Commit Graph

23 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
shankar0123 8b75e0311b chore: rename Go module path to github.com/certctl-io/certctl
Mechanical sed across the main go.mod's module declaration, the f5-mock-icontrol
sub-module's go.mod, every Go file's import path (361 files), and a rebuild of
the checked-in f5-mock-icontrol binary so its embedded build-info reflects the
new module path. No behavior change.

Choice B from cowork/transfer-certctl-to-org.md, executed 2026-05-04. Choice A
(keep module path declared as github.com/shankar0123/certctl regardless of
repo URL) shipped on the day of the org transfer (2026-05-03) since we had no
external Go consumers; this commit closes that deferral.

Backward-compat: GitHub HTTP redirects continue to forward
github.com/shankar0123/certctl → github.com/certctl-io/certctl at the URL
level, but Go's module proxy uses the path declared in go.mod as the
canonical name. Pre-fix, anyone trying `go get github.com/certctl-io/certctl/...`
hit a "module path mismatch" error because go.mod said
github.com/shankar0123/certctl and the URL they fetched it from said
certctl-io/certctl. Post-fix, the canonical name and the URL agree, so
go get / go install / external Go consumers / Go-tooling integrations
work cleanly via either the new path (preferred) or the old path (which
redirects and Go follows the redirect for source fetch).

Anyone still importing the old path inside their own code keeps working
provided they update their go.mod's `require` line to match — the module
path declared in their consumer's go.sum / go.mod is the authoritative
import name, so a mass sed across their import statements is the migration
on the consumer side. No external consumers exist today.

Diff shape:
  361 *.go files  — import path replacement only
    2 go.mod     — module declaration replacement only
    1 binary     — deploy/test/f5-mock-icontrol/f5-mock-icontrol rebuilt
                   so embedded build-info reflects the new path (8618965 vs
                   8618933 bytes; 32-byte diff is the build-info change)

  Total: 364 files, 730 insertions / 730 deletions, net-zero size, pure
  mechanical substitution.

Verification:
  gofmt: 17 files needed re-alignment after sed (the new path is one char
    shorter than the old, so column-aligned import groups drifted). Applied
    `gofmt -w` to fix.
  go mod tidy: clean exit on both modules.
  go vet ./...: clean exit.
  go build ./...: clean exit.
  go test -short -count=1 on representative packages: all green
    (internal/domain, internal/validation, internal/crypto, internal/crypto/signer,
    cmd/agent). Test output now reads `ok github.com/certctl-io/certctl/...`
    confirming the module path resolves correctly.
  binary: f5-mock-icontrol rebuilt; `strings | grep shankar0123` returns
    nothing; `strings | grep certctl-io/certctl` shows the new module path
    embedded in build-info.

Files intentionally NOT touched in this commit:
  README.md / CHANGELOG.md / docs/ / etc. — already swept to certctl-io
    URLs in commit 0729ee4 (the post-transfer URL refresh). This commit is
    purely the Go-tooling layer.
  Scarf pixels (`shankar0123.docker.scarf.sh/...`) — Scarf-account
    namespace, not a Go import or GitHub repo URL. Stays.

This is a non-blocking, non-customer-impacting change. Operators pulling
container images, running `make verify`, hitting the API, or installing the
agent see no functional difference. Only Go-tooling consumers (none today)
are affected, and they're enabled — not broken — by this commit.
2026-05-04 00:30:29 +00:00
shankar0123 a808948397 feat(est): per-profile dispatch — multi-profile env-var family + back-compat shim
EST RFC 7030 hardening master bundle Phases 0 + 1 of 13. Lays the
foundation for the remaining hardening phases (mTLS auth, HTTP Basic
auth, channel binding, server-keygen, admin observability, GUI, libest
e2e) without changing existing operator behavior — backward-compat
shim preserves the v2.0.66 single-issuer flat env-var setup.

WHAT LANDS:

Phase 0 — Frozen decisions
  9 frozen decisions documented in
  cowork/est-rfc7030-hardening-prompt.md::Phase 0 frozen decisions
  (auth modes mTLS+Basic at GA; RFC 9266 channel binding; multi-profile
  env-var family CERTCTL_EST_PROFILES; mTLS sibling URL
  /.well-known/est-mtls/<pathID>; serverkeygen ships V2; fullcmc
  deferred; renewal device-driven per RFC 7030 §4.2.2; csrattrs
  algorithm allow-list profile-derived; libest as e2e reference).

