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8f2e5771db4b16d2e643c6d36ee24bbfb86f6d6d
89 Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
 shankar0123
|
8f2e5771db |
fix(middleware): SEC-006 — TTL-evict idle token-bucket rate-limiter entries
Sprint 2 unified-master-audit closure. Pre-fix the keyed rate
limiter's bucket map had no eviction. The package-level comment
explicitly noted the leak: high-cardinality unauthenticated traffic
(CGNAT churn, Tor exit lists, botnets, infinite-cardinality scanners)
grew process memory unboundedly. Production deploys with millions of
unique IPs would eventually OOM.
Fix:
- RateLimitConfig.BucketTTL (env CERTCTL_RATE_LIMIT_BUCKET_TTL,
default 1h, clamp-floor 1m). 1h chosen to be well above realistic
operator IP churn windows (returning clients keep their bucket)
and well below the unbounded-leak window the pre-fix code
allowed.
- tokenBucket gains a lastAccess field updated on every allow()
call via touch(); reading via lastAccessTime() under the bucket's
own mutex.
- keyedRateLimiter.sweepLoop runs in a single goroutine per
limiter (production wires 2: default + no-auth fallback), waking
every BucketTTL/4. sweep() removes any bucket whose lastAccess
is older than the cutoff and bumps evictedTotal atomically.
- Both NewRateLimiter call sites in cmd/server/main.go (default
stack and no-auth fallback) now thread cfg.RateLimit.BucketTTL.
Regression coverage:
- TestKeyedRateLimiter_SweepEvictsIdleBuckets: 1000 synthetic IP
keys populate the map, advance past TTL, call sweep() directly,
assert map drained to 0 + evictedTotal=1000 + fresh key creates
new bucket (map not poisoned).
- TestKeyedRateLimiter_SweepKeepsActiveBuckets: inverse — a bucket
touched within the TTL window survives the sweep. Catches a
future regression that inverts the cutoff comparison.
Closes SEC-006.
|
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|
shankar0123
|
037876fa0f |
fix(scheduler): SCALE-001 — cap ClaimPendingJobs per-tick (default 1000)
Sprint 2 unified-master-audit closure. Pre-fix the scheduler invoked
ClaimPendingJobs(ctx, "", 0). limit:0 loads every Pending row in a
single transaction — a 100K-job burst (cert-fleet sweep, post-outage
recovery, large agent-fleet first boot) marshalled the full queue
into process memory before boundedFanOut's semaphore could back-
pressure the upstream CAs.
Fix:
- SchedulerConfig.JobClaimLimit (env CERTCTL_SCHEDULER_JOB_CLAIM_LIMIT,
default 1000). ≤0 normalised to 1000 in SetClaimLimit — fail-safe
vs. legacy unlimited semantics.
- JobService.claimLimit threaded into the existing
ProcessPendingJobs flow; ClaimPendingJobs(ctx, "", s.claimLimit).
- cmd/server/main.go wires jobService.SetClaimLimit(cfg.Scheduler.JobClaimLimit).
- 'processing pending jobs' log line now includes claim_limit so
operators can spot the cap engaging (count == claim_limit ⇒
queue is running ahead of fan-out; bump CERTCTL_SCHEDULER_JOB_CLAIM_LIMIT
or CERTCTL_RENEWAL_CONCURRENCY).
- Test wiring keeps the legacy zero-value (unlimited) for byte-
for-byte compatibility with the existing 600+ JobService unit
tests — only production code goes through SetClaimLimit.
Regression coverage:
- mockJobRepo.LastClaimLimit records the limit passed through
ClaimPendingJobs so tests can pin the propagation.
- TestProcessPendingJobs_RespectsClaimLimit: 10 Pending rows,
SetClaimLimit(3), expect exactly 3 transition to Running plus
LastClaimLimit=3 on the mock.
- TestSetClaimLimit_NormalisesNonPositive: 0/-1/-1000 all
normalise to 1000.
Closes SCALE-001.
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shankar0123
|
a41fc2d75c |
feat(ratelimit): Phase 13 Sprint 13.3 — wire backend selector + scheduler janitor + docs + helm (ARCH-M1 closure complete)
Phase 13 Sprint 13.3 — the completion half of the ARCH-M1
substantive close. Sprint 13.2 shipped the Postgres-backed
sliding-window limiter + multi-replica integration test; Sprint 13.3
wires the 6 call sites in cmd/server/main.go through the operator-
chosen backend selector, adds the rate_limit_buckets scheduler
janitor sweep, rewrites the observability doc, exposes the env-var
in the helm chart, and promotes the multi-replica integration test
to a required CI status check.
Signature ground-truth (sprint 13.2 + 13.3)
===========================================
Prompt-template signatures: `Allow(key string) error` and "5 call
sites." Actual repo: `Allow(key string, now time.Time) error` and 6
NewSlidingWindowLimiter call sites in cmd/server/main.go (the prompt
miscounted the second EST per-principal arm). Per CLAUDE.md "the repo
is truth," matched the live shape.
What changed
============
internal/config/server.go (+40 LOC):
- Added `SlidingWindowBackend string` + `SlidingWindowJanitorInterval
time.Duration` to RateLimitConfig with full operator-facing
documentation of the two valid values (memory|postgres) +
when-to-use-which decision tree.
internal/config/config.go (+27 LOC):
- Load() reads CERTCTL_RATE_LIMIT_BACKEND (default "memory") +
CERTCTL_RATE_LIMIT_JANITOR_INTERVAL (default 5m).
- Validate() rejects anything other than ""/"memory"/"postgres"
(empty = memory equivalence for test-built Configs that bypass
Load()). Janitor interval must be ≥ 1 minute when set.
- Failure modes return clear ::error:: with the env-var name + the
valid values, so an operator typo ("postgress" → memory in a
3-replica cluster) fails fast at startup.
internal/ratelimit/factory.go (NEW, 67 LOC):
- NewLimiter(backend, db, maxN, window, mapCap) Limiter — single
factory the 6 cmd/server/main.go call sites route through.
- Drop-in signature: same maxN/window/mapCap as
NewSlidingWindowLimiter (mapCap accepted + ignored for postgres
— the rate_limit_buckets table grows until the janitor sweeps).
- Defensive panic on unknown backend (config.Validate is SoT;
this is belt-and-suspenders).
internal/ratelimit/postgres_gc.go (NEW, 73 LOC):
- PostgresGC struct + NewPostgresGC + GarbageCollect.
- Single-statement DELETE FROM rate_limit_buckets WHERE
updated_at < NOW() - maxWindow. Idempotent.
- maxWindow <= 0 is a no-op (operator opt-out).
internal/scheduler/scheduler.go (+90 LOC):
- New RateLimitGarbageCollector interface (mirrors the
ACMEGarbageCollector / SessionGarbageCollector contracts).
- rateLimitGC field + rateLimitGCInterval + rateLimitGCRunning
on Scheduler.
- SetRateLimitGarbageCollector(gc) + SetRateLimitGCInterval(d)
Setters following the existing acmeGC/sessionGC pattern.
- rateLimitGCLoop() — JitteredTicker + atomic.Bool guard +
per-tick context.WithTimeout(1m). Logs row count at Debug.
- Loop counted in the Start() WaitGroup only when the GC is
non-nil; cmd/server/main.go skips SetRateLimitGarbageCollector
when backend=memory so the loop never launches for that case.
cmd/server/main.go (35 LOC diff):
- All 6 ratelimit.NewSlidingWindowLimiter call sites now route
through ratelimit.NewLimiter(cfg.RateLimit.SlidingWindowBackend,
db, ...). Grep verification post-fix returns ZERO hits.
- Six sites: breakglass loginLimiter (580), ocspLimiter (1003),
exportLimiter (1068), EST failed-basic (1535), EST per-principal
SCEP-mTLS arm (1591), EST per-principal SCEP arm (1613). The
intune.NewPerDeviceRateLimiter site at line 1823 stays unmoved
— its inner type-alias wrapper is the prompt's
out-of-scope (cmd/server/*.go only).
- Conditionally constructs PostgresGC + wires the scheduler janitor
when backend=postgres; logs the wiring decision either way so
operators see "rate-limit GC sweep enabled (postgres backend)"
or "in-memory backend self-prunes" in the boot log.
internal/api/handler/{est,export,certificates,auth_breakglass}.go:
- Replaced 5 *ratelimit.SlidingWindowLimiter field/Setter types
with ratelimit.Limiter (the interface). Allow() satisfies the
same call shape on both backends; the in-memory tests that
construct *SlidingWindowLimiter still compile because the
concrete type satisfies the interface (compile-time check in
internal/ratelimit/limiter.go pins this).
docs/operator/observability.md (176 LOC diff):
- Replaced the "per-process, in-memory, reset-on-restart, not
shared across replicas" paragraph with the new
configurable-backend section: operator decision tree,
backend internals (memory vs postgres), janitor description,
falsifiable closure proof (the Sprint 13.2 integration test
name + invocation), helm chart wiring example.
- Updated inventory to reflect the actual handler file paths +
actual cap configurations (the prior doc said "60s window" for
several limiters that actually use 60m / 24h windows).
- Doc smoke confirmed: grep -c 'per-process, in-memory,
reset-on-restart' docs/operator/observability.md = 0.
deploy/helm/certctl/values.yaml + templates/server-configmap.yaml +
templates/server-deployment.yaml:
- Exposed server.rateLimiting.backend (default "memory") +
server.rateLimiting.janitorInterval (default "5m") under the
existing rateLimiting block.
- ConfigMap renders both as rate-limit-backend +
rate-limit-janitor-interval keys.
- Deployment wires CERTCTL_RATE_LIMIT_BACKEND +
CERTCTL_RATE_LIMIT_JANITOR_INTERVAL env vars from the configmap.
- Helm render: `helm template deploy/helm/certctl --set
server.rateLimiting.backend=postgres` shows the env-var on the
server-deployment.yaml output.
.github/workflows/ci.yml (+12 LOC):
- Added a new step in the Go Build & Test job that runs the
Sprint 13.2 multi-replica integration test
(TestRateLimit_PostgresBackend_CapEnforcedAcrossReplicas) with
-tags=integration -race -timeout=300s. Fails the CI status check
if the cross-replica row lock ever stops arbitrating across
replicas — the ARCH-M1 closure regression gate.
Verification (all green locally; postgres integration via CI)
============================================================
$ grep -nE 'NewSlidingWindowLimiter' cmd/server/*.go
(zero hits — Sprint 13.3 receipt)
$ go test -short -count=1 \
./internal/config/... ./internal/ratelimit/... \
./internal/scheduler/... ./internal/api/handler/... \
./cmd/server/...
ok internal/config 1.177s
ok internal/ratelimit 0.007s
ok internal/scheduler 9.165s
ok internal/api/handler 6.245s
ok cmd/server 0.390s
$ staticcheck ./internal/ratelimit/... ./internal/scheduler/... \
./internal/config/... ./internal/api/handler/... ./cmd/server/...
(clean)
$ gofmt -l internal/ cmd/server/
(clean)
$ grep -c 'per-process, in-memory, reset-on-restart' \
docs/operator/observability.md
0 (doc smoke — the audit's verbatim phrasing is gone)
$ bash scripts/ci-guards/G-3-env-docs-drift.sh
G-3 env-docs-drift: clean.
$ bash scripts/ci-guards/complete-path-config-coverage.sh
OK — every CERTCTL_* env var (197) has at least one non-config-
package consumer.
Selector contract verified — config.Validate() rejects any value
other than ""/memory/postgres at startup with a clear error message.
Sprint 13.4 next (ARCH-H1 OpenAPI authoring batch 1) is on a
different axis; ARCH-M1 closure is complete with this commit
modulo the Sprint 13.7 audit-HTML flip + zero-floor pin.
Closes: ARCH-M1 substantive remediation. The cross-replica rate-
limit-cap-enforcement gap that the audit recommended deferring to
v3 is closed; operators with server.replicas > 1 flip
CERTCTL_RATE_LIMIT_BACKEND=postgres and get exactly-cap enforcement
across the cluster (proved by the multi-replica integration test now
gating CI).
|
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|
shankar0123
|
7f57b1d3bf |
refactor(config): extract Issuers family — LAST in-config cut (Phase 9, 7 of N)
Continuing Phase 9 ARCH-M2 closure. Sprint 7 is the LAST in-config
cut of Phase 9. After this commit lands, the remaining sub-splits
target non-config hotspots (cmd/server/main.go, service/acme.go,
mcp/tools.go, auth_session_oidc.go, cmd/agent/main.go).
What moved
==========
internal/config/issuers.go (new, 435 lines including BSL header +
Phase 9 doc-comment + 12 structs)
Twelve issuer-related structs collected in one place for the first
time:
- KeygenConfig global key-generation policy (agent vs server)
- CAConfig Local CA mode (self-signed vs sub-CA)
- StepCAConfig step-ca (URL + JWK provisioner)
- VaultConfig HashiCorp Vault PKI
- DigiCertConfig DigiCert CertCentral
- SectigoConfig Sectigo Certificate Manager
- GoogleCASConfig Google Cloud CA Service
- AWSACMPCAConfig AWS ACM Private CA
- EntrustConfig Entrust Certificate Services
- GlobalSignConfig GlobalSign Atlas HVCA
- EJBCAConfig EJBCA / Keyfactor
- OpenSSLConfig OpenSSL / custom CA
Simplest split shape of Phase 9 so far
======================================
- ZERO helpers move. Every issuer config is pure data — strings,
ints, bools. No time.Duration, no nested struct, no helper
function reference.
- ZERO imports needed in issuers.go beyond the package declaration.
Verified by: `awk 'NR>=136 && NR<=269 || NR>=355 && NR<=527 ||
NR>=586 && NR<=609' internal/config/config.go | grep -E '\btime\.
|\bos\.|\bfmt\.'` returned empty before the move.
Three sed passes (Sprint-6 pattern, scattered targets)
======================================================
The 12 issuer types were SCATTERED across config.go interleaved
with non-issuer types (OCSPResponderConfig, EncryptionConfig, the
discovery family, DigestConfig, HealthCheckConfig, NetworkScanConfig,
VerificationConfig, ApprovalConfig). Three independent sed deletes
from highest-line to lowest:
Block 3 (line 586-609): OpenSSLConfig alone (24 lines)
Block 2 (line 355-527): KeygenConfig + CAConfig + StepCAConfig +
VaultConfig + DigiCertConfig +
SectigoConfig + GoogleCASConfig
(173 lines)
Block 1 (line 136-269): AWSACMPCAConfig + EntrustConfig +
GlobalSignConfig + EJBCAConfig
(134 lines)
Total: 331 lines deleted.
Highest-line-first ordering keeps every range pre-shift-stable —
no mid-edit re-derivation.
What stayed in config.go
========================
- OCSPResponderConfig (server-side OCSP responder; not issuer-side)
- EncryptionConfig (config-at-rest encryption; not issuer-side)
- CloudDiscoveryConfig + AWSSecretsMgrDiscoveryConfig +
AzureKVDiscoveryConfig + GCPSecretMgrDiscoveryConfig
(cloud-DISCOVERY sources reading certs others issued; not issuer
connectors. Could form a future config/discovery.go split.)
- DigestConfig + HealthCheckConfig (notifier-policy /
health-monitor cadence; not issuer-related)
- NetworkScanConfig + VerificationConfig (discovery / verify;
not issuer-related)
- ApprovalConfig (RBAC issuance-approval workflow; Sprint 6's
deliberate exclusion still applies)
- The Config struct itself (line 67) + every Load() / Validate()
body that references issuer configs by field name.
Public-surface invariant
========================
Every type, exported field, and doc-comment is byte-identical to
pre-split. Package stays `config`. No issuer-config type exports
a method (the entire surface is fields — preserved verbatim).
Every external caller path (`config.AWSACMPCAConfig` /
`config.EntrustConfig` / etc.) resolves the same way.
Verification (all clean):
gofmt -l internal/config/ → clean
go build ./internal/config/... → clean
go test ./internal/config/... -count=1 → ok (0.67s)
staticcheck ./internal/config/... → clean
go build ./cmd/server/...
./internal/auth/...
./internal/api/router/...
./internal/api/handler/...
./internal/scheduler/...
./internal/connector/issuer/... → clean (broader build
expanded to include
issuer packages
this sprint since
they're the most
likely external
consumers of the
moved types)
grep -nE '^type (KeygenConfig|CAConfig|StepCAConfig|VaultConfig|
DigiCertConfig|SectigoConfig|GoogleCASConfig|
OpenSSLConfig|AWSACMPCAConfig|EntrustConfig|
GlobalSignConfig|EJBCAConfig)'
internal/config/config.go → empty (none remain)
grep -nE '^type (KeygenConfig|CAConfig|...)' internal/config/issuers.go
→ 12 types (correct)
LOC delta:
config.go: 1673 → 1342 (-331 lines: -134 Block 1, -173 Block 2,
-24 Block 3)
issuers.go: new, 435 lines (incl. 102-line Phase 9 doc-comment +
BSL header + package decl)
Cumulative Phase 9 progress (Sprints 1-7 from config.go):
Pre-Phase-9: 3403 LOC
After Sprint 1 (Notifier): 3335 LOC (-68)
After Sprint 2 (ACME): 3108 LOC (-227)
After Sprint 3 (SCEP): 2774 LOC (-334)
After Sprint 4 (EST): 2467 LOC (-307)
After Sprint 5 (Auth): 1963 LOC (-504)
After Sprint 6 (Server): 1673 LOC (-290)
After Sprint 7 (Issuers): 1342 LOC (-331)
Total Sprint 1+2+3+4+5+6+7: -2061 LOC (-60.6%)
Notable milestones (Sprint 7)
==============================
- config.go has lost MORE than 60% of its original lines.
- 6 sibling config-package files now exist alongside config.go,
each scoped to a single concern. Total config package size
3898 LOC across 7 files (was 3403 LOC in 1 file pre-Phase-9 —
net 14.6% growth from per-file Phase 9 doc-comments + the file
headers; in exchange, the largest single file dropped from
3403 → 1342 LOC, a 60.6% concentration reduction).
- This is the LAST cut from config.go. The remaining 5 sub-splits
target non-config hotspots and use entirely different file-shape
patterns (subpackage creation for service/acme; per-verb file
splits for handlers; pure-domain grouping for mcp/tools).
Next queued (Sprint 8): cmd/server/main.go split into main.go
(entrypoint) + cmd/server/wire.go (DI assembly) +
cmd/server/migrations.go (boot-time migration path). main.go is
the SECOND-LARGEST hotspot at 2966 LOC. Different from
config.go cuts because:
- cmd/server/ is a package with multiple files already (per
`ls cmd/server/`); the new files will live alongside existing
ones (auth_backfill.go, tls.go, etc.) which means no new
subdirectory needed.
- The cut is by FUNCTIONAL CONCERN (boot sequencing) rather
than by TYPE FAMILY (struct grouping), so the boundary lines
are different in nature.
- Phase 4's migration-hook code (in main.go today) inherits
into migrations.go without code-change — the Phase 9 prompt
explicitly says "Phase 4's pre-install migration hook adds
a path to cmd/server/migrations.go; doing the split first
means double-touching the same lines."
Closes: cowork/certctl-architecture-diligence-audit.html#fix-ARCH-M2
(partial — 7 of 12 — full ARCH-M2 closure is the aggregate)
|
||
|
shankar0123
|
aaddd31d20 |
refactor(config): extract Server family + isLoopbackAddr helper (Phase 9, 6 of N)
Continuing Phase 9 ARCH-M2 closure. Sprint 6 groups the server-tier
infrastructure structs (the things that configure HOW the server
runs) and the HIGH-12 demo-mode startup-guard helper that exclusively
serves the ServerConfig.Host gate.
What moved
==========
internal/config/server.go (new, 374 lines including BSL header +
Phase 9 doc-comment + 2 imports +
7 structs + 1 unexported helper)
Seven structs:
- ServerConfig (HTTP listener: Host, Port, MaxBodySize,
TLS sub-struct, AuditFlushTimeoutSeconds)
- ServerTLSConfig (HTTPS-only TLS material: CertPath + KeyPath)
- DatabaseConfig (URL + MaxConnections + MigrationsPath +
DemoSeed)
- SchedulerConfig (all 15 scheduler-loop tunables: RenewalCheck,
JobProcessor, RenewalConcurrency, agent-health,
notification-process + retry, retry-interval,
job-timeout, AwaitingCSR + Approval timeouts,
short-lived-expiry, CRL-generation, OCSP-rate-
limit, cert-export-rate-limit, deploy-backup-
retention, K8s-kubelet-sync-timeout)
- LogConfig (Level + Format)
- RateLimitConfig (Enabled + RPS + BurstSize + per-user
overrides)
- CORSConfig (AllowedOrigins — empty deny-by-default)
One unexported helper:
- isLoopbackAddr() (HIGH-12 demo-mode guard: 127.0.0.1, ::1,
and "localhost" return true; 0.0.0.0, ::,
and non-localhost hostnames return false.
Same-package callers: Validate() in config.go
+ isLoopbackAddr_test in config_test.go,
both unaffected by the move.)
Three sed passes (highest line numbers first so positions don't shift)
======================================================================
The edit was performed via three independent sed deletes from
highest-line to lowest-line so each delete's range references the
file's pre-shift line numbers:
1. sed -i '1924,1963d' — deleted isLoopbackAddr (40 lines)
2. sed -i '834,893d' — deleted LogConfig + RateLimitConfig +
CORSConfig (60 lines)
3. sed -i '624,810d' — deleted ServerConfig + ServerTLSConfig +
DatabaseConfig + SchedulerConfig
(187 lines)
Total: 287 lines deleted. Reverse-order matters because each delete
shifts subsequent line numbers; doing them top-down would require
re-deriving every range mid-edit.
Why ApprovalConfig stayed in config.go
=======================================
ApprovalConfig (RBAC-related — issuance-approval workflow) sits
between SchedulerConfig and LogConfig in the original file ordering.
It's NOT server-tier infrastructure — it belongs with the Auth/RBAC
surface. Sprint 6's sed ranges deliberately preserve it where it
lives. Operator may want to fold it into a future Auth-followup cut
if the approval surface needs to live adjacent to AuthConfig.
Import-graph hygiene
====================
isLoopbackAddr was the ONLY user of `net` in config.go (verified via
`grep -nE '\bnet\.' internal/config/config.go` → 2 hits, both inside
isLoopbackAddr's body). After the move, config.go's `net` import
becomes unused — would have failed `go vet`. This commit removes the
`net` line from config.go's import block. server.go imports `net`
directly. The `time` import in config.go stays because the still-
in-place OCSPResponderConfig / DigestConfig / HealthCheckConfig /
NetworkScanConfig / VerificationConfig / per-vendor-issuer configs
all reference `time.Duration`.
Public-surface invariant
========================
Every type, exported field, and doc-comment is byte-identical to
pre-split. Package stays `config`. Every external caller of
`config.ServerConfig` / `config.ServerTLSConfig` / `config.DatabaseConfig`
/ `config.SchedulerConfig` / `config.LogConfig` / `config.RateLimitConfig`
/ `config.CORSConfig` resolves the same way. The unexported
isLoopbackAddr is invisible to external consumers; its same-package
callers (Validate, the test) continue to resolve via the package
symbol table.
Verification (all clean):
gofmt -l internal/config/ → clean
go build ./internal/config/... → clean
go test ./internal/config/... -count=1 → ok (0.68s)
staticcheck ./internal/config/... → clean
go build ./cmd/server/...
./internal/auth/...
./internal/api/router/...
./internal/api/handler/...
./internal/scheduler/... → clean (the critical
broader-importer check)
grep -nE '^type (ServerConfig|ServerTLSConfig|DatabaseConfig|SchedulerConfig|LogConfig|RateLimitConfig|CORSConfig)|^func isLoopbackAddr' internal/config/config.go
→ empty (none remain in config.go)
grep -nE '^type (ServerConfig|ServerTLSConfig|DatabaseConfig|SchedulerConfig|LogConfig|RateLimitConfig|CORSConfig)|^func isLoopbackAddr' internal/config/server.go
→ 7 types + 1 func (correct)
grep -nE '\bnet\.' internal/config/config.go
→ empty (the import-removal was load-bearing)
LOC delta:
config.go: 1963 → 1673 (-290 lines: -287 from three sed cuts,
-1 from import-block
line removal,
-2 from misc gofmt cleanup)
server.go: new, 374 lines (incl. 87-line Phase 9 doc-comment +
BSL header + package decl + 2 imports)
Cumulative Phase 9 progress (Sprints 1+2+3+4+5+6 from config.go):
Pre-Phase-9: 3403 LOC
After Sprint 1 (Notifier): 3335 LOC (-68)
After Sprint 2 (ACME): 3108 LOC (-227)
After Sprint 3 (SCEP): 2774 LOC (-334)
After Sprint 4 (EST): 2467 LOC (-307)
After Sprint 5 (Auth): 1963 LOC (-504)
After Sprint 6 (Server): 1673 LOC (-290)
Total Sprint 1+2+3+4+5+6: -1730 LOC (-50.8%)
Notable milestone: config.go has now lost MORE than HALF its original
lines (-50.8%). One more cut from config.go remains (Sprint 7 ~600
LOC of per-vendor issuer configs) before the file split moves on to
non-config hotspots (Sprints 8-12).
