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58b14412a11245a7c53ddb3e2a0801a3bdbf0535
398 Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
 shankar0123
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b4378942fc |
fix(ciparity): drop unused methodPathRe regex (golangci-lint cleanup)
golangci-lint v2.11.4 surfaced one finding against the bundle's new code: 'var methodPathRe is unused' in internal/ciparity/surface_parity_test.go:46. The regex was leftover scaffolding from when I drafted the file as a package-router test before moving it into the stdlib-only ciparity package. The router-route scanner in this package uses its own inline regex (registerRe + muxHandleRe via scanRouterRoutes) and never reads methodPathRe. Verified clean against the two bundle packages: - golangci-lint run --timeout 5m ./internal/ciparity/... ./internal/config/... → 0 issues - gofmt -l → no output - go vet → clean - go test -short -count=1 → ciparity 0.017s, config 0.727s Audit-Closes: post-v2.1.0-anti-rot/item-2 |
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shankar0123
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e3a9317693 |
feat(ci): item-2 cross-surface contract parity (stdlib-only package)
internal/ciparity/ — new stdlib-only package with four tests: 1. TestSurfaceParity_MCPToolCatalogue (HARD GATE): - Every MCP tool name conforms to certctl_<word>(_<word>)* - No duplicate names across the five tools*.go files - Total tools ≥ mcpBaselineFloor (150; current count 155) Catches accidental tool deletions + naming-convention drift. 2. TestSurfaceParity_CLICommandCatalogue (INFORMATIONAL): Walks cmd/cli/main.go's switch-case dispatcher. Logs the 31 distinct verbs. Per frozen decision 0.9, warn-only until the CLI surface stabilizes. 3. TestSurfaceParity_OpenAPI_MCPHeuristicCoverage (INFORMATIONAL): Reports the fraction of OpenAPI ops whose path tokens overlap with MCP tool name tokens. Trend metric; current coverage 92%. 4. TestSurfaceParity_Summary (INFORMATIONAL): One-glance count of router routes / OpenAPI ops / MCP tools / CLI verbs. Easy eyeball for a PR reviewer. Verified in sandbox: - gofmt clean - go vet clean - go test -short -count=1: all four PASS in 0.017s Stdlib-only by design — the tests read source files with os.ReadFile + regexp + go/ast. Keeps the test runnable without pulling in the rest of the codebase's transitive deps; fast self-contained signal. Router ↔ OpenAPI parity (TestRouter_OpenAPIParity) stays in internal/api/router/openapi_parity_test.go where it already lives. This bundle does not duplicate it. Allowlist scaffold at scripts/ci-guards/surface-parity-mcp-exemptions.yaml for the day TestSurfaceParity_OpenAPI_MCP* is promoted from informational to hard gate. Audit-Closes: post-v2.1.0-anti-rot/item-2 |
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shankar0123
|
0ab6bc4a73 |
feat(ci): item-1 complete-path config-coverage guard (PARTIAL — sandbox could not verify Go test)
Shell guard verified working in sandbox:
- Green on clean repo: 'OK — every CERTCTL_* env var (194) has at least
one non-config-package consumer.'
- Red on injected orphan: '::error::Orphan env vars — defined in
config.go but no consumer found outside internal/config/' with three
remediation paths listed.
Go test internal/config/coverage_test.go written but NOT verified —
sandbox Go 1.25.9 < go.mod's 1.25.10 requirement; toolchain
auto-download fails (disk full). Operator must run `make verify` from
workstation before merge.
Allowlist scaffold at scripts/ci-guards/complete-path-config-coverage-exceptions.yaml.
Every entry requires name + justification + expires fields; expired
entries fail the guard.
Catches the lying-field bug class — env var defined in config.go that no
business-logic code reads. The 2026-04-29 SCEP MustStaple Phase 5.6 gap
(domain field shipped, service layer never read profile.MustStaple) is
the canonical case this guard would have caught at commit time.
Audit-Closes: post-v2.1.0-anti-rot/item-1
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shankar0123
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1b03d0c594 |
fix(repo/job): split UNION ALL + FOR UPDATE into two queries (Postgres-correctness)
Phase-9 docker compose smoke surfaced a latent production-breaking bug introduced by commit |
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shankar0123
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aa1efd0676 |
fix(oidc/testfixtures): set legacy KEYCLOAK_ADMIN* env vars for start-dev master-admin bootstrap
Phase-10 live-IdP smoke (post-iss-param fix landing in
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shankar0123
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360e7449ad |
fix(oidc/integration): pass fx.IssuerURL as callbackIss arg in 7 HandleCallback call sites
Phase-10 live-IdP smoke (post-Enabled-true fix landing in
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shankar0123
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1b529985be |
fix(oidc/testfixtures): set Enabled=true on Keycloak integration-test provider
Phase-10 live-IdP smoke re-run (after the alg-downgrade relax landed in
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shankar0123
|
fefeccfa59 |
harden(oidc): relax alg-downgrade IdP-bind check to intersection-empty (Keycloak compat)
Phase-10 live-IdP smoke (Keycloak 26.x via testcontainers-go) revealed
the IdP-bind alg-downgrade check was too strict for real-world IdPs.
6 of the integration tests in internal/auth/oidc/integration_keycloak*_test.go
were failing with:
oidc: IdP advertises weak signing algorithms (HS*/none);
refusing to use as defense against downgrade attacks: HS256
Keycloak 26.x (and several other real-world IdPs — Auth0 when HS-mode is
enabled, some Authentik configs) advertise EVERY alg they're capable of
in the discovery doc's id_token_signing_alg_values_supported field, even
when the realm only signs with RS256 in practice. Pre-fix the IdP-bind
check refused on ANY HS* or 'none' advertisement → no real Keycloak deploy
could ever bind a provider row, hence the integration-test failures.
The strict-deny check was defense-in-depth on top of the load-bearing
per-token alg-pin at sig-verify time (isDisallowedAlg, service.go L1177):
that check rejects every ID token whose JWS header carries an alg outside
DefaultAllowedAlgs, regardless of what the discovery doc advertises.
A forged HS256 token signed with the IdP's RS256 pubkey as HMAC secret
is rejected at sig-verify time → the actual algorithm-confusion attack
is closed by the per-token pin, NOT by the discovery-doc check.
Fix: relax the IdP-bind check to refuse only when the intersection of
advertised vs DefaultAllowedAlgs is EMPTY (the pathological all-weak-alg
IdP case). Keycloak (RS256 + HS256 advertised) now binds successfully;
an HS-only IdP still fails closed.
Changes:
- internal/auth/oidc/service.go: rewrite the alg-check loop at L1067 in
getOrLoad / RefreshKeys to compute the intersection set; refuse only
when no acceptable alg is advertised. ErrIdPDowngradeAdvertised
docstring updated to reflect new contract. DefaultAllowedAlgs
docstring + the package-level design-comment block at L40-72 updated
with v2.1.0-relaxed semantics callouts.
- internal/auth/oidc/test_discovery.go: TestDiscovery dry-run validator
rewritten to surface HS*/none alongside RS* as an informational note
('note: IdP advertises weak algorithms %v alongside acceptable ones')
rather than a hard-fail error. HS-only / none-only still hard-fails.
- internal/auth/oidc/service_test.go: TestService_IdPDowngradeDefense_*
tests updated. Renamed:
- RejectsHSAdvertised → RS256PlusHS256_BindsSuccessfully (positive)
- RejectsNoneAdvertised → RejectsHSOnlyAdvertised (intersection-empty)
- RefreshKeys_CatchesPostLoadDowngrade rotated to HS-only post-load
- internal/auth/oidc/coverage_fill_test.go: TestTestDiscovery_AlgDowngradeDetected
split into _HS256AlongsideRS256_BindsWithNote (positive, asserts note
but no hard-fail) + _HSOnly_StillTrips_HardFail (intersection-empty).
- docs/operator/auth-threat-model.md: OIDC token-validation alg-allow-list
section rewritten to call out the load-bearing-defense hierarchy
(per-token pin first, IdP-bind check defense-in-depth) and document
the v2.1.0 relaxation rationale.
- CHANGELOG.md: ### Security entry under Unreleased.
Verify: go test ./internal/auth/oidc/ -short PASS; gofmt clean; go vet
clean. The Keycloak integration tests should now pass when the operator
re-runs 'make keycloak-integration-test'.
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shankar0123
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80cbd2db59 |
test(coverage): backfill 5 packages to clear v2.1.0 release-gate Phase 3 floors
Phase 3 of /Users/shankar/Desktop/cowork/v2.1.0-release-gate.md surfaced
four packages below their coverage floors. All four are regressions from
new code shipped in the audit-2026-05-10/11 fix bundles that didn't get
per-function tests:
internal/auth/breakglass 87.5% -> 93.3% (floor: 90%)
+ List (was 0%) — 3 tests (disabled, empty+populated, repo err)
+ RemoveCredential, Unlock disabled-branch tests
internal/auth/oidc 89.4% -> 95.4% (floor: 90%)
+ JWKSStatus (was 0%) — 2 tests (unknown provider, after AuthRequest)
+ TestDiscovery (was 0%) — 5 tests (discovery failure, happy path,
HS256 alg-downgrade detected, missing jwks_uri, JWKS 500 fetch)
internal/auth/session 89.9% -> 94.4% (floor: 90%)
+ SetTrustedProxies (was 0%) — round-trip + clear
+ ComputeCookieHMAC (was 0%) — determinism + key/inputs differ
+ DecryptKeyMaterial (was 0%) — round-trip + wrong-passphrase
internal/api/handler 73.2% -> 75.5% (floor: 75%)
+ 6 auth_breakglass handler funcs (were all 0%) — 14 tests
(disabled/404, invalid JSON, empty fields, service err, happy
path with cookies, admin endpoints, ListCredentials no
password_hash on the wire)
+ WithPermissionChecker setter test (was 0%, Bundle 2 MED-2)
+ NewAdminCRLCacheServiceImpl + CacheRows (were 0%) — 3 tests
+ itoaForRetryAfter + challengeURLBuilder ACME helpers (were 0%) —
4 tests
All five coverage gates green:
internal/service 72.7% (floor: 70%)
internal/api/handler 75.5% (floor: 75%)
internal/api/middleware 67.9% (floor: 30%)
internal/auth 93.3% (floor: 85%)
internal/service/auth 91.8% (floor: 85%)
internal/auth/oidc 95.4% (floor: 90%)
internal/auth/oidc/groupclaim 100.0% (floor: 95%)
internal/auth/oidc/domain 97.6% (floor: 90%)
internal/auth/session 94.4% (floor: 90%)
internal/auth/session/domain 98.3% (floor: 90%)
internal/auth/breakglass 93.3% (floor: 90%)
internal/auth/breakglass/domain 100.0% (floor: 90%)
internal/auth/user/domain 96.2% (floor: 90%)
(and 6 more — all green)
Per CLAUDE.md operating rule: 'Lowering a floor REQUIRES corresponding
code-side test work — never lower the gate to make CI green.' The
floors stay at their committed values; the new tests close the gap.
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shankar0123
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8aeeec93c0 |
chore(lint): close 5 golangci-lint v2 findings surfaced by v2.1.0 release-gate Phase 1.3
Five golangci-lint v2 findings surfaced when running the v2.1.0 release gate (auth-bundle-2 → master pre-flight). Each is mechanical: 1. govet/printf-style misuse — internal/auth/oidc/service_test.go used integer literal 501 in http.Error; switched to http.StatusNotImplemented. 2. staticcheck SA1019 — internal/auth/breakglass/reflect_helper_test.go referenced reflect.Ptr; the canonical name since Go 1.18 is reflect.Pointer. 3. staticcheck ST1020 — internal/repository/postgres/auth.go ActorRoleRepository.Revoke had a doc comment that did not begin with the method name. Prepended 'Revoke drops actor_roles rows.' to the comment so it now starts with the method name. 4. staticcheck ST1022 — internal/api/handler/auth_session_oidc.go DefaultBCLVerifierMaxAge docstring was attached to the DefaultBCLVerifier type docstring. Moved the const docstring directly above the const declaration, separated by a blank line. 5. unused — internal/auth/session/bench_test.go declared benchSessionMinSamples and never referenced it; the bench loop relies on Go's default b.N scaling. Replaced the const block with a comment describing the rationale. Lint clean (golangci-lint v2.12.2 with the .golangci.yml config) on the five edited packages. |
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shankar0123
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09bea664d5 |
chore(fmt): gofmt cleanup on three pre-bundle drift files surfaced by v2.1.0 release-gate Phase 1
Phase 1 (make verify) of cowork/v2.1.0-release-gate.md surfaced three
files with pre-existing gofmt drift that pre-dated the 2026-05-11 fix
bundle work:
internal/auth/oidc/domain/types.go
internal/auth/oidc/integration_keycloak_rotate_test.go
internal/auth/oidc/test_discovery.go
The 2026-05-11 Fix 08 fmt-cleanup commit (
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shankar0123
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a4b2919f59 |
Merge Fix 13 (HIGH-2 fourth call site): CSRF rotation on Logout
# Conflicts: # CHANGELOG.md |
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shankar0123
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9a8130de32 |
harden(auth/sessions): CSRF rotation on logout closes HIGH-2 fourth call site
Audit 2026-05-11 Fix 13 closure. The HIGH-2 closure on dev/auth-bundle-2 documented four RotateCSRFTokenForActor call sites — login completion (fresh by construction), Assign/Revoke RoleToKey (wired at internal/api/handler/auth.go:498 + 546), Logout, and an explicit operator endpoint. The 2026-05-11 adversarial review observed only 3 of the 4: Logout did NOT rotate the actor's sibling sessions post-revoke. Threat closed: a token captured pre-logout (browser DevTools, malicious extension, session-storage leak) could be replayed against the user's other-device/other-browser sessions until those sessions hit their own idle/absolute expiry. Rotation on logout defeats this — the captured token is dead the moment the user clicks 'Sign out' anywhere. What this changes: * internal/api/handler/auth_session_oidc.go::SessionMinter interface gains RotateCSRFTokenForActor(ctx, actorID, actorType string) int. Nil-safe semantics by convention — the production wiring is *session.Service which already implements the method; rotation NEVER errors (returns int count, swallows per-row failures via the underlying Service.RotateCSRFToken) so it can't block the surrounding Revoke that triggered it. * internal/api/handler/auth_session_oidc.go::Logout calls RotateCSRFTokenForActor after Revoke(sess.ID) succeeds. The auth.session_revoked audit row gains a csrf_rotated detail key carrying the count so SOC/SIEM can correlate logout events with CSRF churn on sibling sessions. * The no-cookie + invalid-cookie 204 short-circuit paths skip rotation. No session row exists to rotate against; the caller is already unauthenticated. Rotation on those paths would do nothing useful and pollute the audit log. Test coverage in internal/api/handler/auth_session_oidc_test.go: * TestLogout_RotatesCSRFForActor — happy path. Mocks rotateCSRFReturnCount=2; asserts Revoke fires before rotation, rotation fires exactly once with caller's (actor_id, actor_type), audit details carry csrf_rotated=2. * TestLogout_NoCookie_SkipsCSRFRotation — pins the 204 short-circuit branch when there's no cookie. Rotation count stays at 0. * TestLogout_InvalidCookie_SkipsCSRFRotation — pins the 204 short-circuit branch when Validate rejects the cookie. Same rationale: no session row, no rotation. The stubSession test fake gains RotateCSRFTokenForActor with call-recording fields; the phase5StubAudit gains a details slice append-aligned 1:1 with events so the happy-path test can index into the latest entry and assert the count. Spec Phase 3 (explicit operator endpoint) — intentionally NOT shipped. The three automatic triggers (login + role- mutation + logout) cover the HIGH-2 threat model; operators who want a nuclear option can use the existing RevokeAllForActor flow which forces re-login → fresh session → fresh CSRF. Adding a dedicated POST /api/v1/auth/sessions/ rotate-csrf admin endpoint would be defense-in-depth without new attack-surface coverage. Documented in the audit-doc annotation. Verify gate: * gofmt -l — clean * go vet ./internal/api/handler/... — clean * go build ./cmd/server/... ./internal/... — clean (production *session.Service satisfies the extended interface out of the box) * go test -short -count=1 ./internal/api/handler/... ./internal/auth/session/... — all green; 3 new Logout cases + the 2 pre-existing Logout cases all pass. Audit doc annotation at cowork/auth-bundles-audit-2026-05-10.md flips the HIGH-2 row from 'CLOSED 2026-05-10 (3/4 call sites wired)' to 'A-B-3 verified 2026-05-11: HIGH-2 fully closed across all four documented call sites.' Refs cowork/auth-bundles-fixes-2026-05-11/13-verify-logout-csrf-rotation.md. |
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shankar0123
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a923cf697c |
harden(auth): demo-mode residual-grants detector + cleanup endpoint + CI guard (A-8)
Audit 2026-05-11 A-8 closure. Closes the deferred Phase 2 leg of the
2026-05-10 HIGH-12 closure (
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shankar0123
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b8fac59200 |
chore(fmt): gofmt cleanup on files touched by audit-2026-05-11 fix bundle
Whitespace alignment drift surfaced by gofmt -l after merging 7 fix branches.
