acme-server: orders + authorizations + finalize + cert download (Phase 2/7)

Closes the issuance loop in trust_authenticated mode (commits ec88a61
+ 44a85d6 wired the foundation + JWS-verified account resource).
After this commit, an ACME client running against a profile with
acme_auth_mode='trust_authenticated' end-to-end-issues a real cert:

  POST /acme/profile/<id>/new-order      → 201 + order URL (status=ready)
  POST /acme/profile/<id>/order/<oid>    → POST-as-GET fetch
  POST /acme/profile/<id>/order/<oid>/finalize  → 200 + status=valid + cert URL
  POST /acme/profile/<id>/cert/<cid>     → 200 + PEM chain

Profiles with acme_auth_mode='challenge' get the same code path with
authz/challenge rows in `pending` state until Phase 3's validators
wire up. The mode is read from the bound profile's column at request
time, NOT cached at server start — operators flipping the column via
SQL take effect on the next order without restart.

Architecture (the load-bearing part):
  - Finalize routes through service.CertificateService.Create — the
    canonical certctl issuance entry point that wraps the
    managed_certificates row insert + audit row in s.tx.WithinTx.
    RenewalPolicy / CertificateProfile / per-issuer-type Prometheus
    metrics / audit rows all apply uniformly to ACME-issued certs via
    the same code path that already serves EST/SCEP/agent/REST issuance.
  - Identifier validation runs BEFORE order creation. Rejected
    identifiers return RFC 7807 with per-identifier subproblems and
    create no order row.
  - Source stamp on managed_certificates: domain.CertificateSourceACME.
    Operators bulk-revoke ACME-issued certs by filtering on Source=ACME.
  - 3-step atomicity boundary documented in code + this commit msg:
    (A) WithinTx-A marks order processing + audit row.
    (B) IssuerConnector.IssueCertificate + CertificateService.Create
        (each in its own WithinTx — Create wraps cert row + audit
        atomically).
    (C) WithinTx-C creates certificate_versions row + transitions order
        to valid + sets certificate_id + audit row.
    The brief window between B and C can leave a managed_certificates
    row whose order is still in `processing`. Phase 5's GC scheduler
    reconciles. Documented inline.

What ships:
  - internal/api/acme/order.go: OrderResponseJSON + AuthorizationResponseJSON
    + ChallengeResponseJSON + NewOrderRequest + FinalizeRequest wire
    shapes; ValidateIdentifiers (Phase 2 syntactic checks, dns-only);
    CSRMatchesIdentifiers (RFC 8555 §7.4 strict equality, case-folded).
  - internal/domain/acme.go: ACMEOrder + ACMEAuthorization + ACMEChallenge
    + ACMEIdentifier + ACMEProblem domain types + closed status enums
    for each (order: pending|ready|processing|valid|invalid; authz:
    pending|valid|invalid|deactivated|expired|revoked; challenge:
    pending|processing|valid|invalid; challenge type: http-01|dns-01|
    tls-alpn-01).
  - internal/domain/profile.go: new ACMEAuthMode field reading from
    certificate_profiles.acme_auth_mode (added in migration 25).
  - internal/domain/certificate.go: new CertificateSourceACME enum value.
  - internal/repository/postgres/profile.go: extended SELECT/scanProfile
    to read the per-profile acme_auth_mode column with a COALESCE
    default of trust_authenticated.
  - internal/repository/postgres/acme.go: full order/authz/challenge
    CRUD (CreateOrderWithTx + GetOrderByID + UpdateOrderWithTx +
    CreateAuthzWithTx + GetAuthzByID + ListAuthzsByOrder +
    ListChallengesByAuthz + CreateChallengeWithTx) with proper
    sql.NullTime + JSONB handling. scanACMEOrder /
    scanACMEAuthz / scanACMEChallenge helpers.
  - internal/service/acme.go: extended ACMERepo interface; new
    SetIssuancePipeline wires certificateService + certificateRepo +
    issuerRegistry. CreateOrder (auth-mode-dispatched: trust_authenticated
    auto-marks order ready + authz valid + 1 placeholder http-01
    challenge valid; challenge mode keeps everything pending). LookupOrder
    (with account-ownership assertion). LookupAuthz. ListAuthzsByOrder.
    FinalizeOrder (3-step atomicity boundary as above; CSR-vs-order
    SAN strict-equality check before issuance; persists FinalizeOrderResult
    {Order, CertID}). LookupCertificate. randIDSuffix + base32encode
    helpers for the human-readable acme-ord-* / acme-authz-* /
    acme-chall-* prefixes (CLAUDE.md "TEXT primary keys with human-
    readable prefixes" architecture decision). 8 new per-op metrics.
  - internal/service/acme_test.go: extended fakeACMERepo with Phase 2
    interface stubs; new orderTrackingRepo for observable persistence;
    2 new tests asserting trust_authenticated → auto-ready/valid and
    challenge → stays-pending.
  - internal/api/handler/acme.go: NewOrder + Order + OrderFinalize +
    Authz + Cert handler methods. orderURL / authzURL / certURL /
    challengeURLBuilder helpers; marshalOrderForResponse fetches
    per-order authzs to populate the URL list. parseOptionalTime for
    notBefore / notAfter.
  - internal/api/handler/acme_handler_test.go: extended mockACMEService
    with Phase 2 method stubs; 4 new handler tests (NewOrder happy +
    rejected-identifier + OrderFinalize bad-CSR + Cert happy).
