Files
certctl/internal/service/acme.go
T
shankar0123 c351bba41a acme-server: orders + authorizations + finalize + cert download (Phase 2/7)
Closes the issuance loop in trust_authenticated mode (commits ec88a61
+ 44a85d6 wired the foundation + JWS-verified account resource).
After this commit, an ACME client running against a profile with
acme_auth_mode='trust_authenticated' end-to-end-issues a real cert:

  POST /acme/profile/<id>/new-order      → 201 + order URL (status=ready)
  POST /acme/profile/<id>/order/<oid>    → POST-as-GET fetch
  POST /acme/profile/<id>/order/<oid>/finalize  → 200 + status=valid + cert URL
  POST /acme/profile/<id>/cert/<cid>     → 200 + PEM chain

Profiles with acme_auth_mode='challenge' get the same code path with
authz/challenge rows in `pending` state until Phase 3's validators
wire up. The mode is read from the bound profile's column at request
time, NOT cached at server start — operators flipping the column via
SQL take effect on the next order without restart.

Architecture (the load-bearing part):
  - Finalize routes through service.CertificateService.Create — the
    canonical certctl issuance entry point that wraps the
    managed_certificates row insert + audit row in s.tx.WithinTx.
    RenewalPolicy / CertificateProfile / per-issuer-type Prometheus
    metrics / audit rows all apply uniformly to ACME-issued certs via
    the same code path that already serves EST/SCEP/agent/REST issuance.
  - Identifier validation runs BEFORE order creation. Rejected
    identifiers return RFC 7807 with per-identifier subproblems and
    create no order row.
  - Source stamp on managed_certificates: domain.CertificateSourceACME.
    Operators bulk-revoke ACME-issued certs by filtering on Source=ACME.
  - 3-step atomicity boundary documented in code + this commit msg:
    (A) WithinTx-A marks order processing + audit row.
    (B) IssuerConnector.IssueCertificate + CertificateService.Create
        (each in its own WithinTx — Create wraps cert row + audit
        atomically).
    (C) WithinTx-C creates certificate_versions row + transitions order
        to valid + sets certificate_id + audit row.
    The brief window between B and C can leave a managed_certificates
    row whose order is still in `processing`. Phase 5's GC scheduler
    reconciles. Documented inline.

What ships:
  - internal/api/acme/order.go: OrderResponseJSON + AuthorizationResponseJSON
    + ChallengeResponseJSON + NewOrderRequest + FinalizeRequest wire
    shapes; ValidateIdentifiers (Phase 2 syntactic checks, dns-only);
    CSRMatchesIdentifiers (RFC 8555 §7.4 strict equality, case-folded).
  - internal/domain/acme.go: ACMEOrder + ACMEAuthorization + ACMEChallenge
    + ACMEIdentifier + ACMEProblem domain types + closed status enums
    for each (order: pending|ready|processing|valid|invalid; authz:
    pending|valid|invalid|deactivated|expired|revoked; challenge:
    pending|processing|valid|invalid; challenge type: http-01|dns-01|
    tls-alpn-01).
  - internal/domain/profile.go: new ACMEAuthMode field reading from
    certificate_profiles.acme_auth_mode (added in migration 25).
  - internal/domain/certificate.go: new CertificateSourceACME enum value.
  - internal/repository/postgres/profile.go: extended SELECT/scanProfile
    to read the per-profile acme_auth_mode column with a COALESCE
    default of trust_authenticated.
  - internal/repository/postgres/acme.go: full order/authz/challenge
    CRUD (CreateOrderWithTx + GetOrderByID + UpdateOrderWithTx +
    CreateAuthzWithTx + GetAuthzByID + ListAuthzsByOrder +
    ListChallengesByAuthz + CreateChallengeWithTx) with proper
    sql.NullTime + JSONB handling. scanACMEOrder /
    scanACMEAuthz / scanACMEChallenge helpers.
  - internal/service/acme.go: extended ACMERepo interface; new
    SetIssuancePipeline wires certificateService + certificateRepo +
    issuerRegistry. CreateOrder (auth-mode-dispatched: trust_authenticated
    auto-marks order ready + authz valid + 1 placeholder http-01
    challenge valid; challenge mode keeps everything pending). LookupOrder
    (with account-ownership assertion). LookupAuthz. ListAuthzsByOrder.
    FinalizeOrder (3-step atomicity boundary as above; CSR-vs-order
    SAN strict-equality check before issuance; persists FinalizeOrderResult
    {Order, CertID}). LookupCertificate. randIDSuffix + base32encode
    helpers for the human-readable acme-ord-* / acme-authz-* /
    acme-chall-* prefixes (CLAUDE.md "TEXT primary keys with human-
    readable prefixes" architecture decision). 8 new per-op metrics.
  - internal/service/acme_test.go: extended fakeACMERepo with Phase 2
    interface stubs; new orderTrackingRepo for observable persistence;
    2 new tests asserting trust_authenticated → auto-ready/valid and
    challenge → stays-pending.
  - internal/api/handler/acme.go: NewOrder + Order + OrderFinalize +
    Authz + Cert handler methods. orderURL / authzURL / certURL /
    challengeURLBuilder helpers; marshalOrderForResponse fetches
    per-order authzs to populate the URL list. parseOptionalTime for
    notBefore / notAfter.
  - internal/api/handler/acme_handler_test.go: extended mockACMEService
    with Phase 2 method stubs; 4 new handler tests (NewOrder happy +
    rejected-identifier + OrderFinalize bad-CSR + Cert happy).
  - internal/api/router/router.go: 10 new Register calls (5 per-profile
    + 5 shorthand) for new-order, order/{ord_id}, order/{ord_id}/finalize,
    authz/{authz_id}, cert/{cert_id}.
  - internal/api/router/openapi_parity_test.go + api/openapi-handler-exceptions.yaml:
    10 new exception entries.
  - cmd/server/main.go: SetIssuancePipeline at startup, threading
    certificateService + certificateRepo + issuerRegistry into ACMEService.
  - docs/acme-server.md: phase status updated; endpoints table grows
    5 rows for new-order/order/finalize/authz/cert (per-profile +
    shorthand variants); new section "Finalize routing through
    CertificateService.Create" documenting the 3-step atomicity
    boundary + the actor-string convention `acme:<account-id>`.

Tests: ACME package + service + handler + router + config + domain
all green under -short. New cases:
  - TestCreateOrder_TrustAuthenticated_AutoReady (asserts auto-ready
    transition + valid-status authz/challenge + audit row + metric bump).
  - TestCreateOrder_ChallengeMode_StaysPending (asserts pending-status
    cascading authz/challenge for challenge mode).