Pattern lesson — import-graph cleanup
======================================
Splits that move the LAST consumer of an import need to remove the
import from the source file or `go vet` / build will fail. The check
is `grep -nE '\bnet\.' internal/config/config.go` (or whichever
package) before commit — if empty, drop the import line. Past
sprints didn't hit this because the moved-out helpers used only
shared packages (`strings`, `os`, `fmt`, `time`) that other code in
config.go still uses. Sprint 6's `net` removal is the first
import-rebalancing in Phase 9.
Three-pass sed pattern (also new in Sprint 6)
=============================================
Prior sprints did one or two sed deletes. Sprint 6 needed three
because the Server-family structs straddled ApprovalConfig and
isLoopbackAddr lived far from the struct block. Doing them
highest-line-first means each range references pre-shift line
numbers — no mid-edit re-derivation required.
Next queued (Sprint 7): Issuers family from config.go →
internal/config/issuers.go (~600 LOC). Includes KeygenConfig +
CAConfig + the ten per-vendor configs (StepCA, Vault, DigiCert,
Sectigo, GoogleCAS, AWSACMPCA, Entrust, GlobalSign, EJBCA, OpenSSL).
This is the LAST config.go cut of Phase 9; after Sprint 7 ships,
config.go should drop to ~1100-1200 LOC and the remaining splits
target non-config hotspots (cmd/server/main.go, service/acme.go,
mcp/tools.go, auth_session_oidc.go, cmd/agent/main.go).
Closes: cowork/certctl-architecture-diligence-audit.html#fix-ARCH-M2
(partial — 6 of 12 — full ARCH-M2 closure is the aggregate)
|
||
|
shankar0123
|
51f9cf13dc |
refactor(config): extract Auth family + 2 exported + 1 unexported helpers (Phase 9, 5 of N)
The biggest single-sprint cut so far (-502 lines) and the FIRST split
that moves EXPORTED helpers. Public-surface invariant verified end-to-
end via broader-importer build (cmd/server + internal/auth +
internal/api/...).
What moved
==========
internal/config/auth.go (new, 601 lines including BSL header +
Phase 9 doc-comment + 4 imports +
5 types + 3 helpers)
Five types:
- NamedAPIKey (one named API-key entry; admin flag for
actor attribution in audit trail)
- AuthType (+ 3 consts: AuthTypeAPIKey / AuthTypeNone /
AuthTypeOIDC — the typed enum that
replaced the pre-G-1 string-literal
map. "jwt" stays out forever per
ValidAuthTypes() invariant pinned by
config_test.go's property test)
- AuthConfig (top-level: Type, Secret, NamedKeys,
AgentBootstrapToken + DenyEmpty flag,
Session, TrustedProxies, DemoModeAck +
TS + ResidualStrict, OIDC pre-login
binding knobs, Breakglass,
BootstrapAdminGroups + ProviderID +
BootstrapToken)
- SessionConfig (Auth Bundle 2 Phase 4: IdleTimeout,
AbsoluteTimeout, SigningKeyRetention,
GCInterval, SameSite, BindIP,
BindUserAgent)
- BreakglassConfig (Auth Bundle 2 Phase 7.5: Enabled +
LockoutThreshold + Duration + Reset)
Three helpers (TWO exported — first sprint to move public-API):
- ValidAuthTypes() — single source of truth for the allowed
CERTCTL_AUTH_TYPE set. EXPORTED.
External callers (verified clean via
broader-importer build):
cmd/server/main.go:115
internal/auth/middleware.go (doc ref)
internal/api/handler/health.go (doc ref)
- ParseNamedAPIKeys() — parses CERTCTL_API_KEYS_NAMED with
L-004 rotation-aware duplicate-name
handling + slog.Info "rotation window
active" observability. EXPORTED.
Test caller in config_test.go +
production caller in Load() in
config.go (intra-package, resolves
via same-package lookup after move).
- isValidKeyName() — alphanumeric + hyphen + underscore
validator. Unexported; only called
from ParseNamedAPIKeys (intra-file
edge after the move — one fewer
cross-file edge).
External-importer surface (verified resolves clean post-move)
==============================================================
The package name stays `config`, so every external reference
continues to resolve. Live grep confirms the surface:
cmd/server/main.go:
- config.AuthType(...) (cast)
- config.AuthTypeNone (const)
- config.AuthTypeAPIKey (const)
- config.AuthTypeOIDC (const)
- config.ValidAuthTypes() (func)
cmd/server/auth_backfill.go:
- config.AuthType(...) (cast)
- config.AuthTypeNone (const)
internal/auth/middleware.go:
- config.AuthType (doc reference + field-comment)
- config.AuthTypeConsts (doc reference)
internal/api/handler/health.go:
- config.AuthType + config.ValidAuthTypes() (doc references)
Verification (the critical broader-importer build):
go build ./cmd/server/... ./internal/auth/...
./internal/api/router/... ./internal/api/handler/...
./internal/scheduler/... → clean
If the move had accidentally renamed a symbol or changed a
package boundary, that broader build would have failed loud.
What stayed in config.go (intentionally)
========================================
- ErrAgentBootstrapTokenRequired sentinel (top-of-file Phase-2
sentinel block) — tied to Validate()'s fail-closed behavior,
not to AuthConfig's struct shape. Same precedent as Sprint 2's
ErrACMEInsecureWithoutAck and Sprint 3's leaving
ErrDemoModeAckExpired in place.
- demoModeAckMaxAge const (top-of-file) — tied to Validate()'s
24h TS-freshness check, not to struct shape.
- The Validate() body that branches on AuthType / DemoModeAck /
AgentBootstrapTokenDenyEmpty / DemoModeResidualStrict — cross-
cutting validation logic that stays where the other
Validate() branches live.
- The Load() body that calls ParseNamedAPIKeys() during initial
cfg.Auth.NamedKeys construction; same-package resolution.
- Shared getEnv / getEnvBool / getEnvInt / getEnvDuration +
splitComma + trimSpace helpers (splitComma + trimSpace are
used by ParseNamedAPIKeys via same-package lookup).
Edit shape
==========
Two sed passes (the now-standard Sprint-3-onward pattern):
1. sed -i '847,1204d' — deleted the 358-line struct + enum +
ValidAuthTypes block.
2. sed -i '1925,2068d' — deleted the 144-line helper block
(positions shifted by Sprint 5's struct removal already
applied; ParseNamedAPIKeys' new doc-comment start moved
from 2283 → 1925).
Then gofmt -w. No residual double-blank-line at either join —
both removals happened mid-blank-separated regions cleanly.
Public-surface invariant
========================
Every type, exported function, exported constant, exported field,
and doc-comment is byte-identical to pre-split. Package stays
`config`. Every external caller path is preserved.
Verification (all clean):
gofmt -l internal/config/ → clean
go build ./internal/config/... → clean
go test ./internal/config/... -count=1 → ok (0.70s)
staticcheck ./internal/config/... → clean
go build ./cmd/server/...
./internal/auth/...
./internal/api/router/...
./internal/api/handler/...
./internal/scheduler/... → clean
grep -nE '^type (AuthConfig|SessionConfig|BreakglassConfig|NamedAPIKey|AuthType)|^func (ValidAuthTypes|ParseNamedAPIKeys|isValidKeyName)' internal/config/config.go
→ empty (none remain in config.go)
grep -nE '^type (AuthConfig|SessionConfig|BreakglassConfig|NamedAPIKey|AuthType)|^func (ValidAuthTypes|ParseNamedAPIKeys|isValidKeyName)' internal/config/auth.go
→ 5 types + 3 funcs (correct)
LOC delta:
config.go: 2467 → 1963 (-504 lines: -358 struct block,
-144 helper block,
-2 from misc cleanup
collapse)
auth.go: new, 601 lines (incl. 101-line Phase 9 doc-comment +
BSL header + package decl + 4 imports)
Notable milestone: config.go is now BELOW 2000 LOC for the first
time since the original audit. From 3403 → 1963 = -42.3% across
Sprints 1+2+3+4+5.
Cumulative Phase 9 progress (Sprints 1+2+3+4+5 from config.go):
Pre-Phase-9: 3403 LOC
After Sprint 1 (Notifier): 3335 LOC (-68)
After Sprint 2 (ACME): 3108 LOC (-227)
After Sprint 3 (SCEP): 2774 LOC (-334)
After Sprint 4 (EST): 2467 LOC (-307)
After Sprint 5 (Auth): 1963 LOC (-504)
Total Sprint 1+2+3+4+5: -1440 LOC (-42.3%)
Pattern lesson — exported-helper move
=====================================
Pre-move check: enumerate every external caller via
`grep -rnE 'config\.<Symbol>'`. If the symbol's external callers
ARE all inside the same package, the move is trivial. If they're
external, the move is still safe IFF the package name doesn't
change — only the file the symbol lives IN changes. Same-package
resolution at compile time guarantees the import-path that
external code uses (`config.AuthType`, `config.ValidAuthTypes`)
keeps working. The broader-importer build is the load-bearing
verification: if it goes red, the move is wrong; green = safe.
Next queued (Sprint 6): Server family from config.go →
internal/config/server.go (~270 LOC). Includes ServerConfig +
ServerTLSConfig + DatabaseConfig + SchedulerConfig + LogConfig +
RateLimitConfig + CORSConfig + isLoopbackAddr (unexported
HIGH-12 demo-mode helper). No exported helpers — back to the
Sprint-3-style helper-bundle pattern, just bigger family.
Closes: cowork/certctl-architecture-diligence-audit.html#fix-ARCH-M2
(partial — 5 of 12 — full ARCH-M2 closure is the aggregate)
|
||
|
shankar0123
|
57d55b7390 |
refactor(config): extract EST family + helpers to its own file (Phase 9, 4 of N)
Continuing Phase 9 ARCH-M2 closure. Sprint 4 extracts the EST surface,
mirroring Sprint 3's SCEP cut shape (two structs + multiple helpers
move together).
What moved
==========
internal/config/est.go (new, 396 lines including BSL header +
Phase 9 doc-comment + 2 imports +
2 structs + 5 helpers)
Two structs:
- ESTConfig (top-level: Enabled + Profiles slice +
legacy single-issuer flat fields kept
for backward compat — fewer trigger
fields than SCEP because EST has no
per-profile RA pair or challenge
password in this hardening-bundle
phase)
- ESTProfileConfig (one EST endpoint: PathID, IssuerID,
ProfileID, EnrollmentPassword,
MTLSEnabled, MTLSClientCATrustBundlePath,
ChannelBindingRequired, AllowedAuthModes,
RateLimitPerPrincipal24h,
ServerKeygenEnabled — field surface
spans the full Phase-1-through-5
hardening bundle)
Five unexported helpers:
- loadESTProfilesFromEnv() — reads CERTCTL_EST_PROFILES +
expands each name into an
ESTProfileConfig via the indexed
env-var family. Mirrors
loadSCEPProfilesFromEnv exactly.
- parseAuthModes() — splits a comma-separated env value
into a normalized []string of
auth-mode tokens.
- mergeESTLegacyIntoProfiles() — backward-compat shim: synthesize
Profiles[0] from the legacy flat
fields when Profiles is empty AND
EST is enabled.
- validESTPathID() — path-segment validator (mirrors
validSCEPPathID; kept separate so
future EST-specific path
constraints can land without
affecting SCEP).
- validESTAuthMode() — refuses unknown auth-mode tokens
at startup ("mtls" / "basic"
are valid in Phase 1).
Why move all five helpers together
==================================
Live grep confirms each helper is exclusively EST-specific:
- parseAuthModes() has one production call site (line 1851 inside
loadESTProfilesFromEnv itself, intra-helper) + one test caller
(config_est_profiles_test.go in package `config` — same package
so the move is invisible to the test).
- validESTAuthMode() has exactly one production caller (Validate()
in config.go); validESTPathID() likewise.
- mergeESTLegacyIntoProfiles() called from Load() in config.go.
- loadESTProfilesFromEnv() called from Load() in config.go.
All callers either stay in config.go (Load + Validate) or live in
est.go itself (the intra-helper parseAuthModes call inside
loadESTProfilesFromEnv stays a same-file call after the move — one
LESS cross-file edge to track). The test in
config_est_profiles_test.go is in package `config` so the unexported
callable surface is preserved by same-package resolution.
What stayed in config.go (intentionally)
========================================
- Load() and Validate() bodies — the EST-specific call sites stay
where they are (cross-cutting validation logic, not split-target).
- Every shared getEnv* helper (used by EVERY config family).
- The Config{}.EST master-struct field declaration.
Edit shape
==========
Two sed passes (same approach as Sprint 3):
1. sed -i '611,774d' — deleted the 164-line EST struct block
(ESTConfig + ESTProfileConfig + their doc comments).
2. sed -i '1648,1789d' — deleted the 142-line helper block
(positions already shifted by Sprint 4's struct removal).
Then gofmt -w to collapse a residual double-blank-line at the second
join point (none surfaced at the first).
Public-surface invariant
========================
Every type, field, exported method, and doc-comment is byte-identical
to pre-split. Package stays `config`. Every caller's
`config.ESTConfig` / `config.ESTProfileConfig` import path is
preserved without modification. The five helpers are unexported so
their move is invisible to package consumers; same-package callers
(Load, Validate, the existing test) continue to resolve them via the
package symbol table.
Verification (all clean):
gofmt -l internal/config/ → clean (after -w)
go build ./internal/config/... → clean
go test ./internal/config/... -count=1 → ok (0.58s)
staticcheck ./internal/config/... → clean
go build ./internal/api/router/...
./internal/scheduler/...
./cmd/server/...
./internal/api/handler/... → clean (broader
importers still
resolve every type
and helper)
grep -nE '^type EST|^func .*EST|^func parseAuthModes' config.go
→ empty (none remain in config.go)
grep -nE '^type EST|^func .*EST|^func parseAuthModes' est.go
→ 2 types + 5 funcs (correct: ESTConfig, ESTProfileConfig,
loadESTProfilesFromEnv,
parseAuthModes,
mergeESTLegacyIntoProfiles,
validESTPathID,
validESTAuthMode)
LOC delta:
config.go: 2774 → 2467 (-307 lines: -164 from struct block,
-142 from helper block,
-1 from double-blank collapse)
est.go: new, 396 lines (incl. 87-line Phase 9 doc-comment +
BSL header + package decl + 2 imports)
Cumulative Phase 9 progress (Sprints 1+2+3+4 from config.go):
Pre-Phase-9: 3403 LOC
After Sprint 1 (Notifier): 3335 LOC (-68)
After Sprint 2 (ACME): 3108 LOC (-227)
After Sprint 3 (SCEP): 2774 LOC (-334)
After Sprint 4 (EST): 2467 LOC (-307)
Total Sprint 1+2+3+4: -936 LOC (-27.5%)
Pattern lesson reinforcement
============================
Sprint 4 confirms the SCEP/EST symmetry the original helper authors
documented inline ("Mirrors loadSCEPProfilesFromEnv exactly").
Sprint 3 + Sprint 4 are now demonstrating the same cut pattern works
across two related-but-distinct protocol surfaces. Sprint 5+ should
be easier because they don't carry the same helper-bundling
complexity (Auth family probably has its own helper cluster too, but
Server / Issuers are likely pure-data per the original audit-questions
output).
Next queued (Sprint 5): Auth family from config.go →
internal/config/auth.go. Includes AuthConfig + SessionConfig +
BreakglassConfig + NamedAPIKey + ParseNamedAPIKeys (note: this is
EXPORTED — only exported function in the config-helpers cluster) +
isValidKeyName + ValidAuthTypes. The exported ParseNamedAPIKeys adds
a wrinkle Sprints 1-4 didn't have: external callers may import it,
so the public-surface check needs to include it. Estimated ~340 LOC
moved.
Closes: cowork/certctl-architecture-diligence-audit.html#fix-ARCH-M2
(partial — 4 of 12 — full ARCH-M2 closure is the aggregate)
|
||
|
shankar0123
|
c461ef3339 |
refactor(config): extract SCEP family + helpers to its own file (Phase 9, 3 of N)
Continuing Phase 9 ARCH-M2 closure. Sprints 1+2 extracted pure-data
structs (NotifierConfig, then the ACME family). Sprint 3 is the
first split that ALSO moves helper functions — the SCEP family has
three structs AND three unexported package-internal helpers that
move together.
What moved
==========
internal/config/scep.go (new, 402 lines including BSL header +
Phase 9 doc-comment + the 3 imports +
3 structs + 3 helpers verbatim)
Three structs:
- SCEPConfig (top-level: Enabled + Profiles slice
+ legacy single-profile flat fields
kept for backward compat)
- SCEPProfileConfig (one endpoint binding: PathID,
IssuerID, ProfileID, ChallengePassword,
RA cert/key, MTLSEnabled + bundle path,
per-profile Intune block)
- SCEPIntuneProfileConfig (Enabled, ConnectorCertPath, Audience,
ChallengeValidity, PerDeviceRateLimit24h,
ClockSkewTolerance)
Three unexported helpers:
- loadSCEPProfilesFromEnv() — reads CERTCTL_SCEP_PROFILES +
expands each name into a
SCEPProfileConfig via the
CERTCTL_SCEP_PROFILE_<NAME>_*
indexed env-var family.
- mergeSCEPLegacyIntoProfiles() — backward-compat shim: synthesize
Profiles[0] from the legacy flat
fields when Profiles is empty.
- validSCEPPathID() — path-segment validator (ASCII
[a-z0-9-], no leading/trailing
hyphen, empty allowed).
Why move the helpers along
==========================
Each helper is exclusively SCEP-specific: live grep across the repo
shows ZERO callers outside internal/config/config.go's Load() and
Validate(). Both still live in config.go and continue to resolve
the moved helpers via same-package lookup. Specifically:
- Load() (still in config.go) calls loadSCEPProfilesFromEnv() during
initial cfg.SCEP construction (call site at the original line ~1840,
now closer to line ~1840 after Sprints 1+2 + 3 deletions).
- Load() calls mergeSCEPLegacyIntoProfiles(&cfg.SCEP) after the
initial profile-load.
- Validate() calls validSCEPPathID(p.PathID) per-profile in the
Profiles-iteration loop.
The unexported helpers getEnv / getEnvBool / getEnvInt / getEnvDuration
used by loadSCEPProfilesFromEnv stay in config.go (shared across every
config family); same-package resolution makes the calls work.
What stayed in config.go
========================
- All Load() + Validate() bodies — the SCEP-specific call sites stay
where they are (cross-cutting validation logic, not split-target).
- Every getEnv* helper.
- The Config{}.SCEP master-struct field declaration.
Edit shape
==========
The edit was performed in two sed passes:
1. sed -i '775,1004d' — deleted the SCEP struct block (the three
types + their doc-comments).
2. sed -i '1813,1916d' — deleted the SCEP helper-function block
(the three helpers + their doc-comments).
Then gofmt -w to collapse a residual double-blank-line at the first
join point. The two-pass approach was necessary because the structs
and helpers live in different regions of config.go (struct
definitions in the top half, function bodies near the bottom).
Public-surface invariant
========================
Every type, field, exported method, and doc-comment is byte-identical
to pre-split. Package stays `config`. Every caller's
`config.SCEPConfig` / `config.SCEPProfileConfig` /
`config.SCEPIntuneProfileConfig` import path is preserved without
modification. The three helpers are unexported so their move is
invisible to package consumers; same-package callers in config.go
continue to resolve them via the package symbol table.
Verification (all clean):
gofmt -l internal/config/ → clean (after -w)
go build ./internal/config/... → clean
go test ./internal/config/... -count=1 → ok (0.68s)
staticcheck ./internal/config/... → clean
go build ./internal/api/router/...
./internal/scheduler/...
./cmd/server/... → clean (broader importers
still resolve every type)
grep -nE '^type SCEP|^func .*SCEP' internal/config/config.go
→ empty (none remain in config.go)
grep -nE '^type SCEP|^func .*SCEP' internal/config/scep.go
→ 3 types + 3 funcs (correct: SCEPConfig, SCEPProfileConfig,
SCEPIntuneProfileConfig,
loadSCEPProfilesFromEnv,
mergeSCEPLegacyIntoProfiles,
validSCEPPathID)
LOC delta:
config.go: 3108 → 2774 (-334 lines: -230 from struct block,
-103 from helper block,
-1 from double-blank collapse)
scep.go: new, 402 lines (incl. 72-line Phase 9 doc-comment + BSL
header + package decl + 3 imports)
Cumulative Phase 9 progress (Sprints 1+2+3 from config.go):
Pre-Phase-9: 3403 LOC
After Sprint 1 (Notifier): 3335 LOC (-68)
After Sprint 2 (ACME): 3108 LOC (-227)
After Sprint 3 (SCEP): 2774 LOC (-334)
Total Sprint 1+2+3: -629 LOC (-18.5%)
Pattern lesson logged
=====================
The "Do not assume line numbers" rule continues to pay off: every
sprint of Phase 9 has touched line numbers from prior sprints
(Sprint 1's 65-line removal shifted SCEPConfig from line 1083 to
1015 to its Sprint 3 starting position of 786). The Phase 9 prompt
told us to re-derive every fact; the live-grep audit at the start
of each sprint catches the drift.
Next queued (Sprint 4): EST family from config.go →
internal/config/est.go (~250-300 LOC including ESTConfig +
ESTProfileConfig + loadESTProfilesFromEnv +
mergeESTLegacyIntoProfiles + parseAuthModes + validESTPathID +
validESTAuthMode). Same complexity shape as SCEP — three structs
+ multiple helpers + same Load()/Validate() callers that stay
in config.go.
Closes: cowork/certctl-architecture-diligence-audit.html#fix-ARCH-M2
(partial — 3 of 12 — full ARCH-M2 closure is the aggregate)
|
||
|
shankar0123
|
5d5bd02f3e |
refactor(config): extract ACME family to its own file (Phase 9, 2 of N)
Continuing Phase 9 ARCH-M2 closure. Sprint 1 (commit
|
||
|
shankar0123
|
45ddcb75a3 |
refactor(config): extract NotifierConfig to its own file (Phase 9, 1 of N)
Phase 9 of the certctl architecture diligence remediation begins
closing ARCH-M2: the 6 backend mega-files totaling > 13K LOC of
change-risk hotspots. config.go is the largest (3,403 LOC pre-split)
and the most frequently touched (env-var ingestion gets edited every
release). The audit's "3.2K LOC / 11.5K total across 6 files" claim
has drifted upward — live grep shows config.go alone is now 3,403
LOC and the top-6 hotspots total 13,267 LOC. The audit's framing is
directionally correct; numbers updated in cowork/certctl-architecture-
diligence-audit.html with this commit.
This commit ships the FIRST of many splits (one per PR per the
Phase 9 prompt's "Do not bundle" rule):
Extract NotifierConfig (65 lines) → internal/config/notifiers.go
Why NotifierConfig first
========================
- Cleanest possible cut: a single struct, no helper functions, no
validation logic, no cross-references to Load() except via the
Config{}.Notifiers field copy (which is package-internal so
moving the struct definition doesn't touch Load()).
- Demonstrates the split pattern with minimum risk before tackling
the harder cuts (SCEPConfig + helpers, ACMEConfig + helpers, the
giant ESTConfig family).
- Public-surface byte-identical: every caller's
`config.NotifierConfig` import path is preserved (package stays
`config`; the struct just lives in a different file within the
same package).
Live audit (Phase 9 audit questions answered)
==============================================
top-10 production .go files by LOC (find cmd internal -name '*.go'
-not -name '*_test.go' | xargs wc -l | sort -rn | head -10):
3403 internal/config/config.go <-- this commit -68
2966 cmd/server/main.go
1965 internal/service/acme.go
1867 internal/mcp/tools.go
1577 internal/api/handler/auth_session_oidc.go
1489 cmd/agent/main.go
1356 internal/auth/oidc/service.go
1249 internal/scheduler/scheduler.go
1235 internal/connector/issuer/local/local.go
1224 internal/service/scep.go
The audit's "3 others beyond config/main/acme" are:
- internal/mcp/tools.go (1867 LOC)
- internal/api/handler/auth_session_oidc.go (1577 LOC)
- cmd/agent/main.go (1489 LOC)
The top-6 thus differ from the audit's named-only-3 by one entry —
auth/oidc/service.go (1356) edges out the audit's likely fourth pick.
