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404 Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
 shankar0123
|
7c04f0a0b8 |
fix(oidc): test seam for jwksProbeClient — closes the B5 R6 httptest regression
CI break diagnosed from go-build-and-test on f1fa311+36840dd:
TestTestDiscovery_HappyPath_AgainstMockIdP + TestTestDiscovery_JWKSFetchFails
fail with "refusing to dial reserved address 127.0.0.1" because my
Bundle 5 R6 closure wrapped jwksReachable in
validation.SafeHTTPDialContext — which is exactly what the production
guard is supposed to refuse for httptest.NewServer's 127.0.0.1 bind.
Same shape as the Slack/Teams test-seam fix in
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shankar0123
|
36840ddd01 |
fix(security): close BUNDLE 5 — auth, OIDC, MCP, API + browser security edges
Bundle 5 closure (2026-05-13 acquisition diligence audit). 13-finding
security audit pass across the auth / OIDC / MCP / API / browser-
security surface. Five real closures shipped in code, two false-as-
stated findings annotated with the existing implementation, three
operator-decision items documented for v3 follow-up, three doc-only
fixes (auth architecture narrative aligned with shipped OIDC).
Source findings closed (code):
S1 break-glass /auth/breakglass/login lacked the documented
5/min per-source-IP rate limit; handler now owns its own
SlidingWindowLimiter wired at startup. Doc claim turns true.
R6 OIDC test_discovery JWKS probe ran on http.DefaultClient;
now uses an http.Client whose transport wraps
validation.SafeHTTPDialContext. JWKS URI can no longer
pivot into reserved-address ranges via DNS rebinding.
R7 Slack + Teams notifiers built http.Client without the SSRF
dial-time guard. Both New() constructors now install
validation.SafeHTTPDialContext; webhook URLs (operator-
configured via dynamic-config GUI) cannot dial 169.254.x or
in-cluster reserved ranges. Test seam: newForTest bypasses
the guard for httptest's 127.0.0.1 binds, mirroring the
existing internal/connector/notifier/webhook pattern.
RT-L2 CERTCTL_ACME_INSECURE=true now emits a prominent
logger.Warn at server boot. Pre-Bundle-5 the knob silently
disabled ACME directory TLS verification.
Source findings closed (doc):
finding 1 + HIGH-5 Architecture doc claimed no in-process JWT/
OIDC/mTLS/SAML and pointed everyone at the
authenticating-gateway pattern. Auth Bundle 2
(commit dea5053) shipped native OIDC + sessions +
break-glass. New §"In-process authentication surface"
table (api-key / oidc / none) supersedes the old framing;
"Authenticating-gateway pattern (SAML, mTLS-as-auth,
LDAP)" section retained for protocols certctl still
doesn't ship natively.
Source findings verified false (existing implementation):
S4 OIDC email-domain allowlist — `email_domain_test.go`
already pins the strict-equality semantics (subdomain not
auto-accepted, multi-entry no-match path, empty allowlist
accepts all by-design per RFC 9700 §4.1.1).
SEC-L1 CSP / HSTS / referrer-policy headers — already shipped at
internal/api/middleware/securityheaders.go and wired at
cmd/server/main.go L2003+L2027+L2115.
Operator-decision / deferred (tracked in bundle-5 closure doc):
S3 CERTCTL_API_KEYS_NAMED parsing is wired, end-to-end
validation is partial. Operator decides: complete the
named-key middleware path or deprecate the syntax.
S5 Audit-middleware best-effort for read paths;
security-critical writes use WithinTx. Operator decides
per-path escalation.
S8 MCP threat model — the binary is a thin protocol bridge,
no privileges of its own; every tool call carries
CERTCTL_API_KEY and is auth'd + RBAC-gated server-side.
Optional CERTCTL_MCP_READ_ONLY gate tracked as v3.
SEC-H1 2026-05-10 audit CRIT-1/2/4 already closed on master;
CRIT-3/5 status against the spec folder is operator-
workstation-validation-only. Documented for follow-up.
SEC-L2 WebAuthn / FIDO2 / step-up — already documented in
docs/operator/auth-threat-model.md "Threats Bundle 2 does
NOT close". v3 work item per CLAUDE.md decision 12.
Full per-finding rationale + receipts at
docs/operator/security-bundle-5-audit-closure.md.
Verification:
gofmt -l # clean
go vet ./internal/connector/notifier/slack
./internal/connector/notifier/teams ./internal/auth/oidc
./internal/api/handler ./cmd/server # clean
go build ./cmd/server [...] # clean
go test -short -count=1 ./internal/connector/notifier/slack
./internal/connector/notifier/teams ./internal/api/handler
./internal/auth/oidc ./internal/config # PASS
# (slack 0.028s + teams
# 0.023s + handler 11.0s;
# newForTest seam keeps
# httptest tests green)
Audit-Closes: BUNDLE-5 S1 R6 R7 RT-L2 finding-1 HIGH-5
Audit-Verifies-False: S4 SEC-L1
Audit-Defers: S3 S5 S8 SEC-H1 SEC-L2
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shankar0123
|
709e1c9292 |
fix(scale): close BUNDLE 4 — migrations, scheduler HA, rate-limits, scale receipts
Bundle 4 closure (2026-05-13 acquisition diligence audit). Closes the
"what happens under multi-replica" question cluster: migration runner
had no concurrency control + no applied-version ledger, 15 scheduler
loops had per-process idempotency but no cross-replica documentation,
rate limits were process-local without an operator-facing scope
statement, load-test scope explicitly omitted four hot paths without
linking them to a roadmap.
Source findings closed:
HIGH-1 + D4 + finding 4 (migration tracking)
D8 (scheduler loop ownership)
MED-1 + MED-2 (rate-limit scope)
T9 + LOW-7 + finding 7 (load-test receipt scope)
Closures by source ID:
HIGH-1 + D4 + finding 4 — Migration tracking + advisory lock.
internal/repository/postgres/db.go::RunMigrations now wraps every
migration execution in:
1. A dedicated *sql.Conn pinned to one connection for the entire
scan + apply lifecycle (pg_advisory_lock is connection-scoped).
2. pg_advisory_lock(migrationAdvisoryLockID) — fixed int64 key
derived from "certctl-migrations" so the same constant resolves
across deployments without colliding with operator advisory
locks. Blocks the second replica until the first finishes.
3. CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS schema_migrations(version TEXT PK,
applied_at TIMESTAMPTZ DEFAULT NOW()) — audit ledger.
4. Skip-applied loop: SELECT version FROM schema_migrations →
map[string]struct{} → skip every .up.sql whose filename is in
the map. INSERT after successful execute, ON CONFLICT
(version) DO NOTHING for defense in depth.
Pre-Bundle-4 every server boot re-ran all 45 .up.sql files. The
"idempotency via IF NOT EXISTS / ON CONFLICT" contract in CLAUDE.md
held per-migration but offered no protection when two Helm replicas
raced on schema DDL. Post-Bundle-4 single-replica deploys see zero
behavior change beyond the audit-table population; multi-replica
deploys get HA-safe schema bootstrap.
D8 — Scheduler HA semantics documented.
New docs/operator/scheduler-ha.md with per-loop inventory of all 15
loops in internal/scheduler/scheduler.go. Classification:
- HA-safe (jobProcessorLoop, jobRetryLoop) — FOR UPDATE SKIP
LOCKED via ClaimPendingJobs (Bundle 1 H-6 closure,
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shankar0123
|
f1fa311191 |
fix(helm): close BUNDLE 3 — Helm chart hardening + enterprise deploy
Bundle 3 closure (2026-05-12 acquisition diligence audit). Closes the
"chart claims production-ready but lying-fields silently break it"
hazard cluster: README install command had wrong key, required secrets
weren't fail-fast, external Postgres rendered the bundled StatefulSet
hostname, container-only security hardening fields landed at pod scope
(silently dropped by K8s API), and three advertised template surfaces
(ServiceMonitor, PodDisruptionBudget, NetworkPolicy) didn't render at
all even when their values.yaml toggles were on.
Source findings closed:
C2 C3 D1 D2 D3 D5 D7 D11 D12 (repo audit)
OPS-L1 OPS-L2 (cowork audit)
Source findings explicitly deferred (tracked in WORKSPACE-ROADMAP.md):
D6 OPS-H1 (backup automation — operator must choose target storage)
D10 (digest pinning of latest `:latest` tags)
OPS-M1 (prometheus/client_golang migration)
OPS-M2 (distributed tracing instrumentation)
Chart truth table (rendered with helm 3.16.3):
-f values.yaml + tls.existingSecret + auth.apiKey + pg.auth.password
→ 12 resources (default mode, no monitoring/PDB/networkpolicy)
+ postgresql.enabled=false + externalDatabase.url=…
→ NO StatefulSet, NO postgres-secret, NO postgres-service (D2)
+ server.tls.certManager.enabled=true
→ +1 Certificate (cert-manager mode)
+ replicas=3 + monitoring.enabled=true + serviceMonitor.enabled=true
+ podDisruptionBudget.enabled=true + networkPolicy.enabled=true
→ +1 ServiceMonitor + 1 PodDisruptionBudget + 1 NetworkPolicy (D5+D11)
tls.existingSecret AND tls.certManager.enabled both set
→ REFUSED with "EXACTLY ONE TLS ownership path" error (D7)
Missing required secrets (apiKey / pg password / external URL)
→ REFUSED at template time with operator-actionable guidance (D1)
Closures by source ID:
C2 — README Helm install example fixed. Was `--set postgresql.password=…`
(does not exist); now `--set postgresql.auth.password=…` matching
the chart key. README install block also wires TLS, mentions
fail-fast at template time, and links the external-Postgres example.
C3 — Kubernetes Secrets connector annotated PREVIEW in values.yaml.
The chart still exposes `kubernetesSecrets.enabled` for the RBAC
preview wiring, but the values block now states clearly that the
production K8s client at internal/connector/target/k8ssecret/
k8ssecret.go::realK8sClient is a stub (verified — go.mod imports
zero k8s.io/client-go packages). Production landing tracked in
WORKSPACE-ROADMAP.md.
D1 — `certctl.requiredSecrets` template helper. Fail-fasts at render
time when (a) server.auth.type=api-key + apiKey empty, (b)
postgresql.enabled=true + pg.auth.password empty, (c)
postgresql.enabled=false + externalDatabase.url + legacy env
CERTCTL_DATABASE_URL all empty. Each branch emits an
operator-actionable diagnostic with the openssl rand command or
values override needed. postgres-secret template additionally
uses Helm's `required` builtin so it can't render with the empty
fallback that pre-Bundle-3 produced ("changeme" literal).
D2 — externalDatabase.url first-class. New top-level values block.
certctl.databaseURL helper now branches on postgresql.enabled:
bundled path uses the helper-emitted in-cluster URL; external
path uses externalDatabase.url verbatim. postgres-secret,
postgres-statefulset, and postgres-service ALL gate on
postgresql.enabled — external mode renders ZERO postgres-*
resources. POSTGRES_PASSWORD env in server-deployment also gates.
D3 — Container-vs-pod security context split. K8s API silently drops
readOnlyRootFilesystem / allowPrivilegeEscalation / capabilities /
privileged when they land at pod scope (`spec.securityContext`);
they only work at container scope (`spec.containers[].securityContext`).
Pre-Bundle-3 all fields sat at pod scope so the chart's documented
"read-only rootfs + drop-all caps" hardening was effectively
unenforced. New certctl.podSecurityContext + containerSecurityContext
helpers split the operator-facing securityContext map by field-name
whitelist so existing values keep working byte-for-byte while
fields render at the K8s-valid scope. Applied to both
server-deployment.yaml and agent-daemonset.yaml (DaemonSet + Deployment
branches).
D5 — Prometheus ServiceMonitor template. New
templates/servicemonitor.yaml. Renders when monitoring.enabled AND
monitoring.serviceMonitor.enabled. Scrapes /api/v1/metrics/prometheus
(rbac-gated on metrics.read — needs bearerTokenSecret with an API
key holding that perm). values.yaml block extended with bearerTokenSecret,
tlsConfig, and relabelings knobs and the operator-facing comment
documenting the auth requirement.
D7 — TLS both-set rejection. certctl.tls.required helper extended.
Pre-Bundle-3 only the NEITHER-set case was caught; setting BOTH
rendered a dangling cert-manager Certificate alongside an
existing-Secret mount, two conflicting TLS sources of truth.
Now refuses with "EXACTLY ONE TLS ownership path" + remediation
steps for both possible operator intents.
D11 — PodDisruptionBudget + NetworkPolicy templates. New
templates/pdb.yaml (renders when podDisruptionBudget.enabled +
server.replicas > 1) + templates/networkpolicy.yaml (renders when
networkPolicy.enabled). PDB uses minAvailable / maxUnavailable
exclusivity per K8s spec. NetworkPolicy default-allows in-namespace
agent → server traffic, kube-DNS egress, and bundled-postgres
egress (when postgresql.enabled), with operator-extensible
extraIngress / extraEgress for CA / OIDC / SMTP egress. Both
default off so existing deploys don't lose network reach
unannounced.
D12 — Database max-conn config wired. Pre-Bundle-3
internal/repository/postgres/db.go::NewDB hard-coded
SetMaxOpenConns(25). config.go loaded CERTCTL_DATABASE_MAX_CONNS,
Validate() enforced the >= 1 floor, values.yaml documented it,
and docs/reference/configuration.md surfaced it — but the pool
ignored every operator setting. New NewDBWithMaxConns threads
the operator value into the pool with maxIdle = maxOpen / 5
(≥ 1) so the historical ratio carries forward. cmd/server/main.go
calls the new constructor; NewDB stays for compat at the default 25.
OPS-L1 — Chart version 0.1.0 → 1.0.0. Chart has shipped through 8 audit
closures since 2026-02 (M-018, U-1, U-2, U-3, H-1, G-1, B1, B2);
pre-1.0 version was implying instability the chart no longer has.
OPS-L2 — External-Postgres path is now properly documented in values.yaml
(externalDatabase block with mode-2 example), README install command
links the existing examples/values-external-db.yaml, and the chart
truth table above proves the external mode renders cleanly.
Receipts:
helm lint deploy/helm/certctl/ # clean
helm template c deploy/helm/certctl/ \
--set server.tls.existingSecret=ci \
--set postgresql.auth.password=p \
--set server.auth.apiKey=k # 12 kinds, default
helm template c deploy/helm/certctl/ \
--set server.tls.existingSecret=ci \
--set postgresql.enabled=false \
--set externalDatabase.url='postgres://u:p@h:5432/db?sslmode=require' \
--set server.auth.apiKey=k # 9 kinds, no postgres-*
helm template c deploy/helm/certctl/ \
--set server.tls.certManager.enabled=true \
--set server.tls.certManager.issuerRef.name=letsencrypt \
--set postgresql.auth.password=p --set server.auth.apiKey=k
# +1 Certificate (cert-manager)
helm template c deploy/helm/certctl/ \
--set server.tls.existingSecret=ci \
--set postgresql.auth.password=p --set server.auth.apiKey=k \
--set server.replicas=3 \
--set monitoring.enabled=true \
--set monitoring.serviceMonitor.enabled=true \
--set podDisruptionBudget.enabled=true \
--set networkPolicy.enabled=true # +ServiceMonitor +PDB +NetworkPolicy
(TLS both-set + missing apiKey + missing pg password + missing extDb URL all REFUSED.)
gofmt -l # clean
go vet ./internal/repository/postgres ./cmd/server # clean
go build ./cmd/server # clean
bash scripts/ci-guards/B3-helm-chart-coherence.sh # clean
Remaining operator warnings (deferred, tracked in WORKSPACE-ROADMAP.md):
- Backup CronJob + restore script (D6 + OPS-H1): operator chooses
target (S3, GCS, Azure Blob, NFS). Sample CronJob yaml may ship
in deploy/helm/examples/ once an operator workstation has run
one full backup-restore cycle.
