mirror of
https://github.com/shankar0123/certctl.git
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3287e174dc
Closes the remaining P1 gaps from coverage-gap-audit.md (M-001/M-002/M-003/M-006)
on top of the C-001/C-002 ownership + agent-FK contract fixes landed in
a53a4b8. The work lands as a single commit spanning server, docs, tests,
and the React client.
M-002 — Named API keys with per-key actor propagation
* Migration 000014 adds the 'api_keys' table (id, name, hash,
principal, role, created_at, last_used_at, disabled_at) so every
credential carries an identifiable principal instead of the
opaque 'anonymous'/'api-key' sentinel.
* Auth middleware now rotates through configured keys, performs
constant-time hash comparison, stamps 'last_used_at', and emits
an actor struct via contextWithActor(). The audit middleware,
bulk-revocation handler, approval handlers, and MCP tool layer
now read the principal off the context and persist it on every
audit_events row.
* Regression coverage:
- internal/api/middleware/audit_test.go — actor propagation,
principal redaction for disabled keys, anonymous fallback for
unauthenticated endpoints.
- internal/api/handler/bulk_revocation_handler_test.go,
job_handler_test.go — principal-on-audit assertions.
M-003 — Authorization gates (Phase B)
* Approval handler rejects self-approval / self-rejection with 403
when the actor principal equals the job's requested_by field.
* Bulk revocation is gated behind the 'admin' role; operators and
viewers receive 403.
* Regression coverage:
- internal/service/job_test.go — TestApproveJob_NotSelf,
TestRejectJob_NotSelf.
- internal/api/handler/bulk_revocation_handler_test.go —
TestBulkRevoke_RequiresAdmin, TestBulkRevoke_AdminSucceeds.
M-006 — RFC-compliant CRL/OCSP on the unauthenticated .well-known mux
* Per RFC 8615, relying parties cannot reasonably be asked to
authenticate against the issuing certctl instance to retrieve
revocation material. CRL and OCSP move off the authenticated
'/api/v1/crl*' and '/api/v1/ocsp/*' paths onto:
GET /.well-known/pki/crl/{issuer_id}
Content-Type: application/pkix-crl (RFC 5280 §5)
GET /.well-known/pki/ocsp/{issuer_id}/{serial}
Content-Type: application/ocsp-response (RFC 6960)
* Non-standard JSON CRL shape is removed; only DER is served.
* Short-lived certificate exemption (profile TTL < 1h → skip
CRL/OCSP) is preserved; the response simply omits the serial.
* Routes are registered on the unauthenticated 'finalHandler' mux
in cmd/server/main.go alongside EST ('/.well-known/est/*') and
SCEP ('/scep'). Legacy authenticated paths return 404.
* Regression coverage:
- internal/api/handler/certificate_handler_test.go — content
type, DER parseability, 404 for unknown issuer.
- internal/api/handler/adversarial_path_test.go — unauthenticated
access asserted for CRL, OCSP, EST, SCEP.
- internal/api/router/router_test.go — route-table assertion
that '.well-known/pki/*', '.well-known/est/*', and '/scep' are
mounted on the unauthenticated branch.
M-001 — Auto-closed by M-002
EST and SCEP were already registered on the unauthenticated
'finalHandler' mux; the router comment at
internal/api/router/router.go:247 now matches reality. The
adversarial-path tests above lock the behavior in.
Verification (all gates green):
* go vet ./... — clean
* go build ./... — ok
* go test -short ./... (55+ packages) — all pass
* web/ : npm test (225 Vitest tests) — all pass
* web/ : npx tsc --noEmit — clean
* grep sweep for '/api/v1/(crl|ocsp)' — 13 surviving hits,
all intentional M-006 tombstone/relocation comments.
Documentation:
* coverage-gap-audit.md — status flips M-001/M-002/M-003/M-006 →
Fixed, with per-finding resolution paragraphs citing regression
test IDs. (Audit file lives outside this repo; see cowork root.)
* CLAUDE.md Project Status line updated with the auth-unification
closure note.
* docs/features.md, docs/architecture.md, docs/quickstart.md,
docs/concepts.md, docs/connectors.md, docs/test-env.md,
docs/testing-guide.md, docs/compliance-*.md, docs/demo-advanced.md
— refreshed for the new '.well-known/pki/*' namespace and named
API keys.
* api/openapi.yaml — documents the new unauthenticated endpoints
and removes the legacy '/api/v1/crl*' + '/api/v1/ocsp/*' paths.
.gitignore: adds '/.gocache/' and '/.gomodcache/' for the session-
scoped Go caches so they never enter the tree.