Document both in the Phase 9 plan under Tasks-Deferred so the
remaining sub-splits know which files are in scope.
config.go internals (45 distinct exported `type X struct` defs as of
this commit's pre-state):
Config, ServerConfig, ServerTLSConfig,
DatabaseConfig, SchedulerConfig, LogConfig, AuthConfig,
RateLimitConfig, CORSConfig, KeygenConfig, CAConfig,
StepCAConfig, VaultConfig, DigiCertConfig, SectigoConfig,
GoogleCASConfig, OpenSSLConfig, ESTConfig, ESTProfileConfig,
SCEPConfig, SCEPProfileConfig, SCEPIntuneProfileConfig,
NetworkScanConfig, VerificationConfig, ApprovalConfig,
NamedAPIKey, SessionConfig, BreakglassConfig, EncryptionConfig,
CloudDiscoveryConfig, AWSSecretsMgrDiscoveryConfig,
AzureKVDiscoveryConfig, GCPSecretMgrDiscoveryConfig,
NotifierConfig (THIS COMMIT), DigestConfig, HealthCheckConfig,
ACMEConfig, ACMEServerConfig, ACMEServerDirectoryMeta,
AWSACMPCAConfig, EntrustConfig, GlobalSignConfig, EJBCAConfig,
OCSPResponderConfig
Each is a natural future-split candidate. The next 5 cuts target the
highest-LOC groups: ACME family (~230 lines), EST family (~165
lines), SCEP family (~220 lines), Auth family (~210 lines), issuer-
specific configs (AWSACMPCA, Entrust, GlobalSign, EJBCA, StepCA,
Vault, DigiCert, Sectigo, GoogleCAS, OpenSSL — ~600 lines combined).
Public-surface invariant
========================
- Package name stays `config`.
- Struct + all field names byte-identical.
- Every caller's `config.NotifierConfig` import path preserved.
- Verified via:
go build ./internal/config/... → clean
go test ./internal/config/... -count=1 → ok (0.67s)
gofmt -l internal/config/ → clean
staticcheck ./internal/config/... → clean
LOC delta:
config.go: 3403 → 3335 (-68 lines)
notifiers.go: new, 86 lines (incl. 18-line Phase 9 doc-comment +
BSL header + package decl)
Phase 9 follow-on plan (each = separate commit, separate review)
================================================================
Next cuts from config.go (priority order):
2 of N. ACMEConfig + ACMEServerConfig + ACMEServerDirectoryMeta
→ internal/config/acme.go (~230 lines moved)
3 of N. SCEPConfig + SCEPProfileConfig + SCEPIntuneProfileConfig
+ loadSCEPProfilesFromEnv + mergeSCEPLegacyIntoProfiles
+ validSCEPPathID → internal/config/scep.go (~330 lines)
4 of N. ESTConfig + ESTProfileConfig + loadESTProfilesFromEnv +
mergeESTLegacyIntoProfiles + parseAuthModes +
validESTPathID + validESTAuthMode
→ internal/config/est.go (~250 lines)
5 of N. AuthConfig + SessionConfig + BreakglassConfig +
NamedAPIKey + ParseNamedAPIKeys + isValidKeyName +
ValidAuthTypes → internal/config/auth.go (~340 lines)
6 of N. ServerConfig + ServerTLSConfig + DatabaseConfig +
SchedulerConfig + LogConfig + RateLimitConfig +
CORSConfig + isLoopbackAddr → internal/config/server.go
(~270 lines)
7 of N. KeygenConfig + CAConfig + StepCAConfig + VaultConfig +
DigiCertConfig + SectigoConfig + GoogleCASConfig +
AWSACMPCAConfig + EntrustConfig + GlobalSignConfig +
EJBCAConfig + OpenSSLConfig → internal/config/issuers.go
(~600 lines)
After the config.go cuts land, the same pattern applies to the next
5 hotspots:
8 of N. cmd/server/main.go split: main.go (entrypoint),
wire.go (DI assembly), migrations.go (boot-migration
path). Phase 4's migration-hook lives in main.go today;
migrations.go inherits the path without re-touching it.
9 of N. internal/service/acme.go split: orders.go, authz.go,
challenges.go, nonces.go, gc.go under
internal/service/acme/. Becomes its own subpackage.
10 of N. internal/mcp/tools.go split: tools probably group
naturally by certificate / agent / job / discovery /
admin domains.
11 of N. internal/api/handler/auth_session_oidc.go split: by
handler verb (login, callback, refresh, logout,
backchannel).
12 of N. cmd/agent/main.go split: main.go (entrypoint), poll.go
(work-poll loop), deploy.go (deployment execution),
register.go (bootstrap + registration).
Pattern lesson logged in cowork/certctl-architecture-diligence-
audit.html Tasks-Deferred table.
Pre-commit verification gate respected:
gofmt -l → clean
go vet ./internal/config/... → clean (implicit via go test)
go test ./internal/config/... → ok
staticcheck ./internal/config/... → clean
TestRouterRBACGateCoverage → not affected (config package)
Closes: cowork/certctl-architecture-diligence-audit.html#fix-ARCH-M2
(partial — 1 of N — full ARCH-M2 closure is the aggregate)
|
||
|
shankar0123
|
8191b1ee64 |
scheduler+db: close Phase 6 — scale hardening across pool, jitter, ETag, asyncpoll
Phase 6 of the certctl architecture diligence remediation. Five
findings across the same scheduler-and-DB-pool surface.
SCALE-M1 (Med) — DB pool default bumped 25 → 50
internal/config/config.go line 1972:
MaxConnections: getEnvInt("CERTCTL_DATABASE_MAX_CONNS", 50)
Postgres default max_connections is 100; 50 leaves headroom for
pg_dump + ad-hoc psql + a server replica without exhausting the
DB-side cap. Operator override env var unchanged. Operator-tune
ladder for larger fleets (5K / 50K certs) lives in
docs/operator/scale.md as starter values pending Phase 8 load
tests — explicitly marked TBD.
SCALE-M3 (Med) — async-CA poll budget operator-configurable
Live state was partially-already-shipped: all 4 async-CA
connectors (digicert, entrust, globalsign, sectigo) already have
per-connector CERTCTL_<NAME>_POLL_MAX_WAIT_SECONDS (Audit fix #5
closed pre-Phase-6). What was missing: a global package-default
override. Shipped:
- internal/connector/issuer/asyncpoll/asyncpoll.go gains
SetDefaultMaxWait(d) + effectiveDefaultMaxWait var + the
currentDefaultMaxWait() priority resolver.
- cmd/server/main.go reads CERTCTL_ASYNC_POLL_MAX_WAIT_SECONDS
at boot and calls SetDefaultMaxWait.
- deploy/ENVIRONMENTS.md documents the new env var (G-3 guard
green).
Naming deviation from the prompt's CERTCTL_ASYNC_POLL_MAX_ATTEMPTS:
the live code tracks wall-clock time (MaxWait), not attempt count.
Matched the existing per-connector nomenclature (_POLL_MAX_WAIT_SECONDS)
so the priority chain reads naturally.
SCALE-M5 (Med) — JitteredTicker wrapper for all 15 scheduler loops
internal/scheduler/jitter.go ships NewJitteredTicker(interval,
jitterPct) + DefaultSchedulerJitter (±10%). All 15 sites in
internal/scheduler/scheduler.go migrated from bare time.NewTicker
to NewJitteredTicker(interval, DefaultSchedulerJitter). Base
intervals unchanged; only the per-tick envelope adds ±10%
randomized delay so multiple loops with the same nominal cadence
don't co-fire and spike CPU + DB at wall-clock boundaries.
internal/scheduler/jitter_test.go pins:
- Bounded envelope (each tick within ±jitterPct of interval)
- Mean drift < 30% of nominal (sign-bug detector)
- Stop() releases the goroutine + closes C
- Stop() idempotent (no panic on repeat)
- Zero-jitter behaves like time.NewTicker
- Negative and >=1 jitterPct values clamped defensively
CI guard scripts/ci-guards/no-bare-newticker-in-scheduler.sh blocks
any future bare time.NewTicker in scheduler.go.
SCALE-L1 (Low) — renewal-sweep semaphore behavior documented
docs/operator/scale.md "Scheduler tick budgets" section explains
the per-tick concurrency semaphore (CERTCTL_RENEWAL_CONCURRENCY=25
default), the ctx-cancellation drain on tick-budget overrun, and
operator tuning advice (raise concurrency + DB pool together).
No code change — the behavior is defensible as-is per the audit.
SCALE-L2 (Low) — ETag middleware for top-5 read endpoints
internal/api/middleware/etag.go computes SHA-256 ETag over the
buffered response body, respects If-None-Match, short-circuits
to 304 Not Modified on match. GET/HEAD only; non-2xx responses
pass through unchanged. 64 KiB buffer cap degrades gracefully on
oversized responses (no caching, body still flushes intact).
Wired around the top-5 read endpoints via etagged() helper in
internal/api/router/router.go:
GET /api/v1/certificates
GET /api/v1/agents
GET /api/v1/jobs
GET /api/v1/audit
GET /api/v1/discovered-certificates
internal/api/middleware/etag_test.go pins 11 behaviors including
304-on-repeat, 200-after-mutation-with-new-ETag, POST bypass,
4xx/5xx pass-through, oversized-response degradation, wildcard
match, HEAD-treated-like-GET, byte-equal pass-through.
Cross-cutting fixes:
- internal/config/config_test.go::TestLoad_DefaultValues updated
to assert the new 50 default (was 25).
- deploy/helm/certctl/values.yaml comment corrected — agent
pollInterval is hardcoded 30s, not env-configurable; the
Phase 4 comment mistakenly referenced CERTCTL_AGENT_POLL_INTERVAL
which G-3 caught as a phantom env var.
- asyncpoll.go reformatted by gofmt; functionally unchanged.
Verification (all pass):
grep -nE 'SetMaxOpenConns' internal/repository/postgres/db.go # finds 1 site
grep -nE 'CERTCTL_DATABASE_MAX_CONNS.*50' internal/config/config.go # config default is 50
grep -rnE 'CERTCTL_ASYNC_POLL_MAX_WAIT_SECONDS' internal/ deploy/ENVIRONMENTS.md # wired
grep -cE 'time\.NewTicker\(' internal/scheduler/scheduler.go # 0 (all migrated)
grep -cE 'JitteredTicker' internal/scheduler/scheduler.go # 15
ls internal/scheduler/jitter.go internal/api/middleware/etag.go # both exist
ls docs/operator/scale.md # exists
bash scripts/ci-guards/no-bare-newticker-in-scheduler.sh # clean
bash scripts/ci-guards/G-3-env-docs-drift.sh # clean
go test ./internal/scheduler/ ./internal/api/middleware/ \
./internal/connector/issuer/asyncpoll/ ./internal/config/ # 4/4 packages green
Closes: cowork/certctl-architecture-diligence-audit.html#fix-SCALE-M1
cowork/certctl-architecture-diligence-audit.html#fix-SCALE-M3
cowork/certctl-architecture-diligence-audit.html#fix-SCALE-M5
cowork/certctl-architecture-diligence-audit.html#fix-SCALE-L1
cowork/certctl-architecture-diligence-audit.html#fix-SCALE-L2
|
||
|
shankar0123
|
21aeed4f4e |
legal: addlicense headers + normalize legacy variants (Phase 0 RED-4)
Phase 0 closure (Path B2, post-rewrite):
addlicense sweep — adds the canonical certctl LLC copyright + BUSL-1.1
SPDX header to every production Go file. Template:
// Copyright 2026 certctl LLC. All rights reserved.
// SPDX-License-Identifier: BUSL-1.1
Coverage: 338 / 338 production Go files (cmd/ + internal/, excluding
*_test.go and **/testdata/**). Pre-sweep coverage was 22 / 338 (6.5%);
post-sweep is 338 / 338 (100%).
Normalized 22 pre-existing legacy headers (`// Copyright (c) certctl`
+ `// SPDX-License-Identifier: BSL-1.1`) and 1 file using a
`Certctl Contributors` attribution. The legacy SPDX ID `BSL-1.1`
is non-standard; the official SPDX identifier for Business Source
License 1.1 is `BUSL-1.1` (capital U). All 338 files now share the
canonical form.
Generated via:
addlicense -c "certctl LLC" -y 2026 \
-f cowork/legal/copyright-header.tpl \
-ignore '**/testdata/**' -ignore '**/*_test.go' \
cmd/ internal/
Verification:
find cmd internal -name '*.go' -not -name '*_test.go' \
-not -path '*/testdata/*' \
-exec grep -L '^// Copyright 2026 certctl LLC' {} \; | wc -l
Returns: 0
gofmt clean. Header additions are comments only, no compile impact.
Closes: cowork/certctl-architecture-diligence-audit.html#fix-RED-4
|
||
|
shankar0123
|
888e10cba0 |
fix(ci): close two CI regressions from Phase 3 + Phase 5
Phase 3 added @playwright/test@^1.49.0 to web/package.json and
Phase 5 added orval@^7.0.0, both without regenerating
web/package-lock.json. CI's npm ci in both the Frontend Build job
and the Dockerfile frontend stage failed:
npm error Missing: @playwright/test@1.60.0 from lock file
npm error Missing: orval ... from lock file
Regenerate web/package-lock.json with:
cd web && npm install --package-lock-only --no-audit
(+6990 / -1893 lines — orval pulls a deep transitive graph). No
node_modules download required; lockfile-only mode keeps the
operation light. Verified clean with 'npm ci --dry-run' (612
packages would install).
Phase 2's SEC-H3 fail-closed branch (CERTCTL_DEMO_MODE_ACK_TS
required when CERTCTL_DEMO_MODE_ACK=true) broke four pre-existing
tests in internal/config/config_test.go that set DemoModeAck=true
without setting DemoModeAckTS:
TestValidate_AuthTypeNone_NonLoopback_AckPasses (l.722)
TestValidate_Bundle2_PlaceholderAuthSecret_DemoAckExempt (l.1799)
TestValidate_Bundle2_PlaceholderEncryptionKey_DemoAckExempt (l.1832)
TestValidate_Bundle2_CORSWildcard_DemoAckExempt (l.1879)
Each test now sets DemoModeAckTS alongside DemoModeAck=true:
DemoModeAckTS: strconv.FormatInt(time.Now().Unix(), 10)
strconv + time were already imported in config_test.go. Verified
locally: 'go test ./internal/config/... -count=1' passes clean
(0.700s), gofmt clean, go vet clean.
Root cause was the sandbox 'disk-full' constraint that forced
deferring npm install to the operator's workstation — but CI runs
npm ci before any workstation operation. Lockfile-only regen
(this commit) is the right fix; works in low-disk environments
because no node_modules download happens.
|
||
|
shankar0123
|
69a2b5c55a |
config: default hardening + operator docs (Phase 2 closure — SEC-H1, SEC-H3, SEC-M4, DEPL-H1, DEPL-M2 + doc-only carve-outs)
Eleven findings from the architecture diligence audit's Phase 2 bundle
closed in one PR. All touch the same backend config + Helm chart +
operator docs surface, so reviewing in one diff is the natural fit.
config.go: three new fail-closed Validate() branches behind sentinels
=====================================================================
Three new error sentinels exported from internal/config/config.go for
tests to pin via errors.Is + message-text:
- ErrAgentBootstrapTokenRequired (SEC-H1)
- ErrACMEInsecureWithoutAck (SEC-M4)
- ErrDemoModeAckExpired (SEC-H3)
SEC-H1 (staged): introduces CERTCTL_AGENT_BOOTSTRAP_TOKEN_DENY_EMPTY
as an opt-in feature flag. When true AND the bootstrap token is empty,
Validate() returns ErrAgentBootstrapTokenRequired and the server
refuses to start. Default in THIS release: false (warn-mode
pass-through preserved). WORKSPACE-ROADMAP.md schedules the default
flip to true for v2.2.0 — operators get one upgrade window.
SEC-M4: upgrades the existing boot-time WARN log for
CERTCTL_ACME_INSECURE=true into a hard refuse-to-start gate behind
CERTCTL_ACME_INSECURE_ACK=true. The ACK env var must be paired with
the existing INSECURE flag; either alone fails closed. The boot-time
WARN log at cmd/server/main.go:611 continues to fire for the ACK'd
case so every restart logs the reminder.
SEC-H3: tightens the sticky DemoModeAck bit so it expires after 24h.
When DemoModeAck=true, Validate() now requires CERTCTL_DEMO_MODE_ACK_TS
to be set as a unix-epoch timestamp within the last 24h (24h-tolerance
on the past side, 1-minute clock-skew on the future side). Catches the
"forgotten demo deployment promoted to production" failure mode —
next container restart past 24h refuses unless re-ack'd.
Tests in internal/config/config_test.go cover every new branch:
positive (passes when properly set), negative (each fail-closed path
fires with the matching sentinel + message-text). 11 new tests added.
Helm chart + HA runbook (DEPL-H1)
=================================
Created docs/operator/runbooks/ha.md documenting the three values
flips required for production HA: server.replicas, podDisruptionBudget,
service.sessionAffinity. Cross-link comments added to
deploy/helm/certctl/values.yaml next to the server.replicas (line 19)
and podDisruptionBudget (line 566) defaults. DEFAULTS DO NOT CHANGE
— that's the point per the prompt's 'do not flip networkPolicy default'
guidance: a default-enabled PDB blocks fresh helm install on
single-node clusters.
CI guard (DEPL-M2)
==================
scripts/ci-guards/no-change-me-in-prod-compose.sh grep-fails any
'change-me-' literal in compose files OTHER than docker-compose.demo.yml.
Catches the placeholder-credential-leak regression one layer earlier
than the runtime Validate() fail-closed guards from Bundle 2 (2026-05-12).
Excludes comment lines so docs explaining the pattern don't trip the
guard. Verified to fire on a synthetic leak; clean on the current tree.
Consolidated 'Security carve-outs' doc section
==============================================
docs/operator/security.md grows by one new section documenting the
seven existing carve-outs in one canonical place:
- SEC-M3: 3 InsecureSkipVerify=true sites (Agent dev, verify probe, tlsprobe)
- SEC-M5: F5 connector InsecureSkipVerify per-config field
- SEC-M4: ACME insecure + new ACK gate
- SEC-L1: CSP 'unsafe-inline' on style-src (Tailwind carve-out)
- SEC-L2: break-glass Argon2id rest-defense reminder
- SEC-L3: 1 MB body-size cap + CERTCTL_MAX_BODY_SIZE override
- DEPL-M2: change-me-* placeholder credentials in demo overlay
- DEPL-M3: K8s NetworkPolicy operator-opt-in default
Each entry cites the file:line, the rationale for the carve-out, and
the operator action.
CHANGELOG + ENVIRONMENTS coverage
==================================
CHANGELOG.md grows by one new '### Breaking changes (scheduled for
v2.2.0)' section under Unreleased, documenting SEC-H1 / SEC-M4 / SEC-H3
with explicit upgrade-window guidance for each.
deploy/ENVIRONMENTS.md adds five rows: AGENT_BOOTSTRAP_TOKEN +
AGENT_BOOTSTRAP_TOKEN_DENY_EMPTY + DEMO_MODE_ACK + DEMO_MODE_ACK_TS +
ACME_INSECURE_ACK. G-3 env-docs-drift CI guard stays clean.
WORKSPACE-ROADMAP.md (cowork-side) schedules the SEC-H1 default-flip
for v2.2.0.
Sandbox limitation
==================
The certctl repo's working tree is 6.1 GB which fills the sandbox
volume; the go1.25.10 toolchain download (go.mod requires it,
sandbox has 1.25.9) keeps failing on disk-full. Local 'go build' /
'go test' were NOT run in this commit's verification path.
make verify MUST be run on the operator's workstation before push
per CLAUDE.md operating rules.
CI guards (no-change-me, G-3 env-docs-drift, doc-rot-detector, +
all existing) verified clean by running each individually.
Closes: cowork/certctl-architecture-diligence-audit.html#fix-SEC-H1,
cowork/certctl-architecture-diligence-audit.html#fix-SEC-H3,
cowork/certctl-architecture-diligence-audit.html#fix-SEC-M4,
cowork/certctl-architecture-diligence-audit.html#fix-DEPL-H1,
cowork/certctl-architecture-diligence-audit.html#fix-DEPL-M2,
cowork/certctl-architecture-diligence-audit.html#fix-DEPL-M3,
cowork/certctl-architecture-diligence-audit.html#fix-SEC-M3,
cowork/certctl-architecture-diligence-audit.html#fix-SEC-M5,
cowork/certctl-architecture-diligence-audit.html#fix-SEC-L1,
cowork/certctl-architecture-diligence-audit.html#fix-SEC-L2,
cowork/certctl-architecture-diligence-audit.html#fix-SEC-L3
|
||
|
shankar0123
|
a849c8b8cf |
fix(security): close BUNDLE 2 — safe first run, demo mode, agent bootstrap
Bundle 2 closure (2026-05-12 acquisition diligence audit). Closes the
"docker compose up == accidental production" hazard: pre-Bundle-2 the
base deploy/docker-compose.yml WAS the demo path (AUTH_TYPE=none +
DEMO_MODE_ACK=true + KEYGEN_MODE=server + DEMO_SEED=true + literal
change-me-... placeholder creds), the README claimed "drop the demo
overlay for a clean install", and ENVIRONMENTS.md table documented
auth-type default as api-key — three contradictory stories layered on
the same compose file.
Source findings closed:
R2 R3 C1 D9 finding-2 S9 (repo audit)
SEC-H2 SEC-M1 SEC-M3 OPS-M3 LOW-5 HIGH-6 (cowork audit)
Compose split (deploy/docker-compose.yml + deploy/docker-compose.demo.yml):
The base now ships production-shaped — no AUTH_TYPE override, no
KEYGEN_MODE override, no DEMO_MODE_ACK, no DEMO_SEED, no literal
placeholder fallbacks. POSTGRES_PASSWORD / CERTCTL_AUTH_SECRET /
CERTCTL_CONFIG_ENCRYPTION_KEY / CERTCTL_API_KEY / CERTCTL_AGENT_ID
must come from deploy/.env (sample template in deploy/.env.example +
root .env.example). The demo overlay carries the full demo posture
(every env var + every placeholder credential) so the
`-f docker-compose.demo.yml` one-flag flip remains a zero-config
populated-dashboard path.
Fail-closed startup guards (internal/config/config.go::Validate):
Three new gates layered on the existing HIGH-12 demo-mode listen-bind
guard. All three exempt CERTCTL_DEMO_MODE_ACK=true so the demo overlay
keeps working:
• HIGH-6: AUTH_SECRET = "change-me-in-production" → refuse
• HIGH-6: CONFIG_ENCRYPTION_KEY = "change-me-32-char..." → refuse
• LOW-5: CORS_ORIGINS contains "*" (CWE-942 + CWE-352) → refuse
Visible DEMO MODE banner (cmd/server/main.go): every boot under
DEMO_MODE_ACK=true now emits a prominent WARN line with a 6-step
production-promotion checklist. The 2026-04-19 incident (a screenshot
run that kept running for three days) drove this; the per-startup
banner makes the posture unmissable in any log scraper.
Agent enrollment doc alignment:
• docs/reference/configuration.md L83: corrected the non-existent
URL `POST /api/v1/agents/register` to the real route
`POST /api/v1/agents`; added the bootstrap-token note and the
install-agent.sh handoff sequence.
• docs/reference/architecture.md L154: replaced "agents register
themselves at first heartbeat" (false — cmd/agent/main.go fail-
fasts when CERTCTL_AGENT_ID is unset) with the actual two-step
operator-driven flow (REST or GUI registration first, returned ID
fed to install-agent.sh second).
Tests + CI guard:
• 9 new TestValidate_Bundle2_* cases in internal/config/config_test.go
covering: placeholder-secret refused + demo-ack exempt; placeholder
encryption-key refused + demo-ack exempt; real key not mistaken for
placeholder; wildcard CORS refused + demo-ack exempt; wildcard mixed
into a concrete allowlist still refused; concrete allowlist accepted.
• scripts/ci-guards/B2-compose-base-no-demo-env.sh: greps the base
compose for any of the demo-mode env vars + placeholder credentials.
Comments stripped before checking so the narrative header in the
base file can still reference the overlay's posture in prose.
Cold-DB CI smoke (.github/workflows/ci.yml::cold-db-compose-smoke):
Switched to layering -f docker-compose.demo.yml on top of the base —
the new production base requires real env vars the smoke doesn't have,
and the smoke's purpose (catch migration-on-cold-DB regressions + the
bootstrap-token mint path) is orthogonal to which auth posture the
boot lands in.
Receipts:
• Current first-run truth table
compose flag → posture
-f docker-compose.yml (production)
→ requires .env;
fail-fasts on
missing AUTH_SECRET
/ CONFIG_ENCRYPTION
_KEY / POSTGRES
_PASSWORD; agent
fail-fasts on
missing AGENT_ID
-f docker-compose.yml -f docker-compose.demo.yml (demo)
→ zero-config;
AUTH_TYPE=none +
DEMO_MODE_ACK=true
+ KEYGEN=server +
DEMO_SEED=true;
boot banner WARN
-f docker-compose.yml -f docker-compose.dev.yml (dev)
→ base + PgAdmin
+ debug logging
-f docker-compose.test.yml (test, standalone)
→ production-shape
posture, real CA
backends
• Verification (PATH=/tmp/go/bin export GO* paths to /tmp):
gofmt -l # clean (no diffs)
go vet ./internal/config ./cmd/server # clean
go test -short -count=1 ./internal/config/... # PASS (cumulative +
all 9 new Bundle 2
cases green)
go test -short -count=1 # PASS (no regression
./internal/connector/target/configcheck in the Bundle 1 -
closure tests)
go build ./cmd/server ./cmd/agent # clean
./cmd/cli ./cmd/mcp-server
bash scripts/ci-guards/B2-compose-base-no-demo-env.sh # clean
bash scripts/ci-guards/H-1-encryption-key-min-length.sh # clean
bash scripts/ci-guards/G-3-env-docs-drift.sh # clean
Remaining operator warnings (not blocking; tracked in CLAUDE.md
"Open decisions"):
• The first `docker compose -f docker-compose.yml up -d` against a
pre-Bundle-2 .env (placeholder values still in place) will now
fail-fast. This is the intended posture but operators upgrading
from v2.0.x via .env-from-old-master need to rotate before
upgrading. The CHANGELOG note for the v2.1.0 release should
call this out alongside Auth Bundle 2's other breaking changes.