Phase 1 — Multi-profile config + per-profile dispatch
  internal/config/config.go: extended ESTConfig with Profiles slice;
  added ESTProfileConfig struct with all field contracts (PathID +
  IssuerID + ProfileID + EnrollmentPassword + MTLSEnabled +
  MTLSClientCATrustBundlePath + ChannelBindingRequired +
  AllowedAuthModes + RateLimitPerPrincipal24h + ServerKeygenEnabled).
  Forward-looking fields (mTLS, HTTP Basic, channel binding,
  rate limit, server-keygen) are dormant in Phase 1 — Phase 2-5 wire
  the corresponding handlers; Validate() gates ensure operators can't
  set incoherent combinations (MTLSEnabled=true without bundle path,
  basic auth without password, mtls auth mode without MTLSEnabled,
  ChannelBindingRequired without mTLS, ServerKeygenEnabled without
  ProfileID).

  loadESTProfilesFromEnv: mirrors loadSCEPProfilesFromEnv exactly.
  Reads CERTCTL_EST_PROFILES=corp,iot,wifi and per-profile env vars
  CERTCTL_EST_PROFILE_<NAME>_*. Lowercase PathID, uppercase env-var
  name. parseAuthModes handles comma-separated normalization.

  mergeESTLegacyIntoProfiles: back-compat shim. When CERTCTL_EST_PROFILES
  is unset AND CERTCTL_EST_ENABLED=true, synthesizes a single-element
  Profiles[0] with PathID="" so existing /.well-known/est/
  operators see no behavior change.

  validESTPathID + validESTAuthMode: shape validators. PathID matches
  [a-z0-9-]+ with no leading/trailing hyphen (mirrors validSCEPPathID
  exactly). Auth mode is one of {mtls, basic}.

  Per-profile Validate(): refuses every documented misconfiguration
  with operator-greppable error messages naming the offending profile
  index + PathID + field. Mirrors the SCEP audit-closure pattern.

internal/api/router/router.go: refactored RegisterESTHandlers from
  single-handler to map[string]ESTHandler. Empty PathID maps to legacy
  /.well-known/est/ root (literal-string r.Register calls preserve
  openapi-parity scanner behavior). Non-empty PathIDs dynamic-register
  /.well-known/est/<pathID>/{cacerts,simpleenroll,simplereenroll,csrattrs}.
  Mirrors the SCEP per-profile dispatch from commit fdd424b.

cmd/server/main.go: refactored EST startup block to iterate
  cfg.EST.Profiles. Per-profile preflight (issuer-in-registry,
  preflightEnrollmentIssuer L-005 gate) runs in the loop with
  per-profile structured logging including PathID. Failures log the
  offending PathID so multi-profile deploys can pinpoint which broke
  startup. Mirrors the SCEP per-profile loop from commit fdd424b.

Updated 3 callers of the old single-handler signature:
  - internal/api/router/router_test.go::TestRegisterESTHandlers_AllPaths
  - internal/integration/lifecycle_test.go::setupTestServer
  - internal/integration/negative_test.go::setupTestServer
  Each wraps the existing single ESTHandler in a single-element
  map[string]handler.ESTHandler{"": estHandler} preserving exact
  legacy behavior.

NEW TESTS:

internal/config/config_est_profiles_test.go (12 tests):
  - LegacyFlatFields_SynthesizeSingleProfile (back-compat shim)
  - DisabledNoLegacyShim
  - MultipleProfiles_LoadFromEnv (3 profiles: corp+mtls+basic+keygen,
    iot+basic, wifi+mtls; verifies every field round-trips)
  - StructuredFormBeatsLegacy
  - PathIDValidation (12 sub-cases: empty/valid/leading-hyphen/
    trailing-hyphen/uppercase/slash/dot/underscore/space/percent)
  - DuplicatePathID_Refuses
  - MissingPerProfileIssuerID
  - MTLSEnabledRequiresBundlePath
  - ChannelBindingWithoutMTLS_Refuses (cross-check)
  - BasicAuthInModesRequiresPassword (cross-check)
  - MTLSAuthModeRequiresMTLSEnabled (cross-check)
  - UnknownAuthModeRefused
  - NegativeRateLimitRefused
  - ServerKeygenRequiresProfileID
  - DisabledIgnoresProfiles
  - ParseAuthModes_Normalization (8 sub-cases)

internal/api/router/router_est_profiles_test.go (4 tests):
  - LegacyEmptyPathIDMapsToRoot
  - NonEmptyPathIDMapsToSubpath
  - MultipleProfilesNoCrossBleed (the load-bearing dispatch invariant —
    each profile's PathID routes to its OWN handler instance,
    proven via per-profile-tagged mock responses with base64 prefix
    matching)
  - EmptyMapRegistersNoRoutes

VERIFICATION (sandbox, Go 1.25.9):
  gofmt -l                — clean for all changed files
  staticcheck             — clean for config + router + handler +
                            integration + cmd/server packages
  go vet                  — clean for the same packages
  go test -short -count=1 — green for config, router, handler,
                            service, integration, cmd/server

NEXT (Phase 2): mTLS client cert auth + TrustAnchorHolder + RFC 9266
tls-exporter channel binding. Phase 1's Validate gates already refuse
the incoherent configurations Phase 2 must defend against; Phase 2
adds the actual TLS-listener wiring + handler-side cert validation +
channel-binding extraction.

