docs: convert remaining ASCII diagrams to mermaid (audit closure)

Audit pass over docs/ found 4 files with non-mermaid (ASCII
box-drawing) diagrams in fenced code blocks. The other 9 doc files
already used mermaid blocks (architecture.md, demo-advanced.md,
ci-pipeline.md, concepts.md, est.md, legacy-est-scep.md, mcp.md,
qa-test-guide.md, scep-intune.md). Rendering parity for everything
in docs/.

Conversions:

  approval-workflow.md
    1 ASCII swimlane → sequenceDiagram with named participants
    (Operator A / CertificateService / Job+ApprovalRequest /
    Operator B / ApprovalService / Scheduler). Same content: the
    same-actor RBAC reject path, the AwaitingApproval gate, the
    audit + Prometheus side effects.

  intermediate-ca-hierarchy.md
    1 lifecycle ASCII → stateDiagram-v2 (created → active → retiring
    → retired with the drain-first refusal annotation).
    3 ASCII tree patterns → 3 flowchart TD diagrams (FedRAMP 4-level
    boundary CA, financial-services 3-level policy CA, internal-PKI
    2-level). Same depth, same path_len + permitted-DNS labels.

  runbook-cloud-targets.md
    1 dual-column ASCII flow → flowchart TD with two subgraphs
    (AWS ACM path, Azure Key Vault path) joining at the audit +
    Prometheus exposer node. Same 6-step deploy sequence on each
    side with the rollback-on-mismatch step explicit.

  runbook-expiry-alerts.md
    1 nested-loop ASCII flow → flowchart TD with three nested
    subgraphs (per-cert main loop / per-threshold inner / per-channel
    fault-isolating dispatch). Same dedup + Prometheus + audit-row
    side effects per channel.

Verified locally:
  Audit re-run: every fenced block in docs/*.md that does NOT open
    with ```mermaid contains zero ASCII box-drawing characters
    (┌ └ │ ─ ━ ═ ║ ╔ ╚ ▼ ▲).
  Mermaid block tally: 39 across 13 files (up from 32 across 9
    files pre-audit). The +7 new blocks are the 4 conversions plus
    the lifecycle + 3 tree patterns expanded out of the single
    intermediate-ca-hierarchy.md ASCII section.

