error(w, http.StatusNotFound, "mapping not found")
return
}
Error(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "could not remove mapping")
return
}
h.recordAudit(r.Context(), "auth.group_mapping_removed", caller.ActorID, caller.ActorType, id,
map[string]interface{}{"mapping_id": id})
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusNoContent)
}