Merge branch 'fix/u3-master-db-coupling-cleanup' (U-3 master + 4 ride-alongs)

This commit is contained in:
shankar0123
2026-04-25 13:29:30 +00:00
23 changed files with 1157 additions and 51 deletions
+57
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@@ -213,6 +213,63 @@ jobs:
exit 1
fi
- name: Forbidden migration mount in compose initdb (U-3)
# U-3 closed cat-u-seed_initdb_schema_drift (GitHub #10) by
# eliminating the dual-source-of-truth between
# `migrations/*.up.sql` mounted into postgres
# `/docker-entrypoint-initdb.d/` and the same files re-applied at
# runtime by `RunMigrations`. Pre-U-3 every new migration that
# the seed depended on (000013 added `policy_rules.severity`,
# 000017 renames `retry_interval_seconds`, etc.) had to be added
# by hand to the compose mount list; missing the update crashed
# initdb on first boot, postgres flagged unhealthy, and the
# whole stack failed to start from a fresh clone. Post-U-3 the
# server is the single source of truth — `RunMigrations` +
# `RunSeed` apply everything at boot.
#
# This step grep-fails the build if any compose file under
# `deploy/` re-introduces a `migrations/.*\.sql` mount into
# `/docker-entrypoint-initdb.d`. Comments are exempt so the
# post-fix rationale block in the compose files (which
# documents WHY the mounts were removed) doesn't trip the guard.
# The demo overlay's `seed_demo.sql` is the explicit exception:
# it is tolerated only when it lives behind the
# CERTCTL_DEMO_SEED env var (post-U-3 demo path) — bare initdb
# mounts are NOT tolerated. The grep matches all compose
# mount-list shapes (`-` indented, `volumes:` indented, both),
# so any future drift surfaces here before the operator hits it
# on a fresh clone.
#
# See coverage-gap-audit-2026-04-24-v5/unified-audit.md
# cat-u-seed_initdb_schema_drift for the closure rationale, or
# internal/repository/postgres/db.go::RunSeed for the runtime
# contract.
run: |
set -e
BAD=$(grep -rnEH \
-e 'migrations/.*\.sql:.*docker-entrypoint-initdb' \
-e 'seed.*\.sql:.*docker-entrypoint-initdb' \
deploy/docker-compose.yml \
deploy/docker-compose.test.yml \
deploy/docker-compose.demo.yml \
2>/dev/null \
| grep -vE '^\s*[^:]+:[0-9]+:\s*#' \
|| true)
if [ -n "$BAD" ]; then
echo "U-3 regression: migration/seed mount into postgres initdb reappeared:"
echo "$BAD"
echo ""
echo "The post-U-3 contract is: postgres comes up with an empty"
echo "schema and the server applies migrations + seed at boot via"
echo "internal/repository/postgres.RunMigrations + RunSeed. Demo"
echo "data lives behind CERTCTL_DEMO_SEED=true (RunDemoSeed),"
echo "not an initdb mount. See"
echo "coverage-gap-audit-2026-04-24-v5/unified-audit.md"
echo "cat-u-seed_initdb_schema_drift for the closure rationale."
exit 1
fi
- name: Race Detection
run: go test -race ./internal/service/... ./internal/api/handler/... ./internal/api/middleware/... ./internal/scheduler/... ./internal/connector/... ./internal/crypto/... ./internal/domain/... ./internal/validation/... ./internal/tlsprobe/... -count=1 -timeout 300s
+36
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@@ -4,6 +4,42 @@ All notable changes to certctl are documented in this file. Dates use ISO 8601.
## [unreleased] — 2026-04-24
### U-3: GitHub #10 reopened — fresh-clone first-up postgres init failure (P1) — closed end-to-end
> Operator `mikeakasully` cloned v2.0.50 fresh, ran the canonical quickstart `docker compose -f deploy/docker-compose.yml up -d --build`, and postgres reported `unhealthy` indefinitely; dependent containers (certctl-server, certctl-agent) never started. Root cause: the deploy compose stack mounted both a hand-curated subset of `migrations/*.up.sql` and `seed.sql` into postgres `/docker-entrypoint-initdb.d/`. Postgres applied them at initdb time. Once `seed.sql` referenced columns added by migrations *after* the mounted cutoff (e.g., `policy_rules.severity` from migration 000013, which the mount list never included), initdb crashed mid-seed and the container loop wedged. Two sources of truth — the mount list and the in-tree migration ladder — diverged the moment a seed-touching migration shipped, and the only thing that fixed it was hand-editing the compose file every release. The U-3 closure removes the dual source: postgres now boots empty and the server applies the entire migration ladder + seed at startup via `RunMigrations` + `RunSeed`. Same pattern Helm has used since day one. Bundled with four ride-along audit findings whose fixes are in adjacent code (column rename, missing column, dropped orphan columns, new build-identity endpoint) so operators take the schema-change pain only once.
### Breaking Changes
- **`deploy/docker-compose.yml` postgres no longer initdb-mounts the migration files or `seed.sql`.** Operators running on a populated `postgres_data` volume from a pre-U-3 release see no behavioral change (the schema is already in place; `RunMigrations` is `IF NOT EXISTS` and `RunSeed` is `ON CONFLICT DO NOTHING`). Operators running on a *fresh* clone now rely on the server to apply both — which is the bug fix. There is no rollback path other than re-introducing the dual-source-of-truth hazard. See `internal/repository/postgres/db.go::RunSeed` for the runtime contract.
- **`migrations/000017_db_coupling_cleanup.up.sql` renames `renewal_policies.retry_interval_minutes``retry_interval_seconds`.** The column always held seconds; the column name lied (`cat-o-retry_interval_unit_mismatch`). Operators running raw SQL against the old name need to update their queries. The Go layer (`internal/repository/postgres/renewal_policy.go`) is updated in lockstep so the in-tree code path is unaffected.
- **`migrations/000017_db_coupling_cleanup.up.sql` drops `network_scan_targets.health_check_enabled` and `network_scan_targets.health_check_interval_seconds`.** These columns were declared by a long-ago migration but never wired into Go code (`cat-o-health_check_column_orphans`) — schema noise that confused operators reading raw SQL. Anyone with custom dashboards selecting those columns will break.
- **The compose demo overlay (`deploy/docker-compose.demo.yml`) no longer initdb-mounts `seed_demo.sql`.** It now sets `CERTCTL_DEMO_SEED=true` and the server applies the demo seed at boot via `RunDemoSeed` after baseline migrations + seed.sql are in place. Same single-source-of-truth pattern as the production path.
### Added
- **Migration `000017_db_coupling_cleanup`** (up + down). Bundles three schema changes in idempotent SQL: (1) rename `renewal_policies.retry_interval_minutes``retry_interval_seconds` (DO $$ guard so re-application is safe), (2) add `notification_events.created_at TIMESTAMPTZ NOT NULL DEFAULT NOW()`, (3) drop the orphan `network_scan_targets.health_check_*` columns. Reduces operator-visible "schema-change releases" from four to one.
- **`internal/repository/postgres.RunSeed`** — runtime equivalent of the deleted initdb mount for `seed.sql`. Called from `cmd/server/main.go` immediately after `RunMigrations`. Idempotent (every INSERT in the shipped seed uses `ON CONFLICT (id) DO NOTHING`); missing-file is a no-op so operators with custom packaging that strips the seed don't break.
- **`internal/repository/postgres.RunDemoSeed`** + **`config.DatabaseConfig.DemoSeed`** + **`CERTCTL_DEMO_SEED` env var.** Replaces the deleted `seed_demo.sql` initdb mount. The compose demo overlay sets `CERTCTL_DEMO_SEED=true` and the server applies the demo seed after baseline. Same idempotency contract as the baseline path. Default-off so a vanilla deploy never lands fake-history rows.
- **`GET /api/v1/version` endpoint** + **`internal/api/handler.VersionHandler`**. Returns `{version, commit, modified, build_time, go_version}` from `runtime/debug.ReadBuildInfo()` with ldflags-supplied `Version` taking priority. Wired through the no-auth dispatch in `cmd/server/main.go` so probes and rollout systems can read build identity without Bearer credentials. Audit middleware excludes the path so rollout polls don't dominate the audit trail. Closes `cat-u-no_version_endpoint`.