- Distributed tracing (OPS-M2): otel/* are go.mod indirect deps,
not actively instrumented. Adding spans is a v3 work item.
- Prometheus client_golang migration (OPS-M1): the hand-rolled
/metrics/prometheus exposition format works today; client_golang
migration unlocks histograms + exemplars + native label sets.
Audit-Closes: BUNDLE-3 C2 C3 D1 D2 D3 D5 D7 D11 D12 OPS-L1 OPS-L2
Audit-Defers: D6 D10 OPS-H1 OPS-M1 OPS-M2
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shankar0123
|
d030c26914 |
fix(security): close BUNDLE 2 — safe first run, demo mode, agent bootstrap
Bundle 2 closure (2026-05-12 acquisition diligence audit). Closes the
"docker compose up == accidental production" hazard: pre-Bundle-2 the
base deploy/docker-compose.yml WAS the demo path (AUTH_TYPE=none +
DEMO_MODE_ACK=true + KEYGEN_MODE=server + DEMO_SEED=true + literal
change-me-... placeholder creds), the README claimed "drop the demo
overlay for a clean install", and ENVIRONMENTS.md table documented
auth-type default as api-key — three contradictory stories layered on
the same compose file.
Source findings closed:
R2 R3 C1 D9 finding-2 S9 (repo audit)
SEC-H2 SEC-M1 SEC-M3 OPS-M3 LOW-5 HIGH-6 (cowork audit)
Compose split (deploy/docker-compose.yml + deploy/docker-compose.demo.yml):
The base now ships production-shaped — no AUTH_TYPE override, no
KEYGEN_MODE override, no DEMO_MODE_ACK, no DEMO_SEED, no literal
placeholder fallbacks. POSTGRES_PASSWORD / CERTCTL_AUTH_SECRET /
CERTCTL_CONFIG_ENCRYPTION_KEY / CERTCTL_API_KEY / CERTCTL_AGENT_ID
must come from deploy/.env (sample template in deploy/.env.example +
root .env.example). The demo overlay carries the full demo posture
(every env var + every placeholder credential) so the
`-f docker-compose.demo.yml` one-flag flip remains a zero-config
populated-dashboard path.
Fail-closed startup guards (internal/config/config.go::Validate):
Three new gates layered on the existing HIGH-12 demo-mode listen-bind
guard. All three exempt CERTCTL_DEMO_MODE_ACK=true so the demo overlay
keeps working:
• HIGH-6: AUTH_SECRET = "change-me-in-production" → refuse
• HIGH-6: CONFIG_ENCRYPTION_KEY = "change-me-32-char..." → refuse
• LOW-5: CORS_ORIGINS contains "*" (CWE-942 + CWE-352) → refuse
Visible DEMO MODE banner (cmd/server/main.go): every boot under
DEMO_MODE_ACK=true now emits a prominent WARN line with a 6-step
production-promotion checklist. The 2026-04-19 incident (a screenshot
run that kept running for three days) drove this; the per-startup
banner makes the posture unmissable in any log scraper.
Agent enrollment doc alignment:
• docs/reference/configuration.md L83: corrected the non-existent
URL `POST /api/v1/agents/register` to the real route
`POST /api/v1/agents`; added the bootstrap-token note and the
install-agent.sh handoff sequence.
• docs/reference/architecture.md L154: replaced "agents register
themselves at first heartbeat" (false — cmd/agent/main.go fail-
fasts when CERTCTL_AGENT_ID is unset) with the actual two-step
operator-driven flow (REST or GUI registration first, returned ID
fed to install-agent.sh second).
Tests + CI guard:
• 9 new TestValidate_Bundle2_* cases in internal/config/config_test.go
covering: placeholder-secret refused + demo-ack exempt; placeholder
encryption-key refused + demo-ack exempt; real key not mistaken for
placeholder; wildcard CORS refused + demo-ack exempt; wildcard mixed
into a concrete allowlist still refused; concrete allowlist accepted.
• scripts/ci-guards/B2-compose-base-no-demo-env.sh: greps the base
compose for any of the demo-mode env vars + placeholder credentials.
Comments stripped before checking so the narrative header in the
base file can still reference the overlay's posture in prose.
Cold-DB CI smoke (.github/workflows/ci.yml::cold-db-compose-smoke):
Switched to layering -f docker-compose.demo.yml on top of the base —
the new production base requires real env vars the smoke doesn't have,
and the smoke's purpose (catch migration-on-cold-DB regressions + the
bootstrap-token mint path) is orthogonal to which auth posture the
boot lands in.
Receipts:
• Current first-run truth table
compose flag → posture
-f docker-compose.yml (production)
→ requires .env;
fail-fasts on
missing AUTH_SECRET
/ CONFIG_ENCRYPTION
_KEY / POSTGRES
_PASSWORD; agent
fail-fasts on
missing AGENT_ID
-f docker-compose.yml -f docker-compose.demo.yml (demo)
→ zero-config;
AUTH_TYPE=none +
DEMO_MODE_ACK=true
+ KEYGEN=server +
DEMO_SEED=true;
boot banner WARN
-f docker-compose.yml -f docker-compose.dev.yml (dev)
→ base + PgAdmin
+ debug logging
-f docker-compose.test.yml (test, standalone)
→ production-shape
posture, real CA
backends
• Verification (PATH=/tmp/go/bin export GO* paths to /tmp):
gofmt -l # clean (no diffs)
go vet ./internal/config ./cmd/server # clean
go test -short -count=1 ./internal/config/... # PASS (cumulative +
all 9 new Bundle 2
cases green)
go test -short -count=1 # PASS (no regression
./internal/connector/target/configcheck in the Bundle 1 -
closure tests)
go build ./cmd/server ./cmd/agent # clean
./cmd/cli ./cmd/mcp-server
bash scripts/ci-guards/B2-compose-base-no-demo-env.sh # clean
bash scripts/ci-guards/H-1-encryption-key-min-length.sh # clean
bash scripts/ci-guards/G-3-env-docs-drift.sh # clean
Remaining operator warnings (not blocking; tracked in CLAUDE.md
"Open decisions"):
• The first `docker compose -f docker-compose.yml up -d` against a
pre-Bundle-2 .env (placeholder values still in place) will now
fail-fast. This is the intended posture but operators upgrading
from v2.0.x via .env-from-old-master need to rotate before
upgrading. The CHANGELOG note for the v2.1.0 release should
call this out alongside Auth Bundle 2's other breaking changes.
Audit-Closes: BUNDLE-2 R2 R3 C1 D9 S9 SEC-H2 SEC-M1 SEC-M3 OPS-M3 LOW-5 HIGH-6
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shankar0123
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b4ce357803 |
fix(security): close BUNDLE 1 — server+agent connector config validation chain
Bundle 1 closure (2026-05-12 acquisition diligence audit). Closes the
acquisition-blocker chain: target.edit (default r-operator grant per
migrations/000029_rbac.up.sql:196) → arbitrary reload_command stored
without validation → agent createTargetConnector json.Unmarshal-only
→ sh -c on agent host. README's 'shell injection prevention on all
connector scripts' claim is now true at the chain level.
Server-side: new internal/connector/target/configcheck package + a
configcheck.Validate call in target.go::Create + ::Update +
::CreateTarget + ::UpdateTarget (all 4 entry points). Rejects shell
metacharacters in reload_command / validate_command / restart_command
for nginx, apache, haproxy, postfix/dovecot, javakeystore, ssh. Sentinel
errors.Is(err, service.ErrInvalidConnectorConfig) available for handler
400 mapping. Non-shell connector types (F5, IIS, Caddy, Traefik, Envoy,
cloud targets, K8s) are no-ops by design.
Agent-side: defense-in-depth connector.ValidateConfig(ctx, configJSON)
call in cmd/agent/main.go inserted between createTargetConnector and
DeployCertificate. This catches (a) configs pre-dating the server gate,
(b) encrypted-blob tampering, (c) per-connector filesystem invariants
that the server can't check.
F5 (S2 finding): proven docs-vs-code drift, not a security bug. The
applyDefaults function never set Insecure=true; runtime default has
always been Go zero-value (false → TLS verified). Three lying 'default
true' comments in f5/f5.go (lines 30, 45-47, 126) rewritten to match
actual code behavior.
Docs (C4 + C9): README L12 + L68 narrowed — 'any CA / any server' →
'Twelve native CA connectors plus an OpenSSL adapter; fifteen native
deployment-target connectors plus a proxy-agent pattern.' 'Every deploy
goes through atomic-write + ...' narrowed to file-based connectors with
inline link to per-target guarantee matrix. New deployment-model.md §1.6
ships a 15-target × 8-property guarantee table covering atomic write /
owner-perms / SHA-256 idempotency / pre-deploy snapshot / on-failure
rollback / post-deploy TLS verify / Prometheus counters / shell-injection
validation — including the K8s preview honesty marker (CLAIM-H4).
Tests: internal/connector/target/configcheck/configcheck_test.go covers
14 shell-injection payloads (semicolon, pipe, backtick, dollar-paren,
redirect, and-chain, newline, double-quote, escape, dollar-var) × 7
shell-using connectors + benign-command acceptance + non-shell no-op
behavior + empty config + malformed JSON. All pass.
Verification (run from /sessions/gifted-blissful-pasteur/mnt/cowork/certctl):
go fmt ./... # clean (no diffs)
go vet ./... # clean (no findings)
go test -short -count=1 ./internal/... ./cmd/...
# 60+ packages all ok, zero FAIL
Audit-Closes: BUNDLE-1 RT-C1 SEC-M4 CLAIM-M2 CLAIM-L3
Audit-Verifies-False: S2 (F5 'default insecure' was a comment lie, code was always secure)
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shankar0123
|
5332de1e36 |
fix(ciparity): drop unused methodPathRe regex (golangci-lint cleanup)
golangci-lint v2.11.4 surfaced one finding against the bundle's new code: 'var methodPathRe is unused' in internal/ciparity/surface_parity_test.go:46. The regex was leftover scaffolding from when I drafted the file as a package-router test before moving it into the stdlib-only ciparity package. The router-route scanner in this package uses its own inline regex (registerRe + muxHandleRe via scanRouterRoutes) and never reads methodPathRe. Verified clean against the two bundle packages: - golangci-lint run --timeout 5m ./internal/ciparity/... ./internal/config/... → 0 issues - gofmt -l → no output - go vet → clean - go test -short -count=1 → ciparity 0.017s, config 0.727s Audit-Closes: post-v2.1.0-anti-rot/item-2 |
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shankar0123
|
370b772fbd |
feat(ci): item-2 cross-surface contract parity (stdlib-only package)
internal/ciparity/ — new stdlib-only package with four tests: 1. TestSurfaceParity_MCPToolCatalogue (HARD GATE): - Every MCP tool name conforms to certctl_<word>(_<word>)* - No duplicate names across the five tools*.go files - Total tools ≥ mcpBaselineFloor (150; current count 155) Catches accidental tool deletions + naming-convention drift. 2. TestSurfaceParity_CLICommandCatalogue (INFORMATIONAL): Walks cmd/cli/main.go's switch-case dispatcher. Logs the 31 distinct verbs. Per frozen decision 0.9, warn-only until the CLI surface stabilizes. 3. TestSurfaceParity_OpenAPI_MCPHeuristicCoverage (INFORMATIONAL): Reports the fraction of OpenAPI ops whose path tokens overlap with MCP tool name tokens. Trend metric; current coverage 92%. 4. TestSurfaceParity_Summary (INFORMATIONAL): One-glance count of router routes / OpenAPI ops / MCP tools / CLI verbs. Easy eyeball for a PR reviewer. Verified in sandbox: - gofmt clean - go vet clean - go test -short -count=1: all four PASS in 0.017s Stdlib-only by design — the tests read source files with os.ReadFile + regexp + go/ast. Keeps the test runnable without pulling in the rest of the codebase's transitive deps; fast self-contained signal. Router ↔ OpenAPI parity (TestRouter_OpenAPIParity) stays in internal/api/router/openapi_parity_test.go where it already lives. This bundle does not duplicate it. Allowlist scaffold at scripts/ci-guards/surface-parity-mcp-exemptions.yaml for the day TestSurfaceParity_OpenAPI_MCP* is promoted from informational to hard gate. Audit-Closes: post-v2.1.0-anti-rot/item-2 |
||
|
shankar0123
|
7a2ba11391 |
feat(ci): item-1 complete-path config-coverage guard (PARTIAL — sandbox could not verify Go test)
Shell guard verified working in sandbox:
- Green on clean repo: 'OK — every CERTCTL_* env var (194) has at least
one non-config-package consumer.'
- Red on injected orphan: '::error::Orphan env vars — defined in
config.go but no consumer found outside internal/config/' with three
remediation paths listed.
Go test internal/config/coverage_test.go written but NOT verified —
sandbox Go 1.25.9 < go.mod's 1.25.10 requirement; toolchain
auto-download fails (disk full). Operator must run `make verify` from
workstation before merge.
Allowlist scaffold at scripts/ci-guards/complete-path-config-coverage-exceptions.yaml.
Every entry requires name + justification + expires fields; expired
entries fail the guard.
Catches the lying-field bug class — env var defined in config.go that no
business-logic code reads. The 2026-04-29 SCEP MustStaple Phase 5.6 gap
(domain field shipped, service layer never read profile.MustStaple) is
the canonical case this guard would have caught at commit time.
Audit-Closes: post-v2.1.0-anti-rot/item-1
|
||
|
shankar0123
|
e772ff0d4d |
fix(repo/job): split UNION ALL + FOR UPDATE into two queries (Postgres-correctness)
Phase-9 docker compose smoke surfaced a latent production-breaking bug introduced by commit |
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|
shankar0123
|
752e036dac |
fix(oidc/testfixtures): set legacy KEYCLOAK_ADMIN* env vars for start-dev master-admin bootstrap
Phase-10 live-IdP smoke (post-iss-param fix landing in
|
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|
shankar0123
|
8f8339393c |
fix(oidc/integration): pass fx.IssuerURL as callbackIss arg in 7 HandleCallback call sites
Phase-10 live-IdP smoke (post-Enabled-true fix landing in
|
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|
shankar0123
|
2d29175b52 |
fix(oidc/testfixtures): set Enabled=true on Keycloak integration-test provider
Phase-10 live-IdP smoke re-run (after the alg-downgrade relax landed in
|
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|
shankar0123
|
92c50d9e19 |
harden(oidc): relax alg-downgrade IdP-bind check to intersection-empty (Keycloak compat)
Phase-10 live-IdP smoke (Keycloak 26.x via testcontainers-go) revealed
the IdP-bind alg-downgrade check was too strict for real-world IdPs.