  - TestACMEHandler_NewOrder_HappyPath (asserts 201 + Location +
    finalize URL shape).
  - TestACMEHandler_NewOrder_RejectedIdentifier (asserts 400 + RFC 7807
    rejectedIdentifier + per-identifier subproblems for type=ip).
  - TestACMEHandler_OrderFinalize_BadCSR (asserts 400 + badCSR for
    non-base64 CSR field).
  - TestACMEHandler_Cert_HappyPath (asserts 200 + PEM content-type +
    PEM chain in body).

Engineering history: cowork/WORKSPACE-CHANGELOG.md "ACME-Server-2".
2026-05-03 13:46:10 +00:00

1087 lines
41 KiB
Go

// Copyright (c) certctl
// SPDX-License-Identifier: BSL-1.1
package service
import (
"context"
cryptorand "crypto/rand"
"crypto/x509"
"errors"
"fmt"
"strings"
"sync/atomic"
"time"
jose "github.com/go-jose/go-jose/v4"
"github.com/shankar0123/certctl/internal/api/acme"
"github.com/shankar0123/certctl/internal/config"
"github.com/shankar0123/certctl/internal/domain"
"github.com/shankar0123/certctl/internal/repository"
)
// ACMERepo is the persistence-layer surface ACMEService consumes for
// nonce + account state. Phase 1b extends the Phase 1a interface with
// the account CRUD path; Phases 2-4 will further extend with order /
// authz / challenge state.
//
// Defining the interface in the service package (rather than
// internal/repository/interfaces.go) keeps the cross-phase blast
// radius small: only this file and the concrete postgres
// ACMERepository move together. Mock implementations in tests satisfy
// this interface without depending on the postgres package.
type ACMERepo interface {
// Phase 1a — nonce.
IssueNonce(ctx context.Context, nonce string, ttl time.Duration) error
ConsumeNonce(ctx context.Context, nonce string) error
// Phase 1b — account CRUD.
CreateAccountWithTx(ctx context.Context, q repository.Querier, acct *domain.ACMEAccount) error
GetAccountByID(ctx context.Context, accountID string) (*domain.ACMEAccount, error)
GetAccountByThumbprint(ctx context.Context, profileID, thumbprint string) (*domain.ACMEAccount, error)
UpdateAccountContactWithTx(ctx context.Context, q repository.Querier, accountID string, contact []string) error
UpdateAccountStatusWithTx(ctx context.Context, q repository.Querier, accountID string, status domain.ACMEAccountStatus) error
// Phase 2 — order / authz / challenge CRUD.
CreateOrderWithTx(ctx context.Context, q repository.Querier, order *domain.ACMEOrder) error
GetOrderByID(ctx context.Context, orderID string) (*domain.ACMEOrder, error)
UpdateOrderWithTx(ctx context.Context, q repository.Querier, order *domain.ACMEOrder) error
CreateAuthzWithTx(ctx context.Context, q repository.Querier, authz *domain.ACMEAuthorization) error
GetAuthzByID(ctx context.Context, authzID string) (*domain.ACMEAuthorization, error)
ListAuthzsByOrder(ctx context.Context, orderID string) ([]*domain.ACMEAuthorization, error)
CreateChallengeWithTx(ctx context.Context, q repository.Querier, ch *domain.ACMEChallenge) error
}
// profileLookup is the minimum surface ACMEService needs to resolve a
// per-profile request. Defined as an interface (rather than taking a
// concrete *postgres.ProfileRepository) so tests can inject an in-memory
// fake without spinning up Postgres.
type profileLookup interface {
Get(ctx context.Context, id string) (*domain.CertificateProfile, error)
}
// ACMEService orchestrates the ACME server's RFC 8555 surface.
//
// - Phase 1a (live): BuildDirectory, IssueNonce.
// - Phase 1b (live): VerifyJWS, NewAccount, LookupAccount,
// UpdateAccount, DeactivateAccount.
// - Phase 2 (this commit): CreateOrder, LookupOrder, FinalizeOrder,
// LookupAuthz, LookupCertificate.
// - Subsequent phases extend with challenge validation, key
// rollover, revocation, ARI.
//
// The struct deliberately holds raw config rather than per-field
// extracted values — readers use 4 of the 11 fields and reading them
// lazily keeps the constructor signature tight.
type ACMEService struct {
repo ACMERepo
profiles profileLookup
cfg config.ACMEServerConfig
metrics *ACMEMetrics
// Phase 1b — atomic-audit plumbing for the JWS-authenticated
// POST surface. Both fields are set via SetTransactor +
// SetAuditService (mirrors CertificateService.SetTransactor at
// internal/service/certificate.go:254). When both are nil the
// service falls back to the non-transactional path — kept for
// the legacy directory + new-nonce paths that don't write to
// stateful tables.
tx repository.Transactor
auditService *AuditService
// Phase 2 — finalize plumbing. The finalize handler routes
// through CertificateService.Create (managed_certificates row +
// audit row in its own WithinTx) AND certRepo.CreateVersionWithTx
// (certificate_versions row). Issuance itself goes through the
// IssuerRegistry's IssuerConnector adapter — same code path
// EST/SCEP/agent take. cmd/server/main.go wires all three at
// startup; tests inject mocks.
certService *CertificateService
certRepo repository.CertificateRepository
issuerRegistry *IssuerRegistry
}
// NewACMEService constructs an ACMEService with the directory + nonce
// surface wired. Account-creating endpoints additionally need the
// transactor + audit service — see SetTransactor / SetAuditService.
func NewACMEService(repo ACMERepo, profiles profileLookup, cfg config.ACMEServerConfig) *ACMEService {
return &ACMEService{
repo: repo,
profiles: profiles,
cfg: cfg,
metrics: NewACMEMetrics(),
}
}
// SetTransactor wires the atomic-audit transactor. Mirrors
// CertificateService.SetTransactor; cmd/server/main.go calls this
// at startup with the same *postgres.transactor instance shared
// across CertificateService / RevocationSvc / RenewalService.
func (s *ACMEService) SetTransactor(tx repository.Transactor) { s.tx = tx }
// SetAuditService wires the audit service. cmd/server/main.go
// constructs auditService once and passes the same instance into
// every service that emits audit rows.
func (s *ACMEService) SetAuditService(a *AuditService) { s.auditService = a }
// SetIssuancePipeline wires Phase 2 finalize dependencies: the
// certificate service (for managed_certificates row + audit row),
// the certificate repository (for certificate_versions row), and the
// issuer registry (for routing IssueCertificate against the bound
// profile's issuer). cmd/server/main.go calls this at startup.