Pure formatting, no semantic change. Pre-existing master drift in
internal/auth/oidc/{domain/types.go, integration_keycloak_rotate_test.go,
test_discovery.go} left untouched — that's separate tech debt.
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shankar0123
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11b145b641 |
Merge Fix 06 (HIGH A-6): strict UA/IP binding — close request-empty bypass in MED-16
# Conflicts: # CHANGELOG.md # internal/api/handler/auth_session_oidc.go # internal/api/handler/auth_session_oidc_test.go |
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shankar0123
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68af18d081 | Merge Fix 04 (HIGH A-4): scope-aware ActorRole revoke | ||
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shankar0123
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11a1f0babd | Merge Fix 02 (CRIT A-2): close MED-11 lying field — DeactivatedAt loaded + enforced on login | ||
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shankar0123
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92519436a1 |
harden(oidc): strict UA/IP binding (A-6) — close request-empty bypass in MED-16
The MED-16 closure (
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shankar0123
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0152bdf567 |
fix(auth/rbac): scope-aware ActorRole revoke (A-4)
HIGH-10's UNIQUE (actor, role, scope_type, scope_id, tenant) uniqueness
extension lets an operator grant the same role to the same actor at
multiple scopes (e.g. r-operator on profile=p-acme AND profile=p-globex).
But ActorRoleRepository.Revoke's WHERE clause omitted (scope_type,
scope_id) — a single call deleted every variant. Selective revoke was
unrepresentable; operators had to drop all and re-grant N-1, opening
a race window where the actor's access was briefly different.
Closure across all layers (handler → service → repo → MCP → GUI client),
preserving the legacy "revoke all variants" contract for unmodified
callers:
internal/repository/auth.go
- New ActorRoleRevokeOptions struct. Zero value = legacy semantic;
non-empty ScopeType narrows to one variant.
- New ErrActorRoleNotFound sentinel for scoped no-match (HTTP 404).
internal/repository/postgres/auth.go
- Revoke signature extended with opts. Empty opts.ScopeType uses
the legacy SQL (no scope WHERE), zero-row delete = no error.
- Non-empty narrows with `scope_type = $5 AND scope_id IS NOT
DISTINCT FROM $6` — the IS-NOT-DISTINCT-FROM is load-bearing,
vanilla `=` would silently miss the (global, NULL) case because
NULL ≠ NULL in standard SQL.
- Selective revoke with zero matching rows returns
ErrActorRoleNotFound; operators get feedback on typos.
internal/service/auth/actor_role_service.go
- Revoke takes opts. Audit row's details map records the scope so
SIEMs can distinguish wide-vs-selective revokes:
`scope: "all_variants"` for the legacy path, or
`scope_type` + `scope_id` for selective. Privilege check
(auth.role.assign) and reserved-actor guard unchanged.
internal/api/handler/auth.go
- RevokeRoleFromKey parses optional `?scope_type=` / `?scope_id=`
query params via new parseRevokeScope helper.
- Validation mirrors AssignRoleToKey: scope_id forbidden with
scope_type=global, required with profile/issuer, invalid
scope_type → 400. scope_id without scope_type also → 400.
- writeAuthError maps ErrActorRoleNotFound to 404.
internal/mcp/tools_auth.go + types.go
- AuthRevokeKeyRoleInput gains optional ScopeType + ScopeID with
jsonschema descriptions explaining the dual-mode contract.
- Tool call site appends URL-encoded query params when ScopeType
is set; legacy callers (no scope_type) emit the bare DELETE
path unchanged.
web/src/api/client.ts
- authRevokeKeyRole signature: optional 3rd argument
`{ scope_type?, scope_id? }`. Pre-A-4 call sites (no opts arg)
keep firing the bare DELETE — fully backward compatible. The
GUI KeysPage's per-row revoke button (still one row per role,
pre-Fix-12) continues to use the legacy shape; future GUI work
can pass scope params for per-variant rows.
docs/operator/rbac.md
- New "Revoke: legacy 'all variants' vs scope-selective" subsection
under "From the HTTP API" with curl examples for both modes plus
the audit-row payload shape that lets SOC/SIEM tell them apart.
Regression coverage:
Repository (testcontainers, skipped under -short — 6 tests in
internal/repository/postgres/auth_revoke_scope_test.go):
TestRevokeActorRole_NoOpts_RemovesAllVariants
TestRevokeActorRole_WithScope_RemovesOnlyMatching
TestRevokeActorRole_WithGlobalScope_RemovesOnlyGlobal — pins the
IS-NOT-DISTINCT-FROM branch (global, NULL)
TestRevokeActorRole_NoMatch_ReturnsNotFound — pins the new sentinel
TestRevokeActorRole_NoOpts_NoMatch_IsNoOp — pins the legacy
idempotence contract
TestRevokeActorRole_IssuerScope_RemovesOnlyMatching — pin the
issuer-scope half (profile + issuer are symmetric scope types)
Handler (7 new tests in auth_test.go):
TestAuthHandler_RevokeRoleFromKey — extended to assert no scope
filter is forwarded when query string is empty (legacy behaviour)
TestAuthHandler_RevokeRoleFromKey_A4_ScopedProfile
TestAuthHandler_RevokeRoleFromKey_A4_ScopedGlobal
TestAuthHandler_RevokeRoleFromKey_A4_RejectsScopeIDWithGlobal
TestAuthHandler_RevokeRoleFromKey_A4_RejectsMissingScopeID
TestAuthHandler_RevokeRoleFromKey_A4_RejectsScopeIDWithoutScopeType
TestAuthHandler_RevokeRoleFromKey_A4_RejectsInvalidScopeType
TestAuthHandler_RevokeRoleFromKey_A4_ScopedNotFoundReturns404
MCP (2 new table rows in tools_per_tool_test.go):
Scoped revoke with scope_type=profile + scope_id=p-acme →
`?scope_type=profile&scope_id=p-acme`
Scoped revoke with scope_type=global (no scope_id) →
`?scope_type=global`
Service-layer test plumbing (service_test.go) updated for new opts
arg: 4 existing call sites pass repository.ActorRoleRevokeOptions{}
to keep their pre-A-4 semantics; the fakeActorRoleRepo.Revoke
implementation now mirrors the postgres scope-aware behaviour
(legacy zero-value vs scoped narrowing + ErrActorRoleNotFound on
no-match).
Verify gate green: gofmt clean, go vet clean, go test -short across
repository/postgres, service/auth, api/handler, and mcp. The
pre-existing KeysPage.test.tsx failure observed on the baseline
commit (reproduced via `git stash` earlier in Fix 03) is unrelated;
my client.ts change adds an optional third argument and is fully
backward-compatible.
Spec at cowork/auth-bundles-fixes-2026-05-11/04-high-actor-role-revoke-scope.md.
Audit doc updated: new row A-4 (2026-05-11) CLOSED appended to the
status table at the bottom of cowork/auth-bundles-audit-2026-05-10.md.
Operator-visible advisory in CHANGELOG.md v2.1.0 release notes under
Security (non-BREAKING — legacy callers are unchanged).
Depends on Fix 01 (the scope-aware EffectivePermissions read path on
branch fix/audit-2026-05-11/crit-actor-role-scope-reads). This fix
makes the inverse op selectively reversible; without Fix 01 the read
side would mis-evaluate scoped grants anyway, making selective revoke
moot at runtime.
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shankar0123
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78485f7429 |
fix(auth/users): close MED-11 lying field — DeactivatedAt loaded + enforced on login (A-2)
The MED-11 closure shipped users.deactivated_at + DELETE /api/v1/auth/users/{id}
+ cascade-revoke, but the federated-user soft-delete was reversible: the next
OIDC login under the same (provider, subject) tuple re-minted a session and
re-elevated the user.
Three legs of the chain were severed (each independently CRIT-shaped):
Leg A — postgres/user.go::userColumns omitted `deactivated_at`, so scanUser
never populated User.DeactivatedAt. Every Get / GetByOIDCSubject /
ListAll returned DeactivatedAt = nil regardless of the column value.
Leg B — postgres/user.go::Update SQL omitted `deactivated_at = $X`, so the
handler's `u.DeactivatedAt = now()` mutation was a no-op write at
the SQL level. Even with leg A closed, no row ever flipped.
Leg C — oidc/service.go::upsertUser did not inspect DeactivatedAt on the
existing-user path. Even with legs A + B closed, the OIDC login
would still proceed normally.
The cascade-session-revoke half of the original closure remained correct, but
only for the duration of the user's current cookie. SOC 2 CC6.3 + ISO 27001
A.9.2.6 "user access removal" controls require both immediate revoke AND
persistent block — this fix restores the persistent-block leg.
Closure across layers:
internal/repository/postgres/user.go
- userColumns adds `deactivated_at`
- scanUser reads via sql.NullTime intermediate (column is nullable)
- Create writes deactivated_at explicitly (NULL for new active users;
forward-compat for future seed-data flows that pre-populate the column)
- Update writes deactivated_at on every call; nil DeactivatedAt → NULL
(supports reactivation)
internal/auth/oidc/service.go
- New sentinel ErrUserDeactivated
- upsertUser checks existing.DeactivatedAt != nil BEFORE mutating email /
display_name / last_login_at — preserves last_login_at forensics on
rejected login attempts (defense-in-depth pin against future
"performance optimization" that reorders the gate)
internal/api/handler/auth_session_oidc.go
- classifyOIDCFailure adds typed errors.Is dispatch for ErrUserDeactivated
→ audit category "user_deactivated" (SOC/SIEM observability surface)
internal/api/handler/auth_users.go
- Self-deactivate guard on Deactivate: HTTP 409 + audit row
auth.user_deactivate_self_rejected when caller targets own User row.
Prevents an admin from one-way-door locking themselves out via the
standard handler; break-glass remains the recovery path.
- New Reactivate handler: inverse of Deactivate. Clears DeactivatedAt
via Update; emits auth.user_reactivated audit row. Idempotent on
already-active rows. Sessions revoked at deactivation stay revoked
(cascade irreversible by design — user must complete fresh OIDC
login).
internal/api/router/router.go
- POST /api/v1/auth/users/{id}/reactivate wired with auth.user.deactivate
gate (reactivation is the inverse op, not a separate privilege)
web/src/api/client.ts + web/src/pages/auth/UsersPage.tsx
- authReactivateUser() client function
- Reactivate button on deactivated rows in UsersPage
Regression coverage:
Postgres (testcontainers, skipped under -short):
TestUserRepository_DeactivatedAt_RoundTrip — Create → set DeactivatedAt
→ Update → Get / GetByOIDCSubject / ListAll round-trip the value
TestUserRepository_DeactivatedAt_CreateWritesNullForActive — new active
user reads back DeactivatedAt = nil
TestUserRepository_DeactivatedAt_CreatePersistsPreDeactivated — Create
with non-nil DeactivatedAt round-trips (forward-compat path)
OIDC service:
TestService_HandleCallback_RejectsDeactivatedUser — errors.Is
ErrUserDeactivated; CallbackResult nil; persisted email / last_login_at
/ deactivated_at NOT mutated by the rejected attempt
TestService_HandleCallback_AllowsReactivatedUser — DeactivatedAt = nil
→ happy path resumes
TestService_HandleCallback_DeactivatedUserPreservesForensics —
defense-in-depth pin against future regressions that reorder the
gate-vs-mutation sequence
Classifier:
TestClassifyOIDCFailure extended — typed dispatch + wrapped variant
round-trip through errors.Is
Handler:
TestAuthUsers_Deactivate_RejectsSelfDeactivate — HTTP 409 + audit
row + cascade-revoke NOT fired + row stays active
TestAuthUsers_Deactivate_OtherUser_HappyPath — HTTP 204 + cascade
fires + row soft-deleted
TestAuthUsers_Reactivate_HappyPath / _IdempotentOnActiveUser /
_UnknownID / _MissingID / _UpdateError
Phase 6 verify gate green on the targeted packages: gofmt clean, go vet
clean, go test -short pass across internal/auth/oidc, internal/api/handler,
internal/api/router, internal/repository/postgres, internal/auth/...,
internal/service/..., internal/tlsprobe/..., internal/trustanchor/...,
internal/validation/...
Spec at cowork/auth-bundles-fixes-2026-05-11/02-crit-deactivated-at-enforcement.md
Closure annotation at cowork/auth-bundles-audit-2026-05-10.md MED-11 row.
Operator advisory in CHANGELOG.md v2.1.0 release notes.
|
||
|
shankar0123
|
a123263498 |
fix(auth/rbac): close HIGH-10 lying field — EffectivePermissions reads actor-role scope (A-1)
Audit 2026-05-11 A-1 closure. Spec at
cowork/auth-bundles-fixes-2026-05-11/01-crit-actor-role-scope-reads.md.