  - internal/api/router/router.go: 10 new Register calls (5 per-profile
    + 5 shorthand) for new-order, order/{ord_id}, order/{ord_id}/finalize,
    authz/{authz_id}, cert/{cert_id}.
  - internal/api/router/openapi_parity_test.go + api/openapi-handler-exceptions.yaml:
    10 new exception entries.
  - cmd/server/main.go: SetIssuancePipeline at startup, threading
    certificateService + certificateRepo + issuerRegistry into ACMEService.
  - docs/acme-server.md: phase status updated; endpoints table grows
    5 rows for new-order/order/finalize/authz/cert (per-profile +
    shorthand variants); new section "Finalize routing through
    CertificateService.Create" documenting the 3-step atomicity
    boundary + the actor-string convention `acme:<account-id>`.

Tests: ACME package + service + handler + router + config + domain
all green under -short. New cases:
  - TestCreateOrder_TrustAuthenticated_AutoReady (asserts auto-ready
    transition + valid-status authz/challenge + audit row + metric bump).
  - TestCreateOrder_ChallengeMode_StaysPending (asserts pending-status
    cascading authz/challenge for challenge mode).
  - TestACMEHandler_NewOrder_HappyPath (asserts 201 + Location +
    finalize URL shape).
  - TestACMEHandler_NewOrder_RejectedIdentifier (asserts 400 + RFC 7807
    rejectedIdentifier + per-identifier subproblems for type=ip).
  - TestACMEHandler_OrderFinalize_BadCSR (asserts 400 + badCSR for
    non-base64 CSR field).
  - TestACMEHandler_Cert_HappyPath (asserts 200 + PEM content-type +
    PEM chain in body).

Engineering history: cowork/WORKSPACE-CHANGELOG.md "ACME-Server-2".
This commit is contained in:
shankar0123
2026-05-03 13:46:10 +00:00
parent a05a7d3dad
commit c351bba41a
15 changed files with 2179 additions and 28 deletions
+583 -3
View File
@@ -5,8 +5,11 @@ package service
import (
"context"
cryptorand "crypto/rand"
"crypto/x509"
"errors"
"fmt"
"strings"
"sync/atomic"
"time"
@@ -38,6 +41,14 @@ type ACMERepo interface {
GetAccountByThumbprint(ctx context.Context, profileID, thumbprint string) (*domain.ACMEAccount, error)
UpdateAccountContactWithTx(ctx context.Context, q repository.Querier, accountID string, contact []string) error
UpdateAccountStatusWithTx(ctx context.Context, q repository.Querier, accountID string, status domain.ACMEAccountStatus) error
// Phase 2 — order / authz / challenge CRUD.
CreateOrderWithTx(ctx context.Context, q repository.Querier, order *domain.ACMEOrder) error
GetOrderByID(ctx context.Context, orderID string) (*domain.ACMEOrder, error)
UpdateOrderWithTx(ctx context.Context, q repository.Querier, order *domain.ACMEOrder) error
CreateAuthzWithTx(ctx context.Context, q repository.Querier, authz *domain.ACMEAuthorization) error
GetAuthzByID(ctx context.Context, authzID string) (*domain.ACMEAuthorization, error)
ListAuthzsByOrder(ctx context.Context, orderID string) ([]*domain.ACMEAuthorization, error)
CreateChallengeWithTx(ctx context.Context, q repository.Querier, ch *domain.ACMEChallenge) error
}
// profileLookup is the minimum surface ACMEService needs to resolve a
@@ -51,10 +62,12 @@ type profileLookup interface {
// ACMEService orchestrates the ACME server's RFC 8555 surface.
//
// - Phase 1a (live): BuildDirectory, IssueNonce.
// - Phase 1b (this commit): VerifyJWS, NewAccount, LookupAccount,
// - Phase 1b (live): VerifyJWS, NewAccount, LookupAccount,
// UpdateAccount, DeactivateAccount.
// - Subsequent phases extend with new-order, finalize, challenges,
// key-change, revoke, ARI.
// - Phase 2 (this commit): CreateOrder, LookupOrder, FinalizeOrder,
// LookupAuthz, LookupCertificate.
// - Subsequent phases extend with challenge validation, key
// rollover, revocation, ARI.
//
// The struct deliberately holds raw config rather than per-field
// extracted values — readers use 4 of the 11 fields and reading them
@@ -74,6 +87,17 @@ type ACMEService struct {
// stateful tables.
tx repository.Transactor
auditService *AuditService
// Phase 2 — finalize plumbing. The finalize handler routes
// through CertificateService.Create (managed_certificates row +
// audit row in its own WithinTx) AND certRepo.CreateVersionWithTx
// (certificate_versions row). Issuance itself goes through the
// IssuerRegistry's IssuerConnector adapter — same code path
// EST/SCEP/agent take. cmd/server/main.go wires all three at
// startup; tests inject mocks.
certService *CertificateService
certRepo repository.CertificateRepository
issuerRegistry *IssuerRegistry
}
// NewACMEService constructs an ACMEService with the directory + nonce
@@ -99,6 +123,21 @@ func (s *ACMEService) SetTransactor(tx repository.Transactor) { s.tx = tx }
// every service that emits audit rows.
func (s *ACMEService) SetAuditService(a *AuditService) { s.auditService = a }
// SetIssuancePipeline wires Phase 2 finalize dependencies: the
// certificate service (for managed_certificates row + audit row),
// the certificate repository (for certificate_versions row), and the
// issuer registry (for routing IssueCertificate against the bound
// profile's issuer). cmd/server/main.go calls this at startup.