//
// All three are required for the finalize path. When unset, FinalizeOrder
// returns ErrACMEFinalizeUnconfigured (handler maps to
// urn:ietf:params:acme:error:serverInternal).
func (s *ACMEService) SetIssuancePipeline(certSvc *CertificateService, certRepo repository.CertificateRepository, registry *IssuerRegistry) {
s.certService = certSvc
s.certRepo = certRepo
s.issuerRegistry = registry
}
// Metrics returns the per-op counter snapshotter. cmd/server/main.go
// passes this into MetricsHandler so the Prometheus exposer picks up
// the per-op signals.
func (s *ACMEService) Metrics() *ACMEMetrics { return s.metrics }
// ErrACMEUserActionRequired is returned by BuildDirectory when the
// caller hits the /acme/* shorthand path without
// CERTCTL_ACME_SERVER_DEFAULT_PROFILE_ID being set. Handler maps to
// RFC 7807 + RFC 8555 §6.7 userActionRequired.
var ErrACMEUserActionRequired = errors.New("acme: default profile not configured; use /acme/profile/<id>/*")
// ErrACMEProfileNotFound is returned when the profile in the request
// path doesn't exist. Handler maps to HTTP 404 (NOT 500 — the
// distinction is operator-meaningful: 404 says "fix your URL," 500
// says "something is wrong server-side").
var ErrACMEProfileNotFound = errors.New("acme: profile not found")
// ErrACMEAccountNotFound is returned by LookupAccount when the
// account ID in the URL doesn't match any row. Handler maps to
// 404 + RFC 8555 §6.7 accountDoesNotExist.
var ErrACMEAccountNotFound = errors.New("acme: account not found")
// ErrACMEAccountDoesNotExist is returned by NewAccount when
// onlyReturnExisting=true and no account exists for the supplied
// JWK. RFC 8555 §7.3.1 requires returning 400 +
// urn:ietf:params:acme:error:accountDoesNotExist (NOT 404).
var ErrACMEAccountDoesNotExist = errors.New("acme: account does not exist for this JWK")
// Phase 2 sentinels.
// ErrACMEOrderNotFound is returned when the order ID in the URL
// doesn't match any row.
var ErrACMEOrderNotFound = errors.New("acme: order not found")
// ErrACMEAuthzNotFound is returned when the authz ID in the URL
// doesn't match any row.
var ErrACMEAuthzNotFound = errors.New("acme: authz not found")
// ErrACMECertificateNotFound is returned when the cert ID in the URL
// doesn't match any managed_certificates row OR doesn't link back
// to an order owned by the requesting account.
var ErrACMECertificateNotFound = errors.New("acme: certificate not found")
// ErrACMEOrderNotReady is returned by FinalizeOrder when the order
// status is not ready/processing. RFC 8555 §7.4 mandates
// urn:ietf:params:acme:error:orderNotReady.
var ErrACMEOrderNotReady = errors.New("acme: order not in ready state")
// ErrACMEOrderUnauthorized is returned when the request's authenticated
// account doesn't own the targeted order/authz/cert.
var ErrACMEOrderUnauthorized = errors.New("acme: account does not own this resource")
// ErrACMEFinalizeUnconfigured is returned by FinalizeOrder when
// SetIssuancePipeline hasn't been called. Indicates a deploy-time
// wiring bug; mapped to serverInternal.
var ErrACMEFinalizeUnconfigured = errors.New("acme: finalize pipeline not wired (call SetIssuancePipeline)")
// ErrACMEUnsupportedAuthMode is returned when an order is created
// against a profile whose acme_auth_mode is not one of
// `trust_authenticated` (Phase 2) or `challenge` (Phase 3 — wired
// but the validators land in Phase 3).
var ErrACMEUnsupportedAuthMode = errors.New("acme: unsupported auth mode on profile")
// BuildDirectory constructs the per-profile directory document.
//
// profileID resolution:
// - non-empty: look up that profile; ErrACMEProfileNotFound on miss.
// - empty + cfg.DefaultProfileID set: substitute the default.
// - empty + cfg.DefaultProfileID unset: ErrACMEUserActionRequired.
//
// baseURL is the per-profile base path the directory's URL fields are
// constructed against. The handler computes baseURL from the inbound
// request (scheme + host + /acme/profile/<id>) and passes it in;
// keeping the URL composition in the handler avoids embedding HTTP
// concerns in the service layer.
//
// On success the metrics counter for the directory op increments;
// failures bump the failure variant of the same counter.
func (s *ACMEService) BuildDirectory(ctx context.Context, profileID, baseURL string) (*acme.Directory, error) {
profileID, err := s.resolveProfile(ctx, profileID)
if err != nil {
s.metrics.bump(&s.metrics.DirectoryFailureTotal)
return nil, err
}
dir := acme.BuildDirectory(
baseURL,
s.cfg.DirectoryMeta.TermsOfService,
s.cfg.DirectoryMeta.Website,
s.cfg.DirectoryMeta.CAAIdentities,
s.cfg.DirectoryMeta.ExternalAccountRequired,
// Phase 1a: ARI is non-functional. The Phase 4 commit flips this
// to true once the renewal-info handler ships.
false,
)
_ = profileID // Phase 1b will use the resolved profile to read
// acme_auth_mode + record per-profile metrics. Phase 1a
// only needs the existence check above.
s.metrics.bump(&s.metrics.DirectoryTotal)
return dir, nil
}
// IssueNonce generates a fresh ACME nonce, persists it with the
// configured TTL, and returns the encoded string for the
// Replay-Nonce header.
//
// RFC 8555 §6.5: every successful ACME response carries a
// Replay-Nonce. Phase 1a wires this via the directory + new-nonce
// handlers; Phase 1b extends with new-account + account/<id> POST
// responses (the JWS-authenticated paths).
func (s *ACMEService) IssueNonce(ctx context.Context) (string, error) {
nonce, err := acme.GenerateNonce()
if err != nil {
s.metrics.bump(&s.metrics.NewNonceFailureTotal)
return "", fmt.Errorf("acme: generate nonce: %w", err)
}
if err := s.repo.IssueNonce(ctx, nonce, s.cfg.NonceTTL); err != nil {
s.metrics.bump(&s.metrics.NewNonceFailureTotal)
return "", fmt.Errorf("acme: persist nonce: %w", err)
}
s.metrics.bump(&s.metrics.NewNonceTotal)
return nonce, nil
}
// resolveProfile applies the default-profile fallback and confirms the
// profile exists. Returns the resolved (canonical) profileID on
// success. Centralizing the resolution here keeps every Phase
// 1a/1b/2/3/4 endpoint's "which profile is this request bound to"
// logic uniform.
func (s *ACMEService) resolveProfile(ctx context.Context, profileID string) (string, error) {
if profileID == "" {
if s.cfg.DefaultProfileID == "" {
return "", ErrACMEUserActionRequired
}
profileID = s.cfg.DefaultProfileID
}
_, err := s.profiles.Get(ctx, profileID)
if err != nil {
if errors.Is(err, repository.ErrNotFound) {
return "", ErrACMEProfileNotFound
}
return "", fmt.Errorf("acme: lookup profile: %w", err)
}
return profileID, nil
}
// ACMEMetrics is the per-op counter table for the ACME server. Mirrors
// the IssuanceMetrics / DeployCounters pattern (atomic.Uint64 + a
// Snapshot method that emits stable tuples). Phases 2-4 will extend
// with new-order / finalize / challenge counters.
type ACMEMetrics struct {
// Phase 1a — directory + new-nonce.