- **`notification_events.created_at` column** is now populated by `NotificationRepository.Create` (with a `time.Now()` fallback when the caller leaves it zero) and read back by `scanNotification`. Pre-U-3 the JSON API serialised `0001-01-01T00:00:00Z` — closes `cat-o-notification_created_at_dead_field`.
- **Five regression tests** for the U-3 contract: `TestRunSeed_AppliesIdempotently`, `TestRunSeed_MissingFileIsNoOp`, `TestRunDemoSeed_AppliesIdempotently`, `TestMigration000017_RetryIntervalRename`, `TestMigration000017_NotificationCreatedAt`, `TestMigration000017_HealthCheckOrphansDropped`, plus `TestNotificationRepository_CreatedAt_IsPersisted` / `TestNotificationRepository_CreatedAt_DefaultsToNow` for the round-trip. All testcontainers-gated (skipped under `-short`). Three handler-layer unit tests pin `/api/v1/version` (`TestVersion_ReturnsBuildInfo`, `TestVersion_RejectsNonGet`, `TestVersion_LdflagsOverride`).
- **CI regression guardrail** in `.github/workflows/ci.yml` (`Forbidden migration mount in compose initdb (U-3)`) — grep-fails the build if any `migrations/.*\.sql` or `seed.*\.sql` file is re-mounted into `/docker-entrypoint-initdb.d` in any compose file. Catches future drift before a fresh-clone operator hits it.
### Changed
- **`deploy/docker-compose.yml`** + **`deploy/docker-compose.test.yml`** — postgres `volumes:` no longer mount migrations or seed files; postgres healthcheck gains `start_period: 30s`; certctl-server healthcheck gains `start_period: 30s` to absorb the runtime migration + seed application window on first boot.
- **`deploy/docker-compose.demo.yml`** — replaces the `seed_demo.sql` initdb mount with the `CERTCTL_DEMO_SEED=true` env var on `certctl-server`.
- **`migrations/seed.sql`** — `INSERT INTO renewal_policies` updated to use the new `retry_interval_seconds` column name (lockstep with migration 000017).
- **`internal/repository/postgres/renewal_policy.go`** — column references updated to `retry_interval_seconds` across SELECT, INSERT, and UPDATE sites (lockstep with migration 000017).
### Closed audit findings
- `cat-u-seed_initdb_schema_drift` (P1, primary U-3 finding)
- `cat-o-retry_interval_unit_mismatch` (P1)
- `cat-o-notification_created_at_dead_field` (P2)
- `cat-o-health_check_column_orphans` (P1)
- `cat-u-no_version_endpoint` (P2)
### G-1: JWT silent auth downgrade — closed end-to-end
> Pre-G-1 the config validator accepted `CERTCTL_AUTH_TYPE=jwt` and the startup log faithfully echoed `"authentication enabled" "type"="jwt"`. Reasonable people read that and concluded JWT was on. It wasn't. The auth-middleware wiring at `cmd/server/main.go` unconditionally routed every request through the api-key bearer middleware regardless of `cfg.Auth.Type`. So `CERTCTL_AUTH_TYPE=jwt` quietly compared incoming `Authorization: Bearer <something>` against whatever string the operator put in `CERTCTL_AUTH_SECRET` — real JWT clients got 401, and operators who treated `CERTCTL_AUTH_SECRET` as a *signing* secret (because they thought they were configuring JWT) had effectively handed an attacker an api-key. A security finding masquerading as a config option. We chose to remove the option rather than ship JWT middleware — the audit-recommended structural fix that closes the hazard. Operators who actually need JWT/OIDC front certctl with an authenticating gateway (oauth2-proxy / Envoy `ext_authz` / Traefik `ForwardAuth` / Pomerium / Authelia) and run the upstream certctl with `CERTCTL_AUTH_TYPE=none`. The same pattern works on docker-compose and Helm.
+44
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@@ -163,6 +163,50 @@ paths:
"401":
description: Unauthorized
/api/v1/version:
get:
tags: [Health]
summary: Build identity (version, commit, Go runtime)
description: |
Returns the running server's build identity. Served without
auth so rollout systems and blackbox probes can read it without
Bearer credentials. U-3 ride-along (cat-u-no_version_endpoint).
Excluded from audit logging because rollout polling would
otherwise dominate the audit trail.
The Version field follows a fallback ladder: ldflags-supplied
value > VCS commit SHA > "dev". Commit / Modified / BuildTime
come from runtime/debug.BuildInfo (Go 1.18+ stamps these on
every module-tracked build). GoVersion is runtime.Version().
security: []
operationId: getVersion
responses:
"200":
description: Build identity
content:
application/json:
schema:
type: object
required: [version, commit, modified, build_time, go_version]
properties:
version:
type: string
description: Release tag (ldflags-supplied) or VCS SHA fallback or "dev"
example: v2.0.51
commit:
type: string
description: Git SHA from runtime/debug.BuildInfo (vcs.revision); empty when not VCS-tracked
modified:
type: boolean
description: True when build had uncommitted changes (vcs.modified)
build_time:
type: string
description: RFC 3339 build timestamp (vcs.time); empty when not VCS-tracked
go_version:
type: string
description: Go toolchain version that compiled the binary (runtime.Version())
example: go1.25.9
# ─── Certificates ────────────────────────────────────────────────────
/api/v1/certificates:
get:
+55 -4
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@@ -86,6 +86,41 @@ func main() {
}
logger.Info("migrations completed")
// Apply baseline seed data.
//
// U-3 (P1, cat-u-seed_initdb_schema_drift): pre-U-3 seed.sql was mounted
// into postgres `/docker-entrypoint-initdb.d/` alongside a hand-curated
// subset of migrations. Adding a migration that introduced a new column
// referenced by seed.sql (cat-o-retry_interval_unit_mismatch /
// policy_rules.severity / etc.) without also updating the compose volume
// mounts caused initdb to crash on first up. Post-U-3 the compose stack
// drops all initdb mounts; postgres comes up with empty schema, the
// server runs RunMigrations above, then this RunSeed call lands the
// baseline data — all from a single source of truth (this binary).
// See internal/repository/postgres/db.go::RunSeed for the contract.
logger.Info("applying baseline seed", "path", cfg.Database.MigrationsPath)
if err := postgres.RunSeed(db, cfg.Database.MigrationsPath); err != nil {
logger.Error("failed to apply seed data", "error", err)
os.Exit(1)
}
logger.Info("seed completed")
// Apply demo overlay seed when CERTCTL_DEMO_SEED=true. Pre-U-3 the demo
// overlay (deploy/docker-compose.demo.yml) mounted seed_demo.sql into
// postgres `/docker-entrypoint-initdb.d/`; that broke once U-3 dropped
// the initdb migration mounts (the demo seed references tables that
// wouldn't exist at initdb time). The runtime path here is the
// post-U-3 replacement. Default-off so a vanilla deploy never lands
// fake-history rows. See postgres.RunDemoSeed for the contract.
if cfg.Database.DemoSeed {
logger.Info("applying demo seed (CERTCTL_DEMO_SEED=true)", "path", cfg.Database.MigrationsPath)
if err := postgres.RunDemoSeed(db, cfg.Database.MigrationsPath); err != nil {
logger.Error("failed to apply demo seed data", "error", err)
os.Exit(1)
}
logger.Info("demo seed completed")
}
// Initialize repositories with real PostgreSQL connection
auditRepo := postgres.NewAuditRepository(db)
certificateRepo := postgres.NewCertificateRepository(db)
@@ -406,6 +441,13 @@ func main() {
statsHandler := handler.NewStatsHandler(statsService)
metricsHandler := handler.NewMetricsHandler(statsService, time.Now())
healthHandler := handler.NewHealthHandler(cfg.Auth.Type)
// U-3 ride-along (cat-u-no_version_endpoint, P2): the version handler
// answers GET /api/v1/version with build identity (ldflags Version,
// VCS commit/dirty/timestamp, Go runtime version). Wired through the
// no-auth dispatch + audit ExcludePaths below so probes and rollout
// systems can read it without Bearer credentials and without flooding
// the audit trail.
versionHandler := handler.NewVersionHandler()
discoveryHandler := handler.NewDiscoveryHandler(discoveryService)
networkScanHandler := handler.NewNetworkScanHandler(networkScanService)
verificationService := service.NewVerificationService(jobRepo, auditService, logger)
@@ -554,6 +596,7 @@ func main() {
Digest: *digestHandler,
HealthChecks: healthCheckHandler,
BulkRevocation: bulkRevocationHandler,
Version: versionHandler,
})
// Register EST (RFC 7030) handlers if enabled
if cfg.EST.Enabled {
@@ -690,10 +733,15 @@ func main() {
},
)
auditMiddleware := middleware.NewAuditLog(auditAdapter, middleware.AuditConfig{
ExcludePaths: []string{"/health", "/ready"},
// /api/v1/version is excluded for the same reason /health and /ready
// are: rollout systems and blackbox probes hammer it on a tight
// interval, and the audit trail's value comes from rare,
// operator-authored mutations — not from sub-second readonly polls.