WHAT.
The HIGH-10 closure (commit
|
||
|
shankar0123
|
172b30b8f1 |
feat(auth): backend endpoints for MED-7 + MED-11 + MED-12
Audit 2026-05-10 MED-7 + MED-11 + MED-12 backend halves.
WHAT.
Three new admin-gated endpoints:
GET /api/v1/auth/oidc/providers/{id}/jwks-status (auth.oidc.list) — MED-7
GET /api/v1/auth/users (auth.user.read) — MED-11
DELETE /api/v1/auth/users/{id} (auth.user.deactivate) — MED-11
GET /api/v1/auth/runtime-config (auth.role.assign) — MED-12
MED-7 — JWKS health surface
- providerEntry gains 4 counters (statsMu, lastRefreshAt, refreshCount,
lastError, rejectedJWSCount) updated under sync.Mutex
- RefreshKeys increments refreshCount + records lastRefreshAt
- New JWKSStatus(ctx, providerID) returns *JWKSStatusSnapshot —
surfaced via the new endpoint
- CurrentKIDs intentionally empty (go-oidc's internal JWKS cache
isn't exposed); shape kept for forward compat
MED-11 — federated-user admin
- AuthUsersHandler.List with optional ?oidc_provider_id filter
- AuthUsersHandler.Deactivate sets users.deactivated_at + cascade-
revokes sessions via UserSessionsRevoker (best-effort; revoke
failure does NOT roll back the deactivation)
- Idempotent: re-deactivating an already-deactivated user is a no-op
MED-12 — runtime config
- AuthRuntimeConfigHandler.Get returns the deployed
CERTCTL_AUTH_TYPE / SESSION_SAMESITE / OIDC_BCL_MAX_AGE / OIDC
pre-login require-UA/IP / BREAKGLASS_ENABLED+THRESHOLD /
DEMO_MODE_ACK / TRUSTED_PROXIES_COUNT / BOOTSTRAP_TOKEN_SET +
PROVIDER_ID + ADMIN_GROUPS_COUNT flat map
- Sensitive values (token, secrets, proxy CIDRs) NEVER leaked —
only counts + booleans. Token presence surfaced as 'set/unset'
- Gated auth.role.assign (admin-class) so non-admins can't
enumerate the deployment's auth knobs
cmd/server/main.go wires all three handlers into HandlerRegistry.
internal/api/router/router.go registers the routes when the handler
fields are non-nil (zero-value-safe for tests).
VERIFY.
- go vet ./internal/api/... ./internal/auth/... ./internal/repository/... PASS
- go build ./cmd/server/... PASS
- go test -short -count=1 ./internal/auth/oidc/... PASS (4.1s)
- go test -short -count=1 ./internal/api/handler/... PASS (4.1s)
GUI halves for MED-7 + MED-11 + MED-12 are the GUI batch (pending).
Refs: cowork/auth-bundles-audit-2026-05-10.md MED-7, MED-11, MED-12
cowork/auth-bundles-fixes-2026-05-10/HANDOFF.md items 11 14 15
|
||
|
shankar0123
|
e1e43c8924 |
feat(auth): foundation for MED-11 — users.deactivated_at + 2 catalogue perms
Audit 2026-05-10 MED-11 closure (foundation step).
WHAT.
Lays the schema + domain foundation for the MED-11 federated-user
admin surface:
1. Migration 000045 adds users.deactivated_at TIMESTAMPTZ (nullable;
non-NULL = deactivated). Soft-delete semantics — the row is the
OIDC binding, so destroying it would re-mint a fresh user on next
IdP login under the same subject, losing the audit trail.
2. Seeds 2 new catalogue permissions:
- auth.user.read (admin / operator / auditor)
- auth.user.deactivate (admin ONLY)
3. Extends User domain struct with DeactivatedAt *time.Time
(json:'omitempty') so existing code paths keep compiling and the
JSON wire surface only emits the field when non-nil.
WHY.
The GET /v1/auth/users + DELETE /v1/auth/users/{id} handlers + the
GUI UsersPage that consume this foundation are the next steps and
remain pending — committing the migration + domain field alone
gives a clean checkpoint that the rest of the auth surface code can
build on incrementally without leaving the tree in a half-mutated
state.
HOW.
migrations/000045_users_deactivated_at.up.sql:
- ALTER TABLE users ADD COLUMN IF NOT EXISTS deactivated_at TIMESTAMPTZ
- INSERT 2 permissions into permissions
- INSERT role_permissions rows (read in r-admin/operator/auditor;
deactivate in r-admin)
- Single BEGIN/COMMIT, idempotent (ON CONFLICT DO NOTHING)
migrations/000045_users_deactivated_at.down.sql:
- reverse-order DELETE + DROP COLUMN
internal/auth/user/domain/types.go:
- User.DeactivatedAt *time.Time, JSON tag omitempty.
VERIFY.
- go vet ./internal/auth/user/... ./internal/auth/oidc/...
./internal/repository/... PASS
- Existing tests unchanged — DeactivatedAt is nil for every row
the existing code paths produce, so zero-value JSON wire stays
identical and no regression surface.
Refs: cowork/auth-bundles-audit-2026-05-10.md MED-11
cowork/auth-bundles-fixes-2026-05-10/HANDOFF.md item 14
|
||
|
shankar0123
|
ca31232ad2 |
feat(mcp): 11 audit-fix MCP tools — approvals, break-glass, bootstrap, audit-category (MED-13)
Audit 2026-05-10 MED-13 closure.
WHAT.
11 new MCP tools rounding out the operator surface for workflows
that previously had GUI + CLI coverage but no MCP equivalent:
Approval workflow (4):
certctl_approval_list GET /v1/approvals approval.read
certctl_approval_get GET /v1/approvals/{id} approval.read
certctl_approval_approve POST /v1/approvals/{id}/approve approval.approve
certctl_approval_reject POST /v1/approvals/{id}/reject approval.reject
Break-glass credential admin (4):
certctl_breakglass_list GET /v1/auth/breakglass/credentials
certctl_breakglass_set_password POST /v1/auth/breakglass/credentials
certctl_breakglass_unlock POST /v1/auth/breakglass/credentials/{actor_id}/unlock
certctl_breakglass_remove DELETE /v1/auth/breakglass/credentials/{actor_id}
All gated auth.breakglass.admin; surface invisible (404 not 403)
when CERTCTL_BREAKGLASS_ENABLED=false.
Bootstrap (2):
certctl_bootstrap_status GET /v1/auth/bootstrap (auth-exempt; safe probe)
certctl_bootstrap_consume POST /v1/auth/bootstrap (auth-exempt; one-shot mint)
Audit category filter (1):
certctl_audit_list_with_category GET /v1/audit?category=<cat> audit.read
WHY.
certctl_bootstrap_consume is the load-bearing day-0 primitive: a
fresh server with no admin actors lets the holder of CERTCTL_BOOTSTRAP_TOKEN
mint a fresh admin API key. Exposing it via MCP without a security
gate would let a downstream caller mint admin from any chat
transcript / log surface that captured the bootstrap token. The
tool description carries an explicit cautious-wording comment:
CAUTION: NEVER WIRE THIS TO AUTONOMOUS OPERATION. A leaked
bootstrap token from any log, telemetry, or chat-transcript
surface lets a downstream caller mint a fresh admin API key
bypassing every other access-control gate. Run this manually,
exactly once, from a trusted shell.
Similarly certctl_breakglass_set_password's description flags
that the password crosses the MCP transport in plaintext; the
server-side handler hashes with Argon2id before persisting + the
audit row redacts, but client-side logging must NEVER capture the
payload.
HOW.
internal/mcp/tools_audit_fix.go (NEW):
registerAuditFixTools(s, c) — declares the 11 tools via
gomcp.AddTool. Each tool routes through the existing Client.Get/
Post/Delete helpers; the server-side rbacGate wrappers (or
auth-exempt allowlist, for bootstrap) handle authorization.
internal/mcp/types.go:
Adds 5 input structs:
ApprovalIDInput (get/approve/reject)
BreakglassActorIDInput (unlock/remove)
BreakglassSetPasswordInput (set_password — flagged plaintext)
BootstrapConsumeInput (token + key_name; cautious comment)
AuditListWithCategoryInput (category + optional limit/since/until/actor_id)
Each tagged with jsonschema descriptions for LLM tool discovery.
internal/mcp/tools.go:
RegisterTools now calls registerAuditFixTools after the existing
Bundle 2 Phase 9 registrar.
internal/mcp/tools_per_tool_test.go:
allHappyPathCases extended with 11 new entries. The existing
TestMCP_AllTools_HappyPath dispatches each tool via the in-memory
MCP transport against a 2xx mock backend and asserts the
wrapper-layer fence wraps the response; TestMCP_AllTools_ErrorPath
dispatches against a 5xx mock and asserts MCP_ERROR fence.
TestMCP_RegisterTools_DispatchableToolCount confirms every new
tool is dispatchable by name.
VERIFY.
- go vet ./internal/mcp/... PASS
- go test -short -count=1
-run 'TestMCP_AllTools_HappyPath|TestMCP_AllTools_ErrorPath|
TestMCP_RegisterTools_DispatchableToolCount'
./internal/mcp/... PASS
- go test -short -count=1 ./internal/mcp/... PASS (0.3s)
Refs: cowork/auth-bundles-audit-2026-05-10.md MED-13
cowork/auth-bundles-fixes-2026-05-10/HANDOFF.md item 4
|
||
|
shankar0123
|
532cae249d |
test(oidc): Keycloak integration test for MED-6 auto-refresh (Nit-5)
Audit 2026-05-10 Nit-5 closure.
WHAT.
New build-tagged integration test
(internal/auth/oidc/integration_keycloak_rotate_test.go,
//go:build integration) that exercises MED-6's implicit JWKS
auto-refresh against a real Keycloak realm. Distinct from the
existing TestKeycloakIntegration_JWKSRotation_RefreshKeysPicksUpNewKey
test which calls svc.RefreshKeys explicitly between the rotate
event and the second login — this test DELIBERATELY does NOT call
RefreshKeys, relying entirely on the MED-6 auto-refresh inside
HandleCallback's verify-error branch.
WHY.
The mockIdP-based unit test (TestService_HandleCallback_MED6_
AutoRefreshOnKidMiss) is the canonical regression because it runs
in the standard test path. This Keycloak-backed counterpart is the
belt-and-braces check that the kid-mismatch substring matcher
matches the actual go-oidc error wording emitted by a production-
grade JWKS endpoint with multiple active keys + key-priority
changes — wording the in-process mockIdP can't reproduce exactly.
HOW.
internal/auth/oidc/integration_keycloak_rotate_test.go (NEW):
TestKeycloakIntegration_MED6_AutoRefreshOnKidMiss
1. Baseline login under original key (primes JWKS cache).
2. fx.RotateRealmKeys(t) — rotate via Keycloak admin REST API.
3. Fresh login flow WITHOUT explicit RefreshKeys call.
4. Assert callback succeeds (proves MED-6 auto-refresh fired).
internal/auth/oidc/integration_keycloak_test.go:
itestPreLogin now satisfies the post-MED-16 PreLoginStore
signature (clientIP/userAgent on Create + LookupAndConsume).
Pre-existing TestKeycloakIntegration_JWKSRotation_RefreshKeysPicksUp
NewKey unchanged.
VERIFY.
- go vet -tags=integration ./internal/auth/oidc/... PASS
- go vet -tags='integration okta_smoke'
./internal/auth/oidc/... PASS
Note: actual integration test run requires the Keycloak testcontainer
(invoked via 'make keycloak-integration-test'); not exercised in this
session because the sandbox lacks Docker. The unit-test sibling
(TestService_HandleCallback_MED6_AutoRefreshOnKidMiss) provides
runtime coverage in the standard test path.
Refs: cowork/auth-bundles-audit-2026-05-10.md Nit-5
cowork/auth-bundles-fixes-2026-05-10/HANDOFF.md item 20
|
||
|
shankar0123
|
e005c004e1 |
harden(oidc): JWKS auto-refresh on kid-not-in-cache (MED-6)
Audit 2026-05-10 MED-6 closure.
WHAT.
When an IdP rotates its signing key between a user's /auth/oidc/login
click and the /auth/oidc/callback return, the gooidc verifier's
cached JWKS no longer contains the kid referenced by the inbound
ID token's JWS header. Pre-fix, the verify failed and the operator
had to manually hit POST /api/v1/auth/oidc/providers/{id}/refresh.
HandleCallback now distinguishes the kid-not-in-cache shape
(isKidMismatchError) from generic verify failures and runs a
one-shot recovery:
1. RefreshKeys(providerID) — evict + re-fetch discovery + JWKS,
re-run alg-downgrade defense
2. getOrLoad(providerID) — refresh the cached providerEntry
3. verifier.Verify(rawJWT) — one-shot retry against new JWKS
A second failure surfaces through the original error branches
(ErrJWKSUnreachable for fetch errors, generic wrap for everything
else). NO retry loop — bounded recovery only.
WHY.
Operators on multi-tenant IdPs (Keycloak realms, Auth0 tenants,
Azure AD apps) rotate signing keys on a 24-72h cadence. Between
the rotation event and the operator's manual refresh call, every
in-flight handshake fails with a generic verify error. The fix is
both an UX improvement (auto-recovery, no operator intervention)
AND a security improvement (the audit row now distinguishes
'transient rotation race' from 'genuine forgery attempt' via the
prelogin_kid_mismatch_recovered category vs generic id_token verify
failures).
HOW.
internal/auth/oidc/service.go:
- HandleCallback's Verify-failure branch checks isKidMismatchError
BEFORE the existing isJWKSFetchError branch. On match, runs
RefreshKeys + getOrLoad + verifier.Verify exactly once. On
success, idToken := retried and err := nil; falls through to
the existing Step 5 onwards. On any failure in the retry path,
surfaces via the original branches unchanged.
- isKidMismatchError matcher: pinned go-oidc/v3 v3.18.0 substrings
('kid .* not found', 'signing key .* not found', 'no matching
key', 'key with id .* not found'). Intentionally narrow — a
generic 'invalid signature' must NOT trigger refresh (forged
tokens would otherwise produce unbounded refresh load on the
JWKS endpoint).
internal/auth/oidc/service_test.go:
- TestIsKidMismatchError_GoOIDCV318Strings pins the canonical
substrings + asserts 'invalid signature' does NOT trip the
matcher.
- TestService_HandleCallback_MED6_AutoRefreshOnKidMiss runs an
end-to-end rotation against mockIdP: handshake 1 primes the
JWKS cache; rotateMockIdPKey() rotates the IdP's RSA key + kid;
handshake 2 trips the kid-mismatch branch, the auto-refresh
fires, the second verify succeeds against the new key.
VERIFY.
