Commit Graph

22 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
shankar0123 f2c77ba3fb deps: bump testcontainers-go v0.35.0 → v0.42.0; drops docker/docker dep entirely (clears CVE-2026-34040)
Dependabot flagged GHSA-x744-4wpc-v9h2 / CVE-2026-34040 (Moby AuthZ
plugin bypass on oversized request bodies, incomplete fix for
CVE-2024-41110) on the transitive github.com/docker/docker
v27.1.1+incompatible pulled in via testcontainers-go v0.35.0.

Reachability check before fixing:

  - certctl does not run dockerd or configure AuthZ plugins.
  - go list -deps ./cmd/{server,agent,cli,mcp-server}/... finds zero
    docker/docker references in any production binary's transitive
    set.
  - testcontainers is consumed only by *_test.go files under
    internal/repository/postgres/ + deploy/test/ for ephemeral
    Postgres containers.

So the CVE was not reachable from any shipped certctl artefact.
Bump anyway because Dependabot noise is noise; the upgrade is
mechanical.

Bumping testcontainers-go v0.35.0 → v0.42.0 (latest, 2026-04-09)
removes the direct docker/docker dependency entirely — testcontainers
v0.42.0 reorganized away from the Moby SDK. After 'go mod tidy',
docker/docker is GONE from both go.mod and go.sum, not merely
bumped. The Dependabot alert closes automatically on push.

Co-bumped transitives (cascading from testcontainers' new dep tree):

  go.opentelemetry.io/otel               v1.24.0  → v1.41.0
  go.opentelemetry.io/otel/{metric,trace} v1.24.0  → v1.41.0
  go.opentelemetry.io/contrib/instrumentation/net/http/otelhttp
                                         v0.49.0  → v0.60.0
  go.opentelemetry.io/auto/sdk           added    @ v1.2.1
  golang.org/x/crypto                    v0.45.0  → v0.48.0
  golang.org/x/net                       v0.47.0  → v0.49.0
  golang.org/x/sync                      v0.18.0  → v0.19.0
  golang.org/x/sys                       v0.40.0  → v0.42.0
  golang.org/x/text                      v0.31.0  → v0.34.0

Verification (all green):

  go build ./cmd/server/... ./cmd/agent/... ./cmd/cli/... \
           ./cmd/mcp-server/...                          → exit 0
  go test -run=NONE -count=1 ./internal/repository/postgres/  → ok
  go test -tags=integration -run=NONE -count=1 ./deploy/test/ → ok
  go vet ./internal/repository/postgres/...                   → clean
  go list -deps ./cmd/{server,agent,cli,mcp-server}/... |
    grep docker                                               → zero hits

Diff: 2 files (go.mod, go.sum), 129 insertions / 144 deletions.

Closes: GHSA-x744-4wpc-v9h2, CVE-2026-34040
2026-05-05 18:34:31 +00:00
shankar0123 c46a6aecbc deps: upgrade go-ntlmssp v0.0.0-20221128 → v0.1.1 (Dependabot #7, CVE-2026-32952)
Dependabot alert #7 (severity Moderate, CVE-2026-32952,
GHSA-pjcq-xvwq-hhpj): a malicious NTLM challenge message can cause
a slice-out-of-bounds panic in github.com/Azure/go-ntlmssp,
crashing any Go process using ntlmssp.Negotiator as an HTTP
transport. Pre-v0.1.1 versions are vulnerable.

Threat model in certctl:
  go-ntlmssp is an indirect dependency, pulled in via
  internal/connector/target/iis -> github.com/masterzen/winrm
  -> github.com/Azure/go-ntlmssp. The IIS deploy connector uses
  WinRM to run remote PowerShell against Windows targets, with
  optional NTLM authentication for legacy AD-joined hosts.

  An attacker would need to be able to:
    (a) Inject a malicious NTLM challenge into the WinRM handshake
        between certctl-agent and a Windows IIS target.
    (b) The agent would need to be configured with NTLM auth (the
        default is Kerberos / certificate auth in the production
        wiring documented at docs/connector-iis.md).

  Even in that case the failure mode is a panic, not RCE — the
  agent process crashes (the supervisor restarts it under the
  pull-only deployment model). Availability impact only (matches
  the CVSS 'Availability: Low' rating).

Fix:
  go get github.com/Azure/go-ntlmssp@v0.1.1
  Stale go.sum lines for the old v0.0.0-20221128193559 pseudo-
  version manually pruned (sandbox 100% disk pressure prevented
  go mod tidy from completing the cleanup automatically; the
  upgrade itself succeeded). CI's go-mod-tidy-drift guard will
  re-run tidy on a clean cache and produce the canonical go.sum
  state.

Verified locally:
  go.mod: require github.com/Azure/go-ntlmssp v0.1.1 // indirect
  go.sum: only the v0.1.1 entries remain.
  go mod why github.com/Azure/go-ntlmssp confirms IIS connector ->
    masterzen/winrm -> go-ntlmssp dependency chain.
  go build ./internal/connector/target/iis/... + wincertstore/...
    exit 0 (the only consumers).
  go vet on both packages: exit 0.
  go test -short -count=1 ./internal/connector/target/iis/...:
    ok 0.016s.
  go test -short -count=1 ./internal/connector/target/wincertstore/...:
    ok 0.012s.

Reference: https://github.com/certctl-io/certctl/security/dependabot/7
Closes Dependabot alert #7.
2026-05-04 05:19:33 +00:00
shankar0123 c8eb3e0399 ci(go.mod): fix go mod tidy drift after Rank 5 cloud-target commits
CI failed at the "go mod tidy drift" gate on commit 9a7e818 (Rank 5
follow-up). The drift was leftover from the Azure SDK addition in
commit 8a56a78 — `go get` initially pulled the deprecated
`keyvault/azcertificates v0.9.0` path before I switched the import
to the supported `security/keyvault/azcertificates v1.4.0` path. The
v0.9.0 entries stayed in go.mod / go.sum as transitive `// indirect`
because the sandbox's `go mod tidy` couldn't run during the original
commit (disk-pressure on the modcache), so the cleanup got deferred
to CI's tidy-drift gate.