DirectoryTotal atomic.Uint64
DirectoryFailureTotal atomic.Uint64
NewNonceTotal atomic.Uint64
NewNonceFailureTotal atomic.Uint64
// Phase 1b — account resource.
NewAccountTotal atomic.Uint64
NewAccountFailureTotal atomic.Uint64
NewAccountIdempotentTotal atomic.Uint64 // re-registration of existing JWK (RFC 8555 §7.3.1)
UpdateAccountTotal atomic.Uint64
UpdateAccountFailureTotal atomic.Uint64
DeactivateAccountTotal atomic.Uint64
// Phase 2 — orders + finalize + cert download.
NewOrderTotal atomic.Uint64
NewOrderFailureTotal atomic.Uint64
NewOrderRejectedTotal atomic.Uint64 // identifier-validation rejection
FinalizeOrderTotal atomic.Uint64
FinalizeOrderFailureTotal atomic.Uint64
CertDownloadTotal atomic.Uint64
CertDownloadFailureTotal atomic.Uint64
AuthzReadTotal atomic.Uint64
}
// NewACMEMetrics returns a zeroed counter table. Concurrent callers
// can bump counters without external synchronization (atomic.Uint64
// is the synchronization primitive).
func NewACMEMetrics() *ACMEMetrics { return &ACMEMetrics{} }
// bump increments a single atomic counter. Centralized so the call
// sites in BuildDirectory + IssueNonce + NewAccount + etc. are uniform.
func (m *ACMEMetrics) bump(c *atomic.Uint64) { c.Add(1) }
// Snapshot emits the current counter values as a map (op → count).
// Naming is certctl_acme_<op>_total per frozen decision 0.10
// (cardinality discipline) so the Prometheus exposer can lift them
// directly without per-op stringly-typed branching.
func (m *ACMEMetrics) Snapshot() map[string]uint64 {
return map[string]uint64{
"certctl_acme_directory_total": m.DirectoryTotal.Load(),
"certctl_acme_directory_failures_total": m.DirectoryFailureTotal.Load(),
"certctl_acme_new_nonce_total": m.NewNonceTotal.Load(),
"certctl_acme_new_nonce_failures_total": m.NewNonceFailureTotal.Load(),
"certctl_acme_new_account_total": m.NewAccountTotal.Load(),
"certctl_acme_new_account_failures_total": m.NewAccountFailureTotal.Load(),
"certctl_acme_new_account_idempotent_total": m.NewAccountIdempotentTotal.Load(),
"certctl_acme_update_account_total": m.UpdateAccountTotal.Load(),
"certctl_acme_update_account_failures_total": m.UpdateAccountFailureTotal.Load(),
"certctl_acme_deactivate_account_total": m.DeactivateAccountTotal.Load(),
"certctl_acme_new_order_total": m.NewOrderTotal.Load(),
"certctl_acme_new_order_failures_total": m.NewOrderFailureTotal.Load(),
"certctl_acme_new_order_rejected_total": m.NewOrderRejectedTotal.Load(),
"certctl_acme_finalize_order_total": m.FinalizeOrderTotal.Load(),
"certctl_acme_finalize_order_failures_total": m.FinalizeOrderFailureTotal.Load(),
"certctl_acme_cert_download_total": m.CertDownloadTotal.Load(),
"certctl_acme_cert_download_failures_total": m.CertDownloadFailureTotal.Load(),
"certctl_acme_authz_read_total": m.AuthzReadTotal.Load(),
}
}
// VerifyJWS adapts the api/acme verifier to the service-layer
// dependency surface. It builds the VerifierConfig from the service's
// repo + the supplied AccountKID-builder closure, then delegates to
// acme.VerifyJWS.
//
// accountKID is the handler-supplied closure that returns the
// canonical kid URL for an account ID (scheme + host + per-profile
// path). VerifyJWS uses it to round-trip-check the inbound `kid`
// against what the server would have emitted on new-account.
func (s *ACMEService) VerifyJWS(
ctx context.Context,
body []byte,
requestURL string,
expectNewAccount bool,
accountKID func(accountID string) string,
) (*acme.VerifiedRequest, error) {
cfg := acme.VerifierConfig{
Accounts: &accountAdapter{ctx: ctx, repo: s.repo},
Nonces: &nonceAdapter{ctx: ctx, repo: s.repo},
AccountKID: accountKID,
}
return acme.VerifyJWS(cfg, body, requestURL, acme.VerifyOptions{
ExpectNewAccount: expectNewAccount,
})
}
// accountAdapter bridges the service-layer ACMERepo to the verifier's
// AccountLookup interface. The verifier doesn't take a context (its
// surface is sync-pure for testability), so the adapter captures the
// per-request context at construction time.
type accountAdapter struct {
ctx context.Context
repo ACMERepo
}
func (a *accountAdapter) LookupAccount(accountID string) (*domain.ACMEAccount, error) {
acct, err := a.repo.GetAccountByID(a.ctx, accountID)
if err != nil {
if errors.Is(err, repository.ErrNotFound) {
return nil, acme.ErrJWSAccountNotFound
}
return nil, fmt.Errorf("acme: lookup account: %w", err)
}
return acct, nil
}
// nonceAdapter bridges the service-layer ACMERepo's ConsumeNonce
// to the verifier's NonceConsumer interface (no-context signature).
type nonceAdapter struct {
ctx context.Context
repo ACMERepo
}
func (n *nonceAdapter) ConsumeNonce(nonce string) error {
return n.repo.ConsumeNonce(n.ctx, nonce)
}
// NewAccount creates (or, on RFC 8555 §7.3.1 idempotent re-registration,
// re-returns the existing) account row for the supplied JWK. Returns
// the persisted ACMEAccount + a bool indicating whether the row was
// newly created (true) or already existed (false).