- go vet ./internal/auth/oidc/... PASS
- go test -short -count=1 -run 'MED6|KidMismatch'
./internal/auth/oidc/... PASS (2/2)
- go test -short -count=1 ./internal/auth/oidc/... PASS (4.3s)
Out of scope: Nit-5's RotateRealmKeys-backed Keycloak integration
test (build-tagged 'integration') — that's the realm-running
counterpart to the mockIdP-based MED-6 test added here; tracked
separately as item 20 in HANDOFF.md.
Refs: cowork/auth-bundles-audit-2026-05-10.md MED-6
cowork/auth-bundles-fixes-2026-05-10/HANDOFF.md item 3
|
||
|
shankar0123
|
b4b98799d5 |
feat(oidc): POST /api/v1/auth/oidc/test dry-run endpoint (MED-5)
Audit 2026-05-10 MED-5 closure (backend half).
WHAT.
New POST /api/v1/auth/oidc/test endpoint that validates an OIDC
provider configuration without persisting anything. Mirrors the
read-only legs of the production getOrLoad path so operators can
catch typos / network reachability problems / IdP-advertises-weak-
alg conditions BEFORE creating the provider row.
Request body: {issuer_url, client_id, client_secret, scopes} —
client_secret is accepted but unused (discovery + JWKS reachability
do not require it).
Response body: TestDiscoveryResult{
discovery_succeeded — gooidc.NewProvider returned without error
jwks_reachable — explicit GET against jwks_uri succeeded
supported_alg_values — verbatim id_token_signing_alg_values_supported
iss_param_supported — RFC 9207 advertisement parsed off the disco doc
issuer_echo — the iss URL we were called with
authorization_url,
token_url, jwks_uri,
userinfo_endpoint — discovery doc fields for the GUI to preview
errors[] — per-leg failure messages
}
HTTP status:
- 200 even when individual checks fail (the per-leg errors[] carries
detail so the GUI renders per-check status rows)
- 400 only when the request body is malformed or issuer_url empty
- 500 only when the service-layer call itself errors
WHY.
Pre-fix, operators configuring OIDC had to create a provider, then
hit /refresh, then read the audit log to figure out whether the
discovery doc was reachable / whether the IdP advertises HS256
(the alg-downgrade trap). The GUI rendered no per-check feedback.
MED-5 closes the dry-run gap for the same reason every Issuer +
Target connector has a 'Test connection' button — operator
experience parity.
HOW.
internal/auth/oidc/test_discovery.go (NEW):
- TestDiscoveryResult struct with the per-leg projection.
- Service.TestDiscovery(ctx, issuerURL) drives the read-only
subset of getOrLoad: gooidc.NewProvider, claims parse for
alg-supported + iss-param-supported + jwks_uri + userinfo,
alg-downgrade defense, jwksReachable HTTP GET.
- jwksReachable is a package-level closure so tests can swap.
internal/api/handler/auth_session_oidc.go:
- TestProvider HTTP handler. Uses an inline discoveryTester
interface to type-assert against the OIDCAuthHandshaker stub
(the production Service satisfies; test stubs supply via
explicit method). Audit row 'auth.oidc_provider_tested' carries
the summary fields.
internal/api/router/router.go:
- Wired as POST /api/v1/auth/oidc/test under rbacGate('auth.oidc.create').
internal/api/handler/auth_session_oidc_test.go:
- stubOIDCSvc gains testResult + testErr fields + TestDiscovery
method so it satisfies the inline interface.
- 3 regression tests: happy path, missing issuer_url -> 400,
discovery-failure -> 200 with errors[] populated.
VERIFY.
- go vet ./internal/auth/oidc/... ./internal/api/handler/...
./internal/api/router/... PASS
- go test -short -count=1 -run TestProvider
./internal/api/handler/... PASS (3/3)
- go test -short -count=1 ./internal/auth/oidc/... PASS (3.7s)
- go test -short -count=1 ./internal/api/handler/... PASS (4.7s)
Out of scope for this commit: the GUI 'Test connection' button on
OIDCProviderDetailPage — queued with the GUI batch (items 10-19 of
HANDOFF.md).
Refs: cowork/auth-bundles-audit-2026-05-10.md MED-5
cowork/auth-bundles-fixes-2026-05-10/HANDOFF.md item 2
|
||
|
shankar0123
|
2a1a0b347c |
harden(oidc): pre-login UA/IP binding (MED-16) — RFC 9700 §4.7.1
Audit 2026-05-10 MED-16 closure.
WHAT.
Binds the OIDC pre-login row to the (clientIP, userAgent) tuple of
the /auth/oidc/login request, and enforces a constant-time compare
against the /auth/oidc/callback request at consume time. Defeats
replay of a stolen pre-login cookie by a different browser /
source — the secondary defense layer recommended by RFC 9700 §4.7.1
when the primary layer (HMAC integrity + Path=/ + SameSite=Lax on
the cookie) is bypassed via CSRF / XSS / TLS-termination leak.
WHY.
Pre-fix, the pre-login cookie's HMAC verified only that 'some'
caller of /auth/oidc/login was talking to /auth/oidc/callback; it
did not verify that the SAME browser / source was on both sides.
An attacker who exfiltrated the cookie value via any vector could
replay the bytes through their own user-agent and ride the victim's
authorization. RFC 9700 §4.7.1 calls out the gap explicitly and
recommends binding state to a user-agent fingerprint + source IP.
HOW.
Migration:
migrations/000044_prelogin_uaip.up.sql
ALTER TABLE oidc_pre_login_sessions
ADD COLUMN IF NOT EXISTS client_ip TEXT,
ADD COLUMN IF NOT EXISTS user_agent TEXT;
Both nullable for in-flight rolling-deploy compat — the consume-
side check only enforces when both row AND request carry non-empty
values for the leg in question.
Domain:
internal/repository/oidc.go (PreLoginSession) — adds ClientIP +
UserAgent fields.
Repository:
internal/repository/postgres/oidc_prelogin.go — Create persists
via sql.NullString (empty → NULL); LookupAndConsume reads back.
Re-uses package-local nullableString from discovery.go.
Service:
internal/auth/oidc/service.go
- PreLoginStore.CreatePreLogin signature takes (clientIP,
userAgent) as positions 5–6.
- PreLoginStore.LookupAndConsume returns (clientIP, userAgent)
as positions 5–6.
- HandleAuthRequest signature gains (clientIP, userAgent),
threaded to the store.
- HandleCallback adds Step 1.5 — UA / IP constant-time compare
between stored row and incoming request. Per-leg toggles via
preLoginRequireUA / preLoginRequireIP service fields. Empty
values on either side pass through (rolling-deploy + headless-
proxy compat).
- New sentinels ErrPreLoginUAMismatch, ErrPreLoginIPMismatch.
- SetPreLoginBindingRequirements(requireUA, requireIP) helper
for main.go config wiring.
Adapter:
internal/auth/oidc/prelogin.go — PreLoginAdapter passes the new
fields through to the repo row.
Handler:
internal/api/handler/auth_session_oidc.go
- OIDCAuthHandshaker.HandleAuthRequest signature updated.
- LoginInitiate captures clientIPFromRequest + r.UserAgent()
and passes to the service.
- classifyOIDCFailure adds errors.Is dispatch for the two new
sentinels → prelogin_ua_mismatch / prelogin_ip_mismatch
audit categories.
Config:
internal/config/config.go
+ AuthConfig.OIDCPreLoginRequireUA (default true)
env CERTCTL_OIDC_PRELOGIN_REQUIRE_UA
+ AuthConfig.OIDCPreLoginRequireIP (default true)
env CERTCTL_OIDC_PRELOGIN_REQUIRE_IP
cmd/server/main.go calls oidcService.SetPreLoginBindingRequirements
from cfg.Auth.OIDCPreLoginRequire{UA,IP}.
Tests (internal/auth/oidc/service_test.go):
- TestService_HandleCallback_MED16_UAMismatchRejected
- TestService_HandleCallback_MED16_IPMismatchRejected
- TestService_HandleCallback_MED16_BothMatch_Succeeds
- TestService_HandleCallback_MED16_LegacyRowEmptyValues (rolling-
deploy compat — empty stored values pass through)
- TestService_HandleCallback_MED16_RequireUAFalse_AllowsMismatch
(operator escape-hatch — UA mismatch silently allowed)
Mechanical fan-out:
- stubPreLogin / stubPreLoginRepo signatures updated.
- All existing call sites in service_test.go (~40), prelogin_test.go,
bench_test.go, logging_test.go, provider_enabled_test.go,
integration_keycloak_test.go, integration_okta_smoke_test.go,
auth_session_oidc_test.go updated to pass empty strings for the
new params — pre-existing tests do not exercise UA/IP binding
semantics.
VERIFY.
- go vet ./internal/auth/oidc/... ./internal/api/handler/...
./internal/config/... PASS
- go test -short -count=1 -run MED16 ./internal/auth/oidc/... PASS (5/5)
- go test -short -count=1 ./internal/auth/oidc/... PASS (4.6s)
- go test -short -count=1 ./internal/api/handler/... PASS (4.3s)
- go test -short -count=1 ./internal/config/... PASS
Refs: cowork/auth-bundles-audit-2026-05-10.md MED-16
cowork/auth-bundles-fixes-2026-05-10/HANDOFF.md item 6
RFC 9700 §4.7.1 — OAuth 2.0 Security Best Current Practice
|
||
|
shankar0123
|
2cd2a5c52f |
harden(oidc): RFC 9207 iss URL parameter check on callback (MED-17)
Audit 2026-05-10 MED-17 closure.
WHAT.
When the matched IdP's discovery doc advertises
authorization_response_iss_parameter_supported=true (RFC 9207 §3),
HandleCallback now REQUIRES a non-empty `iss` query parameter on
/auth/oidc/callback and enforces a constant-time compare against the
configured provider's IssuerURL. Mismatch maps to two new sentinel
errors (ErrIssParamMissing / ErrIssParamMismatch) that the handler's
classifyOIDCFailure dispatches via errors.Is BEFORE the substring
fall-through, so the audit failure_category remains distinguishable
between the RFC 9207 leg (iss_param_missing / iss_param_mismatch) and
the in-token iss claim leg (id_token_iss_mismatch).
WHY.
The RFC 9207 iss URL parameter is the load-bearing mix-up-attack
defense for multi-tenant IdPs (Keycloak realms, Authentik tenants,
Auth0 tenants, public-trust CAs). Pre-fix the parameter was silently
ignored — an attacker controlling one IdP tenant could route an auth
code to certctl's callback against a different tenant's pre-login
state without detection. Modern Keycloak / Authentik / public-trust
CAs ship the discovery flag by default; legacy IdPs that don't
advertise are unaffected (back-compat preserved).
HOW.
- internal/auth/oidc/service.go
- providerEntry gains issParamSupported bool.
- getOrLoad extends the discovery-claims read to include
authorization_response_iss_parameter_supported, alongside the
existing id_token_signing_alg_values_supported defense.
- HandleCallback's signature gains callbackIss string at position 5.
Step 2.5 runs after the state compare + provider load: when
issParamSupported is true, an empty callbackIss returns
ErrIssParamMissing; a present-but-mismatched value returns
ErrIssParamMismatch (constant-time compare).
- Two new sentinels: ErrIssParamMissing, ErrIssParamMismatch.
ErrIssuerMismatch's doc-string clarified to note it covers the
in-token leg only.
- internal/api/handler/auth_session_oidc.go
- OIDCAuthHandshaker.HandleCallback signature updated.
- LoginCallback reads r.URL.Query().Get("iss") (no TrimSpace —
byte-strict compare upstream) and threads it through.
- classifyOIDCFailure: typed errors.Is dispatch for the three
iss-family sentinels BEFORE the substring fall-through, so the
three cases stay distinguishable in the audit row.
- internal/api/handler/auth_session_oidc_test.go
- stubOIDCSvc.HandleCallback bumped to 7-arg signature.
- TestClassifyOIDCFailure extended with 5 new cases pinning the
iss-family dispatch + a wrapped-error round-trip.
- internal/auth/oidc/service_test.go
- mockIdP gains advertiseIssParameterSupported bool; the
/.well-known/openid-configuration handler emits the claim only
when set (so existing tests stay back-compat).
- 4 new regression tests:
* MED17_NoSupport_AnyIssAccepted — provider doesn't advertise;
arbitrary callbackIss is ignored (back-compat).
* MED17_SupportButMissing — provider advertises; missing iss →
ErrIssParamMissing.
* MED17_SupportButMismatch — provider advertises; wrong iss →
ErrIssParamMismatch (load-bearing mix-up defense).
* MED17_SupportAndCorrect — provider advertises; matching iss →
success path proves the gate isn't over-eager.
- internal/auth/oidc/bench_test.go,
internal/auth/oidc/logging_test.go,
internal/auth/oidc/integration_keycloak_test.go
- Mechanical: all existing HandleCallback call sites updated to
pass "" for callbackIss (matches pre-fix behavior for IdPs that
don't advertise support — the Keycloak integration suite tests
will be re-evaluated once the Keycloak fixture is run against a
realm with the discovery flag enabled).
VERIFY.
- go vet ./internal/auth/oidc/... ./internal/api/handler/... PASS
- go test -short -count=1 ./internal/auth/oidc/... PASS (3.4s)
- go test -short -count=1 ./internal/api/handler/... PASS (5.4s)
- 4 new MED-17 regression tests + extended TestClassifyOIDCFailure pass.
Refs: cowork/auth-bundles-audit-2026-05-10.md MED-17
cowork/auth-bundles-fixes-2026-05-10/HANDOFF.md item 7
RFC 9207 — OAuth 2.0 Authorization Server Issuer Identification
|
||
|
shankar0123
|
874419989d |
harden(auth/cookies): __Host- prefix on all three auth cookies (MED-14, BREAKING)
Audit 2026-05-10 — close MED-14 from the HANDOFF.md backend batch
(item 5). The session, CSRF, and OIDC pre-login cookies all carry
the __Host- prefix; browsers now reject any subdomain attempt to
overwrite them.
Cookie name changes (BREAKING — existing sessions invalidate):
- certctl_session → __Host-certctl_session
- certctl_csrf → __Host-certctl_csrf
- certctl_oidc_pending → __Host-certctl_oidc_pending
The __Host- prefix requires Path=/ + Secure + no Domain attribute.
Post-login session + CSRF cookies already met all three. The pre-login
cookie's Path widened from '/auth/oidc/' to '/' to satisfy the prefix;
the cookie lives 10 minutes and is only consumed by the callback
handler, so the wider path scope is harmless.
Files touched:
- internal/auth/session/domain/types.go — constant rename + comment
- internal/auth/session/domain/types_test.go — assertion update
- internal/api/handler/auth_session_oidc.go — pre-login set + clear
paths widened from /auth/oidc/ to /
- web/src/api/client.ts — readCSRFCookie now compares against
'__Host-certctl_csrf'
- CHANGELOG.md — Unreleased > Security (BREAKING) entry
- docs/migration/oidc-enable.md — operator-facing detail of the
one-time re-authentication window + GUI customization guidance
Operator impact: ONE re-login prompt per active session at the deploy
that lands this change. Subsequent logins issue the __Host-prefixed
cookie automatically. Existing bookmarked deep links work without
modification (cookies are path-scoped, not URL-scoped).
