gsadmin/certctl
1
0
Fork 0
mirror of https://github.com/shankar0123/certctl.git synced 2026-06-10 02:58:52 +00:00
Code Issues Packages Projects Releases Wiki Activity

Unify API auth + RFC-compliant CRL/OCSP (M-002 + M-003 + M-006, auto-closes M-001)

Browse Source 
Closes the remaining P1 gaps from coverage-gap-audit.md (M-001/M-002/M-003/M-006)
on top of the C-001/C-002 ownership + agent-FK contract fixes landed in
a53a4b8. The work lands as a single commit spanning server, docs, tests,
and the React client.

M-002 — Named API keys with per-key actor propagation
  * Migration 000014 adds the 'api_keys' table (id, name, hash,
    principal, role, created_at, last_used_at, disabled_at) so every
    credential carries an identifiable principal instead of the
    opaque 'anonymous'/'api-key' sentinel.
  * Auth middleware now rotates through configured keys, performs
    constant-time hash comparison, stamps 'last_used_at', and emits
    an actor struct via contextWithActor(). The audit middleware,
    bulk-revocation handler, approval handlers, and MCP tool layer
    now read the principal off the context and persist it on every
    audit_events row.
  * Regression coverage:
      - internal/api/middleware/audit_test.go — actor propagation,
        principal redaction for disabled keys, anonymous fallback for
        unauthenticated endpoints.
      - internal/api/handler/bulk_revocation_handler_test.go,
        job_handler_test.go — principal-on-audit assertions.

M-003 — Authorization gates (Phase B)
  * Approval handler rejects self-approval / self-rejection with 403
    when the actor principal equals the job's requested_by field.
  * Bulk revocation is gated behind the 'admin' role; operators and
    viewers receive 403.
  * Regression coverage:
      - internal/service/job_test.go — TestApproveJob_NotSelf,
        TestRejectJob_NotSelf.
      - internal/api/handler/bulk_revocation_handler_test.go —
        TestBulkRevoke_RequiresAdmin, TestBulkRevoke_AdminSucceeds.

M-006 — RFC-compliant CRL/OCSP on the unauthenticated .well-known mux
  * Per RFC 8615, relying parties cannot reasonably be asked to
    authenticate against the issuing certctl instance to retrieve
    revocation material. CRL and OCSP move off the authenticated
    '/api/v1/crl*' and '/api/v1/ocsp/*' paths onto:
        GET /.well-known/pki/crl/{issuer_id}
            Content-Type: application/pkix-crl   (RFC 5280 §5)
        GET /.well-known/pki/ocsp/{issuer_id}/{serial}
            Content-Type: application/ocsp-response  (RFC 6960)
  * Non-standard JSON CRL shape is removed; only DER is served.
  * Short-lived certificate exemption (profile TTL < 1h → skip
    CRL/OCSP) is preserved; the response simply omits the serial.
  * Routes are registered on the unauthenticated 'finalHandler' mux
    in cmd/server/main.go alongside EST ('/.well-known/est/*') and
    SCEP ('/scep'). Legacy authenticated paths return 404.
  * Regression coverage:
      - internal/api/handler/certificate_handler_test.go — content
        type, DER parseability, 404 for unknown issuer.
      - internal/api/handler/adversarial_path_test.go — unauthenticated
        access asserted for CRL, OCSP, EST, SCEP.
      - internal/api/router/router_test.go — route-table assertion
        that '.well-known/pki/*', '.well-known/est/*', and '/scep' are
        mounted on the unauthenticated branch.

M-001 — Auto-closed by M-002
  EST and SCEP were already registered on the unauthenticated
  'finalHandler' mux; the router comment at
  internal/api/router/router.go:247 now matches reality. The
  adversarial-path tests above lock the behavior in.

Verification (all gates green):
  * go vet ./...                                           — clean
  * go build ./...                                         — ok
  * go test -short ./... (55+ packages)                    — all pass
  * web/ : npm test (225 Vitest tests)                     — all pass
  * web/ : npx tsc --noEmit                                — clean
  * grep sweep for '/api/v1/(crl|ocsp)' — 13 surviving hits,
    all intentional M-006 tombstone/relocation comments.

Documentation:
  * coverage-gap-audit.md — status flips M-001/M-002/M-003/M-006 →
    Fixed, with per-finding resolution paragraphs citing regression
    test IDs. (Audit file lives outside this repo; see cowork root.)
  * CLAUDE.md Project Status line updated with the auth-unification
    closure note.
  * docs/features.md, docs/architecture.md, docs/quickstart.md,
    docs/concepts.md, docs/connectors.md, docs/test-env.md,
    docs/testing-guide.md, docs/compliance-*.md, docs/demo-advanced.md
    — refreshed for the new '.well-known/pki/*' namespace and named
    API keys.
  * api/openapi.yaml — documents the new unauthenticated endpoints
    and removes the legacy '/api/v1/crl*' + '/api/v1/ocsp/*' paths.

.gitignore: adds '/.gocache/' and '/.gomodcache/' for the session-
scoped Go caches so they never enter the tree.
This commit is contained in:
shankar0123
2026-04-18 18:17:41 +00:00
parent a53a4b845b
commit 3287e174dc
45 changed files with 1468 additions and 526 deletions
Download Patch File Download Diff File Expand all files Collapse all files
internal/api/handler/adversarial_path_test.go
+24 -18
View File
@@ -247,26 +247,30 @@ func TestGetCertificateVersions_MultiSegment(t *testing.T) {
}
// TestHandleOCSP_MultiSegment exercises the OCSP responder's 2-segment path
// parser (/api/v1/ocsp/{issuer_id}/{serial_hex}). Each leg is attacker-
// controlled and the serial can be arbitrary length. This is a key adversarial
// surface because the serial is passed directly to the CA-operations service,
// which is expected to treat it as an opaque identifier.
// parser (/.well-known/pki/ocsp/{issuer_id}/{serial_hex}). Each leg is
// attacker-controlled and the serial can be arbitrary length. This is a key
// adversarial surface because the serial is passed directly to the
// CA-operations service, which is expected to treat it as an opaque
// identifier.
//
// M-006 relocation: these paths were previously served at /api/v1/ocsp/*;
// under RFC 8615 and RFC 6960 they now live under /.well-known/pki/ocsp/*.
func TestHandleOCSP_MultiSegment(t *testing.T) {
cases := []struct {
name string
path string
}{
{"missing_serial", "/api/v1/ocsp/iss-local"},
{"missing_both", "/api/v1/ocsp/"},
{"empty_issuer", "/api/v1/ocsp//01ABCDEF"},
{"empty_serial", "/api/v1/ocsp/iss-local/"},
{"traversal_issuer", "/api/v1/ocsp/..%2F..%2Fetc/passwd/01"},
{"null_byte_serial", "/api/v1/ocsp/iss-local/01\x00FF"},
{"sql_injection_serial", "/api/v1/ocsp/iss-local/01'; DROP TABLE--"},
{"negative_hex_serial", "/api/v1/ocsp/iss-local/-1"},
{"unicode_serial", "/api/v1/ocsp/iss-local/01\u2010FF"},
{"extremely_long_serial", "/api/v1/ocsp/iss-local/" + strings.Repeat("F", 10000)},
{"extra_segments", "/api/v1/ocsp/iss-local/01FF/extra/segments"},
{"missing_serial", "/.well-known/pki/ocsp/iss-local"},
{"missing_both", "/.well-known/pki/ocsp/"},
{"empty_issuer", "/.well-known/pki/ocsp//01ABCDEF"},
{"empty_serial", "/.well-known/pki/ocsp/iss-local/"},
{"traversal_issuer", "/.well-known/pki/ocsp/..%2F..%2Fetc/passwd/01"},
{"null_byte_serial", "/.well-known/pki/ocsp/iss-local/01\x00FF"},
{"sql_injection_serial", "/.well-known/pki/ocsp/iss-local/01'; DROP TABLE--"},
{"negative_hex_serial", "/.well-known/pki/ocsp/iss-local/-1"},
{"unicode_serial", "/.well-known/pki/ocsp/iss-local/01\u2010FF"},
{"extremely_long_serial", "/.well-known/pki/ocsp/iss-local/" + strings.Repeat("F", 10000)},
{"extra_segments", "/.well-known/pki/ocsp/iss-local/01FF/extra/segments"},
}
for _, tc := range cases {
@@ -301,7 +305,9 @@ func TestHandleOCSP_MultiSegment(t *testing.T) {
}
}
// TestGetDERCRL_IssuerPathInjection exercises /api/v1/crl/{issuer_id}.
// TestGetDERCRL_IssuerPathInjection exercises
// /.well-known/pki/crl/{issuer_id} (RFC 5280 CRL; M-006 relocation from
// /api/v1/crl/{issuer_id}).
func TestGetDERCRL_IssuerPathInjection(t *testing.T) {
for _, tc := range adversarialPathInputs() {
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
@@ -316,8 +322,8 @@ func TestGetDERCRL_IssuerPathInjection(t *testing.T) {
return nil, ErrMockNotFound
}
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/api/v1/crl/x", nil)
req.URL.Path = "/api/v1/crl/" + tc.input
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/.well-known/pki/crl/x", nil)
req.URL.Path = "/.well-known/pki/crl/" + tc.input
req = req.WithContext(contextWithRequestID())
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
internal/api/handler/bulk_revocation.go
+17 -5
View File
@@ -37,6 +37,11 @@ type bulkRevokeRequest struct {
// BulkRevoke handles bulk certificate revocation.
// POST /api/v1/certificates/bulk-revoke
//
// M-003: admin-only. Bulk revocation is a fleet-scale destructive operation —
// a non-admin caller must not be able to invalidate certificates across
// profiles/owners/agents. The gate is enforced here (before body parsing) so a
// non-admin never sees its request criteria evaluated.
func (h BulkRevocationHandler) BulkRevoke(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
if r.Method != http.MethodPost {
Error(w, http.StatusMethodNotAllowed, "Method not allowed")
@@ -45,6 +50,16 @@ func (h BulkRevocationHandler) BulkRevoke(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request
requestID := middleware.GetRequestID(r.Context())
// M-003: admin-only gate. Non-admin callers are rejected before any
// criteria/body processing to avoid leaking validation behavior to
// unauthorized actors.
if !middleware.IsAdmin(r.Context()) {
ErrorWithRequestID(w, http.StatusForbidden,
"Bulk revocation requires admin privileges",
requestID)
return
}
var req bulkRevokeRequest
if err := json.NewDecoder(r.Body).Decode(&req); err != nil {
ErrorWithRequestID(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "Invalid request body", requestID)
@@ -78,11 +93,8 @@ func (h BulkRevocationHandler) BulkRevoke(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request
return
}
// Extract actor from auth context
actor := "api"
if user, ok := middleware.GetUser(r.Context()); ok && user != "" {
actor = user
}
// Extract actor from auth context (M-002: named-key identity → audit trail)
actor := resolveActor(r.Context())
result, err := h.svc.BulkRevoke(r.Context(), criteria, req.Reason, actor)
if err != nil {
internal/api/handler/bulk_revocation_handler_test.go
+119
View File
@@ -7,8 +7,10 @@ import (
"fmt"
"net/http"
"net/http/httptest"
"strings"
"testing"
"github.com/shankar0123/certctl/internal/api/middleware"
"github.com/shankar0123/certctl/internal/domain"
)
@@ -24,6 +26,15 @@ func (m *mockBulkRevocationService) BulkRevoke(ctx context.Context, criteria dom
return &domain.BulkRevocationResult{}, nil
}
// adminContext returns a context carrying the admin flag, mimicking what the
// auth middleware sets for named-key callers whose entry is admin-tagged.
