certctl/CHANGELOG.md

# Changelog

## Unreleased

### Breaking changes (scheduled for v2.2.0)

- **SEC-H1 staged: `CERTCTL_AGENT_BOOTSTRAP_TOKEN_DENY_EMPTY` opt-in flag.**
  Phase 2 of the architecture diligence remediation (2026-05-13) introduces
  a new env var that, when set to `true`, makes the server refuse to start
  unless `CERTCTL_AGENT_BOOTSTRAP_TOKEN` is also set to a real value.
  Default in this release: `false` (preserves the v2.1.x warn-mode
  pass-through behavior for backward compatibility). Default flip to
  `true` is scheduled for v2.2.0 per `WORKSPACE-ROADMAP.md`.

  **Operator action before the v2.2.0 upgrade:** generate a real
  bootstrap token (`openssl rand -base64 32`) and set
  `CERTCTL_AGENT_BOOTSTRAP_TOKEN` in your env. When v2.2.0 ships, the
  deny-empty default flips to `true` and a missing or empty token will
  fail closed at boot. Operators with the token already set: no action
  required.

- **SEC-M4: `CERTCTL_ACME_INSECURE` now requires explicit ACK.**
  Pre-Phase-2, `CERTCTL_ACME_INSECURE=true` produced only a boot-time
  WARN log. Post-Phase-2 (THIS release), the server refuses to start
  unless `CERTCTL_ACME_INSECURE_ACK=true` is set alongside it. ACME
  directory TLS verification is the load-bearing defense against a
  network attacker intercepting ACME enrollment; the existing flag was
  too easy to flip via a copy-pasted Pebble runbook.

  **Operator action:** if you intentionally run against a self-signed
  ACME server (Pebble, step-ca, internal dev), add
  `CERTCTL_ACME_INSECURE_ACK=true` to your env. Production deploys
  MUST never set either flag.

- **SEC-H3: `CERTCTL_DEMO_MODE_ACK` is no longer sticky — 24h re-ack required.**
  Pre-Phase-2, setting `CERTCTL_DEMO_MODE_ACK=true` was sticky for the
  lifetime of the container. Post-Phase-2, operators must ALSO set
  `CERTCTL_DEMO_MODE_ACK_TS=$(date +%s)` to a unix epoch within the
  last 24h. The next container restart past 24h refuses to start
  unless a fresh TS is supplied. Catches the "forgotten demo deployment
  promoted to production" failure mode.

  **Operator action:** demo deploys must set `CERTCTL_DEMO_MODE_ACK_TS`
  at every `docker compose up`. The demo Compose helper script handles
  this automatically when wired; standalone demo deploys add it
  manually. Production deploys: this guard is irrelevant
  (`CERTCTL_DEMO_MODE_ACK` should not be set in production).

### Fixed

- **GitHub #13 / Hotfix #19 — GUI "Something went wrong" after browser
  refresh on a real (non-demo) install.** Refresh-after-login wipes the
  in-memory `apiKey` (deliberate — the GUI never persists it to
  localStorage as a security posture). The next API call returns a
  bare 401 with no `WWW-Authenticate` header. Pre-Hotfix-19 the
  AuthProvider 401 handler only hard-navigated to `/login` when `cause`
  was a recognised OIDC session-expiry category (`idle_timeout` /
  `absolute_timeout` / `back_channel_revoked`); bare 401s
  (`cause === ''`) and `invalid_token` causes fell through to an
  in-place `AuthGate` state flip that unmounted `BrowserRouter` under
  an in-flight `<Link>`, triggering a `react-router-dom` invariant
  that surfaced via `ErrorBoundary` as the "Something went wrong"
  screen. **Fix:** every 401 now hard-navigates to `/login` regardless
  of cause; the cause-aware UX is preserved by forwarding
  `?session_expired=<cause>` only when cause is non-empty (bare 401s
  redirect to plain `/login`). Three-line change in
  `web/src/components/AuthProvider.tsx`; 4 regression tests added to
  `AuthProvider.test.tsx` (empty cause from `/targets`, `invalid_token`
  cause, `idle_timeout` cause, already-on-`/login` no-op guard).
  Closes #13.

### Security

- **Alg-downgrade defense relaxed for Keycloak-shape IdPs (v2.1.0 pre-tag fix).**
  Pre-fix, the IdP-bind alg-downgrade check at `internal/auth/oidc/service.go`
  refused to load any OIDC provider whose discovery doc advertised HS256 /
  HS384 / HS512 / `none` in `id_token_signing_alg_values_supported` —
  even if RS256 was ALSO advertised. This broke binding against
  Keycloak 26.x (and a handful of other real IdPs) which list every alg
  the codebase is capable of in their discovery doc, regardless of which
  one the realm actually signs with. The v2.1.0 Phase-10 live-IdP smoke
  surfaced the regression: 6 testcontainers-Keycloak integration tests
  failed with `oidc: IdP advertises weak signing algorithms (HS*/none); refusing to use as defense against downgrade attacks: HS256`.
  **Fix:** the check now refuses only when the intersection of advertised
  vs `DefaultAllowedAlgs` is EMPTY — an IdP advertising HS256 alongside
  RS256 binds successfully, but an IdP advertising HS-only / none-only
  still fails closed. The per-token alg pin at sig-verify time
  (`isDisallowedAlg`, service.go ~L1177) remains the load-bearing defense
  against the actual algorithm-confusion attack (forged HS256 token
  signed with the IdP's RS256 pubkey as HMAC secret) — go-oidc/v3's
  verifier rejects any token whose `alg` header isn't in the configured
  allow-list, regardless of what the discovery doc claims. Updates:
  `Service.getOrLoad` alg-check loop rewritten to compute intersection;
  `ErrIdPDowngradeAdvertised` docstring reflects new semantics;
  `TestDiscovery` dry-run validator surfaces HS*/none alongside RS* as
  an informational note (not a hard fail); `docs/operator/auth-threat-model.md`
  alg-allow-list section updated to call out the load-bearing-defense
  hierarchy. Tests: `TestService_IdPDowngradeDefense_RS256PlusHS256_BindsSuccessfully`
  (positive — Keycloak-shape) + `TestService_IdPDowngradeDefense_RejectsHSOnlyAdvertised`
  (negative — pathological intersection-empty case) +
  `TestService_RefreshKeys_CatchesPostLoadDowngrade` updated to assert
  intersection-empty post-rotation; `TestTestDiscovery_AlgDowngrade_HS256AlongsideRS256_BindsWithNote`
  + `TestTestDiscovery_AlgDowngrade_HSOnly_StillTrips_HardFail` pin the
  dry-run validator's new behavior.