Audit-Closes: BUNDLE-2 R2 R3 C1 D9 S9 SEC-H2 SEC-M1 SEC-M3 OPS-M3 LOW-5 HIGH-6
|
||
|
shankar0123
|
0ab6bc4a73 |
feat(ci): item-1 complete-path config-coverage guard (PARTIAL — sandbox could not verify Go test)
Shell guard verified working in sandbox:
- Green on clean repo: 'OK — every CERTCTL_* env var (194) has at least
one non-config-package consumer.'
- Red on injected orphan: '::error::Orphan env vars — defined in
config.go but no consumer found outside internal/config/' with three
remediation paths listed.
Go test internal/config/coverage_test.go written but NOT verified —
sandbox Go 1.25.9 < go.mod's 1.25.10 requirement; toolchain
auto-download fails (disk full). Operator must run `make verify` from
workstation before merge.
Allowlist scaffold at scripts/ci-guards/complete-path-config-coverage-exceptions.yaml.
Every entry requires name + justification + expires fields; expired
entries fail the guard.
Catches the lying-field bug class — env var defined in config.go that no
business-logic code reads. The 2026-04-29 SCEP MustStaple Phase 5.6 gap
(domain field shipped, service layer never read profile.MustStaple) is
the canonical case this guard would have caught at commit time.
Audit-Closes: post-v2.1.0-anti-rot/item-1
|
||
|
shankar0123
|
a923cf697c |
harden(auth): demo-mode residual-grants detector + cleanup endpoint + CI guard (A-8)
Audit 2026-05-11 A-8 closure. Closes the deferred Phase 2 leg of the
2026-05-10 HIGH-12 closure (
|
||
|
shankar0123
|
b8fac59200 |
chore(fmt): gofmt cleanup on files touched by audit-2026-05-11 fix bundle
Whitespace alignment drift surfaced by gofmt -l after merging 7 fix branches.
Pure formatting, no semantic change. Pre-existing master drift in
internal/auth/oidc/{domain/types.go, integration_keycloak_rotate_test.go,
test_discovery.go} left untouched — that's separate tech debt.
|
||
|
shankar0123
|
2a1a0b347c |
harden(oidc): pre-login UA/IP binding (MED-16) — RFC 9700 §4.7.1
Audit 2026-05-10 MED-16 closure.
WHAT.
Binds the OIDC pre-login row to the (clientIP, userAgent) tuple of
the /auth/oidc/login request, and enforces a constant-time compare
against the /auth/oidc/callback request at consume time. Defeats
replay of a stolen pre-login cookie by a different browser /
source — the secondary defense layer recommended by RFC 9700 §4.7.1
when the primary layer (HMAC integrity + Path=/ + SameSite=Lax on
the cookie) is bypassed via CSRF / XSS / TLS-termination leak.
WHY.
Pre-fix, the pre-login cookie's HMAC verified only that 'some'
caller of /auth/oidc/login was talking to /auth/oidc/callback; it
did not verify that the SAME browser / source was on both sides.
An attacker who exfiltrated the cookie value via any vector could
replay the bytes through their own user-agent and ride the victim's
authorization. RFC 9700 §4.7.1 calls out the gap explicitly and
recommends binding state to a user-agent fingerprint + source IP.
HOW.
Migration:
migrations/000044_prelogin_uaip.up.sql
ALTER TABLE oidc_pre_login_sessions
ADD COLUMN IF NOT EXISTS client_ip TEXT,
ADD COLUMN IF NOT EXISTS user_agent TEXT;
Both nullable for in-flight rolling-deploy compat — the consume-
side check only enforces when both row AND request carry non-empty
values for the leg in question.
Domain:
internal/repository/oidc.go (PreLoginSession) — adds ClientIP +
UserAgent fields.
Repository:
internal/repository/postgres/oidc_prelogin.go — Create persists
via sql.NullString (empty → NULL); LookupAndConsume reads back.
Re-uses package-local nullableString from discovery.go.
Service:
internal/auth/oidc/service.go
- PreLoginStore.CreatePreLogin signature takes (clientIP,
userAgent) as positions 5–6.
- PreLoginStore.LookupAndConsume returns (clientIP, userAgent)
as positions 5–6.
- HandleAuthRequest signature gains (clientIP, userAgent),
threaded to the store.
- HandleCallback adds Step 1.5 — UA / IP constant-time compare
between stored row and incoming request. Per-leg toggles via
preLoginRequireUA / preLoginRequireIP service fields. Empty
values on either side pass through (rolling-deploy + headless-
proxy compat).
- New sentinels ErrPreLoginUAMismatch, ErrPreLoginIPMismatch.
- SetPreLoginBindingRequirements(requireUA, requireIP) helper
for main.go config wiring.
Adapter:
internal/auth/oidc/prelogin.go — PreLoginAdapter passes the new
fields through to the repo row.
Handler:
internal/api/handler/auth_session_oidc.go
- OIDCAuthHandshaker.HandleAuthRequest signature updated.
- LoginInitiate captures clientIPFromRequest + r.UserAgent()
and passes to the service.
- classifyOIDCFailure adds errors.Is dispatch for the two new
sentinels → prelogin_ua_mismatch / prelogin_ip_mismatch
audit categories.
Config:
internal/config/config.go
+ AuthConfig.OIDCPreLoginRequireUA (default true)
env CERTCTL_OIDC_PRELOGIN_REQUIRE_UA
+ AuthConfig.OIDCPreLoginRequireIP (default true)
env CERTCTL_OIDC_PRELOGIN_REQUIRE_IP
cmd/server/main.go calls oidcService.SetPreLoginBindingRequirements
from cfg.Auth.OIDCPreLoginRequire{UA,IP}.
Tests (internal/auth/oidc/service_test.go):
- TestService_HandleCallback_MED16_UAMismatchRejected
- TestService_HandleCallback_MED16_IPMismatchRejected
- TestService_HandleCallback_MED16_BothMatch_Succeeds
- TestService_HandleCallback_MED16_LegacyRowEmptyValues (rolling-
deploy compat — empty stored values pass through)
- TestService_HandleCallback_MED16_RequireUAFalse_AllowsMismatch
(operator escape-hatch — UA mismatch silently allowed)
Mechanical fan-out:
- stubPreLogin / stubPreLoginRepo signatures updated.
- All existing call sites in service_test.go (~40), prelogin_test.go,
bench_test.go, logging_test.go, provider_enabled_test.go,
integration_keycloak_test.go, integration_okta_smoke_test.go,
auth_session_oidc_test.go updated to pass empty strings for the
new params — pre-existing tests do not exercise UA/IP binding
semantics.
VERIFY.
- go vet ./internal/auth/oidc/... ./internal/api/handler/...
./internal/config/... PASS
- go test -short -count=1 -run MED16 ./internal/auth/oidc/... PASS (5/5)
- go test -short -count=1 ./internal/auth/oidc/... PASS (4.6s)
- go test -short -count=1 ./internal/api/handler/... PASS (4.3s)
- go test -short -count=1 ./internal/config/... PASS
Refs: cowork/auth-bundles-audit-2026-05-10.md MED-16
cowork/auth-bundles-fixes-2026-05-10/HANDOFF.md item 6
RFC 9700 §4.7.1 — OAuth 2.0 Security Best Current Practice
|
||
|
shankar0123
|
9cce2ab043 |
harden(auth): LOW + Nit batch — bootstrap audit, crypto/rand, XFF trust, CSRF check, protocol-prefix unify (Batch 1)
Audit 2026-05-10 — close 8 LOWs + 2 Nits in-bundle. Remainder
(LOW-1/6/9/11/12, Nit-2/5) need GUI or DB-test runtime not present
in-session; tracked in the audit-doc batch table.
LOW-2: bootstrap.ValidateAndMint now emits 'bootstrap.consume_failed'
audit rows on persist-key + grant-role failure branches before
bubbling. Recovery requires DB seeding per the docstring; without this
row, later forensics can't tell 'bootstrap was used and failed' from
'never invoked.'
LOW-3: randomB64URLForHandler now uses crypto/rand (was time-nano-
shifted). Two providers/mappings created in the same nanosecond used
to collide; now they don't. Time-nano fallback retained for the
unlikely crypto/rand-broken path.
LOW-4: breakglass.verifyDummy uses s.readRand(salt) for the dummy
Argon2id verify. Wall-clock cost unchanged (Argon2id memory alloc
dominates), but cache/branch behavior now matches a real verify —
closes the subtle timing side channel.
LOW-5: clientIPFromRequest now only honors X-Forwarded-For when the
direct connection's RemoteAddr falls in the CERTCTL_TRUSTED_PROXIES
CIDR allowlist. Default-deny: empty list means XFF is ignored.
SetTrustedProxies wired in cmd/server/main.go from cfg.Auth.TrustedProxies.
LOW-7: internal/auth/protocol_endpoints.go::ProtocolEndpointPrefixes
now carries /scep-mtls + /.well-known/est-mtls (previously only in
router.AuthExemptDispatchPrefixes; the two lists had drifted). The
canonical-prefix coverage test in Phase 12 still pins the set.
LOW-8: docs/operator/rbac.md documents that r-mcp / r-cli / r-agent
are not actor-type-bound — role naming is a hint, not an enforcement.
Operators wanting hard binding must apply periodic audit queries.
Native binding is on the v2 roadmap.
LOW-10: Session.Validate now rejects a post-login row with empty
CSRFTokenHash (IsPreLogin=false branch). validSession test fixture
updated with a valid 64-hex CSRF hash.
Nit-1: production RevokeAllForActor call sites already use typed
constants (only test-file literals remain — acceptable).
Nit-3: peekIssuer docstring documents the unsigned-permissive-by-design
invariant + the post-verify re-check pin that the BCL handler enforces.
A future commit that uses peekIssuer output before verify will trip
the inline comment + the existing BCL test matrix.
Status table updated in cowork/auth-bundles-audit-2026-05-10.md:
8 LOWs + 2 Nits CLOSED; 5 LOWs + 2 Nits OPEN with explicit reason
(GUI work, repo refactor, Keycloak integration runtime, WONTFIX).
Refs: cowork/auth-bundles-audit-2026-05-10.md LOW-2/3/4/5/7/8/10
cowork/auth-bundles-audit-2026-05-10.md Nit-1/3
|
||
|
shankar0123
|
2e97cc10b8 |
fix(config): refuse to start when CERTCTL_AUTH_TYPE=none binds non-loopback (HIGH-12)
Audit 2026-05-10 HIGH-12 closure. Pre-fix, an operator who flipped
CERTCTL_AUTH_TYPE=none 'temporarily' or via misconfig exposed admin
functions to anyone reachable on port 8443 — the demo-mode synthetic
actor 'actor-demo-anon' is wired with AdminKey=true. The control
plane is HTTPS-only, but a misconfigured ingress / public listen-bind
means any reachable client gets full admin without authentication.
The previous defense was a startup WARN log that operators routinely
miss in shell-output noise.
Post-fix: Config.Validate() refuses to start when:
- Auth.Type = 'none'
- AND Server.Host is non-loopback (NOT in {127.0.0.1, ::1, localhost})
- AND Auth.DemoModeAck = false (CERTCTL_DEMO_MODE_ACK=true overrides)
Real authn types (api-key, oidc) are unaffected — the guard fires only
when Type=none.
isLoopbackAddr defensively rejects:
- '' (Go's default-everything bind)
- '0.0.0.0', '::', '[::]' (explicit all-interfaces)
- RFC1918 / public-internet IPs (the misconfig the guard is built for)
- Hostnames other than 'localhost' (DNS state isn't dependable at
startup; operators wanting a non-default loopback alias must use a
literal IP or set DemoModeAck)
- Accepts 127.0.0.0/8 (all loopback IPs), ::1, localhost
- Strips host:port form before classifying
Regression matrix in config_test.go:
- TestValidate_AuthTypeNone (loopback path stays green)
- TestValidate_AuthTypeNone_NonLoopback_FailsClosed (hard fail
on Host=0.0.0.0, error message mentions CERTCTL_DEMO_MODE_ACK)
- TestValidate_AuthTypeNone_NonLoopback_AckPasses (opt-in path)
- TestValidate_AuthTypeAPIKey_NonLoopback_NotAffected (Type=api-key
on 0.0.0.0 unaffected by the guard)
- TestIsLoopbackAddr (15-case matrix: IPv4 + IPv6 + RFC1918 + public
IPs + hostnames + host:port forms)
The Phase 2 spec items — production-startup banner when actor-demo-anon
has residual role grants; CI guard banning new synthetic-admin code
paths — are partial-deferred to a v3 hygiene bundle. The high-impact,
fail-closed leg ships in this commit.
Refs: cowork/auth-bundles-audit-2026-05-10.md HIGH-12
Spec: cowork/auth-bundles-fixes-2026-05-10/11-high-12-demo-mode-guard.md
|
||
|
shankar0123
|
15435ca02b |
fix(oidc/bcl): jti replay-cache + iat freshness check (HIGH-3 closure)
Closes HIGH-3 of the 2026-05-10 audit. Pre-fix the BCL handler
accepted any logout_token whose iat + jti were syntactically present
but never checked (a) that iat fell within a skew window or (b) that
jti hadn't been seen before. A captured logout_token was replayable
indefinitely; once CRIT-2 was fixed, every replay would revoke the
user's current sessions — persistent DoS. RFC 9700 §2.7 + OIDC BCL
1.0 §2.5 require jti replay defense.
- Migration 000040_bcl_replay_cache: oidc_bcl_consumed_jtis table with
composite PK on (jti, issuer_url) — RFC 7519 §4.1.7 per-issuer
uniqueness — and an expires_at index for the GC sweep.
- repository.BCLReplayRepository interface + ErrBCLJTIAlreadyConsumed
sentinel. Postgres impl uses INSERT...ON CONFLICT DO NOTHING
RETURNING true for atomic single-use semantics in one round-trip.
- handler.DefaultBCLVerifier gains WithMaxAge + nowFn clock seam. iat
freshness check rejects tokens whose iat is in the future beyond
max-age OR stale beyond it. Verifier signature extended:
Verify(ctx, jwt) (iss, sub, sid, jti string, iat int64, err error).
- handler.AuthSessionOIDCHandler gains BCLReplayConsumer (interface)
+ WithBCLReplayConsumer(consumer, maxAge) setter. BackChannelLogout
consumes the jti post-verify with TTL = max(24h, 2*maxAge):
- first-receive → 200, sessions revoked, audit outcome=revoked
- replay (ErrBCLJTIAlreadyConsumed) → 200 + Cache-Control: no-store,
audit outcome=jti_replayed, sessions NOT re-revoked
- transient (non-AlreadyConsumed error) → 503 so the IdP retries
- internal/scheduler/scheduler.go: SetBCLReplayGarbageCollector wires
SweepExpired into the existing session-GC tick (no separate ticker
for short-lived replay rows).
- cmd/server/main.go: bclMaxAge from cfg.Auth.OIDCBCLMaxAgeSeconds
(default 60s, env CERTCTL_OIDC_BCL_MAX_AGE_SECONDS); bclReplayRepo
wired into the verifier + handler + scheduler.
- Three regression tests in internal/api/handler/bcl_replay_test.go:
TestBackChannelLogout_FirstReceiveConsumesJTI,
TestBackChannelLogout_ReplayedJTIReturns200WithAudit,
TestBackChannelLogout_TransientConsumeFailureReturns503.
- internal/api/handler/auth_session_oidc_test.go: stubBCLVerifier
gains jti + iat fields; existing TestBackChannelLogout_* tests
rewritten for the new Verify return.
Verification gate green: gofmt clean, go vet clean, go test -short
-count=1 on internal/api/handler / internal/api/router /
internal/scheduler / cmd/server / internal/auth/oidc /
internal/auth/breakglass — all pass.
CRIT-1..CRIT-5 + HIGH-1 + HIGH-2 + HIGH-3 of the 2026-05-10 audit
now closed on this branch. Spec at
cowork/auth-bundles-fixes-2026-05-10/07-high-3-bcl-replay-defense.md.
Refs: cowork/auth-bundles-audit-2026-05-10.md HIGH-3
|
||
|
shankar0123
|
1d01c87663 |
auth-bundle-2 Phase 7 + Phase 7.5: OIDC first-admin bootstrap +
break-glass admin (Argon2id, lockout, default-OFF, surface-invisibility)
Phase 7 — OIDC first-admin bootstrap (Decision 3):
- Optional AdminBootstrapHook closure on *oidc.Service. When wired,
HandleCallback consults the hook AFTER group resolution + user
upsert and BEFORE the empty-mapping fail-closed check. Hook
receives (providerID, groups, userID); returns grantAdmin=true
when the user matches CERTCTL_BOOTSTRAP_ADMIN_GROUPS AND no
admin exists yet in the tenant.
- cmd/server/main.go wires the hook as a closure that:
* Filters by CERTCTL_BOOTSTRAP_OIDC_PROVIDER_ID (if configured).
* Probes AdminExists via authActorRoleRepo (admin-already-exists
silently returns false; bootstrap mode is one-shot per tenant).
* Walks group intersection.
* On match: grants r-admin via authActorRoleRepo.Grant + emits
the bootstrap.oidc_first_admin audit row with
event_category=auth + INFO log.
- Coexists with the Bundle 1 env-var-token bootstrap. Both paths
can be configured; first match wins (admin-existence probe
short-circuits the second).
- HandleCallback's empty-mapping fail-closed check moved AFTER the
hook so a fresh deployment with zero group_role_mappings can
still mint the first admin.
- 5 tests in service_test.go: hook grants admin on match, hook
returns false preserves empty-mapping fail-closed, admin-already-
exists silently falls through to normal mapping, hook-error wraps
+ bubbles, idempotent when admin is already in the mapped role set.
Phase 7.5 — Break-glass admin (Decision 4, default-OFF):
Migration 000038 ships:
- breakglass_credentials table — at-most-one-credential-per-actor
(UNIQUE(actor_id)), Argon2id PHC-format password_hash, lockout
state machine (failure_count, locked_until, last_failure_at).
FK CASCADE on users(id) so deleting a user atomically removes
their credential.
- Two new permissions seeded into r-admin only:
auth.breakglass.admin — set/rotate/unlock/remove credentials.
auth.breakglass.login — actor uses break-glass to log in.
CanonicalPermissions extended in lockstep.
internal/auth/breakglass/service.go (~580 LOC):
- Service.Enabled() reflects CERTCTL_BREAKGLASS_ENABLED.
- SetPassword: Argon2id with OWASP 2024 params (m=64MiB, t=3, p=4,
salt=16 random bytes, output=32 bytes); per-password random salt;
PHC-format hash output. Min 12 / max 256 byte input.
- Authenticate: constant-time-compare via subtle.ConstantTimeCompare
on every code path. Identical 401 + identical timing across the
wrong-password / locked-account / non-existent-actor paths so an
attacker cannot probe whether a given actor has break-glass
configured. Non-existent-actor + locked-account paths run a
verifyDummy() Argon2id pass for timing parity. Lockout state
machine: failure_count++ on every wrong attempt; threshold (default
5) trips locked_until = NOW() + duration (default 15m). Successful
Authenticate resets the counter. Reset-window: failures aged out
after CERTCTL_BREAKGLASS_LOCKOUT_RESET_INTERVAL (default 1h)
auto-reset on next attempt.
- Unlock + RemoveCredential: admin-only (auth.breakglass.admin
gated at the router via rbacGate). Audit rows on every operation.
- All public methods refuse to act when Enabled()==false (returns
ErrDisabled; the handler maps to HTTP 404 — surface invisibility).
internal/repository/postgres/breakglass.go ships the 5-method
postgres impl with atomic single-statement IncrementFailure (so
concurrent racing wrong-password attempts can't observe an
intermediate state and slip past the threshold) and idempotent
ResetFailureCount.
internal/api/handler/auth_breakglass.go ships the 4-endpoint HTTP
surface:
- POST /auth/breakglass/login (auth-exempt; 5/min rate-limited per
source IP via the existing rate limiter; returns 404 when
disabled). On success sets the post-login session cookie + CSRF
cookie via SessionService.Create + 204. On any failure:
uniform 401 + identical timing (the service has already audited
the specific failure category).
- POST /api/v1/auth/breakglass/credentials (auth.breakglass.admin)
- POST /api/v1/auth/breakglass/credentials/{actor_id}/unlock
(auth.breakglass.admin)
- DELETE /api/v1/auth/breakglass/credentials/{actor_id}
(auth.breakglass.admin)
Admin endpoints share the surface-invisibility property: when
CERTCTL_BREAKGLASS_ENABLED=false, every admin endpoint also returns
404 (not 403) so probing via the admin surface gets the same signal
as probing the login endpoint.
Tests (internal/auth/breakglass/service_test.go):
All 8 Phase 7.5 spec-mandated negative cases:
1. Service.Enabled()==false → all ops return ErrDisabled.
2. Wrong password → ErrInvalidCredentials, failure_count++,
audit row with event_category=auth.
3. Failure_count exceeds threshold → locked, subsequent attempts
(including with the CORRECT password) return identical-shape
401 while the lockout window holds.
4. Lockout window expires → next attempt with correct password
succeeds + resets the counter.
5. Password < 12 bytes (or > 256 bytes) → ErrWeakPassword.
6. Password leak hygiene — the service has zero slog calls; the
audit-row map literal never includes the password plaintext.
7. Argon2id hash never appears in logs OR API responses — pinned
by `json:"-"` tag on BreakglassCredential.PasswordHash + a
belt-and-braces json.Marshal probe asserting the hash bytes
never appear in the marshaled output.
8. Constant-time-compare verified via timing-statistical test —
wrong-password vs no-credential paths take statistically
indistinguishable time (within 5x ratio). The verifyDummy()
hash compute on the no-credential + locked paths is what
keeps timing parity; absent that, an attacker could side-
channel "actor doesn't have a credential" via timing.
Plus coverage-lift batch covering: SetPassword first-time vs rotate,
no-caller-id rejection, no-target-id rejection, RNG failure surface,
Authenticate happy-path mints session, no-credential audit row,
session-mint-failure surface, FailureResetInterval recycle, Unlock
+ RemoveCredential happy paths, hash-format unit tests (round-trip,
mismatch, malformed/wrong-version/bad-base64 formats), nil-audit +
nil-session pass-through.
Coverage on internal/auth/breakglass/ at 91.5% per-statement (above
the Phase 7.5 spec ≥ 90% floor).
cmd/server/main.go wiring:
- Constructs breakglassRepo + breakglassService + breakglassHandler
after the OIDC service block.
- breakglassSessionMinterAdapter shim bridges *session.Service.Create
to the breakglass.SessionMinter port.
- Logs WARN at boot when CERTCTL_BREAKGLASS_ENABLED=true (operator
visibility for the deliberate SSO-bypass).
internal/config/config.go gains:
- AuthConfig.BootstrapAdminGroups + BootstrapOIDCProviderID for
Phase 7 (CERTCTL_BOOTSTRAP_ADMIN_GROUPS comma-list +
CERTCTL_BOOTSTRAP_OIDC_PROVIDER_ID).
- AuthConfig.Breakglass nested struct with 4 env vars
(CERTCTL_BREAKGLASS_ENABLED + LOCKOUT_THRESHOLD + LOCKOUT_DURATION
+ LOCKOUT_RESET_INTERVAL).
Router wiring:
- 4 new breakglass routes registered when reg.AuthBreakglass != nil;
public login route via direct r.mux.Handle (auth-exempt), 3 admin
routes via r.Register + rbacGate(auth.breakglass.admin).
- POST /auth/breakglass/login pinned in AuthExemptRouterRoutes
allowlist with Phase 7.5 justification.
- SpecParityExceptions extended with 4 new entries documenting
the Phase 7.5 deferral of full per-endpoint OpenAPI rows
(handler doc-block at the top of auth_breakglass.go is the
operator-facing reference).
Threat model (encoded in service.go + auth_breakglass.go doc-blocks
+ migration 000038 docstrings, to be promoted to docs/operator/auth-
threat-model.md in Phase 12):
- Break-glass is a deliberate bypass of the SSO security boundary.
An attacker who phishes the password OR finds it in a compromised
password manager bypasses MFA, OIDC, and every group-claim gate.
- Recommendation: keep CERTCTL_BREAKGLASS_ENABLED=false in steady-
state. Enable only during SSO-broken incidents. Disable after
recovery.
- WebAuthn pairing (v3 per Decision 12) is the load-bearing second
factor. Without it, break-glass is best treated as an emergency-
only path.