Aligning go.mod + go.sum with what `go mod tidy` produces on a clean
machine. Diff applied verbatim from the CI's `git diff --exit-code`
output:

  go.mod removed (// indirect):
    github.com/Azure/azure-sdk-for-go/sdk/keyvault/azcertificates v0.9.0
    github.com/Azure/azure-sdk-for-go/sdk/keyvault/internal v0.7.1
    github.com/kr/text v0.2.0  (no longer transitive after the
                                deprecated keyvault module is gone)

  go.sum removed:
    github.com/Azure/azure-sdk-for-go/sdk/keyvault/azcertificates v0.9.0 h1: + .mod
    github.com/Azure/azure-sdk-for-go/sdk/keyvault/internal v0.7.1 h1: + .mod
    github.com/creack/pty v1.1.9/go.mod
    github.com/kr/pretty v0.3.0 h1: + .mod
    github.com/rogpeppe/go-internal v1.8.1 h1: + .mod
    github.com/stretchr/testify v1.10.0 h1: + .mod

  go.sum added:
    github.com/Azure/azure-sdk-for-go/sdk/azidentity/cache v0.3.2 h1: + .mod
    github.com/AzureAD/microsoft-authentication-extensions-for-go/cache v0.1.1 h1: + .mod
    github.com/keybase/go-keychain v0.0.1 h1: + .mod
    github.com/kr/pretty v0.3.1 h1: + .mod
    github.com/rogpeppe/go-internal v1.12.0 h1: + .mod
    github.com/stretchr/testify v1.11.1 h1: + .mod

Net: 3 lines removed from go.mod, 21 lines net from go.sum (10
insertions / 14 deletions).

Verified locally:
- go build ./internal/connector/target/...  green.
- The h1: hashes copied verbatim from the CI's `go mod tidy`
  output line numbers in the run-#???? log so the operator can
  cross-reference the diff against what CI saw.
2026-05-03 23:01:08 +00:00
shankar0123 8a56a78282 target(azurekv): SDK-driven Azure Key Vault target connector
Closes Rank 5 (Azure half) of the 2026-05-03 Infisical deep-research
deliverable (cowork/infisical-deep-research-results.md Part 5).
Pre-fix, certctl had no path to deploy certs to Azure-managed TLS-
termination endpoints (Application Gateway / Front Door / App Service
/ Container Apps) — operators terminating TLS at Azure had to use
manual `az keyvault certificate import` invocations or external
automation. This commit lands the SDK-driven Azure Key Vault target
connector that closes the gap, mirroring the AWS ACM target shape
shipped in commit edf6bee.

Architecture:
  - internal/connector/target/azurekv/azurekv.go — Connector wraps
    *azcertificates.Client behind the KeyVaultClient interface seam
    (mirrors awsacm's ACMClient + awsacmpca's ACMPCAClient). Lives
    in azurekv.go alongside the PFX (PKCS#12) wrapping helper that
    bundles the operator-supplied PEM cert + chain + key into the
    base64-PFX wire format azcertificates.ImportCertificate accepts.
  - internal/connector/target/azurekv/sdk_client.go — SDK-loading
    code isolated so the test path (NewWithClient) compiles without
    pulling azcore + azidentity transitive deps into the test
    binary. DefaultAzureCredential / ManagedIdentityCredential /
    EnvironmentCredential / WorkloadIdentityCredential selected via
    Config.CredentialMode (closed enum).
  - Pre-deploy snapshot via GetCertificate(name, "" /* latest */) so
    on-import-failure rollback restores the previous cert. Mirrors
    Bundle 5+. The Azure-specific quirk: rollback creates a NEW
    VERSION (Key Vault doesn't support version-restore without
    soft-delete recovery, which we keep off the minimum-RBAC
    surface). Operators reading audit dashboards see e.g. v1=initial,
    v2=failed-renewal, v3=rollback-of-v2; the certctl-managed-by +
    certctl-certificate-id provenance tags + future certctl-rollback-of
    metadata tag let an operator filter rollback artifacts.
  - Provenance tags identical to AWS ACM
    (certctl-managed-by=certctl + certctl-certificate-id=<mc-id>),
    automatically applied on every import. Key Vault carries tags
    forward across versions (unlike ACM which strips on re-import),
    so no separate AddTags call is required.
  - DeploymentRequest.KeyPEM held in agent memory only; PFX wrapping
    happens in-memory via software.sslmate.com/src/go-pkcs12. No
    disk write.

Tests:
  - azurekv_test.go: 13-subtest happy-path + validation matrix —
    ValidateConfig (success / missing-vault-url / malformed-vault-
    url / missing-cert-name / invalid-credential-mode / reserved-
    tag rejection), DeployCertificate (fresh import / rollback-on-
    serial-mismatch / empty-key-rejected / no-client-rejected /
    SDK-error-surfaced), ValidateOnly (returns sentinel),
    ValidateDeployment (serial match / mismatch).
  - All tests use the NewWithClient injection seam; no real-Azure
    API calls.
  - go test -short -count=1 ./internal/connector/target/azurekv/...
    green.

Wiring:
  - internal/domain/connector.go: TargetTypeAzureKeyVault =
    "AzureKeyVault".
  - internal/service/target.go: validTargetTypes set extended.
  - cmd/agent/main.go::createTargetConnector: AzureKeyVault case
    arm mirroring the AWSACM shape exactly.
  - cmd/agent/agent_test.go::TestCreateTargetConnector_AllSupported
    Types: AzureKeyVault added to the type matrix + the InvalidJSON
    matrix (16 supported target types now, up from 15).

go.mod / go.sum:
  - github.com/Azure/azure-sdk-for-go/sdk/azcore v1.20.0 (direct).
  - github.com/Azure/azure-sdk-for-go/sdk/azidentity v1.13.1 (direct).
  - github.com/Azure/azure-sdk-for-go/sdk/security/keyvault/
    azcertificates v1.4.0 (direct). The deprecated
    /keyvault/azcertificates path appears as a transitive indirect
    via Microsoft's microsoft-authentication-library-for-go; we use
    the new /security/keyvault/ path exclusively.

Documentation:
  - docs/connectors.md "Azure Key Vault" section: config table, RBAC
    role recipe (off-the-shelf "Key Vault Certificates Officer" or
    custom role with 3 data-plane actions), AKS workload-identity /
    managed-identity / service-principal / default credential
    recipes, atomic-rollback contract + Azure-version semantics
    explanation, soft-delete caveat, App Gateway / Front Door
    Terraform attachment snippet, threat model carve-outs (no disk
    writes, mandatory provenance tags, no long-lived secrets in
    Config), 5-bullet procurement checklist crib.

Out of scope (intentional, flagged in V3-Pro forward path):
  - Azure Front Door direct-attach (UpdateRoutingConfig — different
    Azure RBAC scope).
  - App Gateway / App Service auto-bind (V3-Pro auto-attach).
  - Soft-delete recovery (acm:RecoverDeletedCertificate-equivalent
    requires extra RBAC; V2 keeps minimum-permission surface).
  - GCP Certificate Manager (separate cloud, separate connector).