### Tests

- **Vitest coverage for the 2026-05-10/11 GUI batch (Audit 2026-05-11 Fix 12).**
  The original GUI-batch commit `661b6db` claimed `npx tsc --noEmit PASS`
  but shipped no Vitest cases for the new surfaces. The regression-
  prevention layer was missing — a future refactor of `KeysPage`'s
  assign modal could silently drop scope_type handling, the LOW-1 demo
  banner could be hidden by a stray predicate flip, the LOW-11 hide of
  the delete button on default roles could disappear and let operators
  click straight into a backend 409, and nothing would surface in CI.
  This closure adds 35 new test cases across five files:
  `web/src/pages/auth/UsersPage.test.tsx` (new, 8 cases pinning the
  active/deactivated/reactivate flow + provider filter + empty state +
  loading state), `web/src/pages/auth/AuthSettingsPage.test.tsx`
  (extended +4 cases pinning the MED-12 runtime-config panel —
  alphabetical sort, `(empty)` placeholder, 403 silent-hide),
  `web/src/pages/auth/KeysPage.test.tsx` (extended +8 cases pinning
  the HIGH-10 GUI half — scope_type=global/profile/issuer body shape,
  expires_at omission vs RFC3339 promotion, whitespace-only scope_id
  rejection, demo-anon row mutation-button hide),
  `web/src/pages/auth/RoleDetailPage.test.tsx` (new, 9 cases pinning
  the MED-8 scope picker + the LOW-11 default-role delete-button hide
  via the `DEFAULT_ROLE_IDS` set against `r-admin` + `r-auditor`),
  `web/src/components/AuthProvider.test.tsx` (new, 5 cases pinning the
  LOW-1 demo-banner visibility predicate — `authType==='none' &&
  !loading` — across happy/api-key/oidc/loading/rejected branches; the
  rejected-fetch path keeps the banner visible because the catch
  treats it as an old-server-fallback to demo-mode, and that behavior
  is pinned here so a future change surfaces in the diff). 40/40
  test-file-scoped pass; `tsc --noEmit` clean.

### Security

- **CSRF rotation on logout closes HIGH-2 fourth call site (Audit 2026-05-11 Fix 13).**
  The HIGH-2 closure (`dev/auth-bundle-2`) documented four
  `RotateCSRFTokenForActor` call sites: login completion (fresh by
  construction), Assign/RevokeRole on role-mutation (wired), Logout, and
  an explicit operator endpoint. The 2026-05-11 review verified only 3
  of the 4 — Logout did NOT rotate the actor's sibling sessions
  post-revoke, leaving a window where a token captured pre-logout
  (browser DevTools, malicious extension, session-storage leak) could
  be replayed against the user's other-device/other-browser sessions
  until those sessions hit their own idle/absolute expiry.
  `SessionMinter` interface extended with `RotateCSRFTokenForActor`;
  `Logout` invokes it after `Revoke(sess.ID)` succeeds. The
  `auth.session_revoked` audit row gains a `csrf_rotated` detail key
  carrying the rotated count so SOC / SIEM can correlate logout events
  with CSRF churn. The no-cookie + invalid-cookie 204 short-circuit
  paths skip rotation (no session row to rotate against). 3 regression
  tests in `internal/api/handler/auth_session_oidc_test.go` pin the
  happy path + the two short-circuit branches. The explicit operator
  endpoint (4) remains intentionally unbuilt — the three automatic
  triggers (login + role-mutation + logout) cover the threat model;
  operators who want a nuclear option can use the existing
  `RevokeAllForActor` flow which forces re-login → fresh session →
  fresh CSRF. **HIGH-2 fully closed across all four documented call
  sites.**

- **Demo-mode residual-grants detector + cleanup endpoint + CI guard (Audit 2026-05-11 A-8).**
  HIGH-12 (closure `b81588e`) added a fail-closed bind-address guard
  that refuses startup when `CERTCTL_AUTH_TYPE=none` binds non-loopback
  without `CERTCTL_DEMO_MODE_ACK=true`. The Phase 2 leg of that spec —
  production-startup banner when `actor-demo-anon` has residual role
  grants in `actor_roles` plus a CI guard banning new synthetic-admin
  code paths — was deferred. This closure lands all three deferred
  legs. (1) `cmd/server/preflight_demo_residual.go` runs after the DB
  is open + audit service is constructed, before the HTTPS listener
  starts; under any non-`none` auth type it queries `actor_roles` for
  `actor-demo-anon` and emits a WARN log + `auth.demo_residual_grants_detected`
  audit row when the row is present. The migration 000029 baseline
  unconditionally seeds the `ar-demo-anon-admin` row at install time,
  so EVERY production deploy will see this WARN on first boot — the
  intended cutover workflow is documented at `docs/operator/security.md`.
  (2) `POST /api/v1/auth/demo-residual/cleanup` is an admin-class
  (`auth.role.assign`) cleanup endpoint that removes every
  `actor-demo-anon` row from `actor_roles` and returns
  `{"removed": <int64>}`; idempotent (a second call returns
  `removed:0`), refuses 503 under `Auth.Type=none` (deleting the row
  would break the demo path), audit-logs every invocation. (3) New
  env var `CERTCTL_DEMO_MODE_RESIDUAL_STRICT` (default `false`)
  pivots the WARN to fail-closed startup refusal for operators who
  want a paranoid hostile-environment posture. (4) CI guard
  `scripts/ci-guards/no-new-synthetic-admin.sh` pins the 17-entry
  allowlist of source files that may reference the `actor-demo-anon`
  literal; new runtime code paths that resolve to the synthetic actor
  are rejected at PR time so the credibility gap stays closed. The
  closure was framed as "credibility gap, not exploitable
  vulnerability" — the residue requires a regression elsewhere in the
  middleware chain to be exploitable. After this fix, the canonical
  acquisition-readiness narrative ("RBAC primitive with no
  synthetic-admin fallback") is fully true. Operator runbook at
  `docs/operator/security.md#demo-to-production-cutover-audit-2026-05-11-a-8`.

- **OIDC provider "Test connection" panel (Audit 2026-05-11 Fix 09 — MED-5 GUI half).**
  MED-5's backend dry-run endpoint (`POST /api/v1/auth/oidc/test`, gated
  `auth.oidc.create`) shipped on `dev/auth-bundle-2` but had no GUI caller —
  the `authOIDCTestProvider` function in `web/src/api/client.ts` was dead
  code. Operators had to complete the create form blind, save, then click
  "Refresh" to discover whether the issuer URL worked; failures left a
  broken provider row in the database that had to be deleted before
  retrying. New shared component
  `web/src/pages/auth/OIDCTestConnectionPanel.tsx` calls the backend
  against the live form state and renders a four-row status panel inline:
  Discovery fetched, JWKS reachable, supported algs (warns when the IdP
  advertises none), and RFC 9207 iss-parameter advertisement (informational
  `·` glyph, not ✗, because the spec is SHOULD). Backend per-leg `errors[]`
  flow into an inline bullet list. The panel is mounted in the
  OIDCProvidersPage create modal AND the OIDCProviderDetailPage edit form —
  the edit-form half is load-bearing for verifying IdP rotations (Keycloak
  realm rename, Okta tenant move) without committing first. Run button is
  disabled until the issuer URL is non-empty (whitespace-trimmed); the
  component is read-only — safe to run repeatedly. 8 Vitest tests pin the
  glyph-vs-glyph contract (✓/✗/⚠/·), the button-disabled-without-issuer
  shape, and the test-id-suffix collision-prevention when the panel is
  mounted twice on the same page.