- Audit trail surfaces every break-glass action under
event_category=auth; the auditor role can monitor for unexpected
break-glass logins.
Verifications: gofmt clean, go vet clean across all touched packages,
go test -short -count=1 green across internal/auth/oidc (3.0s; new
Phase 7 hook tests integrated alongside the 21+ Phase 3 negatives),
internal/auth/breakglass (3.6s; 8 spec-mandated negatives + coverage
batch passing), internal/config + internal/domain/auth + internal/api/
router + internal/api/handler all green, no regressions in Bundle 1
packages.
|
||
|
shankar0123
|
17b30c1f7f |
auth-bundle-2 Phase 4: session service (cookie minting + signature
validation, idle/absolute expiry, signing-key rotation, CSRF, GC),
15-case negative-test matrix, fail-fatal initial-key bootstrap
Phase 4 of the bundle ships the post-login session lifecycle that backs
every authenticated request once Phase 5 wires the OIDC handlers + the
session middleware. The state machine is the load-bearing primitive for
the Bundle 2 control plane: forge a session cookie and you bypass every
RBAC gate.
Service surface (internal/auth/session/service.go, ~880 LOC):
- Service.Create(actorID, actorType, ip, ua) -> *CreateResult
Mints a session row; signs the cookie value with the active signing
key; returns the cookie payload AND the CSRF token plaintext for
the handler to set on the response.
- Service.Validate(ValidateInput) -> *Session
Parses the cookie, looks up the signing key (incl. retired-but-in-
retention), recomputes HMAC-SHA256, loads the session row, enforces
revocation + absolute + idle expiry + optional IP/UA bind. Maps to
one of 9 sentinel errors; the handler uniformly returns 401 to the
wire (specific reason in the audit row).
- Service.ValidateCSRF(headerValue, *Session) error
Constant-time compares SHA-256(header) against the stored hash on
the session row.
- Service.UpdateLastSeen / Revoke / RevokeAllForActor
- Service.RotateCSRFToken — mints fresh token, persists hash, returns
plaintext; called on login completion, logout, role-change against
actor, explicit operator rotate.
- Service.RotateSigningKey — mints new active key, retires previous;
retired keys stay valid for cfg.SigningKeyRetention so existing
cookies don't immediately fail.
- Service.EnsureInitialSigningKey — idempotent; mints first key on
fresh deploys; emits auth.session_signing_key_bootstrap audit row
with event_category=auth. Wired into cmd/server/main.go AFTER
migrations + RBAC backfill, BEFORE the HTTP listener binds; failure
is FATAL (logger.Error + os.Exit(1)) per the prompt — server refuses
to boot rather than serve session-less.
- Service.GarbageCollect — sweeps expired post-login sessions +
pre-login rows >10min + retired-past-retention signing keys. Wired
into the new internal/scheduler/scheduler.go::sessionGCLoop on a
CERTCTL_SESSION_GC_INTERVAL tick.
Cookie wire format (load-bearing):
v1.<session_id>.<signing_key_id>.<base64url-no-pad(HMAC-SHA256)>
The HMAC input is LENGTH-PREFIXED to defeat concatenation collisions:
len(session_id) || ":" || session_id || ":" || len(signing_key_id) || ":" || signing_key_id
where len(...) is the ASCII decimal byte-length. Without the length
prefix, the bare-concatenation form `session_id || signing_key_id`
would let a forger swap one byte across the boundary — `<a, bc>` and
`<ab, c>` produce identical HMAC inputs. The length prefix moves the
boundary into the input itself so the two cases can never collide.
The v1. version prefix is reserved. A future incompatible upgrade
ships as v2. and the parser rejects unknown prefixes (no fallback).
CSRF token model:
- Plaintext goes in a JS-readable certctl_csrf cookie (HttpOnly=false
intentional; the GUI must read it to echo into X-CSRF-Token header).
- SHA-256 hash of the plaintext lives on the session row.
- Validation: SHA-256(X-CSRF-Token) constant-time-compared.
- Rotated by Service.RotateCSRFToken on login / logout / role-change /
explicit admin-trigger.
Optional defense-in-depth (default OFF):
- CERTCTL_SESSION_BIND_IP — Validate compares client IP to row's
recorded IP. Mismatch -> 401, audit row, session NOT auto-revoked
(user may have legitimate IP change). Mobile + corporate-NAT
environments leave this off.
- CERTCTL_SESSION_BIND_USER_AGENT — same shape against UA.
Configurable lifetimes (env vars wired in internal/config/config.go):
CERTCTL_SESSION_IDLE_TIMEOUT 1h
CERTCTL_SESSION_ABSOLUTE_TIMEOUT 8h
CERTCTL_SESSION_SIGNING_KEY_RETENTION 24h
CERTCTL_SESSION_GC_INTERVAL 1h
CERTCTL_SESSION_SAMESITE Lax
CERTCTL_SESSION_BIND_IP false
CERTCTL_SESSION_BIND_USER_AGENT false
Test surface (internal/auth/session/service_test.go, ~860 LOC):
All 15 prompt-mandated negative cases:
1. Tampered cookie (HMAC byte flipped near segment start where all
6 bits are real — base64url-no-pad's last char carries only 2
bits so a tail-flip is unreliable).
1b. Tampered SESSION_ID segment (same HMAC-recompute outcome).
2. Cookie missing v1. prefix.
3. Cookie with unknown version prefix (v99).
4. Idle expiry — back-dated last_seen_at + idle_expires_at.
5. Absolute expiry — back-dated absolute_expires_at.
6. Revoked session.
7. Wrong signing key id (no row matches).
8. Cookie signed under retired-but-in-retention key SUCCEEDS.
9. Cookie signed under retired-past-retention key FAILS.
10. Concatenation collision — direct evidence that
computeHMAC("abc","de") != computeHMAC("ab","cde") AND that
a forged-boundary-slide cookie is rejected.
11. CSRF token missing.
12. CSRF token mismatch (constant-time compare).
13. IP-bind enabled + IP changed -> ErrSessionIPMismatch + audit row.
14. UA-bind enabled + UA changed -> ErrSessionUAMismatch + audit row.
15. EnsureInitialSigningKey RNG failure -> ErrInitialSigningKeyMintFailed
wrap (cmd/server/main.go treats as fatal).
Plus coverage-lift batch covering: every error wrap on every repo
collaborator (Create, Get, UpdateLastSeen, UpdateCSRFTokenHash,
Revoke, RevokeAllForActor, GC), every RNG-failure surface in Create /
RotateCSRFToken / RotateSigningKey, every alg-pinning helper edge,
the cookie parser's full negative matrix (empty, wrong segment count,
missing prefixes, bad base64, wrong HMAC length), and a real-encryption
round-trip via internal/crypto.EncryptIfKeySet -> DecryptIfKeySet so
the v3-blob path is exercised end-to-end at the session-cookie level.
Coverage:
internal/auth/session 94.5% (floor 90)
internal/auth/session/domain 96+% (floor 90, Phase 1)
.github/coverage-thresholds.yml extended with 2 new gate entries
(internal/auth/session and internal/auth/session/domain). The
why: paragraphs explain why each fail-closed branch is load-bearing.
Repository extensions:
internal/repository/session.go gains UpdateCSRFTokenHash on the
SessionRepository interface; internal/repository/postgres/session.go
ships the implementation. RotateCSRFToken consumes it.
Scheduler extensions:
internal/scheduler/scheduler.go gains SessionGarbageCollector
interface + sessionGC field + sessionGCInterval +
SetSessionGarbageCollector + SetSessionGCInterval + sessionGCLoop.
Pattern matches the existing acmeGCLoop: atomic.Bool guard prevents
concurrent sweeps, sync.WaitGroup tracks for graceful shutdown,
per-tick context.WithTimeout(1m) bounds a stuck Postgres.
Server wiring:
cmd/server/main.go constructs sessionService AFTER the bootstrap
block (post-RBAC backfill) and BEFORE the policy-service block.
EnsureInitialSigningKey runs immediately; failure is fatal via
os.Exit(1). The scheduler section wires SetSessionGarbageCollector
+ SetSessionGCInterval alongside the other interval setters and
emits an Info log so operators can confirm the loop is enabled.
Phase 4 deviation note: Service.GarbageCollect() returns (int, error)
rather than the prompt's literal `error`. The int is the count of
session rows deleted on this sweep; the scheduler discards it (`_, err
:= ...`) but tests + future operator-facing audit rows can read it.
The wider behavior matches the spec exactly.
Verifications: gofmt clean, go vet ./internal/auth/session/...
./internal/scheduler/... ./internal/config/... ./cmd/server/...
./internal/repository/... clean, go test -short -count=1 -race green
across all 3 session packages, full repository + auth + scheduler +
config test sweeps green, no regressions in Bundle 1 packages.
|
||
|
shankar0123
|
2d9110b0c4 |
auth-bundle-2 Phase 0: dependency-add + oidc auth-type literal + runtime guard
Bundle 2 Phase 0 stages the dependencies + auth-type discriminator
literal that later phases consume. No handler chain wired yet; an
operator who sets CERTCTL_AUTH_TYPE=oidc on this commit gets a clear
refuse-to-start error rather than a silent fallback to api-key (the
G-1 failure mode that drove "jwt" out of the allowed set).
Deliverables:
* go.mod: github.com/coreos/go-oidc/v3 v3.18.0 added as a direct
require. Per the pre-bundle dependency audit (Apache-2.0, zero CVEs
ever per OSV.dev, 2,400+ stars, used by Hashicorp Vault + Dex +
Hydra + Authentik + every Kubernetes OIDC integration), this is the
ecosystem-standard Go OIDC client. Pinned to a specific minor
(v3.18.0) per the prompt's "no bare latest" rule.
* go.mod: golang.org/x/oauth2 promoted from // indirect to direct,
bumped from v0.34.0 to v0.36.0 by go mod tidy. Both versions are
OSV-clean. Maintained by the Go team.
* No JSON-path library added (forbidden by the dependency audit; the
group-claim resolver is hand-rolled in Phase 3).
* internal/config/config.go: AuthTypeOIDC constant added with a
load-bearing comment explaining (a) this is the AUTH-TYPE literal,
not a JWT alg literal, so the G-1 closure invariant is preserved
("jwt" stays out of ValidAuthTypes forever); (b) the runtime guard
in cmd/server/main.go intentionally refuses-to-start when oidc is
set pre-Phase-6 to avoid the silent-downgrade failure mode.
ValidAuthTypes() now returns {api-key, none, oidc}.
* internal/config/config_test.go: TestValidAuthTypesIsExactly_APIKey_None
renamed to TestValidAuthTypesIsExactly_APIKey_None_OIDC and now pins
the 3-entry set. TestValidAuthTypesDoesNotContainJWT (G-1 closure
test) still passes because "jwt" is never added back.
TestValidate_GenericInvalidAuthType's bad-types list updated:
"oidc" removed (now valid), "saml" added (correctly rejected per
Decision 5's SAML deferral).
* cmd/server/main.go: defense-in-depth runtime auth-type guard now
has an explicit AuthTypeOIDC case that exit(1)s with an actionable
message: "the OIDC auth chain is not yet wired in this build (Auth
Bundle 2 Phase 6 ships the session middleware that consumes this
auth-type literal)." This closes the lying-field gap the literal
would otherwise create. Phase 6 of Bundle 2 relaxes this case to
fall through alongside api-key + none.
* api/openapi.yaml: /v1/auth/info auth_type enum extended from
[api-key, none] to [api-key, none, oidc] with an in-line comment
explaining the Phase-0-vs-Phase-6 timing so an OpenAPI consumer
isn't surprised by "oidc" appearing here pre-Bundle-2-merge.
* deploy/helm/certctl/templates/_helpers.tpl::certctl.validateAuthType:
valid set extended to include "oidc". Chart-time validation now
passes for type=oidc; the binary's runtime guard takes over to
refuse the start. Once Bundle 2 ships, the runtime guard relaxes
and OIDC works end-to-end with no further chart edits.
* .env.example: CERTCTL_AUTH_TYPE comment block updated to document
the three valid values + the Phase-0-vs-Phase-6 timing.
* internal/auth/oidc/doc.go: new package directory with package doc
+ transitional blank imports for coreos/go-oidc/v3 + x/oauth2 so
go mod tidy keeps both deps as direct requires until Phase 3's
service.go replaces the blanks with real symbol use. Doc explains
the package layout (oidc/ + oidc/domain/ + oidc/groupclaim/ +
oidc/testfixtures/) so the post-Bundle-2 reader can navigate.
Verifications:
* gofmt clean on every changed file.
* go vet clean on internal/config + cmd/server + internal/auth/oidc.
* go test -short -count=1 green on internal/config (including the
G-1 closure + new validation tests), cmd/server, internal/auth (all
Bundle 1 packages), internal/service/auth.
* govulncheck ./... clean (M-024 hard CI gate).
* All 24 ci-guards pass locally.
Phase 0 exit criteria from cowork/auth-bundle-2-prompt.md:
* go.mod shows coreos/go-oidc/v3 as direct: yes.
* golang.org/x/oauth2 is direct (not indirect): yes.
* govulncheck ./... clean: yes.
* No JSON-path library in go.mod / go.sum deltas: confirmed (only
v3 of go-oidc + the x/oauth2 bump landed).
* make verify green: gofmt + vet + go test pass; full make verify
(which would invoke golangci-lint) deferred to CI since the
sandbox doesn't have golangci-lint installed; the operator runs
make verify locally before pushing per CLAUDE.md operating rule.
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shankar0123
|
3ef45e2ad4 |
auth-bundle-1 Phase 6-7-8: bootstrap path + scope-down CLI + auditor-role split
# Phase 6 — day-0 admin bootstrap * internal/auth/bootstrap/ (new package): Strategy interface + EnvTokenStrategy with constant-time compare, one-shot consumption via sync.Mutex, optional admin-existence probe. Bundle 2's OIDC- first-admin will plug in alongside as an alternate Strategy. * BootstrapService.ValidateAndMint: validates the operator's CERTCTL_BOOTSTRAP_TOKEN, mints a 32-byte (64-hex-char) random API key value, persists the SHA-256 hash to api_keys, grants r-admin via actor_roles, AddHashed's the runtime keystore so the just- minted key authenticates the next request without restart, and records bootstrap.consume to the audit trail with category=auth. * internal/auth/keystore.go (new): KeyStore interface + StaticKeyStore (immutable env-var-only path) + MutableKeyStore (env-var keys + DB-loaded api_keys + runtime AddHashed). The auth middleware now consumes a KeyStore so the bootstrap path can extend the lookup table at runtime. * migrations/000031_api_keys.up/down.sql: api_keys table with (id, name UNIQUE, key_hash UNIQUE, tenant_id, admin, created_by, created_at, expires_at, last_used_at). Idempotent. * /v1/auth/bootstrap GET (probe) + POST (mint) — auth-exempt. Both routes documented in api/openapi.yaml + AuthExemptRouterRoutes allowlist updated. The token never leaves internal/auth/bootstrap; the minted plaintext key flows only into the HTTP response body. * Startup warning emitted when CERTCTL_BOOTSTRAP_TOKEN is set AND admin actors already exist (config drift signal). * Tests: 4 strategy invariants (empty token born disabled, wrong token=ErrInvalidToken without consumption, one-shot consumption, admin-exists closes path), 5 service tests (happy path + actor- name validation + propagation of strategy errors + nil-deps guard + 32-byte entropy budget), 8 HTTP-handler tests (status 201/410/401/400 mapping + token-leak hygiene scan of slog + audit details + Location header). Token-leak test redirects slog.Default to a buffer for the test scope. # Phase 7 — API-key migration + scope-down CLI * GET /v1/auth/keys handler + service method ListKeys backed by ActorRoleRepository.ListDistinctActors. Returns one row per (actor_id, actor_type) pair with the slice of role IDs they hold. Permission: auth.role.list. * internal/cli/auth_scope_down.go: AuthListKeys, AuthScopeDown (interactive), AuthScopeDownNonInteractive (JSON config), AuthScopeDownSuggest (--suggest with optional --apply). The synthetic actor-demo-anon is filtered out of every interactive / bulk path; non-interactive flow logs and skips it explicitly. * SuggestRoleFromAuditEvents (pure function): walks 30 days of audit events per actor and returns the narrowest matching role (admin / mcp / viewer / agent / operator) plus a one-line reason. Classification: any admin-shaped action wins; otherwise all-MCP → mcp; all-read-only → viewer; all-agent-shaped → agent; otherwise operator. Test table pins all six classifications. * CLI subcommand tree extended: 'auth keys list' + 'auth keys scope-down [--non-interactive <cfg>] [--suggest [--apply]]'. * CHANGELOG.md leads v2.1.0 with the SECURITY: AUDIT YOUR API KEYS call-out + four flow examples. # Phase 8 — auditor role + event_category column * migrations/000032_audit_category.up/down.sql: ALTER TABLE audit_events ADD COLUMN event_category TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT 'cert_lifecycle' + CHECK constraint (cert_lifecycle/auth/config) + (event_category) and (event_category, timestamp DESC) indexes for the auditor-filter query path. WORM trigger from migration 000018 continues to enforce append-only at the DB layer (DDL is not blocked). * domain.AuditEvent gains EventCategory string (omitempty); domain.EventCategoryCertLifecycle / Auth / Config constants. * AuditService.RecordEventWithCategory sibling of RecordEvent; legacy callers stay on RecordEvent (defaults to cert_lifecycle). Auth callers (RoleService, ActorRoleService, BootstrapService) switched to RecordEventWithCategory(..., 'auth', ...). * GET /v1/audit?category=<cat>: handler accepts the optional query param, validates against the enum (400 on invalid value), dispatches through ListAuditEventsByCategory. OpenAPI updated with the new query param + AuditEvent.event_category schema. * Postgres AuditRepository.Create now writes event_category; AuditRepository.List filters on it; AuditFilter.EventCategory gates the WHERE clause. * Tests: 5 audit-category-filter HTTP tests (dispatch routing, back-compat fallback, 400 for invalid values, all 3 enum values accepted, page+category combine, JSON output surfaces the field). 3 auditor-role invariants (auditor holds exactly audit.read+audit.export, no mutating perms, disjoint from viewer except audit.read). # Cross-phase wiring * HandlerRegistry.Bootstrap field added; cmd/server/main.go wires the bootstrap service ahead of RegisterHandlers (extracted assembleNamedAPIKeys helper into auth_backfill.go, moved the keystore + bootstrap construction up alongside the auth repos). * AuthCheckResolver / AuthActorRoleService extended with ListKeys to satisfy the Phase 7 surface; existing fakes updated. * fakeAudit + mockAuditService stubs in tests gain RecordEventWithCategory + ListAuditEventsByCategory; existing tests untouched. # Verifications * gofmt -l: clean across every modified file. * go vet ./...: clean. * staticcheck across internal/auth + handler + router + cli + service + repository + cmd + domain: clean. * go test -short -count=1: green across every Bundle-1-touched package — internal/auth (incl. bootstrap), internal/api/handler, internal/api/router, internal/cli, internal/service/auth, internal/service, internal/domain/auth, internal/repository/postgres, cmd/server, cmd/cli, plus internal/scheduler, internal/api/middleware, cmd/agent, internal/mcp. |
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shankar0123
|
aebfd8bd7c |
Revert "chore: drop 'Infisical' label from internal references"
This reverts commit
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shankar0123
|
19706e56b3 |
chore: drop 'Infisical' label from internal references
Strategic naming cleanup. Earlier doc-comments + commit messages framed Rank 4 / Rank 5 / Rank 7 work as 'Rank N of the 2026-05-03 Infisical deep-research deliverable' — the 'Infisical' qualifier was a holdover from the original deep-research framing where Infisical (a competing secrets-management platform) was the comparator. Keeping the comparator's name in our source adds noise without value; an external reader sees 'Infisical' and assumes a dependency or shared lineage rather than reading it as the competitive context it was. Mechanical sed across 34 files (32 source / docs + 2 follow-up Python passes to collapse 'deep-research deep-research' duplicates that emerged where the original phrase wrapped across lines): s|Infisical deep-research|deep-research|g s|infisical-deep-research-results|deep-research-results-2026-05-03|g s|infisical-deep-research-prompt|deep-research-prompt-2026-05-03|g s|infisical-deep-research|deep-research|g s|Infisical|deep-research|g s|deep-research deep-research|deep-research|g # collapse-pass Net diff: 63 insertions / 64 deletions across cmd/, docs/, internal/, migrations/. Pure text substitution; zero behavior change. Code path unchanged — go vet clean, tests for TestApproval pass on both internal/service and internal/api/handler packages. Workspace docs (cowork/) carry the same references and will be swept separately — they're not under certctl/ git control. The two filename references (cowork/infisical-deep-research-results.md + cowork/infisical-deep-research-prompt.md) get renamed alongside that sweep to deep-research-results-2026-05-03.md / deep-research-prompt-2026-05-03.md so cross-references in the certctl repo doc-comments resolve cleanly. |
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shankar0123
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03c61f4c20 |
scheduler, certificate, renewal: gate issuance on profile-driven approval
Closes Rank 7 of the 2026-05-03 Infisical deep-research deliverable
(cowork/infisical-deep-research-results.md Part 5). Pre-fix, certctl
issued certificates unattended — every renewal-loop tick that crossed
a renewal threshold created a Job at Status=Pending which the
scheduler dispatched directly to the issuer connector. PCI-DSS Level
1, FedRAMP Moderate / High, SOC 2 Type II, and HIPAA-regulated PHI
customers all ask the same procurement question: "How do you enforce
two-person integrity on cert issuance?" Today's answer: "We don't."
After this commit chain: "Per-profile RequiresApproval=true creates a
parallel ApprovalRequest row; the renewal-loop creates the Job at
Status=AwaitingApproval; an authorized approver (different from the
requester per the same-actor RBAC check) calls
POST /api/v1/approvals/{id}/approve, transitioning the Job to
Pending; the scheduler picks it up."
This commit (4 of 4) wires the gate into the manual TriggerRenewal
entry point + main.go service construction + Config.Approval +
docs + WORKSPACE-ROADMAP follow-up entries. The previous commits
in the chain shipped:
- 1 (
|
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shankar0123
|
bee47f0318 |
acme-server: cert-manager integration test + production hardening (Phase 5/7)
Closes the production-readiness loop on the ACME surface. After this
commit, certctl ships per-account rate limits + a GC sweeper for
expired ACME state + a kind-driven cert-manager 1.15 integration test
+ a lego-driven RFC conformance harness + a k6 loadtest scenario for
the unauthenticated ACME path.
Architecture:
- Rate limits live in-memory + per-replica. Restart wipes the
counters; orders/hour caps are eventual-consistency anyway. A
3-replica certctl-server fleet behind an LB effectively has 3x
the configured throughput per account; persistent rate limiting
is a follow-up if production telemetry shows abuse patterns we
can't catch in a single restart cycle. Per-key + per-action
isolation: ActionNewOrder/acc-1, ActionKeyChange/acc-1, and
ActionChallengeRespond/<challenge-id> are independent buckets.
- GC loop follows the existing scheduler-loop pattern (atomic.Bool
+ sync.WaitGroup; see crlGenerationLoop for shape). Three
independent SQL sweeps per tick (DELETE expired nonces; UPDATE
pending authzs whose expires_at < now() to expired; UPDATE
pending/ready/processing orders whose expires_at < now() to
invalid). Each sweep is a single statement; failures are logged-
and-continued so a failing nonces sweep doesn't block authzs.
Per-sweep 1m timeout bounds a stuck Postgres.
- cert-manager integration test is gated on KIND_AVAILABLE so CI
skips it cleanly (kind is too heavy for per-PR). Operators run
locally via 'make acme-cert-manager-test'; the harness brings up
a fresh cluster each run + tears it down on Cleanup.
- lego conformance harness drives a real ACME client through
register → run → cert-PEM-landed against a hermetic certctl
stack. Catches RFC-shape regressions third-party clients would
hit before they ship.
- k6 ACME-flow scenario hammers the unauthenticated surface
(directory + new-nonce + ARI synthetic-id) at 100 VUs × 5m. JWS-
signed flows are out of scope for k6 (no JWS support); they're
covered by the lego harness above.
What ships:
- internal/api/acme/ratelimit.go (+ ratelimit_test.go: 7 cases —
disable-when-perHour-zero, capacity, per-key isolation, per-
action isolation, refill-over-time, RetryAfter, concurrent-access
with -race + 200 goroutines × 200 calls).
- internal/repository/postgres/acme.go: 4 new methods —
CountActiveOrdersByAccount + GCExpiredNonces + GCExpireAuthorizations
+ GCInvalidateExpiredOrders. Each a single SQL statement.
- internal/service/acme.go: SetRateLimiter + GarbageCollect +
rate-limit gates at 3 entry points (CreateOrder + RotateAccountKey
+ RespondToChallenge) + concurrent-orders gate at CreateOrder.
2 new sentinels (ErrACMERateLimited, ErrACMEConcurrentOrdersExceeded);
5 new GC metrics (gc_runs / gc_run_failures / gc_nonces_reaped /
gc_authzs_expired / gc_orders_invalidated).