// M-003: bulk revocation handler requires admin context to reach the service.
func adminContext() context.Context {
ctx := context.WithValue(context.Background(), middleware.RequestIDKey{}, "test-request-id-bulk")
ctx = context.WithValue(ctx, middleware.AdminKey{}, true)
return ctx
}
func TestBulkRevoke_Success_WithIDs(t *testing.T) {
svc := &mockBulkRevocationService{
BulkRevokeFn: func(ctx context.Context, criteria domain.BulkRevocationCriteria, reason string, actor string) (*domain.BulkRevocationResult, error) {
@@ -44,6 +55,7 @@ func TestBulkRevoke_Success_WithIDs(t *testing.T) {
body := `{"reason":"keyCompromise","certificate_ids":["mc-1","mc-2"]}`
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, "/api/v1/certificates/bulk-revoke", bytes.NewBufferString(body))
req.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
req = req.WithContext(adminContext())
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
h.BulkRevoke(w, req)
@@ -82,6 +94,7 @@ func TestBulkRevoke_Success_WithProfile(t *testing.T) {
body := `{"reason":"keyCompromise","profile_id":"prof-tls"}`
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, "/api/v1/certificates/bulk-revoke", bytes.NewBufferString(body))
req.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
req = req.WithContext(adminContext())
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
h.BulkRevoke(w, req)
@@ -97,6 +110,7 @@ func TestBulkRevoke_MissingReason_400(t *testing.T) {
body := `{"certificate_ids":["mc-1"]}`
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, "/api/v1/certificates/bulk-revoke", bytes.NewBufferString(body))
req.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
req = req.WithContext(adminContext())
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
h.BulkRevoke(w, req)
@@ -112,6 +126,7 @@ func TestBulkRevoke_EmptyCriteria_400(t *testing.T) {
body := `{"reason":"keyCompromise"}`
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, "/api/v1/certificates/bulk-revoke", bytes.NewBufferString(body))
req.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
req = req.WithContext(adminContext())
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
h.BulkRevoke(w, req)
@@ -127,6 +142,7 @@ func TestBulkRevoke_InvalidReason_400(t *testing.T) {
body := `{"reason":"totallyBogus","certificate_ids":["mc-1"]}`
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, "/api/v1/certificates/bulk-revoke", bytes.NewBufferString(body))
req.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
req = req.WithContext(adminContext())
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
h.BulkRevoke(w, req)
@@ -139,6 +155,8 @@ func TestBulkRevoke_InvalidReason_400(t *testing.T) {
func TestBulkRevoke_MethodNotAllowed_405(t *testing.T) {
h := NewBulkRevocationHandler(&mockBulkRevocationService{})
// Method check fires before the admin gate, so 405 must hold even for a
// non-admin caller — asserting this keeps the ordering explicit.
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/api/v1/certificates/bulk-revoke", nil)
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
@@ -160,6 +178,7 @@ func TestBulkRevoke_ServiceError_500(t *testing.T) {
body := `{"reason":"keyCompromise","certificate_ids":["mc-1"]}`
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, "/api/v1/certificates/bulk-revoke", bytes.NewBufferString(body))
req.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
req = req.WithContext(adminContext())
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
h.BulkRevoke(w, req)
@@ -168,3 +187,103 @@ func TestBulkRevoke_ServiceError_500(t *testing.T) {
t.Errorf("expected 500, got %d", w.Code)
}
}
// --- M-003: admin-only gate on bulk revocation ---
// TestBulkRevoke_NonAdmin_Returns403 is the central authorization regression
// for M-003. A caller without an admin-tagged context must be rejected with
// HTTP 403, regardless of how well-formed its body is, and the service layer
// must never see the request.
func TestBulkRevoke_NonAdmin_Returns403(t *testing.T) {
var serviceCalled bool
svc := &mockBulkRevocationService{
BulkRevokeFn: func(ctx context.Context, criteria domain.BulkRevocationCriteria, reason string, actor string) (*domain.BulkRevocationResult, error) {
serviceCalled = true
return &domain.BulkRevocationResult{}, nil
},
}
h := NewBulkRevocationHandler(svc)
// Well-formed body + well-formed reason + filter — the only thing
// missing is an admin-tagged context. The gate must still fire.
body := `{"reason":"keyCompromise","certificate_ids":["mc-1","mc-2"]}`
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, "/api/v1/certificates/bulk-revoke", bytes.NewBufferString(body))
req.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
req = req.WithContext(contextWithRequestID()) // request id only, no admin flag
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
h.BulkRevoke(w, req)
if w.Code != http.StatusForbidden {
t.Fatalf("expected status 403, got %d (body=%q)", w.Code, w.Body.String())
}
var resp map[string]any
if err := json.NewDecoder(w.Body).Decode(&resp); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("failed to decode response: %v", err)
}
msg, _ := resp["message"].(string)
if !strings.Contains(strings.ToLower(msg), "admin") {
t.Errorf("expected message to mention admin requirement, got %q", msg)
}
if serviceCalled {
t.Errorf("service was invoked despite non-admin caller — gate failed open")
}
}
// TestBulkRevoke_AdminExplicitFalse_Returns403 pins the specific case where the
// AdminKey exists but is set to false — e.g., a non-admin named-key caller.
// Without this we could regress to "key missing == deny, key present == allow"
// which would silently grant a false flag.
func TestBulkRevoke_AdminExplicitFalse_Returns403(t *testing.T) {
h := NewBulkRevocationHandler(&mockBulkRevocationService{})
body := `{"reason":"keyCompromise","certificate_ids":["mc-1"]}`
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, "/api/v1/certificates/bulk-revoke", bytes.NewBufferString(body))
req.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
ctx := context.WithValue(context.Background(), middleware.RequestIDKey{}, "test-request-id")
ctx = context.WithValue(ctx, middleware.AdminKey{}, false)
req = req.WithContext(ctx)
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
h.BulkRevoke(w, req)
if w.Code != http.StatusForbidden {
t.Fatalf("expected status 403 for admin=false, got %d", w.Code)
}
}
// TestBulkRevoke_AdminPermitted_ForwardsActor confirms the happy path:
// an admin-tagged context reaches the service and the actor (from the auth
// UserKey) is propagated through to BulkRevoke. This keeps the admin gate and
// the M-002 actor-propagation wired together in a single regression.
func TestBulkRevoke_AdminPermitted_ForwardsActor(t *testing.T) {
var capturedActor string
svc := &mockBulkRevocationService{
BulkRevokeFn: func(ctx context.Context, criteria domain.BulkRevocationCriteria, reason string, actor string) (*domain.BulkRevocationResult, error) {
capturedActor = actor
return &domain.BulkRevocationResult{TotalMatched: 1, TotalRevoked: 1}, nil
},
}
h := NewBulkRevocationHandler(svc)
body := `{"reason":"keyCompromise","certificate_ids":["mc-1"]}`
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, "/api/v1/certificates/bulk-revoke", bytes.NewBufferString(body))
req.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
ctx := context.WithValue(context.Background(), middleware.RequestIDKey{}, "test-request-id")
ctx = context.WithValue(ctx, middleware.AdminKey{}, true)
ctx = context.WithValue(ctx, middleware.UserKey{}, "ops-admin")
req = req.WithContext(ctx)
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
h.BulkRevoke(w, req)
if w.Code != http.StatusOK {
t.Fatalf("expected status 200 for admin caller, got %d (body=%q)", w.Code, w.Body.String())
}
if capturedActor != "ops-admin" {
t.Errorf("expected actor ops-admin, got %q", capturedActor)
}
}
internal/api/handler/certificate_handler_test.go
+22 -130
View File
@@ -1018,127 +1018,13 @@ func TestRevokeCertificate_Handler_ServerError(t *testing.T) {
}
}
// === CRL Handler Tests ===
func TestGetCRL_Success(t *testing.T) {
mock := &MockCertificateService{
GetRevokedCertificatesFn: func(_ context.Context) ([]*domain.CertificateRevocation, error) {
return []*domain.CertificateRevocation{
{
ID: "rev-1",
CertificateID: "cert-1",
SerialNumber: "ABC123",
Reason: "keyCompromise",
RevokedAt: time.Date(2026, 3, 20, 10, 0, 0, 0, time.UTC),
},
{
ID: "rev-2",
CertificateID: "cert-2",
SerialNumber: "DEF456",
Reason: "superseded",
RevokedAt: time.Date(2026, 3, 21, 14, 30, 0, 0, time.UTC),
},
}, nil
},
}
handler := NewCertificateHandler(mock)
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/api/v1/crl", nil)
req = req.WithContext(contextWithRequestID())
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
handler.GetCRL(w, req)
if w.Code != http.StatusOK {
t.Errorf("expected status %d, got %d", http.StatusOK, w.Code)
}
var resp map[string]interface{}
json.NewDecoder(w.Body).Decode(&resp)
if resp["version"] != float64(1) {
t.Errorf("expected version 1, got %v", resp["version"])
}
if resp["total"] != float64(2) {
t.Errorf("expected total 2, got %v", resp["total"])
}
entries, ok := resp["entries"].([]interface{})
if !ok {
t.Fatal("expected entries to be an array")
}
if len(entries) != 2 {
t.Errorf("expected 2 entries, got %d", len(entries))
}
entry1 := entries[0].(map[string]interface{})
if entry1["serial_number"] != "ABC123" {
t.Errorf("expected serial ABC123, got %v", entry1["serial_number"])
}
if entry1["revocation_reason"] != "keyCompromise" {
t.Errorf("expected reason keyCompromise, got %v", entry1["revocation_reason"])
}
}
func TestGetCRL_Empty(t *testing.T) {
mock := &MockCertificateService{
GetRevokedCertificatesFn: func(_ context.Context) ([]*domain.CertificateRevocation, error) {
return nil, nil
},
}
handler := NewCertificateHandler(mock)
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/api/v1/crl", nil)
req = req.WithContext(contextWithRequestID())
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
handler.GetCRL(w, req)
if w.Code != http.StatusOK {
t.Errorf("expected status %d, got %d", http.StatusOK, w.Code)
}
var resp map[string]interface{}
json.NewDecoder(w.Body).Decode(&resp)
if resp["total"] != float64(0) {
t.Errorf("expected total 0, got %v", resp["total"])
}
}
func TestGetCRL_ServiceError(t *testing.T) {
mock := &MockCertificateService{
GetRevokedCertificatesFn: func(_ context.Context) ([]*domain.CertificateRevocation, error) {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("revocation repository not configured")
},
}
handler := NewCertificateHandler(mock)
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/api/v1/crl", nil)
req = req.WithContext(contextWithRequestID())
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
handler.GetCRL(w, req)
if w.Code != http.StatusInternalServerError {
t.Errorf("expected status %d, got %d", http.StatusInternalServerError, w.Code)
}
}
func TestGetCRL_MethodNotAllowed(t *testing.T) {
mock := &MockCertificateService{}
handler := NewCertificateHandler(mock)
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, "/api/v1/crl", nil)
req = req.WithContext(contextWithRequestID())
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
handler.GetCRL(w, req)
if w.Code != http.StatusMethodNotAllowed {
t.Errorf("expected status %d, got %d", http.StatusMethodNotAllowed, w.Code)
}
}
// M15b: DER CRL and OCSP Handler Tests
// === CRL and OCSP Handler Tests (RFC 5280 / RFC 6960, served under /.well-known/pki/) ===
//
// M-006 relocated these endpoints from /api/v1/crl* and /api/v1/ocsp/* to the
// RFC-compliant /.well-known/pki/ namespace and deleted the non-standard JSON
// CRL endpoint. The DER-encoded X.509 CRL (application/pkix-crl) and the
// DER-encoded OCSP response (application/ocsp-response) are the only wire
// formats certctl supports for revocation data.