Refs: cowork/auth-bundles-fixes-2026-05-10/HANDOFF.md item 5
cowork/auth-bundles-audit-2026-05-10.md MED-14
|
||
|
shankar0123
|
72b54ce850 |
feat(auth/rbac): scope_type+scope_id+expires_at on role grants (HIGH-10)
Audit 2026-05-10 — close HIGH-10 from the HANDOFF.md backend batch
(item 1). Per-actor scoped + time-bound role grants are now
expressible via the API.
Migration 000043: adds scope_type TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT 'global' +
scope_id TEXT to actor_roles. Constraints:
- actor_roles_scope_type_enum: scope_type ∈ {global, profile, issuer}
- actor_roles_scope_id_required_when_not_global: scope_id is NULL
iff scope_type='global'
- Uniqueness extended: (actor_id, actor_type, role_id, scope_type,
scope_id, tenant_id) — so an operator can grant the same role to
the same actor scoped to multiple profiles/issuers (e.g.
r-operator on p-finance AND on p-engineering).
Index idx_actor_roles_scope for non-global lookup hot paths.
Domain: ActorRole.ScopeType (ScopeType enum) + ScopeID (*string).
Authorizer.CheckPermission already understands the tuple via the
parallel role_permissions columns; this addition gives operators a
per-actor knob without forking roles.
Postgres repo: Grant writes scope_type+scope_id with ON CONFLICT keyed
on the new uniqueness tuple. Defaults to (global, NULL) when caller
omits.
Handler: assignRoleRequest extended with scope_type / scope_id /
expires_at. Validation:
- role_id required (unchanged)
- scope_type defaults to 'global'; allowed values global/profile/
issuer; anything else → 400
- scope_id required when scope_type ∈ {profile, issuer}; rejected
(must be empty) when scope_type='global'
- expires_at must be in the future when present; nil = standing
Regression matrix in internal/api/handler/auth_test.go (6 cases):
- TestAssignRoleToKey_HIGH10_ProfileScopeBoundGrantPersists
- TestAssignRoleToKey_HIGH10_TimeBoundGrantPersists
- TestAssignRoleToKey_HIGH10_RejectsScopeIDWithGlobalScope
- TestAssignRoleToKey_HIGH10_RejectsMissingScopeIDOnProfile
- TestAssignRoleToKey_HIGH10_RejectsPastExpiry
- TestAssignRoleToKey_HIGH10_RejectsInvalidScopeType
HIGH-10 marked CLOSED in audit-doc — the v3 deferral from the prior
session is reversed; everything lands in v2.
Refs: cowork/auth-bundles-fixes-2026-05-10/HANDOFF.md item 1
cowork/auth-bundles-audit-2026-05-10.md HIGH-10
|
||
|
shankar0123
|
e7c4654b16 |
harden(auth/session+oidc): 503/401 split + go-oidc string pin (LOW-6 + Nit-2)
Audit 2026-05-10 — close LOW-6 + Nit-2 from the HANDOFF.md backend
batch (items 8 + 9).
LOW-6: introduce ErrSessionTransient sentinel in session.Service.
session.Validate now distinguishes:
- errors.Is(err, repository.ErrSessionNotFound) → ErrSessionInvalidCookie (401)
- All other repo errors → ErrSessionTransient (503)
The session middleware maps ErrSessionTransient to HTTP 503 with
Retry-After: 1. Pre-fix, every DB hiccup looked like a forged-cookie
401 and forced the user to re-authenticate on a transient outage.
Two new regression tests pin the wire shape:
- TestService_Validate_TransientSessionGetError (service layer)
- TestService_Validate_SessionNotFoundMapsToInvalidCookie (negative
leg: not-found stays 401)
- TestSessionMiddleware_TransientErrorMappedTo503 (middleware-level
503 + Retry-After header)
Nit-2: isJWKSFetchError documentation now pins go-oidc/v3 v3.18.0 as
the source-of-truth string set. v3.18.0 exposes only
*oidc.TokenExpiredError as a typed error; JWKS-fetch failures bubble
up as fmt.Errorf-wrapped strings. New regression test
TestIsJWKSFetchError_GoOIDCV318Strings pins the canonical substrings
emitted by go-oidc's jwks.go — a future upstream bump that changes
the wording trips the test and forces the matcher to be re-derived.
The test caught a real gap: 'oidc: failed to decode keys' (emitted
when the IdP returns non-JSON at the jwks_uri — broken proxy, gateway
HTML error page, etc.) was previously misclassified as a generic 500
instead of 503 ErrJWKSUnreachable. Added 'decode keys' substring to
the matcher.
Status: LOW-6 + Nit-2 marked CLOSED in audit-doc table.
Refs: cowork/auth-bundles-fixes-2026-05-10/HANDOFF.md items 8, 9
cowork/auth-bundles-audit-2026-05-10.md LOW-6, Nit-2
|
||
|
shankar0123
|
9cce2ab043 |
harden(auth): LOW + Nit batch — bootstrap audit, crypto/rand, XFF trust, CSRF check, protocol-prefix unify (Batch 1)
Audit 2026-05-10 — close 8 LOWs + 2 Nits in-bundle. Remainder
(LOW-1/6/9/11/12, Nit-2/5) need GUI or DB-test runtime not present
in-session; tracked in the audit-doc batch table.
LOW-2: bootstrap.ValidateAndMint now emits 'bootstrap.consume_failed'
audit rows on persist-key + grant-role failure branches before
bubbling. Recovery requires DB seeding per the docstring; without this
row, later forensics can't tell 'bootstrap was used and failed' from
'never invoked.'
LOW-3: randomB64URLForHandler now uses crypto/rand (was time-nano-
shifted). Two providers/mappings created in the same nanosecond used
to collide; now they don't. Time-nano fallback retained for the
unlikely crypto/rand-broken path.
LOW-4: breakglass.verifyDummy uses s.readRand(salt) for the dummy
Argon2id verify. Wall-clock cost unchanged (Argon2id memory alloc
dominates), but cache/branch behavior now matches a real verify —
closes the subtle timing side channel.
LOW-5: clientIPFromRequest now only honors X-Forwarded-For when the
direct connection's RemoteAddr falls in the CERTCTL_TRUSTED_PROXIES
CIDR allowlist. Default-deny: empty list means XFF is ignored.
SetTrustedProxies wired in cmd/server/main.go from cfg.Auth.TrustedProxies.
LOW-7: internal/auth/protocol_endpoints.go::ProtocolEndpointPrefixes
now carries /scep-mtls + /.well-known/est-mtls (previously only in
router.AuthExemptDispatchPrefixes; the two lists had drifted). The
canonical-prefix coverage test in Phase 12 still pins the set.
LOW-8: docs/operator/rbac.md documents that r-mcp / r-cli / r-agent
are not actor-type-bound — role naming is a hint, not an enforcement.
Operators wanting hard binding must apply periodic audit queries.
Native binding is on the v2 roadmap.
LOW-10: Session.Validate now rejects a post-login row with empty
CSRFTokenHash (IsPreLogin=false branch). validSession test fixture
updated with a valid 64-hex CSRF hash.
Nit-1: production RevokeAllForActor call sites already use typed
constants (only test-file literals remain — acceptable).
Nit-3: peekIssuer docstring documents the unsigned-permissive-by-design
invariant + the post-verify re-check pin that the BCL handler enforces.
A future commit that uses peekIssuer output before verify will trip
the inline comment + the existing BCL test matrix.
Status table updated in cowork/auth-bundles-audit-2026-05-10.md:
8 LOWs + 2 Nits CLOSED; 5 LOWs + 2 Nits OPEN with explicit reason
(GUI work, repo refactor, Keycloak integration runtime, WONTFIX).
Refs: cowork/auth-bundles-audit-2026-05-10.md LOW-2/3/4/5/7/8/10
cowork/auth-bundles-audit-2026-05-10.md Nit-1/3
|
||
|
shankar0123
|
630831aeac |
harden(audit+session): full SHA-256 audit hash + cookie segment length cap (MED-15 + Nit-4)
Audit 2026-05-10 Fix 13 Phase F + Fix 14 Phase F partial — close
MED-15 + Nit-4. Phases C/D/E/G of Fix 13 and the bulk of Fix 14
deferred to v3 with documented workarounds (see audit doc
batch-deferral summary).
MED-15: internal/api/middleware/audit.go::AuditLog now emits the
full 64-hex-char SHA-256 hash instead of the prior [:16] truncation.
The audit_events.body_hash schema column is already CHAR(64); the
truncation was an integrity-collision hole — 64 bits is
birthday-attack-feasible (~2^32 ~ 4B). Regression test
TestAuditLog_HashesRequestBody updated to assert len(BodyHash) == 64.
Nit-4: internal/auth/session/service.go::parseCookie adds a
per-segment length cap (maxCookieSegmentLen = 4 KiB). Pre-fix, an
attacker could send a 10MB cookie segment to amplify HMAC compute
cost; the constant-time compare chews through the input regardless
of outcome. The cap is loose enough that no legitimate client trips
it (real cookies are <1KB total per segment), tight enough to bound
attacker-extracted work per failed request.
Deferred (with audit-doc closure annotations):
- MED-4/5/6/7: OIDC GUI advanced fields + test endpoint + JWKS
auto-refresh + JWKS health. v3 OIDC-operator-experience bundle.
Workarounds documented.
- MED-8/10/11/12: RBAC GUI scope picker / approval payload decode /
UsersPage / runtime config panel. v3 GUI-polish bundle. Backend
already accepts the scope_type/scope_id fields; the gap is GUI.
- MED-13: MCP tools for approvals / break-glass / bootstrap.
v3 MCP-expansion bundle.
- MED-14: __Host- cookie rename. Risky (invalidates active
sessions on rolling deploy); warrants own change-window.
- MED-16/17: Pre-login UA/IP binding + RFC 9207 iss URL check.
v3 OIDC-hardening bundle.
- All 12 LOWs + 4 of 5 Nits: v3 cleanup bundle.
Closure tally: 5 CRIT + 11 of 12 HIGH (HIGH-10 deferred) + 5 MEDs
(MED-1/2/3/9/15) + Nit-4 closed in-bundle. The deferred set is
ergonomics + observability polish that fits planned v3 bundles; no
CRIT/HIGH-class risk surface remains exposed.
Refs: cowork/auth-bundles-audit-2026-05-10.md MED-15, Nit-4
Spec: cowork/auth-bundles-fixes-2026-05-10/13-med-bundle.md Phase F
cowork/auth-bundles-fixes-2026-05-10/14-low-nit-cleanup.md Phase F
|
||
|
shankar0123
|
925523e06e |
feat(oidc): Enabled toggle on OIDCProvider (MED-9)
Audit 2026-05-10 Fix 13 Phase B — close MED-9. MED-4/5/6/7 deferred to v3.
MED-9: ship the OIDCProvider.Enabled boolean. Pre-fix, the only way
to take a provider offline during an incident was DELETE, which
breaks active user_oidc_provider FK references and orphans any
session that minted under the provider. Post-fix:
- Migration 000042 adds enabled BOOLEAN NOT NULL DEFAULT TRUE.
Default-true means existing pre-migration rows are all enabled
post-deploy; no breaking-change window.
- internal/auth/oidc/domain/types.go::OIDCProvider.Enabled ships
the domain field with JSON tag 'enabled'.
- Repository read/write paths (List, Get, GetByName, Create, Update)
all carry the column.
- internal/auth/oidc/service.go::HandleAuthRequest rejects with
the new ErrProviderDisabled sentinel when cfgRow.Enabled=false.
- cmd/server/main.go::oidcProvidersListAdapter.List filters
disabled providers before constructing OIDCProviderInfo so the
LoginPage's 'Sign in with X' buttons never render for offline
IdPs.
- Defense-in-depth: the ErrProviderDisabled service-layer check
is the guard for direct API / MCP / CLI callers that bypass the
GUI.
Regression test: internal/auth/oidc/provider_enabled_test.go warms
the entry cache via a successful HandleAuthRequest, flips
cfgRow.Enabled=false on the cached entry, then asserts the next call
returns ErrProviderDisabled (errors.Is). Test fixtures (newValidProvider,
makeProvider) updated to set Enabled: true so existing tests stay
green.
Operators can toggle Enabled today via the existing PUT
/api/v1/auth/oidc/providers/{id} body field. A dedicated GUI
toggle on OIDCProviderDetailPage and a single-purpose PUT-just-enabled
endpoint are deferred to the v3 GUI-polish bundle — the load-bearing
wire is in place now.
MED-4 (GUI advanced fields on edit), MED-5 (POST .../test endpoint
+ button), MED-6 (JWKS auto-refresh on cache-miss), MED-7 (JWKS
health endpoint + GUI panel): DEFERRED to v3 with explicit
annotations in the audit doc. Workarounds: MED-4 fields are
PUT-editable via curl/MCP; MED-5 → call refresh post-create;
MED-6 → call refresh manually on key rotation.
Refs: cowork/auth-bundles-audit-2026-05-10.md MED-4, MED-5, MED-6,
MED-7, MED-9
Spec: cowork/auth-bundles-fixes-2026-05-10/13-med-bundle.md Phase B
|
||
|
shankar0123
|
ba0959ddc7 |
feat(auth/sessions): list-all gate + revoke-all-except-current (MED-1/2/3)
Audit 2026-05-10 Fix 13 Phase A — close MED-1, MED-2, MED-3.
MED-1 (verification only): Fix 01's CRIT-1 router-gate sweep already
wraps every read endpoint with rbacGate(reg.Checker, '<resource>.read',
...). Verified post-sweep that GET /api/v1/certificates, /profiles,
/issuers, /targets, /agents, /audit all carry the corresponding
*.read permission gate.
MED-2: ListSessions now gates ?actor_id=<other> on auth.session.list.all
via the new permissionChecker projection installed by
WithPermissionChecker. cmd/server/main.go threads the existing
authCheckerAdapter into the handler. When caller's actor_id !=
caller.ActorID AND the handler has a checker, an inline
CheckPermission(..., 'auth.session.list.all', 'global', nil) call
fires; on false → 403 with explanatory message; on repository error
→ 500. Defense-in-depth: the router-level rbacGate enforces
auth.session.list as the floor; the .list.all re-check is the
privilege-elevation guard for cross-actor queries that the rbacGate
can't express (it can't see the query parameter).
MED-3: ship DELETE /api/v1/auth/sessions?except=current — the
'sign out all other sessions' flow. Gated by auth.session.revoke;
the handler reads the caller's current session ID from
session.SessionFromContext(ctx) (cookie-mode); empty for Bearer-mode
callers (in which case ALL the actor's sessions revoke, matching
'log me out everywhere' semantic for API-key users).
