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fix(auth/rbac): close HIGH-10 lying field — EffectivePermissions reads actor-role scope (A-1)

Browse Source 
Audit 2026-05-11 A-1 closure. Spec at
cowork/auth-bundles-fixes-2026-05-11/01-crit-actor-role-scope-reads.md.

WHAT.

The HIGH-10 closure (commit 72b54ce on dev/auth-bundle-2) added
`scope_type` + `scope_id` columns to `actor_roles` via migration
000043. The handler accepted them on POST /api/v1/auth/keys/{id}/roles.
The repo Grant INSERTed them. The uniqueness tuple was extended to
include them. The GUI exposed them as form inputs.

But the load-bearing `EffectivePermissions` SQL at
internal/repository/postgres/auth.go:470 never read them. The query
only JOINed against rp.scope_type/rp.scope_id (role-permission
scope) and ignored ar.scope_type/ar.scope_id (actor-role scope).

Operator-visible failure: granting Alice r-operator scoped to
profile=p-prod silently elevated her to r-operator GLOBALLY at
authorization time. The Authorizer's matcher correctly handled
whatever EffectivePermissions returned, but EffectivePermissions
returned the rp.scope (typically global), not the ar.scope
narrowing.

This is the canonical CRIT-5 lying-field shape — a security
control claimed, persisted across 4 layers, with unit tests at
each isolated layer, but the load-bearing wire severed mid-flight.
CLAUDE.md's 'Always take the complete path' rule was violated by
the original HIGH-10 closure.

Additionally, `scanActorRoles` failed to read the new columns
even when present, so every GET-side path (ListByActor /
ListByRole) returned ActorRole with zero-value scope fields — the
GUI / MCP couldn't show operators what they had configured.

HOW.

internal/repository/postgres/auth.go:
  - EffectivePermissions SQL extended to intersect ar.scope with
    rp.scope via a CASE-in-subquery. The effective scope is the
    NARROWER of the two; disjoint tuples and scope-type mismatches
    drop the row entirely. WHERE filter on effective_scope_type
    IS NOT NULL excludes dropped rows.

    Match matrix (encoded by the CASE):
      ar.scope    rp.scope    effective_scope
      ─────────   ─────────   ──────────────────
      global      global      global / NULL
      global      profile=X   profile=X (rp narrows)
      profile=X   global      profile=X (ar narrows)
      profile=X   profile=X   profile=X (both agree)
      profile=X   profile=Y   ROW DROPPED (disjoint)
      profile=X   issuer=*    ROW DROPPED (type mismatch)

  - ListByActor + ListByRole SELECTs extended with scope_type +
    scope_id columns so the read-side surfaces what was persisted.
  - scanActorRoles reads the new columns into ActorRole.ScopeType
    + ScopeID via the existing sql.NullString + ScopeType cast
    pattern (mirrors RolePermission scan).

internal/repository/postgres/auth_scope_test.go (NEW):
  Testcontainer-backed regression matrix. 8 cases:
  1. ActorRoleGlobal_RolePermGlobal — trivial happy path.
  2. ActorRoleGlobal_RolePermProfile — rp narrows.
  3. ActorRoleProfile_RolePermGlobal_A1Closure — **load-bearing**
     post-fix case: profile-scoped grant narrows to profile.
  4. BothScopedSameTuple_Matches — exact-match collapse.
  5. BothScopedDifferentIDs_RowDropped — disjoint scopes produce
     no effective permission.
  6. ScopeTypeMismatch_RowDropped — profile vs issuer mismatch.
  7. ExpiredGrant_Excluded — pre-fix behavior preserved.
  8. ListByActor_ReturnsScopeColumns — read-side surface check.

  Tests skip in -short mode (testcontainers-backed; require Docker
  on operator workstation).

internal/service/auth/service_test.go:
  TestAuthorizer_ActorRoleProfileScope_OnlyNarrowedScopeAuthorizes_A1
  — unit-level pin (sandbox-runnable, no Docker). Simulates the
  post-A-1 SQL emission (narrowed effective row at
  profile=p-prod) and asserts CheckPermission authorizes only
  matching profile, rejects other profiles AND rejects global.
  Existing matcher code is unchanged; this proves the integration
  point.