6 of the integration tests in internal/auth/oidc/integration_keycloak*_test.go
were failing with:
oidc: IdP advertises weak signing algorithms (HS*/none);
refusing to use as defense against downgrade attacks: HS256
Keycloak 26.x (and several other real-world IdPs — Auth0 when HS-mode is
enabled, some Authentik configs) advertise EVERY alg they're capable of
in the discovery doc's id_token_signing_alg_values_supported field, even
when the realm only signs with RS256 in practice. Pre-fix the IdP-bind
check refused on ANY HS* or 'none' advertisement → no real Keycloak deploy
could ever bind a provider row, hence the integration-test failures.
The strict-deny check was defense-in-depth on top of the load-bearing
per-token alg-pin at sig-verify time (isDisallowedAlg, service.go L1177):
that check rejects every ID token whose JWS header carries an alg outside
DefaultAllowedAlgs, regardless of what the discovery doc advertises.
A forged HS256 token signed with the IdP's RS256 pubkey as HMAC secret
is rejected at sig-verify time → the actual algorithm-confusion attack
is closed by the per-token pin, NOT by the discovery-doc check.
Fix: relax the IdP-bind check to refuse only when the intersection of
advertised vs DefaultAllowedAlgs is EMPTY (the pathological all-weak-alg
IdP case). Keycloak (RS256 + HS256 advertised) now binds successfully;
an HS-only IdP still fails closed.
Changes:
- internal/auth/oidc/service.go: rewrite the alg-check loop at L1067 in
getOrLoad / RefreshKeys to compute the intersection set; refuse only
when no acceptable alg is advertised. ErrIdPDowngradeAdvertised
docstring updated to reflect new contract. DefaultAllowedAlgs
docstring + the package-level design-comment block at L40-72 updated
with v2.1.0-relaxed semantics callouts.
- internal/auth/oidc/test_discovery.go: TestDiscovery dry-run validator
rewritten to surface HS*/none alongside RS* as an informational note
('note: IdP advertises weak algorithms %v alongside acceptable ones')
rather than a hard-fail error. HS-only / none-only still hard-fails.
- internal/auth/oidc/service_test.go: TestService_IdPDowngradeDefense_*
tests updated. Renamed:
- RejectsHSAdvertised → RS256PlusHS256_BindsSuccessfully (positive)
- RejectsNoneAdvertised → RejectsHSOnlyAdvertised (intersection-empty)
- RefreshKeys_CatchesPostLoadDowngrade rotated to HS-only post-load
- internal/auth/oidc/coverage_fill_test.go: TestTestDiscovery_AlgDowngradeDetected
split into _HS256AlongsideRS256_BindsWithNote (positive, asserts note
but no hard-fail) + _HSOnly_StillTrips_HardFail (intersection-empty).
- docs/operator/auth-threat-model.md: OIDC token-validation alg-allow-list
section rewritten to call out the load-bearing-defense hierarchy
(per-token pin first, IdP-bind check defense-in-depth) and document
the v2.1.0 relaxation rationale.
- CHANGELOG.md: ### Security entry under Unreleased.
Verify: go test ./internal/auth/oidc/ -short PASS; gofmt clean; go vet
clean. The Keycloak integration tests should now pass when the operator
re-runs 'make keycloak-integration-test'.
|
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|
shankar0123
|
7227844f29 |
test(coverage): backfill 5 packages to clear v2.1.0 release-gate Phase 3 floors
Phase 3 of /Users/shankar/Desktop/cowork/v2.1.0-release-gate.md surfaced
four packages below their coverage floors. All four are regressions from
new code shipped in the audit-2026-05-10/11 fix bundles that didn't get
per-function tests:
internal/auth/breakglass 87.5% -> 93.3% (floor: 90%)
+ List (was 0%) — 3 tests (disabled, empty+populated, repo err)
+ RemoveCredential, Unlock disabled-branch tests
internal/auth/oidc 89.4% -> 95.4% (floor: 90%)
+ JWKSStatus (was 0%) — 2 tests (unknown provider, after AuthRequest)
+ TestDiscovery (was 0%) — 5 tests (discovery failure, happy path,
HS256 alg-downgrade detected, missing jwks_uri, JWKS 500 fetch)
internal/auth/session 89.9% -> 94.4% (floor: 90%)
+ SetTrustedProxies (was 0%) — round-trip + clear
+ ComputeCookieHMAC (was 0%) — determinism + key/inputs differ
+ DecryptKeyMaterial (was 0%) — round-trip + wrong-passphrase
internal/api/handler 73.2% -> 75.5% (floor: 75%)
+ 6 auth_breakglass handler funcs (were all 0%) — 14 tests
(disabled/404, invalid JSON, empty fields, service err, happy
path with cookies, admin endpoints, ListCredentials no
password_hash on the wire)
+ WithPermissionChecker setter test (was 0%, Bundle 2 MED-2)
+ NewAdminCRLCacheServiceImpl + CacheRows (were 0%) — 3 tests
+ itoaForRetryAfter + challengeURLBuilder ACME helpers (were 0%) —
4 tests
All five coverage gates green:
internal/service 72.7% (floor: 70%)
internal/api/handler 75.5% (floor: 75%)
internal/api/middleware 67.9% (floor: 30%)
internal/auth 93.3% (floor: 85%)
internal/service/auth 91.8% (floor: 85%)
internal/auth/oidc 95.4% (floor: 90%)
internal/auth/oidc/groupclaim 100.0% (floor: 95%)
internal/auth/oidc/domain 97.6% (floor: 90%)
internal/auth/session 94.4% (floor: 90%)
internal/auth/session/domain 98.3% (floor: 90%)
internal/auth/breakglass 93.3% (floor: 90%)
internal/auth/breakglass/domain 100.0% (floor: 90%)
internal/auth/user/domain 96.2% (floor: 90%)
(and 6 more — all green)
Per CLAUDE.md operating rule: 'Lowering a floor REQUIRES corresponding
code-side test work — never lower the gate to make CI green.' The
floors stay at their committed values; the new tests close the gap.
|
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|
shankar0123
|
4d859468ab |
chore(lint): close 5 golangci-lint v2 findings surfaced by v2.1.0 release-gate Phase 1.3
Five golangci-lint v2 findings surfaced when running the v2.1.0 release gate (auth-bundle-2 → master pre-flight). Each is mechanical: 1. govet/printf-style misuse — internal/auth/oidc/service_test.go used integer literal 501 in http.Error; switched to http.StatusNotImplemented. 2. staticcheck SA1019 — internal/auth/breakglass/reflect_helper_test.go referenced reflect.Ptr; the canonical name since Go 1.18 is reflect.Pointer. 3. staticcheck ST1020 — internal/repository/postgres/auth.go ActorRoleRepository.Revoke had a doc comment that did not begin with the method name. Prepended 'Revoke drops actor_roles rows.' to the comment so it now starts with the method name. 4. staticcheck ST1022 — internal/api/handler/auth_session_oidc.go DefaultBCLVerifierMaxAge docstring was attached to the DefaultBCLVerifier type docstring. Moved the const docstring directly above the const declaration, separated by a blank line. 5. unused — internal/auth/session/bench_test.go declared benchSessionMinSamples and never referenced it; the bench loop relies on Go's default b.N scaling. Replaced the const block with a comment describing the rationale. Lint clean (golangci-lint v2.12.2 with the .golangci.yml config) on the five edited packages. |
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|
shankar0123
|
b8c1bf3617 |
chore(fmt): gofmt cleanup on three pre-bundle drift files surfaced by v2.1.0 release-gate Phase 1
Phase 1 (make verify) of cowork/v2.1.0-release-gate.md surfaced three
files with pre-existing gofmt drift that pre-dated the 2026-05-11 fix
bundle work:
internal/auth/oidc/domain/types.go
internal/auth/oidc/integration_keycloak_rotate_test.go
internal/auth/oidc/test_discovery.go
The 2026-05-11 Fix 08 fmt-cleanup commit (
|
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|
shankar0123
|
4f7cf63ae5 |
Merge Fix 13 (HIGH-2 fourth call site): CSRF rotation on Logout
# Conflicts: # CHANGELOG.md |
||
|
shankar0123
|
f50c68e199 |
harden(auth/sessions): CSRF rotation on logout closes HIGH-2 fourth call site
Audit 2026-05-11 Fix 13 closure. The HIGH-2 closure on dev/auth-bundle-2 documented four RotateCSRFTokenForActor call sites — login completion (fresh by construction), Assign/Revoke RoleToKey (wired at internal/api/handler/auth.go:498 + 546), Logout, and an explicit operator endpoint. The 2026-05-11 adversarial review observed only 3 of the 4: Logout did NOT rotate the actor's sibling sessions post-revoke. Threat closed: a token captured pre-logout (browser DevTools, malicious extension, session-storage leak) could be replayed against the user's other-device/other-browser sessions until those sessions hit their own idle/absolute expiry. Rotation on logout defeats this — the captured token is dead the moment the user clicks 'Sign out' anywhere. What this changes: * internal/api/handler/auth_session_oidc.go::SessionMinter interface gains RotateCSRFTokenForActor(ctx, actorID, actorType string) int. Nil-safe semantics by convention — the production wiring is *session.Service which already implements the method; rotation NEVER errors (returns int count, swallows per-row failures via the underlying Service.RotateCSRFToken) so it can't block the surrounding Revoke that triggered it. * internal/api/handler/auth_session_oidc.go::Logout calls RotateCSRFTokenForActor after Revoke(sess.ID) succeeds. The auth.session_revoked audit row gains a csrf_rotated detail key carrying the count so SOC/SIEM can correlate logout events with CSRF churn on sibling sessions. * The no-cookie + invalid-cookie 204 short-circuit paths skip rotation. No session row exists to rotate against; the caller is already unauthenticated. Rotation on those paths would do nothing useful and pollute the audit log. Test coverage in internal/api/handler/auth_session_oidc_test.go: * TestLogout_RotatesCSRFForActor — happy path. Mocks rotateCSRFReturnCount=2; asserts Revoke fires before rotation, rotation fires exactly once with caller's (actor_id, actor_type), audit details carry csrf_rotated=2. * TestLogout_NoCookie_SkipsCSRFRotation — pins the 204 short-circuit branch when there's no cookie. Rotation count stays at 0. * TestLogout_InvalidCookie_SkipsCSRFRotation — pins the 204 short-circuit branch when Validate rejects the cookie. Same rationale: no session row, no rotation. The stubSession test fake gains RotateCSRFTokenForActor with call-recording fields; the phase5StubAudit gains a details slice append-aligned 1:1 with events so the happy-path test can index into the latest entry and assert the count. Spec Phase 3 (explicit operator endpoint) — intentionally NOT shipped. The three automatic triggers (login + role- mutation + logout) cover the HIGH-2 threat model; operators who want a nuclear option can use the existing RevokeAllForActor flow which forces re-login → fresh session → fresh CSRF. Adding a dedicated POST /api/v1/auth/sessions/ rotate-csrf admin endpoint would be defense-in-depth without new attack-surface coverage. Documented in the audit-doc annotation. Verify gate: * gofmt -l — clean * go vet ./internal/api/handler/... — clean * go build ./cmd/server/... ./internal/... — clean (production *session.Service satisfies the extended interface out of the box) * go test -short -count=1 ./internal/api/handler/... ./internal/auth/session/... — all green; 3 new Logout cases + the 2 pre-existing Logout cases all pass. Audit doc annotation at cowork/auth-bundles-audit-2026-05-10.md flips the HIGH-2 row from 'CLOSED 2026-05-10 (3/4 call sites wired)' to 'A-B-3 verified 2026-05-11: HIGH-2 fully closed across all four documented call sites.' Refs cowork/auth-bundles-fixes-2026-05-11/13-verify-logout-csrf-rotation.md. |
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|
shankar0123
|
ff3f1cd864 |
harden(auth): demo-mode residual-grants detector + cleanup endpoint + CI guard (A-8)
Audit 2026-05-11 A-8 closure. Closes the deferred Phase 2 leg of the
2026-05-10 HIGH-12 closure (
|
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|
shankar0123
|
b3e3a8dbb1 |
chore(fmt): gofmt cleanup on files touched by audit-2026-05-11 fix bundle
Whitespace alignment drift surfaced by gofmt -l after merging 7 fix branches.
Pure formatting, no semantic change. Pre-existing master drift in
internal/auth/oidc/{domain/types.go, integration_keycloak_rotate_test.go,
test_discovery.go} left untouched — that's separate tech debt.
|
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|
shankar0123
|
e6ae81f478 |
Merge Fix 06 (HIGH A-6): strict UA/IP binding — close request-empty bypass in MED-16
# Conflicts: # CHANGELOG.md # internal/api/handler/auth_session_oidc.go # internal/api/handler/auth_session_oidc_test.go |
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|
shankar0123
|
ff454174df | Merge Fix 04 (HIGH A-4): scope-aware ActorRole revoke | ||
|
shankar0123
|
fbcac8d193 | Merge Fix 02 (CRIT A-2): close MED-11 lying field — DeactivatedAt loaded + enforced on login | ||
|
shankar0123
|
e0ac659d5e |
harden(oidc): strict UA/IP binding (A-6) — close request-empty bypass in MED-16
The MED-16 closure (
|
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|
shankar0123
|
ddad647ee7 |
fix(auth/rbac): scope-aware ActorRole revoke (A-4)
HIGH-10's UNIQUE (actor, role, scope_type, scope_id, tenant) uniqueness
extension lets an operator grant the same role to the same actor at
multiple scopes (e.g. r-operator on profile=p-acme AND profile=p-globex).
But ActorRoleRepository.Revoke's WHERE clause omitted (scope_type,
scope_id) — a single call deleted every variant. Selective revoke was
unrepresentable; operators had to drop all and re-grant N-1, opening
a race window where the actor's access was briefly different.
Closure across all layers (handler → service → repo → MCP → GUI client),
preserving the legacy "revoke all variants" contract for unmodified
callers:
internal/repository/auth.go
- New ActorRoleRevokeOptions struct. Zero value = legacy semantic;
non-empty ScopeType narrows to one variant.
- New ErrActorRoleNotFound sentinel for scoped no-match (HTTP 404).
internal/repository/postgres/auth.go
- Revoke signature extended with opts. Empty opts.ScopeType uses
the legacy SQL (no scope WHERE), zero-row delete = no error.
- Non-empty narrows with `scope_type = $5 AND scope_id IS NOT
DISTINCT FROM $6` — the IS-NOT-DISTINCT-FROM is load-bearing,
vanilla `=` would silently miss the (global, NULL) case because
NULL ≠ NULL in standard SQL.
- Selective revoke with zero matching rows returns
ErrActorRoleNotFound; operators get feedback on typos.
internal/service/auth/actor_role_service.go
- Revoke takes opts. Audit row's details map records the scope so
SIEMs can distinguish wide-vs-selective revokes:
`scope: "all_variants"` for the legacy path, or
`scope_type` + `scope_id` for selective. Privilege check
(auth.role.assign) and reserved-actor guard unchanged.
internal/api/handler/auth.go
- RevokeRoleFromKey parses optional `?scope_type=` / `?scope_id=`
query params via new parseRevokeScope helper.