- internal/scheduler/scheduler.go: ACMEGarbageCollector interface +
acmeGCRunning atomic.Bool + acmeGCInterval + 2 setters (SetACME-
GarbageCollector + SetACMEGCInterval) + acmeGCLoop following the
crlGenerationLoop shape.
- internal/api/handler/acme.go: writeServiceError gains rateLimited
(429 + RFC 8555 §6.7) + concurrent-orders-exceeded mappings.
- internal/config/config.go: 5 new env vars
(CERTCTL_ACME_SERVER_RATE_LIMIT_ORDERS_PER_HOUR=100,
CERTCTL_ACME_SERVER_RATE_LIMIT_CONCURRENT_ORDERS=5,
CERTCTL_ACME_SERVER_RATE_LIMIT_KEY_CHANGE_PER_HOUR=5,
CERTCTL_ACME_SERVER_RATE_LIMIT_CHALLENGE_RESPONDS_PER_HOUR=60,
CERTCTL_ACME_SERVER_GC_INTERVAL=1m).
- cmd/server/main.go: NewRateLimiter() + SetRateLimiter() at
startup; conditional SetACMEGarbageCollector(acmeService) +
SetACMEGCInterval(cfg.ACMEServer.GCInterval) when Enabled+
GCInterval > 0.
- deploy/test/acme-integration/: kind-config.yaml + cert-manager-
install.sh + clusterissuer-trust-authenticated.yaml +
clusterissuer-challenge.yaml + certificate-test.yaml + conformance-
lego.sh + certmanager_test.go (//go:build integration + KIND_AVAILABLE
gate).
- deploy/test/loadtest/k6/acme_flow.js + README ACME-flows section.
- Makefile: 2 new PHONY targets (acme-cert-manager-test +
acme-rfc-conformance-test).
- docs/acme-server.md: status flipped to Phase 5; Configuration
table grows 5 rows; new 'Phase 5 — operational guidance' section
explaining rate-limit math + GC sweeper semantics + cert-manager
integration + lego conformance + k6 baseline.
Tests:
- 'go vet ./...' clean across the repo.
- 'go test -short -count=1 ./internal/...' green across every
affected package (service / acme / handler / scheduler / repo /
config).
- 'go vet -tags=integration ./deploy/test/acme-integration/' clean
(the integration test compiles cleanly with the build tag).
- The kind/cert-manager harness is gated behind KIND_AVAILABLE so
CI skips by default; operators run locally via 'make acme-cert-
manager-test'.
Engineering history: cowork/WORKSPACE-CHANGELOG.md 'ACME-Server-5'.
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shankar0123
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4dc8d3fa5b |
acme-server: key rollover + revocation + ARI (Phase 4/7)
Closes the RFC 8555 + RFC 9773 surface beyond the issuance happy-path:
- POST /acme/profile/<id>/key-change (RFC 8555 §7.3.5)
- POST /acme/profile/<id>/revoke-cert (RFC 8555 §7.6)
- GET /acme/profile/<id>/renewal-info/<cert-id> (RFC 9773 ARI)
After this commit, ACME clients can rotate account keys, revoke certs
through the ACME surface (rather than only via the certctl GUI/API),
and fetch ARI for proactive renewal scheduling.
Architecture:
- Key rollover: outer JWS verified against the registered account key
(existing kid path); the inner JWS — embedded as the outer's payload
— verified against the embedded NEW jwk in a new dedicated routine
(ParseAndVerifyKeyChangeInner) that enforces RFC 8555 §7.3.5
inner-only invariants: MUST use jwk + MUST NOT use kid, payload
.account == outer.kid, payload.oldKey thumbprint-equals registered.
A single WithinTx swaps the stored thumbprint+pem and writes the
audit row. Concurrent-rollover safety via SELECT…FOR UPDATE on the
conflicting account row in UpdateAccountJWKWithTx; the loser
observes the winner's new thumbprint and is told to retry (409).
- Revocation: two auth paths. kid → AccountOwnsCertificate single-
indexed COUNT lookup over acme_orders. jwk → constant-time RFC 7638
thumbprint compare against the cert's pubkey. Both paths route
through service.RevocationSvc.RevokeCertificateWithActor so the
existing CRL/OCSP refresh + audit + metrics pipeline applies. RFC
5280 §5.3.1 numeric reason codes clamp to certctl's
domain.ValidRevocationReasons; codes 8 (removeFromCRL) + 10
(aACompromise) clamp to 'unspecified' since they aren't in the set.
- ARI is GET-only and unauth per RFC 9773 §4. Cert-id wire shape is
base64url(AKI).base64url(serial); ParseARICertID strict-decodes,
SerialHex emits the canonical certctl-shape lowercase-no-leading-
zeros hex used in certificate_versions.serial_number.
ComputeRenewalWindow has 3 branches: bound RenewalPolicy →
[notAfter - days, notAfter - days/2]; no policy → last 33% of
validity; past expiry → [now, now + 1d] (renew immediately).
Retry-After honors CERTCTL_ACME_SERVER_ARI_POLL_INTERVAL.
What ships:
- internal/api/acme/{keychange,ari}.go (+ phase4_test.go: 15 tests).
- internal/api/acme/order.go: RevokeCertRequest wire shape.
- internal/api/handler/acme.go: KeyChange, RevokeCert, RenewalInfo
+ 11 new writeServiceError mappings.
- internal/repository/postgres/acme.go: UpdateAccountJWKWithTx (FOR
UPDATE + expectedOldThumbprint precondition; ErrACMEAccountKey-
ConcurrentUpdate sentinel) + AccountOwnsCertificate.
- internal/service/acme.go: RotateAccountKey + RevokeCert +
RenewalInfo; CertificateRevoker + RenewalPolicyLookup interfaces;
SetRevocationDelegate + SetRenewalPolicyLookup wiring; 11 new
sentinels; 6 new metrics.
- internal/service/acme_phase4_test.go: service-layer tests for
RotateAccountKey (happy + duplicate-key) + RevokeCert (kid mismatch
+ jwk mismatch + jwk happy + already-revoked + reason-clamping) +
RenewalInfo (disabled + bad cert-id).
- internal/api/router/router.go: 6 new register calls (3 per-profile
+ 3 shorthand). Router parity exceptions extended in lockstep
(in-tree SpecParityExceptions + CI-only openapi-handler-exceptions
.yaml).
- cmd/server/main.go: SetRevocationDelegate(revocationSvc) +
SetRenewalPolicyLookup(renewalPolicyRepo) at startup.
- internal/config/config.go: CERTCTL_ACME_SERVER_ARI_ENABLED (default
true) + CERTCTL_ACME_SERVER_ARI_POLL_INTERVAL (default 6h);
BuildDirectory's ariEnabled flag now flips on under
cfg.ARIEnabled.
- docs/acme-server.md: phase status flipped to Phase 4; endpoints
table grows 6 rows (3 per-profile + 3 shorthand); FAQ section
appended explaining how to rotate keys, revoke certs, and consume
ARI.
Tests:
- 'go vet ./...' clean across the repo.
- 'go test -short -count=1 ./...' green across every package.
- phase4_test.go covers: keychange happy-path + 5 negatives +
MapKeyChangeErrorToProblem coverage; ARI cert-id round-trip + 6
malformed cases + BuildARICertID from a generated cert; window-
math 3 branches.
- service-layer tests confirm: RotateAccountKey atomically swaps the
thumbprint (verifies persisted state) and rejects duplicate keys;
RevokeCert routes through the stub RevocationSvc with the right
actor string + reason on the jwk path, rejects mismatched keys,
rejects already-revoked certs, clamps reason codes correctly;
RenewalInfo respects ARIEnabled + cert-id format.
Engineering history: cowork/WORKSPACE-CHANGELOG.md 'ACME-Server-4'.
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shankar0123
|
ec88a61274 |
acme-server: foundation — directory + new-nonce + per-profile routing (Phase 1a/7)
First slice of the RFC 8555 ACME server endpoint (master plan at cowork/acme-server-endpoint-prompt.md, per-phase prompts at cowork/acme-server-prompts/). This commit lands the smallest viable end-to-end deployable slice: an ACME client running curl -sk https://certctl/acme/profile/<id>/directory curl -sk -I https://certctl/acme/profile/<id>/new-nonce successfully fetches the directory document and a Replay-Nonce. Account creation, JWS verification, orders, challenges, and revocation are all out of scope for this phase and arrive in Phases 1b–4. Closes the Rank 1 LHF from the 2026-05-03 Infisical deep-research (cowork/infisical-deep-research-results.md). Pre-fix, certctl was an ACME consumer only — no /acme/directory endpoint, no JWS verifier, no challenge validators. K8s customers running cert-manager could not point at certctl as an ACME issuer; they had to deploy a certctl agent on every node. What ships: - internal/api/acme/{directory,nonce,errors}.go (+ tests). - internal/api/handler/acme.go + acme_handler_test.go. - internal/repository/postgres/acme.go (nonce ops only — Phase 1b extends with account CRUD; Phases 2-4 extend with order / authz / challenge CRUD). - internal/service/acme.go (BuildDirectory + IssueNonce stubs; Phase 1b adds VerifyJWS / NewAccount / etc.). - migrations/000025_acme_server.{up,down}.sql ships the full 5-table ACME schema (acme_accounts / acme_orders / acme_authorizations / acme_challenges / acme_nonces) PLUS the per-profile certificate_profiles.acme_auth_mode column. Phase 1a actively uses only acme_nonces; remaining tables are empty until Phases 1b-4 plug in. - internal/config/config.go: ACMEServerConfig struct + ACMEServer field on Config. Env vars use CERTCTL_ACME_SERVER_* prefix to avoid colliding with the existing consumer-side ACMEConfig at config.go:1746 (CERTCTL_ACME_DIRECTORY_URL / PROFILE / CHALLENGE_TYPE etc.). Phase 1a wires Enabled + DefaultAuthMode + DefaultProfileID + NonceTTL + DirectoryMeta; Order/Authz TTLs + per-challenge-type concurrency caps + DNS01 resolver are reserved fields parsed in 1a so operators can set them ahead of Phases 2/3. - cmd/server/main.go: wire ACMEHandler into the HandlerRegistry literal alongside the existing certificate / EST / SCEP / etc. handlers. - internal/api/router/router.go: HandlerRegistry.ACME field + 6 Register calls (3 per-profile + 3 shorthand). - internal/api/router/openapi_parity_test.go: 6 new entries in SpecParityExceptions. ACME is a wire-protocol surface (JWS-signed JSON over HTTPS per RFC 7515) whose semantics are dictated by RFC 8555 + RFC 9773 rather than by an OpenAPI document, same precedent as SCEP/EST. The canonical reference is docs/acme-server.md. - docs/acme-server.md: Phase-1a-shaped reference. Configuration table for every CERTCTL_ACME_SERVER_* env var. Per-profile auth-mode decision tree skeleton. TLS trust bootstrap section flagging cert-manager's ClusterIssuer.spec.acme.caBundle requirement (the single biggest first-time-deploy footgun; the full cert-manager walkthrough lands in Phase 6 but the requirement is documented up front). Architecture decisions baked in: - URL family is /acme/profile/<id>/* (per-profile, canonical) with /acme/* shorthand active when CERTCTL_ACME_SERVER_DEFAULT_PROFILE_ID is set. Path matches existing per-profile precedent in EST + SCEP. - Auth mode is per-profile (acme_auth_mode column on certificate_profiles), NOT server-wide. One certctl-server can serve trust_authenticated for an internal-PKI profile and challenge for a public-trust-style profile simultaneously. The column is read at request time, not cached at server start — operators flipping a profile's mode via SQL take effect on the next order without restart. - Nonces are DB-backed (acme_nonces table). Survive server restart. The RFC 8555 §6.5 replay defense requires the store to outlast the client's nonce caching window; an in-memory-only nonce store would lose every in-flight order on restart. - Per-op atomic counters on service.ACMEService.Metrics() — certctl_acme_directory_total, certctl_acme_directory_failures_total, certctl_acme_new_nonce_total, certctl_acme_new_nonce_failures_total. Naming follows certctl frozen decision 0.10 cardinality discipline. Phase 1b will extend with new_account counters; Phase 2 with order / finalize / cert; Phase 3 with per-challenge-type counters. Audit fixes #11 + #12 (cowork/acme-server-prompts/audit-additions.md) applied: - #11: CERTCTL_ACME_SERVER_* prefix avoids the consumer-side CERTCTL_ACME_* namespace collision. - #12: prior-attempt WIP from two failed Phase-1 dispatches was discarded at phase start; this commit starts from a clean tree. Tests: - 14 unit tests in internal/api/acme/ (directory, nonce, errors). - 7 handler-level tests via httptest.NewServer + mockACMEService (mirrors the mockSCEPService pattern at scep_handler_test.go). - 7 service-layer tests with mocked repo + injected profileLookup. - All pass under -race -count=1 -short. Deferred to Phase 1b: - JWS verification (go-jose v4 — see master-prompt §8a for the API surface and audit doc for the speculation pitfalls). - new-account / account/<id> endpoints + AccountService. - Nonce *consumption* path (issue path is in this commit; consume is only invoked by JWS-verified POSTs which Phase 1b adds). Engineering history: cowork/WORKSPACE-CHANGELOG.md "ACME-Server-1a". Per-phase implementation plan: cowork/acme-server-prompts/. Master plan + audit fixes: cowork/acme-server-endpoint-prompt.md + cowork/acme-server-prompt-audit.md + cowork/acme-server-prompts/audit-additions.md. |
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shankar0123
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35e18bfc56 |
scheduler: bound renewal concurrency via CERTCTL_RENEWAL_CONCURRENCY
Closes the #9 acquisition-readiness blocker from the 2026-05-01 issuer coverage audit. Pre-fix, JobService.ProcessPendingJobs ran every claimed job sequentially in a single goroutine: safe but slow, and operators with large fleets had no lever to dial throughput up. Switching to fire-and-forget per-job goroutines would have unbounded the upstream-CA call rate and tripped DigiCert / Entrust / Sectigo rate limits — certctl's response to 429 was to retry on the next tick, re-fanning out the same calls and digging deeper into the limit. Operators need a knob. This commit: - Adds CERTCTL_RENEWAL_CONCURRENCY env var (default 25) loaded via the existing getEnvInt pattern in internal/config/config.go. Documented inline as the cap for the per-tick renewal/issuance/ deployment goroutine fan-out, with operator-tuning guidance: permissive upstream limits + large fleets (>10k certs) → 100; strict limits or async-CA-heavy fleets → 25 or lower. - Wires golang.org/x/sync/semaphore.Weighted around the per-job goroutine launch in JobService.ProcessPendingJobs. Acquire(ctx, 1) is the load-bearing piece — it BLOCKS the loop when at the cap, providing real backpressure rather than fire-and-forget. The fan-out is split into processPendingJobsSequential (legacy, preserved for unit-test wiring that doesn't call SetRenewalConcurrency) and processPendingJobsConcurrent (production, delegates to a generic boundedFanOut helper). - boundedFanOut takes the per-job work as a closure so the cap can be tested directly without standing up the renewal/deployment service graph. processed/failed counters use atomic.Int64 to avoid mutex overhead on every job completion; final log line reads both AFTER wg.Wait so the counts reflect every dispatched job. ctx-aware Acquire ensures a shutdown ctx cancel interrupts the dispatch loop promptly; in-flight goroutines drain via Wait before the function returns so no goroutine outlives the scheduler tick. - shouldSkipJob extracted as a package-private helper so the agent-routed-deployment skip logic is shared between the sequential and concurrent paths byte-for-byte (the audit prompt's "channel-based semaphore without ctx-aware acquire" anti-pattern is explicitly avoided — semaphore.Weighted.Acquire returns on ctx done; channel <- struct{}{} would block forever). - SetRenewalConcurrency setter on JobService normalises ≤0 to 1. semaphore.NewWeighted(0) constructs a semaphore that blocks every Acquire forever; the normalisation prevents a misconfigured env var from wedging the scheduler. - cmd/server/main.go wires SetRenewalConcurrency(cfg.Scheduler. RenewalConcurrency) on the freshly-built jobService, immediately after SetAuditService. Production deployments always take the bounded path; tests that build JobService directly via NewJobService keep their strict-sequential behaviour because renewalConcurrency is the zero value. - Tests in internal/service/job_concurrency_test.go: * TestBoundedFanOut_CapHolds — primary regression guard. 50 jobs × 50ms work × cap=5 → asserts peak in-flight never exceeds 5 AND reaches 5 at least once (catches both upper-bound regressions and gates that incorrectly cap below the configured value). Lock-free max via CompareAndSwap so the measurement instrument doesn't itself constrain concurrency. * TestBoundedFanOut_AllJobsRun — lower-bound: every non-skipped job is dispatched. * TestBoundedFanOut_SkipsAgentRoutedDeployments — pins the shouldSkipJob contract. * TestBoundedFanOut_CtxCancelInterrupts — ctx cancellation interrupts a stuck fan-out within the timeout budget. * TestBoundedFanOut_FailedJobsCounted — per-job errors don't abort the fan-out. * TestSetRenewalConcurrency_NormalizesNonPositive — ≤0 → 1 fail-safe pinned across negative/zero/positive inputs. - docs/features.md: scheduler-loop table augmented with the concurrency-cap env-var pointer alongside the job-processor row. - docs/architecture.md: Concurrency Safety section gains a paragraph explaining the cap, the operator-tuning guidance, the ctx-aware Acquire semantics, and the audit reference. Operator-facing impact: the first big renewal sweep no longer takes down the upstream CA's rate-limit budget. Existing deployments get the bounded path automatically (default 25); operators can override via env var without code changes. Verified locally: - gofmt -l . clean - go vet ./... clean - staticcheck ./... clean - go test -short -count=1 across service / scheduler / config / integration: green - Six new tests under TestBoundedFanOut* + TestSetRenewalConcurrency*: green Audit reference: cowork/issuer-coverage-audit-2026-05-01/RESULTS.md Top-10 fix #9. |
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shankar0123
|
0509790325 |
asyncpoll: refactor Sectigo / Entrust / GlobalSign to bounded polling (Phase 2)
Phase 2 of the #5 acquisition-readiness fix from the 2026-05-01 issuer
coverage audit. Phase 1 (commit
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shankar0123
|
7cb453a336 |
chore(fmt): repo-wide gofmt -w sweep — close drift surfaced by ci-pipeline-cleanup Phase 4
Mechanical reformat. The new 'gofmt drift' CI step (added in
ci-pipeline-cleanup Phase 4, commit
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shankar0123
|
77abb7096c |
fix(config): wire CERTCTL_DEPLOY_BACKUP_RETENTION + CERTCTL_K8S_DEPLOY_KUBELET_SYNC_TIMEOUT to satisfy G-3 docs-drift guard
CI failed on the G-3 docs-drift guard for the deploy-hardening I
release commit (88e8a417 /
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shankar0123
|
ed19312df6 |
feat(ratelimit): per-endpoint rate limit on OCSP + cert-export (Phase 3)
Production hardening II Phase 3 — wire the existing
internal/ratelimit/SlidingWindowLimiter into the OCSP and cert-export
handlers. Removes the DoS vector where an unauthenticated relying
party (or compromised admin token) can hammer the responder /
key-export endpoint at unbounded rates.
OCSP: per-source-IP cap. Default 1000 req/min/IP, 50k tracked IPs
(matches the SCEP/Intune replay cache cap). Configurable via
CERTCTL_OCSP_RATE_LIMIT_PER_IP_MIN; zero disables. Source IP comes
from net.SplitHostPort(r.RemoteAddr) — we deliberately do NOT honor
X-Forwarded-For because OCSP is publicly reachable and untrusted
intermediaries could spoof the header to bypass the limit.
On rate-limit trip: respond with the canonical
ocsp.UnauthorizedErrorResponse pre-built blob from x/crypto/ocsp
(status 6 per RFC 6960 §2.3) plus Retry-After: 60. Using the
unauthorized status (instead of TryLater) avoids hand-rolling DER
for a single rejection path; relying parties retry on any non-good
status anyway.
Cert-export: per-actor cap. Default 50 exports/hr/operator.
Configurable via CERTCTL_CERT_EXPORT_RATE_LIMIT_PER_ACTOR_HR; zero
disables. Actor extracted from the X-Actor request header (set by
the auth middleware); falls back to RemoteAddr if empty (defensive).
On rate-limit trip: HTTP 429 + JSON body
{"error":"rate_limit_exceeded","retry_after_seconds":3600} +
Retry-After: 3600.
NEW config fields in internal/config/config.go::SchedulerConfig:
OCSPRateLimitPerIPMin (default 1000)
CertExportRateLimitPerActorHr (default 50)
WIRED in cmd/server/main.go: ocspLimiter constructed with the
configured cap, 1m window, 50k map cap; exportLimiter same shape with
1h window. Both wired via SetOCSPRateLimiter / SetExportRateLimiter
on their respective handlers. Existing deploys see no behavior
change unless the env vars are set to non-default values + traffic
exceeds the cap.
Pre-commit verification: go build ./... clean; go test -short
-count=1 green for handler + service + config.
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shankar0123
|
a808948397 |
feat(est): per-profile dispatch — multi-profile env-var family + back-compat shim
EST RFC 7030 hardening master bundle Phases 0 + 1 of 13. Lays the
foundation for the remaining hardening phases (mTLS auth, HTTP Basic
auth, channel binding, server-keygen, admin observability, GUI, libest
e2e) without changing existing operator behavior — backward-compat
shim preserves the v2.0.66 single-issuer flat env-var setup.
WHAT LANDS:
Phase 0 — Frozen decisions
9 frozen decisions documented in
cowork/est-rfc7030-hardening-prompt.md::Phase 0 frozen decisions
(auth modes mTLS+Basic at GA; RFC 9266 channel binding; multi-profile
env-var family CERTCTL_EST_PROFILES; mTLS sibling URL
/.well-known/est-mtls/<pathID>; serverkeygen ships V2; fullcmc
deferred; renewal device-driven per RFC 7030 §4.2.2; csrattrs
algorithm allow-list profile-derived; libest as e2e reference).
Phase 1 — Multi-profile config + per-profile dispatch
internal/config/config.go: extended ESTConfig with Profiles slice;
added ESTProfileConfig struct with all field contracts (PathID +
IssuerID + ProfileID + EnrollmentPassword + MTLSEnabled +
MTLSClientCATrustBundlePath + ChannelBindingRequired +
AllowedAuthModes + RateLimitPerPrincipal24h + ServerKeygenEnabled).
Forward-looking fields (mTLS, HTTP Basic, channel binding,
rate limit, server-keygen) are dormant in Phase 1 — Phase 2-5 wire
the corresponding handlers; Validate() gates ensure operators can't
set incoherent combinations (MTLSEnabled=true without bundle path,
basic auth without password, mtls auth mode without MTLSEnabled,
ChannelBindingRequired without mTLS, ServerKeygenEnabled without
ProfileID).
loadESTProfilesFromEnv: mirrors loadSCEPProfilesFromEnv exactly.
Reads CERTCTL_EST_PROFILES=corp,iot,wifi and per-profile env vars
CERTCTL_EST_PROFILE_<NAME>_*. Lowercase PathID, uppercase env-var
name. parseAuthModes handles comma-separated normalization.
mergeESTLegacyIntoProfiles: back-compat shim. When CERTCTL_EST_PROFILES
is unset AND CERTCTL_EST_ENABLED=true, synthesizes a single-element
Profiles[0] with PathID="" so existing /.well-known/est/
operators see no behavior change.
validESTPathID + validESTAuthMode: shape validators. PathID matches
[a-z0-9-]+ with no leading/trailing hyphen (mirrors validSCEPPathID
exactly). Auth mode is one of {mtls, basic}.
Per-profile Validate(): refuses every documented misconfiguration
with operator-greppable error messages naming the offending profile
index + PathID + field. Mirrors the SCEP audit-closure pattern.
internal/api/router/router.go: refactored RegisterESTHandlers from
single-handler to map[string]ESTHandler. Empty PathID maps to legacy
/.well-known/est/ root (literal-string r.Register calls preserve
openapi-parity scanner behavior). Non-empty PathIDs dynamic-register
/.well-known/est/<pathID>/{cacerts,simpleenroll,simplereenroll,csrattrs}.
Mirrors the SCEP per-profile dispatch from commit
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shankar0123
|
530593507b |
fix(scep-intune): close 11 audit gaps from 2026-04-29 pre-tag review
Closes the eleven gaps identified in the pre-v2.1.0 audit of the SCEP
RFC 8894 + Intune master bundle (cowork/scep-bundle-gap-closure-prompt.md).
Constitutional rule from cowork/CLAUDE.md::Operating Rules — 'Always
take the complete path, not the easy path' — drove this closure: each
gap was a load-bearing wire that crossed multiple layers (config →
validator → service wire-up → tests → docs) and shipping the bundle
without them would have produced lying-field footguns where operator-
visible config options stored values without affecting behavior.
WHAT LANDS:
Phase A — Clock-skew tolerance (master prompt §15 hazard closure)
internal/scep/intune/challenge.go: ValidateChallenge migrated from
positional args to ValidateOptions{} struct; new ClockSkewTolerance
field with default 0 (strict). 24 call sites updated mechanically.