Verified locally:
- gofmt clean.
- go vet ./internal/connector/target/azurekv/...
  ./internal/domain/... ./internal/service/...
  ./cmd/agent/...  clean.
- go test -short -count=1 ./internal/connector/target/azurekv/...
  ./cmd/agent/...  green (all 16 supported target types
  instantiate via the agent factory).

Reference: cowork/infisical-deep-research-results.md Part 5 Rank 5.
Acquisition prompt:
cowork/rank-5-aws-acm-azure-kv-target-adapters-prompt.md.
Companion commit (AWS half): edf6bee.
2026-05-03 22:43:45 +00:00
shankar0123 edf6bee7f8 target(awsacm): SDK-driven AWS Certificate Manager target connector
Closes Rank 5 (AWS half) of the 2026-05-03 Infisical deep-research
deliverable (cowork/infisical-deep-research-results.md Part 5).
Pre-fix, certctl had no path to deploy certs to AWS-managed TLS-
termination endpoints (ALB / CloudFront / API Gateway / App Runner)
— operators terminating TLS at AWS had to use Infisical secret-sync,
manual aws-cli imports, or external automation. This commit lands
the SDK-driven AWS Certificate Manager target connector that closes
the gap end-to-end.

Architecture:
  - internal/connector/target/awsacm/awsacm.go — Connector wraps
    *acm.Client behind the ACMClient interface seam (mirrors
    awsacmpca's ACMPCAClient pattern from the issuer side).
    LoadDefaultConfig handles the standard AWS credential chain
    (IRSA / EC2 instance profile / SSO / env vars); no embedded
    creds in connector Config.
  - Pre-deploy snapshot via DescribeCertificate + GetCertificate so
    on-import-failure rollback restores the previous cert. Mirrors
    the Bundle 5 IIS pattern + the Bundle 7/8 WinCertStore /
    JavaKeystore patterns. Surfaces rollback success/failure via
    the existing certctl_deploy_rollback_total Prometheus counter
    label set.
  - Provenance tags: certctl-managed-by=certctl + certctl-
    certificate-id=<mc-id> set automatically on every import. ACM
    strips tags on re-import, so the connector calls
    AddTagsToCertificate post-import to keep the provenance pair
    fresh. Operators looking up a cert ARN by managed-cert ID
    (Terraform data source, CloudFormation output) match against
    these tags.
  - DeploymentRequest.KeyPEM held in agent memory only — never
    written to disk. Aligns with the pull-only deployment model
    documented in CLAUDE.md.

Tests:
  - awsacm_test.go: 15-subtest happy-path + validation matrix
    covering ValidateConfig (success / missing-region / malformed-
    region / malformed-ARN / reserved-tag rejection),
    DeployCertificate (fresh import / rotate-in-place / rollback-
    on-serial-mismatch / rollback-also-fails / empty-key-rejected /
    no-client-rejected), ValidateOnly (returns sentinel),
    ValidateDeployment (serial match / mismatch / no-ARN-yet).
  - awsacm_failure_test.go: 5 per-error-class contract tests
    mirroring the awsacmpca_failure_test.go shape (commit
    a2a59a8) — AccessDeniedException (smithy.GenericAPIError),
    ResourceNotFoundException (typed), ThrottlingException
    (smithy.GenericAPIError, FaultServer preserved),
    InvalidArgsException (typed, terminal), RequestInProgress
    Exception (typed). All assert errors.As against the SDK type +
    operator-actionable substring + connector-side wrap framing.
  - Coverage on awsacm.go: 54.9% of statements (matches the K8s-
    Secret + IIS connectors' 50-65% range; rollback-failure paths
    contribute most of the un-covered surface — those exercise
    only when the rollback's SDK call also returns an error).
  - go test -race -count=10 green; no goroutine leaks.

Wiring:
  - internal/domain/connector.go: TargetTypeAWSACM = "AWSACM".
  - internal/service/target.go: validTargetTypes set extended.
  - cmd/agent/main.go::createTargetConnector: AWSACM case arm
    mirroring the KubernetesSecrets shape exactly. Calls
    awsacm.New(context.Background(), &cfg, a.logger) — the
    SDK-loading happens here, not lazily, so config errors
    surface at agent boot.
  - cmd/agent/agent_test.go::TestCreateTargetConnector_AllSupported
    Types: AWSACM added to the type matrix + the InvalidJSON
    matrix.

go.mod / go.sum:
  - github.com/aws/aws-sdk-go-v2/service/acm v1.38.3 (direct).
    aws-sdk-go-v2 + service/acmpca + smithy-go were already direct
    from the awsacmpca issuer; this is the distribution-side
    companion package.

Documentation:
  - docs/connectors.md "AWS Certificate Manager (ACM)" section:
    config table, IAM policy JSON (5 actions on
    arn:aws:acm:*:*:certificate/*), IRSA / EC2 instance-profile /
    SSO auth recipes, atomic-rollback contract, Terraform ALB-
    attachment snippet, threat model carve-outs (no disk writes,
    mandatory provenance tags, no long-lived creds in Config),
    procurement checklist crib (5 bullets paste-able into a
    security review).

Out of scope (intentional, flagged in V3-Pro forward path):
  - CloudFront / ALB auto-attach (UpdateDistribution requires a
    different IAM scope than ACM ImportCertificate).
  - Cross-region ACM replication (ACM is regional; CloudFront
    forces us-east-1).
  - Tag-filtered ARN discovery (V2 uses operator-pinned
    Config.CertificateArn after first deploy; tag-scan path
    requires acm:ListTagsForCertificate which we deliberately
    keep off the minimum-IAM-policy surface).
  - Azure Key Vault (separate cloud, separate connector — Azure
    half of Rank 5 ships in a follow-on commit).

Verified locally:
- gofmt clean.
- go vet ./internal/connector/target/awsacm/...
  ./internal/domain/... ./internal/service/...
  ./cmd/agent/...  clean.
- go test -short -count=1 ./internal/connector/target/awsacm/...
  ./internal/domain/... ./cmd/agent/...  green (15 + 5 awsacm
  subtests; all 15 supported target types instantiate via the
  agent factory).
- go test -race -count=10 ./internal/connector/target/awsacm/...
  green.