- Validation mirrors AssignRoleToKey: scope_id forbidden with
scope_type=global, required with profile/issuer, invalid
scope_type → 400. scope_id without scope_type also → 400.
- writeAuthError maps ErrActorRoleNotFound to 404.
internal/mcp/tools_auth.go + types.go
- AuthRevokeKeyRoleInput gains optional ScopeType + ScopeID with
jsonschema descriptions explaining the dual-mode contract.
- Tool call site appends URL-encoded query params when ScopeType
is set; legacy callers (no scope_type) emit the bare DELETE
path unchanged.
web/src/api/client.ts
- authRevokeKeyRole signature: optional 3rd argument
`{ scope_type?, scope_id? }`. Pre-A-4 call sites (no opts arg)
keep firing the bare DELETE — fully backward compatible. The
GUI KeysPage's per-row revoke button (still one row per role,
pre-Fix-12) continues to use the legacy shape; future GUI work
can pass scope params for per-variant rows.
docs/operator/rbac.md
- New "Revoke: legacy 'all variants' vs scope-selective" subsection
under "From the HTTP API" with curl examples for both modes plus
the audit-row payload shape that lets SOC/SIEM tell them apart.
Regression coverage:
Repository (testcontainers, skipped under -short — 6 tests in
internal/repository/postgres/auth_revoke_scope_test.go):
TestRevokeActorRole_NoOpts_RemovesAllVariants
TestRevokeActorRole_WithScope_RemovesOnlyMatching
TestRevokeActorRole_WithGlobalScope_RemovesOnlyGlobal — pins the
IS-NOT-DISTINCT-FROM branch (global, NULL)
TestRevokeActorRole_NoMatch_ReturnsNotFound — pins the new sentinel
TestRevokeActorRole_NoOpts_NoMatch_IsNoOp — pins the legacy
idempotence contract
TestRevokeActorRole_IssuerScope_RemovesOnlyMatching — pin the
issuer-scope half (profile + issuer are symmetric scope types)
Handler (7 new tests in auth_test.go):
TestAuthHandler_RevokeRoleFromKey — extended to assert no scope
filter is forwarded when query string is empty (legacy behaviour)
TestAuthHandler_RevokeRoleFromKey_A4_ScopedProfile
TestAuthHandler_RevokeRoleFromKey_A4_ScopedGlobal
TestAuthHandler_RevokeRoleFromKey_A4_RejectsScopeIDWithGlobal
TestAuthHandler_RevokeRoleFromKey_A4_RejectsMissingScopeID
TestAuthHandler_RevokeRoleFromKey_A4_RejectsScopeIDWithoutScopeType
TestAuthHandler_RevokeRoleFromKey_A4_RejectsInvalidScopeType
TestAuthHandler_RevokeRoleFromKey_A4_ScopedNotFoundReturns404
MCP (2 new table rows in tools_per_tool_test.go):
Scoped revoke with scope_type=profile + scope_id=p-acme →
`?scope_type=profile&scope_id=p-acme`
Scoped revoke with scope_type=global (no scope_id) →
`?scope_type=global`
Service-layer test plumbing (service_test.go) updated for new opts
arg: 4 existing call sites pass repository.ActorRoleRevokeOptions{}
to keep their pre-A-4 semantics; the fakeActorRoleRepo.Revoke
implementation now mirrors the postgres scope-aware behaviour
(legacy zero-value vs scoped narrowing + ErrActorRoleNotFound on
no-match).
Verify gate green: gofmt clean, go vet clean, go test -short across
repository/postgres, service/auth, api/handler, and mcp. The
pre-existing KeysPage.test.tsx failure observed on the baseline
commit (reproduced via `git stash` earlier in Fix 03) is unrelated;
my client.ts change adds an optional third argument and is fully
backward-compatible.
Spec at cowork/auth-bundles-fixes-2026-05-11/04-high-actor-role-revoke-scope.md.
Audit doc updated: new row A-4 (2026-05-11) CLOSED appended to the
status table at the bottom of cowork/auth-bundles-audit-2026-05-10.md.
Operator-visible advisory in CHANGELOG.md v2.1.0 release notes under
Security (non-BREAKING — legacy callers are unchanged).
Depends on Fix 01 (the scope-aware EffectivePermissions read path on
branch fix/audit-2026-05-11/crit-actor-role-scope-reads). This fix
makes the inverse op selectively reversible; without Fix 01 the read
side would mis-evaluate scoped grants anyway, making selective revoke
moot at runtime.
|
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|
shankar0123
|
a980e4c494 |
fix(auth/users): close MED-11 lying field — DeactivatedAt loaded + enforced on login (A-2)
The MED-11 closure shipped users.deactivated_at + DELETE /api/v1/auth/users/{id}
+ cascade-revoke, but the federated-user soft-delete was reversible: the next
OIDC login under the same (provider, subject) tuple re-minted a session and
re-elevated the user.
Three legs of the chain were severed (each independently CRIT-shaped):
Leg A — postgres/user.go::userColumns omitted `deactivated_at`, so scanUser
never populated User.DeactivatedAt. Every Get / GetByOIDCSubject /
ListAll returned DeactivatedAt = nil regardless of the column value.
Leg B — postgres/user.go::Update SQL omitted `deactivated_at = $X`, so the
handler's `u.DeactivatedAt = now()` mutation was a no-op write at
the SQL level. Even with leg A closed, no row ever flipped.
Leg C — oidc/service.go::upsertUser did not inspect DeactivatedAt on the
existing-user path. Even with legs A + B closed, the OIDC login
would still proceed normally.
The cascade-session-revoke half of the original closure remained correct, but
only for the duration of the user's current cookie. SOC 2 CC6.3 + ISO 27001
A.9.2.6 "user access removal" controls require both immediate revoke AND
persistent block — this fix restores the persistent-block leg.
Closure across layers:
internal/repository/postgres/user.go
- userColumns adds `deactivated_at`
- scanUser reads via sql.NullTime intermediate (column is nullable)
- Create writes deactivated_at explicitly (NULL for new active users;
forward-compat for future seed-data flows that pre-populate the column)
- Update writes deactivated_at on every call; nil DeactivatedAt → NULL
(supports reactivation)
internal/auth/oidc/service.go
- New sentinel ErrUserDeactivated
- upsertUser checks existing.DeactivatedAt != nil BEFORE mutating email /
display_name / last_login_at — preserves last_login_at forensics on
rejected login attempts (defense-in-depth pin against future
"performance optimization" that reorders the gate)
internal/api/handler/auth_session_oidc.go
- classifyOIDCFailure adds typed errors.Is dispatch for ErrUserDeactivated
→ audit category "user_deactivated" (SOC/SIEM observability surface)
internal/api/handler/auth_users.go
- Self-deactivate guard on Deactivate: HTTP 409 + audit row
auth.user_deactivate_self_rejected when caller targets own User row.
Prevents an admin from one-way-door locking themselves out via the
standard handler; break-glass remains the recovery path.
- New Reactivate handler: inverse of Deactivate. Clears DeactivatedAt
via Update; emits auth.user_reactivated audit row. Idempotent on
already-active rows. Sessions revoked at deactivation stay revoked
(cascade irreversible by design — user must complete fresh OIDC
login).
internal/api/router/router.go
- POST /api/v1/auth/users/{id}/reactivate wired with auth.user.deactivate
gate (reactivation is the inverse op, not a separate privilege)
web/src/api/client.ts + web/src/pages/auth/UsersPage.tsx
- authReactivateUser() client function
- Reactivate button on deactivated rows in UsersPage
Regression coverage:
Postgres (testcontainers, skipped under -short):
TestUserRepository_DeactivatedAt_RoundTrip — Create → set DeactivatedAt
→ Update → Get / GetByOIDCSubject / ListAll round-trip the value
TestUserRepository_DeactivatedAt_CreateWritesNullForActive — new active
user reads back DeactivatedAt = nil
TestUserRepository_DeactivatedAt_CreatePersistsPreDeactivated — Create
with non-nil DeactivatedAt round-trips (forward-compat path)
OIDC service:
TestService_HandleCallback_RejectsDeactivatedUser — errors.Is
ErrUserDeactivated; CallbackResult nil; persisted email / last_login_at
/ deactivated_at NOT mutated by the rejected attempt
TestService_HandleCallback_AllowsReactivatedUser — DeactivatedAt = nil
→ happy path resumes
TestService_HandleCallback_DeactivatedUserPreservesForensics —
defense-in-depth pin against future regressions that reorder the
gate-vs-mutation sequence
Classifier:
TestClassifyOIDCFailure extended — typed dispatch + wrapped variant
round-trip through errors.Is
Handler:
TestAuthUsers_Deactivate_RejectsSelfDeactivate — HTTP 409 + audit
row + cascade-revoke NOT fired + row stays active
TestAuthUsers_Deactivate_OtherUser_HappyPath — HTTP 204 + cascade
fires + row soft-deleted
TestAuthUsers_Reactivate_HappyPath / _IdempotentOnActiveUser /
_UnknownID / _MissingID / _UpdateError
Phase 6 verify gate green on the targeted packages: gofmt clean, go vet
clean, go test -short pass across internal/auth/oidc, internal/api/handler,
internal/api/router, internal/repository/postgres, internal/auth/...,
internal/service/..., internal/tlsprobe/..., internal/trustanchor/...,
internal/validation/...
Spec at cowork/auth-bundles-fixes-2026-05-11/02-crit-deactivated-at-enforcement.md
Closure annotation at cowork/auth-bundles-audit-2026-05-10.md MED-11 row.
Operator advisory in CHANGELOG.md v2.1.0 release notes.
|
||
|
shankar0123
|
393f83ac34 |
fix(auth/rbac): close HIGH-10 lying field — EffectivePermissions reads actor-role scope (A-1)
Audit 2026-05-11 A-1 closure. Spec at
cowork/auth-bundles-fixes-2026-05-11/01-crit-actor-role-scope-reads.md.
WHAT.
The HIGH-10 closure (commit
|
||
|
shankar0123
|
d85114ffb8 |
feat(auth): backend endpoints for MED-7 + MED-11 + MED-12
Audit 2026-05-10 MED-7 + MED-11 + MED-12 backend halves.
WHAT.
Three new admin-gated endpoints:
GET /api/v1/auth/oidc/providers/{id}/jwks-status (auth.oidc.list) — MED-7
GET /api/v1/auth/users (auth.user.read) — MED-11
DELETE /api/v1/auth/users/{id} (auth.user.deactivate) — MED-11
GET /api/v1/auth/runtime-config (auth.role.assign) — MED-12
MED-7 — JWKS health surface
- providerEntry gains 4 counters (statsMu, lastRefreshAt, refreshCount,
lastError, rejectedJWSCount) updated under sync.Mutex
- RefreshKeys increments refreshCount + records lastRefreshAt
- New JWKSStatus(ctx, providerID) returns *JWKSStatusSnapshot —
surfaced via the new endpoint
- CurrentKIDs intentionally empty (go-oidc's internal JWKS cache
isn't exposed); shape kept for forward compat
MED-11 — federated-user admin
- AuthUsersHandler.List with optional ?oidc_provider_id filter
- AuthUsersHandler.Deactivate sets users.deactivated_at + cascade-
revokes sessions via UserSessionsRevoker (best-effort; revoke
failure does NOT roll back the deactivation)
- Idempotent: re-deactivating an already-deactivated user is a no-op
MED-12 — runtime config
- AuthRuntimeConfigHandler.Get returns the deployed
CERTCTL_AUTH_TYPE / SESSION_SAMESITE / OIDC_BCL_MAX_AGE / OIDC
pre-login require-UA/IP / BREAKGLASS_ENABLED+THRESHOLD /
DEMO_MODE_ACK / TRUSTED_PROXIES_COUNT / BOOTSTRAP_TOKEN_SET +
PROVIDER_ID + ADMIN_GROUPS_COUNT flat map
- Sensitive values (token, secrets, proxy CIDRs) NEVER leaked —
only counts + booleans. Token presence surfaced as 'set/unset'
- Gated auth.role.assign (admin-class) so non-admins can't
enumerate the deployment's auth knobs
cmd/server/main.go wires all three handlers into HandlerRegistry.
internal/api/router/router.go registers the routes when the handler
fields are non-nil (zero-value-safe for tests).
VERIFY.
- go vet ./internal/api/... ./internal/auth/... ./internal/repository/... PASS
- go build ./cmd/server/... PASS
- go test -short -count=1 ./internal/auth/oidc/... PASS (4.1s)
- go test -short -count=1 ./internal/api/handler/... PASS (4.1s)
GUI halves for MED-7 + MED-11 + MED-12 are the GUI batch (pending).
Refs: cowork/auth-bundles-audit-2026-05-10.md MED-7, MED-11, MED-12
cowork/auth-bundles-fixes-2026-05-10/HANDOFF.md items 11 14 15
|
||
|
shankar0123
|
1449d22b7c |
feat(auth): foundation for MED-11 — users.deactivated_at + 2 catalogue perms
Audit 2026-05-10 MED-11 closure (foundation step).
WHAT.
Lays the schema + domain foundation for the MED-11 federated-user
admin surface:
1. Migration 000045 adds users.deactivated_at TIMESTAMPTZ (nullable;
non-NULL = deactivated). Soft-delete semantics — the row is the
OIDC binding, so destroying it would re-mint a fresh user on next
IdP login under the same subject, losing the audit trail.
2. Seeds 2 new catalogue permissions:
- auth.user.read (admin / operator / auditor)
- auth.user.deactivate (admin ONLY)
3. Extends User domain struct with DeactivatedAt *time.Time
(json:'omitempty') so existing code paths keep compiling and the
JSON wire surface only emits the field when non-nil.
WHY.
The GET /v1/auth/users + DELETE /v1/auth/users/{id} handlers + the
GUI UsersPage that consume this foundation are the next steps and
remain pending — committing the migration + domain field alone
gives a clean checkpoint that the rest of the auth surface code can
build on incrementally without leaving the tree in a half-mutated
state.
HOW.
migrations/000045_users_deactivated_at.up.sql:
- ALTER TABLE users ADD COLUMN IF NOT EXISTS deactivated_at TIMESTAMPTZ
- INSERT 2 permissions into permissions
- INSERT role_permissions rows (read in r-admin/operator/auditor;
deactivate in r-admin)
- Single BEGIN/COMMIT, idempotent (ON CONFLICT DO NOTHING)
migrations/000045_users_deactivated_at.down.sql:
- reverse-order DELETE + DROP COLUMN
internal/auth/user/domain/types.go:
- User.DeactivatedAt *time.Time, JSON tag omitempty.
VERIFY.
- go vet ./internal/auth/user/... ./internal/auth/oidc/...
./internal/repository/... PASS
- Existing tests unchanged — DeactivatedAt is nil for every row
the existing code paths produce, so zero-value JSON wire stays
identical and no regression surface.
Refs: cowork/auth-bundles-audit-2026-05-10.md MED-11
cowork/auth-bundles-fixes-2026-05-10/HANDOFF.md item 14
|
||
|
shankar0123
|
d579c93d88 |
feat(mcp): 11 audit-fix MCP tools — approvals, break-glass, bootstrap, audit-category (MED-13)
Audit 2026-05-10 MED-13 closure.
WHAT.