No code or test changes. Doc-only commit.
This commit is contained in:
shankar0123
2026-05-04 02:40:01 +00:00
parent 478c75dffe
commit 57ae1184b1
4 changed files with 108 additions and 127 deletions
+19 -36
View File
@@ -6,42 +6,25 @@ Closes the procurement-checklist question "How do you enforce two-person integri
## End-to-end flow
```
Operator A (or scheduler) Operator B
│ │
▼ │
POST /api/v1/certificates/ │
{id}/renew │
(or renewal-loop tick) │
│ │
▼ │
CertificateService.TriggerRenewal │
├── reads profile.RequiresApproval │
├── creates Job at │
│ JobStatusAwaitingApproval │
└── creates parallel │
ApprovalRequest row │
(state=pending, │
requested_by=Operator A) │
│ │
│ scheduler skips — │
│ AwaitingApproval is │
│ NOT a dispatchable status │
│ │
│ GET /api/v1/approvals?state=pending
│ ▼
│ POST /api/v1/approvals/{id}/approve
│ │
▼ ▼
ApprovalService.Approve(decided_by=Operator B, note=...)
├── RBAC: rejects if Operator B == Operator A → ErrApproveBySameActor (HTTP 403)
├── transitions ApprovalRequest to state=approved
├── transitions Job from AwaitingApproval → Pending
├── records audit row (action=approval_approved, actor=Operator B)
└── increments certctl_approval_decisions_total{outcome=approved,profile_id=...}
Scheduler picks up Job at Pending, dispatches to issuer connector — cert issues normally.
```mermaid
sequenceDiagram
autonumber
participant A as Operator A<br/>(or scheduler)
participant SVC as CertificateService<br/>.TriggerRenewal
participant JOB as Job + ApprovalRequest
participant B as Operator B
participant APR as ApprovalService.Approve
participant SCH as Scheduler
A->>SVC: POST /api/v1/certificates/{id}/renew<br/>(or renewal-loop tick)
SVC->>JOB: read profile.RequiresApproval;<br/>create Job @ JobStatusAwaitingApproval;<br/>create ApprovalRequest<br/>(state=pending, requested_by=Operator A)
Note over JOB,SCH: Scheduler skips —<br/>AwaitingApproval is NOT a dispatchable status
B->>JOB: GET /api/v1/approvals?state=pending
B->>APR: POST /api/v1/approvals/{id}/approve<br/>(decided_by=Operator B, note=...)
APR->>APR: RBAC: reject if Operator B == Operator A<br/>→ ErrApproveBySameActor (HTTP 403)
APR->>JOB: ApprovalRequest → state=approved;<br/>Job AwaitingApproval → Pending;<br/>audit row (action=approval_approved,<br/>actor=Operator B);<br/>certctl_approval_decisions_total<br/>{outcome=approved,profile_id=...}++
SCH->>JOB: pick up Pending → dispatch to issuer connector
JOB-->>A: cert issues normally
```
## Configuration
+25 -25
View File
@@ -43,19 +43,13 @@ reference can leak.
## Lifecycle states
```
created (CreateRoot or CreateChild)
active (issuing certs)
retiring (drain — children still active; this CA stops issuing
NEW children but existing children continue)
retired (terminal — no issuance, OCSP responder keeps responding
for already-issued leaves until expiry)
```mermaid
stateDiagram-v2
[*] --> created : CreateRoot / CreateChild
created --> active : registration completes
active --> retiring : Retire(confirm=false) —<br/>drain start; this CA stops issuing<br/>NEW children but existing children continue
retiring --> retired : Retire(confirm=true) —<br/>terminal; refused if active children remain<br/>(ErrCAStillHasActiveChildren → HTTP 409)
retired --> [*] : no issuance;<br/>OCSP keeps responding for<br/>already-issued leaves until expiry
```
Drain-first semantics: a CA in `retiring` state cannot terminalize to
@@ -67,11 +61,13 @@ the children first.
### Pattern A — 4-level FedRAMP boundary CA
```
Acme Root CA (path_len=3, offline air-gapped)
└── Acme Policy CA (path_len=2, FedRAMP-Moderate boundary)
└── Acme Issuing A (path_len=0, prod workload leaves)
└── Acme Issuing B (path_len=0, ephemeral pod identity)
```mermaid
flowchart TD
Root["Acme Root CA<br/>path_len=3<br/>offline air-gapped"]
Policy["Acme Policy CA<br/>path_len=2<br/>FedRAMP-Moderate boundary"]
IssA["Acme Issuing A<br/>path_len=0<br/>prod workload leaves"]
IssB["Acme Issuing B<br/>path_len=0<br/>ephemeral pod identity"]
Root --> Policy --> IssA --> IssB
```
Operator workflow:
@@ -98,10 +94,12 @@ Operator workflow:
### Pattern B — 3-level financial-services policy CA
```
FinCo Root CA (path_len=2)
└── FinCo Trading Policy CA (path_len=1; permitted DNS = trading.finco.example)
└── FinCo Trading Issuing CA (path_len=0)
```mermaid
flowchart TD
Root["FinCo Root CA<br/>path_len=2"]
Pol["FinCo Trading Policy CA<br/>path_len=1<br/>permitted DNS = trading.finco.example"]
Iss["FinCo Trading Issuing CA<br/>path_len=0"]
Root --> Pol --> Iss
```
Per business-unit name constraints: each policy CA carries a
@@ -113,9 +111,11 @@ excluded subtree. Operators submit `name_constraints` on the
### Pattern C — 2-level internal PKI
```
Internal Root CA (path_len=0)
└── Internal Issuing CA (path_len=0; issues leaves directly)
```mermaid
flowchart TD
Root["Internal Root CA<br/>path_len=0"]
Iss["Internal Issuing CA<br/>path_len=0<br/>issues leaves directly"]
Root --> Iss
```