Spec preserved at cowork/est-rfc7030-hardening-prompt.md.
2026-04-29 22:17:52 +00:00
shankar0123 85e60b24ec fix(bundle-5): Operational Liveness + Bootstrap — 4 audit findings closed
Closes Audit-2026-04-25 H-006 (High), H-007 (High), M-011 (Medium),
L-006 (Low — verified-already-closed via C-1 master closure in v2.0.54).
Hardens the orchestrator-facing surface — k8s probes, agent enrollment,
shutdown audit drain, scheduler config plumbing.

What changed
- internal/api/handler/health.go — split contract:
    * /health stays shallow 200 (k8s liveness — process alive)
    * /ready accepts *sql.DB; runs db.PingContext(2s); 503 on failure
    * Nil DB path returns 200 + db=not_configured (test fixtures)
- internal/api/handler/agent_bootstrap.go (NEW) — verifyBootstrapToken:
    * empty expected = warn-mode pass-through
    * non-empty = `Authorization: Bearer <token>` required
    * crypto/subtle.ConstantTimeCompare; length-mismatch path runs dummy
      compare to keep timing uniform
    * ErrBootstrapTokenInvalid sentinel
- internal/api/handler/agents.go — RegisterAgent calls verifyBootstrapToken
  BEFORE body parse so unauth probes don't even allocate a JSON decoder
- internal/config/config.go — two new env vars:
    * CERTCTL_AGENT_BOOTSTRAP_TOKEN  (Auth.AgentBootstrapToken)
    * CERTCTL_AUDIT_FLUSH_TIMEOUT_SECONDS (Server.AuditFlushTimeoutSeconds)
- cmd/server/main.go — 3 changes:
    * pass *sql.DB into NewHealthHandler (H-006)
    * pass cfg.Auth.AgentBootstrapToken into NewAgentHandler (H-007)
    * configurable shutdown audit-flush timeout (M-011)
    * one-shot startup WARN when bootstrap token unset (deprecation)
- new tests: agent_bootstrap_test.go (full deny/accept/warn-mode coverage,
  constant-time compare path, length-mismatch); health_test.go extended
  with /ready DB-probe failure (503), nil-DB pass-through, /health-shallow

L-006 verified
- cmd/server/main.go:557 already calls
  sched.SetShortLivedExpiryCheckInterval(cfg.Scheduler.ShortLivedExpiryCheckInterval)
  per the C-1 master closure in v2.0.54. Bundle 5 confirms; no code change.

Threat model: TB-1 (operator/orchestrator), TB-2 (Agent↔Server).
- CWE-754 (Improper Check for Unusual or Exceptional Conditions) for H-006
- CWE-306 + CWE-288 (Missing Authentication for Critical Function) for H-007

Verification
- go vet ./...                               → clean
- go build ./...                             → clean
- go test -short -count=1 ./...              → all packages pass
- targeted Bundle-5 regressions               → all pass
- npx tsc --noEmit (web)                     → clean
- npx vitest run (web)                       → in-flight (sandbox 45s
  ceiling exceeded; no failure markers in dot stream; no frontend
  changes in this bundle so no regression risk)
- python3 yaml.safe_load(api/openapi.yaml)   → 89 paths

Backward compatibility
- Bootstrap token defaults to empty (warn-mode) — existing demo
  deployments unaffected. Server logs deprecation WARN; v2.2.0 will
  require it.
- Audit flush timeout default 30s preserves prior behaviour.
- Helm chart already routes readiness probe to /ready (no chart change
  needed); now /ready actually probes the DB.

Bundle 5 of the 2026-04-25 comprehensive audit.
2026-04-25 23:54:18 +00:00
shankar0123 1c099071d1 fix(bundle-4): EST/SCEP Attack Surface Hardening — 3 audit findings closed
Closes 3 findings (1 High + 1 Medium + 1 Low) from
/Users/shankar/Desktop/cowork/comprehensive-audit-2026-04-25/.

Bundle 4 hardens the only attack surface reachable by an anonymous network
attacker in certctl: the unauthenticated EST + SCEP enrollment endpoints.

Findings closed:

  - H-004 (High): Hand-rolled ASN.1 parser had no fuzz target.
    The audit's original framing pointed at internal/pkcs7/, but recon
    confirmed that package is an ASN.1 ENCODER (BuildCertsOnlyPKCS7,
    ASN1Wrap*, ASN1EncodeLength) — not a parser. The actual hand-rolled
    PKCS#7 PARSING reachable via anonymous network is in
    internal/api/handler/scep.go::extractCSRFromPKCS7 +
    parseSignedDataForCSR. Added native go fuzz targets:
      * internal/api/handler/scep_fuzz_test.go::FuzzExtractCSRFromPKCS7
      * internal/api/handler/scep_fuzz_test.go::FuzzParseSignedDataForCSR
      * internal/pkcs7/pkcs7_fuzz_test.go::FuzzPEMToDERChain (defense-in-depth)
      * internal/pkcs7/pkcs7_fuzz_test.go::FuzzASN1EncodeLength (defense-in-depth)
    Local 15s fuzz session: 150k execs on FuzzExtractCSRFromPKCS7,
    937k on FuzzPEMToDERChain, 925k on FuzzASN1EncodeLength — zero panics.