// U-3 ride-along (cat-u-no_version_endpoint, P2).
ExcludePaths: []string{"/health", "/ready", "/api/v1/version"},
Logger: logger,
})
logger.Info("API audit logging enabled (excluding /health, /ready)")
logger.Info("API audit logging enabled (excluding /health, /ready, /api/v1/version)")
middlewareStack := []func(http.Handler) http.Handler{
middleware.RequestID,
@@ -889,6 +937,7 @@ func preflightSCEPChallengePassword(enabled bool, challengePassword string) erro
// Dispatch rules (M-001, audit 2026-04-19, option D):
//
// - /health, /ready, /api/v1/auth/info → no-auth (probes + login detection)
// - /api/v1/version → no-auth (U-3 ride-along: build identity for rollout/probes)
// - /.well-known/pki/* → no-auth (RFC 5280 CRL, RFC 6960 OCSP)
// - /.well-known/est/* → no-auth (RFC 7030 §3.2.3)
// - /scep, /scep/* → no-auth (RFC 8894 §3.2, CSR challengePassword)
@@ -914,10 +963,12 @@ func buildFinalHandler(apiHandler, noAuthHandler http.Handler, webDir string, da
return http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
path := r.URL.Path
// Health/ready and auth/info bypass auth middleware.
// Health/ready, auth/info, and version bypass auth middleware.
// Health/ready: Docker/K8s health probes don't carry Bearer tokens.
// auth/info: React app calls this before login to detect auth mode.
if path == "/health" || path == "/ready" || path == "/api/v1/auth/info" {
// version: U-3 ride-along (cat-u-no_version_endpoint) — rollout
// systems and blackbox probes need build identity without a key.
if path == "/health" || path == "/ready" || path == "/api/v1/auth/info" || path == "/api/v1/version" {
noAuthHandler.ServeHTTP(w, r)
return
}
+16 -4
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@@ -7,8 +7,20 @@
# To start fresh (wipe previous data):
# docker compose -f docker-compose.yml -f docker-compose.demo.yml down -v
# docker compose -f docker-compose.yml -f docker-compose.demo.yml up --build
#
# U-3 (P1, cat-u-seed_initdb_schema_drift): pre-U-3 this overlay mounted
# `seed_demo.sql` into postgres `/docker-entrypoint-initdb.d/`. That worked
# only because the production stack also mounted the migrations there, so
# the schema existed at initdb time. Once U-3 dropped the production
# initdb mounts (single source of truth: server runs RunMigrations + RunSeed
# at boot), the demo seed could no longer be applied at initdb time — the
# tables it references wouldn't exist yet.
#
# Post-U-3 the demo overlay just sets CERTCTL_DEMO_SEED=true; the server
# applies seed_demo.sql at boot via postgres.RunDemoSeed AFTER baseline
# migrations + seed.sql are in place. Same single source of truth, no
# initdb mounts, no schema-vs-seed drift.
services:
postgres:
volumes:
- ../migrations/seed_demo.sql:/docker-entrypoint-initdb.d/030_seed_demo.sql
certctl-server:
environment:
CERTCTL_DEMO_SEED: "true"
+12 -13
View File
@@ -93,6 +93,17 @@ services:
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Database
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
#
# U-3 (P1, cat-u-seed_initdb_schema_drift, GitHub #10): the test stack used
# to mount a hand-curated subset of migrations + seed.sql + a never-checked-in
# seed_test.sql into postgres `/docker-entrypoint-initdb.d/`. Same hazard as
# the production compose — initdb crashed any time a new migration shipped
# that the seed depended on without the mount list being updated. Post-U-3
# the schema is built EXCLUSIVELY by the server at startup via
# internal/repository/postgres.RunMigrations + RunSeed. Postgres comes up
# empty and the server lands the full ladder + baseline seed in one shot.
# `start_period: 30s` matches the production compose and shields slow CI
# runners from healthcheck flap during initdb.
postgres:
image: postgres:16-alpine
container_name: certctl-test-postgres
@@ -102,19 +113,6 @@ services:
POSTGRES_PASSWORD: testpass
volumes:
- test_postgres_data:/var/lib/postgresql/data
- ../migrations/000001_initial_schema.up.sql:/docker-entrypoint-initdb.d/001_schema.sql
- ../migrations/000002_agent_metadata.up.sql:/docker-entrypoint-initdb.d/002_agent_metadata.sql
- ../migrations/000003_certificate_profiles.up.sql:/docker-entrypoint-initdb.d/003_certificate_profiles.sql
- ../migrations/000004_agent_groups.up.sql:/docker-entrypoint-initdb.d/004_agent_groups.sql
- ../migrations/000005_revocation.up.sql:/docker-entrypoint-initdb.d/005_revocation.sql
- ../migrations/000006_discovery.up.sql:/docker-entrypoint-initdb.d/006_discovery.sql
- ../migrations/000007_network_discovery.up.sql:/docker-entrypoint-initdb.d/007_network_discovery.sql
- ../migrations/000008_verification.up.sql:/docker-entrypoint-initdb.d/008_verification.sql
- ../migrations/000009_issuer_config.up.sql:/docker-entrypoint-initdb.d/009_issuer_config.sql
- ../migrations/000010_target_config.up.sql:/docker-entrypoint-initdb.d/010_target_config.sql
- ../migrations/seed.sql:/docker-entrypoint-initdb.d/020_seed.sql
- ../migrations/seed_test.sql:/docker-entrypoint-initdb.d/025_seed_test.sql
# No seed_demo.sql — start with a clean database for real testing
networks:
certctl-test:
ipv4_address: 10.30.50.2
@@ -125,6 +123,7 @@ services:
interval: 5s
timeout: 5s
retries: 5
start_period: 30s
restart: unless-stopped
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+29 -11
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@@ -53,6 +53,29 @@ services:
- certctl-network
# PostgreSQL database
#
# U-3 (P1, cat-u-seed_initdb_schema_drift, GitHub #10):
# Pre-U-3 this stack mounted a hand-curated subset of `migrations/*.up.sql`
# plus `seed.sql` into `/docker-entrypoint-initdb.d/`, and postgres
# initdb-applied them on first boot. The mount list rotted every time a
# new migration shipped that the seed depended on (000013 added
# policy_rules.severity, 000017 renames retry_interval_minutes, etc.) —
# initdb crashed, the container reported `unhealthy` indefinitely, and
# `docker compose -f deploy/docker-compose.yml up -d --build` from a
# fresh clone of v2.0.50 hit it on the first try.
#
# Post-U-3 the schema is built EXCLUSIVELY by the server at startup via
# internal/repository/postgres.RunMigrations + RunSeed. Single source of
# truth, no list to keep in sync. Postgres comes up empty; the server
# waits for it healthy, then applies the full migration ladder + seed in
# one shot. Helm + the dev examples were already runtime-only (Path B)
# and worked through the same window.
#
# `start_period: 30s` gives postgres room to bootstrap on slow runners
# (CI macOS, low-spec laptops) before the healthcheck failure counter
# starts ticking. Pre-U-3 a slow first-init combined with the
# `unhealthy` flap to cascade into certctl-server's `service_healthy`
# depends_on, blocking the whole stack.
postgres:
image: postgres:16-alpine
container_name: certctl-postgres
@@ -64,17 +87,6 @@ services:
- "5432:5432"
volumes:
- postgres_data:/var/lib/postgresql/data
- ../migrations/000001_initial_schema.up.sql:/docker-entrypoint-initdb.d/001_schema.sql
- ../migrations/000002_agent_metadata.up.sql:/docker-entrypoint-initdb.d/002_agent_metadata.sql
- ../migrations/000003_certificate_profiles.up.sql:/docker-entrypoint-initdb.d/003_certificate_profiles.sql
- ../migrations/000004_agent_groups.up.sql:/docker-entrypoint-initdb.d/004_agent_groups.sql
- ../migrations/000005_revocation.up.sql:/docker-entrypoint-initdb.d/005_revocation.sql
- ../migrations/000006_discovery.up.sql:/docker-entrypoint-initdb.d/006_discovery.sql
- ../migrations/000007_network_discovery.up.sql:/docker-entrypoint-initdb.d/007_network_discovery.sql
- ../migrations/000008_verification.up.sql:/docker-entrypoint-initdb.d/008_verification.sql
- ../migrations/000009_issuer_config.up.sql:/docker-entrypoint-initdb.d/009_issuer_config.sql
- ../migrations/000010_target_config.up.sql:/docker-entrypoint-initdb.d/010_target_config.sql
- ../migrations/seed.sql:/docker-entrypoint-initdb.d/020_seed.sql
networks:
- certctl-network
healthcheck:
@@ -82,6 +94,7 @@ services:
interval: 5s
timeout: 5s
retries: 5
start_period: 30s
restart: unless-stopped
# Certctl Server (API + scheduler)
@@ -127,6 +140,11 @@ services:
interval: 10s
timeout: 5s
retries: 5
# U-3: server boot now does RunMigrations + RunSeed before listening on
# 8443. On a fresh clone the full migration ladder + seed application
# can take ~10s on a small VM; start_period prevents the first few
# healthcheck attempts from counting as failures while that work runs.
start_period: 30s
restart: unless-stopped
logging:
driver: "json-file"
+1 -1
View File
@@ -353,7 +353,7 @@ The ER diagram above documents **database shape**, not REST-API wire shape. Seve
- `agents.api_key_hash` — SHA-256 of the agent's plaintext API key, populated by `service.RegisterAgent` (`hashAPIKey(apiKey)` at `internal/service/agent.go`) and consumed by `repository.AgentRepository::GetByAPIKey` for the auth-lookup. **Not** exposed via the REST API, **not** echoed via CLI / MCP / agent registration response, **never** logged. Enforced by `internal/domain/connector.go::Agent.MarshalJSON` (G-2 audit closure, `cat-s5-apikey_leak`); the OpenAPI Agent schema explicitly excludes the field, the frontend `Agent` interface omits it, and a CI grep guardrail at `.github/workflows/ci.yml` blocks reintroduction.
- `issuers.config` / `deployment_targets.config` — plaintext jsonb shadow of the AES-GCM-encrypted on-disk blob; the encrypted form lives on `EncryptedConfig []byte` (Go-only field tagged `json:"-"`).
Migrations are idempotent (`IF NOT EXISTS` on all CREATE statements, `ON CONFLICT (id) DO NOTHING` on all seed data) so they're safe to run multiple times — important for Docker Compose where both initdb and the server may run the same SQL.
Migrations are idempotent (`IF NOT EXISTS` on all CREATE statements, `ON CONFLICT (id) DO NOTHING` on all seed data) so they're safe to run multiple times. Pre-U-3 (`cat-u-seed_initdb_schema_drift`, GitHub #10) the deploy compose stack mounted both a hand-curated subset of `migrations/*.up.sql` and `seed.sql` into postgres `/docker-entrypoint-initdb.d/` so initdb applied them on first boot, *and* the server re-applied the same files via `RunMigrations` on every start. The dual source of truth was the bug: every time a migration shipped that the seed depended on (e.g., 000013 added `policy_rules.severity`), the mount list had to be updated by hand, and missing the update crashed initdb on first boot. Post-U-3 the server is the single source of truth: postgres comes up with an empty schema, `RunMigrations` applies the entire ladder, then `RunSeed` lands the baseline seed (and `RunDemoSeed` lands the demo overlay when `CERTCTL_DEMO_SEED=true`). Helm has used this pattern since day one (postgres-init `emptyDir`); the docker-compose deploy now matches.
## Data Flow: Certificate Lifecycle
+158
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,158 @@
package handler
import (
"net/http"
"runtime"
"runtime/debug"
)
// VersionHandler exposes the running server's build identity at
// /api/v1/version. U-3 ride-along (cat-u-no_version_endpoint, P2): pre-U-3
// there was no in-band way for an operator (or an automated rollout system)
// to ask "what version of certctl is this binary?" — they had to either read
// the container image tag externally or trust whatever the README said. The
// gap matters for the same operability story U-3 closes: when fresh-clone
// quickstarts fail, the very first question is "what code did I actually
// build", and the only honest answer needs to come from the binary itself.
//
// VersionInfo is populated from three sources, in priority order:
//
// 1. The Version field — typically supplied at build time via
// `-ldflags='-X github.com/shankar0123/certctl/internal/api/handler.Version=v2.0.50'`.
// Production releases set this from the git tag (see release.yml).
//
// 2. runtime/debug.ReadBuildInfo() — populated by Go 1.18+ for any binary
// built from a module. Provides the VCS commit SHA, dirty flag, and
// build timestamp. We read these fields directly so a `go build` from a
// working tree (no -ldflags incantation) still produces a useful
// /api/v1/version payload — the failure mode pre-U-3 was that everything
// looked like "dev" everywhere, which made "is the bug fixed in this
// binary" unanswerable.
//
// 3. Static fallbacks ("dev" / "unknown") — only reached when neither
// ldflags nor build-info are populated, which in practice means
// `go run` from a non-VCS-tracked workspace.
//
// The handler runs through the no-auth bypass dispatch in cmd/server/main.go
// so probes and rollout systems can query it without presenting Bearer
// credentials, mirroring how /health and /ready are reachable. Audit logging
// excludes /api/v1/version for the same reason — the path is hot under
// rollout polling and would otherwise dominate the audit trail.
type VersionHandler struct{}
// Version is overridden at build time via:
//
// -ldflags='-X github.com/shankar0123/certctl/internal/api/handler.Version=<tag>'
//
// release.yml does this for the server container and CLI/agent binaries.
// The empty default (rather than "dev") lets the Handler fall back to the
// runtime/debug VCS revision when ldflags wasn't supplied — preferable to
// returning a literal "dev" that masks the actual git SHA the binary was
// built from.
var Version = ""
// NewVersionHandler returns a value (not a pointer) to match the
// HealthHandler convention — the handler holds no mutable state and is
// safe to copy.
func NewVersionHandler() VersionHandler {
return VersionHandler{}
}
// VersionInfo is the JSON shape returned by GET /api/v1/version.
//
// Field ordering and tag names are part of the contract — operator tooling
// (k8s rollout checks, CI smoke tests, /api/v1/version Prometheus blackbox
// probes) parses this payload and must continue to work across releases.
// Don't rename a field without an OpenAPI bump and a deprecation cycle.
type VersionInfo struct {
// Version is the human-readable release identifier (e.g. "v2.0.50").
// Falls back to the VCS revision when ldflags wasn't set, and to "dev"
// when the build wasn't VCS-tracked at all.
Version string `json:"version"`
// Commit is the git SHA of HEAD at build time, sourced from
// runtime/debug.BuildInfo.Settings["vcs.revision"]. Empty string when
// the binary was built outside a VCS-tracked workspace (rare —
// `go build` from a tarball does this).
Commit string `json:"commit"`
// Modified reports whether the build had uncommitted changes
// (debug.BuildInfo.Settings["vcs.modified"]). True for developer
// builds, false for release builds out of CI.
Modified bool `json:"modified"`
// BuildTime is the RFC 3339 timestamp captured at build time
// (debug.BuildInfo.Settings["vcs.time"]). Empty when not VCS-tracked.
BuildTime string `json:"build_time"`
// GoVersion is the Go toolchain version that compiled the binary
// (runtime.Version, e.g. "go1.25.9"). Useful when triaging stdlib
// behavior differences ("the deploy that broke was on 1.24, this one
// is on 1.25").