The simplest tree-mode deployment. Roughly equivalent to single mode
+33 -36
View File
@@ -15,42 +15,39 @@ install certctl.
## End-to-end flow (cloud targets)
```
cert renewed → renewal job created
agent picks up DeployCertificate work item
target.Connector.DeployCertificate(ctx, request)
┌──────────────────┴──────────────────┐
│ │
▼ ▼
AWS ACM path Azure Key Vault path
│ │
▼ ▼
1. (rotate-in-place only) 1. GetCertificate(name, "" /* latest */)
DescribeCertificate(arn) — capture snapshot CER bytes
2. GetCertificate(arn) — capture 2. Build PFX from cert+chain+key
snapshot bytes for rollback (PKCS#12 via go-pkcs12)
3. ImportCertificate(arn, new_bytes) 3. ImportCertificate(name, PFX, tags)
— fresh ARN OR rotate-in-place — ALWAYS creates a new version
4. AddTagsToCertificate(arn, 4. (Tags carried forward
provenance) — ACM strips on automatically)
re-import; we re-apply
5. DescribeCertificate(arn) — verify 5. GetCertificate(name, "" /* latest */)
serial matches expected — verify serial matches expected
6. ON MISMATCH: rollback ←──── (same shape) ────→ 6. ON MISMATCH: rollback
ImportCertificate(arn, ImportCertificate(name,
snapshot_bytes) snapshot_PFX) — new version
7. Audit row + Prometheus counter
certctl_deploy_attempts_total{target_type="AWSACM"|"AzureKeyVault",
result="success"|"failure"}
certctl_deploy_rollback_total{target_type=...,
outcome="restored"|"also_failed"}
```mermaid
flowchart TD
Renew["cert renewed → renewal job created"]
Pick["agent picks up DeployCertificate work item"]
Dispatch["target.Connector.DeployCertificate(ctx, request)"]
Renew --> Pick --> Dispatch
Dispatch --> AWS
Dispatch --> AZ
subgraph AWS["AWS ACM path"]
A1["1. rotate-in-place only:<br/>DescribeCertificate(arn)"]
A2["2. GetCertificate(arn) —<br/>capture snapshot bytes for rollback"]
A3["3. ImportCertificate(arn, new_bytes) —<br/>fresh ARN OR rotate-in-place"]
A4["4. AddTagsToCertificate(arn, provenance) —<br/>ACM strips on re-import; we re-apply"]
A5["5. DescribeCertificate(arn) —<br/>verify serial matches expected"]
A6["6. ON MISMATCH: rollback<br/>ImportCertificate(arn, snapshot_bytes)"]
A1 --> A2 --> A3 --> A4 --> A5 --> A6
end
subgraph AZ["Azure Key Vault path"]
Z1["1. GetCertificate(name, '' = latest) —<br/>capture snapshot CER bytes"]
Z2["2. Build PFX from cert+chain+key<br/>(PKCS#12 via go-pkcs12)"]
Z3["3. ImportCertificate(name, PFX, tags) —<br/>ALWAYS creates a new version"]
Z4["4. Tags carried forward automatically"]
Z5["5. GetCertificate(name, '' = latest) —<br/>verify serial matches expected"]
Z6["6. ON MISMATCH: rollback<br/>ImportCertificate(name, snapshot_PFX) —<br/>new version"]
Z1 --> Z2 --> Z3 --> Z4 --> Z5 --> Z6
end
A6 --> Audit
Z6 --> Audit
Audit["7. Audit row + Prometheus counters<br/>certctl_deploy_attempts_total{target_type, result}<br/>certctl_deploy_rollback_total{target_type, outcome}"]
```
---
+31 -30
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@@ -14,36 +14,37 @@ walkthrough of how to install certctl — that lives in the README.
## End-to-end flow
```
daily ticker (renewalCheckLoop)
RenewalService.CheckExpiringCertificates
┌────────────────┴────────────────┐
for cert in expiring (≤30 days):│
1. Resolve RenewalPolicy
2. Compute daysUntil
3. updateCertExpiryStatus
4. sendThresholdAlerts ──────►│ per threshold:
5. Create renewal job (if │ a. resolve severity tier
│ issuer registered + ARI │ via AlertSeverityMap
│ allows) │ b. resolve channel set
└──────────────────────────────────┘ via AlertChannels[tier]
c. for each channel:
i. dedup via
notification_events
(cert,threshold,channel)
ii. SendThresholdAlertOnChannel
→ notifierRegistry[channel]
→ Send(recipient,subj,body)
iii. record audit row
(event_type=expiration_alert_sent,
metadata.channel,
metadata.severity_tier)
iv. bump Prometheus counter
certctl_expiry_alerts_total
{channel,threshold,result}
```mermaid
flowchart TD
Tick["daily ticker (renewalCheckLoop)"]
Check["RenewalService.CheckExpiringCertificates"]
Tick --> Check --> Loop
subgraph Loop["for cert in expiring (≤30 days)"]
L1["1. Resolve RenewalPolicy"]
L2["2. Compute daysUntil"]
L3["3. updateCertExpiryStatus"]
L4["4. sendThresholdAlerts"]
L5["5. Create renewal job<br/>(if issuer registered +<br/>ARI allows)"]
L1 --> L2 --> L3 --> L4 --> L5
end
L4 --> Threshold
subgraph Threshold["per threshold"]
T1["a. resolve severity tier<br/>via AlertSeverityMap"]
T2["b. resolve channel set<br/>via AlertChannels[tier]"]
T1 --> T2 --> Channel
end
subgraph Channel["for each channel (fault-isolating)"]
C1["i. dedup via notification_events<br/>(cert, threshold, channel)"]
C2["ii. SendThresholdAlertOnChannel<br/>→ notifierRegistry[channel]<br/>→ Send(recipient, subj, body)"]
C3["iii. record audit row<br/>event_type=expiration_alert_sent<br/>metadata.channel, metadata.severity_tier"]
C4["iv. bump Prometheus counter<br/>certctl_expiry_alerts_total<br/>{channel, threshold, result}"]
C1 --> C2 --> C3 --> C4
end
```
The dispatch loop's per-channel error handling is