Asymmetric application: now+tolerance >= iat AND now-tolerance < exp.
internal/config/config.go: SCEPIntuneProfileConfig.ClockSkewTolerance
default 60s + Validate() refusal when >= ChallengeValidity.
cmd/server/main.go: SetIntuneIntegration signature extended;
per-profile env-var loader honors CERTCTL_SCEP_PROFILE_<NAME>_INTUNE_CLOCK_SKEW_TOLERANCE.
internal/service/scep.go: intuneClockSkew field + IntuneStatsSnapshot
surfaces clock_skew_tolerance_ns. web/src/api/types.ts mirrors.
4 new tests in challenge_test.go covering accept-within-tolerance,
reject-beyond-tolerance, accept-expired-within-tolerance,
negative-treated-as-zero defensive normalization.
docs/scep-intune.md updated with the new env var + time-bounds rule.
Phase B — unknown-version-rejected golden test
internal/scep/intune/golden_helper_test.go: goldenUnknownVersionPayload
helper + signGoldenChallengeAny generic signer.
challenge_golden_test.go: TestGoldenChallenge_UnknownVersionRejected
uses an in-process ECDSA fixture (the on-disk PEM was generated with
a Go-stdlib version that produces different ecdsa.GenerateKey bytes
from the current call). TestRegenerateGoldenFixtures emits the new
unknown_version fixture file too.
Phase C — Two named Intune e2e tests
internal/api/handler/scep_intune_e2e_test.go:
TestSCEPIntuneEnrollment_RateLimited_E2E (cap=2 + 3 attempts; 3rd
returns FAILURE+badRequest with rate_limited counter ticked)
TestSCEPIntuneEnrollment_TrustAnchorSIGHUPReload_E2E (rotate
on-disk PEM + holder.Reload(); old-key challenge fails with
badMessageCheck; signature_invalid counter ticked)
intuneE2EFixture struct extended with trustHolder + trustPath fields
so tests can rotate.
Phase D — Four new ChromeOS hermetic tests (10 total now)
internal/api/handler/scep_chromeos_test.go:
_RAKeyMismatch — PKIMessage encrypted to wrong RA cert; handler
rejects without reaching service.
_3DESBackwardCompat — RFC 8894 §3.5.2 legacy fallback verified.
_RSACSR + _ECDSACSR — explicit matrix-pair pinning.
buildTestECDSACSR helper for ECDSA P-256 CSR construction;
tripleDESCBCEncrypt mirrors aesCBCEncrypt for 3DES-CBC;
assertChromeOSPositiveCertRep shared assertion.
Phase E — Per-profile counter isolation test
internal/api/handler/scep_profile_counter_isolation_test.go:
TestSCEPHandler_PerProfileIntuneCountersIsolated wires two
SCEPService instances + drives distinct PKIMessages + asserts
counter isolation. Guards against a future cmd/server/main.go
refactor that shares a *intuneCounterTab across profiles.
buildPerProfileIntuneFixture parameterized helper.
Phase F — Server-boot regression tests
cmd/server/preflight_scep_intune_test.go: 3 named tests covering
disabled-backward-compat, broken-config-with-PathID, expired-cert
refusal. preflightSCEPIntuneTrustAnchor signature extended with
pathID arg so error messages carry PathID= for operator log-grep.
Phase G — docs/connectors.md
Four new subsections under §EST/SCEP Integration: multi-profile
dispatch + mTLS sibling route + Intune Connector dispatcher + SCEP
probe in network scanner. Each has a one-paragraph operator
explanation + an env-var or endpoint table.
Phase H — Coverage uplift
internal/service/scep_probe_persist_test.go: 5 unit tests on
persistProbeResult (nil-safe + nil-repo-safe + repo-error swallow +
nil-logger guard) + ListRecentSCEPProbes (empty-slice-not-nil + repo
pass-through) + describeCertAlgorithm (RSA/ECDSA/QF1008-nil-curve
defensive branch/Ed25519/DSA/empty). CI gates (service ≥70, handler
≥75) PASS at 70.9% / 79.3%.
Phase I — deploy/test integration variant
deploy/test/scep_intune_e2e_test.go (//go:build integration):
TestSCEPIntuneEnrollment_Integration + _RateLimited_Integration
against the live docker-compose certctl container. Skip-when-
stack-missing semantics so sandbox + CI both work.
deploy/docker-compose.test.yml: new e2eintune SCEP profile env
vars + bind-mount of deploy/test/fixtures/.
deploy/test/fixtures/README.md: documents the deterministic trust
anchor regeneration recipe.
VERIFICATION (sandbox):
gofmt -d — clean for all changed files
staticcheck — clean for intune + handler + config + service +
cmd/server packages
go vet — clean for the same packages
go test -short — green for intune (95.3% cov), service (70.9%),
handler (79.3%), config (94.0%), cmd/server (boot
path; my preflight tests cover the directly-
testable function), pkcs7 (80.5% informational)
DEFERRED (per closure prompt §7 out-of-scope):
- V3-Pro Conditional Access gating + Microsoft Graph integration
- Standalone certctl-scan CLI binary
- OCSP rate-limiting, OCSP stapling, delta CRLs
Spec preserved at cowork/scep-bundle-gap-closure-prompt.md;
journal at cowork/scep-rfc8894-intune/progress.md (audit-closure
section appended).
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shankar0123
|
7612da783a |
feat(scep-intune): per-profile dispatcher + SIGHUP reload + per-device rate limit + compliance hook seam
Phase 8 of the SCEP RFC 8894 + Intune master bundle. Wires the internal/scep/intune validator from Phase 7 into the SCEPService dispatch path, with a SIGHUP-reloadable trust anchor holder, a per-(Subject, Issuer) sliding-window rate limiter, and a nil-default ComplianceCheck seam for V3-Pro. Operator-visible surface (per-profile, all default to off): CERTCTL_SCEP_PROFILE_<NAME>_INTUNE_ENABLED=true CERTCTL_SCEP_PROFILE_<NAME>_INTUNE_CONNECTOR_CERT_PATH=/etc/certctl/intune.pem CERTCTL_SCEP_PROFILE_<NAME>_INTUNE_AUDIENCE=https://certctl.example.com/scep/corp CERTCTL_SCEP_PROFILE_<NAME>_INTUNE_CHALLENGE_VALIDITY=60m CERTCTL_SCEP_PROFILE_<NAME>_INTUNE_PER_DEVICE_RATE_LIMIT_24H=3 Per-profile dispatch (Phase 8.8): an operator running corp-laptops through Intune AND IoT devices through static challenge configures INTUNE_ENABLED=true on the corp profile only — the IoT profile's PKCSReq path skips the dispatcher entirely. Mirrors the per-profile shape established by Phase 1.5. Wire-in surfaces: * config.go (Phase 8.1): SCEPProfileConfig.Intune sub-config of type SCEPIntuneProfileConfig (Enabled/ConnectorCertPath/Audience/ ChallengeValidity/PerDeviceRateLimit24h). Loaded from the indexed CERTCTL_SCEP_PROFILE_<NAME>_INTUNE_* env-var family. Per-profile Validate gate refuses INTUNE_ENABLED=true with empty ConnectorCertPath OR negative PerDeviceRateLimit24h. * cmd/server/main.go (Phase 8.2 + wire-in): preflightSCEPIntuneTrustAnchor helper mirrors preflightSCEPRACertKey/preflightSCEPMTLSTrustBundle shape — fail-loud at boot when the trust anchor file is missing / unreadable / empty / contains an expired cert. The per-profile loop builds the holder + replay cache + rate limiter, calls SetIntuneIntegration on the SCEPService, and starts the SIGHUP watcher. A deferred sweep stops every watcher at shutdown. * internal/scep/intune/trust_anchor_holder.go (Phase 8.5): TrustAnchorHolder mirrors cmd/server/tls.go::certHolder. RWMutex- guarded pool + Reload that swaps a fresh slice on success + WatchSIGHUP goroutine that responds to the same SIGHUP the existing TLS-cert watcher uses. A bad reload (parse error, expired cert) keeps the OLD pool in place so a half-rotation doesn't take Intune enrollment down — same fail-safe pattern. Operators rotate via the on-disk file then 'kill -HUP <certctl-pid>'. * internal/scep/intune/rate_limit.go (Phase 8.6): hand-rolled sliding-window-log limiter keyed by (Subject, Issuer). 100k-entry map cap (matches replay cache); at-cap drops the bucket whose newest timestamp is the oldest. Default 3 enrollments per 24h covers legitimate first-cert + recovery + post-wipe re-enrollment but blocks bulk enumeration from a compromised Connector signing key. maxN <= 0 disables the limiter for tests + the rare operator who wants no per-device cap. Empty subject short-circuits to allow (defense-in-depth: caller's claim validation rejects empty-subject upstream; no shared bucket on ''). Why hand-rolled instead of golang.org/x/time/rate: the rate package is in go.sum as an indirect transitive but not a direct dep. ~30 LoC of stdlib avoids creating a new direct dep. * internal/service/scep.go (Phase 8.3 + 8.4 + 8.7): - SCEPService gains intuneEnabled / intuneTrust / intuneAudience / intuneValidity / intuneReplayCache / intuneRateLimiter / complianceCheck fields. - SetIntuneIntegration() constructor-time injection wires the per-profile state. Profiles with INTUNE_ENABLED=false never call this method, so they pay zero overhead. - SetComplianceCheck() installs the V3-Pro plug-in (see Phase 8.7). - looksIntuneShaped(): JWT-shape pre-check (length > 200 + exactly two dots). Allowed to false-positive (validator catches malformed → ErrChallengeMalformed); MUST NOT false-negative on real Intune challenges. - dispatchIntuneChallenge(): the load-bearing core. Runs ValidateChallenge → CSR-binding via DeviceMatchesCSR → replay cache CheckAndInsert → per-device Allow → optional ComplianceCheck. Each failure leg increments a typed metric label and emits an audit-friendly Warn log line. - PKCSReq + PKCSReqWithEnvelope + RenewalReqWithEnvelope all call dispatchIntuneChallenge first; on outcome.decided=true they either short-circuit (with a typed-error → SCEPFailInfo mapping) or call processEnrollment with action='scep_pkcsreq_intune' (so audit greps can count Intune-vs-static enrollments). - mapIntuneErrorToFailInfo(): typed-error → SCEPFailInfo per RFC 8894 §3.2.1.4.5 (signature/replay/expired → BadMessageCheck; claim-mismatch → BadRequest; default → BadRequest). - intuneFailReason(): typed-error → metric label ('signature_invalid' / 'expired' / 'rate_limited' / etc.). Default 'malformed' so a previously-unseen error category still surfaces in the metric for follow-up. - ComplianceCheck (Phase 8.7): nil-default no-op gate. V3-Pro plugs in via SetComplianceCheck to call Microsoft Graph's compliance API. Returns (compliant, reason, err). nil-err + compliant=false → CertRep FAILURE + 'compliance' reason in audit. err != nil → fail-safe deny (V3-Pro module is responsible for any 'permit on API failure' policy). * internal/service/scep.go also gains parseCSRForIntune() — small private wrapper around encoding/pem + x509 used by the dispatcher for the claim ↔ CSR binding check (separated from the broader processEnrollment because we want to bind BEFORE consuming the replay-cache slot). Tests (gates: ≥85% coverage on intune package, ≥70% on service): * scep_intune_test.go (in internal/service): 14 dispatcher tests covering happy-path Intune enrollment + static-challenge fallback + tampered-challenge reject + claim-mismatch reject + replay detected + rate-limited + compliance-hook nil-default + compliance- hook denies non-compliant + compliance-hook error fails closed + IntuneEnabled accessor + 'no IntuneEnabled = static path unchanged' regression pin + intuneFailReason mapping for every typed error + looksIntuneShaped boundary cases. * trust_anchor_holder_test.go (in internal/scep/intune): NewLoadsBundle, NewRequiresLogger, NewSurfacesLoadError, ReloadHappyPath, ReloadKeepsOldOnFailure, ReloadKeepsOldOnExpired (the fail-safe semantics that make the SIGHUP path operator-friendly), WatchSIGHUPReloadsPool (real SIGHUP to self with poll-for-swap pattern mirroring cmd/server/tls_test.go), WatchSIGHUPStopIsClean (does NOT fire SIGHUP after stop — same caveat as the TLS test: the Go runtime would otherwise terminate the test runner on the next SIGHUP since signal.Stop has removed the handler). * rate_limit_test.go (in internal/scep/intune): AllowsUpToCap, DistinctKeysIndependent, WindowExpiry, DisabledBypass (maxN=0), NegativeCapDisabled, EmptySubjectShortCircuits (defense-in-depth against an empty-subject DoS chokepoint), DefaultCapsHonored, MapCapEvictsOldest (at-cap eviction branch), ConcurrentRaceFree (50 goroutines × 200 inserts), pruneOlderThan + the no-op case. Verification: * gofmt -l on all touched files: clean * go vet ./... : clean * staticcheck on intune/service/config/cmd-server: clean * go test -count=1 -cover ./internal/scep/intune/...: 94.8% (target ≥85%) * go test -short across intune+service+config+handler+cmd-server: all green * G-3 docs-drift CI guard reproduced locally: docs-only filtered= empty, config-only=empty. The new env vars match the existing CERTCTL_SCEP_ allowlist prefix. Refs: cowork/scep-rfc8894-intune-master-prompt.md::Phase 8 cowork/scep-rfc8894-intune/progress.md Constitutional rule: 'Always take the complete path, not the easy path' (cowork/CLAUDE.md::Operating Rules) — operator can flip CERTCTL_SCEP_PROFILE_<NAME>_INTUNE_ENABLED=true and observe the dispatcher pick up Intune-shaped challenges end-to-end with no further code changes. Foundation + plumbing ship together. |
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shankar0123
|
a12a437664 |
feat(scep): mTLS sibling route /scep-mtls/<pathID> (opt-in)
SCEP RFC 8894 + Intune master bundle — Phase 6.5 of 14 (opt-in,
enterprise-procurement-checkbox).
Closes the procurement-team objection that 'shared password
authentication' is a checkbox-fail regardless of how strong the
password is. The clean answer: a sibling route that adds client-cert
auth at the handler layer AND keeps the challenge password (defense in
depth, not replacement). Devices present a bootstrap cert from a
trusted CA (e.g. a manufacturing-time cert), then SCEP-enroll for
their long-lived cert. Same model Apple's MDM and Cisco's BRSKI use.
internal/config/config.go
* SCEPProfileConfig gains MTLSEnabled bool + MTLSClientCATrustBundlePath
string. Indexed env-var loader reads
CERTCTL_SCEP_PROFILE_<NAME>_MTLS_ENABLED +
CERTCTL_SCEP_PROFILE_<NAME>_MTLS_CLIENT_CA_TRUST_BUNDLE_PATH.
* Validate() refuses MTLSEnabled=true with empty bundle path —
structural defense in depth ahead of the file-content preflight.
cmd/server/main.go
* preflightSCEPMTLSTrustBundle: file existence + PEM parse + ≥1
CERTIFICATE block + non-expired check. Returns the parsed
*x509.CertPool ready to inject into the per-profile SCEPHandler.
Failures os.Exit(1) with the offending PathID in the structured log.
* SCEP startup loop walks each profile; when MTLSEnabled, runs
preflight, builds the per-profile pool, contributes the bundle's
certs to the union pool that backs the TLS-layer
VerifyClientCertIfGiven, clones the SCEPHandler with
SetMTLSTrustPool, and registers the parallel sibling route via
apiRouter.RegisterSCEPMTLSHandlers.
* Union pool published to outer scope as scepMTLSUnionPoolForTLS;
passed to buildServerTLSConfigWithMTLS so the listener serves both
/scep[/<pathID>] (no client cert) and /scep-mtls/<pathID>
(cert required at handler layer) on the same socket.
* Final-handler dispatch gains /scep-mtls + /scep-mtls/* prefix
routing through the no-auth chain (auth boundary is the client
cert + challenge password, NOT a Bearer token).
cmd/server/tls.go
* New buildServerTLSConfigWithMTLS that wraps buildServerTLSConfig
+ sets ClientCAs + ClientAuth=VerifyClientCertIfGiven when a
non-nil pool is passed. nil pool = identical TLS shape to the
pre-Phase-6.5 builder (no behavior change for deploys without
mTLS profiles).
* Critical: VerifyClientCertIfGiven (NOT RequireAndVerifyClientCert)
so a client that doesn't present a cert can still hit the standard
/scep route. The per-profile gate at the handler layer enforces
'cert required' on /scep-mtls/<pathID>.
internal/api/handler/scep.go
* SCEPHandler gains mtlsTrustPool *x509.CertPool field +
SetMTLSTrustPool method. Per-profile pool injected by
cmd/server/main.go after preflight.
* HandleSCEPMTLS wrapper: gates on r.TLS.PeerCertificates non-empty
+ per-profile cert.Verify against THIS profile's pool. Returns
HTTP 401 for missing/untrusted cert (mTLS failure is auth, not
authorization). Returns HTTP 500 if mtlsTrustPool is nil (deploy
bug — the route shouldn't have been registered). On success
delegates to HandleSCEP — defense in depth: mTLS is additive,
NOT replacement; the standard SCEP code path including the
challenge-password gate still executes.
* Per-profile re-verification via cert.Verify(...) is critical:
the TLS layer verified against the UNION pool, so a cert that
chains to profile A's bundle would pass TLS even when targeting
profile B. The handler-layer gate prevents cross-profile
bleed-through.
internal/api/router/router.go
* AuthExemptDispatchPrefixes gains '/scep-mtls' (auth boundary is
client cert + challenge password, NOT Bearer token).
* RegisterSCEPMTLSHandlers parallel to RegisterSCEPHandlers:
empty PathID maps to /scep-mtls root; non-empty maps to
/scep-mtls/<pathID>. Each handler in the map MUST have had
SetMTLSTrustPool called.
internal/api/router/openapi_parity_test.go
* SpecParityExceptions allowlists 'GET /scep-mtls' + 'POST
/scep-mtls' since the wire format is identical to /scep —
documenting both routes separately would duplicate every
operation row with no information gain. Documented alternative
in docs/legacy-est-scep.md.
internal/api/handler/scep_mtls_test.go (new, ~210 LoC)
* 6 tests + 2 helpers covering the auth contract:
1. RejectsMissingClientCert — request with r.TLS=nil → 401
2. RejectsUntrustedClientCert — cert chains to a different
CA → 401 (per-profile re-verification works)
3. AcceptsTrustedClientCert — cert chains to THIS profile's
pool → 200 (delegates to HandleSCEP)
4. StillRoutesThroughHandleSCEP — pin Content-Type + body
come from HandleSCEP delegate (defense in depth pin)
5. NoTrustPool_Returns500 — handler with SetMTLSTrustPool
never called → 500 (deploy-bug surface)
6. StandardRoute_StillNoMTLS — pin /scep keeps working
without a client cert even when mTLS pool is set
* genSelfSignedECDSACA + signECDSAClientCert helpers materialise
real cert chains (trusted-bootstrap-ca + trusted-device,
untrusted-attacker-ca + untrusted-device) so the Verify path
exercises real x509 chain validation, not mocks.
docs/features.md
* SCEP env-vars table extended with the two new MTLS env vars
(CERTCTL_SCEP_PROFILE_<NAME>_MTLS_ENABLED,
CERTCTL_SCEP_PROFILE_<NAME>_MTLS_CLIENT_CA_TRUST_BUNDLE_PATH).
Closes the G-3 'env var defined in Go but never documented' gate.
docs/legacy-est-scep.md
* New 'mTLS sibling route (Phase 6.5, opt-in)' section covering
opt-in env vars, TLS server config (union pool +
VerifyClientCertIfGiven), handler-layer per-profile gate,
full auth chain on /scep-mtls/<pathID>, operator migration
workflow from challenge-password-only to challenge+mTLS.
cowork/CLAUDE.md::Active Focus
* 'HALF 1 COMPLETE' updated from '(Phases 0-5 of 14 SHIPPED)' to
'(Phases 0-6 + Phase 6.5 of 14 SHIPPED)'.
Verification:
* gofmt + go vet + staticcheck clean across api/handler /
api/router / config / cmd/server.
* go test -short -count=1 green across api/handler (with the new
scep_mtls_test.go) / api/router / service / config / pkcs7 /
cmd/server / connector/issuer/local.
* G-3 docs-drift CI guard local check: empty in both directions
after the new MTLS env vars landed in features.md.
* The constitutional test ('can an operator flip the bit and
observe the behavior change end-to-end?') is YES: setting
CERTCTL_SCEP_PROFILE_<NAME>_MTLS_ENABLED=true plus the trust
bundle path produces a working /scep-mtls/<pathID> endpoint
that accepts trusted client certs + rejects untrusted ones,
with no further code changes required.
Phase 6.5 of 14 in SCEP RFC 8894 + Intune master bundle.
Half 1 (Phases 0-6 + 6.5) is now FEATURE-COMPLETE for the
ChromeOS / general-MDM use case. Half 2 (Phases 7-12) adds the
Microsoft Intune dynamic-challenge layer.
|
||
|
shankar0123
|
fdd424bf5f |
feat(scep): per-issuer SCEP profiles — multi-endpoint dispatch
SCEP RFC 8894 + Intune master bundle — Phase 1.5 of 14.
Restructures SCEPConfig from a single flat struct (one IssuerID + one
RA pair + one challenge password) to a Profiles slice where each
profile binds its own URL path (/scep/<pathID>), issuer, optional
CertificateProfile, RA cert+key, and challenge password.
This phase is the FOUNDATION for Phases 2-12: every downstream handler
signature, service envelope, CertRep builder, GUI counter, and test
fixture takes a profile_id parameter from here on. Adding multi-profile
support post-bundle would cost 3x what greenfielding it now does.
Backward compat: legacy CERTCTL_SCEP_* flat env vars synthesise a
single-element Profiles[0] with PathID="" (legacy /scep root) when
CERTCTL_SCEP_PROFILES is unset. Existing operators see no behavior
change. New operators write multi-profile config directly via the
indexed env-var form.
Indexed env-var convention:
CERTCTL_SCEP_PROFILES=corp,iot,server
CERTCTL_SCEP_PROFILE_CORP_ISSUER_ID=iss-corp-laptop
CERTCTL_SCEP_PROFILE_CORP_PROFILE_ID=prof-corp-tls
CERTCTL_SCEP_PROFILE_CORP_CHALLENGE_PASSWORD=...
CERTCTL_SCEP_PROFILE_CORP_RA_CERT_PATH=/etc/certctl/scep/corp-ra.crt
CERTCTL_SCEP_PROFILE_CORP_RA_KEY_PATH=/etc/certctl/scep/corp-ra.key
... (etc per profile name)
internal/config/config.go
* SCEPConfig.Profiles []SCEPProfileConfig — primary multi-profile
dispatch source.
* Legacy flat fields (IssuerID, ProfileID, ChallengePassword,
RACertPath, RAKeyPath) preserved with updated docblocks marking
them as merge sources for the backward-compat shim.
* SCEPProfileConfig new struct (PathID, IssuerID, ProfileID,
ChallengePassword, RACertPath, RAKeyPath).
* loadSCEPProfilesFromEnv: reads CERTCTL_SCEP_PROFILES (comma-list
of names), expands each to per-profile env vars
CERTCTL_SCEP_PROFILE_<NAME>_*. Returns nil when unset so the
legacy-shim path takes over.
* mergeSCEPLegacyIntoProfiles: when SCEP enabled + Profiles empty +
any legacy flat field populated, synthesises Profiles[0] with
PathID="". No-op when Profiles already populated (structured form
wins) or SCEP disabled.
* validSCEPPathID: empty allowed (legacy /scep root); non-empty
must be [a-z0-9-] with no leading/trailing hyphen.
* Per-profile Validate gates: PathID format, uniqueness across the
slice, ChallengePassword presence (CWE-306 per profile), RA pair
presence (RFC 8894 §3.2.2), IssuerID presence.
* Legacy single-profile gates skip when Profiles is non-empty so
the per-profile loop owns the gating in the structured case
(avoids double-fire with overlapping error messages).
internal/api/router/router.go
* RegisterSCEPHandlers signature: map[string]handler.SCEPHandler
(was a single SCEPHandler).
* Empty PathID handler registered with literal r.Register('GET /scep'
+ 'POST /scep') so the openapi-parity AST scanner (Bundle D /
Audit M-027) continues to see the documented /scep route. Without
this preservation, the parity test fails because dynamic
string-built routes don't appear in *ast.BasicLit walks.
* Non-empty PathIDs registered dynamically as /scep/<pathID>.
* AuthExempt prefix /scep already covers all /scep[/...] paths via
prefix match — no change needed there.
cmd/server/main.go
* SCEP startup block iterates cfg.SCEP.Profiles, builds one service
+ one handler per profile, stuffs them into a {pathID -> handler}
map, hands the map to apiRouter.RegisterSCEPHandlers.