- **OIDC JWKS health panel + Refresh-now button (Audit 2026-05-11 Fix 10 — MED-7 GUI half).**
  MED-7's backend endpoint `GET /api/v1/auth/oidc/providers/{id}/jwks-status`
  (commit `d85114f`) shipped the per-provider verifier counters on
  `dev/auth-bundle-2` but the GUI never called it. The audit doc had
  prematurely flipped the row to CLOSED; `authOIDCJWKSStatus` in the
  API client was dead code. Operators investigating "why is login
  failing for this IdP" couldn't see `last_refresh_at`,
  `rejected_jws_count`, or `last_error` from the GUI — they had to
  drop to curl. New shared component
  `web/src/pages/auth/OIDCJWKSStatusPanel.tsx` queries the endpoint
  via TanStack Query (30s `staleTime`, `retry: 0` so a 403 hides the
  panel silently for callers without `auth.oidc.list`) and renders
  six dt/dd rows: Last refresh (with `(never — cold cache)` sentinel
  when the timestamp is empty), Refresh count, Rejected JWS count,
  Last error (red treatment when non-empty, `(none)` sentinel
  otherwise), RFC 9207 iss param ("supported by IdP" / "not
  advertised"), and Current KIDs (`(not exposed — query jwks_uri
  directly)` sentinel when the backend declines to expose the list).
  A "Refresh now" button invokes the existing
  `POST .../refresh` (RefreshKeys path) and invalidates the panel's
  query so the freshly-updated counters render without a page
  reload. The button is hidden for callers without `auth.oidc.edit`
  via the panel's optional `canRefresh` prop. Mounted on
  `OIDCProviderDetailPage.tsx` between the read-only field display
  and the Actions section. 9 Vitest tests pin: loading state,
  happy-path-all-six-rows, 403-hides-panel, refresh-invalidates-
  query, refresh-failure-surfaces-inline-without-hiding-panel,
  never-refreshed-cold-cache-sentinel, current-kids-empty-not-
  exposed-sentinel, last-error-red-treatment, and canRefresh=false-
  hides-the-button.

- **UsersPage sidebar nav entry (Audit 2026-05-11 Fix 11 — MED-11
  discoverability).** The MED-11 closure shipped `UsersPage.tsx` + wired
  the `/auth/users` route in `web/src/main.tsx`, but the sidebar
  navigation never gained a corresponding entry. Operators reached the
  federated-user-admin surface (used during compliance audits — "show
  me last login for every IdP-federated user") only by knowing the URL.
  A page that exists but isn't navigable is a half-finished page. New
  Users entry under the Auth section in `web/src/components/Layout.tsx`
  sits between Sessions and Roles (federated-identity grouping). Three
  Vitest tests in `Layout.test.tsx` pin the link's presence, the
  `/auth/users` destination, and the DOM ordering relative to Sessions
  so a future refactor that re-orders or removes the entry surfaces in
  the diff.

- **Scope-aware actor-role revoke (Audit 2026-05-11 A-4).**
  HIGH-10 made it possible to grant the same role to the same actor at
  multiple scopes (e.g. `r-operator` on `profile=p-acme` AND `profile=p-globex`)
  via the unique constraint extension on `actor_roles`, but
  `ActorRoleRepository.Revoke` ignored `(scope_type, scope_id)` and
  unconditionally deleted every variant. Operators who wanted to drop
  one scoped grant had to nuke them all and re-grant the remainder —
  a race window where the actor's access was briefly different. The
  `DELETE /v1/auth/keys/{id}/roles/{role_id}` endpoint now accepts
  optional `?scope_type=` / `?scope_id=` query params that narrow the
  revoke to a single variant; no-match returns 404. The legacy "revoke
  every variant" semantic is preserved when the query params are
  absent, so existing CLI / GUI buttons keep working unchanged. The
  audit row's `details` payload records which mode fired so SOC / SIEM
  can distinguish wide cleanups from targeted demotions. MCP tool
  `certctl_auth_revoke_role_from_key` gains optional `scope_type` +
  `scope_id` input fields with matching semantics. Documented in
  `docs/operator/rbac.md` under "Revoke: legacy 'all variants' vs
  scope-selective."

### Security (BREAKING — silent-elevation closure)

- **HIGH-10 actor-role scope is now enforced (Audit 2026-05-11 A-1).**
  Pre-fix, `actor_roles.scope_type` / `scope_id` (added in migration 000043
  by the HIGH-10 closure) were persisted by Grant + accepted on the handler
  body + surfaced through the GUI/MCP — but the load-bearing
  `EffectivePermissions` SQL never read them. A profile-scoped grant
  silently elevated to global at authorization time. Canonical CRIT-5
  lying-field shape, replicated. **The post-fix authorization narrows
  correctly**: every existing `actor_roles` row with `scope_type != 'global'`
  now takes effect.

  > **Operator advisory:** if you used the HIGH-10 scope-bound role-grant
  > API between commit `551812b` and the v2.1.0 tag (the column was
  > populated but ignored), the grants were silently global. After
  > upgrading, audit `SELECT actor_id, role_id, scope_type, scope_id FROM
  > actor_roles WHERE scope_type != 'global'` and confirm the narrowing
  > reflects intent. If an actor was granted a scoped role but expected
  > global behavior, re-grant with `scope_type=global`.