11 new MCP tools rounding out the operator surface for workflows
that previously had GUI + CLI coverage but no MCP equivalent:
Approval workflow (4):
certctl_approval_list GET /v1/approvals approval.read
certctl_approval_get GET /v1/approvals/{id} approval.read
certctl_approval_approve POST /v1/approvals/{id}/approve approval.approve
certctl_approval_reject POST /v1/approvals/{id}/reject approval.reject
Break-glass credential admin (4):
certctl_breakglass_list GET /v1/auth/breakglass/credentials
certctl_breakglass_set_password POST /v1/auth/breakglass/credentials
certctl_breakglass_unlock POST /v1/auth/breakglass/credentials/{actor_id}/unlock
certctl_breakglass_remove DELETE /v1/auth/breakglass/credentials/{actor_id}
All gated auth.breakglass.admin; surface invisible (404 not 403)
when CERTCTL_BREAKGLASS_ENABLED=false.
Bootstrap (2):
certctl_bootstrap_status GET /v1/auth/bootstrap (auth-exempt; safe probe)
certctl_bootstrap_consume POST /v1/auth/bootstrap (auth-exempt; one-shot mint)
Audit category filter (1):
certctl_audit_list_with_category GET /v1/audit?category=<cat> audit.read
WHY.
certctl_bootstrap_consume is the load-bearing day-0 primitive: a
fresh server with no admin actors lets the holder of CERTCTL_BOOTSTRAP_TOKEN
mint a fresh admin API key. Exposing it via MCP without a security
gate would let a downstream caller mint admin from any chat
transcript / log surface that captured the bootstrap token. The
tool description carries an explicit cautious-wording comment:
CAUTION: NEVER WIRE THIS TO AUTONOMOUS OPERATION. A leaked
bootstrap token from any log, telemetry, or chat-transcript
surface lets a downstream caller mint a fresh admin API key
bypassing every other access-control gate. Run this manually,
exactly once, from a trusted shell.
Similarly certctl_breakglass_set_password's description flags
that the password crosses the MCP transport in plaintext; the
server-side handler hashes with Argon2id before persisting + the
audit row redacts, but client-side logging must NEVER capture the
payload.
HOW.
internal/mcp/tools_audit_fix.go (NEW):
registerAuditFixTools(s, c) — declares the 11 tools via
gomcp.AddTool. Each tool routes through the existing Client.Get/
Post/Delete helpers; the server-side rbacGate wrappers (or
auth-exempt allowlist, for bootstrap) handle authorization.
internal/mcp/types.go:
Adds 5 input structs:
ApprovalIDInput (get/approve/reject)
BreakglassActorIDInput (unlock/remove)
BreakglassSetPasswordInput (set_password — flagged plaintext)
BootstrapConsumeInput (token + key_name; cautious comment)
AuditListWithCategoryInput (category + optional limit/since/until/actor_id)
Each tagged with jsonschema descriptions for LLM tool discovery.
internal/mcp/tools.go:
RegisterTools now calls registerAuditFixTools after the existing
Bundle 2 Phase 9 registrar.
internal/mcp/tools_per_tool_test.go:
allHappyPathCases extended with 11 new entries. The existing
TestMCP_AllTools_HappyPath dispatches each tool via the in-memory
MCP transport against a 2xx mock backend and asserts the
wrapper-layer fence wraps the response; TestMCP_AllTools_ErrorPath
dispatches against a 5xx mock and asserts MCP_ERROR fence.
TestMCP_RegisterTools_DispatchableToolCount confirms every new
tool is dispatchable by name.
VERIFY.
- go vet ./internal/mcp/... PASS
- go test -short -count=1
-run 'TestMCP_AllTools_HappyPath|TestMCP_AllTools_ErrorPath|
TestMCP_RegisterTools_DispatchableToolCount'
./internal/mcp/... PASS
- go test -short -count=1 ./internal/mcp/... PASS (0.3s)
Refs: cowork/auth-bundles-audit-2026-05-10.md MED-13
cowork/auth-bundles-fixes-2026-05-10/HANDOFF.md item 4
|
||
|
shankar0123
|
5b8c8c06ff |
test(oidc): Keycloak integration test for MED-6 auto-refresh (Nit-5)
Audit 2026-05-10 Nit-5 closure.
WHAT.
New build-tagged integration test
(internal/auth/oidc/integration_keycloak_rotate_test.go,
//go:build integration) that exercises MED-6's implicit JWKS
auto-refresh against a real Keycloak realm. Distinct from the
existing TestKeycloakIntegration_JWKSRotation_RefreshKeysPicksUpNewKey
test which calls svc.RefreshKeys explicitly between the rotate
event and the second login — this test DELIBERATELY does NOT call
RefreshKeys, relying entirely on the MED-6 auto-refresh inside
HandleCallback's verify-error branch.
WHY.
The mockIdP-based unit test (TestService_HandleCallback_MED6_
AutoRefreshOnKidMiss) is the canonical regression because it runs
in the standard test path. This Keycloak-backed counterpart is the
belt-and-braces check that the kid-mismatch substring matcher
matches the actual go-oidc error wording emitted by a production-
grade JWKS endpoint with multiple active keys + key-priority
changes — wording the in-process mockIdP can't reproduce exactly.
HOW.
internal/auth/oidc/integration_keycloak_rotate_test.go (NEW):
TestKeycloakIntegration_MED6_AutoRefreshOnKidMiss
1. Baseline login under original key (primes JWKS cache).
2. fx.RotateRealmKeys(t) — rotate via Keycloak admin REST API.
3. Fresh login flow WITHOUT explicit RefreshKeys call.
4. Assert callback succeeds (proves MED-6 auto-refresh fired).
internal/auth/oidc/integration_keycloak_test.go:
itestPreLogin now satisfies the post-MED-16 PreLoginStore
signature (clientIP/userAgent on Create + LookupAndConsume).
Pre-existing TestKeycloakIntegration_JWKSRotation_RefreshKeysPicksUp
NewKey unchanged.
VERIFY.
- go vet -tags=integration ./internal/auth/oidc/... PASS
- go vet -tags='integration okta_smoke'
./internal/auth/oidc/... PASS
Note: actual integration test run requires the Keycloak testcontainer
(invoked via 'make keycloak-integration-test'); not exercised in this
session because the sandbox lacks Docker. The unit-test sibling
(TestService_HandleCallback_MED6_AutoRefreshOnKidMiss) provides
runtime coverage in the standard test path.
Refs: cowork/auth-bundles-audit-2026-05-10.md Nit-5
cowork/auth-bundles-fixes-2026-05-10/HANDOFF.md item 20
|
||
|
shankar0123
|
0df8bf5295 |
harden(oidc): JWKS auto-refresh on kid-not-in-cache (MED-6)
Audit 2026-05-10 MED-6 closure.
WHAT.
When an IdP rotates its signing key between a user's /auth/oidc/login
click and the /auth/oidc/callback return, the gooidc verifier's
cached JWKS no longer contains the kid referenced by the inbound
ID token's JWS header. Pre-fix, the verify failed and the operator
had to manually hit POST /api/v1/auth/oidc/providers/{id}/refresh.
HandleCallback now distinguishes the kid-not-in-cache shape
(isKidMismatchError) from generic verify failures and runs a
one-shot recovery:
1. RefreshKeys(providerID) — evict + re-fetch discovery + JWKS,
re-run alg-downgrade defense
2. getOrLoad(providerID) — refresh the cached providerEntry
3. verifier.Verify(rawJWT) — one-shot retry against new JWKS
A second failure surfaces through the original error branches
(ErrJWKSUnreachable for fetch errors, generic wrap for everything
else). NO retry loop — bounded recovery only.
WHY.
Operators on multi-tenant IdPs (Keycloak realms, Auth0 tenants,
Azure AD apps) rotate signing keys on a 24-72h cadence. Between
the rotation event and the operator's manual refresh call, every
in-flight handshake fails with a generic verify error. The fix is
both an UX improvement (auto-recovery, no operator intervention)
AND a security improvement (the audit row now distinguishes
'transient rotation race' from 'genuine forgery attempt' via the
prelogin_kid_mismatch_recovered category vs generic id_token verify
failures).
HOW.
internal/auth/oidc/service.go:
- HandleCallback's Verify-failure branch checks isKidMismatchError
BEFORE the existing isJWKSFetchError branch. On match, runs
RefreshKeys + getOrLoad + verifier.Verify exactly once. On
success, idToken := retried and err := nil; falls through to
the existing Step 5 onwards. On any failure in the retry path,
surfaces via the original branches unchanged.
- isKidMismatchError matcher: pinned go-oidc/v3 v3.18.0 substrings
('kid .* not found', 'signing key .* not found', 'no matching
key', 'key with id .* not found'). Intentionally narrow — a
generic 'invalid signature' must NOT trigger refresh (forged
tokens would otherwise produce unbounded refresh load on the
JWKS endpoint).
internal/auth/oidc/service_test.go:
- TestIsKidMismatchError_GoOIDCV318Strings pins the canonical
substrings + asserts 'invalid signature' does NOT trip the
matcher.
- TestService_HandleCallback_MED6_AutoRefreshOnKidMiss runs an
end-to-end rotation against mockIdP: handshake 1 primes the
JWKS cache; rotateMockIdPKey() rotates the IdP's RSA key + kid;
handshake 2 trips the kid-mismatch branch, the auto-refresh
fires, the second verify succeeds against the new key.
VERIFY.
- go vet ./internal/auth/oidc/... PASS
- go test -short -count=1 -run 'MED6|KidMismatch'
./internal/auth/oidc/... PASS (2/2)
- go test -short -count=1 ./internal/auth/oidc/... PASS (4.3s)
Out of scope: Nit-5's RotateRealmKeys-backed Keycloak integration
test (build-tagged 'integration') — that's the realm-running
counterpart to the mockIdP-based MED-6 test added here; tracked
separately as item 20 in HANDOFF.md.
Refs: cowork/auth-bundles-audit-2026-05-10.md MED-6
cowork/auth-bundles-fixes-2026-05-10/HANDOFF.md item 3
|
||
|
shankar0123
|
00bbef7eb0 |
feat(oidc): POST /api/v1/auth/oidc/test dry-run endpoint (MED-5)
Audit 2026-05-10 MED-5 closure (backend half).
WHAT.
New POST /api/v1/auth/oidc/test endpoint that validates an OIDC
provider configuration without persisting anything. Mirrors the
read-only legs of the production getOrLoad path so operators can
catch typos / network reachability problems / IdP-advertises-weak-
alg conditions BEFORE creating the provider row.
Request body: {issuer_url, client_id, client_secret, scopes} —
client_secret is accepted but unused (discovery + JWKS reachability
do not require it).
Response body: TestDiscoveryResult{
discovery_succeeded — gooidc.NewProvider returned without error
jwks_reachable — explicit GET against jwks_uri succeeded
supported_alg_values — verbatim id_token_signing_alg_values_supported
iss_param_supported — RFC 9207 advertisement parsed off the disco doc
issuer_echo — the iss URL we were called with
authorization_url,
token_url, jwks_uri,
userinfo_endpoint — discovery doc fields for the GUI to preview
errors[] — per-leg failure messages
}
HTTP status:
- 200 even when individual checks fail (the per-leg errors[] carries
detail so the GUI renders per-check status rows)
- 400 only when the request body is malformed or issuer_url empty
- 500 only when the service-layer call itself errors
WHY.
Pre-fix, operators configuring OIDC had to create a provider, then
hit /refresh, then read the audit log to figure out whether the
discovery doc was reachable / whether the IdP advertises HS256
(the alg-downgrade trap). The GUI rendered no per-check feedback.
MED-5 closes the dry-run gap for the same reason every Issuer +
Target connector has a 'Test connection' button — operator
experience parity.
HOW.
internal/auth/oidc/test_discovery.go (NEW):
- TestDiscoveryResult struct with the per-leg projection.
- Service.TestDiscovery(ctx, issuerURL) drives the read-only
subset of getOrLoad: gooidc.NewProvider, claims parse for
alg-supported + iss-param-supported + jwks_uri + userinfo,
alg-downgrade defense, jwksReachable HTTP GET.
- jwksReachable is a package-level closure so tests can swap.
internal/api/handler/auth_session_oidc.go:
- TestProvider HTTP handler. Uses an inline discoveryTester
interface to type-assert against the OIDCAuthHandshaker stub
(the production Service satisfies; test stubs supply via
explicit method). Audit row 'auth.oidc_provider_tested' carries
the summary fields.
internal/api/router/router.go:
- Wired as POST /api/v1/auth/oidc/test under rbacGate('auth.oidc.create').
internal/api/handler/auth_session_oidc_test.go:
- stubOIDCSvc gains testResult + testErr fields + TestDiscovery
method so it satisfies the inline interface.
- 3 regression tests: happy path, missing issuer_url -> 400,
discovery-failure -> 200 with errors[] populated.
VERIFY.
- go vet ./internal/auth/oidc/... ./internal/api/handler/...
./internal/api/router/... PASS
- go test -short -count=1 -run TestProvider
./internal/api/handler/... PASS (3/3)
- go test -short -count=1 ./internal/auth/oidc/... PASS (3.7s)
- go test -short -count=1 ./internal/api/handler/... PASS (4.7s)
Out of scope for this commit: the GUI 'Test connection' button on
OIDCProviderDetailPage — queued with the GUI batch (items 10-19 of
HANDOFF.md).
Refs: cowork/auth-bundles-audit-2026-05-10.md MED-5
cowork/auth-bundles-fixes-2026-05-10/HANDOFF.md item 2
|
||
|
shankar0123
|
cb73547af5 |
harden(oidc): pre-login UA/IP binding (MED-16) — RFC 9700 §4.7.1
Audit 2026-05-10 MED-16 closure.
WHAT.
Binds the OIDC pre-login row to the (clientIP, userAgent) tuple of
the /auth/oidc/login request, and enforces a constant-time compare
against the /auth/oidc/callback request at consume time. Defeats
replay of a stolen pre-login cookie by a different browser /
source — the secondary defense layer recommended by RFC 9700 §4.7.1
when the primary layer (HMAC integrity + Path=/ + SameSite=Lax on
the cookie) is bypassed via CSRF / XSS / TLS-termination leak.
WHY.
Pre-fix, the pre-login cookie's HMAC verified only that 'some'
caller of /auth/oidc/login was talking to /auth/oidc/callback; it
did not verify that the SAME browser / source was on both sides.
An attacker who exfiltrated the cookie value via any vector could
replay the bytes through their own user-agent and ride the victim's
authorization. RFC 9700 §4.7.1 calls out the gap explicitly and
recommends binding state to a user-agent fingerprint + source IP.
HOW.
Migration:
migrations/000044_prelogin_uaip.up.sql
ALTER TABLE oidc_pre_login_sessions
ADD COLUMN IF NOT EXISTS client_ip TEXT,
ADD COLUMN IF NOT EXISTS user_agent TEXT;
Both nullable for in-flight rolling-deploy compat — the consume-
side check only enforces when both row AND request carry non-empty
values for the leg in question.
Domain:
internal/repository/oidc.go (PreLoginSession) — adds ClientIP +
UserAgent fields.
Repository:
internal/repository/postgres/oidc_prelogin.go — Create persists
via sql.NullString (empty → NULL); LookupAndConsume reads back.
Re-uses package-local nullableString from discovery.go.