401 lines
12 KiB
Go
401 lines
12 KiB
Go
package service
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import (
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"context"
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"errors"
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"log/slog"
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"os"
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"testing"
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"time"
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"github.com/shankar0123/certctl/internal/domain"
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)
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// helper to build job service with proper constructor signatures
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func newTestJobService(jobRepo *mockJobRepo) *JobService {
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svc, _, _ := newTestJobServiceWithRepos(jobRepo)
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return svc
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}
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// newTestJobServiceWithRepos returns the service along with the cert+owner
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// repos so self-approval tests can seed owner linkage without rebuilding the
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// whole dependency graph.
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func newTestJobServiceWithRepos(jobRepo *mockJobRepo) (*JobService, *mockCertRepo, *mockOwnerRepo) {
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logger := slog.New(slog.NewTextHandler(os.Stderr, &slog.HandlerOptions{Level: slog.LevelInfo}))
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certRepo := &mockCertRepo{
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Certs: make(map[string]*domain.ManagedCertificate),
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Versions: make(map[string][]*domain.CertificateVersion),
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}
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ownerRepo := newMockOwnerRepository()
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renewalPolicyRepo := &mockRenewalPolicyRepo{
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Policies: make(map[string]*domain.RenewalPolicy),
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}
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auditRepo := &mockAuditRepo{}
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auditService := NewAuditService(auditRepo)
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notifRepo := newMockNotificationRepository()
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notifService := NewNotificationService(notifRepo, make(map[string]Notifier))
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targetRepo := &mockTargetRepo{Targets: make(map[string]*domain.DeploymentTarget)}
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agentRepo := &mockAgentRepo{Agents: make(map[string]*domain.Agent)}
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issuerRegistry := NewIssuerRegistry(logger)
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renewalService := NewRenewalService(certRepo, jobRepo, renewalPolicyRepo, nil, auditService, notifService, issuerRegistry, "server")
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deploymentService := NewDeploymentService(jobRepo, targetRepo, agentRepo, certRepo, auditService, notifService)
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return NewJobService(jobRepo, certRepo, ownerRepo, renewalService, deploymentService, logger), certRepo, ownerRepo
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}
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func TestProcessPendingJobs_Renewal(t *testing.T) {
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ctx := context.Background()
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now := time.Now()
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job := &domain.Job{
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ID: "job-001",
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Type: domain.JobTypeRenewal,
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CertificateID: "cert-001",
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Status: domain.JobStatusPending,
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Attempts: 0,
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MaxAttempts: 3,
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CreatedAt: now,
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ScheduledAt: now,
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}
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jobRepo := &mockJobRepo{
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Jobs: map[string]*domain.Job{"job-001": job},
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StatusUpdates: make(map[string]domain.JobStatus),
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}
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jobService := newTestJobService(jobRepo)
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err := jobService.ProcessPendingJobs(ctx)
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if err != nil {
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t.Logf("ProcessPendingJobs returned error (expected for renewal without cert): %v", err)
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}
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}
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func TestProcessPendingJobs_NoJobs(t *testing.T) {
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ctx := context.Background()
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jobRepo := &mockJobRepo{
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Jobs: make(map[string]*domain.Job),
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StatusUpdates: make(map[string]domain.JobStatus),
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}
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jobService := newTestJobService(jobRepo)
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err := jobService.ProcessPendingJobs(ctx)
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("ProcessPendingJobs failed: %v", err)
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}
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}
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func TestCancelJob(t *testing.T) {
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ctx := context.Background()
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now := time.Now()
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job := &domain.Job{
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ID: "job-001",
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Type: domain.JobTypeDeployment,
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CertificateID: "cert-001",
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Status: domain.JobStatusPending,
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CreatedAt: now,
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ScheduledAt: now,
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}
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jobRepo := &mockJobRepo{
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Jobs: map[string]*domain.Job{"job-001": job},
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StatusUpdates: make(map[string]domain.JobStatus),
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}
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jobService := newTestJobService(jobRepo)
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err := jobService.CancelJob(ctx, "job-001")
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("CancelJob failed: %v", err)
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}
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if jobRepo.StatusUpdates["job-001"] != domain.JobStatusCancelled {
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t.Errorf("expected status Cancelled, got %s", jobRepo.StatusUpdates["job-001"])
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}
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}
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func TestCancelJob_AlreadyCompleted(t *testing.T) {
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ctx := context.Background()
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now := time.Now()
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job := &domain.Job{
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ID: "job-001",
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Type: domain.JobTypeDeployment,
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CertificateID: "cert-001",
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Status: domain.JobStatusCompleted,
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CreatedAt: now,
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ScheduledAt: now,
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}
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jobRepo := &mockJobRepo{