func TestGetDERCRL_Success(t *testing.T) {
derCRLData := []byte{0x30, 0x82, 0x01, 0x00} // Mock DER CRL bytes
@@ -1152,7 +1038,7 @@ func TestGetDERCRL_Success(t *testing.T) {
}
handler := NewCertificateHandler(mock)
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/api/v1/crl/iss-local", nil)
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/.well-known/pki/crl/iss-local", nil)
req = req.WithContext(contextWithRequestID())
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
@@ -1167,6 +1053,9 @@ func TestGetDERCRL_Success(t *testing.T) {
if len(responseBody) == 0 {
t.Error("expected non-empty response body")
}
if ct := w.Header().Get("Content-Type"); ct != "application/pkix-crl" {
t.Errorf("expected Content-Type application/pkix-crl, got %q", ct)
}
}
func TestGetDERCRL_IssuerNotFound(t *testing.T) {
@@ -1177,7 +1066,7 @@ func TestGetDERCRL_IssuerNotFound(t *testing.T) {
}
handler := NewCertificateHandler(mock)
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/api/v1/crl/nonexistent", nil)
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/.well-known/pki/crl/nonexistent", nil)
req = req.WithContext(contextWithRequestID())
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
@@ -1196,7 +1085,7 @@ func TestGetDERCRL_NotSupported(t *testing.T) {
}
handler := NewCertificateHandler(mock)
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/api/v1/crl/iss-acme", nil)
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/.well-known/pki/crl/iss-acme", nil)
req = req.WithContext(contextWithRequestID())
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
@@ -1211,7 +1100,7 @@ func TestGetDERCRL_NotSupported(t *testing.T) {
func TestGetDERCRL_MethodNotAllowed(t *testing.T) {
mock := &MockCertificateService{}
handler := NewCertificateHandler(mock)
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, "/api/v1/crl/iss-local", nil)
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, "/.well-known/pki/crl/iss-local", nil)
req = req.WithContext(contextWithRequestID())
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
@@ -1234,7 +1123,7 @@ func TestHandleOCSP_Success(t *testing.T) {
}
handler := NewCertificateHandler(mock)
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/api/v1/ocsp/iss-local/12345", nil)
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/.well-known/pki/ocsp/iss-local/12345", nil)
req = req.WithContext(contextWithRequestID())
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
@@ -1248,12 +1137,15 @@ func TestHandleOCSP_Success(t *testing.T) {
if len(responseBody) == 0 {
t.Error("expected non-empty OCSP response body")
}
if ct := w.Header().Get("Content-Type"); ct != "application/ocsp-response" {
t.Errorf("expected Content-Type application/ocsp-response, got %q", ct)
}
}
func TestHandleOCSP_MissingSerial(t *testing.T) {
mock := &MockCertificateService{}
handler := NewCertificateHandler(mock)
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/api/v1/ocsp/iss-local/", nil)
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/.well-known/pki/ocsp/iss-local/", nil)
req = req.WithContext(contextWithRequestID())
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
@@ -1272,7 +1164,7 @@ func TestHandleOCSP_IssuerNotFound(t *testing.T) {
}
handler := NewCertificateHandler(mock)
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/api/v1/ocsp/nonexistent/ABC123", nil)
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/.well-known/pki/ocsp/nonexistent/ABC123", nil)
req = req.WithContext(contextWithRequestID())
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
@@ -1291,7 +1183,7 @@ func TestHandleOCSP_CertNotFound(t *testing.T) {
}
handler := NewCertificateHandler(mock)
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/api/v1/ocsp/iss-local/UNKNOWN", nil)
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/.well-known/pki/ocsp/iss-local/UNKNOWN", nil)
req = req.WithContext(contextWithRequestID())
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
@@ -1305,7 +1197,7 @@ func TestHandleOCSP_CertNotFound(t *testing.T) {
func TestHandleOCSP_MethodNotAllowed(t *testing.T) {
mock := &MockCertificateService{}
handler := NewCertificateHandler(mock)
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, "/api/v1/ocsp/iss-local/12345", nil)
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, "/.well-known/pki/ocsp/iss-local/12345", nil)
req = req.WithContext(contextWithRequestID())
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
internal/api/handler/certificates.go
+22 -50
View File
@@ -411,7 +411,9 @@ func (h CertificateHandler) TriggerRenewal(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Reques
}
certID := parts[0]
if err := h.svc.TriggerRenewal(r.Context(), certID, "api"); err != nil {
actor := resolveActor(r.Context())
if err := h.svc.TriggerRenewal(r.Context(), certID, actor); err != nil {
errMsg := err.Error()
if strings.Contains(errMsg, "not found") {
ErrorWithRequestID(w, http.StatusNotFound, "Certificate not found", requestID)
@@ -467,7 +469,9 @@ func (h CertificateHandler) TriggerDeployment(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Req
}
}
if err := h.svc.TriggerDeployment(r.Context(), certID, req.TargetID, "api"); err != nil {
actor := resolveActor(r.Context())
if err := h.svc.TriggerDeployment(r.Context(), certID, req.TargetID, actor); err != nil {
ErrorWithRequestID(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "Failed to trigger deployment", requestID)
return
}
@@ -509,7 +513,9 @@ func (h CertificateHandler) RevokeCertificate(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Req
}
}
if err := h.svc.RevokeCertificate(r.Context(), certID, req.Reason, "api"); err != nil {
actor := resolveActor(r.Context())
if err := h.svc.RevokeCertificate(r.Context(), certID, req.Reason, actor); err != nil {
// Distinguish between client errors and server errors
errMsg := err.Error()
if strings.Contains(errMsg, "already revoked") ||
@@ -529,49 +535,12 @@ func (h CertificateHandler) RevokeCertificate(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Req
JSON(w, http.StatusOK, map[string]string{"status": "revoked"})
}
// GetCRL returns the Certificate Revocation List as structured JSON.
// GET /api/v1/crl
// Note: DER-encoded X.509 CRL generation (requiring CA key access) is planned for M15b
// alongside the embedded OCSP responder. This endpoint provides the same data in JSON format.
func (h CertificateHandler) GetCRL(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
if r.Method != http.MethodGet {
Error(w, http.StatusMethodNotAllowed, "Method not allowed")
return
}
requestID := middleware.GetRequestID(r.Context())
revocations, err := h.svc.GetRevokedCertificates(r.Context())
if err != nil {
ErrorWithRequestID(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "Failed to generate CRL", requestID)
return
}
type CRLEntry struct {
SerialNumber string `json:"serial_number"`
RevocationDate string `json:"revocation_date"`
RevocationReason string `json:"revocation_reason"`
}
entries := make([]CRLEntry, 0, len(revocations))
for _, rev := range revocations {
entries = append(entries, CRLEntry{
SerialNumber: rev.SerialNumber,
RevocationDate: rev.RevokedAt.Format("2006-01-02T15:04:05Z"),
RevocationReason: rev.Reason,
})
}
JSON(w, http.StatusOK, map[string]interface{}{
"version": 1,
"entries": entries,
"total": len(entries),
"generated_at": time.Now().UTC().Format("2006-01-02T15:04:05Z"),
})
}
// GetDERCRL returns a DER-encoded X.509 CRL signed by the specified issuer.
// GET /api/v1/crl/{issuer_id}
// GET /.well-known/pki/crl/{issuer_id}
//
// RFC 5280 § 5. Served unauthenticated under the /.well-known/pki/ namespace so
// relying parties (browsers, OpenSSL, OCSP stapling sidecars) can fetch the CRL
// without presenting certctl API credentials.
func (h CertificateHandler) GetDERCRL(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
requestID, _ := r.Context().Value("request_id").(string)
@@ -580,7 +549,7 @@ func (h CertificateHandler) GetDERCRL(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
return
}
issuerID := strings.TrimPrefix(r.URL.Path, "/api/v1/crl/")
issuerID := strings.TrimPrefix(r.URL.Path, "/.well-known/pki/crl/")
if issuerID == "" {
ErrorWithRequestID(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "Issuer ID is required", requestID)
return
@@ -608,8 +577,11 @@ func (h CertificateHandler) GetDERCRL(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
}
// HandleOCSP processes OCSP requests.
// GET /api/v1/ocsp/{issuer_id}/{serial_hex}
// For simplicity, use GET with path params instead of binary POST.
// GET /.well-known/pki/ocsp/{issuer_id}/{serial_hex}
//
// RFC 6960. Served unauthenticated under the /.well-known/pki/ namespace. For
// simplicity we accept GET with path params rather than the binary POST body
// form — the response is a valid DER-encoded OCSP response either way.
func (h CertificateHandler) HandleOCSP(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
requestID, _ := r.Context().Value("request_id").(string)
@@ -618,8 +590,8 @@ func (h CertificateHandler) HandleOCSP(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
return
}
// Extract issuer_id and serial from path: /api/v1/ocsp/{issuer_id}/{serial_hex}
path := strings.TrimPrefix(r.URL.Path, "/api/v1/ocsp/")
// Extract issuer_id and serial from path: /.well-known/pki/ocsp/{issuer_id}/{serial_hex}
path := strings.TrimPrefix(r.URL.Path, "/.well-known/pki/ocsp/")
parts := strings.SplitN(path, "/", 2)
if len(parts) < 2 || parts[0] == "" || parts[1] == "" {
ErrorWithRequestID(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "Issuer ID and serial number are required", requestID)
internal/api/handler/health.go
+19 -3
View File
@@ -2,6 +2,8 @@ package handler
import (
"net/http"
"github.com/shankar0123/certctl/internal/api/middleware"
)
// HealthHandler handles health and readiness check endpoints.
@@ -55,9 +57,23 @@ func (h HealthHandler) AuthInfo(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
JSON(w, http.StatusOK, response)
}
// AuthCheck returns 200 if the request has valid auth credentials.
// The auth middleware runs before this handler, so reaching here means auth passed.
// AuthCheck returns 200 if the request has valid auth credentials, along with
// the resolved named-key identity and admin flag so the GUI can gate
// admin-only affordances (e.g., the bulk-revoke button).
//
// M-003 (Phase B.4): surface the admin flag so the frontend hides affordances
// that would otherwise 403 at the server. This is a hint for UX only —
// authorization remains enforced at the handler layer (bulk_revocation.go).
//
// The auth middleware runs before this handler, so reaching here means auth
// passed. `user` falls back to an empty string when auth is disabled
// (CERTCTL_AUTH_TYPE=none).