### Security (BREAKING)

- **Federated-user deactivation now actually blocks login (Audit 2026-05-11 A-2).**
  The MED-11 closure shipped `users.deactivated_at` + `DELETE /api/v1/auth/users/{id}`
  + cascade-session-revoke, but the column was a "lying field" three legs over: the
  postgres user repository never SELECTed it (so `User.DeactivatedAt` always read
  nil), the `Update` SQL never wrote it (so the handler's mutation was a no-op),
  and the OIDC `upsertUser` path never checked it (so the next login under the
  same `(provider, subject)` tuple re-minted a session and re-elevated the user).
  The cascade-revoke remained correct for the current cookie only. **Operator
  advisory: if you deactivated a federated user between the MED-11 closure
  (Bundle 2 merge `dea5053`) and the v2.1.0 release tag, verify the user cannot
  OIDC-log-in after upgrading — the column took no effect at login time before
  this fix. If needed, re-run the deactivation against the upgraded server.**
  Closure: `userColumns` + `scanUser` now read `deactivated_at` via `sql.NullTime`;
  `Create` + `Update` write it explicitly; `upsertUser` returns the new
  `ErrUserDeactivated` sentinel before mutating fields (preserves `last_login_at`
  forensics on rejected logins); `classifyOIDCFailure` surfaces the rejection
  as audit category `user_deactivated`. Self-deactivate guard on
  `DELETE /api/v1/auth/users/{id}` returns HTTP 409 + audit row
  `auth.user_deactivate_self_rejected` (prevents an admin from one-way-door
  locking themselves out via the standard handler — break-glass remains the
  recovery path). New inverse endpoint `POST /api/v1/auth/users/{id}/reactivate`
  (gated `auth.user.deactivate` — reactivation is the inverse op, not a separate
  privilege) clears `deactivated_at`; emits audit row `auth.user_reactivated`.
  Sessions revoked at deactivation stay revoked across reactivation — the user
  must complete a fresh OIDC login. GUI: `UsersPage.tsx` now renders a Reactivate
  button on deactivated rows. CWE-862 (missing authorization at the user-state
  boundary). SOC 2 CC6.3 + ISO 27001 A.9.2.6 compliance-table-flipping fix.
- **`__Host-` cookie prefix on all three auth cookies (Audit 2026-05-10 MED-14).**
  The session cookie, CSRF cookie, and OIDC pre-login cookie are renamed from
  `certctl_session` / `certctl_csrf` / `certctl_oidc_pending` to
  `__Host-certctl_session` / `__Host-certctl_csrf` / `__Host-certctl_oidc_pending`
  to gain browser-enforced subdomain-takeover protection (a `__Host-*` cookie can
  only be set with `Path=/` + `Secure` + no `Domain` attribute, and the browser
  rejects subdomain attempts to overwrite it). **Active sessions invalidate on
  the rolling deploy that lands this change** — operators must re-authenticate
  once after upgrading. The GUI's CSRF cookie reader was updated in lockstep.
  See `docs/migration/oidc-enable.md` for operator-facing detail.

### Security

- **OIDC `allowed_email_domains` now editable in the GUI (Audit 2026-05-11 A-3).**
  The backend gate that rejects logins whose email domain is outside the
  configured allowlist landed in v2.1.0 (CRIT-5 closure, 2026-05-10), but the
  GUI never exposed the field — GUI-driven operators had to use the API
  directly to configure tenant isolation against multi-tenant IdPs (Auth0,
  Azure AD common endpoint, Google Workspace). The OIDCProvidersPage create
  modal and OIDCProviderDetailPage detail view now render a chip-style
  multi-input with client-side validation that mirrors the backend rules
  (no `@`, no whitespace, no wildcards, lowercase-only FQDNs). The read-only
  view renders an explicit "any (no gate configured)" sentinel when the list
  is empty so operators can tell "not configured" apart from "field is
  invisible." A "Clear all" button on the edit form is gated by a confirm
  dialog that warns about removing the tenant gate. **Operator advisory: if
  you provisioned OIDC providers via the GUI between v2.1.0 and this fix,
  verify `allowed_email_domains` matches your tenant policy — the field was
  configurable only via API / MCP / direct SQL during that window.** Per-IdP
  runbooks for multi-tenant IdPs in `docs/operator/oidc-runbooks/` already
  documented the field; the GUI now matches.

- **Approval payload preview (Audit 2026-05-11 A-5).**
  The MED-10 closure claim ("PARTIAL: raw JSON preview; diff library
  deferred") was inaccurate — `ApprovalsPage.tsx` rendered no payload
  at all, so approvers were clicking Approve / Reject without seeing
  the change they were authorizing. That defeats the entire four-eyes
  primitive: an approver who can't see what they're approving is
  rubber-stamping. Each row now carries a Preview toggle that expands
  an inline panel dispatching by kind: `profile_edit` shows a
  field-level before/after diff (changed-only rows, red/green cells,
  `(unset)` sentinel for added/removed fields); `cert_issuance` shows
  a definition list of CN / SANs / profile / key algo / must-staple /
  validity (catches the wildcard-against-corp-internal-profile attack
  at review time); unknown kinds render a generic JSON preview for
  forward-compat with future approval kinds. The base64-encoded JSON
  payload is decoded via the new `decodePayload` helper; malformed
  inputs render an explicit decode-error fallback — silent failure on
  the payload preview is what produced this bug in the first place.

- **Strict pre-login UA/IP binding (Audit 2026-05-11 A-6).**
  The MED-16 closure left a request-side empty-header bypass: when the
  pre-login row carried a User-Agent or client-IP binding but the
  `/auth/oidc/callback` request omitted the corresponding value, the
  binding check was silently skipped. `curl` doesn't send User-Agent
  by default; many programmatic clients omit it. An attacker who
  acquired a pre-login cookie could replay it without the bound
  header and bypass the RFC 9700 §4.7.1 defense. The check is now
  strict-when-stored — an empty request-side value with a non-empty
  stored binding rejects with HTTP 400 and the new audit failure
  categories `prelogin_ua_missing` / `prelogin_ip_missing` (distinct
  from the existing `*_mismatch` categories so SIEM rules can alert
  specifically on bypass attempts). **Operator advisory:** environments
  where the User-Agent is stripped in transit (some debug proxies, a
  handful of CDN configurations) must set
  `CERTCTL_OIDC_PRELOGIN_REQUIRE_UA=false` to keep logins working;
  symmetric `CERTCTL_OIDC_PRELOGIN_REQUIRE_IP=false` exists for the
  IP-side. The legacy-row compat window — pre-migration rows with no
  stored binding — still passes through unchecked, but that window is
  bounded by the 10-minute pre-login TTL.

- **OIDC provider Advanced fields are now editable in the GUI (Audit 2026-05-11 A-7).**
  The MED-4 row had been DEFERRED to v3 with the rationale "backend
  already accepts these fields." The verifier hit the GUI and found
  that the read-only display claimed the values were editable, but the
  edit form had no inputs — the save handler passed `provider.scopes`
  / `provider.groups_claim_path` / `provider.groups_claim_format` /
  `provider.iat_window_seconds` / `provider.jwks_cache_ttl_seconds`
  unchanged from the loaded object. Operators who wanted to bump the
  IAT window or change the groups-claim path had to drop to curl /
  MCP and trust the GUI's display matched what they'd set elsewhere.
  Lying UX. The OIDCProviderDetailPage edit form now has a collapsible
  Advanced section with five inputs (scopes as a space-separated text
  field; groups-claim path; groups-claim format select with the
  backend's `string-array` / `json-path` enum; IAT window number input
  bounded 1–600; JWKS cache TTL number input with floor 60). Client-side
  validation mirrors the backend `Validate` rules so common operator
  mistakes (IAT > 600, JWKS TTL < 60, empty scopes, empty groups-claim-path)
  reject inline instead of round-tripping a 400. The read-only `<dl>`
  also gained the previously-invisible `jwks_cache_ttl_seconds` row.