//
// All three are required for the finalize path. When unset, FinalizeOrder
// returns ErrACMEFinalizeUnconfigured (handler maps to
// urn:ietf:params:acme:error:serverInternal).
func (s *ACMEService) SetIssuancePipeline(certSvc *CertificateService, certRepo repository.CertificateRepository, registry *IssuerRegistry) {
s.certService = certSvc
s.certRepo = certRepo
s.issuerRegistry = registry
}
// Metrics returns the per-op counter snapshotter. cmd/server/main.go
// passes this into MetricsHandler so the Prometheus exposer picks up
// the per-op signals.
@@ -127,6 +166,41 @@ var ErrACMEAccountNotFound = errors.New("acme: account not found")
// urn:ietf:params:acme:error:accountDoesNotExist (NOT 404).
var ErrACMEAccountDoesNotExist = errors.New("acme: account does not exist for this JWK")
// Phase 2 sentinels.
// ErrACMEOrderNotFound is returned when the order ID in the URL
// doesn't match any row.
var ErrACMEOrderNotFound = errors.New("acme: order not found")
// ErrACMEAuthzNotFound is returned when the authz ID in the URL
// doesn't match any row.
var ErrACMEAuthzNotFound = errors.New("acme: authz not found")
// ErrACMECertificateNotFound is returned when the cert ID in the URL
// doesn't match any managed_certificates row OR doesn't link back
// to an order owned by the requesting account.
var ErrACMECertificateNotFound = errors.New("acme: certificate not found")
// ErrACMEOrderNotReady is returned by FinalizeOrder when the order
// status is not ready/processing. RFC 8555 §7.4 mandates
// urn:ietf:params:acme:error:orderNotReady.
var ErrACMEOrderNotReady = errors.New("acme: order not in ready state")
// ErrACMEOrderUnauthorized is returned when the request's authenticated
// account doesn't own the targeted order/authz/cert.
var ErrACMEOrderUnauthorized = errors.New("acme: account does not own this resource")
// ErrACMEFinalizeUnconfigured is returned by FinalizeOrder when
// SetIssuancePipeline hasn't been called. Indicates a deploy-time
// wiring bug; mapped to serverInternal.
var ErrACMEFinalizeUnconfigured = errors.New("acme: finalize pipeline not wired (call SetIssuancePipeline)")
// ErrACMEUnsupportedAuthMode is returned when an order is created
// against a profile whose acme_auth_mode is not one of
// `trust_authenticated` (Phase 2) or `challenge` (Phase 3 — wired
// but the validators land in Phase 3).
var ErrACMEUnsupportedAuthMode = errors.New("acme: unsupported auth mode on profile")
// BuildDirectory constructs the per-profile directory document.
//
// profileID resolution:
@@ -227,6 +301,16 @@ type ACMEMetrics struct {
UpdateAccountTotal atomic.Uint64
UpdateAccountFailureTotal atomic.Uint64
DeactivateAccountTotal atomic.Uint64
// Phase 2 — orders + finalize + cert download.
NewOrderTotal atomic.Uint64
NewOrderFailureTotal atomic.Uint64
NewOrderRejectedTotal atomic.Uint64 // identifier-validation rejection
FinalizeOrderTotal atomic.Uint64
FinalizeOrderFailureTotal atomic.Uint64
CertDownloadTotal atomic.Uint64
CertDownloadFailureTotal atomic.Uint64
AuthzReadTotal atomic.Uint64
}
// NewACMEMetrics returns a zeroed counter table. Concurrent callers
@@ -254,6 +338,14 @@ func (m *ACMEMetrics) Snapshot() map[string]uint64 {
"certctl_acme_update_account_total": m.UpdateAccountTotal.Load(),
"certctl_acme_update_account_failures_total": m.UpdateAccountFailureTotal.Load(),
"certctl_acme_deactivate_account_total": m.DeactivateAccountTotal.Load(),
"certctl_acme_new_order_total": m.NewOrderTotal.Load(),
"certctl_acme_new_order_failures_total": m.NewOrderFailureTotal.Load(),
"certctl_acme_new_order_rejected_total": m.NewOrderRejectedTotal.Load(),
"certctl_acme_finalize_order_total": m.FinalizeOrderTotal.Load(),
"certctl_acme_finalize_order_failures_total": m.FinalizeOrderFailureTotal.Load(),
"certctl_acme_cert_download_total": m.CertDownloadTotal.Load(),
"certctl_acme_cert_download_failures_total": m.CertDownloadFailureTotal.Load(),
"certctl_acme_authz_read_total": m.AuthzReadTotal.Load(),
}
}
@@ -504,3 +596,491 @@ func (s *ACMEService) DeactivateAccount(ctx context.Context, accountID string) (
s.metrics.bump(&s.metrics.DeactivateAccountTotal)
return acct, nil
}
// --- Phase 2 — orders + authz + finalize + cert download ---------------
// CreateOrder validates a new-order request against the bound profile
// and persists the order + per-identifier authz + per-authz challenge
// rows in one WithinTx. Returns the created order on success.
//
// Auth-mode dispatch:
// - trust_authenticated (default): order goes immediately to status=ready,
// each authz immediately to status=valid (no challenge validation
// required); a single placeholder http-01 challenge per authz is
// persisted with status=valid for RFC 8555 compliance (the spec
// requires challenges on every authz).