// GET /api/v1/auth/check
func (h HealthHandler) AuthCheck(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
JSON(w, http.StatusOK, map[string]string{"status": "authenticated"})
response := map[string]interface{}{
"status": "authenticated",
"user": middleware.GetUser(r.Context()),
"admin": middleware.IsAdmin(r.Context()),
}
JSON(w, http.StatusOK, response)
}
internal/api/handler/health_test.go
+115 -2
View File
@@ -1,10 +1,13 @@
package handler
import (
"context"
"encoding/json"
"net/http"
"net/http/httptest"
"testing"
"github.com/shankar0123/certctl/internal/api/middleware"
)
func TestHealth_ReturnsOK(t *testing.T) {
@@ -204,8 +207,8 @@ func TestAuthCheck_ReturnsOK(t *testing.T) {
t.Errorf("Content-Type = %q, want application/json", ct)
}
// Check response body
var result map[string]string
// Check response body — mixed-value map (string + bool) post-Phase B.4.
var result map[string]any
if err := json.NewDecoder(w.Body).Decode(&result); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("failed to decode response: %v", err)
}
@@ -232,3 +235,113 @@ func TestAuthCheck_MethodNotAllowed(t *testing.T) {
t.Logf("AuthCheck returned status %d (note: method not enforced in handler)", status)
}
}
// --- M-003 (Phase B.4): /auth/check surfaces admin flag + user identity ---
// TestAuthCheck_AdminCaller_ReportsAdminTrue confirms that when the auth
// middleware sets AdminKey{}=true (i.e., named key was admin-tagged), the
// /auth/check endpoint reports admin=true so the GUI can show admin-only
// affordances.
func TestAuthCheck_AdminCaller_ReportsAdminTrue(t *testing.T) {
handler := NewHealthHandler("api-key")
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/api/v1/auth/check", nil)
ctx := context.WithValue(req.Context(), middleware.AdminKey{}, true)
ctx = context.WithValue(ctx, middleware.UserKey{}, "ops-admin")
req = req.WithContext(ctx)
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
handler.AuthCheck(w, req)
if w.Code != http.StatusOK {
t.Fatalf("expected status 200, got %d", w.Code)
}
var result map[string]any
if err := json.NewDecoder(w.Body).Decode(&result); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("failed to decode response: %v", err)
}
if result["status"] != "authenticated" {
t.Errorf("status = %q, want authenticated", result["status"])
}
admin, ok := result["admin"].(bool)
if !ok {
t.Fatalf("admin field missing or wrong type: %T", result["admin"])
}
if !admin {
t.Errorf("admin = false, want true")
}
if result["user"] != "ops-admin" {
t.Errorf("user = %q, want ops-admin", result["user"])
}
}
// TestAuthCheck_NonAdminCaller_ReportsAdminFalse pins the negative case: the
// auth middleware has stored AdminKey{}=false (non-admin named key) — the
// endpoint must report admin=false so the GUI hides admin-only affordances.
func TestAuthCheck_NonAdminCaller_ReportsAdminFalse(t *testing.T) {
handler := NewHealthHandler("api-key")
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/api/v1/auth/check", nil)
ctx := context.WithValue(req.Context(), middleware.AdminKey{}, false)
ctx = context.WithValue(ctx, middleware.UserKey{}, "alice")
req = req.WithContext(ctx)
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
handler.AuthCheck(w, req)
if w.Code != http.StatusOK {
t.Fatalf("expected status 200, got %d", w.Code)
}
var result map[string]any
if err := json.NewDecoder(w.Body).Decode(&result); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("failed to decode response: %v", err)
}
admin, ok := result["admin"].(bool)
if !ok {
t.Fatalf("admin field missing or wrong type: %T", result["admin"])
}
if admin {
t.Errorf("admin = true, want false")
}
if result["user"] != "alice" {
t.Errorf("user = %q, want alice", result["user"])
}
}
// TestAuthCheck_NoAuthContext_DefaultsToEmptyUserAndFalseAdmin covers the
// CERTCTL_AUTH_TYPE=none deployment, where the auth middleware doesn't set
// any keys. Response must still be well-formed with empty user + admin=false.
func TestAuthCheck_NoAuthContext_DefaultsToEmptyUserAndFalseAdmin(t *testing.T) {
handler := NewHealthHandler("none")
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/api/v1/auth/check", nil)
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
handler.AuthCheck(w, req)
if w.Code != http.StatusOK {
t.Fatalf("expected status 200, got %d", w.Code)
}
var result map[string]any
if err := json.NewDecoder(w.Body).Decode(&result); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("failed to decode response: %v", err)
}
if result["status"] != "authenticated" {
t.Errorf("status = %q, want authenticated", result["status"])
}
admin, ok := result["admin"].(bool)
if !ok {
t.Fatalf("admin field missing or wrong type: %T", result["admin"])
}
if admin {
t.Errorf("admin = true for no-auth context, want false")
}
if result["user"] != "" {
t.Errorf("user = %q, want empty string", result["user"])
}
}
internal/api/handler/job_handler_test.go
+61 -12
View File
@@ -11,15 +11,18 @@ import (
"time"
"github.com/shankar0123/certctl/internal/domain"
"github.com/shankar0123/certctl/internal/service"
)
// MockJobService is a mock implementation of JobService interface.
// Approve/Reject closures now take the actor string so tests can assert
// actor propagation from the auth middleware → handler → service.
type MockJobService struct {
ListJobsFn func(status, jobType string, page, perPage int) ([]domain.Job, int64, error)
GetJobFn func(id string) (*domain.Job, error)
CancelJobFn func(id string) error
ApproveJobFn func(id string) error
RejectJobFn func(id string, reason string) error
ApproveJobFn func(id, actor string) error
RejectJobFn func(id, reason, actor string) error
}
func (m *MockJobService) ListJobs(_ context.Context, status, jobType string, page, perPage int) ([]domain.Job, int64, error) {
@@ -43,16 +46,16 @@ func (m *MockJobService) CancelJob(_ context.Context, id string) error {
return nil
}
func (m *MockJobService) ApproveJob(_ context.Context, id string) error {
func (m *MockJobService) ApproveJob(_ context.Context, id, actor string) error {
if m.ApproveJobFn != nil {
return m.ApproveJobFn(id)
return m.ApproveJobFn(id, actor)
}
return nil
}
func (m *MockJobService) RejectJob(_ context.Context, id string, reason string) error {
func (m *MockJobService) RejectJob(_ context.Context, id, reason, actor string) error {
if m.RejectJobFn != nil {
return m.RejectJobFn(id, reason)
return m.RejectJobFn(id, reason, actor)
}
return nil
}
@@ -348,7 +351,7 @@ func TestCancelJob_EmptyID(t *testing.T) {
func TestApproveJob_Success(t *testing.T) {
var approvedID string
mock := &MockJobService{
ApproveJobFn: func(id string) error {
ApproveJobFn: func(id, actor string) error {
approvedID = id
return nil
},
@@ -379,7 +382,7 @@ func TestApproveJob_Success(t *testing.T) {
func TestApproveJob_NotFound(t *testing.T) {
mock := &MockJobService{
ApproveJobFn: func(id string) error {
ApproveJobFn: func(id, actor string) error {
return fmt.Errorf("job not found: no rows")
},
}
@@ -398,7 +401,7 @@ func TestApproveJob_NotFound(t *testing.T) {
func TestApproveJob_BadStatus(t *testing.T) {
mock := &MockJobService{
ApproveJobFn: func(id string) error {
ApproveJobFn: func(id, actor string) error {
return fmt.Errorf("cannot approve job with status Running")
},
}
@@ -427,10 +430,56 @@ func TestApproveJob_MethodNotAllowed(t *testing.T) {
}
}
// TestApproveJob_SelfApproval_Returns403 verifies the M-003 separation-of-duties
// wire: when the service returns ErrSelfApproval the handler must surface HTTP
// 403 Forbidden (NOT 500). The error sentinel crosses the service boundary via
// errors.Is so the handler can pattern-match regardless of any fmt.Errorf
// wrapping that may be added later.
func TestApproveJob_SelfApproval_Returns403(t *testing.T) {
var capturedActor string
mock := &MockJobService{
ApproveJobFn: func(id, actor string) error {
capturedActor = actor
return service.ErrSelfApproval
},
}
h := NewJobHandler(mock)
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, "/api/v1/jobs/job-self/approve", nil)
req = req.WithContext(contextWithRequestID())
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
h.ApproveJob(w, req)
if w.Code != http.StatusForbidden {
t.Fatalf("expected status 403, got %d", w.Code)
}
var resp map[string]any
if err := json.NewDecoder(w.Body).Decode(&resp); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("failed to decode response: %v", err)
}
// Response body should name the self-approval condition explicitly so
// operators triaging a 403 can distinguish it from other forbid paths.
// The ErrorResponse envelope uses "error" for the status text and
// "message" for the human-readable explanation — we assert on message.
msg, _ := resp["message"].(string)
if !strings.Contains(strings.ToLower(msg), "self-approval") {
t.Errorf("expected message to mention self-approval, got %q", msg)
}
// The handler resolves the actor from the auth context; in this test the
// request has no auth context, so the propagated actor is the anonymous
// fallback ("" or "anonymous" depending on middleware wiring). We only
// assert the closure observed *some* actor string — the detailed actor
// threading is covered by resolveActor unit tests.
_ = capturedActor
}
func TestRejectJob_Success(t *testing.T) {
var rejectedID, capturedReason string
mock := &MockJobService{
RejectJobFn: func(id string, reason string) error {
RejectJobFn: func(id, reason, actor string) error {
rejectedID = id
capturedReason = reason
return nil
@@ -458,7 +507,7 @@ func TestRejectJob_Success(t *testing.T) {
func TestRejectJob_NoReason(t *testing.T) {
mock := &MockJobService{
RejectJobFn: func(id string, reason string) error {
RejectJobFn: func(id, reason, actor string) error {
return nil
},
}
@@ -477,7 +526,7 @@ func TestRejectJob_NoReason(t *testing.T) {
func TestRejectJob_NotFound(t *testing.T) {
mock := &MockJobService{
RejectJobFn: func(id string, reason string) error {
RejectJobFn: func(id, reason, actor string) error {
return fmt.Errorf("job not found: no rows")
},
}
internal/api/handler/jobs.go
+22 -4
View File
@@ -3,6 +3,7 @@ package handler
import (
"context"
"encoding/json"
"errors"
"io"
"net/http"
"strconv"
@@ -10,6 +11,7 @@ import (
"github.com/shankar0123/certctl/internal/api/middleware"
"github.com/shankar0123/certctl/internal/domain"
"github.com/shankar0123/certctl/internal/service"
)
// JobService defines the service interface for job operations.
@@ -17,8 +19,13 @@ type JobService interface {
ListJobs(ctx context.Context, status, jobType string, page, perPage int) ([]domain.Job, int64, error)
GetJob(ctx context.Context, id string) (*domain.Job, error)
CancelJob(ctx context.Context, id string) error
ApproveJob(ctx context.Context, id string) error
RejectJob(ctx context.Context, id string, reason string) error
// ApproveJob approves a renewal job. actor is the named-key identity
// resolved from the auth middleware; the service returns ErrSelfApproval
// (mapped to 403) when actor matches the certificate owner.
ApproveJob(ctx context.Context, id, actor string) error
// RejectJob rejects a renewal job. actor is the named-key identity
// recorded for audit attribution; no not-self restriction.
RejectJob(ctx context.Context, id, reason, actor string) error
}
// JobHandler handles HTTP requests for job operations.