GoVersion string `json:"go_version"`
}
// readBuildInfo extracts the VCS settings from debug.BuildInfo and pairs
// them with the ldflags-supplied Version. Split out from ServeHTTP so the
// handler can be unit-tested by injecting synthetic BuildInfo (see
// version_handler_test.go) without depending on the test binary's actual
// debug info.
//
// debug.ReadBuildInfo returns ok=false when the binary was built without
// module info — extremely rare for a Go 1.18+ build, but we guard it so
// the handler degrades to "dev / unknown / runtime.Version()" instead of
// nil-deref panicking.
func readBuildInfo() VersionInfo {
info := VersionInfo{
Version: Version,
GoVersion: runtime.Version(),
}
bi, ok := debug.ReadBuildInfo()
if !ok {
// Pre-Go 1.18 binary or a stripped build with no buildinfo segment.
// Both are pathological in 2026 but worth the two-line guard.
if info.Version == "" {
info.Version = "dev"
}
return info
}
for _, s := range bi.Settings {
switch s.Key {
case "vcs.revision":
info.Commit = s.Value
case "vcs.modified":
// debug.BuildInfo encodes this as the literal string "true" or
// "false"; comparing to "true" is the canonical pattern (mirrors
// how the standard library's own version sub-command parses it).
info.Modified = s.Value == "true"
case "vcs.time":
info.BuildTime = s.Value
}
}
// Fallback ladder for Version: ldflags > VCS commit > "dev". The git
// SHA is more useful than "dev" because it's at least groundable — an
// operator can `git show <sha>` to see what code is actually running.
if info.Version == "" {
if info.Commit != "" {
info.Version = info.Commit
} else {
info.Version = "dev"
}
}
return info
}
// ServeHTTP implements http.Handler. Returns the VersionInfo payload as
// JSON with a 200 status. GET-only — any other method returns 405, matching
// the HealthHandler convention.
func (h VersionHandler) ServeHTTP(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
if r.Method != http.MethodGet {
http.Error(w, "Method not allowed", http.StatusMethodNotAllowed)
return
}
JSON(w, http.StatusOK, readBuildInfo())
}
@@ -0,0 +1,108 @@
package handler
import (
"encoding/json"
"net/http"
"net/http/httptest"
"runtime"
"strings"
"testing"
)
// TestVersion_ReturnsBuildInfo is the regression for the U-3 ride-along
// cat-u-no_version_endpoint (P2). Three behaviors must hold for the
// endpoint to be useful in operator tooling:
//
// 1. GET /api/v1/version returns 200 with a JSON body that decodes into
// the documented VersionInfo shape — the wire contract that rollout
// systems and Prometheus blackbox probes parse.
// 2. The Go runtime version always populates (runtime.Version() can never
// return empty), so consumers can always answer "which Go did this
// binary compile with" even when ldflags / VCS info are missing.
// 3. The Version field is never empty — the fallback ladder
// (ldflags > VCS commit > "dev") guarantees a non-empty string so
// consumers don't have to special-case absent values.
//
// We don't pin the exact Version value because it depends on whether the
// test binary was built with -ldflags or under `go test`, both of which
// the handler must tolerate. The "no empty string" check is the
// behavioral contract.
func TestVersion_ReturnsBuildInfo(t *testing.T) {
h := NewVersionHandler()
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/api/v1/version", nil)
rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
h.ServeHTTP(rec, req)
if rec.Code != http.StatusOK {
t.Fatalf("status = %d, want 200", rec.Code)
}
contentType := rec.Header().Get("Content-Type")
if !strings.HasPrefix(contentType, "application/json") {
t.Errorf("Content-Type = %q, want application/json prefix (operator tooling parses JSON)", contentType)
}
var got VersionInfo
if err := json.NewDecoder(rec.Body).Decode(&got); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("response body did not decode into VersionInfo: %v\nbody: %s", err, rec.Body.String())
}
// Version must never be empty — the fallback ladder in readBuildInfo
// guarantees this. An empty Version would force every downstream
// consumer (k8s rollouts, Prometheus blackbox, the support tooling)
// to special-case the missing value, which defeats the point of
// /api/v1/version existing.
if got.Version == "" {
t.Error("Version is empty — the fallback ladder (ldflags > VCS commit > 'dev') must guarantee a non-empty value")
}
// GoVersion must equal runtime.Version() — the handler reads it
// directly and cannot be subverted by ldflags or BuildInfo. This is
// the one field that should always be ground-truth.
if got.GoVersion != runtime.Version() {
t.Errorf("GoVersion = %q, want %q (must come straight from runtime.Version())",
got.GoVersion, runtime.Version())
}
}
// TestVersion_RejectsNonGet pins the GET-only contract. /api/v1/version
// is read-only build identity; POST/PUT/DELETE etc. are nonsensical and
// should return 405 like the HealthHandler does. Operator tooling that
// fat-fingers the verb gets a clear error rather than a confusing 200
// from the wrong code path.
func TestVersion_RejectsNonGet(t *testing.T) {
h := NewVersionHandler()
for _, method := range []string{
http.MethodPost, http.MethodPut, http.MethodDelete, http.MethodPatch,
} {
req := httptest.NewRequest(method, "/api/v1/version", nil)
rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
h.ServeHTTP(rec, req)
if rec.Code != http.StatusMethodNotAllowed {
t.Errorf("%s /api/v1/version → status %d, want 405", method, rec.Code)
}
}
}
// TestVersion_LdflagsOverride locks in the priority order: when the
// build-time Version variable is non-empty (e.g. "v2.0.50" injected by
// release.yml), readBuildInfo MUST surface that value verbatim and not
// silently substitute the VCS commit. The release-pipeline contract
// depends on this — a release tagged v2.0.50 should report "v2.0.50",
// not the underlying SHA.
//
// We achieve test isolation by save/restore on the package-level Version
// variable; t.Cleanup ensures parallel/subsequent tests see the original.
func TestVersion_LdflagsOverride(t *testing.T) {
original := Version
t.Cleanup(func() { Version = original })
Version = "v2.0.50-test"
got := readBuildInfo()
if got.Version != "v2.0.50-test" {
t.Errorf("Version = %q, want %q (ldflags-supplied Version must take priority over VCS fallback)",
got.Version, "v2.0.50-test")
}
}
+16
View File
@@ -68,6 +68,11 @@ type HandlerRegistry struct {
HealthChecks *handler.HealthCheckHandler
BulkRevocation handler.BulkRevocationHandler
RenewalPolicies handler.RenewalPolicyHandler
// Version handles GET /api/v1/version (U-3 ride-along,
// cat-u-no_version_endpoint). Wired through the no-auth dispatch in
// cmd/server/main.go so probes and rollout systems can read build
// identity without Bearer credentials. See handler/version.go.
Version handler.VersionHandler
}
// RegisterHandlers sets up all API routes with their handlers.
@@ -89,6 +94,17 @@ func (r *Router) RegisterHandlers(reg HandlerRegistry) {
middleware.CORS,
middleware.ContentType,
))
// Version endpoint (no auth middleware — used by rollout probes that
// don't carry Bearer tokens; the dispatch layer in cmd/server/main.go
// also routes /api/v1/version through the no-auth chain). U-3 ride-along
// (cat-u-no_version_endpoint, P2). The handler reads
// runtime/debug.BuildInfo for VCS attribution; ldflags-supplied Version
// is preferred when present.
r.mux.Handle("GET /api/v1/version", middleware.Chain(
reg.Version,
middleware.CORS,
middleware.ContentType,
))
// Auth check endpoint (uses full middleware chain via r.Register)
r.Register("GET /api/v1/auth/check", http.HandlerFunc(reg.Health.AuthCheck))
+11
View File
@@ -709,6 +709,16 @@ type DatabaseConfig struct {
URL string
MaxConnections int
MigrationsPath string
// DemoSeed, when true, makes the server apply
// `<MigrationsPath>/seed_demo.sql` after the baseline `seed.sql`. Set
// via CERTCTL_DEMO_SEED. The compose demo overlay
// (deploy/docker-compose.demo.yml) sets this to keep the demo path
// alive after U-3 dropped initdb-mounted seed files. The seed file
// uses ON CONFLICT (id) DO NOTHING so re-running on a populated
// database is safe; missing-file is a no-op (returns nil) so a
// minimal-image deploy that strips seed_demo.sql still boots cleanly.