New repository method SessionRepository.RevokeAllExceptForActor:
UPDATE sessions SET revoked_at = NOW()
WHERE actor_id = AND actor_type = AND tenant_id =
AND revoked_at IS NULL
AND id !=
returning rowcount. Added to the interface in internal/repository/session.go,
wired into postgres impl, and added to all SessionRepo test stubs
(handler stubSessionRepo, service-test stubSessionRepo, benchmark
slowSessionRepo). The session.SessionRepo internal interface also
gains the method so the bench_test.go forwarder compiles.
Audit row records the count for compliance evidence (one summary row
per invocation per the existing audit policy).
OpenAPI parity exception added for the new route — the
unbounded-DELETE-with-query-flag shape doesn't fit standard REST CRUD
operations cleanly; matches the documented-inline pattern set by the
streaming audit-export endpoint.
GUI button (SessionsPage 'Sign out all other sessions') deferred to
Phase D.
Refs: cowork/auth-bundles-audit-2026-05-10.md MED-1, MED-2, MED-3
Spec: cowork/auth-bundles-fixes-2026-05-10/13-med-bundle.md Phase A
|
||
|
shankar0123
|
912ec3f547 |
fix(audit): ship streaming NDJSON audit export endpoint (HIGH-9 / HIGH-11)
Audit 2026-05-10 HIGH-9 + HIGH-11 closure. HIGH-10 deferred to v3.
HIGH-9 (verification only): Fix 01's CRIT-1 router-gate sweep already
wraps every role-mgmt route with rbacGate. Verified via grep:
- GET /api/v1/auth/roles → auth.role.list
- POST /api/v1/auth/roles → auth.role.create
- GET /api/v1/auth/roles/{id} → auth.role.list
- PUT /api/v1/auth/roles/{id} → auth.role.edit
- DELETE /api/v1/auth/roles/{id} → auth.role.delete
- POST /api/v1/auth/roles/{id}/permissions → auth.role.edit
- DELETE /api/v1/auth/roles/{id}/permissions/{perm} → auth.role.edit
- POST /api/v1/auth/keys/{id}/roles → auth.role.assign
- DELETE /api/v1/auth/keys/{id}/roles/{role_id} → auth.role.revoke
Defense-in-depth invariant restored: privilege check fires at BOTH
router and service layers; AST-level coverage is pinned by
TestRouterRBACGateCoverage (Fix 01's CI guard).
HIGH-11: ship GET /api/v1/audit/export — streaming NDJSON audit export
gated by audit.export. Pre-fix, the permission was seeded into r-admin
and r-auditor (migration 000031) but no endpoint enforced it; r-auditor's
claim was misleading capability advertisement. Post-fix:
- internal/api/handler/audit.go::ExportAudit emits one JSON event per
line as application/x-ndjson — the de-facto compliance-archive
format consumed by SIEMs (Splunk universal forwarder, Elastic
Filebeat, Vector).
- Required from/to (RFC3339) bounded to a 90-day max window;
optional category filter (cert_lifecycle/auth/config); optional
limit capped at 100k rows.
- Content-Disposition: attachment; filename="certctl-audit-<from>_to_<to>.ndjson"
so curl + browser downloads land with a sensible filename.
- Recursively self-audits: every successful export emits an
audit.export row capturing actor + range + category + row count
so compliance reviewers can see who pulled which evidence and when.
- Service layer: AuditService.ExportEventsByFilter reuses the
existing repository.AuditFilter (From/To/EventCategory already
supported); no SQL duplication.
- OpenAPI parity exception added for the streaming-shape route
(matches the ACME/SCEP/EST precedent at
internal/api/router/openapi_parity_test.go::SpecParityExceptions).
Regression matrix in audit_export_test.go (7 cases):
- TestExportAudit_StreamsNDJSONLines (happy path; pins content-type +
content-disposition + JSON-per-line shape + recursive self-audit)
- TestExportAudit_RejectsRangeBeyond90Days (100-day window → 400)
- TestExportAudit_RejectsMissingFromOrTo (3 cases)
- TestExportAudit_RejectsInvalidCategory (unknown enum → 400)
- TestExportAudit_AcceptsValidCategoryFilter (auth filter passes through)
- TestExportAudit_RejectsNonGET (POST → 405)
- TestExportAudit_RejectsToBeforeFrom (inverted range → 400)
The auditor role's surface is now complete (read + export). The
handler interface is extended with ExportEventsByFilter +
RecordEventWithCategory; mockAuditService satisfies both with a
self-audit trace (lastAuditAction / lastAuditCategory / lastAuditActor).
HIGH-10 (scope + expiry on assignRoleRequest): DEFERRED to v3.
Schema column already exists (ActorRole.ExpiresAt); load-bearing wire
remains v3 work. Documented carve-out at HIGH-10's annotation.
Refs: cowork/auth-bundles-audit-2026-05-10.md HIGH-9 HIGH-11
Spec: cowork/auth-bundles-fixes-2026-05-10/12-high-9-10-11-role-mgmt-cleanup.md
|
||
|
shankar0123
|
2e97cc10b8 |
fix(config): refuse to start when CERTCTL_AUTH_TYPE=none binds non-loopback (HIGH-12)
Audit 2026-05-10 HIGH-12 closure. Pre-fix, an operator who flipped
CERTCTL_AUTH_TYPE=none 'temporarily' or via misconfig exposed admin
functions to anyone reachable on port 8443 — the demo-mode synthetic
actor 'actor-demo-anon' is wired with AdminKey=true. The control
plane is HTTPS-only, but a misconfigured ingress / public listen-bind
means any reachable client gets full admin without authentication.
The previous defense was a startup WARN log that operators routinely
miss in shell-output noise.
Post-fix: Config.Validate() refuses to start when:
- Auth.Type = 'none'
- AND Server.Host is non-loopback (NOT in {127.0.0.1, ::1, localhost})
- AND Auth.DemoModeAck = false (CERTCTL_DEMO_MODE_ACK=true overrides)
Real authn types (api-key, oidc) are unaffected — the guard fires only
when Type=none.
isLoopbackAddr defensively rejects:
- '' (Go's default-everything bind)
- '0.0.0.0', '::', '[::]' (explicit all-interfaces)
- RFC1918 / public-internet IPs (the misconfig the guard is built for)
- Hostnames other than 'localhost' (DNS state isn't dependable at
startup; operators wanting a non-default loopback alias must use a
literal IP or set DemoModeAck)
- Accepts 127.0.0.0/8 (all loopback IPs), ::1, localhost
- Strips host:port form before classifying
Regression matrix in config_test.go:
- TestValidate_AuthTypeNone (loopback path stays green)
- TestValidate_AuthTypeNone_NonLoopback_FailsClosed (hard fail
on Host=0.0.0.0, error message mentions CERTCTL_DEMO_MODE_ACK)
- TestValidate_AuthTypeNone_NonLoopback_AckPasses (opt-in path)
- TestValidate_AuthTypeAPIKey_NonLoopback_NotAffected (Type=api-key
on 0.0.0.0 unaffected by the guard)
- TestIsLoopbackAddr (15-case matrix: IPv4 + IPv6 + RFC1918 + public
IPs + hostnames + host:port forms)
The Phase 2 spec items — production-startup banner when actor-demo-anon
has residual role grants; CI guard banning new synthetic-admin code
paths — are partial-deferred to a v3 hygiene bundle. The high-impact,
fail-closed leg ships in this commit.
Refs: cowork/auth-bundles-audit-2026-05-10.md HIGH-12
Spec: cowork/auth-bundles-fixes-2026-05-10/11-high-12-demo-mode-guard.md
|
||
|
shankar0123
|
f5ba17114d |
fix(audit): close silence-leg of HIGH-6; emit WARN on audit-write failure
Audit 2026-05-10 HIGH-6 partial closure (silence leg). The audit
identified two distinct gaps in the auth surface's audit-emit pattern:
(1) silence — `_ = audit.RecordEventWithCategory(...)` discards the
error, so a DB hiccup or connection reset between action and
audit-row INSERT goes completely unnoticed. CWE-778; SOC 2 / NIST
AU-9 compliance requires every authorization event to be durably
logged, and 'we have an audit log' is a weaker claim than 'every
authorization event is durably logged.'
(2) non-transactional — the audit row uses a separate connection
from the action's tx, so partial failure leaves an orphan action
row that committed with no audit trail. Decision 8 of the
auth-bundles-index requires action + audit row atomic.
This commit closes leg (1) fully across all six audit-emit call sites
in the auth surface:
- internal/service/auth/actor_role_service.go::recordAudit
- internal/service/auth/role_service.go::recordAudit
- internal/auth/bootstrap/service.go::ValidateAndMint
- internal/auth/breakglass/service.go::recordAudit
- internal/auth/session/service.go::recordAudit
- internal/api/handler/auth_session_oidc.go::recordAudit
- internal/service/profile.go::Update (Phase 9 approval-bypass)
Each `_ = ...` swallow is replaced with:
if err := audit.RecordEventWithCategory(...); err != nil {
slog.WarnContext(ctx, '<surface> audit write failed (action
committed; audit row may be missing)',
'action', action, 'actor_id', actor, 'resource_id', resource,
'err', err)
}
Operators monitoring audit-write failures now see structured WARN
logs with action + actor + resource attribution; missing audit rows
can be cross-referenced against monitoring without manual SELECT-from-
audit-table.
Infrastructure for leg (2) (transactional commit) is also landed in
this commit:
- service.AuditService.RecordEventWithCategoryWithTx (new method;
accepts repository.Querier from postgres.WithinTx — the existing
helper used by the issuer-coverage audit closure)
- service/auth.AuditService interface declares the new method
- test stub fakeAudit.RecordEventWithCategoryWithTx satisfies the
extended interface
The eight per-path WithinTx-refactors documented in
cowork/auth-bundles-fixes-2026-05-10/10-high-6-atomic-audit-commit.md
(role grant/revoke, session revoke, breakglass set/remove, approval
submit/approve/reject, OIDC provider CRUD, bootstrap consume) are
deferred to a v3 follow-on bundle. Each requires reshaping the
corresponding repository methods to accept *Tx variants; collectively
that's ~2 days of refactor work that warrants its own bundle. The
silence-leg closure is the high-impact, low-risk subset that catches
the common-failure case (DB connection drops, audit-table outage).
Refs: cowork/auth-bundles-audit-2026-05-10.md HIGH-6
Spec: cowork/auth-bundles-fixes-2026-05-10/10-high-6-atomic-audit-commit.md
|
||
|
shankar0123
|
90210c9334 |
fix(oidc/prelogin): encrypt state/nonce/PKCE-verifier at rest (HIGH-5)
Pre-login rows previously persisted the OIDC state, nonce, and PKCE
verifier as plaintext columns; an operator restoring an unredacted
backup of oidc_pre_login_sessions to a debug environment leaked every
in-flight handshake. If the IdP also leaked the auth code in the same
window (logged at a misconfigured TLS terminator, etc.), the attacker
could exchange code + verifier directly. RFC 7636 §7 requires verifier
confidentiality.
This commit:
- Migration 000041 adds {state,nonce,pkce_verifier}_enc BYTEA columns
and makes the legacy plaintext columns nullable. A follow-up
migration drops the plaintext columns once the rolling deploy
completes.
- internal/repository/postgres/oidc_prelogin.go::Create encrypts the
three secrets via crypto.EncryptIfKeySet (v3 magic 0x03 + per-row
salt + nonce + AES-256-GCM tag) and writes only the encrypted
columns; legacy plaintext stays NULL on the write path.
- LookupAndConsume prefers encrypted columns via materialize(),
falling back to the legacy plaintext only when _enc is NULL — the
rolling-deploy compat layer that 000042 will retire.
- NewPreLoginRepository takes encryptionKey; cmd/server/main.go threads
cfg.Encryption.ConfigEncryptionKey in.
- Encryption key reuses CERTCTL_CONFIG_ENCRYPTION_KEY (same passphrase
already protecting OIDC client secrets and SessionSigningKey material).
No new env var.
Why encryption-at-rest, not HMAC: the spec's HMAC approach required
moving plaintext into the cookie (the cookie currently carries only
row ID + HMAC). Re-shaping the cookie wire format would be a larger
refactor; the audit explicitly admits encryption-at-rest is an
acceptable closure (weaker because backups still contain decryptable
ciphertext, but the encryption key is held separately from the DB
backup, and the 10-minute TTL further bounds usable secret window).
Three new regression tests in oidc_prelogin_encryption_test.go pin:
(a) _enc columns contain v3-format ciphertext, NOT plaintext
substrings, post-Create
(b) legacy plaintext columns are NULL post-Create (defends against
future patches that re-introduce plaintext writes)
(c) LookupAndConsume round-trips state/nonce/verifier byte-for-byte
A fourth test pins the legacy-row fallback for rolling-deploy compat.
Refs: cowork/auth-bundles-audit-2026-05-10.md HIGH-5
Spec: cowork/auth-bundles-fixes-2026-05-10/09-high-5-prelogin-secret-protection.md
|
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shankar0123
|
0f340beb14 |
fix(auth/ux): cause-aware OIDC + session error surfacing (HIGH-7 + HIGH-8 closure)
Server (HIGH-7): the OIDC callback failure path now 302-redirects to /login?error=oidc_failed&reason=<category> instead of emitting a blank 400. `category` is the existing audit `failure_category` value; classifyOIDCFailure was extended with three new sentinel paths (email_domain_not_allowed, email_missing_but_required, pkce_invalid) so CRIT-5 + PKCE failures get distinguishable GUI rendering. Audit-log observability is unchanged — the same failure_category is written to the auth.oidc_login_failed audit row; the 302 is purely a UX leg layered on top. Server (HIGH-8): SessionMiddleware now stashes a cause classification on the request context when Validate returns an error, mapping the sentinels via classifySessionError (errors.Is-based, so wrapped sentinels still classify) to the stable wire-strings idle_timeout / absolute_timeout / back_channel_revoked / invalid_token. The 401 emit point in bearerSkipIfAuthenticated reads the stashed cause and emits WWW-Authenticate: Bearer realm="certctl", error="invalid_token", error_description=<cause> per RFC 6750 §3. GUI (HIGH-7): LoginPage reads ?error= + ?reason= from the URL via react-router useSearchParams and renders an operator-friendly amber-bordered banner above the form; OIDC_FAILURE_REASON_TEXT maps all 16 known categories with a defensive 'unspecified' fallback for forward-compat with future server-side categories. GUI (HIGH-8): api/client fetchJSON parses the WWW-Authenticate cause via parseWWWAuthenticateCause and attaches it to the 'certctl:auth-required' CustomEvent detail; AuthProvider redirects to /login?session_expired=<cause> on cause-aware 401s; LoginPage renders a blue-bordered session-cause banner. invalid_token stays on the current page (no hard redirect for opaque failures). Misc cleanup: ErrorState now accepts the title/message/data-testid form added by CRIT-4 BreakglassPage (was erroring tsc on master). Regression matrix: - internal/api/handler/oidc_redirect_categories_test.go pins all 16 failure categories to the 302 + reason= location + audit-row leg - internal/auth/session/www_authenticate_test.go pins the 4 stable cause categories on classifySessionError (incl. errors.Is wrapped sentinels) + the WWW-Authenticate emission across all 4 categories + the no-session-context fallback case - internal/api/handler/auth_session_oidc_test.go: 4 pre-existing TestLoginCallback_*Returns400 tests updated to assert 302 + reason= location (the wire shape changed from 400 to 302, but the audit observability and behaviour-equivalent failure-classification are preserved) - web/src/pages/LoginPage.test.tsx: 6 new cases pinning the failure banner, session-cause banner, unknown-reason fallback, and forward-compat 'unspecified' category Spec: cowork/auth-bundles-fixes-2026-05-10/08-high-7-8-error-surfacing.md Closes: HIGH-7, HIGH-8 of cowork/auth-bundles-audit-2026-05-10.md |
||
|
shankar0123
|
15435ca02b |
fix(oidc/bcl): jti replay-cache + iat freshness check (HIGH-3 closure)
Closes HIGH-3 of the 2026-05-10 audit. Pre-fix the BCL handler
accepted any logout_token whose iat + jti were syntactically present
but never checked (a) that iat fell within a skew window or (b) that
jti hadn't been seen before. A captured logout_token was replayable
indefinitely; once CRIT-2 was fixed, every replay would revoke the
user's current sessions — persistent DoS. RFC 9700 §2.7 + OIDC BCL
1.0 §2.5 require jti replay defense.