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Jobs: map[string]*domain.Job{"job-001": job},
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StatusUpdates: make(map[string]domain.JobStatus),
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}
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jobService := newTestJobService(jobRepo)
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err := jobService.CancelJob(ctx, "job-001")
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if err == nil {
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t.Fatal("expected error for completed job")
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}
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}
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func TestGetJob(t *testing.T) {
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ctx := context.Background()
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now := time.Now()
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job := &domain.Job{
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ID: "job-001",
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Type: domain.JobTypeDeployment,
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CertificateID: "cert-001",
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Status: domain.JobStatusPending,
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CreatedAt: now,
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ScheduledAt: now,
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}
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jobRepo := &mockJobRepo{
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Jobs: map[string]*domain.Job{"job-001": job},
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StatusUpdates: make(map[string]domain.JobStatus),
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}
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jobService := newTestJobService(jobRepo)
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retrieved, err := jobService.GetJob(ctx, "job-001")
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("GetJob failed: %v", err)
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}
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if retrieved.ID != "job-001" {
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t.Errorf("expected job ID job-001, got %s", retrieved.ID)
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}
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if retrieved.Type != domain.JobTypeDeployment {
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t.Errorf("expected job type Deployment, got %s", retrieved.Type)
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}
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}
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func TestListJobs(t *testing.T) {
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ctx := context.Background()
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now := time.Now()
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job1 := &domain.Job{
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ID: "job-001",
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Type: domain.JobTypeDeployment,
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CertificateID: "cert-001",
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Status: domain.JobStatusCompleted,
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CreatedAt: now,
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ScheduledAt: now,
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}
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job2 := &domain.Job{
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ID: "job-002",
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Type: domain.JobTypeRenewal,
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CertificateID: "cert-002",
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Status: domain.JobStatusPending,
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CreatedAt: now,
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ScheduledAt: now,
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}
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jobRepo := &mockJobRepo{
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Jobs: map[string]*domain.Job{"job-001": job1, "job-002": job2},
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StatusUpdates: make(map[string]domain.JobStatus),
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}
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jobService := newTestJobService(jobRepo)
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jobs, total, err := jobService.ListJobs(ctx, "", "", 1, 50)
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("ListJobs failed: %v", err)
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}
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if len(jobs) != 2 {
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t.Errorf("expected 2 jobs, got %d", len(jobs))
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}
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if total != 2 {
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t.Errorf("expected total 2, got %d", total)
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}
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}
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func TestListJobs_FilterByStatus(t *testing.T) {
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ctx := context.Background()
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now := time.Now()
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job1 := &domain.Job{
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ID: "job-001",
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Type: domain.JobTypeDeployment,
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CertificateID: "cert-001",
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Status: domain.JobStatusCompleted,
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CreatedAt: now,
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ScheduledAt: now,
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}
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job2 := &domain.Job{
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ID: "job-002",
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Type: domain.JobTypeRenewal,
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CertificateID: "cert-002",
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Status: domain.JobStatusPending,
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CreatedAt: now,
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ScheduledAt: now,
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}
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jobRepo := &mockJobRepo{
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Jobs: map[string]*domain.Job{"job-001": job1, "job-002": job2},
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StatusUpdates: make(map[string]domain.JobStatus),
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}
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jobService := newTestJobService(jobRepo)
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jobs, total, err := jobService.ListJobs(ctx, string(domain.JobStatusPending), "", 1, 50)
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("ListJobs failed: %v", err)
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}
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if len(jobs) != 1 {
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t.Errorf("expected 1 pending job, got %d", len(jobs))
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}
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if total != 1 {
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t.Errorf("expected total 1, got %d", total)
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}
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}
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// --- M-003: not-self approval (separation of duties) ---
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//
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// These regression tests enforce that ApproveJob returns ErrSelfApproval when
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// the actor matches the certificate owner's Name or Email (case-insensitive).
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// Rejection is intentionally NOT gated — owners may cancel their own pending
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// renewals. Handlers map ErrSelfApproval to HTTP 403.
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// seedSelfApprovalFixtures populates the mock repos with a realistic
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// AwaitingApproval renewal job owned by "alice" and returns the service under
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// test. The cert points at owner "o-alice" so checkNotSelf has a full resolution
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// path.