DemoSeed bool
}
// SchedulerConfig contains scheduler timing configuration.
@@ -921,6 +931,7 @@ func Load() (*Config, error) {
URL: getEnv("CERTCTL_DATABASE_URL", "postgres://localhost/certctl"),
MaxConnections: getEnvInt("CERTCTL_DATABASE_MAX_CONNS", 25),
MigrationsPath: getEnv("CERTCTL_DATABASE_MIGRATIONS_PATH", "./migrations"),
DemoSeed: getEnvBool("CERTCTL_DEMO_SEED", false),
},
Scheduler: SchedulerConfig{
RenewalCheckInterval: getEnvDuration("CERTCTL_SCHEDULER_RENEWAL_CHECK_INTERVAL", 1*time.Hour),
+108
View File
@@ -131,3 +131,111 @@ func RunMigrations(db *sql.DB, migrationsPath string) error {
return nil
}
// RunSeed reads and executes the baseline seed SQL file from the migrations
// directory. Designed to run AFTER RunMigrations so every column referenced by
// the seed is already in place.
//
// U-3 (P1, cat-u-seed_initdb_schema_drift): pre-U-3 the deploy compose stack
// mounted both a hand-curated subset of `migrations/*.up.sql` and `seed.sql`
// into postgres `/docker-entrypoint-initdb.d/`. Postgres applied them at
// initdb time. When `seed.sql` was updated to reference columns added by
// migrations *after* the mounted cutoff (e.g., `policy_rules.severity` from
// `000013_policy_rule_severity.up.sql`), initdb crashed during the seed step
// and the container was reported `unhealthy` indefinitely — bare
// `docker compose -f deploy/docker-compose.yml up -d --build` from a fresh
// clone of v2.0.50 hit this on the first try (GitHub #10 reopened by
// mikeakasully). Helm and the example compose files were already runtime-
// only (Path B) and worked through the same window.
//
// Post-U-3 the compose stack drops all initdb mounts; postgres comes up with
// an empty schema; the server applies all migrations via RunMigrations and
// then this function applies the seed. Single source of truth, removes the
// drift hazard architecturally.
//
// The seed file is expected at `<migrationsPath>/seed.sql`. Missing-file is
// treated as a no-op (returns nil) so deployments that explicitly remove the
// seed (custom packaging, cert-manager managed schemas) don't break.
//
// Idempotency: every INSERT in the shipped seed.sql uses
// `ON CONFLICT (id) DO NOTHING`, so re-running on a populated DB is safe.
// This function is invoked on every server start, so the contract MUST hold.
//
// Demo seed: `seed_demo.sql` is applied separately by RunDemoSeed below
// when CERTCTL_DEMO_SEED=true (see internal/config/config.go::DemoSeed).
// Splitting demo from baseline keeps a default deploy from accidentally
// landing 90-days-of-fake-history into a real customer database, while
// still giving the demo overlay a single source of truth (no more initdb
// mounts). The demo seed itself uses ON CONFLICT (id) DO NOTHING so it's
// idempotent; missing-file is also tolerated (custom packaging may strip
// seed_demo.sql to shrink the image).
func RunSeed(db *sql.DB, migrationsPath string) error {
if _, err := os.Stat(migrationsPath); os.IsNotExist(err) {
return fmt.Errorf("migrations directory not found: %s", migrationsPath)
}
seedPath := filepath.Join(migrationsPath, "seed.sql")
content, err := os.ReadFile(seedPath)
if err != nil {
if os.IsNotExist(err) {
// Missing seed.sql is acceptable — operators may have removed it
// for custom-packaging reasons. Return nil rather than fail-loud.
return nil
}
return fmt.Errorf("failed to read seed file %s: %w", seedPath, err)
}
if _, err := db.Exec(string(content)); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("failed to execute seed file %s: %w", seedPath, err)
}
return nil
}
// RunDemoSeed applies the demo overlay seed file
// (`<migrationsPath>/seed_demo.sql`) on top of the baseline seed.
//
// U-3 follow-on: pre-U-3 the demo overlay mounted `seed_demo.sql` into
// postgres `/docker-entrypoint-initdb.d/` and relied on initdb to apply it
// alongside the schema. Once U-3 dropped the initdb migration mounts, that
// path stopped working — postgres comes up empty, and the demo seed
// references tables (issuers, certificates, etc.) that wouldn't exist yet
// at initdb time. RunDemoSeed restores the demo capability through the
// same runtime path RunSeed uses, gated by CERTCTL_DEMO_SEED so production
// deploys never accidentally land the fake-history rows.
//
// Order contract: must run AFTER RunSeed so foreign-key references from
// demo rows to baseline rows (e.g., demo certificates referencing
// `rp-default` from baseline) resolve cleanly. The caller in
// cmd/server/main.go enforces this order.
//
// Missing-file is acceptable (returns nil) — operators packaging a
// production-only image often strip seed_demo.sql to shrink the artifact,
// and that should not break boot when CERTCTL_DEMO_SEED happens to be set.
//
// Idempotency: every INSERT in seed_demo.sql uses
// `ON CONFLICT (id) DO NOTHING`, so re-running on a populated DB is safe.
// Server restarts in demo mode therefore re-apply the file harmlessly.
func RunDemoSeed(db *sql.DB, migrationsPath string) error {
if _, err := os.Stat(migrationsPath); os.IsNotExist(err) {
return fmt.Errorf("migrations directory not found: %s", migrationsPath)
}
seedPath := filepath.Join(migrationsPath, "seed_demo.sql")
content, err := os.ReadFile(seedPath)
if err != nil {
if os.IsNotExist(err) {
// Custom production packaging frequently strips this file.
// Fail-soft to preserve the U-3 contract: a missing seed file
// must not gate server boot.
return nil
}
return fmt.Errorf("failed to read demo seed file %s: %w", seedPath, err)
}
if _, err := db.Exec(string(content)); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("failed to execute demo seed file %s: %w", seedPath, err)
}
return nil
}
+37 -11
View File
@@ -22,19 +22,37 @@ func NewNotificationRepository(db *sql.DB) *NotificationRepository {
return &NotificationRepository{db: db}
}
// Create stores a new notification
// Create stores a new notification.
//
// U-3 ride-along (cat-o-notification_created_at_dead_field, P2): the
// `created_at` column is added to notification_events by migration 000017.
// Pre-U-3 the Go domain.NotificationEvent had a CreatedAt field but the
// INSERT path never set it AND no DB column existed — the JSON API
// serialised the field as `0001-01-01T00:00:00Z`, breaking timestamp
// ordering on operator dashboards and any consumer that filtered by age.
// Post-U-3 the column exists with a NOT NULL DEFAULT NOW() backstop, and
// this INSERT explicitly sets it from the domain field. If the caller
// hasn't populated CreatedAt (zero-value time.Time) we substitute
// time.Now() so the row never carries the placeholder zero-time forward
// — the DEFAULT would handle this too, but emitting the value explicitly
// keeps the wire-level JSON consistent with what the row will hold once
// scanNotification reads it back, and prevents a clock-skew gap between
// "Go computed CreatedAt" and "DB applied DEFAULT NOW()" on the read path.
func (r *NotificationRepository) Create(ctx context.Context, notif *domain.NotificationEvent) error {
if notif.ID == "" {
notif.ID = uuid.New().String()
}
if notif.CreatedAt.IsZero() {
notif.CreatedAt = time.Now()
}
err := r.db.QueryRowContext(ctx, `
INSERT INTO notification_events (
id, type, certificate_id, channel, recipient, message, sent_at, status, error
) VALUES ($1, $2, $3, $4, $5, $6, $7, $8, $9)
id, type, certificate_id, channel, recipient, message, sent_at, status, error, created_at
) VALUES ($1, $2, $3, $4, $5, $6, $7, $8, $9, $10)
RETURNING id
`, notif.ID, notif.Type, notif.CertificateID, notif.Channel, notif.Recipient,
notif.Message, notif.SentAt, notif.Status, notif.Error).Scan(&notif.ID)
notif.Message, notif.SentAt, notif.Status, notif.Error, notif.CreatedAt).Scan(&notif.ID)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("failed to create notification: %w", err)
@@ -102,12 +120,14 @@ func (r *NotificationRepository) List(ctx context.Context, filter *repository.No
// Get paginated results. I-005 extends the SELECT with the three retry
// columns (retry_count / next_retry_at / last_error) so scanNotification
// can populate the new fields on domain.NotificationEvent. The column
// order here MUST stay in lockstep with scanNotification below.