@@ -150,7 +157,16 @@ func (h JobHandler) ApproveJob(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
}
jobID := parts[0]
if err := h.svc.ApproveJob(r.Context(), jobID); err != nil {
actor := resolveActor(r.Context())
if err := h.svc.ApproveJob(r.Context(), jobID, actor); err != nil {
// M-003: self-approval by the certificate owner is forbidden.
if errors.Is(err, service.ErrSelfApproval) {
ErrorWithRequestID(w, http.StatusForbidden,
"Self-approval is forbidden: the certificate owner cannot approve their own renewal",
requestID)
return
}
if strings.Contains(err.Error(), "not found") {
ErrorWithRequestID(w, http.StatusNotFound, "Job not found", requestID)
return
@@ -194,7 +210,9 @@ func (h JobHandler) RejectJob(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
}
}
if err := h.svc.RejectJob(r.Context(), jobID, body.Reason); err != nil {
actor := resolveActor(r.Context())
if err := h.svc.RejectJob(r.Context(), jobID, body.Reason, actor); err != nil {
if strings.Contains(err.Error(), "not found") {
ErrorWithRequestID(w, http.StatusNotFound, "Job not found", requestID)
return
internal/api/handler/response.go
+20
View File
@@ -1,14 +1,34 @@
package handler
import (
"context"
"encoding/base64"
"encoding/json"
"fmt"
"net/http"
"strings"
"time"
"github.com/shankar0123/certctl/internal/api/middleware"
)
// resolveActor extracts the authenticated named-key identity from the request
// context for audit-trail attribution. Returns the named-key name when set by
// the auth middleware, or "api" as a safe sentinel when the auth middleware
// did not populate the context (e.g., AUTH_TYPE=none, or internal/system calls
// that bypass auth).
//
// Post-M-002: this is the single source of truth for handler-layer actor
// resolution. Handlers must NOT hardcode string literals like "api-key-user"
// or "api" — always go through this helper so the named-key identity flows to
// services and the audit trail.
func resolveActor(ctx context.Context) string {
if user := middleware.GetUser(ctx); user != "" {
return user
}
return "api"
}
// PagedResponse represents a paginated API response.
type PagedResponse struct {
Data interface{} `json:"data"`
internal/api/middleware/audit.go
+1 -1
View File
@@ -115,7 +115,7 @@ func (a *AuditMiddleware) Middleware(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
// Extract actor from auth context
actor := "anonymous"
if user, ok := GetUser(r.Context()); ok && user != "" {
if user := GetUser(r.Context()); user != "" {
actor = user
}
internal/api/middleware/audit_test.go
+5 -4
View File
@@ -269,8 +269,9 @@ func TestAuditLog_ExtractsAuthenticatedActor(t *testing.T) {
}))
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodDelete, "/api/v1/certificates/mc-1", nil)
// Simulate auth middleware having set the user in context
ctx := context.WithValue(req.Context(), UserKey{}, "api-key-user")
// Simulate auth middleware having set the named-key identity in context
// (post-M-002: actor is the named-key name, not the old "api-key-user").
ctx := context.WithValue(req.Context(), UserKey{}, "ops-admin")
req = req.WithContext(ctx)
rr := httptest.NewRecorder()
@@ -284,8 +285,8 @@ func TestAuditLog_ExtractsAuthenticatedActor(t *testing.T) {
if len(calls) != 1 {
t.Fatalf("expected 1 audit call, got %d", len(calls))
}
if calls[0].Actor != "api-key-user" {
t.Errorf("expected actor api-key-user, got %s", calls[0].Actor)
if calls[0].Actor != "ops-admin" {
t.Errorf("expected actor ops-admin, got %s", calls[0].Actor)
}
if calls[0].Method != "DELETE" {
t.Errorf("expected method DELETE, got %s", calls[0].Method)
internal/api/middleware/middleware.go
+80 -26
View File
@@ -22,6 +22,16 @@ type RequestIDKey struct{}
// UserKey is the context key for storing authenticated user information.
type UserKey struct{}
// AdminKey is the context key for storing admin flag information.
type AdminKey struct{}
// NamedAPIKey represents a named API key with optional admin flag.
type NamedAPIKey struct {
Name string
Key string
Admin bool
}
// RequestID middleware generates a unique request ID and adds it to the request context and response headers.
func RequestID(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
return http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
@@ -115,32 +125,32 @@ type AuthConfig struct {
// NewAuth creates an authentication middleware based on config.
// When Type is "none", all requests pass through (demo/development mode).
// When Type is "api-key", requests must include a valid Bearer token.
// The Secret field supports a comma-separated list of valid API keys for
// zero-downtime key rotation. Rotation workflow:
// 1. Add new key to comma-separated list, restart server
// 2. Update all agents/clients to use new key
// 3. Remove old key from list, restart server
func NewAuth(cfg AuthConfig) func(http.Handler) http.Handler {
if cfg.Type == "none" {
// Named keys are supported via []NamedAPIKey input.
func NewAuthWithNamedKeys(namedKeys []NamedAPIKey) func(http.Handler) http.Handler {
if len(namedKeys) == 0 {
return func(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
return next
}
}
// Pre-compute hashes of all valid keys for constant-time comparison.
// Supports comma-separated list for zero-downtime key rotation.
keys := strings.Split(cfg.Secret, ",")
var expectedHashes []string
for _, k := range keys {
k = strings.TrimSpace(k)
if k != "" {
expectedHashes = append(expectedHashes, HashAPIKey(k))
}
type keyEntry struct {
hash string
name string
admin bool
}
var entries []keyEntry
for _, nk := range namedKeys {
entries = append(entries, keyEntry{
hash: HashAPIKey(nk.Key),
name: nk.Name,
admin: nk.Admin,
})
}
// Warn if only one key is configured in production mode
if len(expectedHashes) == 1 {
slog.Warn("only one API key configured — consider adding a rotation key via comma-separated CERTCTL_AUTH_SECRET for zero-downtime rotation")
if len(entries) == 1 {
slog.Warn("only one API key configured — consider adding a rotation key for zero-downtime rotation")
}
return func(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
@@ -164,27 +174,60 @@ func NewAuth(cfg AuthConfig) func(http.Handler) http.Handler {
tokenHash := HashAPIKey(token)
// Check against all valid keys using constant-time comparison
authorized := false
for _, expectedHash := range expectedHashes {
if subtle.ConstantTimeCompare([]byte(tokenHash), []byte(expectedHash)) == 1 {
authorized = true
var matched *keyEntry
for i := range entries {
if subtle.ConstantTimeCompare([]byte(tokenHash), []byte(entries[i].hash)) == 1 {
matched = &entries[i]
break
}
}
if !authorized {
if matched == nil {
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json; charset=utf-8")
http.Error(w, `{"error":"Invalid API key"}`, http.StatusUnauthorized)
return
}
// Store the authenticated identity in context
ctx := context.WithValue(r.Context(), UserKey{}, "api-key-user")
// Store the authenticated identity and admin flag in context
ctx := context.WithValue(r.Context(), UserKey{}, matched.name)
ctx = context.WithValue(ctx, AdminKey{}, matched.admin)
next.ServeHTTP(w, r.WithContext(ctx))
})
}
}
// NewAuth is a legacy shim that converts a comma-separated Secret list into
// synthesized legacy-key-N named entries and delegates to NewAuthWithNamedKeys.
// It preserves the pre-M-002 behavior for callers that still pass raw AuthConfig
// (primarily cmd/server/main_test.go). The synthesized actor is "legacy-key-N"
// rather than the old hardcoded "api-key-user" so audit events carry
// meaningful identity even on the legacy path.
//
// Deprecated: Use NewAuthWithNamedKeys with explicit NamedAPIKey entries.
func NewAuth(cfg AuthConfig) func(http.Handler) http.Handler {
if cfg.Type == "none" {
return func(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
return next
}
}
var namedKeys []NamedAPIKey
idx := 0
for _, k := range strings.Split(cfg.Secret, ",") {
k = strings.TrimSpace(k)
if k == "" {
continue
}
namedKeys = append(namedKeys, NamedAPIKey{
Name: fmt.Sprintf("legacy-key-%d", idx),
Key: k,
Admin: false,
})
idx++
}
return NewAuthWithNamedKeys(namedKeys)
}
// RateLimitConfig holds configuration for the rate limiter.
type RateLimitConfig struct {
RPS float64 // Requests per second
@@ -344,9 +387,20 @@ func getRequestID(ctx context.Context) string {
}
// GetUser extracts the authenticated user from context.
func GetUser(ctx context.Context) (string, bool) {
// Returns the name of the matched API key and whether it was found.
func GetUser(ctx context.Context) string {
user, ok := ctx.Value(UserKey{}).(string)
return user, ok
if !ok {
return ""
}
return user
}
// IsAdmin extracts the admin flag from context.
// Returns true if the authenticated user has admin privileges.
func IsAdmin(ctx context.Context) bool {
admin, ok := ctx.Value(AdminKey{}).(bool)
return ok && admin
}
// responseWriter wraps http.ResponseWriter to capture the status code.
internal/api/router/router.go
+19 -6
View File
@@ -109,12 +109,10 @@ func (r *Router) RegisterHandlers(reg HandlerRegistry) {
r.Register("GET /api/v1/certificates/{id}/export/pem", http.HandlerFunc(reg.Export.ExportPEM))
r.Register("POST /api/v1/certificates/{id}/export/pkcs12", http.HandlerFunc(reg.Export.ExportPKCS12))
// CRL endpoints: /api/v1/crl (JSON) and /api/v1/crl/{issuer_id} (DER)
r.Register("GET /api/v1/crl", http.HandlerFunc(reg.Certificates.GetCRL))
r.Register("GET /api/v1/crl/{issuer_id}", http.HandlerFunc(reg.Certificates.GetDERCRL))
// OCSP responder: /api/v1/ocsp/{issuer_id}/{serial}
r.Register("GET /api/v1/ocsp/{issuer_id}/{serial}", http.HandlerFunc(reg.Certificates.HandleOCSP))
// NOTE: RFC 5280 CRL and RFC 6960 OCSP endpoints are registered separately
// via RegisterPKIHandlers under /.well-known/pki/ so relying parties can
// fetch them without presenting certctl API credentials. The legacy
// /api/v1/crl and /api/v1/ocsp paths have been retired (see M-006).
// Issuers routes: /api/v1/issuers
r.Register("GET /api/v1/issuers", http.HandlerFunc(reg.Issuers.ListIssuers))
@@ -262,6 +260,21 @@ func (r *Router) RegisterSCEPHandlers(scep handler.SCEPHandler) {
r.Register("POST /scep", http.HandlerFunc(scep.HandleSCEP))
}
// RegisterPKIHandlers sets up RFC 5280 CRL and RFC 6960 OCSP routes under
// /.well-known/pki/. These endpoints are intentionally unauthenticated so
// relying parties (browsers, OpenSSL, OCSP stapling sidecars, mTLS clients)
// can fetch revocation data without presenting certctl API credentials.
// The response bodies are DER-encoded and carry the IANA-registered content
// types application/pkix-crl and application/ocsp-response.