//
// onlyReturnExisting=true makes the call read-only: when no account
// exists for the JWK, the service returns ErrACMEAccountDoesNotExist
// instead of creating one.
//
// State writes (cert insert + audit row) are atomic via WithinTx +
// RecordEventWithTx — same pattern as CertificateService.Create.
func (s *ACMEService) NewAccount(
ctx context.Context,
profileID string,
jwk *jose.JSONWebKey,
contact []string,
onlyReturnExisting bool,
tosAgreed bool,
) (*domain.ACMEAccount, bool, error) {
if s.tx == nil || s.auditService == nil {
s.metrics.bump(&s.metrics.NewAccountFailureTotal)
return nil, false, fmt.Errorf("acme: new-account requires SetTransactor + SetAuditService")
}
resolvedProfileID, err := s.resolveProfile(ctx, profileID)
if err != nil {
s.metrics.bump(&s.metrics.NewAccountFailureTotal)
return nil, false, err
}
thumb, err := acme.JWKThumbprint(jwk)
if err != nil {
s.metrics.bump(&s.metrics.NewAccountFailureTotal)
return nil, false, fmt.Errorf("acme: thumbprint: %w", err)
}
// RFC 8555 §7.3.1 idempotency: a new-account request for an
// already-registered JWK returns the existing row unmodified.
if existing, err := s.repo.GetAccountByThumbprint(ctx, resolvedProfileID, thumb); err == nil {
s.metrics.bump(&s.metrics.NewAccountIdempotentTotal)
return existing, false, nil
} else if !errors.Is(err, repository.ErrNotFound) {
s.metrics.bump(&s.metrics.NewAccountFailureTotal)
return nil, false, fmt.Errorf("acme: lookup-by-thumbprint: %w", err)
}
if onlyReturnExisting {
s.metrics.bump(&s.metrics.NewAccountFailureTotal)
return nil, false, ErrACMEAccountDoesNotExist
}
jwkPEM, err := acme.JWKToPEM(jwk)
if err != nil {
s.metrics.bump(&s.metrics.NewAccountFailureTotal)
return nil, false, fmt.Errorf("acme: serialize jwk: %w", err)
}
acct := &domain.ACMEAccount{
AccountID: acme.AccountID(thumb),
JWKThumbprint: thumb,
JWKPEM: jwkPEM,
Contact: contact,
Status: domain.ACMEAccountStatusValid,
ProfileID: resolvedProfileID,
}
auditDetails := map[string]interface{}{
"profile_id": resolvedProfileID,
"jwk_thumbprint": thumb,
"contact_count": len(contact),
"tos_agreed": tosAgreed,
}
err = s.tx.WithinTx(ctx, func(q repository.Querier) error {
if err := s.repo.CreateAccountWithTx(ctx, q, acct); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("acme: create account: %w", err)
}
return s.auditService.RecordEventWithTx(
ctx, q,
fmt.Sprintf("acme:%s", acct.AccountID),
domain.ActorTypeUser,
"acme_account_created",
"acme_account",
acct.AccountID,
auditDetails,
)
})
if err != nil {
s.metrics.bump(&s.metrics.NewAccountFailureTotal)
return nil, false, err
}
s.metrics.bump(&s.metrics.NewAccountTotal)
return acct, true, nil
}
// LookupAccount returns the account by ID. Returns
// ErrACMEAccountNotFound when the row doesn't exist (handler maps to
// 404 with RFC 7807 + RFC 8555 §6.7 accountDoesNotExist Problem).
func (s *ACMEService) LookupAccount(ctx context.Context, accountID string) (*domain.ACMEAccount, error) {
acct, err := s.repo.GetAccountByID(ctx, accountID)
if err != nil {
if errors.Is(err, repository.ErrNotFound) {
return nil, ErrACMEAccountNotFound
}
return nil, fmt.Errorf("acme: lookup account: %w", err)
}
return acct, nil
}
// UpdateAccount replaces the account's contact list. Atomic: the
// repo update + audit row run in one WithinTx.
func (s *ACMEService) UpdateAccount(
ctx context.Context,
accountID string,
contact []string,
) (*domain.ACMEAccount, error) {
if s.tx == nil || s.auditService == nil {
s.metrics.bump(&s.metrics.UpdateAccountFailureTotal)
return nil, fmt.Errorf("acme: update-account requires SetTransactor + SetAuditService")
}
auditDetails := map[string]interface{}{
"account_id": accountID,
"contact_count": len(contact),
}
err := s.tx.WithinTx(ctx, func(q repository.Querier) error {
if err := s.repo.UpdateAccountContactWithTx(ctx, q, accountID, contact); err != nil {
return err
}
return s.auditService.RecordEventWithTx(
ctx, q,
fmt.Sprintf("acme:%s", accountID),
domain.ActorTypeUser,
"acme_account_updated",
"acme_account",
accountID,
auditDetails,
)
})
if err != nil {
s.metrics.bump(&s.metrics.UpdateAccountFailureTotal)
return nil, err
}
// Re-read the row so the response carries the persisted state.
acct, err := s.LookupAccount(ctx, accountID)
if err != nil {
s.metrics.bump(&s.metrics.UpdateAccountFailureTotal)
return nil, err
}
s.metrics.bump(&s.metrics.UpdateAccountTotal)
return acct, nil
}
// DeactivateAccount transitions the account from `valid` to
// `deactivated` (RFC 8555 §7.3.6). Subsequent JWS-authenticated
// requests using this account's kid are rejected by the verifier
// (status check at acme/jws.go).
func (s *ACMEService) DeactivateAccount(ctx context.Context, accountID string) (*domain.ACMEAccount, error) {
if s.tx == nil || s.auditService == nil {
s.metrics.bump(&s.metrics.UpdateAccountFailureTotal)
return nil, fmt.Errorf("acme: deactivate-account requires SetTransactor + SetAuditService")
}
auditDetails := map[string]interface{}{
"account_id": accountID,
"new_status": string(domain.ACMEAccountStatusDeactivated),
}
err := s.tx.WithinTx(ctx, func(q repository.Querier) error {
if err := s.repo.UpdateAccountStatusWithTx(ctx, q, accountID, domain.ACMEAccountStatusDeactivated); err != nil {
return err
}
return s.auditService.RecordEventWithTx(
ctx, q,
fmt.Sprintf("acme:%s", accountID),
domain.ActorTypeUser,
"acme_account_deactivated",
"acme_account",
accountID,
auditDetails,
)
})
if err != nil {
s.metrics.bump(&s.metrics.UpdateAccountFailureTotal)
return nil, err
}
acct, err := s.LookupAccount(ctx, accountID)
if err != nil {
s.metrics.bump(&s.metrics.UpdateAccountFailureTotal)
return nil, err
}
s.metrics.bump(&s.metrics.DeactivateAccountTotal)
return acct, nil
}
// --- Phase 2 — orders + authz + finalize + cert download ---------------
// CreateOrder validates a new-order request against the bound profile
// and persists the order + per-identifier authz + per-authz challenge
// rows in one WithinTx. Returns the created order on success.