CHANGELOG.md:
  Operator advisory in the new 'Security (BREAKING — silent-elevation
  closure)' section. Pre-existing scope-bound grants take effect on
  upgrade; operators audit `actor_roles WHERE scope_type != 'global'`
  to confirm intent.

cowork/auth-bundles-audit-2026-05-10.md:
  HIGH-10 row gets an A-1 follow-on CLOSED 2026-05-11 annotation
  describing the regression + closure.

VERIFY.

- gofmt -l <changed files>                                       (no diff)
- go vet ./internal/repository/postgres/... ./internal/service/auth/...
  ./internal/api/handler/... ./internal/auth/... ./cmd/server/...  PASS
- go test -short -count=1 ./internal/service/auth/...
  ./internal/repository/postgres/... ./internal/api/handler/...    PASS
- The testcontainer-backed regression matrix runs on operator
  workstation via 'go test -count=1 ./internal/repository/postgres/...'
  (skip in -short).

Refs: cowork/auth-bundles-audit-2026-05-10.md HIGH-10 (A-1 follow-on)
      cowork/auth-bundles-fixes-2026-05-11/01-crit-actor-role-scope-reads.md
      CLAUDE.md 'Always take the complete path' rule
This commit is contained in:
shankar0123
2026-05-11 02:02:39 +00:00
parent 191384c1d2
commit a123263498
4 changed files with 444 additions and 12 deletions
Download Patch File Download Diff File Expand all files Collapse all files
internal/repository/postgres/auth.go
+69 -12
View File
@@ -335,8 +335,13 @@ func NewActorRoleRepository(db *sql.DB) *ActorRoleRepository {
}
func (r *ActorRoleRepository) ListByActor(ctx context.Context, actorID string, actorType authdomain.ActorTypeValue, tenantID string) ([]*authdomain.ActorRole, error) {
// Audit 2026-05-11 A-1 — include scope_type + scope_id in the
// SELECT so the GUI / MCP surface can render which scope an
// actor's grant is bound to. Pre-fix, these columns were
// persisted by Grant (HIGH-10 closure) but never surfaced on
// read — operators couldn't see what they configured.
rows, err := r.db.QueryContext(ctx, `
SELECT id, actor_id, actor_type, role_id, granted_at, expires_at, granted_by, tenant_id
SELECT id, actor_id, actor_type, role_id, granted_at, expires_at, granted_by, tenant_id, scope_type, scope_id
FROM actor_roles
WHERE actor_id = $1 AND actor_type = $2 AND tenant_id = $3
ORDER BY granted_at
@@ -349,7 +354,7 @@ func (r *ActorRoleRepository) ListByActor(ctx context.Context, actorID string, a
func (r *ActorRoleRepository) ListByRole(ctx context.Context, roleID string) ([]*authdomain.ActorRole, error) {
rows, err := r.db.QueryContext(ctx, `
SELECT id, actor_id, actor_type, role_id, granted_at, expires_at, granted_by, tenant_id
SELECT id, actor_id, actor_type, role_id, granted_at, expires_at, granted_by, tenant_id, scope_type, scope_id
FROM actor_roles
WHERE role_id = $1
ORDER BY granted_at
@@ -468,15 +473,55 @@ func (r *ActorRoleRepository) AdminExists(ctx context.Context, tenantID string)
}
func (r *ActorRoleRepository) EffectivePermissions(ctx context.Context, actorID string, actorType authdomain.ActorTypeValue, tenantID string) ([]repository.EffectivePermission, error) {
// Audit 2026-05-11 A-1 — effective scope is the intersection of
// the actor-role's scope (ar.scope_*) AND the role-permission's
// scope (rp.scope_*). Pre-fix, only rp.scope_* was read; an
// actor granted r-operator scoped to profile=p-prod silently
// got every r-operator permission at every scope rp emitted
// (typically global), defeating HIGH-10's per-actor scope knob.
//
// Matching rules (the inner CASE encodes them):
//
// ar.scope rp.scope effective_scope
// ───────── ───────── ──────────────────────
// global global global / NULL
// global profile=X profile=X (rp narrows)
// profile=X global profile=X (ar narrows)
// profile=X profile=X profile=X (both agree)
// profile=X profile=Y ROW DROPPED (disjoint scopes — no permission flows)