- **Pre-login cookie Path widened from `/auth/oidc/` to `/` (Audit MED-14
  follow-on).** Required to satisfy the `__Host-` prefix's `Path=/` rule. The
  cookie lifetime is unchanged (10 minutes) and only the callback handler
  consumes it; the wider path scope is harmless.

- **RFC 9207 `iss` URL parameter check on OIDC callback (Audit 2026-05-10
  MED-17).** When the matched IdP's discovery doc advertises
  `authorization_response_iss_parameter_supported: true`, certctl now requires
  the `iss` query parameter on `/auth/oidc/callback` and enforces a
  constant-time compare against the configured provider's `IssuerURL`. Mismatch
  rejects with HTTP 400; the audit row's `failure_category` distinguishes
  `iss_param_missing` / `iss_param_mismatch` (RFC 9207 leg) from the existing
  `id_token_iss_mismatch` (in-token iss claim leg). Closes the mix-up-attack
  defense for modern Keycloak, Authentik, and public-trust CAs that ship
  RFC-9207 discovery. Providers that don't advertise support (the majority
  today) keep pre-fix behavior — back-compat is preserved.

- **Auth GUI batch (Audit 2026-05-10 MED-4/7/8/10/11/12 + LOW-1/11/12 +
  HIGH-10 GUI).** New backend endpoints land alongside their GUI
  consumers: `GET /api/v1/auth/users` + `DELETE /api/v1/auth/users/{id}`
  (auth.user.read / auth.user.deactivate; migration 000045 adds
  `users.deactivated_at` plus the two new permissions); `GET
  /api/v1/auth/runtime-config` (auth.role.assign) returning a sanitized
  flat-map of deployed CERTCTL_* values (no secrets leaked — only
  set/unset booleans and counts); `GET
  /api/v1/auth/oidc/providers/{id}/jwks-status` (auth.oidc.list)
  returning the per-provider verifier counters (refresh count, last
  refresh / error timestamps, rejected JWS count, RFC 9207 iss-param
  flag). New `UsersPage` lists federated identities + soft-deactivates.
  `AuthSettingsPage` gains the runtime-config panel. `KeysPage`'s
  assign-role modal now collects `scope_type` / `scope_id` /
  `expires_at`. `RoleDetailPage`'s add-permission form gains the same
  scope picker, and the Delete button is hidden on the 7 default
  system roles (server already rejected, this is pure UX).
  `AuthProvider` renders a sticky red demo-mode banner when
  `auth_type=none`. `actor-demo-anon` rows on `KeysPage` already had
  buttons disabled.

- **11 new MCP tools (Audit 2026-05-10 MED-13).** Approval workflow
  (`certctl_approval_list` / `_get` / `_approve` / `_reject`), break-glass
  credential admin (`certctl_breakglass_list` / `_set_password` /
  `_unlock` / `_remove`), bootstrap status + consume
  (`certctl_bootstrap_status` / `_consume`), and audit category filter
  (`certctl_audit_list_with_category`). All route through the existing
  HTTP client so server-side permission gates fire unchanged.
  `certctl_bootstrap_consume`'s tool description carries an explicit
  "NEVER WIRE THIS TO AUTONOMOUS OPERATION" warning — a leaked
  bootstrap token mints a fresh admin API key bypassing every other
  access-control gate, so the tool is for one-shot manual operator
  invocation only.

- **JWKS auto-refresh on cache-miss (Audit 2026-05-10 MED-6).** When
  the IdP rotates its signing key between pre-login + callback, the
  cached JWKS no longer contains the kid referenced by the inbound ID
  token's JWS header. Pre-fix, the verify failed with a generic error
  and the operator had to manually call `POST
  /api/v1/auth/oidc/providers/{id}/refresh`. The service now detects
  the kid-not-in-cache shape (`isKidMismatchError`) and runs a
  one-shot `RefreshKeys` (evict cache → re-fetch discovery + JWKS →
  re-run alg-downgrade defense) before retrying the verify exactly
  once. Bounded recovery: a second failure surfaces as
  `ErrJWKSUnreachable` per the original branches; no retry loop. A
  separate matcher (`isKidMismatchError`) is intentionally narrow
  so generic signature failures don't trigger refresh.

- **OIDC provider test endpoint (Audit 2026-05-10 MED-5).** New
  `POST /api/v1/auth/oidc/test` dry-runs an OIDC provider configuration
  without persisting: fetches the discovery doc, runs the alg-downgrade
  defense, detects RFC 9207 iss-parameter advertisement, and confirms
  JWKS reachability. Returns `TestDiscoveryResult{discovery_succeeded,
  jwks_reachable, supported_alg_values, iss_param_supported, errors[]}`
  so the GUI (forthcoming) can render per-check status rows. Per-leg
  failures ride in the response body's `errors` array; only a malformed
  request body trips 400. Gate: `auth.oidc.create`. Audit row
  `auth.oidc_provider_tested` carries the success/failure summary.

- **Pre-login UA / source-IP binding on OIDC callback (Audit 2026-05-10
  MED-16).** RFC 9700 §4.7.1 defense against stolen-pre-login-cookie replay
  by a different browser / source. Migration `000044_prelogin_uaip` adds
  `client_ip` + `user_agent` to `oidc_pre_login_sessions`; values captured at
  `/auth/oidc/login` are constant-time compared at `/auth/oidc/callback`.
  Mismatches return HTTP 400 with audit `failure_category` =
  `prelogin_ua_mismatch` or `prelogin_ip_mismatch`. Two operator escape
  hatches: `CERTCTL_OIDC_PRELOGIN_REQUIRE_UA` and
  `CERTCTL_OIDC_PRELOGIN_REQUIRE_IP` (both default `true`) — operators on
  enterprise proxies that rewrite UA, or dual-stack v4/v6 environments where
  source IP routinely flips, can disable the affected leg. The binding column
  is persisted even when enforcement is off, so retroactive forensics remain
  possible. Empty values on either side pass through (rolling-deploy +
  headless-proxy compat).