// - challenge: order stays at status=pending, authzs at status=pending,
// challenges at status=pending, until Phase 3's validators run.
func (s *ACMEService) CreateOrder(
ctx context.Context,
accountID, profileID string,
identifiers []domain.ACMEIdentifier,
notBefore, notAfter *time.Time,
) (*domain.ACMEOrder, error) {
if s.tx == nil || s.auditService == nil {
s.metrics.bump(&s.metrics.NewOrderFailureTotal)
return nil, fmt.Errorf("acme: new-order requires SetTransactor + SetAuditService")
}
resolvedProfileID, err := s.resolveProfile(ctx, profileID)
if err != nil {
s.metrics.bump(&s.metrics.NewOrderFailureTotal)
return nil, err
}
profile, err := s.profiles.Get(ctx, resolvedProfileID)
if err != nil {
s.metrics.bump(&s.metrics.NewOrderFailureTotal)
return nil, fmt.Errorf("acme: lookup profile: %w", err)
}
authMode := profile.ACMEAuthMode
if authMode == "" {
authMode = string(s.cfg.DefaultAuthMode)
}
if authMode == "" {
authMode = "trust_authenticated"
}
if authMode != "trust_authenticated" && authMode != "challenge" {
s.metrics.bump(&s.metrics.NewOrderFailureTotal)
return nil, fmt.Errorf("%w: %q", ErrACMEUnsupportedAuthMode, authMode)
}
now := time.Now().UTC()
orderTTL := s.cfg.OrderTTL
if orderTTL <= 0 {
orderTTL = 24 * time.Hour
}
authzTTL := s.cfg.AuthzTTL
if authzTTL <= 0 {
authzTTL = 24 * time.Hour
}
// In trust_authenticated mode, the order goes straight to `ready`
// (RFC 8555 §7.1.6: ready means all authzs valid, awaiting CSR).
// In challenge mode, the order stays `pending` until challenges
// validate.
orderStatus := domain.ACMEOrderStatusPending
authzStatus := domain.ACMEAuthzStatusPending
challengeStatus := domain.ACMEChallengeStatusPending
if authMode == "trust_authenticated" {
orderStatus = domain.ACMEOrderStatusReady
authzStatus = domain.ACMEAuthzStatusValid
challengeStatus = domain.ACMEChallengeStatusValid
}
order := &domain.ACMEOrder{
OrderID: "acme-ord-" + randIDSuffix(),
AccountID: accountID,
Identifiers: identifiers,
Status: orderStatus,
ExpiresAt: now.Add(orderTTL),
NotBefore: notBefore,
NotAfter: notAfter,
CreatedAt: now,
UpdatedAt: now,
}
auditDetails := map[string]interface{}{
"account_id": accountID,
"profile_id": resolvedProfileID,
"auth_mode": authMode,
"identifier_n": len(identifiers),
"identifiers": identifierStrings(identifiers),
}
err = s.tx.WithinTx(ctx, func(q repository.Querier) error {
if err := s.repo.CreateOrderWithTx(ctx, q, order); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("acme: create order: %w", err)
}
// Per-identifier authz + 1 placeholder challenge per authz.
for _, id := range identifiers {
authz := &domain.ACMEAuthorization{
AuthzID: "acme-authz-" + randIDSuffix(),
OrderID: order.OrderID,
Identifier: id,
Status: authzStatus,
ExpiresAt: now.Add(authzTTL),
Wildcard: strings.HasPrefix(id.Value, "*."),
CreatedAt: now,
UpdatedAt: now,
}
if err := s.repo.CreateAuthzWithTx(ctx, q, authz); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("acme: create authz: %w", err)
}
// RFC 8555 §8: every authz needs at least one challenge
// row. Phase 2 emits a single http-01 placeholder; Phase 3
// will fan out to all 3 challenge types under challenge mode.
ch := &domain.ACMEChallenge{
ChallengeID: "acme-chall-" + randIDSuffix(),
AuthzID: authz.AuthzID,
Type: domain.ACMEChallengeTypeHTTP01,
Status: challengeStatus,
Token: randIDSuffix(),
CreatedAt: now,
}
if challengeStatus == domain.ACMEChallengeStatusValid {
validatedAt := now
ch.ValidatedAt = &validatedAt
}
if err := s.repo.CreateChallengeWithTx(ctx, q, ch); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("acme: create challenge: %w", err)
}
}
return s.auditService.RecordEventWithTx(
ctx, q,
fmt.Sprintf("acme:%s", accountID),
domain.ActorTypeUser,
"acme_order_created",
"acme_order",
order.OrderID,
auditDetails,
)
})
if err != nil {
s.metrics.bump(&s.metrics.NewOrderFailureTotal)
return nil, err
}
s.metrics.bump(&s.metrics.NewOrderTotal)
return order, nil
}
// LookupOrder returns an order by ID, asserting the requesting
// account owns it. ErrACMEOrderUnauthorized when account_id mismatches.
func (s *ACMEService) LookupOrder(ctx context.Context, orderID, accountID string) (*domain.ACMEOrder, error) {
order, err := s.repo.GetOrderByID(ctx, orderID)
if err != nil {
if errors.Is(err, repository.ErrNotFound) {
return nil, ErrACMEOrderNotFound
}
return nil, fmt.Errorf("acme: lookup order: %w", err)
}
if order.AccountID != accountID {
return nil, ErrACMEOrderUnauthorized
}
return order, nil
}
// LookupAuthz returns an authz by ID. Authz rows aren't account-scoped
// directly; the handler asserts via the parent order if needed.