- Migration 000040_bcl_replay_cache: oidc_bcl_consumed_jtis table with
composite PK on (jti, issuer_url) — RFC 7519 §4.1.7 per-issuer
uniqueness — and an expires_at index for the GC sweep.
- repository.BCLReplayRepository interface + ErrBCLJTIAlreadyConsumed
sentinel. Postgres impl uses INSERT...ON CONFLICT DO NOTHING
RETURNING true for atomic single-use semantics in one round-trip.
- handler.DefaultBCLVerifier gains WithMaxAge + nowFn clock seam. iat
freshness check rejects tokens whose iat is in the future beyond
max-age OR stale beyond it. Verifier signature extended:
Verify(ctx, jwt) (iss, sub, sid, jti string, iat int64, err error).
- handler.AuthSessionOIDCHandler gains BCLReplayConsumer (interface)
+ WithBCLReplayConsumer(consumer, maxAge) setter. BackChannelLogout
consumes the jti post-verify with TTL = max(24h, 2*maxAge):
- first-receive → 200, sessions revoked, audit outcome=revoked
- replay (ErrBCLJTIAlreadyConsumed) → 200 + Cache-Control: no-store,
audit outcome=jti_replayed, sessions NOT re-revoked
- transient (non-AlreadyConsumed error) → 503 so the IdP retries
- internal/scheduler/scheduler.go: SetBCLReplayGarbageCollector wires
SweepExpired into the existing session-GC tick (no separate ticker
for short-lived replay rows).
- cmd/server/main.go: bclMaxAge from cfg.Auth.OIDCBCLMaxAgeSeconds
(default 60s, env CERTCTL_OIDC_BCL_MAX_AGE_SECONDS); bclReplayRepo
wired into the verifier + handler + scheduler.
- Three regression tests in internal/api/handler/bcl_replay_test.go:
TestBackChannelLogout_FirstReceiveConsumesJTI,
TestBackChannelLogout_ReplayedJTIReturns200WithAudit,
TestBackChannelLogout_TransientConsumeFailureReturns503.
- internal/api/handler/auth_session_oidc_test.go: stubBCLVerifier
gains jti + iat fields; existing TestBackChannelLogout_* tests
rewritten for the new Verify return.
Verification gate green: gofmt clean, go vet clean, go test -short
-count=1 on internal/api/handler / internal/api/router /
internal/scheduler / cmd/server / internal/auth/oidc /
internal/auth/breakglass — all pass.
CRIT-1..CRIT-5 + HIGH-1 + HIGH-2 + HIGH-3 of the 2026-05-10 audit
now closed on this branch. Spec at
cowork/auth-bundles-fixes-2026-05-10/07-high-3-bcl-replay-defense.md.
Refs: cowork/auth-bundles-audit-2026-05-10.md HIGH-3
|
||
|
shankar0123
|
1697845493 |
fix(auth): wire RevokeAllForActor + RotateCSRFToken to mutation paths
Closes HIGH-1 + HIGH-2 of the 2026-05-10 audit.
HIGH-1: breakglass.Service.SetPassword and RemoveCredential now call
sessions.RevokeAllForActor(targetActorID, "User") best-effort after the
mutation completes. A phished-then-rotated password no longer leaves
the attacker's session alive (CWE-613). Failure to revoke is audited
with outcome=session_revoke_failed and logged at WARN level but does
NOT roll back the credential change (the operator rotated for a
reason; forcing rollback opens a worse window).
- breakglass.SessionMinter interface extended with RevokeAllForActor.
- cmd/server/main.go::breakglassSessionMinterAdapter gains the bridge
to session.Service.RevokeAllForActor.
- stubSessions in service_test.go tracks revokeAllIDs / revokeAllTypes
/ revokeAllErr.
- Three regression tests:
- TestService_SetPassword_RevokesExistingSessions
- TestService_RemoveCredential_RevokesExistingSessions
- TestService_SetPassword_RevokeFailureDoesNotRollback
HIGH-2: New session.Service.RotateCSRFTokenForActor(ctx, actorID,
actorType) int method walks ListByActor and rotates the CSRF token on
every active (non-revoked, non-expired) row. Returns count rotated;
per-row failures log WARN + skip, never errors to caller. New
handler.CSRFRotator interface + AuthHandler.WithCSRFRotator(r) setter;
AssignRoleToKey and RevokeRoleFromKey invoke it post-success as
defense-in-depth (a CSRF token leaked while the actor held a lower-
priv role no longer rides through to the elevated role).
- SessionRepo interface gains ListByActor (already implemented on the
postgres SessionRepository; stubs in service_test.go + bench_test.go
updated to match).
- cmd/server/main.go calls .WithCSRFRotator(sessionService) on the
AuthHandler.
- Two regression tests:
- TestRotateCSRFTokenForActor_RotatesAllActiveRows (asserts revoked /
expired / other-actor rows are skipped)
- TestRotateCSRFTokenForActor_NoSessionsReturnsZero
Verification gate green: gofmt clean, go vet clean, go test -short
-count=1 ./internal/auth/breakglass/ ./internal/auth/session/
./internal/api/handler/ ./internal/api/router/ ./cmd/server/
./internal/domain/auth/ — all pass.
CRIT-1..CRIT-5 + HIGH-1 + HIGH-2 of the 2026-05-10 audit now closed
on this branch. Spec at
cowork/auth-bundles-fixes-2026-05-10/06-high-1-2-revoke-and-rotate.md.
Refs: cowork/auth-bundles-audit-2026-05-10.md HIGH-1 HIGH-2
|
||
|
shankar0123
|
739745e9fe |
fix(oidc): enforce AllowedEmailDomains allowlist in HandleCallback
Closes CRIT-5 of the 2026-05-10 audit — the LAST Critical blocker for
v2.1.0. The OIDCProvider.AllowedEmailDomains field shipped persisted
(internal/auth/oidc/domain/types.go:47), API-surfaced
(internal/api/handler/auth_session_oidc.go), MCP-surfaced
(internal/mcp/tools_auth_bundle2.go), and GUI-editable, but the
verifier in internal/auth/oidc/service.go::HandleCallback NEVER read
it. Operators filling allowed_email_domains: ["acme.com"] expected
"users outside acme.com cannot log in" — the field had zero effect.
Textbook lying-field shape per CLAUDE.md's "complete path" rule.
This commit:
- Adds Step 7.5 to HandleCallback (between profile-claim resolve and
group-claim resolve): when the provider's AllowedEmailDomains slice
is non-empty, the user's email-domain MUST match a list entry (case-
insensitive exact match; subdomains NOT auto-accepted — operators
who want dev.acme.com authorized must list it explicitly).
- Two new sentinel errors at the package level:
- ErrEmailDomainNotAllowed — email is set but domain not in list
- ErrEmailMissingButRequired — allowlist set + ID token has no email
- New extractEmailDomain helper: case-folds + trims whitespace + uses
LastIndex for the @ split + rejects empty input / no-@ / empty
local-part / empty domain-part. Returns the lowercase domain or
an error.
- 21 regression tests in internal/auth/oidc/email_domain_test.go:
- 10 extractEmailDomain shape cases (plain, mixed-case input,
leading/trailing whitespace, subdomain preserved, empty, no @,
empty local-part, empty domain-part, multiple @ via LastIndex).
- 11 match-semantic cases (empty list passes any, lowercase match,
mixed-case allowlist entry match, mixed-case email match,
whitespace-padded allowlist entry, unmatched returns
ErrEmailDomainNotAllowed, missing email + non-empty allowlist
returns ErrEmailMissingButRequired, subdomain NOT auto-accepted,
parent-domain NOT auto-accepted, multi-entry first-match,
multi-entry no-match).
Subdomain matching (alice@dev.acme.com against allowlist=[acme.com])
is intentionally NOT auto-accepted. The audit's MED-line tracks the
wildcard / suffix support story for v3; v2.1 ships strict.
Verification gate green:
- gofmt clean
- go vet clean
- go test -short -count=1 ./internal/auth/oidc/... ./internal/api/...
./internal/domain/auth/ — all pass (incl. existing OIDC service
test suite, the 4 BCL tests, the auditor pin, and the AST
RBAC-gate coverage guard).
Branch dev/auth-bundle-2 status post-commit: CRIT-1 (
|
||
|
shankar0123
|
f1d97710e1 |
feat(gui+auth): break-glass admin GUI surface (CRIT-4 closure)
Closes CRIT-4 of the 2026-05-10 audit. Bundle 2 Phase 7.5 shipped the
break-glass backend (Argon2id + lockout + 4 endpoints) but no GUI
surface. Operators recovering during an SSO outage had to hand-craft
curl commands — operationally hostile and the opposite of what
docs/operator/security.md advertised. This commit closes the gap.
Three GUI surfaces:
1. LoginPage.tsx — inline "Use break-glass account (SSO outage
recovery)" toggle below the API-key form. Clicking reveals an
amber-bordered inline form (actor-id + password, autocomplete=off).
Calls breakglassLogin(actor_id, password); on success navigates
to "/" where AuthProvider re-validates via the session-cookie path.
Intentionally low-visibility (text-amber-600 small text) — this is
the deliberate-bypass path, not the everyday-login path.
2. web/src/pages/auth/BreakglassPage.tsx — admin page at /auth/breakglass
(permission-gated by auth.breakglass.admin). Three sections:
- Sticky security banner ("every action audited; use only during
incidents").
- Set/rotate-password form (≥12-char + confirm-match).
- Credentialed-actor table with rotate / unlock (disabled when
not locked) / remove per row. Remove requires type-the-actor-id
confirmation.
3. Layout.tsx nav — "Break-glass" entry under the auth section. Visible
to all callers; the page itself permission-gates (server-side 403 is
the load-bearing defense). Cosmetic hide-when-no-perm is deferred
to fix 14's LOW bundle.
Backend support (new endpoint required to enumerate credentialed actors):
- internal/repository/breakglass.go — BreakglassCredentialRepository
gains List(ctx, tenantID) method.
- internal/repository/postgres/breakglass.go — postgres impl; reuses
the existing breakglassColumns / scanBreakglass helpers.
- internal/auth/breakglass/service.go — Service.List(ctx) method;
returns ErrDisabled when CERTCTL_BREAKGLASS_ENABLED=false (handler
maps to 404 for surface invisibility).
- internal/api/handler/auth_breakglass.go — ListCredentials handler;
password_hash field NEVER serialized to the wire (response shape
is intentionally limited to actor_id + timestamps + failure_count +
locked_until).
- internal/api/router/router.go — registers GET
/api/v1/auth/breakglass/credentials gated by auth.breakglass.admin.
- internal/api/router/openapi_parity_test.go — SpecParityExceptions
entry for the new endpoint (full OpenAPI row rides along with the
next OpenAPI sweep).
GUI api/client.ts gains breakglassListCredentials() + the
BreakglassCredentialRow type matching the wire shape.
Six Vitest cases in BreakglassPage.test.tsx pin the contract:
permission gate (forbidden state when caller lacks the perm; admin
surface when they have it), set-password mismatch rejection, set-
password below-threshold-length rejection, unlock-disabled-when-not-
locked, remove-modal type-confirm.
Verification gate green:
- gofmt -l clean on all touched files
- go vet clean
- go test -short -count=1 on internal/api/router (TestRouter_OpenAPIParity
+ TestRouterRBACGateCoverage + TestRouter_AuthExemptAllowlist),
internal/api/handler (all BCL tests + ListCredentials),
internal/auth/breakglass (Service.List + stubRepo.List),
internal/repository/postgres, internal/domain/auth (auditor pin)
— all pass.
CRIT-1 + CRIT-2 + CRIT-3 from the same audit are already closed on
this branch (commits
|
||
|
shankar0123
|
00eace8068 |
fix(api/cors): narrow Bundle-2 routes from wildcard to NewCORS(corsCfg)
Closes CRIT-3 of the 2026-05-10 audit. Bundle 2's OIDC handshake +
back-channel-logout + logout + bootstrap + breakglass-login routes were
wrapped by middleware.CORS — a hard-coded
Access-Control-Allow-Origin: * middleware that ignored the operator's
CERTCTL_CORS_ORIGINS knob (CWE-942). The properly-configured
middleware.NewCORS(corsCfg) exists right next to it but wasn't used here.
The deprecation comment on middleware.CORS said "Kept for health endpoints"
but Bundle 2 added four additional call sites without converting them.
This commit:
- Renames middleware.CORS -> middleware.CORSWildcard with a stronger doc
block making the security tradeoff explicit at every remaining call
site. The doc references the CI guard + the 2026-05-10 audit closure.
- Adds a CorsCfg middleware.CORSConfig field to router.HandlerRegistry
and threads it from cmd/server/main.go using the existing
cfg.CORS.AllowedOrigins value. The same config that drives the global
corsMiddleware now also drives the per-route NewCORS wraps for the
auth-exempt direct r.mux.Handle blocks.
- Swaps middleware.CORS -> middleware.NewCORS(reg.CorsCfg) for the 7
credentialed auth-exempt routes:
- GET /auth/oidc/login
- GET /auth/oidc/callback
- POST /auth/oidc/back-channel-logout
- POST /auth/logout
- POST /auth/breakglass/login
- GET /api/v1/auth/bootstrap
- POST /api/v1/auth/bootstrap
- Keeps middleware.CORSWildcard for the 4 credential-free probe routes:
- GET /health
- GET /ready
- GET /api/v1/version
- GET /api/v1/auth/info
- Adds scripts/ci-guards/cors-wildcard-allowlist.sh — pins the 4-route
allowlist; fails CI when a new middleware.CORSWildcard wrap appears
outside the allowlist. Adding a new wildcard call site requires
updating the allowlist AND documenting why in the commit body.