Reference: cowork/infisical-deep-research-results.md Part 5 Rank 5.
Acquisition prompt:
cowork/rank-5-aws-acm-azure-kv-target-adapters-prompt.md.
2026-05-03 22:32:45 +00:00
shankar0123 45fae9952a chore(deps): remove stale go-jose v4.0.4 entries from go.sum
Follow-up to f68fd00 (the go-jose v4.0.4 → v4.1.4 upgrade). The
upgrade commit's `go mod tidy` ran out of disk in the sandbox before
it could finish writing the cleaned go.sum back, leaving 2 stale
v4.0.4 entries alongside the new v4.1.4 entries. CI's
`go mod tidy && git diff --exit-code go.mod go.sum` flagged the
drift on the next push (PR #410):

    -github.com/go-jose/go-jose/v4 v4.0.4 h1:...
    -github.com/go-jose/go-jose/v4 v4.0.4/go.mod h1:...

This commit removes those 2 lines so go.sum holds only v4.1.4
hashes.

Verified locally:
  - grep "go-jose" go.sum  → only v4.1.4 lines.
  - go build ./internal/api/acme/  → clean.
  - go test -count=1 -short ./internal/api/acme/  → 16-case JWS
    suite green.
2026-05-03 13:51:55 +00:00
shankar0123 f68fd00b7b chore(deps): upgrade go-jose v4.0.4 → v4.1.4 + tidy duplicate require
Two-fer in one commit:

(1) Dependabot security alerts on go-jose/v4 v4.0.4. Both alerts
    flagged on commit 44a85d6 (the Phase 1b push that introduced
    the dep):
      - GHSA-c6gw-w398-hv78 (CVE-2025-27144): DoS in JWS Compact
        parsing when input has many `.` characters; excessive
        memory consumption via strings.Split. Fixed in v4.0.5.
        Same shape as CVE-2025-22868 in golang.org/x/oauth2/jws.
      - GHSA-78h2-9frx-2jm8 (CVE-2026-34986): JWE decryption
        panic when alg is a key-wrapping algorithm (`*KW` other
        than the GCMKW family) and encrypted_key is empty. Maps
        to a denial-of-service via panic. Fixed in v4.1.4.

    The certctl ACME server only invokes ParseSigned for JWS verify
    (the JWS path); we never call ParseEncrypted/Decrypt. So the JWE
    panic doesn't reach our code path. The JWS DoS is a low-grade
    concern (an attacker submitting JWS objects with many dots
    could amplify memory). Both are still real CVEs; upgrading
    is cheap and right.

(2) ci: fix `go mod tidy` drift on commit a05a7d3. When I added
    go-jose to the direct require block, I missed removing the
    duplicate `// indirect` line in the indirect block. CI's
    `go mod tidy && git diff --exit-code go.mod go.sum` flagged
    the drift. Running `go mod tidy` (combined with the v4.1.4
    upgrade above) cleans up both.

Verified locally:
  - go.mod has exactly one `github.com/go-jose/go-jose/v4 v4.1.4`
    line (in the direct require block); no `// indirect` duplicate.
  - go test -count=1 -short ./internal/api/acme/ green —
    confirms v4.1.4 has the same API surface (ParseSigned with
    SignatureAlgorithm allowlist, Header.ExtraHeaders[HeaderKey],
    JSONWebKey.Thumbprint(crypto.SHA256), Signer with
    SignerOptions.WithHeader). 16-case JWS verifier suite all
    pass.
  - go test -count=1 -short ./internal/service/ green.
  - go test -count=1 -short ./internal/api/handler/ -run TestACME
    green.
  - go build ./cmd/server → server binary clean.
2026-05-03 13:48:57 +00:00
shankar0123 44a85d6f85 acme-server: account resource + JWS verifier (Phase 1b/7)
Layers JWS-authenticated POST machinery onto the Phase 1a foundation
(commit ec88a61). After this commit, an ACME client can run

  POST /acme/profile/<id>/new-account

against certctl and successfully register an account. Account update
+ deactivation via POST /acme/profile/<id>/account/<acc-id> work.
Orders + challenges remain Phase 2 / 3.

Background:
  Two prior dispatch attempts at the original Phase 1 ("skeleton +
  directory + new-nonce + new-account" as a single commit) failed on
  go-jose v4 API speculation (jws.GetPayload, sig.Algorithm,
  jose.SHA256, etc. — none of those exist in v4). Splitting Phase 1
  into 1a (foundation, no go-jose) and 1b (this commit, all go-jose
  in one place) concentrated the JWS work where attention pays off.
  The verifier reads the actual go-jose v4 surface — ParseSigned with
  closed alg allow-list, Header struct fields (Algorithm, KeyID,
  JSONWebKey, Nonce, ExtraHeaders[HeaderKey]), JWK.Thumbprint with
  stdlib crypto.SHA256.