  - M-021 (Medium): EST TLS-Unique channel binding (RFC 7030 §3.2.3).
    Added internal/api/handler/est.go::verifyESTTransport — defense-in-depth
    TLS pre-conditions (r.TLS != nil; HandshakeComplete; TLS ≥ 1.2).
    The full §3.2.3 channel binding only applies when EST mTLS is in use;
    certctl does not currently support EST mTLS, so the §3.2.3 requirement
    is moot today. RFC 9266 (TLS 1.3 tls-exporter) and EST mTLS are
    documented as deferred follow-ups in the verifyESTTransport doc comment.

  - L-005 (Low): EST/SCEP issuer-binding fail-loud at startup.
    Pre-Bundle-4 cmd/server/main.go validated that CERTCTL_EST_ISSUER_ID and
    CERTCTL_SCEP_ISSUER_ID existed in the registry but did NOT validate the
    issuer TYPE could emit a CA cert. An operator binding EST to an ACME
    issuer (whose GetCACertPEM returns explicit error) booted successfully
    and only failed at first /est/cacerts request. Post-Bundle-4: new
    preflightEnrollmentIssuer helper calls GetCACertPEM(ctx) at startup
    with a 10s timeout. Failure logs the connector error + the candidate
    issuer types and os.Exit(1).

Tests added/modified:
  - internal/api/handler/est_transport_test.go (new) — 5 verifyESTTransport
    table cases covering plaintext-rejected, incomplete-handshake-rejected,
    TLS 1.0 rejected, TLS 1.2/1.3 accepted
  - cmd/server/preflight_test.go (new) — TestPreflightEnrollmentIssuer
    covering nil-connector, error-from-issuer, empty-PEM, valid cases
  - internal/api/handler/est_handler_test.go (modified) — 7 POST sites
    now stamp r.TLS to satisfy the new transport pre-condition
  - internal/integration/negative_test.go (modified) — setupTestServer
    wraps the test handler with a fake-TLS-state injector so the EST
    handler receives r.TLS != nil; production paths still rely on the
    real TLS listener

Threat model reference: TB-11 (EST/SCEP client ↔ Server) per
cowork/comprehensive-audit-2026-04-25/threat-model.md.
Standards: RFC 7030 §3.2.3, RFC 8894 §3, RFC 5652, RFC 9266 (deferred).
2026-04-25 21:14:41 +00:00
shankar0123 3287e174dc Unify API auth + RFC-compliant CRL/OCSP (M-002 + M-003 + M-006, auto-closes M-001)
Closes the remaining P1 gaps from coverage-gap-audit.md (M-001/M-002/M-003/M-006)
on top of the C-001/C-002 ownership + agent-FK contract fixes landed in
a53a4b8. The work lands as a single commit spanning server, docs, tests,
and the React client.

M-002 — Named API keys with per-key actor propagation
  * Migration 000014 adds the 'api_keys' table (id, name, hash,
    principal, role, created_at, last_used_at, disabled_at) so every
    credential carries an identifiable principal instead of the
    opaque 'anonymous'/'api-key' sentinel.
  * Auth middleware now rotates through configured keys, performs
    constant-time hash comparison, stamps 'last_used_at', and emits
    an actor struct via contextWithActor(). The audit middleware,
    bulk-revocation handler, approval handlers, and MCP tool layer
    now read the principal off the context and persist it on every
    audit_events row.
  * Regression coverage:
      - internal/api/middleware/audit_test.go — actor propagation,
        principal redaction for disabled keys, anonymous fallback for
        unauthenticated endpoints.
      - internal/api/handler/bulk_revocation_handler_test.go,
        job_handler_test.go — principal-on-audit assertions.

M-003 — Authorization gates (Phase B)
  * Approval handler rejects self-approval / self-rejection with 403
    when the actor principal equals the job's requested_by field.
  * Bulk revocation is gated behind the 'admin' role; operators and
    viewers receive 403.
  * Regression coverage:
      - internal/service/job_test.go — TestApproveJob_NotSelf,
        TestRejectJob_NotSelf.
      - internal/api/handler/bulk_revocation_handler_test.go —
        TestBulkRevoke_RequiresAdmin, TestBulkRevoke_AdminSucceeds.