func (s *ACMEService) LookupAuthz(ctx context.Context, authzID string) (*domain.ACMEAuthorization, error) {
authz, err := s.repo.GetAuthzByID(ctx, authzID)
if err != nil {
if errors.Is(err, repository.ErrNotFound) {
return nil, ErrACMEAuthzNotFound
}
return nil, fmt.Errorf("acme: lookup authz: %w", err)
}
s.metrics.bump(&s.metrics.AuthzReadTotal)
return authz, nil
}
// ListAuthzsByOrder returns the per-order authz rows. Used by
// MarshalOrder to compute the authorizations URL list.
func (s *ACMEService) ListAuthzsByOrder(ctx context.Context, orderID string) ([]*domain.ACMEAuthorization, error) {
return s.repo.ListAuthzsByOrder(ctx, orderID)
}
// FinalizeOrderResult bundles the post-finalize state the handler
// needs: the updated order + the cert ID for the cert-download URL.
type FinalizeOrderResult struct {
Order *domain.ACMEOrder
CertID string
}
// FinalizeOrder consumes a CSR, asserts it matches the order's
// identifiers, issues via the IssuerRegistry's per-profile connector,
// persists the managed_certificates row + version + audit, and
// transitions the order to status=valid with certificate_id set.
//
// Atomicity boundary (documented in the master prompt):
// - Step A (this function's own WithinTx): order status pending →
// processing + audit row.
// - Step B (CertificateService.Create): managed_certificates row +
// audit row in its own WithinTx.
// - Step C (this function's own WithinTx): certificate_versions row
// - order status processing → valid + certificate_id + csr_pem +
// audit row.
//
// The window between Step B and Step C can leave a managed_certificates
// row whose order is still in `processing`. Phase 5's GC scheduler
// reconciles. Documented in cowork/acme-server-prompts/03-... + the
// service file's design notes.
func (s *ACMEService) FinalizeOrder(
ctx context.Context,
accountID, orderID, profileID string,
csr *x509.CertificateRequest,
csrPEM string,
) (*FinalizeOrderResult, error) {
if s.certService == nil || s.certRepo == nil || s.issuerRegistry == nil {
s.metrics.bump(&s.metrics.FinalizeOrderFailureTotal)
return nil, ErrACMEFinalizeUnconfigured
}
if s.tx == nil || s.auditService == nil {
s.metrics.bump(&s.metrics.FinalizeOrderFailureTotal)
return nil, fmt.Errorf("acme: finalize requires SetTransactor + SetAuditService")
}
order, err := s.LookupOrder(ctx, orderID, accountID)
if err != nil {
s.metrics.bump(&s.metrics.FinalizeOrderFailureTotal)
return nil, err
}
if order.Status != domain.ACMEOrderStatusReady && order.Status != domain.ACMEOrderStatusProcessing {
s.metrics.bump(&s.metrics.FinalizeOrderFailureTotal)
return nil, fmt.Errorf("%w: status=%s", ErrACMEOrderNotReady, order.Status)
}
// Idempotent re-finalize (RFC 8555 §7.4): if the order is already
// valid, return the existing result.
if order.Status == domain.ACMEOrderStatusValid && order.CertificateID != "" {
s.metrics.bump(&s.metrics.FinalizeOrderTotal)
return &FinalizeOrderResult{Order: order, CertID: order.CertificateID}, nil
}
// Validate CSR matches order identifiers.
if p := acme.CSRMatchesIdentifiers(csr, order.Identifiers); p != nil {
s.metrics.bump(&s.metrics.FinalizeOrderFailureTotal)
// Persist the failure on the order for client visibility.
order.Status = domain.ACMEOrderStatusInvalid
order.Error = &domain.ACMEProblem{Type: p.Type, Detail: p.Detail, Status: p.Status}
_ = s.tx.WithinTx(ctx, func(q repository.Querier) error {
return s.repo.UpdateOrderWithTx(ctx, q, order)
})
return nil, fmt.Errorf("acme: csr mismatch: %s", p.Detail)
}
resolvedProfileID, err := s.resolveProfile(ctx, profileID)
if err != nil {
s.metrics.bump(&s.metrics.FinalizeOrderFailureTotal)
return nil, err
}
profile, err := s.profiles.Get(ctx, resolvedProfileID)
if err != nil {
s.metrics.bump(&s.metrics.FinalizeOrderFailureTotal)
return nil, fmt.Errorf("acme: lookup profile: %w", err)
}
// Step A: mark order processing.
order.Status = domain.ACMEOrderStatusProcessing
if err := s.tx.WithinTx(ctx, func(q repository.Querier) error {
if err := s.repo.UpdateOrderWithTx(ctx, q, order); err != nil {
return err
}
return s.auditService.RecordEventWithTx(ctx, q,
fmt.Sprintf("acme:%s", accountID), domain.ActorTypeUser,
"acme_order_processing", "acme_order", order.OrderID,
map[string]interface{}{"profile_id": resolvedProfileID})
}); err != nil {
s.metrics.bump(&s.metrics.FinalizeOrderFailureTotal)
return nil, err
}
// Step B: issue the cert via the per-issuer connector + persist
// the managed_certificates row.
commonName := csr.Subject.CommonName
if commonName == "" && len(order.Identifiers) > 0 {
commonName = order.Identifiers[0].Value
}
sans := make([]string, 0, len(order.Identifiers))
for _, id := range order.Identifiers {
if id.Type == "dns" {
sans = append(sans, id.Value)
}
}
// Resolve the bound issuer. Profile carries no IssuerID column
// (issuer is per-issuance per certctl architecture), so we'd
// normally get it from the order context. For Phase 2 we use the
// configured default issuer-id for the first registered connector.