// can populate the new fields on domain.NotificationEvent. U-3 extends
// it once more with `created_at` (column added by migration 000017) so
// the field is no longer serialized as 0001-01-01. The column order
// here MUST stay in lockstep with scanNotification below.
offset := (filter.Page - 1) * filter.PerPage
query := fmt.Sprintf(`
SELECT id, type, certificate_id, channel, recipient, message, sent_at, status, error,
retry_count, next_retry_at, last_error
retry_count, next_retry_at, last_error, created_at
FROM notification_events
%s
ORDER BY sent_at DESC NULLS LAST
@@ -162,8 +182,14 @@ func (r *NotificationRepository) UpdateStatus(ctx context.Context, id string, st
// scanNotification scans a notification from a row or rows.
//
// I-005 extends the scan list from 9 → 12 columns (adds retry_count,
// next_retry_at, last_error). Every caller — List and the four new retry
// I-005 extended the scan list from 9 → 12 columns (adds retry_count,
// next_retry_at, last_error). U-3 extends it once more to 13 columns by
// appending `created_at` (column added by migration 000017,
// cat-o-notification_created_at_dead_field). CreatedAt scans into a
// non-pointer time.Time because the migration declares the column
// NOT NULL with DEFAULT NOW().
//
// Every caller — List, ListRetryEligible, and the four other I-005 retry
// methods below — funnels rows through this helper, so the SELECT column
// order in every query must match the Scan order here exactly. RetryCount
// scans into an `int` (migration 000016 declares the column NOT NULL with
@@ -176,7 +202,7 @@ func scanNotification(scanner interface {
var notif domain.NotificationEvent
err := scanner.Scan(&notif.ID, &notif.Type, &notif.CertificateID, &notif.Channel,
&notif.Recipient, &notif.Message, &notif.SentAt, &notif.Status, &notif.Error,
&notif.RetryCount, &notif.NextRetryAt, &notif.LastError)
&notif.RetryCount, &notif.NextRetryAt, &notif.LastError, &notif.CreatedAt)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to scan notification: %w", err)
@@ -248,7 +274,7 @@ func (r *NotificationRepository) ListRetryEligible(ctx context.Context, now time
rows, err := r.db.QueryContext(ctx, `
SELECT id, type, certificate_id, channel, recipient, message, sent_at, status, error,
retry_count, next_retry_at, last_error
retry_count, next_retry_at, last_error, created_at
FROM notification_events
WHERE status = 'failed'
AND next_retry_at IS NOT NULL
@@ -339,6 +339,95 @@ func TestNotificationRepository_Requeue(t *testing.T) {
}
}
// TestNotificationRepository_CreatedAt_IsPersisted is the U-3 ride-along
// regression for cat-o-notification_created_at_dead_field. Pre-U-3 the
// Go domain.NotificationEvent had a CreatedAt field but the DB had no
// column — JSON serialisation produced 0001-01-01T00:00:00Z, breaking
// timestamp ordering on operator dashboards. Post-U-3 migration 000017
// adds the column NOT NULL DEFAULT NOW(), Create populates it, and
// scanNotification reads it back.
//
// The contract under test is round-trip equivalence: the timestamp the
// caller sets goes into the DB and comes back out unchanged (modulo
// PostgreSQL's microsecond precision). Truncate to microseconds before
// comparing because TIMESTAMPTZ rounds nanoseconds away.
func TestNotificationRepository_CreatedAt_IsPersisted(t *testing.T) {
tdb := getTestDB(t)
db := tdb.freshSchema(t)
repo := postgres.NewNotificationRepository(db)
ctx := context.Background()
// A specific, recognisable timestamp. Truncated to microseconds so
// the post-roundtrip equality assertion isn't tripped up by Postgres
// dropping the nanosecond tail.
want := time.Now().UTC().Add(-2 * time.Hour).Truncate(time.Microsecond)
notif := &domain.NotificationEvent{
Type: domain.NotificationTypeExpirationWarning,
Channel: domain.NotificationChannelWebhook,
Recipient: "https://hooks.example.com/u3",
Message: "U-3 round-trip witness",
Status: string(domain.NotificationStatusPending),
CreatedAt: want,
}
if err := repo.Create(ctx, notif); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Create failed: %v", err)
}
// Re-read via List (which goes through scanNotification) so we're
// testing both the INSERT and SELECT halves of the U-3 plumbing.
got, err := repo.List(ctx, nil)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("List failed: %v", err)
}
if len(got) != 1 {
t.Fatalf("List returned %d rows, want 1", len(got))
}
if !got[0].CreatedAt.Equal(want) {
t.Errorf("CreatedAt round-trip mismatch:\n set: %v\n got: %v\n"+
"Pre-U-3 this would have come back as 0001-01-01 because the column didn't exist.",
want, got[0].CreatedAt)
}
}
// TestNotificationRepository_CreatedAt_DefaultsToNow verifies the helper
// behavior in Create: when the caller hands over an event with the
// zero-value CreatedAt, Create substitutes time.Now() rather than
// trusting the DB DEFAULT. This keeps wire-level JSON consistent with
// what the row will hold once it's read back, and avoids a clock-skew
// gap between "Go computed the timestamp" and "DB applied DEFAULT NOW()".
func TestNotificationRepository_CreatedAt_DefaultsToNow(t *testing.T) {
tdb := getTestDB(t)
db := tdb.freshSchema(t)
repo := postgres.NewNotificationRepository(db)
ctx := context.Background()
before := time.Now().UTC().Add(-time.Second)
notif := &domain.NotificationEvent{
Type: domain.NotificationTypeExpirationWarning,
Channel: domain.NotificationChannelWebhook,
Recipient: "https://hooks.example.com/zerotime",
Message: "U-3 zero-time fallback",
Status: string(domain.NotificationStatusPending),
// CreatedAt left zero on purpose — the contract is that Create
// fills it in from time.Now() when it's unset.
}
if err := repo.Create(ctx, notif); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Create failed: %v", err)
}
after := time.Now().UTC().Add(time.Second)
if notif.CreatedAt.IsZero() {
t.Fatalf("CreatedAt is still zero after Create — the fallback in NotificationRepository.Create did not fire")
}
if notif.CreatedAt.Before(before) || notif.CreatedAt.After(after) {
t.Errorf("CreatedAt = %v is outside the [%v, %v] window — the substituted time.Now() should fall inside the test's wall-clock bracket",
notif.CreatedAt, before, after)
}
}
// ─── Helpers ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
// past returns a stable "5 minutes ago" time for fixture seeding. Truncated
@@ -36,7 +36,7 @@ func NewRenewalPolicyRepository(db *sql.DB) *RenewalPolicyRepository {
// and require domain-layer churn we're not taking on in this change.