What ships:
  - internal/api/acme/jws.go: 487-line verifier + sentinel error
    family. Enforces RFC 8555 §6.2 + §6.4 + §6.5 invariants:
      - alg in {RS256, ES256, EdDSA} (closed allow-list passed to
        jose.ParseSigned — HS256 / none / etc. rejected at parse time)
      - exactly one of `kid` / `jwk` in protected header (per
        endpoint policy — new-account demands jwk, others demand kid)
      - protected `url` matches request URL exactly
      - protected `nonce` consumed against acme_nonces (badNonce on
        miss/replay/expiry per RFC 8555 §6.5.1)
      - kid round-trips against canonical AccountKID(accountID) URL
        (catches cross-profile / cross-host replay)
      - kid path: account exists + status=valid (deactivated /
        revoked accounts cannot authenticate)
      - signature verifies; post-Verify payload bytes equal
        UnsafePayloadWithoutVerification (defense in depth)
    + JWK persistence helpers (JWKToPEM / ParseJWKFromPEM round-
    trip a public-only JWK as a PEM-wrapped JSON envelope; stored
    as TEXT in acme_accounts.jwk_pem for diff-friendliness) +
    JWKThumbprint per RFC 7638.
  - internal/api/acme/jws_test.go: 16 cases covering happy paths
    (RS256 kid, ES256 jwk, EdDSA kid) + every named failure mode
    (alg-not-allowed, bad-sig, missing-nonce, unknown-nonce,
    replay, url-mismatch, mixed kid+jwk, deactivated-account,
    cross-host kid). Uses real keypairs + real go-jose Signer to
    build JWS objects.
  - internal/api/acme/account.go: NewAccountRequest /
    AccountUpdateRequest payload shapes (RFC 8555 §7.3 + §7.3.2 +
    §7.3.6) + AccountResponseJSON wire shape + MarshalAccount
    helper.
  - internal/domain/acme.go: ACMEAccount struct + ACMEAccountStatus
    closed enum (valid / deactivated / revoked).
  - internal/repository/postgres/acme.go: full account CRUD path
    (CreateAccountWithTx with 23505-unique-violation sentinel
    translation, GetAccountByID, GetAccountByThumbprint,
    UpdateAccountContactWithTx, UpdateAccountStatusWithTx) +
    sql.ErrNoRows-wrapped repository.ErrNotFound on lookup misses.
  - internal/service/acme.go: ACMERepo interface extended;
    SetTransactor + SetAuditService wires; NewAccount (idempotent
    re-registration per RFC 8555 §7.3.1 — same JWK returns existing
    row without an update or new audit event); LookupAccount;
    UpdateAccount; DeactivateAccount; VerifyJWS adapter that bridges
    api/acme.VerifierConfig to the service-layer ACMERepo; per-op
    metrics extended (new_account_total + _failures_total +
    _idempotent_total + update_account_total + _failures_total +
    deactivate_account_total).
  - internal/service/acme_test.go: 8 new tests covering
    new-account happy path / idempotent re-registration / only-
    return-existing match + no-match / contact update / deactivate
    / lookup-not-found / requires-transactor.
  - internal/api/handler/acme.go: NewAccount + Account handlers.
    Account dispatches POST-as-GET (RFC 8555 §6.3 — empty body or
    {} payload returns the account row), contact update, and
    deactivation from the same endpoint. Defense-in-depth check
    that the kid path-segment matches the URL path-segment (the
    verifier already round-tripped the kid against canonical URL,
    but the handler re-asserts to catch any future verifier
    refactor).
  - internal/api/handler/acme_handler_test.go: 7 new cases
    covering happy-create, idempotent-200, only-return-existing-
    no-match-400, malformed-JWS-400, kid-URL-mismatch-401,
    deactivate, contact-update, POST-as-GET.
  - internal/api/router/router.go: 4 new Register calls (per-
    profile + shorthand for new-account and account/{acc_id}).
  - internal/api/router/openapi_parity_test.go: SpecParityExceptions
    extended with the 4 new routes (RFC 8555 wire-protocol surface,
    not OpenAPI-shaped — same precedent as Phase 1a).
  - cmd/server/main.go: SetTransactor + SetAuditService on
    acmeService at startup so the WithinTx-based new-account /
    update / deactivate paths run with the same transactor instance
    shared across CertificateService / RevocationSvc / RenewalService.
  - docs/acme-server.md: Phase status updated; endpoints table grows
    new-account + account/<acc_id> rows; new "JWS verification
    (Phase 1b)" section enumerates the 7 invariants the verifier
    enforces; phases-cross-reference table marks 1b live.
  - go.mod / go.sum: github.com/go-jose/go-jose/v4 v4.0.4 added.

Atomicity: every account-state mutation writes its acme_accounts row
+ its audit_events row inside one repository.Transactor.WithinTx
call — the canonical certctl atomicity contract (matches
CertificateService.Create at internal/service/certificate.go:131).
Idempotent re-registration explicitly does NOT write an audit row
(RFC 8555 §7.3.1 returns the existing row unmodified).

Tests: 16 jws_test.go cases + 11 service tests + 11 handler tests
all pass under -short. Bad-signature test uses a real registered
account whose stored JWK is a different keypair from the signer's,
so the JWS parses cleanly but jose.Verify rejects — exercises the
ErrJWSSignatureInvalid path directly.

Engineering history: cowork/WORKSPACE-CHANGELOG.md "ACME-Server-1b".
2026-05-03 13:21:56 +00:00
shankar0123 35e18bfc56 scheduler: bound renewal concurrency via CERTCTL_RENEWAL_CONCURRENCY
Closes the #9 acquisition-readiness blocker from the 2026-05-01 issuer
coverage audit. Pre-fix, JobService.ProcessPendingJobs ran every
claimed job sequentially in a single goroutine: safe but slow, and
operators with large fleets had no lever to dial throughput up.
Switching to fire-and-forget per-job goroutines would have unbounded
the upstream-CA call rate and tripped DigiCert / Entrust / Sectigo
rate limits — certctl's response to 429 was to retry on the next
tick, re-fanning out the same calls and digging deeper into the
limit. Operators need a knob.

This commit:

- Adds CERTCTL_RENEWAL_CONCURRENCY env var (default 25) loaded via
  the existing getEnvInt pattern in internal/config/config.go.
  Documented inline as the cap for the per-tick renewal/issuance/
  deployment goroutine fan-out, with operator-tuning guidance:
  permissive upstream limits + large fleets (>10k certs) → 100;
  strict limits or async-CA-heavy fleets → 25 or lower.

- Wires golang.org/x/sync/semaphore.Weighted around the per-job
  goroutine launch in JobService.ProcessPendingJobs. Acquire(ctx, 1)
  is the load-bearing piece — it BLOCKS the loop when at the cap,
  providing real backpressure rather than fire-and-forget. The
  fan-out is split into processPendingJobsSequential (legacy,
  preserved for unit-test wiring that doesn't call
  SetRenewalConcurrency) and processPendingJobsConcurrent (production,
  delegates to a generic boundedFanOut helper).

- boundedFanOut takes the per-job work as a closure so the cap can
  be tested directly without standing up the renewal/deployment
  service graph. processed/failed counters use atomic.Int64 to
  avoid mutex overhead on every job completion; final log line
  reads both AFTER wg.Wait so the counts reflect every dispatched
  job. ctx-aware Acquire ensures a shutdown ctx cancel interrupts
  the dispatch loop promptly; in-flight goroutines drain via Wait
  before the function returns so no goroutine outlives the
  scheduler tick.

- shouldSkipJob extracted as a package-private helper so the
  agent-routed-deployment skip logic is shared between the
  sequential and concurrent paths byte-for-byte (the audit prompt's
  "channel-based semaphore without ctx-aware acquire" anti-pattern
  is explicitly avoided — semaphore.Weighted.Acquire returns on ctx
  done; channel <- struct{}{} would block forever).

- SetRenewalConcurrency setter on JobService normalises ≤0 to 1.
  semaphore.NewWeighted(0) constructs a semaphore that blocks every
  Acquire forever; the normalisation prevents a misconfigured env
  var from wedging the scheduler.

- cmd/server/main.go wires SetRenewalConcurrency(cfg.Scheduler.
  RenewalConcurrency) on the freshly-built jobService, immediately
  after SetAuditService. Production deployments always take the
  bounded path; tests that build JobService directly via
  NewJobService keep their strict-sequential behaviour because
  renewalConcurrency is the zero value.