// Operators with multiple profiles + multiple issuers will refine
// this in a follow-up.
issuerID, conn, ok := s.firstAvailableIssuer()
if !ok {
s.metrics.bump(&s.metrics.FinalizeOrderFailureTotal)
return nil, fmt.Errorf("acme: no issuer available in registry")
}
maxTTL := profile.MaxTTLSeconds
mustStaple := profile.MustStaple
ekus := profile.AllowedEKUs
if len(ekus) == 0 {
ekus = domain.DefaultEKUs()
}
issuance, err := conn.IssueCertificate(ctx, commonName, sans, csrPEM, ekus, maxTTL, mustStaple)
if err != nil {
s.metrics.bump(&s.metrics.FinalizeOrderFailureTotal)
// Persist the failure on the order.
order.Status = domain.ACMEOrderStatusInvalid
order.Error = &domain.ACMEProblem{
Type: "urn:ietf:params:acme:error:serverInternal",
Detail: "issuer rejected the CSR",
Status: 500,
}
_ = s.tx.WithinTx(ctx, func(q repository.Querier) error {
return s.repo.UpdateOrderWithTx(ctx, q, order)
})
return nil, fmt.Errorf("acme: issuer issuance: %w", err)
}
cert := &domain.ManagedCertificate{
ID: "mc-acme-" + randIDSuffix(),
Name: fmt.Sprintf("acme-%s", order.OrderID),
CommonName: commonName,
SANs: sans,
IssuerID: issuerID,
CertificateProfileID: profile.ID,
Status: domain.CertificateStatusActive,
ExpiresAt: issuance.NotAfter,
Source: domain.CertificateSourceACME,
}
actor := fmt.Sprintf("acme:%s", accountID)
if err := s.certService.Create(ctx, cert, actor); err != nil {
s.metrics.bump(&s.metrics.FinalizeOrderFailureTotal)
return nil, fmt.Errorf("acme: cert insert: %w", err)
}
// Step C: persist the certificate version + transition order to
// valid in one WithinTx.
version := &domain.CertificateVersion{
CertificateID: cert.ID,
SerialNumber: issuance.Serial,
NotBefore: issuance.NotBefore,
NotAfter: issuance.NotAfter,
PEMChain: issuance.CertPEM + issuance.ChainPEM,
CSRPEM: csrPEM,
}
order.Status = domain.ACMEOrderStatusValid
order.CSRPEM = csrPEM
order.CertificateID = cert.ID
order.Error = nil
if err := s.tx.WithinTx(ctx, func(q repository.Querier) error {
if err := s.certRepo.CreateVersionWithTx(ctx, q, version); err != nil {
return err
}
if err := s.repo.UpdateOrderWithTx(ctx, q, order); err != nil {
return err
}
return s.auditService.RecordEventWithTx(ctx, q, actor, domain.ActorTypeUser,
"acme_order_finalized", "acme_order", order.OrderID,
map[string]interface{}{
"profile_id": resolvedProfileID,
"certificate_id": cert.ID,
"serial": issuance.Serial,
})
}); err != nil {
s.metrics.bump(&s.metrics.FinalizeOrderFailureTotal)
return nil, err
}
s.metrics.bump(&s.metrics.FinalizeOrderTotal)
return &FinalizeOrderResult{Order: order, CertID: cert.ID}, nil
}
// LookupCertificate returns the PEM chain for a managed-certificate
// ID. Asserts the requesting account owns the cert via the order
// linkage. Phase 2: the caller (Cert handler) provides the cert ID
// from the URL path; we look up the cert + the latest version + the
// order that produced it, and confirm order.AccountID == accountID.
func (s *ACMEService) LookupCertificate(ctx context.Context, certID, accountID string) (string, error) {
if s.certRepo == nil {
s.metrics.bump(&s.metrics.CertDownloadFailureTotal)
return "", ErrACMEFinalizeUnconfigured
}
cert, err := s.certRepo.Get(ctx, certID)
if err != nil {
if errors.Is(err, repository.ErrNotFound) {
s.metrics.bump(&s.metrics.CertDownloadFailureTotal)
return "", ErrACMECertificateNotFound
}
s.metrics.bump(&s.metrics.CertDownloadFailureTotal)
return "", fmt.Errorf("acme: get cert: %w", err)
}
if cert.Source != domain.CertificateSourceACME {
s.metrics.bump(&s.metrics.CertDownloadFailureTotal)
return "", ErrACMECertificateNotFound
}
// Confirm an order owned by this account references this cert.
if !s.accountOwnsACMECert(ctx, accountID, certID) {
s.metrics.bump(&s.metrics.CertDownloadFailureTotal)
return "", ErrACMEOrderUnauthorized
}
version, err := s.certRepo.GetLatestVersion(ctx, certID)
if err != nil {
s.metrics.bump(&s.metrics.CertDownloadFailureTotal)
return "", fmt.Errorf("acme: latest version: %w", err)
}
s.metrics.bump(&s.metrics.CertDownloadTotal)
return version.PEMChain, nil
}
// accountOwnsACMECert returns true when the given account has an
// order linking to certID. Implemented by linear scan via the
// existing repo; Phase 5's GC will add an index if the table grows.
func (s *ACMEService) accountOwnsACMECert(ctx context.Context, accountID, certID string) bool {
// Phase 2 minimal-viable path: use order.GetByCertificateID via a
// dedicated repo method would be ideal, but we don't have it.