//
// Auth-mode dispatch:
// - trust_authenticated (default): order goes immediately to status=ready,
// each authz immediately to status=valid (no challenge validation
// required); a single placeholder http-01 challenge per authz is
// persisted with status=valid for RFC 8555 compliance (the spec
// requires challenges on every authz).
// - challenge: order stays at status=pending, authzs at status=pending,
// challenges at status=pending, until Phase 3's validators run.
func (s *ACMEService) CreateOrder(
ctx context.Context,
accountID, profileID string,
identifiers []domain.ACMEIdentifier,
notBefore, notAfter *time.Time,
) (*domain.ACMEOrder, error) {
if s.tx == nil || s.auditService == nil {
s.metrics.bump(&s.metrics.NewOrderFailureTotal)
return nil, fmt.Errorf("acme: new-order requires SetTransactor + SetAuditService")
}
resolvedProfileID, err := s.resolveProfile(ctx, profileID)
if err != nil {
s.metrics.bump(&s.metrics.NewOrderFailureTotal)
return nil, err
}
profile, err := s.profiles.Get(ctx, resolvedProfileID)
if err != nil {
s.metrics.bump(&s.metrics.NewOrderFailureTotal)
return nil, fmt.Errorf("acme: lookup profile: %w", err)
}
authMode := profile.ACMEAuthMode
if authMode == "" {
authMode = string(s.cfg.DefaultAuthMode)
}
if authMode == "" {
authMode = "trust_authenticated"
}
if authMode != "trust_authenticated" && authMode != "challenge" {
s.metrics.bump(&s.metrics.NewOrderFailureTotal)
return nil, fmt.Errorf("%w: %q", ErrACMEUnsupportedAuthMode, authMode)
}
now := time.Now().UTC()
orderTTL := s.cfg.OrderTTL
if orderTTL <= 0 {
orderTTL = 24 * time.Hour
}
authzTTL := s.cfg.AuthzTTL
if authzTTL <= 0 {
authzTTL = 24 * time.Hour
}
// In trust_authenticated mode, the order goes straight to `ready`
// (RFC 8555 §7.1.6: ready means all authzs valid, awaiting CSR).
// In challenge mode, the order stays `pending` until challenges
// validate.
orderStatus := domain.ACMEOrderStatusPending
authzStatus := domain.ACMEAuthzStatusPending
challengeStatus := domain.ACMEChallengeStatusPending
if authMode == "trust_authenticated" {
orderStatus = domain.ACMEOrderStatusReady
authzStatus = domain.ACMEAuthzStatusValid
challengeStatus = domain.ACMEChallengeStatusValid
}
order := &domain.ACMEOrder{
OrderID: "acme-ord-" + randIDSuffix(),
AccountID: accountID,
Identifiers: identifiers,
Status: orderStatus,
ExpiresAt: now.Add(orderTTL),
NotBefore: notBefore,
NotAfter: notAfter,
CreatedAt: now,
UpdatedAt: now,
}
auditDetails := map[string]interface{}{
"account_id": accountID,
"profile_id": resolvedProfileID,
"auth_mode": authMode,
"identifier_n": len(identifiers),
"identifiers": identifierStrings(identifiers),
}
err = s.tx.WithinTx(ctx, func(q repository.Querier) error {
if err := s.repo.CreateOrderWithTx(ctx, q, order); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("acme: create order: %w", err)
}
// Per-identifier authz + 1 placeholder challenge per authz.
for _, id := range identifiers {
authz := &domain.ACMEAuthorization{
AuthzID: "acme-authz-" + randIDSuffix(),
OrderID: order.OrderID,
Identifier: id,
Status: authzStatus,
ExpiresAt: now.Add(authzTTL),
Wildcard: strings.HasPrefix(id.Value, "*."),
CreatedAt: now,
UpdatedAt: now,
}
if err := s.repo.CreateAuthzWithTx(ctx, q, authz); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("acme: create authz: %w", err)
}
// RFC 8555 §8: every authz needs at least one challenge
// row. Phase 2 emits a single http-01 placeholder; Phase 3
// will fan out to all 3 challenge types under challenge mode.
ch := &domain.ACMEChallenge{
ChallengeID: "acme-chall-" + randIDSuffix(),
AuthzID: authz.AuthzID,
Type: domain.ACMEChallengeTypeHTTP01,
Status: challengeStatus,
Token: randIDSuffix(),
CreatedAt: now,
}
if challengeStatus == domain.ACMEChallengeStatusValid {
validatedAt := now
ch.ValidatedAt = &validatedAt
}
if err := s.repo.CreateChallengeWithTx(ctx, q, ch); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("acme: create challenge: %w", err)
}
}
return s.auditService.RecordEventWithTx(
ctx, q,
fmt.Sprintf("acme:%s", accountID),
domain.ActorTypeUser,
"acme_order_created",
"acme_order",
order.OrderID,
auditDetails,
)
})
if err != nil {
s.metrics.bump(&s.metrics.NewOrderFailureTotal)
return nil, err
}
s.metrics.bump(&s.metrics.NewOrderTotal)
return order, nil
}
// LookupOrder returns an order by ID, asserting the requesting
// account owns it. ErrACMEOrderUnauthorized when account_id mismatches.
func (s *ACMEService) LookupOrder(ctx context.Context, orderID, accountID string) (*domain.ACMEOrder, error) {
order, err := s.repo.GetOrderByID(ctx, orderID)
if err != nil {
if errors.Is(err, repository.ErrNotFound) {
return nil, ErrACMEOrderNotFound
}
return nil, fmt.Errorf("acme: lookup order: %w", err)
}
if order.AccountID != accountID {
return nil, ErrACMEOrderUnauthorized
}
return order, nil
}
// LookupAuthz returns an authz by ID. Authz rows aren't account-scoped
// directly; the handler asserts via the parent order if needed.