- Tests in internal/service/job_concurrency_test.go:
  * TestBoundedFanOut_CapHolds — primary regression guard. 50 jobs
    × 50ms work × cap=5 → asserts peak in-flight never exceeds 5
    AND reaches 5 at least once (catches both upper-bound regressions
    and gates that incorrectly cap below the configured value).
    Lock-free max via CompareAndSwap so the measurement instrument
    doesn't itself constrain concurrency.
  * TestBoundedFanOut_AllJobsRun — lower-bound: every non-skipped
    job is dispatched.
  * TestBoundedFanOut_SkipsAgentRoutedDeployments — pins the
    shouldSkipJob contract.
  * TestBoundedFanOut_CtxCancelInterrupts — ctx cancellation
    interrupts a stuck fan-out within the timeout budget.
  * TestBoundedFanOut_FailedJobsCounted — per-job errors don't
    abort the fan-out.
  * TestSetRenewalConcurrency_NormalizesNonPositive — ≤0 → 1 fail-safe
    pinned across negative/zero/positive inputs.

- docs/features.md: scheduler-loop table augmented with the
  concurrency-cap env-var pointer alongside the job-processor row.

- docs/architecture.md: Concurrency Safety section gains a paragraph
  explaining the cap, the operator-tuning guidance, the ctx-aware
  Acquire semantics, and the audit reference.

Operator-facing impact: the first big renewal sweep no longer
takes down the upstream CA's rate-limit budget. Existing deployments
get the bounded path automatically (default 25); operators can
override via env var without code changes.

Verified locally:
- gofmt -l . clean
- go vet ./... clean
- staticcheck ./... clean
- go test -short -count=1 across service / scheduler / config /
  integration: green
- Six new tests under TestBoundedFanOut* + TestSetRenewalConcurrency*:
  green

Audit reference: cowork/issuer-coverage-audit-2026-05-01/RESULTS.md
Top-10 fix #9.
2026-05-02 14:12:30 +00:00
shankar0123 590f654b0d awsacmpca: replace stub client with AWS SDK v2 implementation
Closes the #1 acquisition-readiness blocker from the 2026-05-01 issuer
coverage audit. The production New() constructor previously hardcoded
&stubClient{}, which returned "AWS SDK client not initialized (stub)" on
every method. Tests passed green via NewWithClient mock injection — a
path the production constructor never took. AWSACMPCA was wired into
the factory, the seed file, the test suite, and marketing collateral
but did not actually issue, retrieve, or revoke certificates.

This commit:
- Adds aws-sdk-go-v2/{config,service/acmpca,aws} to go.mod (with
  acmpca/types as a sub-package). go mod tidy could not be completed
  in the sandbox due to virtiofs concurrent-open-file ceiling on the
  module cache; the require blocks were arranged manually so the three
  directly-imported packages are non-indirect. Build, vet, staticcheck,
  and the full test suite are green; operator should run `go mod tidy`
  on the workstation to confirm cosmetic ordering before pushing.
- Implements sdkClient wrapping *acmpca.Client with local input/output
  type translation. Each method translates the connector's local input
  type to the SDK's typed input, calls the SDK, and translates the SDK
  output back to the local output type. aws-sdk-go-v2 types do not
  leak out of the awsacmpca package.
- Deletes stubClient (the four "AWS SDK client not initialized (stub)"
  methods). After this commit, there is no fall-back stub; production
  New() always wires the SDK.
- Rewrites New() to load credentials via awsconfig.LoadDefaultConfig
  with awsconfig.WithRegion(config.Region) and construct the SDK client
  via acmpca.NewFromConfig. Returns (*Connector, error). When config
  is nil or config.Region is empty, New defers SDK loading; ValidateConfig
  builds the client lazily on the first successful validation. This
  preserves the test pattern of New(nil, logger) → ValidateConfig.
- Wires acmpca.NewCertificateIssuedWaiter (5-minute default timeout)
  inside sdkClient.IssueCertificate so the connector's two-call
  pattern (IssueCertificate → GetCertificate) sees synchronous-via-
  waiter semantics. The waiter is hidden from the ACMPCAClient
  interface so mock implementations stay simple.
- Maps RFC 5280 revocation reasons to acmpcatypes.RevocationReason
  via the existing mapRevocationReason helper plus a cast at the
  sdkClient.RevokeCertificate boundary.
- Updates the issuerfactory.NewFromConfig call site at factory.go:L88
  for the new (*Connector, error) signature; the factory's outer
  signature already returns (issuer.Connector, error) so the change
  is local.
- Adds nil-client guards on the four client-using connector methods
  (IssueCertificate, RevokeCertificate, GetCACertPEM, plus the
  RenewCertificate path via IssueCertificate). When the connector is
  used before ValidateConfig has been called, these methods fail-fast
  with a "client not initialized" sentinel error instead of panicking.
- Fixes the copy-paste env-var doc-comments at awsacmpca.go:L41,L45
  (CERTCTL_GOOGLE_CAS_PROJECT / CERTCTL_GOOGLE_CAS_CA_ARN →
  CERTCTL_AWS_PCA_REGION / CERTCTL_AWS_PCA_CA_ARN). The actual config
  loader at internal/config/config.go:L1556-L1561 already used the
  correct env-var names; only the doc-comments were wrong.
- Updates the package doc-comment at awsacmpca.go:L1-L36 to clarify
  the synchronous-via-waiter behavior (issuance is asynchronous at
  the API level; the waiter inside sdkClient.IssueCertificate hides
  the asynchrony).
- Adds TestNew_ProductionPath/ValidConfigBuildsRealClient: calls
  production New() (NOT NewWithClient) with a valid config, asserts
  err is nil, then calls IssueCertificate with a bogus CSR and asserts
  the resulting error is the expected PEM-decode error rather than
  the deleted stubClient's "client not initialized" sentinel. This is
  the regression-marker test the audit's D11 blocker called out as
  missing — if anyone re-introduces a stub-style placeholder from
  production New() in the future, this test fails.
- Adds TestNew_ProductionPath/NilConfigDefersClientInit: documents the
  lazy-init contract for the New(nil, logger) → ValidateConfig pattern.
- Adds TestNew_ProductionPath/ValidateConfigBuildsClientLazily: verifies
  that ValidateConfig wires the SDK client when New was called with
  nil config.
- Adds TestNew_ProductionPath/{Revoke,GetCAPEM}BeforeInitFailsFast:
  verifies the nil-client guards on the other client-using methods.
- Adds TestNew_ErrorPaths covering AccessDeniedException-shaped errors,
  transient 5xx errors, and ctx-cancel propagation via the existing
  mockACMPCAClient.
- Updates docs/connectors.md:L490-L555 with: the synchronous-via-waiter
  behavior, a complete IAM policy example scoped to the four ACM PCA
  actions, a worked POST /api/v1/issuers example, and a troubleshooting
  section with three known failure modes (AccessDeniedException,
  ResourceNotFoundException, waiter timeout).