## v2.1.0 - Auth Bundles 1 + 2: RBAC primitive + OIDC SSO + sessions ⚠️

> **SECURITY: AUDIT YOUR API KEYS.**
>
> Bundle 1 ships role-based authorization. Every existing API key
> configured via `CERTCTL_API_KEYS_NAMED` (or the legacy
> `CERTCTL_AUTH_SECRET`) is mapped to the **r-admin role on the first
> upgrade boot** so existing automation keeps working unchanged. Most
> keys do NOT need full admin power; downgrade them before tagging
> the next release.
>
> Recommended post-upgrade flow:
>
> ```bash
> # 1. List every key with its current role:
> certctl-cli auth keys list
>
> # 2. Walk an interactive prompt that downgrades each key:
> certctl-cli auth keys scope-down
>
> # 3. Or get a heuristic suggestion based on 30 days of audit history:
> certctl-cli auth keys scope-down --suggest
> certctl-cli auth keys scope-down --suggest --apply   # applies the suggestion
>
> # 4. Or drive scope-down from a JSON config (Helm post-upgrade hook):
> certctl-cli auth keys scope-down --non-interactive ./scope-down.json
> ```
>
> The synthetic `actor-demo-anon` actor (used when
> `CERTCTL_AUTH_TYPE=none` is configured) is system-managed and
> excluded from the prompt loop.

What else changed in v2.1.0:

- **Audit 2026-05-10 CRIT-1 closure — wire-layer RBAC enforcement.**
  The Bundle 1 + Bundle 2 audit surfaced that the permission catalogue
  was enforced on ~24 admin-only routes only; the bulk of state-changing
  routes (`POST /api/v1/certificates`, `PUT /api/v1/profiles/{id}`,
  `DELETE /api/v1/issuers/{id}`, `POST /api/v1/agents/{id}/csr`, even
  `POST /api/v1/auth/roles` + `POST /api/v1/auth/keys/{id}/roles`) had
  no `rbacGate` wrap. A `r-viewer` Bearer was essentially `r-admin`
  minus five fine-grained verbs at the wire layer (CWE-862). This
  release wraps every state-changing + read endpoint with
  `rbacGate` (global scope) or `rbacGateScoped` (per-profile / per-
  issuer scope-bound grants), and adds an AST-level CI guard
  (`TestRouterRBACGateCoverage`) that fails when a new route is
  registered without enforcement. Catalogue extended via migration
  000039 with 30 permissions covering `cert.edit`, `job.*`,
  `approval.*`, `policy.*`, `team.*`, `owner.*`, `notification.*`,
  `discovery.*`, `network_scan.*`, `healthcheck.*`, `digest.*`,
  `verification.*`, `stats.read`, `metrics.read`. **AUDIT YOUR
  KEYS** (the scope-down call-out above) now translates to real
  reduction in blast radius. Auditor pin preserved at exactly
  `{audit.read, audit.export}`.

