mirror of
https://github.com/shankar0123/certctl.git
synced 2026-06-07 14:01:36 +00:00
chore: move HSM/TPM to V3 paid tier, rename roadmap.md to strategy.md
- HSM/TPM agent key storage and CA key storage moved from V5+ to V3 Pro (enterprise compliance gate, not adoption driver) - Renamed roadmap.md to strategy.md (gitignored, never committed) - Updated compliance-nist.md HSM references from V5 to V3 Pro Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
+1
-1
@@ -65,7 +65,7 @@ certctl-cli
|
||||
/cli
|
||||
|
||||
# Private strategy docs
|
||||
roadmap.md
|
||||
strategy.md
|
||||
SECURITY_REMEDIATION.md
|
||||
|
||||
# OS
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -72,7 +72,7 @@ certctl implements tiered key storage with different protection profiles based o
|
||||
- Configured via: `CERTCTL_CA_CERT_PATH=/path/to/ca.crt` and `CERTCTL_CA_KEY_PATH=/path/to/ca.key`
|
||||
|
||||
**NIST Gap: HSM Storage**
|
||||
NIST SP 800-57 Part 1 recommends Hardware Security Module (HSM) storage for high-value keys (CA signing keys). certctl V2 uses filesystem storage on the server. HSM support is planned for V5 roadmap, enabling integration with:
|
||||
NIST SP 800-57 Part 1 recommends Hardware Security Module (HSM) storage for high-value keys (CA signing keys). certctl V2 uses filesystem storage on the server. HSM support is planned for certctl Pro (V3), enabling integration with:
|
||||
- AWS CloudHSM
|
||||
- Azure Dedicated HSM
|
||||
- Thales Luna, Gemalto SafeNet, YubiHSM (on-premises)
|
||||
@@ -285,7 +285,7 @@ All revocation events logged:
|
||||
| NIST SP 800-57 Area | Status | Coverage | Notes |
|
||||
|---|---|---|---|
|
||||
| **Key Generation** | ✅ Aligned | 100% | Agent-side ECDSA P-256 using crypto/rand; server mode flagged as demo-only |
|
||||
| **Key Storage** | ⚠️ Partially Aligned | 80% | Filesystem with 0600 perms; HSM support planned V5 |
|
||||
| **Key Storage** | ⚠️ Partially Aligned | 80% | Filesystem with 0600 perms; HSM support planned V3 Pro |
|
||||
| **Cryptoperiods** | ✅ Aligned | 100% | Profile-enforced max_ttl; threshold-based renewal alerting |
|
||||
| **Key States** | ✅ Aligned | 100% | Full lifecycle tracking with immutable audit trail |
|
||||
| **Algorithms** | ✅ Aligned | 100% | NIST-approved algorithms only; post-quantum tracking in progress |
|
||||
@@ -305,9 +305,8 @@ All revocation events logged:
|
||||
- Role-based access control (limit revocation/approval to authorized operators)
|
||||
- Bulk revocation by profile/owner/agent (fleet-level revocation policy)
|
||||
|
||||
### V5 (Planned: 2027+)
|
||||
- HSM support for CA key storage
|
||||
- PKCS#11 integration for hardware tokens
|
||||
### V3 Pro (Planned)
|
||||
- HSM support for CA key storage and agent key storage (TPM 2.0, PKCS#11)
|
||||
- FIPS 140-2/3 validated crypto module (BoringCrypto build or external FIPS library)
|
||||
- Key destruction API (explicit secure erasure of agent keys)
|
||||
- Key escrow / recovery mechanism (backup encrypted private keys for disaster recovery)
|
||||
|
||||
Reference in New Issue
Block a user