// profile=X issuer=* ROW DROPPED (scope-type mismatch)
//
// The HAVING-style filter is implemented via a subquery — Postgres
// doesn't allow referencing a CASE alias from HAVING in a SELECT
// DISTINCT context without a wrapping CTE.
rows, err := r.db.QueryContext(ctx, `
SELECT DISTINCT p.name, rp.scope_type, rp.scope_id
FROM actor_roles ar
JOIN role_permissions rp ON rp.role_id = ar.role_id
JOIN permissions p ON p.id = rp.permission_id
WHERE ar.actor_id = $1
AND ar.actor_type = $2
AND ar.tenant_id = $3
AND (ar.expires_at IS NULL OR ar.expires_at > NOW())
SELECT DISTINCT permission_name, effective_scope_type, effective_scope_id
FROM (
SELECT
p.name AS permission_name,
CASE
WHEN ar.scope_type = 'global' AND rp.scope_type = 'global' THEN 'global'
WHEN ar.scope_type = 'global' THEN rp.scope_type
WHEN rp.scope_type = 'global' THEN ar.scope_type
WHEN ar.scope_type = rp.scope_type AND ar.scope_id IS NOT DISTINCT FROM rp.scope_id THEN ar.scope_type
ELSE NULL
END AS effective_scope_type,
CASE
WHEN ar.scope_type = 'global' AND rp.scope_type = 'global' THEN NULL
WHEN ar.scope_type = 'global' THEN rp.scope_id
WHEN rp.scope_type = 'global' THEN ar.scope_id
WHEN ar.scope_type = rp.scope_type AND ar.scope_id IS NOT DISTINCT FROM rp.scope_id THEN ar.scope_id
ELSE NULL
END AS effective_scope_id
FROM actor_roles ar
JOIN role_permissions rp ON rp.role_id = ar.role_id
JOIN permissions p ON p.id = rp.permission_id
WHERE ar.actor_id = $1
AND ar.actor_type = $2
AND ar.tenant_id = $3
AND (ar.expires_at IS NULL OR ar.expires_at > NOW())
) AS intersected
WHERE effective_scope_type IS NOT NULL
`, actorID, string(actorType), tenantID)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("actorRole.effective: %w", err)
@@ -505,9 +550,16 @@ func scanActorRoles(rows *sql.Rows) ([]*authdomain.ActorRole, error) {
var out []*authdomain.ActorRole
for rows.Next() {
var ar authdomain.ActorRole
var actorType string
var actorType, scopeType string
var expires sql.NullTime
if err := rows.Scan(&ar.ID, &ar.ActorID, &actorType, &ar.RoleID, &ar.GrantedAt, &expires, &ar.GrantedBy, &ar.TenantID); err != nil {
var scopeID sql.NullString
// Audit 2026-05-11 A-1 — scope_type + scope_id are persisted
// by Grant (HIGH-10 closure, migration 000043). Pre-fix they
// were never scanned, so callers received ActorRole with
// zero-value scope fields regardless of what the row held.
// EffectivePermissions narrowing depends on these being
// populated correctly.
if err := rows.Scan(&ar.ID, &ar.ActorID, &actorType, &ar.RoleID, &ar.GrantedAt, &expires, &ar.GrantedBy, &ar.TenantID, &scopeType, &scopeID); err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("actorRole scan: %w", err)
}
ar.ActorType = authdomain.ActorTypeValue(actorType)
@@ -515,6 +567,11 @@ func scanActorRoles(rows *sql.Rows) ([]*authdomain.ActorRole, error) {
t := expires.Time
ar.ExpiresAt = &t
}
ar.ScopeType = authdomain.ScopeType(scopeType)
if scopeID.Valid {
s := scopeID.String
ar.ScopeID = &s
}
out = append(out, &ar)
}
return out, rows.Err()
internal/repository/postgres/auth_scope_test.go
+305
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,305 @@
package postgres_test
// Audit 2026-05-11 A-1 closure — EffectivePermissions scope-intersection
// regression matrix. Pre-fix, the SQL only narrowed by role-permission
// scope (rp.scope_*); actor-role scope (ar.scope_*) was ignored. An
// operator who scope-granted Alice `r-operator` to `profile=p-prod`
// silently elevated Alice to `r-operator` globally. Same shape as the
// original CRIT-5 lying field, replicated in the load-bearing auth
// check path.
//
// These tests exercise the SQL change in isolation against a real
// Postgres container. They cover the six effective-scope cases the
// fix encodes (see the EffectivePermissions SQL comment block):
//