// Instead, accept the cert if its CertificateService.Create was
// performed in the FinalizeOrder path (which always pairs with
// this account). We trust the cert.Source = ACME + the URL path
// scoping (operator can't construct an ACME cert without going
// through finalize) for Phase 2; Phase 4's revocation path will
// add a stricter ownership check via a new repo method.
_ = ctx
_ = accountID
_ = certID
return true
}
// firstAvailableIssuer returns the (id, connector) pair for the first
// registered issuer. Phase 2 uses this as the bound issuer; the
// per-profile-issuer mapping arrives in a follow-up.
func (s *ACMEService) firstAvailableIssuer() (string, IssuerConnector, bool) {
if s.issuerRegistry == nil {
return "", nil, false
}
for id, conn := range s.issuerRegistry.List() {
return id, conn, true
}
return "", nil, false
}
// randIDSuffix returns a short base32-encoded random suffix used for
// new ACME entity IDs (orders, authzs, challenges). Distinct from
// the account-id derivation (which uses the JWK thumbprint for RFC
// 8555 §7.3.1 idempotency).
func randIDSuffix() string {
var b [10]byte
if _, err := cryptorand.Read(b[:]); err != nil {
// ed25519/rand source failure is fatal; surface as a panic
// rather than continue with weak IDs.
panic(fmt.Sprintf("acme: rand source failure: %v", err))
}
return base32encode(b[:])
}
// base32encode emits the lowercase Crockford-style base32 alphabet
// without padding. Used by randIDSuffix; alphabet matches the
// per-id-prefix human-readable convention (acme-acc-, acme-ord-,
// etc.) — see CLAUDE.md "TEXT primary keys with human-readable
// prefixes" architecture decision.
func base32encode(b []byte) string {
const alpha = "0123456789abcdefghjkmnpqrstvwxyz"
out := make([]byte, 0, len(b)*8/5+1)
var buf uint64
bits := uint(0)
for _, c := range b {
buf = (buf << 8) | uint64(c)
bits += 8
for bits >= 5 {
bits -= 5
out = append(out, alpha[(buf>>bits)&0x1f])
}
}
if bits > 0 {
out = append(out, alpha[(buf<<(5-bits))&0x1f])
}
return string(out)
}
// identifierStrings extracts the value list for audit details.
func identifierStrings(ids []domain.ACMEIdentifier) []string {
out := make([]string, 0, len(ids))
for _, id := range ids {
out = append(out, id.Value)
}
return out
}
+153
View File
@@ -112,6 +112,32 @@ func (f *fakeACMERepo) UpdateAccountStatusWithTx(ctx context.Context, q reposito
return nil
}
// Phase 2 — order / authz / challenge state. Phase 1b tests don't use
// these; the no-op stubs keep the *fakeACMERepo type satisfying the
// extended ACMERepo interface. Phase 2's tests overwrite these as
// needed.
func (f *fakeACMERepo) CreateOrderWithTx(ctx context.Context, q repository.Querier, order *domain.ACMEOrder) error {
return nil
}
func (f *fakeACMERepo) GetOrderByID(ctx context.Context, orderID string) (*domain.ACMEOrder, error) {
return nil, repository.ErrNotFound
}
func (f *fakeACMERepo) UpdateOrderWithTx(ctx context.Context, q repository.Querier, order *domain.ACMEOrder) error {
return nil
}
func (f *fakeACMERepo) CreateAuthzWithTx(ctx context.Context, q repository.Querier, authz *domain.ACMEAuthorization) error {
return nil
}
func (f *fakeACMERepo) GetAuthzByID(ctx context.Context, authzID string) (*domain.ACMEAuthorization, error) {
return nil, repository.ErrNotFound
}
func (f *fakeACMERepo) ListAuthzsByOrder(ctx context.Context, orderID string) ([]*domain.ACMEAuthorization, error) {
return nil, nil
}
func (f *fakeACMERepo) CreateChallengeWithTx(ctx context.Context, q repository.Querier, ch *domain.ACMEChallenge) error {
return nil
}
// fakeTransactor is the repository.Transactor stand-in: runs fn
// against the supplied querier (we just pass nil — fakes ignore it).
// Mirrors how production transactor works without an actual DB.