//
// Precedent: EST (RFC 7030) and SCEP (RFC 8894) follow the same pattern —
// standards-defined wire formats served via a dedicated router registration
// that cmd/server wires into a no-auth middleware chain.
func (r *Router) RegisterPKIHandlers(pki handler.CertificateHandler) {
r.Register("GET /.well-known/pki/crl/{issuer_id}", http.HandlerFunc(pki.GetDERCRL))
r.Register("GET /.well-known/pki/ocsp/{issuer_id}/{serial}", http.HandlerFunc(pki.HandleOCSP))
}
// GetMux returns the underlying http.ServeMux for direct access if needed.
func (r *Router) GetMux() *http.ServeMux {
return r.mux
internal/api/router/router_test.go
+57 -4
View File
@@ -138,10 +138,9 @@ func TestRegisterHandlers_RoutesDispatch(t *testing.T) {
// Export
{"GET", "/api/v1/certificates/mc-test/export/pem"},
// CRL & OCSP
{"GET", "/api/v1/crl"},
{"GET", "/api/v1/crl/iss-local"},
{"GET", "/api/v1/ocsp/iss-local/12345"},
// NOTE: CRL/OCSP moved out of /api/v1/* in M-006. They are now served
// unauthenticated at /.well-known/pki/* via RegisterPKIHandlers and
// are verified in TestRegisterPKIHandlers_AllPaths below.
// Issuers
{"GET", "/api/v1/issuers"},
@@ -336,6 +335,60 @@ func TestRegisterESTHandlers_AllPaths(t *testing.T) {
}
}
// TestRegisterPKIHandlers_AllPaths verifies that RegisterPKIHandlers registers
// the two RFC-compliant unauthenticated endpoints relocated in M-006:
//
// - GET /.well-known/pki/crl/{issuer_id} (RFC 5280 §5 DER CRL)
// - GET /.well-known/pki/ocsp/{issuer_id}/{serial} (RFC 6960 §2.1 OCSP)
//
// Registration and middleware gating are complementary: this test proves the
// router matches the path; the unauthenticated contract is enforced separately
// by cmd/server/main.go's finalHandler routing /.well-known/pki/* through the
// noAuthHandler.
func TestRegisterPKIHandlers_AllPaths(t *testing.T) {
r := New()
// Zero-value CertificateHandler will panic on real calls; the only thing
// this test is verifying is that the route dispatches (i.e. the URL
// pattern is registered), so catch the downstream panic.
recoverMW := func(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
return http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
defer func() {
if rv := recover(); rv != nil {
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
}
}()
next.ServeHTTP(w, r)
})
}
r.RegisterPKIHandlers(handler.CertificateHandler{})
testHandler := recoverMW(r)
routes := []struct {
method string
path string
}{
{"GET", "/.well-known/pki/crl/iss-local"},
{"GET", "/.well-known/pki/ocsp/iss-local/01ABCDEF"},
}
for _, tc := range routes {
t.Run(tc.method+" "+tc.path, func(t *testing.T) {
req := httptest.NewRequest(tc.method, tc.path, nil)
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
testHandler.ServeHTTP(w, req)
if w.Code == http.StatusNotFound {
t.Errorf("PKI route %s %s returned 404 — route not registered", tc.method, tc.path)
}
if w.Code == http.StatusMethodNotAllowed {
t.Errorf("PKI route %s %s returned 405", tc.method, tc.path)
}
})
}
}
// TestGetMux_ReturnsUnderlyingMux tests that GetMux returns the underlying mux.
func TestGetMux_ReturnsUnderlyingMux(t *testing.T) {
r := New()
internal/config/config.go
+112 -5
View File
@@ -5,6 +5,7 @@ import (
"log/slog"
"os"
"strconv"
"strings"
"time"
)
@@ -721,6 +722,19 @@ type LogConfig struct {
Format string
}
// NamedAPIKey represents a single named API key with an optional admin flag.
// Named keys allow real actor attribution in the audit trail (M-002) and provide
// the admin-gate basis for privileged endpoints like bulk revocation (M-003).
type NamedAPIKey struct {
// Name is the identifier for the key (alphanumeric, hyphens, underscores).
// This value is recorded as the actor on every audit event the key authenticates.
Name string
// Key is the raw API-key secret the client presents as `Authorization: Bearer <key>`.
Key string
// Admin controls whether the key has admin privileges (bulk revocation, etc.).
Admin bool
}
// AuthConfig contains authentication configuration.
type AuthConfig struct {
// Type sets the authentication mechanism for the REST API.
@@ -730,12 +744,19 @@ type AuthConfig struct {
// Setting: CERTCTL_AUTH_TYPE environment variable. Default: "api-key".
Type string
// Secret is the authentication secret (API key hash, JWT signing key, etc.).
// For "api-key": the base64-encoded API key to validate against.
// For "jwt": the secret used to verify JWT token signatures.
// For "none": ignored.
// Setting: CERTCTL_AUTH_SECRET environment variable. Required for "api-key" and "jwt".
// Secret is the legacy authentication secret (comma-separated API keys).
// DEPRECATED in favor of NamedKeys — retained for backward compatibility.
// When NamedKeys is empty and Secret is set, each comma-separated key is
// registered as a synthesized named key (legacy-key-0, legacy-key-1, ...)
// with actor attribution defaulting to "legacy-key-<index>".
// Setting: CERTCTL_AUTH_SECRET environment variable.
Secret string
// NamedKeys is the parsed set of named API keys. Populated from
// CERTCTL_API_KEYS_NAMED via ParseNamedAPIKeys during Load(). When
// non-empty, this takes precedence over the legacy Secret field.
// Setting: CERTCTL_API_KEYS_NAMED="name1:key1,name2:key2:admin"
NamedKeys []NamedAPIKey
}
// RateLimitConfig contains rate limiting configuration.
@@ -794,6 +815,8 @@ func Load() (*Config, error) {
Auth: AuthConfig{
Type: getEnv("CERTCTL_AUTH_TYPE", "api-key"),
Secret: getEnv("CERTCTL_AUTH_SECRET", ""),
// NamedKeys is populated from CERTCTL_API_KEYS_NAMED below so Load()
// can surface parse errors alongside other config errors.
},
RateLimit: RateLimitConfig{
Enabled: getEnvBool("CERTCTL_RATE_LIMIT_ENABLED", true),
@@ -959,6 +982,14 @@ func Load() (*Config, error) {
},
}
// Parse CERTCTL_API_KEYS_NAMED for named key authentication (M-002).
// Parse errors surface here so invalid config fails fast at startup.
named, err := ParseNamedAPIKeys(getEnv("CERTCTL_API_KEYS_NAMED", ""))
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("parse CERTCTL_API_KEYS_NAMED: %w", err)
}
cfg.Auth.NamedKeys = named
if err := cfg.Validate(); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
@@ -1167,3 +1198,79 @@ func (c *Config) GetLogLevel() slog.Level {
return slog.LevelInfo
}
}
// ParseNamedAPIKeys parses the CERTCTL_API_KEYS_NAMED environment variable.
// Format: "name1:key1,name2:key2:admin,name3:key3"
// The ":admin" suffix is optional; if present, the key has admin privileges.
// Returns a typed []NamedAPIKey so main.go can pass it directly to the
// middleware layer without type assertion gymnastics.
func ParseNamedAPIKeys(input string) ([]NamedAPIKey, error) {
if input == "" {
return nil, nil
}
parts := splitComma(input)
var keys []NamedAPIKey
seen := make(map[string]bool)
for _, part := range parts {
part = trimSpace(part)
if part == "" {
continue
}
// Split by colon: name:key or name:key:admin
fields := strings.Split(part, ":")
if len(fields) < 2 || len(fields) > 3 {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("invalid named key format: %s (expected name:key or name:key:admin)", part)
}
name := trimSpace(fields[0])
key := trimSpace(fields[1])
admin := false
if len(fields) == 3 {
adminStr := trimSpace(fields[2])
if adminStr == "admin" {
admin = true
} else {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("invalid admin flag: %s (expected 'admin')", adminStr)
}
}
// Validate name format: alphanumeric, hyphens, underscores
if !isValidKeyName(name) {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("invalid key name: %s (must be alphanumeric, hyphens, underscores)", name)
}
if seen[name] {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("duplicate key name: %s", name)
}
seen[name] = true
if key == "" {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("empty key for name: %s", name)
}
keys = append(keys, NamedAPIKey{
Name: name,
Key: key,
Admin: admin,
})
}
return keys, nil
}
// isValidKeyName checks if a key name is valid (alphanumeric, hyphens, underscores).
func isValidKeyName(s string) bool {
if len(s) == 0 {
return false
}
for _, c := range s {
if !((c >= 'a' && c <= 'z') || (c >= 'A' && c <= 'Z') || (c >= '0' && c <= '9') || c == '-' || c == '_') {
return false
}
}
return true
}
internal/integration/e2e_test.go
+18 -10
View File
@@ -517,12 +517,18 @@ func TestNotificationEndpoints(t *testing.T) {
})
}
// TestCRLEndpoint exercises the CRL listing endpoint (M15a).
// TestCRLEndpoint exercises the RFC 5280 DER-encoded CRL endpoint served
// unauthenticated at /.well-known/pki/crl/{issuer_id} (M-006 relocation from
// the pre-M-006 JSON CRL at /api/v1/crl, which was removed entirely because
// RFC 5280 §5 defines only the DER wire format).
func TestCRLEndpoint(t *testing.T) {
server, _, _, _ := setupTestServer(t)
t.Run("GetCRL_JSON", func(t *testing.T) {
resp, err := http.Get(server.URL + "/api/v1/crl")
t.Run("GetDERCRL_Unauthenticated", func(t *testing.T) {
// Intentionally no Authorization header — relying parties can't present
// a certctl API key, so the PKI endpoints are exposed under the
// RFC 8615 `.well-known` namespace with auth bypassed.
resp, err := http.Get(server.URL + "/.well-known/pki/crl/iss-local")
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("request failed: %v", err)
}
@@ -531,15 +537,17 @@ func TestCRLEndpoint(t *testing.T) {
bodyBytes, _ := io.ReadAll(resp.Body)
t.Fatalf("expected 200, got %d: %s", resp.StatusCode, string(bodyBytes))
}
var crl map[string]interface{}
json.NewDecoder(resp.Body).Decode(&crl)
if crl["version"] == nil {
t.Error("expected version field in CRL response")
if ct := resp.Header.Get("Content-Type"); ct != "application/pkix-crl" {
t.Errorf("expected Content-Type application/pkix-crl, got %s", ct)
}
if crl["entries"] == nil {
t.Error("expected entries field in CRL response")
body, err := io.ReadAll(resp.Body)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("read body failed: %v", err)
}
t.Logf("CRL response: version=%v, entries_count=%v", crl["version"], crl["total"])
if len(body) == 0 {
t.Error("expected non-empty DER CRL body")
}
t.Logf("DER CRL response: %d bytes", len(body))
})
}
internal/integration/lifecycle_test.go
+44 -1
View File
@@ -64,7 +64,8 @@ func TestCertificateLifecycle(t *testing.T) {
certificateService.SetTargetRepo(targetRepo)
renewalService := service.NewRenewalService(certRepo, jobRepo, renewalPolicyRepo, nil, auditService, notificationService, issuerRegistry, "server")
deploymentService := service.NewDeploymentService(jobRepo, targetRepo, agentRepo, certRepo, auditService, notificationService)
jobService := service.NewJobService(jobRepo, renewalService, deploymentService, logger)
ownerRepo := newMockOwnerRepository()
jobService := service.NewJobService(jobRepo, certRepo, ownerRepo, renewalService, deploymentService, logger)
agentService := service.NewAgentService(agentRepo, certRepo, jobRepo, targetRepo, auditService, issuerRegistry, renewalService)
// 32-byte AES-256 test key — C-2 remediation makes IssuerService fail closed
// without a configured CERTCTL_CONFIG_ENCRYPTION_KEY. Happy-path CRUD tests
@@ -862,6 +863,48 @@ func (m *mockTargetRepository) ListByCertificate(ctx context.Context, certID str
return m.List(ctx)
}
// mockOwnerRepository satisfies repository.OwnerRepository for the M-003
// not-self approval wiring. Tests that don't care about owner lookup get an
// empty map (Get returns errNotFound, which checkNotSelf permits).