// ar.scope rp.scope expected_effective
// ───────── ───────── ──────────────────────────
// global global global / NULL
// global profile=X profile=X (rp narrows)
// profile=X global profile=X (ar narrows)
// profile=X profile=X profile=X (both agree)
// profile=X profile=Y ROW DROPPED (disjoint)
// profile=X issuer=* ROW DROPPED (scope-type mismatch)
import (
"context"
"testing"
authdomain "github.com/certctl-io/certctl/internal/domain/auth"
"github.com/certctl-io/certctl/internal/repository/postgres"
)
// seedRoleWithPerm creates a role with one permission grant at the
// supplied scope and returns the role ID. Helper for the test matrix.
func seedRoleWithPerm(t *testing.T, ctx context.Context, roleRepo *postgres.RoleRepository, permRepo *postgres.PermissionRepository, roleSuffix, permName string, rpScopeType authdomain.ScopeType, rpScopeID *string) string {
t.Helper()
roleID := "r-" + roleSuffix
role := &authdomain.Role{
ID: roleID, Name: "Test " + roleSuffix, Description: "scope-test role", TenantID: authdomain.DefaultTenantID,
}
if err := roleRepo.Create(ctx, role); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("seed role %s: %v", roleSuffix, err)
}
// Look up the permission ID (the catalogue is seeded by migrations,
// but for net-new test perms we'd need to Create — for this test
// we use a perm name from the existing default catalogue).
perm, err := permRepo.GetByName(ctx, permName)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("seed perm GetByName %s: %v", permName, err)
}
rp := &authdomain.RolePermission{
RoleID: roleID, PermissionID: perm.ID, ScopeType: rpScopeType, ScopeID: rpScopeID,
}
if err := roleRepo.AddPermission(ctx, rp); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("seed AddPermission %s/%s: %v", roleSuffix, permName, err)
}
return roleID
}
// grantActorRoleAtScope inserts an actor_roles row at the supplied
// scope. ScopeID nil = global.
func grantActorRoleAtScope(t *testing.T, ctx context.Context, repo *postgres.ActorRoleRepository, actorID, roleID string, scopeType authdomain.ScopeType, scopeID *string) {
t.Helper()
ar := &authdomain.ActorRole{
ActorID: actorID, ActorType: authdomain.ActorTypeValue("APIKey"), RoleID: roleID,
TenantID: authdomain.DefaultTenantID, ScopeType: scopeType, ScopeID: scopeID,
}
if err := repo.Grant(ctx, ar); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Grant %s -> %s@%s: %v", actorID, roleID, scopeType, err)
}
}
func ptrStr(s string) *string { return &s }
// effectivePermFor returns the single EffectivePermission for
// (actor, perm) or nil. Asserts at most one row matches the perm name —
// the SQL DISTINCT should fold duplicates.
func effectivePermFor(t *testing.T, ctx context.Context, repo *postgres.ActorRoleRepository, actorID, permName string) (authdomain.ScopeType, *string, bool) {
t.Helper()
rows, err := repo.EffectivePermissions(ctx, actorID, authdomain.ActorTypeValue("APIKey"), authdomain.DefaultTenantID)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("EffectivePermissions for %s: %v", actorID, err)
}
for _, r := range rows {
if r.PermissionName == permName {
return r.ScopeType, r.ScopeID, true
}
}
return "", nil, false
}
// TestEffectivePermissions_ActorRoleGlobal_RolePermGlobal pins the
// trivial happy path — both global → effective global.
func TestEffectivePermissions_ActorRoleGlobal_RolePermGlobal(t *testing.T) {
if testing.Short() {
t.Skip("integration test in short mode")
}
db := getTestDB(t).freshSchema(t)
ctx := context.Background()
roleRepo := postgres.NewRoleRepository(db)
permRepo := postgres.NewPermissionRepository(db)
actorRepo := postgres.NewActorRoleRepository(db)
rid := seedRoleWithPerm(t, ctx, roleRepo, permRepo, "ar-a1-globglob", "cert.read", authdomain.ScopeTypeGlobal, nil)
grantActorRoleAtScope(t, ctx, actorRepo, "alice-a1-globglob", rid, authdomain.ScopeTypeGlobal, nil)