- **RBAC primitive shipped.** `tenants`, `roles`, `permissions`,
  `role_permissions`, `actor_roles` tables (migration 000029); 33-permission
  canonical catalogue; 7 default roles (`admin`, `operator`, `viewer`,
  `agent`, `mcp`, `cli`, `auditor`); per-handler permission gates via
  `auth.RequirePermission` middleware (replaces the legacy
  `IsAdmin` boolean check on the 5 admin-only handlers).
- **Day-0 admin bootstrap.** Set `CERTCTL_BOOTSTRAP_TOKEN` on a fresh
  deploy and POST a single curl call against `/api/v1/auth/bootstrap` to
  mint the first admin API key; one-shot, never logged, and locks
  closed once any admin actor exists. Migration 000031 ships the
  `api_keys` table that stores the SHA-256 hash; the plaintext is
  shown in the response body once and never persisted.
- **Auditor role split.** New `auditor` role holds only `audit.read`
  + `audit.export`. Compliance reviewers can read the audit trail
  without holding mutation power. Migration 000032 adds
  `audit_events.event_category` so auditors can filter to
  authentication-related events specifically.
- **`/v1/auth/check` enrichment.** Response now includes the actor's
  standing roles and effective permissions, so the GUI gates
  affordances from a single fetch on app boot.
- **Approval-bypass closure.** Edits to a profile that has (or
  would have) `RequiresApproval=true` now route through the
  `ApprovalService` two-person integrity gate (Phase 9). Migration
  000033 adds `approval_kind` + `payload` to
  `issuance_approval_requests` so cert-issuance and profile-edit
  approvals share the same workflow. Same-actor self-approve is
  rejected with `ErrApproveBySameActor` for both kinds. Closes the
  flip-flop loophole where an admin could disable approval, mutate,
  re-enable. Documented at
  [`docs/reference/profiles.md`](docs/reference/profiles.md).
- **GUI: Roles / API Keys / Auth Settings / Approvals queue.**
  Four new pages under `/auth/*` consume `/v1/auth/me` for
  permission-aware rendering. The Approvals queue blocks
  self-approve at the client layer (Approve/Reject buttons hidden
  when requested_by == current actor_id) on top of the server-side
  enforcement. AuditPage gains a category filter (cert_lifecycle /
  auth / config) for the auditor view.
- **MCP server gains 12 RBAC tools.** Operators driving certctl
  from Claude / VS Code / any MCP client get parity with the GUI
  + CLI. Each tool routes through the same HTTP handler; permission
  gates fire server-side.
- **OpenAPI catalogues every new route.** Every Bundle 1 endpoint
  ships with an `operationId`; the parity test guards against drift.
- **Coverage gates.** `internal/auth/` and `internal/service/auth/`
  now have ≥85% coverage floors in `.github/coverage-thresholds.yml`.
  The 12-path negative-test list from the Bundle 1 prompt is
  fully covered (path #12 deferred with in-tree TODO).
- **Protocol-endpoint allowlist pinned at three layers.** The
  middleware bypass (`auth.IsProtocolEndpoint`), the router-level
  `AuthExemptRouterRoutes` constant, and a new
  `phase12_protocol_allowlist_test.go` AST scan all guard against
  accidentally wrapping ACME / SCEP / EST / OCSP / CRL routes in
  `rbacGate`.
- **Bundle 2: OIDC + sessions + back-channel logout + break-glass.**
  Auth Bundle 2 ships in the same v2.1.0 release. Operators get OIDC
  SSO support for Keycloak / Authentik / Okta / Auth0 / Microsoft
  Entra ID / Google Workspace (via Keycloak broker), HMAC-signed
  session cookies with idle/absolute timeouts + CSRF defense,
  back-channel logout per OpenID Connect Back-Channel Logout 1.0,
  and a default-OFF break-glass admin path with Argon2id passwords
  for SSO-broken incidents. API-key auth keeps working unchanged
  alongside; existing automation needs no changes. Migration walkthrough
  at [`docs/migration/oidc-enable.md`](docs/migration/oidc-enable.md);
  per-IdP setup guides at
  [`docs/operator/oidc-runbooks/index.md`](docs/operator/oidc-runbooks/index.md).
- **OIDC token validation pinned at three layers.** Algorithm
  allow-list (RS256/RS512/ES256/ES384/EdDSA only) with HS-family + `none`
  rejected at the service-layer sentinel; IdP-downgrade-attack defense
  at provider creation AND every JWKS RefreshKeys (intersects the IdP's
  advertised `id_token_signing_alg_values_supported` against the allow-
  list, rejects providers that advertise weak algs even before any
  token is signed); OIDC Core §3.1.3.7 re-verification of `iss` /
  `aud` / `azp` / `at_hash` (REQUIRED-when-access_token-present per
  Phase 3 tightening of the spec MAY → MUST) / `exp` / `iat` window
  / `nonce` constant-time-compare. PKCE-S256 mandatory; `plain`
  rejected. Single-use state + nonce via atomic `DELETE...RETURNING`
  on consume.
- **Session cookies use length-prefixed HMAC.** The cookie wire format
  is `v1.<session_id>.<signing_key_id>.<base64url-no-pad(HMAC-SHA256)>`
  with HMAC input `len:sid:len:kid` (NOT bare-concat) to defeat
  concatenation collisions. `HttpOnly` + `Secure` + `SameSite=Lax`
  default; `SameSite=Strict` configurable via `CERTCTL_SESSION_SAMESITE`.
  Idle timeout 1h / absolute 8h defaults; scheduler GC sweeps expired
  rows hourly. Signing keys rotate via the new `RotateSigningKey`
  primitive; the old key stays valid for `CERTCTL_SESSION_SIGNING_KEY_RETENTION`
  (default 24h) so existing cookies validate during rollover.
- **CSRF defense via double-submit-cookie + hashed-token-on-row.**
  Plaintext CSRF token in the JS-readable `certctl_csrf` cookie
  (intentionally `HttpOnly=false` for the GUI to echo into the
  `X-CSRF-Token` header); SHA-256 hash on the session row;
  `subtle.ConstantTimeCompare` in the new `CSRFMiddleware`. API-key
  actors are CSRF-exempt (no session row in context).
- **OIDC `client_secret` encrypted at rest.** AES-256-GCM v3 blob
  format (magic 0x03 + salt(16) + nonce(12) + ciphertext+tag) using
  the existing `CERTCTL_CONFIG_ENCRYPTION_KEY`. Encryption invariant
  pinned by an integration test asserting ciphertext != plaintext +
  v3 blob shape + round-trip recovery + wrong-passphrase fails.
- **OIDC first-admin bootstrap.** New `CERTCTL_BOOTSTRAP_ADMIN_GROUPS`
  + `CERTCTL_BOOTSTRAP_OIDC_PROVIDER_ID` env vars: the first
  OIDC-authenticated user with a matching group claim becomes admin
  per tenant. Coexists with the Bundle 1 env-var-token bootstrap;
  the admin-existence probe ensures only one wins. Audit row
  (`bootstrap.oidc_first_admin`) on every grant.
- **Break-glass admin (default-OFF).** New `CERTCTL_BREAKGLASS_ENABLED`
  env var (default `false`). When enabled, the local Argon2id-password
  admin path bypasses OIDC + group-claim layers — intended ONLY for
  SSO-broken incidents. Argon2id with OWASP 2024 params (m=64 MiB,
  t=3, p=4); lockout after 5 failures (configurable); constant-time
  across all failure paths via `verifyDummy`; surface invisibility
  (HTTP 404 on every endpoint when disabled, NOT 403). WARN log at
  server boot when enabled. WebAuthn/FIDO2 second factor pairing on
  the v3 roadmap (Decision 12).
- **GUI: OIDC Providers + Group → Role Mappings + Sessions + login
  buttons.** Four new pages under `/auth/*` consume the Bundle 2 API
  surface. Login page renders one "Sign in with X" button per
  configured OIDC provider (in addition to the API-key form, which
  remains as a fallback for Bearer-mode + break-glass paths). Sessions
  page exposes own-sessions + admin all-actors view. Every actionable
  element is permission-gated server-side via `auth.oidc.*` and
  `auth.session.*` perms; client-side hide is UX layer. Logout button
  in the sidebar fires `POST /auth/logout` to clear the session
  server-side before redirecting to login.
- **MCP server gains 11 OIDC + session tools.** `certctl_auth_list_oidc_providers`,
  `_get_oidc_provider`, `_create_oidc_provider`, `_update_oidc_provider`,
  `_delete_oidc_provider`, `_refresh_oidc_provider`,
  `_list_group_mappings`, `_add_group_mapping`, `_remove_group_mapping`,
  `_list_sessions`, `_revoke_session`. Operator-facing MCP tool count
  goes 12 (Bundle 1 RBAC) → 23 across the auth surface. Total MCP
  tool count: `grep -cE 'mcp\.AddTool\(' internal/mcp/tools*.go` ≈ 150.
- **Per-IdP runbooks: 6 production-tier setup guides** at
  `docs/operator/oidc-runbooks/`. Each runbook follows a consistent
  five-section layout (Prerequisites / IdP-side config / certctl-side
  config / Verification / Troubleshooting + Validation checklist with
  operator sign-off line). Keycloak is the canonical reference;
  Authentik / Okta / Auth0 / Entra ID / Google Workspace document the
  IdP-specific deltas (Auth0's namespaced custom claims; Entra ID's
  group OBJECT IDs; Google Workspace's missing-groups-claim limitation
  + the recommended Keycloak broker pattern).
- **Threat model extended.** [`docs/operator/auth-threat-model.md`](docs/operator/auth-threat-model.md)
  ships 5 new "Defenses Bundle 2 ships" subsections + 8 new threat-
  catalogue subsections (OIDC token forgery / session hijacking / IdP
  compromise / back-channel logout failure modes / group-claim
  manipulation / bootstrap risks / break-glass risks / token-leak
  hygiene). 6 new SQL-shaped operator-facing checks. New "Threats
  Bundle 2 does NOT close" section enumerating the 8 v3-backlog items
  (WebAuthn / JIT elevation / SAML / multi-tenant activation /
  HSM-FIPS / OIDC RP-initiated logout / Playwright / per-IdP
  external-tester sign-off).
- **Performance baselines documented.** [`docs/operator/auth-benchmarks.md`](docs/operator/auth-benchmarks.md)
  ships four benchmarks with measured baselines on a 4 vCPU /
  8 GiB / Postgres 16 / Go 1.25 floor: `BenchmarkSession_SteadyState`
  p99 5 µs (target < 1 ms; 200× under), `BenchmarkSession_ColdProcess`
  p99 7.1 ms (target < 10 ms), `BenchmarkOIDC_SteadyState` p99 1.5 ms
  (target < 5 ms), `BenchmarkOIDC_ColdCache` operator-runs against
  live Keycloak via `make benchmark-auth-coldcache`.
- **Standards + RFC implementation table.** [`docs/reference/auth-standards-implemented.md`](docs/reference/auth-standards-implemented.md)
  ships 13 RFC / standard rows + 14 CWE rows with concrete file paths
  + negative-test anchors per row. NOT a compliance-mapping doc per
  the operator's 2026-05-05 retired-compliance-docs decision; the
  doc explicitly says "build the framework mapping yourself against
  the rows here using the framework-mapping methodology your audit
  firm prescribes; this project does not own that mapping."
- **Coverage gates held at floor 90 across all four Bundle 2
  packages.** `internal/auth/oidc/` 93.7%, `internal/auth/session/`
  94.9%, `internal/auth/breakglass/` 91.5%, `internal/auth/user/domain/`
  96.4%. NO held-low-with-rationale entry — the Phase 13 prompt's
  anti-Bundle-1-mistake rule held. Bundle 1's existing 85% floors
  for `internal/auth/` + `internal/service/auth/` stay 85
  (already-shipped-and-accepted) per the prompt's explicit
  inheritance rule.
- **Multi-tenant query CI guard.** New `scripts/ci-guards/multi-tenant-query-coverage.sh`
  (ratchet-style, baseline 32 at v2.1.0 close): greps every
  SELECT/UPDATE/DELETE in `internal/repository/postgres/` against
  10 tenant-aware tables, fails on regression OR improvement (forces
  the operator to lift / lower the baseline visibly). Forward-compat
  protection so a future Bundle 3 / managed-service multi-tenant
  activation can flip the switch without finding silent
  tenant-data-leak bugs in shipped queries.
- **Phase 10 Keycloak testcontainers integration test.** New build-tag-
  gated suite at `internal/auth/oidc/testfixtures/` + `integration_keycloak_test.go`
  drives the full OIDC flow against a live Keycloak container booted
  by testcontainers-go. 5-test matrix: discovery + JWKS load, full
  PKCE auth-code happy path with HTTP form scraping, logout-revokes-
  session, JWKS rotation, unmapped-groups-fails-closed. Reuses one
  container across the matrix to amortize the 60-90s boot. Optional
  Okta smoke test (build-tagged `integration && okta_smoke`) for live
  tenant validation. New Makefile targets: `make keycloak-integration-test`
  + `make okta-smoke-test` + `make benchmark-auth-coldcache`.
- **OpenAPI surface extended.** New `cookieAuth` security scheme
  (apiKey/cookie/`certctl_session`) alongside the existing
  `bearerAuth`. 13 new Bundle 2 endpoints across the OIDC + session
  + group-mapping CRUD surface; 4 break-glass endpoints with
  surface-invisibility framing. The N-bundle-2-security-empty-preserved
  CI guard locks the `security: []` opt-out count at ≥ 14 so existing
  public endpoints stay public.
- **Bundle-1-only compat regression CI guard.** New
  `scripts/ci-guards/bundle-1-compat-regression.sh` asserts the
  load-bearing invariants that protect the Bundle-1-only-deploy
  case (session middleware defers-to-next, CSRF passthrough on
  missing session row, ChainAuthSessionThenBearer wired, public
  OIDC routes in AuthExempt allowlist, AuthInfo guards on
  OIDCProvidersResolver != nil). Sibling
  `bundle-1-to-2-upgrade-regression.sh` asserts the upgrade-path
  invariants (migrations 000034..000038 are CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS
  + BEGIN/COMMIT-wrapped + no DROP TABLE / ALTER...DROP COLUMN
  against 19 protected Bundle-1 tables + ON CONFLICT DO NOTHING on
  permission seed).