M-006 — RFC-compliant CRL/OCSP on the unauthenticated .well-known mux
  * Per RFC 8615, relying parties cannot reasonably be asked to
    authenticate against the issuing certctl instance to retrieve
    revocation material. CRL and OCSP move off the authenticated
    '/api/v1/crl*' and '/api/v1/ocsp/*' paths onto:
        GET /.well-known/pki/crl/{issuer_id}
            Content-Type: application/pkix-crl   (RFC 5280 §5)
        GET /.well-known/pki/ocsp/{issuer_id}/{serial}
            Content-Type: application/ocsp-response  (RFC 6960)
  * Non-standard JSON CRL shape is removed; only DER is served.
  * Short-lived certificate exemption (profile TTL < 1h → skip
    CRL/OCSP) is preserved; the response simply omits the serial.
  * Routes are registered on the unauthenticated 'finalHandler' mux
    in cmd/server/main.go alongside EST ('/.well-known/est/*') and
    SCEP ('/scep'). Legacy authenticated paths return 404.
  * Regression coverage:
      - internal/api/handler/certificate_handler_test.go — content
        type, DER parseability, 404 for unknown issuer.
      - internal/api/handler/adversarial_path_test.go — unauthenticated
        access asserted for CRL, OCSP, EST, SCEP.
      - internal/api/router/router_test.go — route-table assertion
        that '.well-known/pki/*', '.well-known/est/*', and '/scep' are
        mounted on the unauthenticated branch.

M-001 — Auto-closed by M-002
  EST and SCEP were already registered on the unauthenticated
  'finalHandler' mux; the router comment at
  internal/api/router/router.go:247 now matches reality. The
  adversarial-path tests above lock the behavior in.

Verification (all gates green):
  * go vet ./...                                           — clean
  * go build ./...                                         — ok
  * go test -short ./... (55+ packages)                    — all pass
  * web/ : npm test (225 Vitest tests)                     — all pass
  * web/ : npx tsc --noEmit                                — clean
  * grep sweep for '/api/v1/(crl|ocsp)' — 13 surviving hits,
    all intentional M-006 tombstone/relocation comments.

Documentation:
  * coverage-gap-audit.md — status flips M-001/M-002/M-003/M-006 →
    Fixed, with per-finding resolution paragraphs citing regression
    test IDs. (Audit file lives outside this repo; see cowork root.)
  * CLAUDE.md Project Status line updated with the auth-unification
    closure note.
  * docs/features.md, docs/architecture.md, docs/quickstart.md,
    docs/concepts.md, docs/connectors.md, docs/test-env.md,
    docs/testing-guide.md, docs/compliance-*.md, docs/demo-advanced.md
    — refreshed for the new '.well-known/pki/*' namespace and named
    API keys.
  * api/openapi.yaml — documents the new unauthenticated endpoints
    and removes the legacy '/api/v1/crl*' + '/api/v1/ocsp/*' paths.

.gitignore: adds '/.gocache/' and '/.gomodcache/' for the session-
scoped Go caches so they never enter the tree.
2026-04-18 18:17:41 +00:00
shankar0123 5abeeb882b fix(crypto): per-ciphertext PBKDF2 salt + v2 versioned format with v1 fallback (M-8) 2026-04-17 05:36:29 +00:00
shankar0123 f549a7aa79 security: fail closed when CERTCTL_CONFIG_ENCRYPTION_KEY is unset (fixes C-2)
EncryptIfKeySet/DecryptIfKeySet in internal/crypto/encryption.go previously
returned plaintext + wasEncrypted=false when the operator had not configured
CERTCTL_CONFIG_ENCRYPTION_KEY. That produced a data-at-rest confidentiality
bypass (CWE-311): sensitive fields on dynamically-configured issuer and
target rows (source='database') were persisted to PostgreSQL without any
encryption, and no caller could distinguish the encrypted from the plaintext
branch at runtime. The only visible signal was a single warning log line
emitted once at startup.

Fail closed instead:

- EncryptIfKeySet / DecryptIfKeySet now return crypto.ErrEncryptionKeyRequired
  (a new exported sentinel, errors.Is-unwrappable) when the key is empty or
  nil, rather than silently emitting plaintext. The (result, wasEncrypted,
  err) tuple signature is preserved for source compatibility; only the
  semantics of the no-key branch changed.

- cmd/server/main.go grows a startup pre-flight check: if no encryption key
  is configured the server lists issuers and targets, counts rows with
  source='database', and refuses to start (os.Exit(1)) if any exist. Operators
  must either configure CERTCTL_CONFIG_ENCRYPTION_KEY or remove the exposed
  rows before the control plane can boot. The warning-only path is retained
  for the clean-slate case (no database rows).

- internal/service/issuer.go's SeedFromEnvVars now guards the encryption call
  with len(s.encryptionKey) > 0 so env-seeded rows (source='env', which are
  reconstructable on every boot from process env) continue to persist as
  plaintext in the 'config' column when no key is configured. Registry load
  already falls through to cfg.Config when EncryptedConfig is nil. GUI/API
  write paths (source='database') remain fail-closed via propagation of
  ErrEncryptionKeyRequired.

- Integration tests that exercise CreateIssuer via the handler layer now
  supply a real 32-byte AES-256 test key so the encrypt path runs instead of
  returning ErrEncryptionKeyRequired. Same pattern in internal/service/
  testutil_test.go for consolidated service-layer tests.