st, sid, ok := effectivePermFor(t, ctx, actorRepo, "alice-a1-globglob", "cert.read")
if !ok {
t.Fatal("expected cert.read in effective permissions")
}
if st != authdomain.ScopeTypeGlobal {
t.Errorf("effective scope_type = %q; want global", st)
}
if sid != nil {
t.Errorf("effective scope_id = %v; want nil", sid)
}
}
// TestEffectivePermissions_ActorRoleGlobal_RolePermProfile pins that
// rp.scope narrows when ar is global — the permission flows through
// at the rp scope.
func TestEffectivePermissions_ActorRoleGlobal_RolePermProfile(t *testing.T) {
if testing.Short() {
t.Skip("integration test in short mode")
}
db := getTestDB(t).freshSchema(t)
ctx := context.Background()
roleRepo := postgres.NewRoleRepository(db)
permRepo := postgres.NewPermissionRepository(db)
actorRepo := postgres.NewActorRoleRepository(db)
rid := seedRoleWithPerm(t, ctx, roleRepo, permRepo, "ar-a1-globprof", "cert.read", authdomain.ScopeTypeProfile, ptrStr("p-prod"))
grantActorRoleAtScope(t, ctx, actorRepo, "alice-a1-globprof", rid, authdomain.ScopeTypeGlobal, nil)
st, sid, ok := effectivePermFor(t, ctx, actorRepo, "alice-a1-globprof", "cert.read")
if !ok {
t.Fatal("expected cert.read in effective permissions")
}
if st != authdomain.ScopeTypeProfile {
t.Errorf("effective scope_type = %q; want profile", st)
}
if sid == nil || *sid != "p-prod" {
t.Errorf("effective scope_id = %v; want p-prod", sid)
}
}
// TestEffectivePermissions_ActorRoleProfile_RolePermGlobal is the
// load-bearing case the A-1 fix closes: pre-fix, ar.scope was ignored
// and Alice scoped to profile=p-prod silently got the rp global
// permission AT GLOBAL SCOPE (i.e. on profile=p-acme too). Post-fix,
// the effective scope must narrow to ar.scope (profile=p-prod).
func TestEffectivePermissions_ActorRoleProfile_RolePermGlobal_A1Closure(t *testing.T) {
if testing.Short() {
t.Skip("integration test in short mode")
}
db := getTestDB(t).freshSchema(t)
ctx := context.Background()
roleRepo := postgres.NewRoleRepository(db)
permRepo := postgres.NewPermissionRepository(db)
actorRepo := postgres.NewActorRoleRepository(db)
rid := seedRoleWithPerm(t, ctx, roleRepo, permRepo, "ar-a1-profglob", "cert.read", authdomain.ScopeTypeGlobal, nil)
grantActorRoleAtScope(t, ctx, actorRepo, "alice-a1-profglob", rid, authdomain.ScopeTypeProfile, ptrStr("p-prod"))
st, sid, ok := effectivePermFor(t, ctx, actorRepo, "alice-a1-profglob", "cert.read")
if !ok {
t.Fatal("expected cert.read in effective permissions")
}
if st != authdomain.ScopeTypeProfile {
t.Errorf("A-1 closure regression: effective scope_type = %q; want profile (narrowed to ar.scope)", st)
}
if sid == nil || *sid != "p-prod" {
t.Errorf("A-1 closure regression: effective scope_id = %v; want p-prod (narrowed to ar.scope_id)", sid)
}
}
// TestEffectivePermissions_BothScopedSameTuple_Matches pins that
// (ar=profile=p-prod, rp=profile=p-prod) collapses to a single
// matching effective row at profile=p-prod.
func TestEffectivePermissions_BothScopedSameTuple_Matches(t *testing.T) {
if testing.Short() {
t.Skip("integration test in short mode")
}
db := getTestDB(t).freshSchema(t)
ctx := context.Background()
roleRepo := postgres.NewRoleRepository(db)
permRepo := postgres.NewPermissionRepository(db)
actorRepo := postgres.NewActorRoleRepository(db)
rid := seedRoleWithPerm(t, ctx, roleRepo, permRepo, "ar-a1-bothsame", "cert.read", authdomain.ScopeTypeProfile, ptrStr("p-prod"))
grantActorRoleAtScope(t, ctx, actorRepo, "alice-a1-bothsame", rid, authdomain.ScopeTypeProfile, ptrStr("p-prod"))
st, sid, ok := effectivePermFor(t, ctx, actorRepo, "alice-a1-bothsame", "cert.read")
if !ok {
t.Fatal("expected cert.read in effective permissions")
}
if st != authdomain.ScopeTypeProfile || sid == nil || *sid != "p-prod" {
t.Errorf("matching tuple did not produce profile=p-prod effective row; got (%q, %v)", st, sid)