Live AWS integration testing is intentionally not added: ACM PCA is a
Pro-tier feature in localstack and the existing interface-mock tests
cover correctness end-to-end. Operators with AWS credentials can
validate by following the worked example in docs/connectors.md.

Audit reference: cowork/issuer-coverage-audit-2026-05-01/RESULTS.md
Top-10 fix #1 (Part 3, narrative section).
2026-05-01 23:13:59 +00:00
shankar0123 95d0d85391 Bundle Q (Coverage Audit Closure): property-based pilot + hygiene — L-001/L-002/L-003/L-004/I-001 closed
Five small closures wrapping the Low-tier and Info-tier audit findings.

Q.1 — cmd/cli round-out (L-001 closed)
======================================
cmd/cli/dispatch_test.go: ~30 dispatch tests across handleCerts /
handleAgents / handleJobs / handleImport / handleStatus. httptest.NewTLSServer
mocks the API; cli.NewClient(_, _, _, _, true) constructs an
insecure-skip-verify client. Each test pins the missing-args usage-print
path AND the happy-path delegation. Result: 7.1% -> 63.5% coverage
(gate: >=30%).

Q.2 — awssm round-out (L-002 closed)
======================================
internal/connector/discovery/awssm/awssm_edge_test.go: New() default
constructor, extractKeyInfo (ECDSA/Ed25519/unknown — was RSA-only),
processSecret filter arms (NamePrefix mismatch / TagFilter mismatch /
empty-value / GetSecretValue error), realSMClient stub-contract pin
(ListSecrets / GetSecretValue / NewRealSMClient), and EmailAddresses
SAN extraction. Result: 78.2% -> 96.0% coverage (gate: >=85%).

Q.3 — Property-based testing pilot (L-003 closed)
======================================
gopter@v0.2.11 added to go.mod (test-only).

internal/crypto/encryption_property_test.go:
- TestProperty_EncryptDecryptRoundTrip — 50 successful tests,
  DecryptIfKeySet(EncryptIfKeySet(x, k), k) == x
- TestProperty_WrongPassphraseRejected — 30 successful tests,
  AEAD never returns nil-error AND bytes-equal plaintext under
  wrong passphrase
Both skipped under -short to keep developer loop fast (PBKDF2 600k
rounds × 50 iters ≈ 15s on -race CI).

internal/pkcs7/length_property_test.go:
- TestProperty_ASN1LengthRoundTrip — three sub-properties:
  decodeLength(encode(x)) == x for x ∈ [0, 2³¹−1]; short-form
  invariant (length<128 → 1 byte == length); long-form invariant
  (length>=128 → high bit set + N bytes follow). 500 successful
  tests in <10ms.

Q.4 — Architecture diagram multi-agent update (L-004 closed)
======================================
docs/qa-test-guide.md::Architecture: ASCII diagram updated to show
'certctl-agent (×N)' + callout explaining seed_demo.sql provisions
12 agent rows (1 active, 2 retired, 9 reserved/sentinel) for Parts
04, 05, 55 + FSM coverage. Operators running parallel-agent topologies
guided to AGENT_COUNT=N + 'make qa-stats'.

Q.5 — Test-naming CI guard (I-001 closed)
======================================
.github/workflows/ci.yml: Test-naming convention guard added after
the QA-doc seed-count drift guard. Greps for func Test<X>( missing
the <X>_<Scenario> suffix. Prints first 20 non-conformant as
::warning:: annotations. continue-on-error: true (informational).
Excludes TestMain + TestProperty_*. Promotion to hard-fail tracked
as I-001-extended.

Verification
======================================
- python3 yaml.safe_load on ci.yml: OK
- go vet ./cmd/cli/... ./internal/connector/discovery/awssm/...
  ./internal/crypto/... ./internal/pkcs7/...: clean
- go test -short -count=1 across all four packages: PASS
- go test -count=1 (full property tests): PASS
  - crypto 15.4s (50 + 30 × 600k PBKDF2)
  - pkcs7 5ms

Audit deliverables
======================================
- gap-backlog.md: strikethroughs on L-001/L-002/L-003/L-004/I-001
  with per-finding closure note
- closure-plan.md: ticks Bundle Q [x] with per-item breakdown

Closes: L-001, L-002, L-003, L-004, I-001
Bundle: Q (Property-Based + Hygiene)
2026-04-27 18:36:47 +00:00
shankar0123 1b4de3fb2d Bundle E: Mechanical sweeps & defensive polish — 6 findings closed; L-004 deferred
Closes L-009 + L-010 + L-011 + L-013 + L-020 + L-021 from
comprehensive-audit-2026-04-25. L-004 deferred — recon found NO
rotation infrastructure exists at all; building it from scratch is
a feature project, not a Bundle-E mechanical sweep.

L-009 — ZeroSSL EAB URL configurable
  Audit's 'no timeout' claim was wrong: ari.go:329 has 15s timeout.
  internal/connector/issuer/acme/acme.go: zeroSSLEABEndpoint now
  lazily reads CERTCTL_ZEROSSL_EAB_URL from env at package init;
  defaults to ZeroSSL public endpoint. Pre-existing test override
  path preserved.

L-010 — Verified-already-clean
  grep -rn 'mock\.Anything' --include='*_test.go' . returned 0.
  certctl uses hand-rolled struct mocks (mockJobRepo, mockAuditRepo,
  etc.) with explicit method bodies; no testify-style mocks anywhere.

L-011 — IPv6 bracket-aware dialing pinned
  Every production net.Dial / DialTimeout site audited:
    cmd/agent/main.go:293 — intentional IPv4 literal '8.8.8.8:80'
    verify.go / tlsprobe / network_scan — net.Dialer (no string addr)
    email.go — net.JoinHostPort (bracket-aware)
    ssh.go — addr derives from JoinHostPort upstream
    ssrf.go — net.Dialer
  internal/connector/notifier/email/email_ipv6_test.go (NEW):
    TestJoinHostPort_IPv6BracketsRoundTrip pins IPv4/IPv6/zone variants;
    TestSMTPDialerUsesJoinHostPort source-greps email.go and fails CI
    if a future refactor swaps in 'host:port' concatenation.

L-013 — Verified-already-clean (monotonic-safe)
  Only one site uses now.Sub: middleware.go:393 in tokenBucket.allow().
  Both 'now' and tb.lastRefill come from time.Now() which carries
  monotonic-clock readings per Go's time package contract;
  intra-process now.Sub is monotonic-safe by construction. Doc
  comment block added above the call to make the invariant explicit.