Operators who configured CERTCTL_CORS_ORIGINS=https://admin.example.com
expecting the OIDC + BCL + breakglass-login routes to honor it now do.
Previously those routes ignored the knob and emitted ACAO: * regardless.
Verification gate green:
- gofmt -l . clean
- go vet ./... clean
- go test -short -count=1 ./internal/api/... ./internal/auth/...
./internal/domain/auth/ ./internal/service/auth/ ./cmd/server/ pass
- go build ./... clean
- scripts/ci-guards/cors-wildcard-allowlist.sh passes (4 allowlisted
routes; zero violations)
CRIT-1 + CRIT-2 from the same audit are already closed on this branch
(commits
|
||
|
shankar0123
|
ca1e135aa3 |
fix(oidc/bcl): resolve sub→actor_id via users.GetByOIDCSubject (CRIT-2 closure)
Closes CRIT-2 of the 2026-05-10 audit. The BCL handler previously called
sessionSvc.RevokeAllForActor(sub, "User") but session rows are keyed by
user.ID (a random "u-" + 16-byte token), not the OIDC subject — the
"Phase 5 simplification" comment in the source was factually wrong about
how internal/auth/oidc/service.go::upsertUser seeds user.ID. As a result,
the SQL lookup returned zero rows on every BCL receive, the error was
silently swallowed (`_ = rerr`), an audit row was written claiming success,
and the handler returned 200 + Cache-Control: no-store. OIDC BCL 1.0 §2.6
("MUST destroy all sessions identified by the sub or sid") was unimplemented.
CWE-613.
This commit:
- Adds userRepo (repository.UserRepository) to AuthSessionOIDCHandler
struct + NewAuthSessionOIDCHandler constructor. cmd/server/main.go
injects the existing oidcUserRepo (no new repository instance).
- Replaces the broken sub-as-actor-id path with:
1. providerRepo.List(ctx, tenantID) + IssuerURL filter to map
claims.iss → provider row (N is small; typically 1-5).
2. userRepo.GetByOIDCSubject(ctx, provider.ID, sub) to resolve the
OIDC subject → user.ID.
3. sessionSvc.RevokeAllForActor(user.ID, "User") with the RESOLVED
actor_id (not the OIDC subject).
- Audits four success-shaped outcome categories:
- outcome=revoked — happy path
- outcome=user_unknown — IdP BCLs a user we never logged in (idempotent 200)
- outcome=issuer_unknown — iss doesn't match any configured provider (idempotent 200)
- outcome=revoke_failed — RevokeAllForActor returned an error (200, best-effort per §2.8)
And two transient outcomes that return 503 (IdP retries per §2.8):
- outcome=provider_lookup_failed — providerRepo.List error
- outcome=user_lookup_failed — non-NotFound userRepo error
- Removes the misleading "Phase 5 simplification" comment block; replaces
with a doc explaining the resolution path + outcome taxonomy + spec refs.
- Adds 5 regression tests in internal/api/handler/auth_session_oidc_test.go:
- TestBackChannelLogout_HappyPath_RevokesSubject (updated to seed
provider + user; asserts RevokeAllForActor was called with the
resolved user.ID, not the raw OIDC subject — the test that would
have caught CRIT-2 had it existed)
- TestBackChannelLogout_UnknownUserReturns200WithAudit
- TestBackChannelLogout_IssuerUnknownReturns200WithAudit
- TestBackChannelLogout_TransientUserRepoErrorReturns503
- TestBackChannelLogout_RevokeFailureReturns200WithAuditFailureOutcome
- Introduces stubUserRepo in the handler test file (matching the four
repository.UserRepository interface methods) so the existing
newPhase5Handler fixture seeds a usable user resolver.
Verification gate green:
- gofmt -l . clean
- go vet ./... clean
- go test -short -count=1 ./internal/api/handler/ ./internal/api/router/
./internal/auth/... ./internal/domain/auth/ ./internal/service/auth/
./cmd/server/ — all pass
- go build ./... clean
CRIT-1 from the same audit is already closed on this branch (commit
|
||
|
shankar0123
|
68ca42fef1 |
fix(auth): apply rbacGate to every state-changing + read handler (CRIT-1 closure)
Closes the wire-layer authorization gap surfaced by the 2026-05-10 audit
(CRIT-1). Before this commit only ~24 of ~140 routes carried rbacGate
enforcement — all of them admin-only fine-grained perms (auth.session.*,
auth.oidc.*, auth.breakglass.admin, cert.bulk_revoke, crl.admin, scep.admin,
est.admin, ca.hierarchy.manage). Every catalogued legacy-CRUD perm
(cert.read/issue/revoke/delete, profile.edit/delete, issuer.edit/delete,
target.*, agent.*, plus role-mgmt verbs) was declared in
internal/domain/auth/validate.go but never wired at the router. A r-viewer
Bearer was essentially r-admin minus five verbs at the wire layer (CWE-862).
This commit:
- Adds rbacGateScoped(checker, perm, scopeType, scopeFn, h) helper to
internal/api/router/router.go for path-bound scope resolution. Per-profile
and per-issuer grants (Decision 2) now reach the wire layer.
- Wraps every state-changing route AND every read endpoint in router.go
with rbacGate (global) or rbacGateScoped (path-bound). The auth-management
routes (POST /api/v1/auth/roles, etc.) gain router-level enforcement
in addition to the existing service-layer Authorizer check — defense in
depth (HIGH-9 of the same audit collapses into this closure).
- Auth-exempt surfaces stay un-gated by design: login, callback, BCL,
logout, breakglass-login, bootstrap, health, auth-info, version. Allowlist
is documented in TestRouterRBACGateCoverage.
- Extends internal/domain/auth/validate.go CanonicalPermissions with 30 new
perms across 12 namespaces: cert.edit; job.read, job.cancel; approval.read,
approval.approve, approval.reject; policy.read/edit/delete;
team.read/edit/delete; owner.read/edit/delete; notification.read/edit;
discovery.read/run/claim; network_scan.read/edit/run;
healthcheck.read/edit/delete/acknowledge; digest.read, digest.send;
verification.read, verification.run; stats.read; metrics.read.
- Updates DefaultRoles for r-admin / r-operator / r-viewer / r-mcp / r-cli /
r-agent. r-auditor gets NOTHING new — the auditor pin
(TestAuditorRoleHoldsExactlyAuditReadAndExport) stays invariant.
- Migration 000039_audit_crit1_perms seeds the new perm rows + role grants
per the updated DefaultRoles map. Idempotent ON CONFLICT DO NOTHING.
Reverse migration removes role_permissions before permissions
(ON DELETE RESTRICT on the FK).
- AST-level CI guard TestRouterRBACGateCoverage in
internal/api/router/router_rbac_coverage_test.go walks router.go and
asserts every state-changing + read route is wrapped (or in the
documented allowlist). Adding a new ungated route fails CI.
- Updates docs/operator/rbac.md permission-catalogue table with the new
namespaces + footer link to the AST CI guard.
- Updates certctl/CHANGELOG.md v2.1.0 section with the closure narrative.
Audit doc cowork/auth-bundles-audit-2026-05-10.md CRIT-1 row annotated
CLOSED 2026-05-10. Bundle's exit-gate spec lives at
cowork/auth-bundles-fixes-2026-05-10/01-crit-1-rbac-gates.md.
CRIT-2 / CRIT-3 / CRIT-4 / CRIT-5 of the same audit remain open and
continue to block the v2.1.0 tag.
Verification gate green:
- gofmt -d (no diff after gofmt -w on the touched files)
- go vet ./...
- go test -short -count=1 ./... (all packages pass including auditor pin)
- go build ./...
HIGH-9 of the audit closes via this commit's router-layer rbacGate on
POST /api/v1/auth/keys/{id}/roles + DELETE /api/v1/auth/keys/{id}/roles/{role_id}
(defense-in-depth on top of the existing service-layer privilege check).
Refs: cowork/auth-bundles-audit-2026-05-10.md CRIT-1 HIGH-9
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shankar0123
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9b6294e83d |
auth-bundle-2 Phase 14: session + OIDC validation benchmarks (steady-state + cold paths) + auth-benchmarks.md operator doc + Makefile targets
Closes Phase 14 of cowork/auth-bundle-2-prompt.md. Ships four
benchmarks producing four numbers + the operator-doc table; three
default-tag benchmarks runnable on every CI runner, the fourth
(cold-cache OIDC) runnable on operator-side Docker hosts via the
new make target.
Files
=====
internal/auth/session/bench_test.go (NEW):
* BenchmarkSession_SteadyState (target p99 < 1ms; measured 5µs).
Warm in-memory repo + warm session row. Pure CPU: parseCookie +
HMAC verify + map lookup + sentinel checks.
* BenchmarkSession_ColdProcess (target p99 < 10ms; measured 7.1ms).
Same pipeline but with a configurable per-call delay simulating
a 1ms Postgres RTT on each repo call. Two repo calls per
Validate (signing-key fetch + session-row fetch) = 2ms minimum;
Go time.Sleep granularity adds ~1-2ms jitter. Documented why
testcontainers Postgres isn't viable inside b.N: 30+ second
container boot incompatible with per-iteration timing.
* slowSessionRepo + slowKeyRepo wrappers add the per-call delay
via time.Sleep; they delegate to the existing in-memory stubs.
* reportPercentiles helper sorts + reports p50/p95/p99/max via
b.ReportMetric (Go testing.B doesn't surface percentiles
natively).
internal/auth/oidc/bench_test.go (NEW):
* BenchmarkOIDC_SteadyState (target p99 < 5ms; measured 1.5ms).
Drives full HandleCallback against an in-process mockIdP
(httptest.Server localhost loopback). Pre-warmed JWKS cache via
RefreshKeys at setup. Pipeline: pre-login consume + state
compare + token exchange (localhost ~50-200µs) + go-oidc
Verify (RSA-2048 sig verify + alg pin) + service-layer iss/
aud/azp/at_hash/exp/iat/nonce re-checks + group-claim
resolution + group→role mapping + user upsert + session mint.
* The localhost-loopback /token call adds ~100-500µs of TCP
overhead vs pure crypto; the prompt's "no network calls"
steady-state framing accommodates this since the localhost
loopback is the closest practical proxy for a same-region
IdP /token call (which adds 5-15ms in production).
internal/auth/oidc/bench_keycloak_test.go (NEW, //go:build integration):
* BenchmarkOIDC_ColdCache (target p99 < 200ms; operator-runs).
Drives RefreshKeys against a live Keycloak container from the
Phase 10 testfixtures harness. Each iteration evicts the
in-process cache + re-fetches discovery + re-fetches JWKS over
real HTTP + re-runs the IdP-downgrade-attack defense.
* Network-bounded: the cold path is dominated by HTTPS RTT to
the IdP discovery endpoint, NOT crypto. The 200ms cap
accommodates a geographically-distant IdP (~150ms RTT) plus
the in-process JWKS fetch + downgrade-defense logic (~5ms
locally).
* Reuses the sharedKeycloak fixture from
integration_keycloak_test.go (Phase 10) so the benchmark
doesn't pay the 60-90s container boot cost separately. Skips
with a clear message if invoked without the integration test
setup.
* Reports p50/p95/p99/max in MILLISECONDS (vs the
microsecond-granularity steady-state benchmarks) since the
cold path is two orders of magnitude slower.
internal/auth/oidc/service_test.go (MODIFIED):
* Refactored newMockIdP(t *testing.T) to delegate to a new
newMockIdPWithTB(t testing.TB) sibling. Standard Go pattern
for sharing test fixtures between *testing.T and *testing.B.
No behavior change for existing service_test.go tests; the
benchmark file in bench_test.go calls newMockIdPWithTB(b)
to get the same fixture.
docs/operator/auth-benchmarks.md (NEW):
* Result table with all four benchmarks + targets + measured
numbers + status markers. Four-row matrix for the default-tag
benchmarks; the fourth row (cold-cache) is operator-recorded
with an empty cell waiting for the first Docker-equipped run.
* Hardware floor section pinning the 4 vCPU / 8 GiB RAM /
Postgres 16 / Go 1.25 baseline. GitHub-hosted Ubuntu runners
satisfy this; operators on weaker hardware re-record.
* "What each benchmark covers (and what it doesn't)" section
per benchmark, distinguishing the warm steady-state pipeline
from the cold path's network-bounded budget.
* "Cold-cache OIDC: how to run" subsection documenting the
make target + the test+benchmark coupling needed to populate
sharedKeycloak. Operator-recorded baseline table seeded
empty for first runs.
* "Why the cold path is bounded by network latency, not crypto"
section explaining the budget breakdown:
- TCP handshake (1 RTT)
- TLS 1.3 handshake (1-2 RTTs)
- 2 HTTPS GETs (discovery + JWKS, 1 RTT each)
- In-process crypto on the certctl side (~5-10ms total)
So the 200ms cap is operator-checkable: real measurement >
200ms means the IdP is slow OR network congestion OR DNS
issues — the diagnosis is upstream of certctl. Real
measurement < 200ms means the IdP is on a fast same-region
link.
* Methodology section pinning the per-iteration timing capture
+ sort + percentile-extract approach.
* Pre-merge audit section for the Phase 14 exit gate: four
benchmarks ran, four numbers recorded, steady-state targets
met, cold path is operator-runnable + measurably-bounded.
Makefile (MODIFIED):
* Added `make benchmark-auth` (default-tag, runs three of four
benchmarks at 2000 samples each).
* Added `make benchmark-auth-coldcache` (integration-tagged,
runs OIDC cold-cache against live Keycloak; requires Docker).
* Both targets carry explanatory comment blocks.
docs/README.md (MODIFIED):
* Added the auth-benchmarks.md doc to the Operator nav table
alongside performance-baselines.md.
Measured baselines at Phase 14 close (linux/arm64, 4 vCPU)
==========================================================
BenchmarkSession_SteadyState p99 = 5µs (target < 1ms) ✓ 200× under
BenchmarkSession_ColdProcess p99 = 7.1ms (target < 10ms) ✓
BenchmarkOIDC_SteadyState p99 = 1.5ms (target < 5ms) ✓ 3× under
BenchmarkOIDC_ColdCache operator-runs (Docker required)
Verification
============
* gofmt -l on three new bench files: clean.
* go vet ./internal/auth/session/... ./internal/auth/oidc/...: clean
(default tag).
* go vet -tags integration ./internal/auth/oidc/...: clean (integration
tag covers the bench_keycloak_test.go file).
* go test -short -count=1 across all 5 OIDC + session packages:
green; the bench_*_test.go files compile but don't run under
-short (testing.Short() guards + benchmarks are not selected
by -run pattern).
* All three runnable benchmarks executed and produce the numbers
above; recorded in auth-benchmarks.md.
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