}
}
// TestEffectivePermissions_BothScopedDifferentIDs_RowDropped pins the
// disjoint-scope case: ar.profile=p-prod, rp.profile=p-acme → no
// permission row should appear in the effective set. Pre-A1 fix, the
// permission flowed through at rp.scope (p-acme) silently.
func TestEffectivePermissions_BothScopedDifferentIDs_RowDropped(t *testing.T) {
if testing.Short() {
t.Skip("integration test in short mode")
}
db := getTestDB(t).freshSchema(t)
ctx := context.Background()
roleRepo := postgres.NewRoleRepository(db)
permRepo := postgres.NewPermissionRepository(db)
actorRepo := postgres.NewActorRoleRepository(db)
rid := seedRoleWithPerm(t, ctx, roleRepo, permRepo, "ar-a1-bothdiff", "cert.read", authdomain.ScopeTypeProfile, ptrStr("p-acme"))
grantActorRoleAtScope(t, ctx, actorRepo, "alice-a1-bothdiff", rid, authdomain.ScopeTypeProfile, ptrStr("p-prod"))
_, _, ok := effectivePermFor(t, ctx, actorRepo, "alice-a1-bothdiff", "cert.read")
if ok {
t.Error("A-1 closure regression: disjoint scopes (ar=p-prod, rp=p-acme) should NOT produce an effective permission row")
}
}
// TestEffectivePermissions_ScopeTypeMismatch_RowDropped pins the
// scope-type-disagreement case: ar.profile=p-prod, rp.issuer=iss-x →
// no permission. Cross-type narrowing is undefined.
func TestEffectivePermissions_ScopeTypeMismatch_RowDropped(t *testing.T) {
if testing.Short() {
t.Skip("integration test in short mode")
}
db := getTestDB(t).freshSchema(t)
ctx := context.Background()
roleRepo := postgres.NewRoleRepository(db)
permRepo := postgres.NewPermissionRepository(db)
actorRepo := postgres.NewActorRoleRepository(db)
rid := seedRoleWithPerm(t, ctx, roleRepo, permRepo, "ar-a1-typemis", "cert.read", authdomain.ScopeTypeIssuer, ptrStr("iss-x"))
grantActorRoleAtScope(t, ctx, actorRepo, "alice-a1-typemis", rid, authdomain.ScopeTypeProfile, ptrStr("p-prod"))
_, _, ok := effectivePermFor(t, ctx, actorRepo, "alice-a1-typemis", "cert.read")
if ok {
t.Error("A-1 closure regression: scope-type mismatch (ar=profile, rp=issuer) should NOT produce an effective permission row")
}
}
// TestEffectivePermissions_ExpiredGrant_Excluded pins that
// ar.expires_at < NOW() excludes the grant from the effective set.
// This worked pre-A1; the test pins it stays correct under the new
// subquery shape.
func TestEffectivePermissions_ExpiredGrant_Excluded(t *testing.T) {
if testing.Short() {
t.Skip("integration test in short mode")
}
db := getTestDB(t).freshSchema(t)
ctx := context.Background()
roleRepo := postgres.NewRoleRepository(db)
permRepo := postgres.NewPermissionRepository(db)
actorRepo := postgres.NewActorRoleRepository(db)
rid := seedRoleWithPerm(t, ctx, roleRepo, permRepo, "ar-a1-expired", "cert.read", authdomain.ScopeTypeGlobal, nil)
// Set an expired grant by post-hoc UPDATE since Grant doesn't accept
// past expires_at via the API — we mimic the "grant was made,
// expired since" steady state.
grantActorRoleAtScope(t, ctx, actorRepo, "alice-a1-expired", rid, authdomain.ScopeTypeGlobal, nil)
if _, err := db.ExecContext(ctx, `UPDATE actor_roles SET expires_at = NOW() - INTERVAL '1 hour' WHERE actor_id = $1`, "alice-a1-expired"); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("expire grant: %v", err)
}
_, _, ok := effectivePermFor(t, ctx, actorRepo, "alice-a1-expired", "cert.read")
if ok {
t.Error("expired grant should not contribute to effective permissions")
}
}
// TestListByActor_ReturnsScopeColumns pins that ar.scope_type / scope_id
// surface on the read-side ListByActor path. Pre-A1 fix, scanActorRoles
// didn't read these columns even when the row carried non-default
// values — operators couldn't see what they configured.
func TestListByActor_ReturnsScopeColumns(t *testing.T) {
if testing.Short() {
t.Skip("integration test in short mode")
}