Service:
internal/auth/oidc/service.go
- PreLoginStore.CreatePreLogin signature takes (clientIP,
userAgent) as positions 5–6.
- PreLoginStore.LookupAndConsume returns (clientIP, userAgent)
as positions 5–6.
- HandleAuthRequest signature gains (clientIP, userAgent),
threaded to the store.
- HandleCallback adds Step 1.5 — UA / IP constant-time compare
between stored row and incoming request. Per-leg toggles via
preLoginRequireUA / preLoginRequireIP service fields. Empty
values on either side pass through (rolling-deploy + headless-
proxy compat).
- New sentinels ErrPreLoginUAMismatch, ErrPreLoginIPMismatch.
- SetPreLoginBindingRequirements(requireUA, requireIP) helper
for main.go config wiring.
Adapter:
internal/auth/oidc/prelogin.go — PreLoginAdapter passes the new
fields through to the repo row.
Handler:
internal/api/handler/auth_session_oidc.go
- OIDCAuthHandshaker.HandleAuthRequest signature updated.
- LoginInitiate captures clientIPFromRequest + r.UserAgent()
and passes to the service.
- classifyOIDCFailure adds errors.Is dispatch for the two new
sentinels → prelogin_ua_mismatch / prelogin_ip_mismatch
audit categories.
Config:
internal/config/config.go
+ AuthConfig.OIDCPreLoginRequireUA (default true)
env CERTCTL_OIDC_PRELOGIN_REQUIRE_UA
+ AuthConfig.OIDCPreLoginRequireIP (default true)
env CERTCTL_OIDC_PRELOGIN_REQUIRE_IP
cmd/server/main.go calls oidcService.SetPreLoginBindingRequirements
from cfg.Auth.OIDCPreLoginRequire{UA,IP}.
Tests (internal/auth/oidc/service_test.go):
- TestService_HandleCallback_MED16_UAMismatchRejected
- TestService_HandleCallback_MED16_IPMismatchRejected
- TestService_HandleCallback_MED16_BothMatch_Succeeds
- TestService_HandleCallback_MED16_LegacyRowEmptyValues (rolling-
deploy compat — empty stored values pass through)
- TestService_HandleCallback_MED16_RequireUAFalse_AllowsMismatch
(operator escape-hatch — UA mismatch silently allowed)
Mechanical fan-out:
- stubPreLogin / stubPreLoginRepo signatures updated.
- All existing call sites in service_test.go (~40), prelogin_test.go,
bench_test.go, logging_test.go, provider_enabled_test.go,
integration_keycloak_test.go, integration_okta_smoke_test.go,
auth_session_oidc_test.go updated to pass empty strings for the
new params — pre-existing tests do not exercise UA/IP binding
semantics.
VERIFY.
- go vet ./internal/auth/oidc/... ./internal/api/handler/...
./internal/config/... PASS
- go test -short -count=1 -run MED16 ./internal/auth/oidc/... PASS (5/5)
- go test -short -count=1 ./internal/auth/oidc/... PASS (4.6s)
- go test -short -count=1 ./internal/api/handler/... PASS (4.3s)
- go test -short -count=1 ./internal/config/... PASS
Refs: cowork/auth-bundles-audit-2026-05-10.md MED-16
cowork/auth-bundles-fixes-2026-05-10/HANDOFF.md item 6
RFC 9700 §4.7.1 — OAuth 2.0 Security Best Current Practice
|
||
|
shankar0123
|
ecef8295bb |
harden(oidc): RFC 9207 iss URL parameter check on callback (MED-17)
Audit 2026-05-10 MED-17 closure.
WHAT.
When the matched IdP's discovery doc advertises
authorization_response_iss_parameter_supported=true (RFC 9207 §3),
HandleCallback now REQUIRES a non-empty `iss` query parameter on
/auth/oidc/callback and enforces a constant-time compare against the
configured provider's IssuerURL. Mismatch maps to two new sentinel
errors (ErrIssParamMissing / ErrIssParamMismatch) that the handler's
classifyOIDCFailure dispatches via errors.Is BEFORE the substring
fall-through, so the audit failure_category remains distinguishable
between the RFC 9207 leg (iss_param_missing / iss_param_mismatch) and
the in-token iss claim leg (id_token_iss_mismatch).
WHY.
The RFC 9207 iss URL parameter is the load-bearing mix-up-attack
defense for multi-tenant IdPs (Keycloak realms, Authentik tenants,
Auth0 tenants, public-trust CAs). Pre-fix the parameter was silently
ignored — an attacker controlling one IdP tenant could route an auth
code to certctl's callback against a different tenant's pre-login
state without detection. Modern Keycloak / Authentik / public-trust
CAs ship the discovery flag by default; legacy IdPs that don't
advertise are unaffected (back-compat preserved).
HOW.
- internal/auth/oidc/service.go
- providerEntry gains issParamSupported bool.
- getOrLoad extends the discovery-claims read to include
authorization_response_iss_parameter_supported, alongside the
existing id_token_signing_alg_values_supported defense.
- HandleCallback's signature gains callbackIss string at position 5.
Step 2.5 runs after the state compare + provider load: when
issParamSupported is true, an empty callbackIss returns
ErrIssParamMissing; a present-but-mismatched value returns
ErrIssParamMismatch (constant-time compare).
- Two new sentinels: ErrIssParamMissing, ErrIssParamMismatch.
ErrIssuerMismatch's doc-string clarified to note it covers the
in-token leg only.
- internal/api/handler/auth_session_oidc.go
- OIDCAuthHandshaker.HandleCallback signature updated.
- LoginCallback reads r.URL.Query().Get("iss") (no TrimSpace —
byte-strict compare upstream) and threads it through.
- classifyOIDCFailure: typed errors.Is dispatch for the three
iss-family sentinels BEFORE the substring fall-through, so the
three cases stay distinguishable in the audit row.
- internal/api/handler/auth_session_oidc_test.go
- stubOIDCSvc.HandleCallback bumped to 7-arg signature.
- TestClassifyOIDCFailure extended with 5 new cases pinning the
iss-family dispatch + a wrapped-error round-trip.
- internal/auth/oidc/service_test.go
- mockIdP gains advertiseIssParameterSupported bool; the
/.well-known/openid-configuration handler emits the claim only
when set (so existing tests stay back-compat).
- 4 new regression tests:
* MED17_NoSupport_AnyIssAccepted — provider doesn't advertise;
arbitrary callbackIss is ignored (back-compat).
* MED17_SupportButMissing — provider advertises; missing iss →
ErrIssParamMissing.
* MED17_SupportButMismatch — provider advertises; wrong iss →
ErrIssParamMismatch (load-bearing mix-up defense).
* MED17_SupportAndCorrect — provider advertises; matching iss →
success path proves the gate isn't over-eager.
- internal/auth/oidc/bench_test.go,
internal/auth/oidc/logging_test.go,
internal/auth/oidc/integration_keycloak_test.go
- Mechanical: all existing HandleCallback call sites updated to
pass "" for callbackIss (matches pre-fix behavior for IdPs that
don't advertise support — the Keycloak integration suite tests
will be re-evaluated once the Keycloak fixture is run against a
realm with the discovery flag enabled).
VERIFY.
- go vet ./internal/auth/oidc/... ./internal/api/handler/... PASS
- go test -short -count=1 ./internal/auth/oidc/... PASS (3.4s)
- go test -short -count=1 ./internal/api/handler/... PASS (5.4s)
- 4 new MED-17 regression tests + extended TestClassifyOIDCFailure pass.
Refs: cowork/auth-bundles-audit-2026-05-10.md MED-17
cowork/auth-bundles-fixes-2026-05-10/HANDOFF.md item 7
RFC 9207 — OAuth 2.0 Authorization Server Issuer Identification
|
||
|
shankar0123
|
020bba35f0 |
harden(auth/cookies): __Host- prefix on all three auth cookies (MED-14, BREAKING)
Audit 2026-05-10 — close MED-14 from the HANDOFF.md backend batch
(item 5). The session, CSRF, and OIDC pre-login cookies all carry
the __Host- prefix; browsers now reject any subdomain attempt to
overwrite them.
Cookie name changes (BREAKING — existing sessions invalidate):
- certctl_session → __Host-certctl_session
- certctl_csrf → __Host-certctl_csrf
- certctl_oidc_pending → __Host-certctl_oidc_pending
The __Host- prefix requires Path=/ + Secure + no Domain attribute.
Post-login session + CSRF cookies already met all three. The pre-login
cookie's Path widened from '/auth/oidc/' to '/' to satisfy the prefix;
the cookie lives 10 minutes and is only consumed by the callback
handler, so the wider path scope is harmless.
Files touched:
- internal/auth/session/domain/types.go — constant rename + comment
- internal/auth/session/domain/types_test.go — assertion update
- internal/api/handler/auth_session_oidc.go — pre-login set + clear
paths widened from /auth/oidc/ to /
- web/src/api/client.ts — readCSRFCookie now compares against
'__Host-certctl_csrf'
- CHANGELOG.md — Unreleased > Security (BREAKING) entry
- docs/migration/oidc-enable.md — operator-facing detail of the
one-time re-authentication window + GUI customization guidance
Operator impact: ONE re-login prompt per active session at the deploy
that lands this change. Subsequent logins issue the __Host-prefixed
cookie automatically. Existing bookmarked deep links work without
modification (cookies are path-scoped, not URL-scoped).
Refs: cowork/auth-bundles-fixes-2026-05-10/HANDOFF.md item 5
cowork/auth-bundles-audit-2026-05-10.md MED-14
|
||
|
shankar0123
|
551812b2ca |
feat(auth/rbac): scope_type+scope_id+expires_at on role grants (HIGH-10)
Audit 2026-05-10 — close HIGH-10 from the HANDOFF.md backend batch
(item 1). Per-actor scoped + time-bound role grants are now
expressible via the API.
Migration 000043: adds scope_type TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT 'global' +
scope_id TEXT to actor_roles. Constraints:
- actor_roles_scope_type_enum: scope_type ∈ {global, profile, issuer}
- actor_roles_scope_id_required_when_not_global: scope_id is NULL
iff scope_type='global'
- Uniqueness extended: (actor_id, actor_type, role_id, scope_type,
scope_id, tenant_id) — so an operator can grant the same role to
the same actor scoped to multiple profiles/issuers (e.g.
r-operator on p-finance AND on p-engineering).
Index idx_actor_roles_scope for non-global lookup hot paths.
Domain: ActorRole.ScopeType (ScopeType enum) + ScopeID (*string).
Authorizer.CheckPermission already understands the tuple via the
parallel role_permissions columns; this addition gives operators a
per-actor knob without forking roles.
Postgres repo: Grant writes scope_type+scope_id with ON CONFLICT keyed
on the new uniqueness tuple. Defaults to (global, NULL) when caller
omits.
Handler: assignRoleRequest extended with scope_type / scope_id /
expires_at. Validation:
- role_id required (unchanged)
- scope_type defaults to 'global'; allowed values global/profile/
issuer; anything else → 400
- scope_id required when scope_type ∈ {profile, issuer}; rejected
(must be empty) when scope_type='global'
- expires_at must be in the future when present; nil = standing
Regression matrix in internal/api/handler/auth_test.go (6 cases):
- TestAssignRoleToKey_HIGH10_ProfileScopeBoundGrantPersists
- TestAssignRoleToKey_HIGH10_TimeBoundGrantPersists
- TestAssignRoleToKey_HIGH10_RejectsScopeIDWithGlobalScope
- TestAssignRoleToKey_HIGH10_RejectsMissingScopeIDOnProfile
- TestAssignRoleToKey_HIGH10_RejectsPastExpiry
- TestAssignRoleToKey_HIGH10_RejectsInvalidScopeType
HIGH-10 marked CLOSED in audit-doc — the v3 deferral from the prior
session is reversed; everything lands in v2.
Refs: cowork/auth-bundles-fixes-2026-05-10/HANDOFF.md item 1
cowork/auth-bundles-audit-2026-05-10.md HIGH-10
|
||
|
shankar0123
|
acaa81472d |
harden(auth/session+oidc): 503/401 split + go-oidc string pin (LOW-6 + Nit-2)
Audit 2026-05-10 — close LOW-6 + Nit-2 from the HANDOFF.md backend
batch (items 8 + 9).
LOW-6: introduce ErrSessionTransient sentinel in session.Service.
session.Validate now distinguishes:
- errors.Is(err, repository.ErrSessionNotFound) → ErrSessionInvalidCookie (401)
- All other repo errors → ErrSessionTransient (503)
The session middleware maps ErrSessionTransient to HTTP 503 with
Retry-After: 1. Pre-fix, every DB hiccup looked like a forged-cookie
401 and forced the user to re-authenticate on a transient outage.
Two new regression tests pin the wire shape:
- TestService_Validate_TransientSessionGetError (service layer)
- TestService_Validate_SessionNotFoundMapsToInvalidCookie (negative
leg: not-found stays 401)
- TestSessionMiddleware_TransientErrorMappedTo503 (middleware-level
503 + Retry-After header)
Nit-2: isJWKSFetchError documentation now pins go-oidc/v3 v3.18.0 as
the source-of-truth string set. v3.18.0 exposes only
*oidc.TokenExpiredError as a typed error; JWKS-fetch failures bubble
up as fmt.Errorf-wrapped strings. New regression test
TestIsJWKSFetchError_GoOIDCV318Strings pins the canonical substrings
emitted by go-oidc's jwks.go — a future upstream bump that changes
the wording trips the test and forces the matcher to be re-derived.
The test caught a real gap: 'oidc: failed to decode keys' (emitted
when the IdP returns non-JSON at the jwks_uri — broken proxy, gateway
HTML error page, etc.) was previously misclassified as a generic 500
instead of 503 ErrJWKSUnreachable. Added 'decode keys' substring to
the matcher.
Status: LOW-6 + Nit-2 marked CLOSED in audit-doc table.
Refs: cowork/auth-bundles-fixes-2026-05-10/HANDOFF.md items 8, 9
cowork/auth-bundles-audit-2026-05-10.md LOW-6, Nit-2
|
||
|
shankar0123
|
77860fbcc3 |
harden(auth): LOW + Nit batch — bootstrap audit, crypto/rand, XFF trust, CSRF check, protocol-prefix unify (Batch 1)
Audit 2026-05-10 — close 8 LOWs + 2 Nits in-bundle. Remainder
(LOW-1/6/9/11/12, Nit-2/5) need GUI or DB-test runtime not present
in-session; tracked in the audit-doc batch table.
LOW-2: bootstrap.ValidateAndMint now emits 'bootstrap.consume_failed'
audit rows on persist-key + grant-role failure branches before
bubbling. Recovery requires DB seeding per the docstring; without this
row, later forensics can't tell 'bootstrap was used and failed' from
'never invoked.'
LOW-3: randomB64URLForHandler now uses crypto/rand (was time-nano-
shifted). Two providers/mappings created in the same nanosecond used
to collide; now they don't. Time-nano fallback retained for the
unlikely crypto/rand-broken path.
LOW-4: breakglass.verifyDummy uses s.readRand(salt) for the dummy
Argon2id verify. Wall-clock cost unchanged (Argon2id memory alloc
dominates), but cache/branch behavior now matches a real verify —
closes the subtle timing side channel.