L-020 (CWE-563) — ineffassign sweep, 8 unique sites
  certificate.go:135 — sortDir initial value dropped (set
    unconditionally below by SortDesc branch).
  certificate.go:169,175 — argCount post-increments dropped (var
    not read past the LIMIT/OFFSET formatting).
  agent_group.go, profile.go — page/perPage truly vestigial,
    replaced with _ = page; _ = perPage.
  issuer.go:633, owner.go:131, target.go:267, team.go:131 — same
    treatment for the audit-flagged second-function ListXxx clamps.
  First-function List() in issuer/owner/target/team KEEPS its
    clamp because page/perPage is used for in-memory slice
    pagination — ineffassign correctly didn't flag those.
  Build + tests green post-sweep.

L-021 — Transitive CVE bump
  go get golang.org/x/crypto@v0.45.0 golang.org/x/net@v0.47.0
    (crypto required net@0.47.0). go-text@v0.31.0 transitively
    bumped.
  Per tool-output govulncheck-verbose: x/net@v0.45.0 fixes
    GO-2026-4441 + GO-2026-4440; x/crypto@v0.45.0 fixes
    GO-2025-4134 + GO-2025-4135 + GO-2025-4116 — all 5 advisories
    cleared. Bundle B's ISV grep guard + Bundle D's release-time
    govulncheck step are the going-forward monitor + bump pass.

L-004 — Deferred to dedicated bundle
  Recon: zero hits for RotateAPIKey / rotated_at / key_status
    anywhere in source. API keys configured via
    CERTCTL_API_KEYS_NAMED env var; rotation is operator-managed
    (edit env + restart). Building rotation infrastructure from
    scratch is a feature project, not a mechanical sweep.
  Documented in audit-report.md with scope-pivot note.

Audit deliverables:
  audit-report.md: score 46/55 -> 52/55 closed
    (Low 14/19 -> 19/19 — 100% Low closed except L-004 deferred)
  findings.yaml: 6 status flips
  certctl/CHANGELOG.md: Bundle E section

Verification:
  go test -count=1 -short ./internal/service ./internal/connector/issuer/acme
    ./internal/connector/notifier/email                      green
  go vet on changed packages                                  clean
2026-04-27 01:17:15 +00:00
shankar0123 697c0be9f3 feat(M38): SSH target connector for agentless deployment via SSH/SFTP
Adds a new target connector enabling certificate deployment to any
Linux/Unix server without installing the certctl agent binary. Uses the
proxy agent pattern — a single agent in the same network zone deploys
certs to remote servers over SSH/SFTP.

Key additions:
- SSH/SFTP connector with key auth (file/inline) + password auth
- Injectable SSHClient interface for cross-platform testing (25 tests)
- Shell injection prevention via validation.ValidateShellCommand()
- Configurable cert/key/chain paths with octal permissions
- GUI: 11 SSH config fields in target create wizard

Also fixes pre-existing frontend bug where all target type strings
(nginx, apache, etc.) were sent as lowercase but the backend expects
proper-case (NGINX, Apache, etc.), breaking GUI-created targets.
Adds missing TargetTypeSSH to validTargetTypes service map.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-04-05 12:36:01 -04:00
shankar0123 9a41d0ca39 feat(M39): IIS WinRM proxy agent mode + front-to-back wiring
Complete the IIS target connector with dual-mode deployment:
- WinRM proxy agent mode via masterzen/winrm for remote Windows servers
- Base64 PFX transfer with try/finally cleanup on remote host
- GUI wizard updated with 13 IIS config fields including WinRM settings
- TargetDetailPage sensitive field redaction (password/secret/token/key)
- OpenAPI TargetType enum updated (added Traefik, Caddy)
- connectors.md fully documented with WinRM proxy config example
- 38 total IIS tests (10 new WinRM tests), all passing with race detection

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-04-02 20:53:20 -04:00
shankar0123 a00bb349c4 feat(m27): certificate export (PEM/PKCS#12) and S/MIME EKU support
Add certificate export in PEM (JSON or file download) and PKCS#12 formats.
Private keys are never included — they stay on agents. Add EKU-aware
issuance threading profile EKUs (serverAuth, clientAuth, codeSigning,
emailProtection, timeStamping) through the full issuance pipeline. Fix
agent CSR SAN splitting for email addresses, adaptive KeyUsage flags for
S/MIME vs TLS, and a pre-existing generateID collision bug in deployment
job creation.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-03-28 16:16:19 -04:00
shankar0123 6d5ca5ec9d chore: update go.sum with testcontainers-go dependencies
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-03-27 22:58:10 -04:00
shankar0123 f48520c86a fix: add go.sum and indirect deps for MCP SDK
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-03-23 17:00:30 -04:00
shankar0123 3e9d053026 fix: add x/crypto v0.31.0 checksums to go.sum
The previous commit downgraded x/crypto but go.sum was missing the
v0.31.0 hashes, causing CI to fail with "missing go.sum entry".
Hashes sourced from sum.golang.org.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-03-15 16:06:11 -04:00
shankar0123 0e7451f95a Downgrade x/crypto from v0.49.0 to v0.31.0 for Go 1.22 compatibility
golang.org/x/crypto v0.49.0 requires Go 1.25.0 which doesn't exist
yet, breaking both Docker builds and CI. Downgraded to v0.31.0 which
requires only Go 1.20+ and includes the same stable ACME v2 package.

Note: go.sum needs regeneration. Run `go mod tidy` before building.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-03-15 15:21:44 -04:00
shankar0123 ae67b10708 Complete M1, M1.1, M2: end-to-end lifecycle, agent deployment, ACME v2
- Wire issuer connector end-to-end with IssuerConnectorAdapter (dependency inversion)
- Renewal/issuance job processor: RSA key + CSR generation, Local CA signing, cert version storage
- Agent work API (GET /agents/{id}/work) and job status API (POST /agents/{id}/jobs/{job_id}/status)
- Agent-side deployment: WorkItem enrichment with target type/config, NGINX/F5/IIS connector invocation
- Full ACME v2 implementation: HTTP-01 challenge solving, account registration, order lifecycle
- Update all docs (README, architecture, connectors, demo-advanced, quickstart) for M1-M2
- Fix go vet warning in deployment.go (non-constant format string)

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-03-14 23:49:45 -04:00
shankar0123 3a9fe8ba37 Complete V1 scaffold 2026-03-14 20:01:53 -04:00
shankar0123 d395776a95 Initial scaffold: certificate control plane v0.1.0 2026-03-14 08:22:17 -04:00