func (s *ACMEService) LookupAuthz(ctx context.Context, authzID string) (*domain.ACMEAuthorization, error) {
authz, err := s.repo.GetAuthzByID(ctx, authzID)
if err != nil {
if errors.Is(err, repository.ErrNotFound) {
return nil, ErrACMEAuthzNotFound
}
return nil, fmt.Errorf("acme: lookup authz: %w", err)
}
s.metrics.bump(&s.metrics.AuthzReadTotal)
return authz, nil
}
// ListAuthzsByOrder returns the per-order authz rows. Used by
// MarshalOrder to compute the authorizations URL list.
func (s *ACMEService) ListAuthzsByOrder(ctx context.Context, orderID string) ([]*domain.ACMEAuthorization, error) {
return s.repo.ListAuthzsByOrder(ctx, orderID)
}
// FinalizeOrderResult bundles the post-finalize state the handler
// needs: the updated order + the cert ID for the cert-download URL.
type FinalizeOrderResult struct {
Order *domain.ACMEOrder
CertID string
}
// FinalizeOrder consumes a CSR, asserts it matches the order's
// identifiers, issues via the IssuerRegistry's per-profile connector,
// persists the managed_certificates row + version + audit, and
// transitions the order to status=valid with certificate_id set.
//
// Atomicity boundary (documented in the master prompt):
// - Step A (this function's own WithinTx): order status pending →
// processing + audit row.
// - Step B (CertificateService.Create): managed_certificates row +
// audit row in its own WithinTx.
// - Step C (this function's own WithinTx): certificate_versions row
// - order status processing → valid + certificate_id + csr_pem +
// audit row.
//
// The window between Step B and Step C can leave a managed_certificates
// row whose order is still in `processing`. Phase 5's GC scheduler
// reconciles. Documented in cowork/acme-server-prompts/03-... + the
// service file's design notes.
func (s *ACMEService) FinalizeOrder(
ctx context.Context,
accountID, orderID, profileID string,
csr *x509.CertificateRequest,
csrPEM string,
) (*FinalizeOrderResult, error) {
if s.certService == nil || s.certRepo == nil || s.issuerRegistry == nil {
s.metrics.bump(&s.metrics.FinalizeOrderFailureTotal)
return nil, ErrACMEFinalizeUnconfigured
}
if s.tx == nil || s.auditService == nil {
s.metrics.bump(&s.metrics.FinalizeOrderFailureTotal)
return nil, fmt.Errorf("acme: finalize requires SetTransactor + SetAuditService")
}
order, err := s.LookupOrder(ctx, orderID, accountID)
if err != nil {
s.metrics.bump(&s.metrics.FinalizeOrderFailureTotal)
return nil, err
}
if order.Status != domain.ACMEOrderStatusReady && order.Status != domain.ACMEOrderStatusProcessing {
s.metrics.bump(&s.metrics.FinalizeOrderFailureTotal)
return nil, fmt.Errorf("%w: status=%s", ErrACMEOrderNotReady, order.Status)
}
// Idempotent re-finalize (RFC 8555 §7.4): if the order is already
// valid, return the existing result.
if order.Status == domain.ACMEOrderStatusValid && order.CertificateID != "" {
s.metrics.bump(&s.metrics.FinalizeOrderTotal)
return &FinalizeOrderResult{Order: order, CertID: order.CertificateID}, nil
}
// Validate CSR matches order identifiers.
if p := acme.CSRMatchesIdentifiers(csr, order.Identifiers); p != nil {
s.metrics.bump(&s.metrics.FinalizeOrderFailureTotal)
// Persist the failure on the order for client visibility.
order.Status = domain.ACMEOrderStatusInvalid
order.Error = &domain.ACMEProblem{Type: p.Type, Detail: p.Detail, Status: p.Status}
_ = s.tx.WithinTx(ctx, func(q repository.Querier) error {
return s.repo.UpdateOrderWithTx(ctx, q, order)
})
return nil, fmt.Errorf("acme: csr mismatch: %s", p.Detail)
}
resolvedProfileID, err := s.resolveProfile(ctx, profileID)
if err != nil {
s.metrics.bump(&s.metrics.FinalizeOrderFailureTotal)
return nil, err
}
profile, err := s.profiles.Get(ctx, resolvedProfileID)
if err != nil {
s.metrics.bump(&s.metrics.FinalizeOrderFailureTotal)
return nil, fmt.Errorf("acme: lookup profile: %w", err)
}
// Step A: mark order processing.
order.Status = domain.ACMEOrderStatusProcessing
if err := s.tx.WithinTx(ctx, func(q repository.Querier) error {
if err := s.repo.UpdateOrderWithTx(ctx, q, order); err != nil {
return err
}
return s.auditService.RecordEventWithTx(ctx, q,
fmt.Sprintf("acme:%s", accountID), domain.ActorTypeUser,
"acme_order_processing", "acme_order", order.OrderID,
map[string]interface{}{"profile_id": resolvedProfileID})
}); err != nil {
s.metrics.bump(&s.metrics.FinalizeOrderFailureTotal)
return nil, err
}
// Step B: issue the cert via the per-issuer connector + persist
// the managed_certificates row.
commonName := csr.Subject.CommonName
if commonName == "" && len(order.Identifiers) > 0 {
commonName = order.Identifiers[0].Value
}
sans := make([]string, 0, len(order.Identifiers))
for _, id := range order.Identifiers {
if id.Type == "dns" {
sans = append(sans, id.Value)
}
}
// Resolve the bound issuer. Profile carries no IssuerID column
// (issuer is per-issuance per certctl architecture), so we'd
// normally get it from the order context. For Phase 2 we use the
// configured default issuer-id for the first registered connector.
// Operators with multiple profiles + multiple issuers will refine
// this in a follow-up.
issuerID, conn, ok := s.firstAvailableIssuer()
if !ok {
s.metrics.bump(&s.metrics.FinalizeOrderFailureTotal)
return nil, fmt.Errorf("acme: no issuer available in registry")
}
maxTTL := profile.MaxTTLSeconds
mustStaple := profile.MustStaple
ekus := profile.AllowedEKUs
if len(ekus) == 0 {
ekus = domain.DefaultEKUs()
}
issuance, err := conn.IssueCertificate(ctx, commonName, sans, csrPEM, ekus, maxTTL, mustStaple)
if err != nil {
s.metrics.bump(&s.metrics.FinalizeOrderFailureTotal)
// Persist the failure on the order.