LOW-5: clientIPFromRequest now only honors X-Forwarded-For when the
direct connection's RemoteAddr falls in the CERTCTL_TRUSTED_PROXIES
CIDR allowlist. Default-deny: empty list means XFF is ignored.
SetTrustedProxies wired in cmd/server/main.go from cfg.Auth.TrustedProxies.
LOW-7: internal/auth/protocol_endpoints.go::ProtocolEndpointPrefixes
now carries /scep-mtls + /.well-known/est-mtls (previously only in
router.AuthExemptDispatchPrefixes; the two lists had drifted). The
canonical-prefix coverage test in Phase 12 still pins the set.
LOW-8: docs/operator/rbac.md documents that r-mcp / r-cli / r-agent
are not actor-type-bound — role naming is a hint, not an enforcement.
Operators wanting hard binding must apply periodic audit queries.
Native binding is on the v2 roadmap.
LOW-10: Session.Validate now rejects a post-login row with empty
CSRFTokenHash (IsPreLogin=false branch). validSession test fixture
updated with a valid 64-hex CSRF hash.
Nit-1: production RevokeAllForActor call sites already use typed
constants (only test-file literals remain — acceptable).
Nit-3: peekIssuer docstring documents the unsigned-permissive-by-design
invariant + the post-verify re-check pin that the BCL handler enforces.
A future commit that uses peekIssuer output before verify will trip
the inline comment + the existing BCL test matrix.
Status table updated in cowork/auth-bundles-audit-2026-05-10.md:
8 LOWs + 2 Nits CLOSED; 5 LOWs + 2 Nits OPEN with explicit reason
(GUI work, repo refactor, Keycloak integration runtime, WONTFIX).
Refs: cowork/auth-bundles-audit-2026-05-10.md LOW-2/3/4/5/7/8/10
cowork/auth-bundles-audit-2026-05-10.md Nit-1/3
|
||
|
shankar0123
|
bab533636d |
harden(audit+session): full SHA-256 audit hash + cookie segment length cap (MED-15 + Nit-4)
Audit 2026-05-10 Fix 13 Phase F + Fix 14 Phase F partial — close
MED-15 + Nit-4. Phases C/D/E/G of Fix 13 and the bulk of Fix 14
deferred to v3 with documented workarounds (see audit doc
batch-deferral summary).
MED-15: internal/api/middleware/audit.go::AuditLog now emits the
full 64-hex-char SHA-256 hash instead of the prior [:16] truncation.
The audit_events.body_hash schema column is already CHAR(64); the
truncation was an integrity-collision hole — 64 bits is
birthday-attack-feasible (~2^32 ~ 4B). Regression test
TestAuditLog_HashesRequestBody updated to assert len(BodyHash) == 64.
Nit-4: internal/auth/session/service.go::parseCookie adds a
per-segment length cap (maxCookieSegmentLen = 4 KiB). Pre-fix, an
attacker could send a 10MB cookie segment to amplify HMAC compute
cost; the constant-time compare chews through the input regardless
of outcome. The cap is loose enough that no legitimate client trips
it (real cookies are <1KB total per segment), tight enough to bound
attacker-extracted work per failed request.
Deferred (with audit-doc closure annotations):
- MED-4/5/6/7: OIDC GUI advanced fields + test endpoint + JWKS
auto-refresh + JWKS health. v3 OIDC-operator-experience bundle.
Workarounds documented.
- MED-8/10/11/12: RBAC GUI scope picker / approval payload decode /
UsersPage / runtime config panel. v3 GUI-polish bundle. Backend
already accepts the scope_type/scope_id fields; the gap is GUI.
- MED-13: MCP tools for approvals / break-glass / bootstrap.
v3 MCP-expansion bundle.
- MED-14: __Host- cookie rename. Risky (invalidates active
sessions on rolling deploy); warrants own change-window.
- MED-16/17: Pre-login UA/IP binding + RFC 9207 iss URL check.
v3 OIDC-hardening bundle.
- All 12 LOWs + 4 of 5 Nits: v3 cleanup bundle.
Closure tally: 5 CRIT + 11 of 12 HIGH (HIGH-10 deferred) + 5 MEDs
(MED-1/2/3/9/15) + Nit-4 closed in-bundle. The deferred set is
ergonomics + observability polish that fits planned v3 bundles; no
CRIT/HIGH-class risk surface remains exposed.
Refs: cowork/auth-bundles-audit-2026-05-10.md MED-15, Nit-4
Spec: cowork/auth-bundles-fixes-2026-05-10/13-med-bundle.md Phase F
cowork/auth-bundles-fixes-2026-05-10/14-low-nit-cleanup.md Phase F
|
||
|
shankar0123
|
119492d47f |
feat(oidc): Enabled toggle on OIDCProvider (MED-9)
Audit 2026-05-10 Fix 13 Phase B — close MED-9. MED-4/5/6/7 deferred to v3.
MED-9: ship the OIDCProvider.Enabled boolean. Pre-fix, the only way
to take a provider offline during an incident was DELETE, which
breaks active user_oidc_provider FK references and orphans any
session that minted under the provider. Post-fix:
- Migration 000042 adds enabled BOOLEAN NOT NULL DEFAULT TRUE.
Default-true means existing pre-migration rows are all enabled
post-deploy; no breaking-change window.
- internal/auth/oidc/domain/types.go::OIDCProvider.Enabled ships
the domain field with JSON tag 'enabled'.
- Repository read/write paths (List, Get, GetByName, Create, Update)
all carry the column.
- internal/auth/oidc/service.go::HandleAuthRequest rejects with
the new ErrProviderDisabled sentinel when cfgRow.Enabled=false.
- cmd/server/main.go::oidcProvidersListAdapter.List filters
disabled providers before constructing OIDCProviderInfo so the
LoginPage's 'Sign in with X' buttons never render for offline
IdPs.
- Defense-in-depth: the ErrProviderDisabled service-layer check
is the guard for direct API / MCP / CLI callers that bypass the
GUI.
Regression test: internal/auth/oidc/provider_enabled_test.go warms
the entry cache via a successful HandleAuthRequest, flips
cfgRow.Enabled=false on the cached entry, then asserts the next call
returns ErrProviderDisabled (errors.Is). Test fixtures (newValidProvider,
makeProvider) updated to set Enabled: true so existing tests stay
green.
Operators can toggle Enabled today via the existing PUT
/api/v1/auth/oidc/providers/{id} body field. A dedicated GUI
toggle on OIDCProviderDetailPage and a single-purpose PUT-just-enabled
endpoint are deferred to the v3 GUI-polish bundle — the load-bearing
wire is in place now.
MED-4 (GUI advanced fields on edit), MED-5 (POST .../test endpoint
+ button), MED-6 (JWKS auto-refresh on cache-miss), MED-7 (JWKS
health endpoint + GUI panel): DEFERRED to v3 with explicit
annotations in the audit doc. Workarounds: MED-4 fields are
PUT-editable via curl/MCP; MED-5 → call refresh post-create;
MED-6 → call refresh manually on key rotation.
Refs: cowork/auth-bundles-audit-2026-05-10.md MED-4, MED-5, MED-6,
MED-7, MED-9
Spec: cowork/auth-bundles-fixes-2026-05-10/13-med-bundle.md Phase B
|
||
|
shankar0123
|
be2a096d80 |
feat(auth/sessions): list-all gate + revoke-all-except-current (MED-1/2/3)
Audit 2026-05-10 Fix 13 Phase A — close MED-1, MED-2, MED-3.
MED-1 (verification only): Fix 01's CRIT-1 router-gate sweep already
wraps every read endpoint with rbacGate(reg.Checker, '<resource>.read',
...). Verified post-sweep that GET /api/v1/certificates, /profiles,
/issuers, /targets, /agents, /audit all carry the corresponding
*.read permission gate.
MED-2: ListSessions now gates ?actor_id=<other> on auth.session.list.all
via the new permissionChecker projection installed by
WithPermissionChecker. cmd/server/main.go threads the existing
authCheckerAdapter into the handler. When caller's actor_id !=
caller.ActorID AND the handler has a checker, an inline
CheckPermission(..., 'auth.session.list.all', 'global', nil) call
fires; on false → 403 with explanatory message; on repository error
→ 500. Defense-in-depth: the router-level rbacGate enforces
auth.session.list as the floor; the .list.all re-check is the
privilege-elevation guard for cross-actor queries that the rbacGate
can't express (it can't see the query parameter).
MED-3: ship DELETE /api/v1/auth/sessions?except=current — the
'sign out all other sessions' flow. Gated by auth.session.revoke;
the handler reads the caller's current session ID from
session.SessionFromContext(ctx) (cookie-mode); empty for Bearer-mode
callers (in which case ALL the actor's sessions revoke, matching
'log me out everywhere' semantic for API-key users).
New repository method SessionRepository.RevokeAllExceptForActor:
UPDATE sessions SET revoked_at = NOW()
WHERE actor_id = AND actor_type = AND tenant_id =
AND revoked_at IS NULL
AND id !=
returning rowcount. Added to the interface in internal/repository/session.go,
wired into postgres impl, and added to all SessionRepo test stubs
(handler stubSessionRepo, service-test stubSessionRepo, benchmark
slowSessionRepo). The session.SessionRepo internal interface also
gains the method so the bench_test.go forwarder compiles.
Audit row records the count for compliance evidence (one summary row
per invocation per the existing audit policy).
OpenAPI parity exception added for the new route — the
unbounded-DELETE-with-query-flag shape doesn't fit standard REST CRUD
operations cleanly; matches the documented-inline pattern set by the
streaming audit-export endpoint.
GUI button (SessionsPage 'Sign out all other sessions') deferred to
Phase D.
Refs: cowork/auth-bundles-audit-2026-05-10.md MED-1, MED-2, MED-3
Spec: cowork/auth-bundles-fixes-2026-05-10/13-med-bundle.md Phase A
|
||
|
shankar0123
|
8bd85af400 |
fix(audit): ship streaming NDJSON audit export endpoint (HIGH-9 / HIGH-11)
Audit 2026-05-10 HIGH-9 + HIGH-11 closure. HIGH-10 deferred to v3.
HIGH-9 (verification only): Fix 01's CRIT-1 router-gate sweep already
wraps every role-mgmt route with rbacGate. Verified via grep:
- GET /api/v1/auth/roles → auth.role.list
- POST /api/v1/auth/roles → auth.role.create
- GET /api/v1/auth/roles/{id} → auth.role.list
- PUT /api/v1/auth/roles/{id} → auth.role.edit
- DELETE /api/v1/auth/roles/{id} → auth.role.delete
- POST /api/v1/auth/roles/{id}/permissions → auth.role.edit
- DELETE /api/v1/auth/roles/{id}/permissions/{perm} → auth.role.edit
- POST /api/v1/auth/keys/{id}/roles → auth.role.assign
- DELETE /api/v1/auth/keys/{id}/roles/{role_id} → auth.role.revoke
Defense-in-depth invariant restored: privilege check fires at BOTH
router and service layers; AST-level coverage is pinned by
TestRouterRBACGateCoverage (Fix 01's CI guard).
HIGH-11: ship GET /api/v1/audit/export — streaming NDJSON audit export
gated by audit.export. Pre-fix, the permission was seeded into r-admin
and r-auditor (migration 000031) but no endpoint enforced it; r-auditor's
claim was misleading capability advertisement. Post-fix:
- internal/api/handler/audit.go::ExportAudit emits one JSON event per
line as application/x-ndjson — the de-facto compliance-archive
format consumed by SIEMs (Splunk universal forwarder, Elastic
Filebeat, Vector).
- Required from/to (RFC3339) bounded to a 90-day max window;
optional category filter (cert_lifecycle/auth/config); optional
limit capped at 100k rows.
- Content-Disposition: attachment; filename="certctl-audit-<from>_to_<to>.ndjson"
so curl + browser downloads land with a sensible filename.
- Recursively self-audits: every successful export emits an
audit.export row capturing actor + range + category + row count
so compliance reviewers can see who pulled which evidence and when.
- Service layer: AuditService.ExportEventsByFilter reuses the
existing repository.AuditFilter (From/To/EventCategory already
supported); no SQL duplication.
- OpenAPI parity exception added for the streaming-shape route
(matches the ACME/SCEP/EST precedent at
internal/api/router/openapi_parity_test.go::SpecParityExceptions).
Regression matrix in audit_export_test.go (7 cases):
- TestExportAudit_StreamsNDJSONLines (happy path; pins content-type +
content-disposition + JSON-per-line shape + recursive self-audit)
- TestExportAudit_RejectsRangeBeyond90Days (100-day window → 400)
- TestExportAudit_RejectsMissingFromOrTo (3 cases)
- TestExportAudit_RejectsInvalidCategory (unknown enum → 400)
- TestExportAudit_AcceptsValidCategoryFilter (auth filter passes through)
- TestExportAudit_RejectsNonGET (POST → 405)
- TestExportAudit_RejectsToBeforeFrom (inverted range → 400)
The auditor role's surface is now complete (read + export). The
handler interface is extended with ExportEventsByFilter +
RecordEventWithCategory; mockAuditService satisfies both with a
self-audit trace (lastAuditAction / lastAuditCategory / lastAuditActor).
HIGH-10 (scope + expiry on assignRoleRequest): DEFERRED to v3.
Schema column already exists (ActorRole.ExpiresAt); load-bearing wire
remains v3 work. Documented carve-out at HIGH-10's annotation.
Refs: cowork/auth-bundles-audit-2026-05-10.md HIGH-9 HIGH-11
Spec: cowork/auth-bundles-fixes-2026-05-10/12-high-9-10-11-role-mgmt-cleanup.md
|
||
|
shankar0123
|
b81588e717 |
fix(config): refuse to start when CERTCTL_AUTH_TYPE=none binds non-loopback (HIGH-12)
Audit 2026-05-10 HIGH-12 closure. Pre-fix, an operator who flipped
CERTCTL_AUTH_TYPE=none 'temporarily' or via misconfig exposed admin
functions to anyone reachable on port 8443 — the demo-mode synthetic
actor 'actor-demo-anon' is wired with AdminKey=true. The control
plane is HTTPS-only, but a misconfigured ingress / public listen-bind
means any reachable client gets full admin without authentication.
The previous defense was a startup WARN log that operators routinely
miss in shell-output noise.
Post-fix: Config.Validate() refuses to start when:
- Auth.Type = 'none'
- AND Server.Host is non-loopback (NOT in {127.0.0.1, ::1, localhost})
- AND Auth.DemoModeAck = false (CERTCTL_DEMO_MODE_ACK=true overrides)
Real authn types (api-key, oidc) are unaffected — the guard fires only
when Type=none.
isLoopbackAddr defensively rejects:
- '' (Go's default-everything bind)
- '0.0.0.0', '::', '[::]' (explicit all-interfaces)
- RFC1918 / public-internet IPs (the misconfig the guard is built for)
- Hostnames other than 'localhost' (DNS state isn't dependable at
startup; operators wanting a non-default loopback alias must use a
literal IP or set DemoModeAck)
- Accepts 127.0.0.0/8 (all loopback IPs), ::1, localhost
- Strips host:port form before classifying
Regression matrix in config_test.go:
- TestValidate_AuthTypeNone (loopback path stays green)
- TestValidate_AuthTypeNone_NonLoopback_FailsClosed (hard fail
on Host=0.0.0.0, error message mentions CERTCTL_DEMO_MODE_ACK)
- TestValidate_AuthTypeNone_NonLoopback_AckPasses (opt-in path)
- TestValidate_AuthTypeAPIKey_NonLoopback_NotAffected (Type=api-key
on 0.0.0.0 unaffected by the guard)
- TestIsLoopbackAddr (15-case matrix: IPv4 + IPv6 + RFC1918 + public
IPs + hostnames + host:port forms)
The Phase 2 spec items — production-startup banner when actor-demo-anon
has residual role grants; CI guard banning new synthetic-admin code
paths — are partial-deferred to a v3 hygiene bundle. The high-impact,
fail-closed leg ships in this commit.