@@ -482,3 +508,130 @@ func TestNewAccount_RequiresTransactor(t *testing.T) {
t.Fatal("expected error when transactor is unset")
}
}
// --- Phase 2 — order creation in trust_authenticated mode -------------
// orderTrackingRepo wraps fakeACMERepo so CreateOrder + CreateAuthz +
// CreateChallenge persistence is observable in tests. The fakeACMERepo's
// stubs no-op; this overrides them.
type orderTrackingRepo struct {
*fakeACMERepo
orders map[string]*domain.ACMEOrder
authzs map[string][]*domain.ACMEAuthorization // orderID → authzs
challenges map[string][]domain.ACMEChallenge // authzID → challenges
}
func newOrderTrackingRepo() *orderTrackingRepo {
return &orderTrackingRepo{
fakeACMERepo: newFakeACMERepo(),
orders: map[string]*domain.ACMEOrder{},
authzs: map[string][]*domain.ACMEAuthorization{},
challenges: map[string][]domain.ACMEChallenge{},
}
}
func (r *orderTrackingRepo) CreateOrderWithTx(ctx context.Context, q repository.Querier, order *domain.ACMEOrder) error {
cp := *order
r.orders[order.OrderID] = &cp
return nil
}
func (r *orderTrackingRepo) GetOrderByID(ctx context.Context, orderID string) (*domain.ACMEOrder, error) {
o, ok := r.orders[orderID]
if !ok {
return nil, repository.ErrNotFound
}
cp := *o
return &cp, nil
}
func (r *orderTrackingRepo) UpdateOrderWithTx(ctx context.Context, q repository.Querier, order *domain.ACMEOrder) error {
cp := *order
r.orders[order.OrderID] = &cp
return nil
}
func (r *orderTrackingRepo) CreateAuthzWithTx(ctx context.Context, q repository.Querier, authz *domain.ACMEAuthorization) error {
cp := *authz
r.authzs[authz.OrderID] = append(r.authzs[authz.OrderID], &cp)
return nil
}
func (r *orderTrackingRepo) ListAuthzsByOrder(ctx context.Context, orderID string) ([]*domain.ACMEAuthorization, error) {
return r.authzs[orderID], nil
}
func (r *orderTrackingRepo) CreateChallengeWithTx(ctx context.Context, q repository.Querier, ch *domain.ACMEChallenge) error {
r.challenges[ch.AuthzID] = append(r.challenges[ch.AuthzID], *ch)
return nil
}
func TestCreateOrder_TrustAuthenticated_AutoReady(t *testing.T) {
cfg := config.ACMEServerConfig{NonceTTL: 5 * time.Minute, OrderTTL: 24 * time.Hour, AuthzTTL: 24 * time.Hour}
repo := newOrderTrackingRepo()
pl := &fakeProfileLookup{profiles: map[string]*domain.CertificateProfile{
"prof-corp": {ID: "prof-corp", Name: "corp", ACMEAuthMode: "trust_authenticated"},
}}
auditRepo := &fakeAuditRepo{}
auditSvc := NewAuditService(auditRepo)
svc := NewACMEService(repo, pl, cfg)
svc.SetTransactor(&fakeTransactor{})
svc.SetAuditService(auditSvc)
order, err := svc.CreateOrder(context.Background(), "acme-acc-X", "prof-corp",
[]domain.ACMEIdentifier{{Type: "dns", Value: "example.com"}}, nil, nil)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("CreateOrder: %v", err)
}
if order.Status != domain.ACMEOrderStatusReady {
t.Errorf("order status = %q, want ready (trust_authenticated)", order.Status)
}
authzs := repo.authzs[order.OrderID]
if len(authzs) != 1 {
t.Fatalf("authzs = %d, want 1", len(authzs))
}
if authzs[0].Status != domain.ACMEAuthzStatusValid {
t.Errorf("authz status = %q, want valid (trust_authenticated)", authzs[0].Status)
}
chs := repo.challenges[authzs[0].AuthzID]
if len(chs) != 1 {
t.Fatalf("challenges = %d, want 1", len(chs))
}
if chs[0].Status != domain.ACMEChallengeStatusValid {
t.Errorf("challenge status = %q, want valid (trust_authenticated)", chs[0].Status)
}
// Audit row written.
if got := len(auditRepo.events); got != 1 {
t.Errorf("audit events = %d, want 1", got)
}
if auditRepo.events[0].Action != "acme_order_created" {
t.Errorf("audit action = %q", auditRepo.events[0].Action)
}
if got := svc.Metrics().NewOrderTotal.Load(); got != 1 {
t.Errorf("NewOrderTotal = %d, want 1", got)
}
}
func TestCreateOrder_ChallengeMode_StaysPending(t *testing.T) {
cfg := config.ACMEServerConfig{NonceTTL: 5 * time.Minute, OrderTTL: 24 * time.Hour, AuthzTTL: 24 * time.Hour}
repo := newOrderTrackingRepo()
pl := &fakeProfileLookup{profiles: map[string]*domain.CertificateProfile{
"prof-corp": {ID: "prof-corp", Name: "corp", ACMEAuthMode: "challenge"},
}}
auditSvc := NewAuditService(&fakeAuditRepo{})
svc := NewACMEService(repo, pl, cfg)
svc.SetTransactor(&fakeTransactor{})
svc.SetAuditService(auditSvc)
order, err := svc.CreateOrder(context.Background(), "acme-acc-X", "prof-corp",
[]domain.ACMEIdentifier{{Type: "dns", Value: "example.com"}}, nil, nil)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("CreateOrder: %v", err)
}
if order.Status != domain.ACMEOrderStatusPending {
t.Errorf("order status = %q, want pending (challenge mode)", order.Status)
}
authzs := repo.authzs[order.OrderID]
if authzs[0].Status != domain.ACMEAuthzStatusPending {
t.Errorf("authz status = %q, want pending (challenge mode)", authzs[0].Status)
}
chs := repo.challenges[authzs[0].AuthzID]
if chs[0].Status != domain.ACMEChallengeStatusPending {
t.Errorf("challenge status = %q, want pending (challenge mode)", chs[0].Status)
}
}