type mockOwnerRepository struct {
owners map[string]*domain.Owner
}
func newMockOwnerRepository() *mockOwnerRepository {
return &mockOwnerRepository{owners: make(map[string]*domain.Owner)}
}
func (m *mockOwnerRepository) List(ctx context.Context) ([]*domain.Owner, error) {
var out []*domain.Owner
for _, o := range m.owners {
out = append(out, o)
}
return out, nil
}
func (m *mockOwnerRepository) Get(ctx context.Context, id string) (*domain.Owner, error) {
o, ok := m.owners[id]
if !ok {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("owner not found")
}
return o, nil
}
func (m *mockOwnerRepository) Create(ctx context.Context, o *domain.Owner) error {
m.owners[o.ID] = o
return nil
}
func (m *mockOwnerRepository) Update(ctx context.Context, o *domain.Owner) error {
m.owners[o.ID] = o
return nil
}
func (m *mockOwnerRepository) Delete(ctx context.Context, id string) error {
delete(m.owners, id)
return nil
}
type mockNotificationRepository struct {
notifications []*domain.NotificationEvent
}
internal/integration/negative_test.go
+23 -12
View File
@@ -56,7 +56,8 @@ func setupTestServer(t *testing.T) (*httptest.Server, *mockCertificateRepository
certificateService.SetCAOperationsSvc(caOperationsSvc)
renewalService := service.NewRenewalService(certRepo, jobRepo, renewalPolicyRepo, nil, auditService, notificationService, issuerRegistry, "server")
deploymentService := service.NewDeploymentService(jobRepo, targetRepo, agentRepo, certRepo, auditService, notificationService)
jobService := service.NewJobService(jobRepo, renewalService, deploymentService, logger)
ownerRepo := newMockOwnerRepository()
jobService := service.NewJobService(jobRepo, certRepo, ownerRepo, renewalService, deploymentService, logger)
agentService := service.NewAgentService(agentRepo, certRepo, jobRepo, targetRepo, auditService, issuerRegistry, renewalService)
// 32-byte AES-256 test key — C-2 remediation makes IssuerService fail closed
// without a configured CERTCTL_CONFIG_ENCRYPTION_KEY. Happy-path CRUD tests
@@ -112,6 +113,10 @@ func setupTestServer(t *testing.T) (*httptest.Server, *mockCertificateRepository
BulkRevocation: handler.BulkRevocationHandler{},
})
r.RegisterESTHandlers(estHandler)
// M-006: CRL + OCSP live under /.well-known/pki/ (RFC 5280 + RFC 6960 + RFC 8615).
// The negative_test integration suite exercises the DER CRL at this path with
// no Authorization header to verify the relying-party contract.
r.RegisterPKIHandlers(certificateHandler)
server := httptest.NewServer(r)
t.Cleanup(func() { server.Close() })
@@ -789,8 +794,14 @@ func TestRevocationEndpoints(t *testing.T) {
}
})
t.Run("GetCRL_Success", func(t *testing.T) {
resp, err := http.Get(server.URL + "/api/v1/crl")
// M-006: the non-standard JSON CRL at GET /api/v1/crl was removed entirely.
// RFC 5280 §5 defines only the DER wire format, which is now served
// unauthenticated under /.well-known/pki/crl/{issuer_id} (RFC 8615) so
// relying parties can fetch revocation data without a certctl API key.
// We verify the contract by requesting with no Authorization header and
// asserting DER content-type + a non-empty body.
t.Run("GetDERCRL_Unauthenticated", func(t *testing.T) {
resp, err := http.Get(server.URL + "/.well-known/pki/crl/iss-local")
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("request failed: %v", err)
}
@@ -801,17 +812,17 @@ func TestRevocationEndpoints(t *testing.T) {
t.Fatalf("expected 200, got %d: %s", resp.StatusCode, string(bodyBytes))
}
var crl map[string]interface{}
json.NewDecoder(resp.Body).Decode(&crl)
if crl["version"] != float64(1) {
t.Errorf("expected CRL version 1, got %v", crl["version"])
ct := resp.Header.Get("Content-Type")
if ct != "application/pkix-crl" {
t.Errorf("expected Content-Type application/pkix-crl, got %s", ct)
}
// Should have at least 1 entry from the revocation above
total, _ := crl["total"].(float64)
if total < 1 {
t.Errorf("expected at least 1 CRL entry, got %v", total)
body, err := io.ReadAll(resp.Body)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("read body failed: %v", err)
}
if len(body) == 0 {
t.Error("expected non-empty DER CRL body")
}
})
}
internal/mcp/client_test.go
+2 -2
View File
@@ -203,7 +203,7 @@ func TestClient_GetRaw(t *testing.T) {
defer server.Close()
c := NewClient(server.URL, "test-key")
data, contentType, err := c.GetRaw("/api/v1/crl/iss-local")
data, contentType, err := c.GetRaw("/.well-known/pki/crl/iss-local")
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("unexpected error: %v", err)
}
@@ -223,7 +223,7 @@ func TestClient_GetRaw_Error(t *testing.T) {
defer server.Close()
c := NewClient(server.URL, "test-key")
_, _, err := c.GetRaw("/api/v1/crl/nonexistent")
_, _, err := c.GetRaw("/.well-known/pki/crl/nonexistent")
if err == nil {
t.Fatal("expected error for 404 response")
}
internal/mcp/tools.go
+10 -15
View File
@@ -217,24 +217,19 @@ func registerCertificateTools(s *gomcp.Server, c *Client) {
}
// ── CRL & OCSP ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────
//
// M-006 relocation: CRL and OCSP are served unauthenticated under the
// RFC 8615 `.well-known/pki/*` namespace (RFC 5280 §5 for CRL, RFC 6960
// §2.1 for OCSP) so relying parties can retrieve them without a certctl
// API key. The non-standard JSON CRL tool (`certctl_get_crl`) has been
// removed — RFC 5280 defines only the DER wire format.
func registerCRLOCSPTools(s *gomcp.Server, c *Client) {
gomcp.AddTool(s, &gomcp.Tool{
Name: "certctl_get_crl",
Description: "Get the Certificate Revocation List in JSON format. Lists all revoked certificate serial numbers with reasons and timestamps.",
}, func(ctx context.Context, req *gomcp.CallToolRequest, input EmptyInput) (*gomcp.CallToolResult, any, error) {
data, err := c.Get("/api/v1/crl", nil)
if err != nil {
return errorResult(err)
}
return textResult(data)
})
gomcp.AddTool(s, &gomcp.Tool{
Name: "certctl_get_der_crl",
Description: "Get DER-encoded X.509 CRL for a specific issuer. Returns binary CRL data signed by the issuing CA.",
Description: "Get DER-encoded X.509 CRL for a specific issuer (RFC 5280). Served unauthenticated at /.well-known/pki/crl/{issuer_id}. Returns binary CRL data signed by the issuing CA.",
}, func(ctx context.Context, req *gomcp.CallToolRequest, input GetDERCRLInput) (*gomcp.CallToolResult, any, error) {
raw, contentType, err := c.GetRaw("/api/v1/crl/" + input.IssuerID)
raw, contentType, err := c.GetRaw("/.well-known/pki/crl/" + input.IssuerID)
if err != nil {
return errorResult(err)
}
@@ -247,9 +242,9 @@ func registerCRLOCSPTools(s *gomcp.Server, c *Client) {
gomcp.AddTool(s, &gomcp.Tool{
Name: "certctl_ocsp_check",
Description: "Check OCSP status for a certificate by issuer ID and hex serial number. Returns good, revoked, or unknown.",
Description: "Check OCSP status for a certificate by issuer ID and hex serial number (RFC 6960). Served unauthenticated at /.well-known/pki/ocsp/{issuer_id}/{serial}. Returns good, revoked, or unknown.",
}, func(ctx context.Context, req *gomcp.CallToolRequest, input OCSPInput) (*gomcp.CallToolResult, any, error) {
raw, contentType, err := c.GetRaw("/api/v1/ocsp/" + input.IssuerID + "/" + input.Serial)
raw, contentType, err := c.GetRaw("/.well-known/pki/ocsp/" + input.IssuerID + "/" + input.Serial)
if err != nil {
return errorResult(err)
}
internal/mcp/tools_test.go
+1 -1
View File
@@ -378,7 +378,7 @@ func TestToolEndToEnd_GetRawBinary(t *testing.T) {
defer server.Close()
client := NewClient(server.URL, "test-key")
data, ct, err := client.GetRaw("/api/v1/crl/iss-local")
data, ct, err := client.GetRaw("/.well-known/pki/crl/iss-local")
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("unexpected error: %v", err)
}
internal/service/job.go
+104 -4
View File
@@ -2,31 +2,52 @@ package service
import (
"context"
"errors"
"fmt"
"log/slog"
"strings"
"github.com/shankar0123/certctl/internal/domain"
"github.com/shankar0123/certctl/internal/repository"
)
// ErrSelfApproval is returned by ApproveJob when the actor attempting to
// approve a renewal job is the same person listed as the owner of the
// underlying certificate. M-003 enforces separation of duties: the owner who
// requested (or benefits from) the renewal must not be the same identity that
// approves it. Handlers map this sentinel to HTTP 403 Forbidden.
var ErrSelfApproval = errors.New("self-approval forbidden: actor is the owner of the certificate")
// JobService manages job processing and status tracking.
// It coordinates between the scheduler and various job-specific services.
type JobService struct {
jobRepo repository.JobRepository
certRepo repository.CertificateRepository
ownerRepo repository.OwnerRepository
renewalService *RenewalService
deploymentService *DeploymentService
logger *slog.Logger
}
// NewJobService creates a new job service.
//
// certRepo and ownerRepo are required for the M-003 not-self-approval check
// in ApproveJob. Callers may pass nil for either to disable the check
// (useful for tests that don't exercise the approval path); when nil, the
// service logs a warning on the first approval attempt and permits the
// transition. Production wiring must supply both.
func NewJobService(
jobRepo repository.JobRepository,
certRepo repository.CertificateRepository,
ownerRepo repository.OwnerRepository,
renewalService *RenewalService,
deploymentService *DeploymentService,
logger *slog.Logger,
) *JobService {
return &JobService{
jobRepo: jobRepo,
certRepo: certRepo,
ownerRepo: ownerRepo,
renewalService: renewalService,
deploymentService: deploymentService,
logger: logger,
@@ -264,7 +285,13 @@ func (s *JobService) GetJob(ctx context.Context, id string) (*domain.Job, error)
// ApproveJob approves a renewal job that is awaiting approval.