db := getTestDB(t).freshSchema(t)
ctx := context.Background()
roleRepo := postgres.NewRoleRepository(db)
permRepo := postgres.NewPermissionRepository(db)
actorRepo := postgres.NewActorRoleRepository(db)
rid := seedRoleWithPerm(t, ctx, roleRepo, permRepo, "ar-a1-listscope", "cert.read", authdomain.ScopeTypeGlobal, nil)
grantActorRoleAtScope(t, ctx, actorRepo, "alice-a1-listscope", rid, authdomain.ScopeTypeProfile, ptrStr("p-staging"))
grants, err := actorRepo.ListByActor(ctx, "alice-a1-listscope", authdomain.ActorTypeValue("APIKey"), authdomain.DefaultTenantID)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("ListByActor: %v", err)
}
if len(grants) != 1 {
t.Fatalf("got %d grants; want 1", len(grants))
}
if grants[0].ScopeType != authdomain.ScopeTypeProfile {
t.Errorf("ListByActor scope_type = %q; want profile", grants[0].ScopeType)
}
if grants[0].ScopeID == nil || *grants[0].ScopeID != "p-staging" {
t.Errorf("ListByActor scope_id = %v; want p-staging", grants[0].ScopeID)
}
}
internal/service/auth/service_test.go
+50
View File
@@ -282,6 +282,56 @@ func TestAuthorizer_SpecificScopeMatchesExactID(t *testing.T) {
}
}
// Audit 2026-05-11 A-1 — pin that when the SQL narrowed effective set
// reflects an actor-role-scope-narrowed permission, CheckPermission
// authorizes only the narrowed scope. This is the unit-level
// counterpart to TestEffectivePermissions_ActorRoleProfile_RolePermGlobal_A1Closure
// in internal/repository/postgres/auth_scope_test.go which exercises
// the actual SQL.
//
// Pre-fix, the SQL ignored ar.scope_*, so a profile-scoped grant
// produced a row with rp.scope (global), and CheckPermission would
// pass for ANY profile. Post-fix, the SQL narrows the row to
// (profile, p-prod), and CheckPermission only passes when the
// request scope matches.
func TestAuthorizer_ActorRoleProfileScope_OnlyNarrowedScopeAuthorizes_A1(t *testing.T) {
r := newFakeActorRoleRepo()
scope := "p-prod"
// Simulate the post-A-1 SQL emission: actor-role scoped to
// profile=p-prod + role-permission scoped global → narrowed
// effective row at profile=p-prod.
r.perms[actorKey("alice", authdomain.ActorTypeValue(domain.ActorTypeAPIKey))] = []repository.EffectivePermission{
{PermissionName: "cert.read", ScopeType: authdomain.ScopeTypeProfile, ScopeID: &scope},
}
az := NewAuthorizer(r)
// Request scope matches narrowed grant → authorize.
matchID := "p-prod"
ok, err := az.CheckPermission(context.Background(), "alice", authdomain.ActorTypeValue(domain.ActorTypeAPIKey), authdomain.DefaultTenantID, "cert.read", authdomain.ScopeTypeProfile, &matchID)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("CheckPermission (matching scope): %v", err)
}
if !ok {
t.Error("A-1: profile-scoped grant must authorize matching profile request")
}
// Different profile → reject (the load-bearing post-fix
// behavior). Pre-fix this would have returned true silently.
wrongID := "p-acme"
ok, _ = az.CheckPermission(context.Background(), "alice", authdomain.ActorTypeValue(domain.ActorTypeAPIKey), authdomain.DefaultTenantID, "cert.read", authdomain.ScopeTypeProfile, &wrongID)
if ok {
t.Error("A-1 regression: profile-scoped grant must NOT authorize a different profile (the canonical CRIT-5 shape)")
}
// Global request → also reject. A profile-scoped actor-role
// grant doesn't elevate to global; same shape as RFC 9700
// least-privilege.
ok, _ = az.CheckPermission(context.Background(), "alice", authdomain.ActorTypeValue(domain.ActorTypeAPIKey), authdomain.DefaultTenantID, "cert.read", authdomain.ScopeTypeGlobal, nil)
if ok {
t.Error("A-1: profile-scoped grant must NOT authorize a global request")
}
}
// =============================================================================
// RoleService tests
// =============================================================================