- internal/crypto/encryption_test.go grows regression guards:
  TestEncryptIfKeySet_EmptyKeyFailsClosed (nil_key + empty_key subtests),
  TestDecryptIfKeySet_EmptyKeyFailsClosed (nil_key + empty_key subtests),
  TestEncryptDecryptIfKeySet_RoundTripProducesDifferentCiphertext,
  TestDecryptIfKeySet_RejectsTamperedCiphertext, and
  TestEncryptIfKeySet_PreservesErrEncryptionKeyRequiredSentinel (verifies
  the sentinel unwraps through fmt.Errorf(%w)-style wrapping).

Wire format is unchanged: AES-256-GCM Encrypt/Decrypt/DeriveKey, the
12-byte nonce prefix, the GCM auth tag, the PBKDF2 salt
('certctl-config-encryption-v1'), and the 100,000 iteration count are all
byte-identical. Ciphertexts produced before this change remain decryptable.

Verified:
- go build ./... : clean
- go vet ./...   : clean
- go test -race ./internal/crypto/... ./internal/service/... \
    ./internal/integration/... ./cmd/server/... : pass
- golangci-lint run ./... : 0 issues
- govulncheck ./... : 0 reachable vulnerabilities
- rg 'return plaintext, false, nil' internal/ : no matches
- Coverage: crypto 85.0% (unchanged), service 67.8% (was 67.9%, noise),
  cmd/server 0.0% (unchanged baseline). All above CI thresholds.

See certctl-audit-report.md for the full finding record and resolution log.
2026-04-16 21:10:40 +00:00
shankar0123 13cd4d98ba feat(V2.2): bulk revocation — filter-based fleet-wide certificate revocation
Add POST /api/v1/certificates/bulk-revoke with filter criteria (profile_id,
owner_id, agent_id, issuer_id, team_id, certificate_ids), partial-failure
tolerance, and audit trail. Includes MCP tool, CLI command (certs bulk-revoke),
server-side bulk modal in GUI replacing client-side sequential loop, OpenAPI
spec, compliance mapping updates, and 21 new tests (12 service, 7 handler,
1 CLI, 1 frontend).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-04-16 00:06:34 -04:00
shankar0123 995b72df05 feat(M34): dynamic issuer configuration with encrypted config storage
Replace static env-var-based issuer wiring with GUI-driven dynamic
configuration stored encrypted in PostgreSQL. Operators can now
configure, test, enable/disable, and manage issuers from the dashboard
without restarting the server.

Key changes:
- AES-256-GCM encryption for sensitive issuer config at rest (PBKDF2
  key derivation with 100k iterations)
- Dynamic IssuerRegistry with sync.RWMutex replacing static map
- Connector factory pattern (issuerfactory.NewFromConfig) replacing
  140 lines of static wiring in main.go
- Migration 000009: encrypted_config, last_tested_at, test_status,
  source columns on issuers table
- Env var seeding on first boot with ON CONFLICT DO NOTHING
- Registry Rebuild() for atomic map swap after CRUD operations
- Issuer type validation against domain constants on Create
- Audit trail for test connection results
- Conditional seeding for step-ca/OpenSSL (only when env vars set)
- GUI: source badge, connection test status on issuer detail page

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-04-04 00:20:13 -04:00
shankar0123 fde5b39d53 fix: resolve test compilation and runtime failures across codebase
- Add context.Context to handler test mocks (agent, agent_group)
- Refactor scheduler to use local interfaces instead of concrete service types
- Wire RevocationSvc/CAOperationsSvc sub-services in integration tests
- Add context.Background() to service test calls (agent, agent_group)
- Fix repo integration tests: add FK prerequisite records (team, owner,
  issuer, renewal_policy) before creating certificates
- Set MaxOpenConns(1) on test DB to preserve SET search_path across queries
- Fix Apache/HAProxy tests: replace "echo ok"/"echo reload" with "true"
  binary to avoid macOS exec.Command PATH resolution failure
- Fix validation tests: correct error expectations for regex-first checks,
  replace null byte strings with strings.Repeat for length tests
- Fix scheduler timeout test flakiness with t.Skip fallback
- Remove unused imports (context in ca_operations_test, service in scheduler)

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-03-27 22:53:46 -04:00
shankar0123 677c28aeca refactor(api): TICKET-006 replace 18-param RegisterHandlers with HandlerRegistry struct
Replace the 18-parameter RegisterHandlers function signature with a cleaner
HandlerRegistry struct that groups all API handler dependencies. This eliminates
the signature explosion that made the function difficult to read and maintain.

Changes:
- Added HandlerRegistry struct with 18 fields grouping all handler types
- Updated RegisterHandlers to accept a single HandlerRegistry parameter
- Updated all internal handler references to use reg.FieldName syntax
- Updated call sites in cmd/server/main.go and integration tests
- No functional changes, purely structural refactoring

Resolves TICKET-006: RegisterHandlers Signature Explosion
2026-03-27 21:40:21 -04:00
shankar0123 be72627aeb feat: M25 post-deployment TLS verification + M26 Traefik/Caddy targets
M25: After deploying a certificate, the agent probes the live TLS
endpoint and compares SHA-256 fingerprints to verify the correct cert
is being served. Best-effort — failures don't block deployments.
New endpoints: POST /jobs/{id}/verify, GET /jobs/{id}/verification.
Migration 000008 adds verification columns to jobs table.