Migration ordering, idempotency, and downgrade are documented in
[`docs/migration/api-keys-to-rbac.md`](docs/migration/api-keys-to-rbac.md)
(API-key → RBAC, Bundle 1) and [`docs/migration/oidc-enable.md`](docs/migration/oidc-enable.md)
(API-key → OIDC, Bundle 2). The threat model lives at
[`docs/operator/auth-threat-model.md`](docs/operator/auth-threat-model.md).
Day-2 RBAC operations live at [`docs/operator/rbac.md`](docs/operator/rbac.md).
RFC + CWE evidence at [`docs/reference/auth-standards-implemented.md`](docs/reference/auth-standards-implemented.md).

## v2.0.68 - Image registry path changed ⚠️

> **Image registry path changed.** Starting this release, container images publish to `ghcr.io/certctl-io/certctl-server` and `ghcr.io/certctl-io/certctl-agent`. Existing pulls from `ghcr.io/shankar0123/certctl-{server,agent}:<tag>` continue to work for previously-published tags (the registry never deletes images), but the `:latest` tag at the old path stops moving forward at this release. Update your `docker pull` paths, `docker-compose.yml` `image:` keys, or Helm `image.repository` values to receive future updates. Old `git clone` / `git push` / install-script / API URLs continue to redirect forever - only the container-registry path changed.

This is the only operator-action-required change in v2.0.68. Other changes in this release are cosmetic URL refreshes after the GitHub-org transfer from `shankar0123/certctl` to `certctl-io/certctl` (HTTP redirects mean no other operator action is required) plus an internal contextcheck lint fix in the agent. Full commit list is on the [GitHub release page](https://github.com/certctl-io/certctl/releases/tag/v2.0.68).

---

certctl no longer maintains a hand-edited per-version changelog. Per-release
notes are auto-generated from commit messages between consecutive tags.

**Where to find what changed in a given release:**

- **[GitHub Releases](https://github.com/certctl-io/certctl/releases)** - every
  tag has an auto-generated "What's Changed" section pulled from the commits
  between that tag and the previous one, plus per-release supply-chain
  verification instructions (Cosign / SLSA / SBOM).
- **`git log <prev-tag>..<this-tag> --oneline`** - same content, locally.

**Why no hand-edited CHANGELOG.md:**

certctl is solo-developed and pushes directly to master. Maintaining a
hand-edited CHANGELOG meant the file drifted (entries piled into
`[unreleased]` and never got promoted to per-version sections when tags were
cut). A stale CHANGELOG is worse than no CHANGELOG - it signals abandoned
maintenance to security-conscious operators doing diligence.

The auto-generated release notes work here because commit messages follow a
descriptive convention: `<area>: <summary>` with a longer body for non-trivial
changes (see `git log v2.0.50..HEAD` for the established pattern). Anyone
reading the GitHub Releases page can see exactly what landed in each version
without depending on the author to manually update a separate file.

**For the historical record:** earlier versions (pre-v2.2.0 and the [2.2.0]
tag itself) had a hand-edited CHANGELOG. That content is preserved in
[git history](https://github.com/certctl-io/certctl/blob/v2.2.0/CHANGELOG.md)
at the v2.2.0 tag.