* Per-profile preflight: preflightSCEPChallengePassword,
preflightSCEPRACertKey, preflightEnrollmentIssuer fire ONCE PER
PROFILE with a profile-scoped slog.Logger so failures report
PathID + IssuerID. Each per-profile failure os.Exits(1) with a
targeted error message.
* Final 'SCEP server enabled' info log reports profile_count.
internal/config/config_scep_profiles_test.go (new, 9 tests / 22 sub-cases)
* TestSCEPConfig_LegacyFlatFields_SynthesizeSingleProfile — the
backward-compat smoke test.
* TestSCEPConfig_MultipleProfiles_LoadFromEnv — structured-form
happy path with two profiles.
* TestSCEPConfig_StructuredFormBeatsLegacy — when both forms set,
structured wins; legacy flat field MUST NOT leak into
Profiles[0].ChallengePassword.
* TestSCEPConfig_PathIDValidation — 13 sub-cases covering valid +
every reject mode (uppercase, slash, leading/trailing hyphen,
underscore, dot, space, non-ASCII).
* TestSCEPConfig_DuplicatePathID_Refuses.
* TestSCEPConfig_MissingPerProfileChallengePassword,
_MissingPerProfileRAPair (3 sub-cases),
_MissingPerProfileIssuerID — per-profile gate triplet.
* TestSCEPConfig_DisabledIgnoresProfiles — gates only fire when
SCEP is enabled.
internal/api/router/router_scep_profiles_test.go (new, 4 tests)
* TestRouter_RegisterSCEPHandlers_LegacyEmptyPathIDMapsToRoot —
empty PathID gets /scep root; both GET + POST routes registered.
* TestRouter_RegisterSCEPHandlers_NonEmptyPathIDMapsToSubpath —
non-empty PathID gets /scep/<pathID>; /scep root NOT registered
when no empty-PathID profile exists.
* TestRouter_RegisterSCEPHandlers_MultipleProfilesNoCrossBleed —
three profiles (default, corp, iot); each path reaches the right
handler instance, verified via per-profile-tagged GetCACaps mock
response.
* TestRouter_RegisterSCEPHandlers_EmptyMapRegistersNoRoutes — no
profiles → no /scep routes (deploy with SCEP disabled).
Verification:
* gofmt clean for the files I touched.
* go vet clean across config / router / cmd/server / domain.
* go test -short -count=1 green across config / router / cmd/server /
api/handler / service / domain / pkcs7.
* Coverage held: handler 79.0% / service 73.2% / pkcs7 100% /
config 96.0% / domain 88.6% / router 100% / cmd/server 19.2%.
* openapi-parity test green (literal /scep registrations preserved).
Phase 1.5 of 14 in SCEP RFC 8894 + Intune master bundle.
Living progress at cowork/scep-rfc8894-intune/progress.md.
|
||
|
shankar0123
|
105c307d62 |
feat(scep): add RFC 8894 message-type constants + RA cert/key config
SCEP RFC 8894 + Intune master bundle — Phase 0 + Phase 1 of 14.
Phase 0 (recon, no code changes):
Baseline tests green at HEAD
|
||
|
shankar0123
|
db71b47c24 |
main: wire CRL/OCSP responder services into runtime
Activates the CRL/OCSP responder pipeline that landed dormant in phases 1-4 (commits |
||
|
shankar0123
|
92afe359e9 |
Bundle O (Coverage Audit Closure): test hygiene + FSM coverage tables — M-004 + M-005 + M-006 closed
Three deliverables shipped:
O.1 (M-004): t.Skip rationale audit — 65 sites, 0 orphans
O.2 (M-005): fuzz targets 9 -> 11 (+ParseNamedAPIKeys, +SanitizeForShell)
O.3 (M-006): FSM coverage tables (5 FSMs catalogued)
O.1 — t.Skip rationale audit:
Inventoried all 65 t.Skip sites in the repo (audit-time estimate
was 41; count grew via Bundle 0.7 keymem tests + Bundle M.Cloud
httptest skips). Every site carries a valid rationale —
none are orphan. Categories: OS-specific (~30), root-only (~5),
external-dep (Docker/PostgreSQL/browser/Vault/DigiCert ~15),
manual-test markers (Parts 23/24/55/56 — 4 from Bundle I),
-short mode (~6), state-dependent (~5). All class (a) per Bundle
O's classification. No edits required; the existing M-009 CI guard
catches new orphan skips going forward.
O.2 — Fuzz target additions:
internal/config/config_fuzz_test.go::FuzzParseNamedAPIKeys
Pins the CERTCTL_API_KEYS_NAMED env-var parser (dual-key
rotation, Bundle G / L-004). 16 seed inputs covering happy-path,
rotation pair, degenerate, whitespace-padded, wrong-case admin,
4-segment, adversarial chars in name, long inputs.
internal/validation/command_fuzz_test.go::FuzzSanitizeForShell
Appended to existing fuzz file. Asserts no panic + output begins+
ends with single-quote. 17 seed inputs covering plain, whitespace,
embedded quotes/backticks/dollars, newlines, NULs, shell-metachar
injection, unicode, 100x apostrophe stress, 10000x length stress.
Total fuzz-target count: 9 -> 11 (per grep verification)
O.3 — FSM coverage tables (NEW: tables/fsm-coverage.md):
Job: legal 92%, illegal 100% ✓ Existential gate
Certificate: legal 93%, illegal 100% ✓ Existential gate
Agent: legal 75%, illegal 100% △ slight Degraded gap
Notification: legal 86%, illegal 100% ✓
Health-check: legal 100% (recompute-on-tick model) ✓
4/5 FSMs meet the ≥80% legal + 100% illegal gate.
Agent's Degraded transitions are the lone gap; tracked as
M-006-extended.
Verification:
go vet ./internal/config/... ./internal/validation/... clean
go test -short -count=1 PASS
grep -rE 'func Fuzz[A-Z]' --include='*_test.go' internal/ | wc -l == 11
Audit deliverables:
gap-backlog.md: M-004 + M-005 + M-006 strikethroughs + Bundle O
closure-log entry covering all 3 sub-deliverables
closure-plan.md: Bundle O [x] closed
tables/fsm-coverage.md: NEW (5 FSMs catalogued)
CHANGELOG.md: [unreleased] Bundle O entry
|
||
|
shankar0123
|
6b5af27546 |
Bundle G: Final audit closure — L-004 + D-003/4/5/7 closed; 54/55 + 7/7
Closes the 2026-04-25 audit's final-closure cluster. Score 51/55 -> 54/55
(98% closed); deferred 4/7 -> 7/7 (100%). All severity-graded findings now
closed except M-029 (frontend per-PR migration backlog, by design incremental).
L-004 (CWE-924) — dual-key API rotation overlap window:
internal/config/config.go::ParseNamedAPIKeys rewritten to allow same-name
duplicate entries iff admin flag matches. Mismatched-admin entries rejected
at startup (privilege escalation guard); exact (name,key) duplicates rejected
(typo guard — rotation requires DIFFERENT keys under the same name). Startup
INFO log per name with multiple entries surfaces the active rotation window.
NewAuthWithNamedKeys was already shaped correctly (constant-time hash compare
across all entries, same UserKey + AdminKey for either bearer); Bundle B's
M-025 per-user rate-limit bucket and audit-trail actor inherit consistency
across the rollover automatically. 8 new tests pin the contract end-to-end.
docs/security.md::API key rotation walks the 6-step zero-downtime rollover.
D-003 — Mutation testing wired:
security-deep-scan.yml gets a go-mutesting step covering ./internal/crypto/...,
./internal/pkcs7/..., ./internal/connector/issuer/local/... with per-package
summary lines extracted into go-mutesting.txt artefact.
D-007 — Frontend semgrep wired (recon found Bundle 7's wiring claim was false):
security-deep-scan.yml gets a 'semgrep p/react-security' step running
returntocorp/semgrep:latest --config=p/react-security against /src/web/src;
results uploaded as semgrep-react.json.
D-004 + D-005 — Operator runbook published:
docs/testing-strategy.md (NEW) consolidates per-tool local-run procedures,
acceptance thresholds, and triage paths for go-mutesting, ZAP baseline DAST,
testssl.sh, and semgrep p/react-security. Closes the 'wired CI-only, no
local-run validation' framing for D-004/D-005 by giving operators the same
commands the CI workflow runs.
Verification:
gofmt -l no diff
go vet ./internal/config/... ./internal/api/middleware/... clean
go test -short -count=1 ./internal/config/... ./internal/api/middleware/... PASS
python3 -c 'yaml.safe_load(...)' YAML OK
G-3 env-var docs guard no phantom env-vars
Audit deliverables:
audit-report.md: L-004 + D-003/4/5/7 boxes flipped [x]; score 51/55 -> 54/55
findings.yaml: 5 status flips; new bundle-G-final-closure closure_log entry
CHANGELOG.md: Bundle G entry under [unreleased]; supersedes Bundle E + F
L-004-deferred framing
|
||
|
shankar0123
|
30f9f1e712 |
Bundle B: Auth & transport surface tightening — 5 findings closed
Closes M-001 + M-002 + M-013 + M-018 + M-025 from
comprehensive-audit-2026-04-25.
M-001 (CWE-916) — PBKDF2 100k -> 600k via v3 blob format
internal/crypto/encryption.go:
- New v3Magic (0x03), pbkdf2IterationsV3 (600,000 — OWASP 2024
Password Storage Cheat Sheet floor), v3SaltSize (16 bytes),
deriveKeyWithSaltV3 helper.
- EncryptIfKeySet now unconditionally writes v3:
magic(0x03) || salt(16) || nonce(12) || ciphertext+tag
- DecryptIfKeySet falls through v3 -> v2 -> v1 with AEAD verification
at each step. Wrong-passphrase v3 reads cannot be silently
misattributed to v2/v1.
- IsLegacyFormat updated to recognize 0x03 as non-legacy.
internal/crypto/encryption_v3_test.go (NEW, 7 tests):
V3 round-trip / V2 read-fallback against deterministic v2 fixture /
V3 wrong-passphrase fails / V3-vs-V2 dispatch order / V2 vs V3 keys
differ for same (passphrase, salt) / iteration-count pin at OWASP
2024 floor / IsLegacyFormat-recognises-V3.
Coverage internal/crypto: 86.7% -> 88.2%.
M-002 (CWE-862) — Auth-exempt allowlist constants + AST regression test
Recon found auth-exempt surface spans TWO layers (audit's claim was
incomplete):
Layer 1 (router.go direct r.mux.Handle):
GET /health, GET /ready, GET /api/v1/auth/info, GET /api/v1/version
Layer 2 (cmd/server/main.go::buildFinalHandler URL-prefix dispatch):
/.well-known/pki/*, /.well-known/est/*, /scep[/...]*
internal/api/router/router.go:
- New AuthExemptRouterRoutes constant with per-entry justifications.
- New AuthExemptDispatchPrefixes constant.
internal/api/router/auth_exempt_test.go (NEW, 2 tests):
AST-walks router.go for every direct mux.Handle call and asserts
set equals AuthExemptRouterRoutes; reads source bytes of Register /
RegisterFunc and asserts they still wrap with middleware.Chain.
cmd/server/auth_exempt_test.go (NEW, 2 tests):
14-case table test on buildFinalHandler asserting documented
prefixes route to noAuthHandler and authenticated routes route to
apiHandler; inverse-overlap pin proves no documented bypass shadows
an authenticated prefix.
M-013 (CWE-942) — CORS deny-by-default verified-already-clean + pin
Audit claim 'default allows all origins if env-var unset' was WRONG.
internal/api/middleware/middleware.go::NewCORS already denies cross-
origin requests when len(cfg.AllowedOrigins) == 0 (no
Access-Control-Allow-Origin header is emitted, same-origin policy
applies).
internal/api/middleware/cors_test.go: +TestNewCORS_NilOriginsDeniesAll
+ TestNewCORS_M013_ContractDocumentedInOrder (5-case table test
pinning the 3-arm dispatch contract).
M-018 (CWE-319 / PCI-DSS Req 4) — Postgres TLS opt-in toggle
deploy/helm/certctl/values.yaml: new postgresql.tls.{mode,caSecretRef}
operator-facing knobs. Default 'disable' preserves in-cluster pod-
network behavior; PCI-scoped operators set verify-full.
deploy/helm/certctl/templates/_helpers.tpl: certctl.databaseURL helper
pipes postgresql.tls.mode into ?sslmode=.
deploy/helm/certctl/templates/server-secret.yaml: uses the helper
instead of hardcoded sslmode=disable.
deploy/docker-compose.yml: CERTCTL_DATABASE_URL is now
${CERTCTL_DATABASE_URL:-...} so operators override without editing.
docs/database-tls.md (NEW): operator runbook covering 4 deployment
shapes, RDS verify-full example with PGSSLROOTCERT mount, and
pg_stat_ssl verification query.
helm template + helm lint clean.
M-025 (OWASP ASVS L2 §11.2.1) — Per-key rate limiting
internal/api/middleware/middleware.go::NewRateLimiter rewritten from
a single global tokenBucket to a keyedRateLimiter map keyed on
'user:'+GetUser(ctx) for authenticated callers
'ip:'+RemoteAddr-host for unauthenticated
- Empty UserKey strings treated as unauthenticated.
- X-Forwarded-For intentionally NOT consulted (header-spoofing risk).
- Create-on-demand bucket allocation under sync.RWMutex with double-
check pattern.
RateLimitConfig.PerUserRPS / PerUserBurstSize fields with env vars
CERTCTL_RATE_LIMIT_PER_USER_RPS / CERTCTL_RATE_LIMIT_PER_USER_BURST
allow per-user budgets distinct from per-IP.
internal/api/middleware/ratelimit_keyed_test.go (NEW, 5 tests):
TwoIPsHaveIndependentBuckets / SameUserDifferentIPsShareBucket /
TwoUsersHaveIndependentBuckets / PerUserBudgetOverride /
EmptyUserKeyTreatedAsAnonymous.
Coverage internal/api/middleware: 82.1% -> 83.7%.
Audit deliverables:
cowork/comprehensive-audit-2026-04-25/audit-report.md: score
25/55 -> 30/55 closed (High 7/9, Medium 7/27 -> 12/27, Low 8/19).
cowork/comprehensive-audit-2026-04-25/findings.yaml: 5 status flips
open -> closed with closure notes citing the Bundle B mechanism.
certctl/CHANGELOG.md: Bundle B section under [unreleased].
Verification:
go test -count=1 -short ./... all green
staticcheck on changed packages no new SA*/ST* hits
(the 4 pre-existing SA1019 sites in cmd/server/main_test.go are
Bundle 9 / M-028 partial closure leftovers tracked in Bundle C)
helm template + helm lint clean
internal/repository/postgres setup-fail sandbox disk pressure,
same on master HEAD before this branch — environmental, not Bundle B
|
||
|
shankar0123
|
85e60b24ec |
fix(bundle-5): Operational Liveness + Bootstrap — 4 audit findings closed
Closes Audit-2026-04-25 H-006 (High), H-007 (High), M-011 (Medium),
L-006 (Low — verified-already-closed via C-1 master closure in v2.0.54).
Hardens the orchestrator-facing surface — k8s probes, agent enrollment,
shutdown audit drain, scheduler config plumbing.
What changed
- internal/api/handler/health.go — split contract:
* /health stays shallow 200 (k8s liveness — process alive)
* /ready accepts *sql.DB; runs db.PingContext(2s); 503 on failure
* Nil DB path returns 200 + db=not_configured (test fixtures)
- internal/api/handler/agent_bootstrap.go (NEW) — verifyBootstrapToken:
* empty expected = warn-mode pass-through
* non-empty = `Authorization: Bearer <token>` required
* crypto/subtle.ConstantTimeCompare; length-mismatch path runs dummy
compare to keep timing uniform
* ErrBootstrapTokenInvalid sentinel
- internal/api/handler/agents.go — RegisterAgent calls verifyBootstrapToken
BEFORE body parse so unauth probes don't even allocate a JSON decoder
- internal/config/config.go — two new env vars:
* CERTCTL_AGENT_BOOTSTRAP_TOKEN (Auth.AgentBootstrapToken)
* CERTCTL_AUDIT_FLUSH_TIMEOUT_SECONDS (Server.AuditFlushTimeoutSeconds)
- cmd/server/main.go — 3 changes:
* pass *sql.DB into NewHealthHandler (H-006)
* pass cfg.Auth.AgentBootstrapToken into NewAgentHandler (H-007)
* configurable shutdown audit-flush timeout (M-011)
* one-shot startup WARN when bootstrap token unset (deprecation)
- new tests: agent_bootstrap_test.go (full deny/accept/warn-mode coverage,
constant-time compare path, length-mismatch); health_test.go extended
with /ready DB-probe failure (503), nil-DB pass-through, /health-shallow
L-006 verified
- cmd/server/main.go:557 already calls
sched.SetShortLivedExpiryCheckInterval(cfg.Scheduler.ShortLivedExpiryCheckInterval)
per the C-1 master closure in v2.0.54. Bundle 5 confirms; no code change.
Threat model: TB-1 (operator/orchestrator), TB-2 (Agent↔Server).
- CWE-754 (Improper Check for Unusual or Exceptional Conditions) for H-006
- CWE-306 + CWE-288 (Missing Authentication for Critical Function) for H-007
Verification
- go vet ./... → clean
- go build ./... → clean
- go test -short -count=1 ./... → all packages pass
- targeted Bundle-5 regressions → all pass
- npx tsc --noEmit (web) → clean
- npx vitest run (web) → in-flight (sandbox 45s
ceiling exceeded; no failure markers in dot stream; no frontend
changes in this bundle so no regression risk)
- python3 yaml.safe_load(api/openapi.yaml) → 89 paths
Backward compatibility
- Bootstrap token defaults to empty (warn-mode) — existing demo
deployments unaffected. Server logs deprecation WARN; v2.2.0 will
require it.
- Audit flush timeout default 30s preserves prior behaviour.
- Helm chart already routes readiness probe to /ready (no chart change
needed); now /ready actually probes the DB.
Bundle 5 of the 2026-04-25 comprehensive audit.
|
||
|
shankar0123
|
1c6009a920 |
chore(cleanup,docs): vite proxy + dead scheduler setter wired + registerAgent/CLI docs (C-1 master)
Closes six 2026-04-24 audit findings (3 P2 + 3 P3) — a cleanup-and-doc
tail bundle that drains the smallest remaining leaves of the audit:
- cat-u-vite_dev_proxy_plaintext_drift (P2): web/vite.config.ts
proxied dev requests to http://localhost:8443 against an HTTPS-only
backend (HTTPS-only since v2.0.47). Every dev-server API call 502'd.
Fix: targets are now object-form `{target: 'https://...', secure: false,
changeOrigin: true}` — the dev cert is self-signed by the
deploy/test bootstrap and changes per-checkout.
- cat-g-7e38f9708e20 (P3): Scheduler.SetShortLivedExpiryCheckInterval
was defined + tested but never called from cmd/server/main.go.
Operators tuning CERTCTL_SHORT_LIVED_EXPIRY_CHECK_INTERVAL got
no effect — the 30s default in scheduler.NewScheduler was
effectively hardcoded. Fix: added Config.Scheduler.ShortLivedExpiryCheckInterval
+ getEnvDuration in Load() reading the env var with a 30s default,
+ sched.SetShortLivedExpiryCheckInterval(...) call in main.go
alongside the other scheduler-interval setters.
- diff-10xmain-2bf4a0a60388 (P3): same root cause as cat-g-7e38f9708e20;
closes as ride-along.
- cat-b-6177f36636fb (P2): registerAgent client fn orphan. By-design
per pull-only deployment model. Fix (audit recommendation:
"document"): added a closure docblock above the export in
client.ts + a new "Registration is by-design pull-only" paragraph
in docs/architecture.md::Agents section explaining when/why a
future GUI-driven enrollment feature might reach the endpoint
(proxy-agent topologies for network appliances).
- cat-i-7c8b28936e3d (P2): CLI scope intentionally narrow but
undocumented. Fix: new "Scope (intentionally narrow)" subsection
in docs/features.md::CLI capturing the SSH-into-prod / day-to-day
GUI / AI-automation MCP three-way split.
Verification:
- go build ./... — clean
- go vet ./... — clean
- go test ./internal/scheduler/... ./internal/config/... — pass
- golangci-lint v2.11.4 run ./... — 0 issues
- tsc --noEmit (frontend) — clean
- All sibling guardrails (S-1 / G-3 / D-1+D-2 / B-1 / L-1 / H-1) still pass
Audit findings closed:
- cat-u-vite_dev_proxy_plaintext_drift (P2)
- cat-g-7e38f9708e20 (P3)
- diff-10xmain-2bf4a0a60388 (P3)
- cat-b-6177f36636fb (P2)
- cat-i-7c8b28936e3d (P2)
- (audit-bookkeeping ride-along: ensures every closed-bundle row has a non-empty merge SHA)
Deferred follow-ups: none from this bundle. The remaining audit
backlog (frontend test campaign, F-1 CertificatesPage UX, P-1
orphan-fn sweep, S-2 handler error-mapping refactor) is sibling
sub-bundles in this mega-prompt.
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shankar0123
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3e78ecb799 |
feat(security): bodyLimit on noAuth + security headers + encryption-key validation (H-1 master)
Closes three 2026-04-24 audit findings (all P2):
- cat-s5-4936a1cf0118: noAuthHandler chain accepted arbitrary-size
bodies (EST simpleenroll, SCEP, PKI CRL/OCSP, /health, /ready).
Memory exhaustion vector without HTTP-layer auth gatekeeping.
- cat-s11-missing_security_headers: zero security headers on any
response. Clickjacking, MIME-sniffing, untrusted-origin resource
loads against the dashboard and API.
- cat-r-encryption_key_no_length_validation: CERTCTL_CONFIG_ENCRYPTION_KEY
accepted with any non-empty value including a single character.
PBKDF2-SHA256 (100k rounds) does not compensate for low-entropy
passphrases at scale (CWE-916, CWE-329).
Changes:
- cmd/server/main.go::noAuthHandler chain — added bodyLimitMiddleware
+ securityHeadersMiddleware. Same default cap as authed surface
(1MB via CERTCTL_MAX_BODY_SIZE), same 413 on overflow.
- cmd/server/main.go::middlewareStack (authed) — added
securityHeadersMiddleware before corsMiddleware.
- internal/api/middleware/securityheaders.go (new) — SecurityHeaders
middleware + SecurityHeadersDefaults() with conservative defaults:
HSTS 1y+includeSubDomains, X-Frame-Options DENY, X-Content-Type-
Options nosniff, Referrer-Policy no-referrer-when-downgrade, CSP
default-src 'self' + img/data + style 'unsafe-inline' (Tailwind/Vite
needs it; scripts still 'self' only) + connect 'self' + frame-
ancestors 'none'. Operators behind a customising reverse proxy can
disable any header by setting its config field to empty.
- internal/config/config.go::Validate() — enforce minEncryptionKeyLength
= 32 bytes when CERTCTL_CONFIG_ENCRYPTION_KEY is set. Empty stays
accepted (downstream fail-closed sentinel handles it). Structured
error names the env var, the actual length, the required minimum,
and the canonical generation command (`openssl rand -base64 32`).
Tests:
- internal/api/middleware/securityheaders_test.go (new) — 4 cases
(defaults present, empty value disables single header, override
applied, headers on 4xx/5xx).
- internal/config/config_test.go — 5 new cases for the encryption-key
length check (empty accepted, 1-byte rejected, 31-byte rejected at
boundary, 32-byte accepted, 44-byte realistic operator key accepted).
Documentation:
- CHANGELOG.md — H-1 section above D-2 under [unreleased] with
Breaking-change callout (operators with low-entropy keys must rotate
before upgrade).
- coverage-gap-audit-2026-04-24-v5/unified-audit.md — Live Tracker
25/47 → 33/47, P1 14/14 (zero remaining), P2 11/27 → 16/27. Three
H-1 findings flipped + closed-bundle row added.
Verification:
- go build ./... — clean
- go vet ./... — clean
- golangci-lint v2.11.4 run ./... — 0 issues
- go test ./internal/api/middleware/... — pass (incl. 4 new
SecurityHeaders cases)
- go test ./internal/config/... — pass (incl. 5 new EncryptionKey
cases)
- tsc --noEmit (frontend) — clean
- All sibling guardrails (S-1 / G-3 / D-1 / D-2 / B-1 / L-1) still pass
Audit findings closed:
- cat-s5-4936a1cf0118 (P2)
- cat-s11-missing_security_headers (P2)
- cat-r-encryption_key_no_length_validation (P2)
Breaking change:
- Operators with CERTCTL_CONFIG_ENCRYPTION_KEY shorter than 32 bytes
must rotate before upgrade. Generate via `openssl rand -base64 32`.
Deferred follow-ups:
- Weak-key dictionary check (reject password123, common ASCII patterns)
— adds operational friction with low marginal entropy gain at the
32-byte minimum.
- CSP 'unsafe-inline' for styles — required for Tailwind/Vite
per-component <style> blocks; removing requires HTML report or
component refactor outside H-1 scope.
- Permissions-Policy header — dashboard uses no advanced browser APIs
(camera, mic, geolocation); deferred until a real consumer needs it.
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