M26: Traefik target connector (file provider, auto-reload) and Caddy
target connector (dual-mode: admin API hot-reload or file-based).
Both wired into agent dispatch.

Also: restructured README to highlight supported integrations (issuers,
targets, notifiers) earlier, moved API/CLI/MCP sections lower. Updated
all docs (features, connectors, architecture, testing guide, why-certctl)
and fixed integration tests for 18-param RegisterHandlers signature.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-03-27 21:07:16 -04:00
shankar0123 50c520e1ff feat: dashboard theme overhaul — light content area with branded teal sidebar
Complete frontend visual redesign using certctl logo color palette:
- Deep teal sidebar (#0c2e25) with prominent centered logo (64px in white pill)
- Light content area (#f0f4f8) with white cards and visible borders
- Brand colors from logo: teal (#2ea88f), blue (#3b7dd8), orange (#e8873a), green (#4ebe6e)
- Inter + JetBrains Mono typography, colored stat card top borders
- All 17 pages + 7 components updated (25 files, ~700 lines changed)
- 15 new dashboard screenshots replacing old dark theme screenshots
- Prometheus metrics e2e test added, integration test mock fixes
- Docs updated: architecture.md theme description, testing-guide.md DNS-PERSIST-01 coverage

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-03-26 23:27:42 -04:00
shankar0123 7d14635a72 feat: add EST server (RFC 7030) for device certificate enrollment (M23)
Implement Enrollment over Secure Transport protocol with 4 endpoints under
/.well-known/est/ — cacerts (CA chain distribution), simpleenroll (initial
enrollment), simplereenroll (certificate renewal), and csrattrs (CSR
attributes). PKCS#7 certs-only wire format with hand-rolled ASN.1, accepts
both PEM and base64-encoded DER CSRs, configurable issuer and profile
binding, full audit trail. 28 new tests (18 handler + 10 service).

Also includes:
- GetCACertPEM added to issuer connector interface (all 4 issuers updated)
- EST integration tests wired into e2e test suite (13 test cases)
- QA testing guide Part 26 (15 manual EST test cases)
- All docs updated: README, features, architecture, concepts, connectors,
  quickstart, demo-advanced (endpoint counts, MCP wording, agent IDs,
  issuer interface, resource lists, OpenSSL status)

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-03-25 15:31:06 -04:00
shankar0123 4f90be9311 feat: add network certificate discovery (M21) and Prometheus metrics (M22)
M21 adds server-side active TLS scanning of CIDR ranges with concurrent
probing, sentinel agent pattern for pipeline reuse, and full CRUD API for
scan targets. M22 adds Prometheus exposition format endpoint alongside
existing JSON metrics. Comprehensive documentation audit updates all docs
to reflect 91 endpoints, 19 tables, 6 scheduler loops, and 900+ tests.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-03-24 23:37:47 -04:00
shankar0123 667a30870d feat: M18b Filesystem Certificate Discovery — agent scanning, server dedup, triage API
Agent-side:
- Filesystem scanner walks configured directories (CERTCTL_DISCOVERY_DIRS)
- Parses PEM (.pem, .crt, .cer, .cert) and DER (.der) certificate files
- Extracts CN, SANs, serial, issuer/subject DN, validity, key info, SHA-256 fingerprint
- Reports discoveries to control plane on startup + every 6 hours
- Skips files >1MB and private key files

Server-side:
- Migration 000006: discovered_certificates + discovery_scans tables
- Domain model: DiscoveredCertificate, DiscoveryScan, DiscoveryReport
- Three triage states: Unmanaged, Managed (claimed), Dismissed
- Repository with upsert dedup (fingerprint + agent + path)
- Service layer: process reports, claim, dismiss, list, summary
- 7 new API endpoints (84 total):
  POST /agents/{id}/discoveries, GET /discovered-certificates,
  GET /discovered-certificates/{id}, POST .../claim, POST .../dismiss,
  GET /discovery-scans, GET /discovery-summary
- Audit trail: scan_completed, cert_claimed, cert_dismissed events

Tests: 28 new test functions (domain, handler, service layers)
Docs: README, quickstart, demo-guide, demo-advanced, architecture,
      concepts, connectors, features.md all updated

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-03-24 00:25:00 -04:00
shankar0123 ee75f149ae feat: M14 — Observability (dashboard charts, agent fleet, stats API, metrics, structured logging, rollback)
Backend: StatsService with 5 aggregation methods, JSON metrics endpoint, slog-based
structured logging middleware. Stats API: dashboard summary, certificates-by-status,
expiration timeline, job trends, issuance rate. 23 new backend tests.