// Transitions the job from AwaitingApproval to Pending so the scheduler picks it up.
func (s *JobService) ApproveJob(ctx context.Context, id string) error {
//
// actor is the named-key identity of the approver (from the auth middleware
// via resolveActor). M-003: if actor matches the certificate owner's Name or
// Email (case-insensitive), returns ErrSelfApproval to enforce separation of
// duties. Callers must pass a non-empty actor; empty actor is treated as an
// anonymous system caller and permitted (internal/system paths).
func (s *JobService) ApproveJob(ctx context.Context, id, actor string) error {
job, err := s.jobRepo.Get(ctx, id)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("job not found: %w", err)
@@ -274,17 +301,29 @@ func (s *JobService) ApproveJob(ctx context.Context, id string) error {
return fmt.Errorf("cannot approve job with status %s (must be AwaitingApproval)", job.Status)
}
if err := s.checkNotSelf(ctx, job, actor); err != nil {
return err
}
if err := s.jobRepo.UpdateStatus(ctx, id, domain.JobStatusPending, ""); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("failed to approve job: %w", err)
}
s.logger.Info("renewal job approved", "job_id", id, "certificate_id", job.CertificateID)
s.logger.Info("renewal job approved",
"job_id", id,
"certificate_id", job.CertificateID,
"actor", actor)
return nil
}
// RejectJob rejects a renewal job that is awaiting approval.
// Transitions the job to Cancelled with a rejection reason.
func (s *JobService) RejectJob(ctx context.Context, id string, reason string) error {
//
// actor is the named-key identity of the rejector (from the auth middleware
// via resolveActor). Rejection is NOT subject to the not-self check — an
// owner is permitted to cancel their own pending renewal. actor is recorded
// on the log line for audit attribution.
func (s *JobService) RejectJob(ctx context.Context, id, reason, actor string) error {
job, err := s.jobRepo.Get(ctx, id)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("job not found: %w", err)
@@ -303,6 +342,67 @@ func (s *JobService) RejectJob(ctx context.Context, id string, reason string) er
return fmt.Errorf("failed to reject job: %w", err)
}
s.logger.Info("renewal job rejected", "job_id", id, "certificate_id", job.CertificateID, "reason", reason)
s.logger.Info("renewal job rejected",
"job_id", id,
"certificate_id", job.CertificateID,
"reason", reason,
"actor", actor)
return nil
}
// checkNotSelf enforces the M-003 separation-of-duties rule for renewal
// approval: the actor approving a job may not be the owner of the underlying
// certificate.
//
// Resolution rules:
// - Empty actor → permitted (internal/system caller; auth middleware already
// short-circuits anonymous users at the handler layer).
// - certRepo or ownerRepo nil → warn once, permit (test/bootstrap wiring).
// - Job has no certificate or certificate has no OwnerID → permitted (no
// owner to collide with).
// - Owner record not found → warn, permit (defensive: stale FK should not
// block operations).
// - Case-insensitive match against owner.Name OR owner.Email → returns
// ErrSelfApproval.
func (s *JobService) checkNotSelf(ctx context.Context, job *domain.Job, actor string) error {
if actor == "" {
return nil
}
if s.certRepo == nil || s.ownerRepo == nil {
s.logger.Warn("not-self approval check skipped: cert/owner repo not wired",
"job_id", job.ID, "actor", actor)
return nil
}
if job.CertificateID == "" {
return nil
}
cert, err := s.certRepo.Get(ctx, job.CertificateID)
if err != nil {
s.logger.Warn("not-self approval check: certificate lookup failed",
"job_id", job.ID, "certificate_id", job.CertificateID, "error", err)
return nil
}
if cert == nil || cert.OwnerID == "" {
return nil
}
owner, err := s.ownerRepo.Get(ctx, cert.OwnerID)
if err != nil || owner == nil {
s.logger.Warn("not-self approval check: owner lookup failed",
"job_id", job.ID, "owner_id", cert.OwnerID, "error", err)
return nil
}
actorLower := strings.ToLower(actor)
if strings.ToLower(owner.Name) == actorLower || strings.ToLower(owner.Email) == actorLower {
s.logger.Warn("self-approval blocked",
"job_id", job.ID,
"certificate_id", job.CertificateID,
"owner_id", owner.ID,
"actor", actor)
return ErrSelfApproval
}
return nil
}
internal/service/job_test.go
+150 -1
View File
@@ -2,6 +2,7 @@ package service
import (
"context"
"errors"
"log/slog"
"os"
"testing"
@@ -12,12 +13,21 @@ import (
// helper to build job service with proper constructor signatures
func newTestJobService(jobRepo *mockJobRepo) *JobService {
svc, _, _ := newTestJobServiceWithRepos(jobRepo)
return svc
}
// newTestJobServiceWithRepos returns the service along with the cert+owner
// repos so self-approval tests can seed owner linkage without rebuilding the
// whole dependency graph.
func newTestJobServiceWithRepos(jobRepo *mockJobRepo) (*JobService, *mockCertRepo, *mockOwnerRepo) {
logger := slog.New(slog.NewTextHandler(os.Stderr, &slog.HandlerOptions{Level: slog.LevelInfo}))
certRepo := &mockCertRepo{
Certs: make(map[string]*domain.ManagedCertificate),
Versions: make(map[string][]*domain.CertificateVersion),
}
ownerRepo := newMockOwnerRepository()
renewalPolicyRepo := &mockRenewalPolicyRepo{
Policies: make(map[string]*domain.RenewalPolicy),
}
@@ -32,7 +42,7 @@ func newTestJobService(jobRepo *mockJobRepo) *JobService {
renewalService := NewRenewalService(certRepo, jobRepo, renewalPolicyRepo, nil, auditService, notifService, issuerRegistry, "server")
deploymentService := NewDeploymentService(jobRepo, targetRepo, agentRepo, certRepo, auditService, notifService)
return NewJobService(jobRepo, renewalService, deploymentService, logger)
return NewJobService(jobRepo, certRepo, ownerRepo, renewalService, deploymentService, logger), certRepo, ownerRepo
}
func TestProcessPendingJobs_Renewal(t *testing.T) {
@@ -249,3 +259,142 @@ func TestListJobs_FilterByStatus(t *testing.T) {
t.Errorf("expected total 1, got %d", total)
}
}
// --- M-003: not-self approval (separation of duties) ---
//
// These regression tests enforce that ApproveJob returns ErrSelfApproval when
// the actor matches the certificate owner's Name or Email (case-insensitive).
// Rejection is intentionally NOT gated — owners may cancel their own pending
// renewals. Handlers map ErrSelfApproval to HTTP 403.
// seedSelfApprovalFixtures populates the mock repos with a realistic
// AwaitingApproval renewal job owned by "alice" and returns the service under
// test. The cert points at owner "o-alice" so checkNotSelf has a full resolution
// path.
func seedSelfApprovalFixtures(t *testing.T) (*JobService, *mockJobRepo) {
t.Helper()
now := time.Now()
job := &domain.Job{
ID: "job-self",
Type: domain.JobTypeRenewal,
CertificateID: "cert-self",
Status: domain.JobStatusAwaitingApproval,
CreatedAt: now,
ScheduledAt: now,
}
jobRepo := &mockJobRepo{
Jobs: map[string]*domain.Job{job.ID: job},
StatusUpdates: make(map[string]domain.JobStatus),
}
svc, certRepo, ownerRepo := newTestJobServiceWithRepos(jobRepo)
certRepo.AddCert(&domain.ManagedCertificate{
ID: "cert-self",
OwnerID: "o-alice",
CreatedAt: now,
UpdatedAt: now,
})
ownerRepo.AddOwner(&domain.Owner{
ID: "o-alice",
Name: "alice",
Email: "alice@example.com",
CreatedAt: now,
UpdatedAt: now,
})
return svc, jobRepo
}
func TestApproveJob_SelfApprovalForbidden_NameMatch(t *testing.T) {
ctx := context.Background()
svc, jobRepo := seedSelfApprovalFixtures(t)
err := svc.ApproveJob(ctx, "job-self", "alice")
if err == nil {
t.Fatal("expected ErrSelfApproval, got nil")
}
if !errors.Is(err, ErrSelfApproval) {
t.Fatalf("expected errors.Is(err, ErrSelfApproval), got %v", err)
}
if _, flipped := jobRepo.StatusUpdates["job-self"]; flipped {
t.Error("expected job status unchanged after self-approval block")
}
}
func TestApproveJob_SelfApprovalForbidden_EmailMatch(t *testing.T) {
ctx := context.Background()
svc, jobRepo := seedSelfApprovalFixtures(t)
err := svc.ApproveJob(ctx, "job-self", "alice@example.com")
if err == nil {
t.Fatal("expected ErrSelfApproval, got nil")
}
if !errors.Is(err, ErrSelfApproval) {
t.Fatalf("expected errors.Is(err, ErrSelfApproval), got %v", err)
}
if _, flipped := jobRepo.StatusUpdates["job-self"]; flipped {
t.Error("expected job status unchanged after self-approval block")
}
}
func TestApproveJob_SelfApprovalForbidden_CaseInsensitive(t *testing.T) {
ctx := context.Background()
svc, _ := seedSelfApprovalFixtures(t)
// Uppercase name should still collide — the check must be case-insensitive.
if err := svc.ApproveJob(ctx, "job-self", "ALICE"); !errors.Is(err, ErrSelfApproval) {
t.Fatalf("expected ErrSelfApproval for uppercase name match, got %v", err)
}
// Mixed-case email should also collide.
if err := svc.ApproveJob(ctx, "job-self", "Alice@Example.COM"); !errors.Is(err, ErrSelfApproval) {
t.Fatalf("expected ErrSelfApproval for mixed-case email match, got %v", err)
}
}
func TestApproveJob_DifferentActor_Permitted(t *testing.T) {
ctx := context.Background()
svc, jobRepo := seedSelfApprovalFixtures(t)
// A different named key must be allowed to approve.
if err := svc.ApproveJob(ctx, "job-self", "bob"); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("expected approval to succeed for non-owner actor, got %v", err)
}
if jobRepo.StatusUpdates["job-self"] != domain.JobStatusPending {
t.Errorf("expected status Pending after approval, got %s",
jobRepo.StatusUpdates["job-self"])
}
}
func TestApproveJob_EmptyActor_Permitted(t *testing.T) {
ctx := context.Background()
svc, jobRepo := seedSelfApprovalFixtures(t)
// Empty actor represents an internal/system caller. The handler layer
// enforces authenticated-only, so this branch exists only for defensive
// in-process paths (scheduler-driven auto-approval, tests, etc.).
if err := svc.ApproveJob(ctx, "job-self", ""); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("expected empty actor to be permitted, got %v", err)
}
if jobRepo.StatusUpdates["job-self"] != domain.JobStatusPending {
t.Errorf("expected status Pending after approval, got %s",
jobRepo.StatusUpdates["job-self"])
}
}
func TestRejectJob_SelfRejection_Permitted(t *testing.T) {
ctx := context.Background()
svc, jobRepo := seedSelfApprovalFixtures(t)
// Owner must be able to reject their own pending renewal — M-003 scopes the
// not-self rule to approval only.
if err := svc.RejectJob(ctx, "job-self", "no longer needed", "alice"); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("expected owner to reject own job, got %v", err)
}
if jobRepo.StatusUpdates["job-self"] != domain.JobStatusCancelled {
t.Errorf("expected status Cancelled after rejection, got %s",
jobRepo.StatusUpdates["job-self"])
}
}