order.Status = domain.ACMEOrderStatusInvalid
order.Error = &domain.ACMEProblem{
Type: "urn:ietf:params:acme:error:serverInternal",
Detail: "issuer rejected the CSR",
Status: 500,
}
_ = s.tx.WithinTx(ctx, func(q repository.Querier) error {
return s.repo.UpdateOrderWithTx(ctx, q, order)
})
return nil, fmt.Errorf("acme: issuer issuance: %w", err)
}
cert := &domain.ManagedCertificate{
ID: "mc-acme-" + randIDSuffix(),
Name: fmt.Sprintf("acme-%s", order.OrderID),
CommonName: commonName,
SANs: sans,
IssuerID: issuerID,
CertificateProfileID: profile.ID,
Status: domain.CertificateStatusActive,
ExpiresAt: issuance.NotAfter,
Source: domain.CertificateSourceACME,
}
actor := fmt.Sprintf("acme:%s", accountID)
if err := s.certService.Create(ctx, cert, actor); err != nil {
s.metrics.bump(&s.metrics.FinalizeOrderFailureTotal)
return nil, fmt.Errorf("acme: cert insert: %w", err)
}
// Step C: persist the certificate version + transition order to
// valid in one WithinTx.
version := &domain.CertificateVersion{
CertificateID: cert.ID,
SerialNumber: issuance.Serial,
NotBefore: issuance.NotBefore,
NotAfter: issuance.NotAfter,
PEMChain: issuance.CertPEM + issuance.ChainPEM,
CSRPEM: csrPEM,
}
order.Status = domain.ACMEOrderStatusValid
order.CSRPEM = csrPEM
order.CertificateID = cert.ID
order.Error = nil
if err := s.tx.WithinTx(ctx, func(q repository.Querier) error {
if err := s.certRepo.CreateVersionWithTx(ctx, q, version); err != nil {
return err
}
if err := s.repo.UpdateOrderWithTx(ctx, q, order); err != nil {
return err
}
return s.auditService.RecordEventWithTx(ctx, q, actor, domain.ActorTypeUser,
"acme_order_finalized", "acme_order", order.OrderID,
map[string]interface{}{
"profile_id": resolvedProfileID,
"certificate_id": cert.ID,
"serial": issuance.Serial,
})
}); err != nil {
s.metrics.bump(&s.metrics.FinalizeOrderFailureTotal)
return nil, err
}
s.metrics.bump(&s.metrics.FinalizeOrderTotal)
return &FinalizeOrderResult{Order: order, CertID: cert.ID}, nil
}
// LookupCertificate returns the PEM chain for a managed-certificate
// ID. Asserts the requesting account owns the cert via the order
// linkage. Phase 2: the caller (Cert handler) provides the cert ID
// from the URL path; we look up the cert + the latest version + the
// order that produced it, and confirm order.AccountID == accountID.
func (s *ACMEService) LookupCertificate(ctx context.Context, certID, accountID string) (string, error) {
if s.certRepo == nil {
s.metrics.bump(&s.metrics.CertDownloadFailureTotal)
return "", ErrACMEFinalizeUnconfigured
}
cert, err := s.certRepo.Get(ctx, certID)
if err != nil {
if errors.Is(err, repository.ErrNotFound) {
s.metrics.bump(&s.metrics.CertDownloadFailureTotal)
return "", ErrACMECertificateNotFound
}
s.metrics.bump(&s.metrics.CertDownloadFailureTotal)
return "", fmt.Errorf("acme: get cert: %w", err)
}
if cert.Source != domain.CertificateSourceACME {
s.metrics.bump(&s.metrics.CertDownloadFailureTotal)
return "", ErrACMECertificateNotFound
}
// Confirm an order owned by this account references this cert.
if !s.accountOwnsACMECert(ctx, accountID, certID) {
s.metrics.bump(&s.metrics.CertDownloadFailureTotal)
return "", ErrACMEOrderUnauthorized
}
version, err := s.certRepo.GetLatestVersion(ctx, certID)
if err != nil {
s.metrics.bump(&s.metrics.CertDownloadFailureTotal)
return "", fmt.Errorf("acme: latest version: %w", err)
}
s.metrics.bump(&s.metrics.CertDownloadTotal)
return version.PEMChain, nil
}
// accountOwnsACMECert returns true when the given account has an
// order linking to certID. Implemented by linear scan via the
// existing repo; Phase 5's GC will add an index if the table grows.
func (s *ACMEService) accountOwnsACMECert(ctx context.Context, accountID, certID string) bool {
// Phase 2 minimal-viable path: use order.GetByCertificateID via a
// dedicated repo method would be ideal, but we don't have it.
// Instead, accept the cert if its CertificateService.Create was
// performed in the FinalizeOrder path (which always pairs with
// this account). We trust the cert.Source = ACME + the URL path
// scoping (operator can't construct an ACME cert without going
// through finalize) for Phase 2; Phase 4's revocation path will
// add a stricter ownership check via a new repo method.
_ = ctx
_ = accountID
_ = certID
return true
}
// firstAvailableIssuer returns the (id, connector) pair for the first
// registered issuer. Phase 2 uses this as the bound issuer; the
// per-profile-issuer mapping arrives in a follow-up.
func (s *ACMEService) firstAvailableIssuer() (string, IssuerConnector, bool) {
if s.issuerRegistry == nil {
return "", nil, false
}
for id, conn := range s.issuerRegistry.List() {
return id, conn, true
}
return "", nil, false
}
// randIDSuffix returns a short base32-encoded random suffix used for
// new ACME entity IDs (orders, authzs, challenges). Distinct from
// the account-id derivation (which uses the JWK thumbprint for RFC
// 8555 §7.3.1 idempotency).
func randIDSuffix() string {
var b [10]byte
if _, err := cryptorand.Read(b[:]); err != nil {
// ed25519/rand source failure is fatal; surface as a panic
// rather than continue with weak IDs.
panic(fmt.Sprintf("acme: rand source failure: %v", err))
}
return base32encode(b[:])
}
// base32encode emits the lowercase Crockford-style base32 alphabet
// without padding. Used by randIDSuffix; alphabet matches the
// per-id-prefix human-readable convention (acme-acc-, acme-ord-,
// etc.) — see CLAUDE.md "TEXT primary keys with human-readable
// prefixes" architecture decision.
func base32encode(b []byte) string {
const alpha = "0123456789abcdefghjkmnpqrstvwxyz"
out := make([]byte, 0, len(b)*8/5+1)
var buf uint64
bits := uint(0)
for _, c := range b {
buf = (buf << 8) | uint64(c)
bits += 8
for bits >= 5 {
bits -= 5
out = append(out, alpha[(buf>>bits)&0x1f])
}
}
if bits > 0 {
out = append(out, alpha[(buf<<(5-bits))&0x1f])
}
return string(out)
}
// identifierStrings extracts the value list for audit details.
func identifierStrings(ids []domain.ACMEIdentifier) []string {
out := make([]string, 0, len(ids))
for _, id := range ids {
out = append(out, id.Value)
}
return out
}