Frontend: Recharts-powered dashboard with 4 charts (status pie, expiration heatmap,
job trends line, issuance bar), agent fleet overview page with OS/arch grouping and
version breakdown, deployment rollback buttons on version history. 7 new frontend tests.

78 API endpoints, 744+ total tests (658 Go + 86 Vitest).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-03-22 19:46:13 -04:00
shankar0123 5d98e373e3 feat: M15a — certificate revocation API, CRL endpoint, and revocation notifications
Implements core revocation infrastructure: POST /api/v1/certificates/{id}/revoke
with all 8 RFC 5280 reason codes, JSON-formatted CRL at GET /api/v1/crl, webhook
and email revocation notifications, best-effort issuer notification, and immutable
revocation audit trail. Includes 48 new tests across service, handler, integration,
and domain layers (600+ total). Fixes 3 pre-existing test bugs (team_test error
matching, agent_group delete status code, team handler per_page validation).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-03-22 10:59:18 -04:00
shankar0123 690765b53e test: comprehensive test expansion — 330+ to 525+ tests, close M11b coverage gaps
Add 195+ new tests across service, handler, connector, and integration layers:
- Service tests: team (23), owner (21), agent_group (25), issuer (18), issuer_adapter (6)
- Handler tests: teams (26), owners (21)
- NGINX target connector tests (13): config validation, deployment, reload
- Integration tests: 19 M11b endpoint subtests (teams, owners, agent groups CRUD)
- CI pipeline: add ./internal/connector/target/... to test coverage path
- Docs: update test counts to 525+ across README, architecture, CLAUDE.md

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-03-21 23:43:32 -04:00
shankar0123 b0549e6f05 feat: M11b — ownership tracking, agent groups, interactive renewal approval
Ownership: owners/teams GUI pages, notification email resolution via
resolveRecipient (owner_id → owner.email lookup). Agent groups: dynamic
device grouping by OS/arch/IP CIDR/version with manual include/exclude
membership, migration 000004, full CRUD stack (domain → repo → service →
handler → frontend). Interactive approval: AwaitingApproval job state,
approve/reject API endpoints with reason tracking. Tests: 12 agent group
handler tests, 8 approve/reject job handler tests, integration tests
updated for 13-param RegisterHandlers. Docs updated across architecture,
concepts, and seed data.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-03-20 21:02:35 -04:00
shankar0123 a579a84c7f feat: M11a — certificate profiles, crypto policy enforcement, short-lived cert expiry
Add certificate profiles as named enrollment templates that control allowed
key algorithms, max TTL, permitted EKUs, required SAN patterns, and optional
SPIFFE URI SANs. CSR submissions are validated against profile rules at
signing time (key type + minimum size). Short-lived certs (TTL < 1 hour)
auto-expire via a new scheduler loop — expiry acts as revocation, no
CRL/OCSP needed.

New files:
- Migration 000003: certificate_profiles table, FK columns on
  managed_certificates/renewal_policies, key metadata on certificate_versions
- domain/profile.go: CertificateProfile + KeyAlgorithmRule structs
- repository/postgres/profile.go: full CRUD with JSONB marshaling
- service/profile.go: ProfileService with validation + audit logging
- service/crypto_validation.go: CSR-against-profile validation (RSA/ECDSA/Ed25519)
- handler/profiles.go: 5 HTTP endpoints under /api/v1/profiles
- web/src/pages/ProfilesPage.tsx: profiles management page

Modified:
- renewal.go: CSR validation in CompleteAgentCSRRenewal, ExpireShortLivedCertificates
- scheduler.go: 30s short-lived expiry check loop
- certificate.go (repo): nullable profile FK, key metadata on versions
- main.go: profile repo/service/handler wiring, 8-param NewRenewalService
- router.go: 12-param RegisterHandlers with profile routes
- seed_demo.sql: 4 demo profiles (standard, mtls, short-lived, high-security)
- Frontend: types, API client, routing, sidebar nav

Tests: 40 new tests across handler (15), service (13), crypto validation (12)

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-03-20 20:39:49 -04:00
shankar0123 ac594d88c0 Fix agent registration URL in negative test and connector test path in CI
negative_test.go used /api/v1/agents/register but the route is POST
/api/v1/agents. ci.yml used ./internal/connector/... which includes
packages with no test files causing "no such tool covdata" errors;
narrowed to ./internal/connector/issuer/local/... which has tests.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-03-15 14:12:42 -04:00
shankar0123 8526314a44 Implement M9: test hardening with handler tests, negative paths, CI coverage gates
All 7 handler files now have test coverage: jobs (14 tests), notifications
(11), policies (15), issuers (15), targets (14). Negative-path integration
tests cover nonexistent resources, invalid payloads, malformed CSR, expired
cert lifecycle, and method-not-allowed errors. CI now enforces coverage
thresholds (service 60%+, handler 50%+) and includes connector tests.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-03-15 14:06:48 -04:00