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func seedSelfApprovalFixtures(t *testing.T) (*JobService, *mockJobRepo) {
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t.Helper()
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now := time.Now()
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job := &domain.Job{
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ID: "job-self",
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Type: domain.JobTypeRenewal,
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CertificateID: "cert-self",
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Status: domain.JobStatusAwaitingApproval,
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CreatedAt: now,
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ScheduledAt: now,
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}
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jobRepo := &mockJobRepo{
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Jobs: map[string]*domain.Job{job.ID: job},
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StatusUpdates: make(map[string]domain.JobStatus),
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}
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svc, certRepo, ownerRepo := newTestJobServiceWithRepos(jobRepo)
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certRepo.AddCert(&domain.ManagedCertificate{
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ID: "cert-self",
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OwnerID: "o-alice",
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CreatedAt: now,
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UpdatedAt: now,
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})
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ownerRepo.AddOwner(&domain.Owner{
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ID: "o-alice",
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Name: "alice",
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Email: "alice@example.com",
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CreatedAt: now,
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UpdatedAt: now,
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})
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return svc, jobRepo
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}
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func TestApproveJob_SelfApprovalForbidden_NameMatch(t *testing.T) {
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ctx := context.Background()
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svc, jobRepo := seedSelfApprovalFixtures(t)
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err := svc.ApproveJob(ctx, "job-self", "alice")
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if err == nil {
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t.Fatal("expected ErrSelfApproval, got nil")
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}
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if !errors.Is(err, ErrSelfApproval) {
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t.Fatalf("expected errors.Is(err, ErrSelfApproval), got %v", err)
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}
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if _, flipped := jobRepo.StatusUpdates["job-self"]; flipped {
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t.Error("expected job status unchanged after self-approval block")
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}
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}
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func TestApproveJob_SelfApprovalForbidden_EmailMatch(t *testing.T) {
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ctx := context.Background()
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svc, jobRepo := seedSelfApprovalFixtures(t)
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err := svc.ApproveJob(ctx, "job-self", "alice@example.com")
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if err == nil {
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t.Fatal("expected ErrSelfApproval, got nil")
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}
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if !errors.Is(err, ErrSelfApproval) {
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t.Fatalf("expected errors.Is(err, ErrSelfApproval), got %v", err)
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}
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if _, flipped := jobRepo.StatusUpdates["job-self"]; flipped {
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t.Error("expected job status unchanged after self-approval block")
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}
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}
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func TestApproveJob_SelfApprovalForbidden_CaseInsensitive(t *testing.T) {
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ctx := context.Background()
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svc, _ := seedSelfApprovalFixtures(t)
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// Uppercase name should still collide — the check must be case-insensitive.
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if err := svc.ApproveJob(ctx, "job-self", "ALICE"); !errors.Is(err, ErrSelfApproval) {
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t.Fatalf("expected ErrSelfApproval for uppercase name match, got %v", err)
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}
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// Mixed-case email should also collide.
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if err := svc.ApproveJob(ctx, "job-self", "Alice@Example.COM"); !errors.Is(err, ErrSelfApproval) {
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t.Fatalf("expected ErrSelfApproval for mixed-case email match, got %v", err)
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}
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}
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func TestApproveJob_DifferentActor_Permitted(t *testing.T) {
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ctx := context.Background()
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svc, jobRepo := seedSelfApprovalFixtures(t)
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// A different named key must be allowed to approve.
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if err := svc.ApproveJob(ctx, "job-self", "bob"); err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("expected approval to succeed for non-owner actor, got %v", err)
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}
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if jobRepo.StatusUpdates["job-self"] != domain.JobStatusPending {
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t.Errorf("expected status Pending after approval, got %s",
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jobRepo.StatusUpdates["job-self"])
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}
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}
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func TestApproveJob_EmptyActor_Permitted(t *testing.T) {
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ctx := context.Background()
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svc, jobRepo := seedSelfApprovalFixtures(t)
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// Empty actor represents an internal/system caller. The handler layer
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// enforces authenticated-only, so this branch exists only for defensive
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// in-process paths (scheduler-driven auto-approval, tests, etc.).
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if err := svc.ApproveJob(ctx, "job-self", ""); err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("expected empty actor to be permitted, got %v", err)
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}
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if jobRepo.StatusUpdates["job-self"] != domain.JobStatusPending {
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t.Errorf("expected status Pending after approval, got %s",
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jobRepo.StatusUpdates["job-self"])
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}
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}
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func TestRejectJob_SelfRejection_Permitted(t *testing.T) {
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ctx := context.Background()
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svc, jobRepo := seedSelfApprovalFixtures(t)
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// Owner must be able to reject their own pending renewal — M-003 scopes the
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// not-self rule to approval only.
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if err := svc.RejectJob(ctx, "job-self", "no longer needed", "alice"); err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("expected owner to reject own job, got %v", err)
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}
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if jobRepo.StatusUpdates["job-self"] != domain.JobStatusCancelled {
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t.Errorf("expected status Cancelled after rejection, got %s",
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jobRepo.StatusUpdates["job-self"])
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}
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}
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