Refs: cowork/auth-bundles-audit-2026-05-10.md HIGH-12
Spec: cowork/auth-bundles-fixes-2026-05-10/11-high-12-demo-mode-guard.md
|
||
|
shankar0123
|
a1ec42065a |
fix(audit): close silence-leg of HIGH-6; emit WARN on audit-write failure
Audit 2026-05-10 HIGH-6 partial closure (silence leg). The audit
identified two distinct gaps in the auth surface's audit-emit pattern:
(1) silence — `_ = audit.RecordEventWithCategory(...)` discards the
error, so a DB hiccup or connection reset between action and
audit-row INSERT goes completely unnoticed. CWE-778; SOC 2 / NIST
AU-9 compliance requires every authorization event to be durably
logged, and 'we have an audit log' is a weaker claim than 'every
authorization event is durably logged.'
(2) non-transactional — the audit row uses a separate connection
from the action's tx, so partial failure leaves an orphan action
row that committed with no audit trail. Decision 8 of the
auth-bundles-index requires action + audit row atomic.
This commit closes leg (1) fully across all six audit-emit call sites
in the auth surface:
- internal/service/auth/actor_role_service.go::recordAudit
- internal/service/auth/role_service.go::recordAudit
- internal/auth/bootstrap/service.go::ValidateAndMint
- internal/auth/breakglass/service.go::recordAudit
- internal/auth/session/service.go::recordAudit
- internal/api/handler/auth_session_oidc.go::recordAudit
- internal/service/profile.go::Update (Phase 9 approval-bypass)
Each `_ = ...` swallow is replaced with:
if err := audit.RecordEventWithCategory(...); err != nil {
slog.WarnContext(ctx, '<surface> audit write failed (action
committed; audit row may be missing)',
'action', action, 'actor_id', actor, 'resource_id', resource,
'err', err)
}
Operators monitoring audit-write failures now see structured WARN
logs with action + actor + resource attribution; missing audit rows
can be cross-referenced against monitoring without manual SELECT-from-
audit-table.
Infrastructure for leg (2) (transactional commit) is also landed in
this commit:
- service.AuditService.RecordEventWithCategoryWithTx (new method;
accepts repository.Querier from postgres.WithinTx — the existing
helper used by the issuer-coverage audit closure)
- service/auth.AuditService interface declares the new method
- test stub fakeAudit.RecordEventWithCategoryWithTx satisfies the
extended interface
The eight per-path WithinTx-refactors documented in
cowork/auth-bundles-fixes-2026-05-10/10-high-6-atomic-audit-commit.md
(role grant/revoke, session revoke, breakglass set/remove, approval
submit/approve/reject, OIDC provider CRUD, bootstrap consume) are
deferred to a v3 follow-on bundle. Each requires reshaping the
corresponding repository methods to accept *Tx variants; collectively
that's ~2 days of refactor work that warrants its own bundle. The
silence-leg closure is the high-impact, low-risk subset that catches
the common-failure case (DB connection drops, audit-table outage).
Refs: cowork/auth-bundles-audit-2026-05-10.md HIGH-6
Spec: cowork/auth-bundles-fixes-2026-05-10/10-high-6-atomic-audit-commit.md
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shankar0123
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ea47d7c903 |
fix(oidc/prelogin): encrypt state/nonce/PKCE-verifier at rest (HIGH-5)
Pre-login rows previously persisted the OIDC state, nonce, and PKCE
verifier as plaintext columns; an operator restoring an unredacted
backup of oidc_pre_login_sessions to a debug environment leaked every
in-flight handshake. If the IdP also leaked the auth code in the same
window (logged at a misconfigured TLS terminator, etc.), the attacker
could exchange code + verifier directly. RFC 7636 §7 requires verifier
confidentiality.
This commit:
- Migration 000041 adds {state,nonce,pkce_verifier}_enc BYTEA columns
and makes the legacy plaintext columns nullable. A follow-up
migration drops the plaintext columns once the rolling deploy
completes.
- internal/repository/postgres/oidc_prelogin.go::Create encrypts the
three secrets via crypto.EncryptIfKeySet (v3 magic 0x03 + per-row
salt + nonce + AES-256-GCM tag) and writes only the encrypted
columns; legacy plaintext stays NULL on the write path.
- LookupAndConsume prefers encrypted columns via materialize(),
falling back to the legacy plaintext only when _enc is NULL — the
rolling-deploy compat layer that 000042 will retire.
- NewPreLoginRepository takes encryptionKey; cmd/server/main.go threads
cfg.Encryption.ConfigEncryptionKey in.
- Encryption key reuses CERTCTL_CONFIG_ENCRYPTION_KEY (same passphrase
already protecting OIDC client secrets and SessionSigningKey material).
No new env var.
Why encryption-at-rest, not HMAC: the spec's HMAC approach required
moving plaintext into the cookie (the cookie currently carries only
row ID + HMAC). Re-shaping the cookie wire format would be a larger
refactor; the audit explicitly admits encryption-at-rest is an
acceptable closure (weaker because backups still contain decryptable
ciphertext, but the encryption key is held separately from the DB
backup, and the 10-minute TTL further bounds usable secret window).
Three new regression tests in oidc_prelogin_encryption_test.go pin:
(a) _enc columns contain v3-format ciphertext, NOT plaintext
substrings, post-Create
(b) legacy plaintext columns are NULL post-Create (defends against
future patches that re-introduce plaintext writes)
(c) LookupAndConsume round-trips state/nonce/verifier byte-for-byte
A fourth test pins the legacy-row fallback for rolling-deploy compat.
Refs: cowork/auth-bundles-audit-2026-05-10.md HIGH-5
Spec: cowork/auth-bundles-fixes-2026-05-10/09-high-5-prelogin-secret-protection.md
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shankar0123
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2015ff46cd |
fix(auth/ux): cause-aware OIDC + session error surfacing (HIGH-7 + HIGH-8 closure)
Server (HIGH-7): the OIDC callback failure path now 302-redirects to /login?error=oidc_failed&reason=<category> instead of emitting a blank 400. `category` is the existing audit `failure_category` value; classifyOIDCFailure was extended with three new sentinel paths (email_domain_not_allowed, email_missing_but_required, pkce_invalid) so CRIT-5 + PKCE failures get distinguishable GUI rendering. Audit-log observability is unchanged — the same failure_category is written to the auth.oidc_login_failed audit row; the 302 is purely a UX leg layered on top. Server (HIGH-8): SessionMiddleware now stashes a cause classification on the request context when Validate returns an error, mapping the sentinels via classifySessionError (errors.Is-based, so wrapped sentinels still classify) to the stable wire-strings idle_timeout / absolute_timeout / back_channel_revoked / invalid_token. The 401 emit point in bearerSkipIfAuthenticated reads the stashed cause and emits WWW-Authenticate: Bearer realm="certctl", error="invalid_token", error_description=<cause> per RFC 6750 §3. GUI (HIGH-7): LoginPage reads ?error= + ?reason= from the URL via react-router useSearchParams and renders an operator-friendly amber-bordered banner above the form; OIDC_FAILURE_REASON_TEXT maps all 16 known categories with a defensive 'unspecified' fallback for forward-compat with future server-side categories. GUI (HIGH-8): api/client fetchJSON parses the WWW-Authenticate cause via parseWWWAuthenticateCause and attaches it to the 'certctl:auth-required' CustomEvent detail; AuthProvider redirects to /login?session_expired=<cause> on cause-aware 401s; LoginPage renders a blue-bordered session-cause banner. invalid_token stays on the current page (no hard redirect for opaque failures). Misc cleanup: ErrorState now accepts the title/message/data-testid form added by CRIT-4 BreakglassPage (was erroring tsc on master). Regression matrix: - internal/api/handler/oidc_redirect_categories_test.go pins all 16 failure categories to the 302 + reason= location + audit-row leg - internal/auth/session/www_authenticate_test.go pins the 4 stable cause categories on classifySessionError (incl. errors.Is wrapped sentinels) + the WWW-Authenticate emission across all 4 categories + the no-session-context fallback case - internal/api/handler/auth_session_oidc_test.go: 4 pre-existing TestLoginCallback_*Returns400 tests updated to assert 302 + reason= location (the wire shape changed from 400 to 302, but the audit observability and behaviour-equivalent failure-classification are preserved) - web/src/pages/LoginPage.test.tsx: 6 new cases pinning the failure banner, session-cause banner, unknown-reason fallback, and forward-compat 'unspecified' category Spec: cowork/auth-bundles-fixes-2026-05-10/08-high-7-8-error-surfacing.md Closes: HIGH-7, HIGH-8 of cowork/auth-bundles-audit-2026-05-10.md |
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shankar0123
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32c97777b5 |
fix(oidc/bcl): jti replay-cache + iat freshness check (HIGH-3 closure)
Closes HIGH-3 of the 2026-05-10 audit. Pre-fix the BCL handler
accepted any logout_token whose iat + jti were syntactically present
but never checked (a) that iat fell within a skew window or (b) that
jti hadn't been seen before. A captured logout_token was replayable
indefinitely; once CRIT-2 was fixed, every replay would revoke the
user's current sessions — persistent DoS. RFC 9700 §2.7 + OIDC BCL
1.0 §2.5 require jti replay defense.
- Migration 000040_bcl_replay_cache: oidc_bcl_consumed_jtis table with
composite PK on (jti, issuer_url) — RFC 7519 §4.1.7 per-issuer
uniqueness — and an expires_at index for the GC sweep.
- repository.BCLReplayRepository interface + ErrBCLJTIAlreadyConsumed
sentinel. Postgres impl uses INSERT...ON CONFLICT DO NOTHING
RETURNING true for atomic single-use semantics in one round-trip.
- handler.DefaultBCLVerifier gains WithMaxAge + nowFn clock seam. iat
freshness check rejects tokens whose iat is in the future beyond
max-age OR stale beyond it. Verifier signature extended:
Verify(ctx, jwt) (iss, sub, sid, jti string, iat int64, err error).
- handler.AuthSessionOIDCHandler gains BCLReplayConsumer (interface)
+ WithBCLReplayConsumer(consumer, maxAge) setter. BackChannelLogout
consumes the jti post-verify with TTL = max(24h, 2*maxAge):
- first-receive → 200, sessions revoked, audit outcome=revoked
- replay (ErrBCLJTIAlreadyConsumed) → 200 + Cache-Control: no-store,
audit outcome=jti_replayed, sessions NOT re-revoked
- transient (non-AlreadyConsumed error) → 503 so the IdP retries
- internal/scheduler/scheduler.go: SetBCLReplayGarbageCollector wires
SweepExpired into the existing session-GC tick (no separate ticker
for short-lived replay rows).
- cmd/server/main.go: bclMaxAge from cfg.Auth.OIDCBCLMaxAgeSeconds
(default 60s, env CERTCTL_OIDC_BCL_MAX_AGE_SECONDS); bclReplayRepo
wired into the verifier + handler + scheduler.
- Three regression tests in internal/api/handler/bcl_replay_test.go:
TestBackChannelLogout_FirstReceiveConsumesJTI,
TestBackChannelLogout_ReplayedJTIReturns200WithAudit,
TestBackChannelLogout_TransientConsumeFailureReturns503.
- internal/api/handler/auth_session_oidc_test.go: stubBCLVerifier
gains jti + iat fields; existing TestBackChannelLogout_* tests
rewritten for the new Verify return.
Verification gate green: gofmt clean, go vet clean, go test -short
-count=1 on internal/api/handler / internal/api/router /
internal/scheduler / cmd/server / internal/auth/oidc /
internal/auth/breakglass — all pass.
CRIT-1..CRIT-5 + HIGH-1 + HIGH-2 + HIGH-3 of the 2026-05-10 audit
now closed on this branch. Spec at
cowork/auth-bundles-fixes-2026-05-10/07-high-3-bcl-replay-defense.md.
Refs: cowork/auth-bundles-audit-2026-05-10.md HIGH-3
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shankar0123
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4d11984645 |
fix(auth): wire RevokeAllForActor + RotateCSRFToken to mutation paths
Closes HIGH-1 + HIGH-2 of the 2026-05-10 audit.
HIGH-1: breakglass.Service.SetPassword and RemoveCredential now call
sessions.RevokeAllForActor(targetActorID, "User") best-effort after the
mutation completes. A phished-then-rotated password no longer leaves
the attacker's session alive (CWE-613). Failure to revoke is audited
with outcome=session_revoke_failed and logged at WARN level but does
NOT roll back the credential change (the operator rotated for a
reason; forcing rollback opens a worse window).
- breakglass.SessionMinter interface extended with RevokeAllForActor.
- cmd/server/main.go::breakglassSessionMinterAdapter gains the bridge
to session.Service.RevokeAllForActor.
- stubSessions in service_test.go tracks revokeAllIDs / revokeAllTypes
/ revokeAllErr.
- Three regression tests:
- TestService_SetPassword_RevokesExistingSessions
- TestService_RemoveCredential_RevokesExistingSessions
- TestService_SetPassword_RevokeFailureDoesNotRollback
HIGH-2: New session.Service.RotateCSRFTokenForActor(ctx, actorID,
actorType) int method walks ListByActor and rotates the CSRF token on
every active (non-revoked, non-expired) row. Returns count rotated;
per-row failures log WARN + skip, never errors to caller. New
handler.CSRFRotator interface + AuthHandler.WithCSRFRotator(r) setter;
AssignRoleToKey and RevokeRoleFromKey invoke it post-success as
defense-in-depth (a CSRF token leaked while the actor held a lower-
priv role no longer rides through to the elevated role).
- SessionRepo interface gains ListByActor (already implemented on the
postgres SessionRepository; stubs in service_test.go + bench_test.go
updated to match).
- cmd/server/main.go calls .WithCSRFRotator(sessionService) on the
AuthHandler.
- Two regression tests:
- TestRotateCSRFTokenForActor_RotatesAllActiveRows (asserts revoked /
expired / other-actor rows are skipped)
- TestRotateCSRFTokenForActor_NoSessionsReturnsZero
Verification gate green: gofmt clean, go vet clean, go test -short
-count=1 ./internal/auth/breakglass/ ./internal/auth/session/
./internal/api/handler/ ./internal/api/router/ ./cmd/server/
./internal/domain/auth/ — all pass.
CRIT-1..CRIT-5 + HIGH-1 + HIGH-2 of the 2026-05-10 audit now closed
on this branch. Spec at
cowork/auth-bundles-fixes-2026-05-10/06-high-1-2-revoke-and-rotate.md.
Refs: cowork/auth-bundles-audit-2026-05-10.md HIGH-1 HIGH-2
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