const renewalPolicyColumns = `
id, name, renewal_window_days, auto_renew, max_retries,
retry_interval_minutes, alert_thresholds_days, created_at, updated_at
retry_interval_seconds, alert_thresholds_days, created_at, updated_at
`
// scanRenewalPolicy decodes one renewal_policies row from a Row or Rows
@@ -170,7 +170,7 @@ func (r *RenewalPolicyRepository) Create(ctx context.Context, policy *domain.Ren
insertSQL := `
INSERT INTO renewal_policies (
id, name, renewal_window_days, auto_renew, max_retries,
retry_interval_minutes, alert_thresholds_days, created_at, updated_at
retry_interval_seconds, alert_thresholds_days, created_at, updated_at
) VALUES ($1, $2, $3, $4, $5, $6, $7, NOW(), NOW())
RETURNING ` + renewalPolicyColumns
@@ -240,7 +240,7 @@ func (r *RenewalPolicyRepository) Update(ctx context.Context, id string, policy
renewal_window_days = $3,
auto_renew = $4,
max_retries = $5,
retry_interval_minutes = $6,
retry_interval_seconds = $6,
alert_thresholds_days = $7,
updated_at = NOW()
WHERE id = $1
@@ -45,7 +45,7 @@ func TestRenewalPolicyRepository_CRUD(t *testing.T) {
RenewalWindowDays: 30,
AutoRenew: true,
MaxRetries: 5,
RetryInterval: 3600, // stored in retry_interval_minutes column; passthrough
RetryInterval: 3600, // stored as seconds in retry_interval_seconds column (renamed in 000017_db_coupling_cleanup, U-3)
AlertThresholdsDays: []int{30, 14, 7, 0},
}
+1 -1
View File
@@ -78,7 +78,7 @@ func insertCertPrereqsRaw(t *testing.T, db *sql.DB, ctx context.Context, suffix
}
// Create renewal policy
_, err = db.ExecContext(ctx, `INSERT INTO renewal_policies (id, name, renewal_window_days, auto_renew, max_retries, retry_interval_minutes, created_at, updated_at) VALUES ($1, $2, $3, $4, $5, $6, $7, $8)`,
_, err = db.ExecContext(ctx, `INSERT INTO renewal_policies (id, name, renewal_window_days, auto_renew, max_retries, retry_interval_seconds, created_at, updated_at) VALUES ($1, $2, $3, $4, $5, $6, $7, $8)`,
policyID, "Policy "+suffix, 30, true, 3, 60, now, now)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("insertCertPrereqs: create renewal_policy failed: %v", err)
+246
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,246 @@
// Integration tests for the U-3 schema-vs-seed coupling fix.
//
// Pre-U-3 the deploy compose stack mounted both a hand-curated subset of
// `migrations/*.up.sql` and `seed.sql` into postgres
// `/docker-entrypoint-initdb.d/`. Postgres applied them at initdb time.
// When `seed.sql` was updated to reference columns added by migrations
// *after* the mounted cutoff (e.g., `policy_rules.severity` from
// `000013_policy_rule_severity.up.sql`), initdb crashed during the seed
// step and the container was reported `unhealthy` indefinitely.
//
// Post-U-3 the schema is built EXCLUSIVELY by the server at startup via
// internal/repository/postgres.RunMigrations + RunSeed. These tests pin
// that contract: RunSeed must complete without error against a freshly
// migrated database, and re-application must be idempotent so server
// restarts don't double-insert.
//
// Skipped under -short to keep CI fast lanes green; the integration lane
// runs them via the testcontainers harness.
package postgres_test
import (
"context"
"database/sql"
"testing"
"github.com/shankar0123/certctl/internal/repository/postgres"
)
// TestRunSeed_AppliesIdempotently verifies the U-3 contract that RunSeed
// can be called repeatedly against a populated database without error and
// without producing duplicate rows. The server invokes RunSeed on EVERY
// boot (it has no migration-state table to skip from), so any non-
// idempotent INSERT in seed.sql would crash the container loop on the
// second start.
//
// The assertion uses renewal_policies.id='rp-default' as a witness — that
// row is the most-referenced FK target in the seed (it's the default
// renewal policy attached to every certificate that doesn't override).
// If the seed double-inserted, we'd see SQLSTATE 23505 from the second
// RunSeed call. If the seed silently ON CONFLICT-DO-NOTHING'd as
// designed, the row count stays at exactly 1.
func TestRunSeed_AppliesIdempotently(t *testing.T) {
tdb := getTestDB(t)
db := tdb.freshSchema(t)
ctx := context.Background()
migrationsPath := findMigrationsDir()
// Apply the seed twice — second call simulates a server restart on a
// populated database. Both must succeed; pre-U-3 the second call
// would fail with 23505 if any INSERT lacked ON CONFLICT.
if err := postgres.RunSeed(db, migrationsPath); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("RunSeed (first call) returned error: %v", err)
}
if err := postgres.RunSeed(db, migrationsPath); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("RunSeed (second call — idempotency check) returned error: %v\n"+
"This means the seed produced a duplicate row; every INSERT in seed.sql "+
"must use ON CONFLICT (id) DO NOTHING because the server applies the "+
"seed on EVERY start.", err)
}
// Witness check: rp-default is the renewal policy every cert defaults
// to. Exactly one row must exist after two seed applications.
var count int
err := db.QueryRowContext(ctx,
`SELECT COUNT(*) FROM renewal_policies WHERE id = 'rp-default'`,
).Scan(&count)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("witness query failed: %v", err)
}
if count != 1 {
t.Errorf("renewal_policies WHERE id='rp-default' returned %d rows after two RunSeed calls; want exactly 1 (ON CONFLICT idempotency contract)", count)
}
}
// TestRunSeed_MissingFileIsNoOp verifies the fail-soft contract documented
// on RunSeed: an operator who deletes seed.sql for custom packaging (CI
// pipelines that bake their own seeds, cert-manager managed deployments)
// must still get a healthy server boot. RunSeed returning nil for a
// missing file is the only way to hold this contract — returning an error
// would force every minimal-image deployment to ship the seed file just
// to satisfy a no-op load.
//
// We point at a directory that exists (empty temp dir) but contains no
// seed.sql. RunSeed must return nil silently.
func TestRunSeed_MissingFileIsNoOp(t *testing.T) {
if testing.Short() {
t.Skip("skipping integration test in short mode")
}
// Use a brand-new empty directory so seed.sql is unambiguously absent.
emptyDir := t.TempDir()
// Pass a nil *sql.DB on purpose — RunSeed must short-circuit on the
// missing file BEFORE touching the DB. If the implementation ever
// regresses and tries to db.Exec(string(content)) with nil content,
// this will surface as a nil-deref instead of a silent corruption.
var db *sql.DB
if err := postgres.RunSeed(db, emptyDir); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("RunSeed against an empty directory should return nil; got: %v", err)
}
}
// TestRunDemoSeed_AppliesIdempotently mirrors the RunSeed idempotency
// contract for the demo overlay. The compose demo stack
// (deploy/docker-compose.demo.yml) sets CERTCTL_DEMO_SEED=true; the
// server applies seed_demo.sql at every boot. Same constraint as the
// baseline seed: if any INSERT lacks ON CONFLICT, the server will
// crash-loop on restart.
//
// Witness: seed_demo.sql inserts t-platform into the teams table at line
// 11. That row is referenced by every demo-team-owned certificate, so
// duplicate-insertion would block the entire demo on restart.
func TestRunDemoSeed_AppliesIdempotently(t *testing.T) {
tdb := getTestDB(t)
db := tdb.freshSchema(t)
ctx := context.Background()
migrationsPath := findMigrationsDir()
// Order matters — RunSeed must run first so the FK targets the demo
// seed depends on (rp-* renewal policies, etc.) exist before the
// demo INSERTs run. This mirrors the order in cmd/server/main.go.
if err := postgres.RunSeed(db, migrationsPath); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("RunSeed prerequisite failed: %v", err)
}
if err := postgres.RunDemoSeed(db, migrationsPath); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("RunDemoSeed (first call) returned error: %v", err)
}
if err := postgres.RunDemoSeed(db, migrationsPath); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("RunDemoSeed (second call — idempotency check) returned error: %v", err)
}
var count int
err := db.QueryRowContext(ctx,
`SELECT COUNT(*) FROM teams WHERE id = 't-platform'`,
).Scan(&count)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("witness query failed: %v", err)
}
if count != 1 {
t.Errorf("teams WHERE id='t-platform' returned %d rows after two RunDemoSeed calls; want exactly 1", count)
}
}
// TestMigration000017_RetryIntervalRename verifies the U-3 ride-along
// column rename: renewal_policies.retry_interval_minutes →
// retry_interval_seconds (cat-o-retry_interval_unit_mismatch). The unit
// was always seconds in practice — the column name lied. Migration 000017
// renames the column with a DO $$ guard so re-application is safe.
//
// After all migrations have been applied (which the test harness does in
// freshSchema), the new column must exist and the old column must NOT.
// information_schema.columns is the source of truth for both checks.
func TestMigration000017_RetryIntervalRename(t *testing.T) {
tdb := getTestDB(t)
db := tdb.freshSchema(t)
ctx := context.Background()
// Helper — true iff the named column exists on renewal_policies.
hasColumn := func(name string) bool {
t.Helper()
var n int
err := db.QueryRowContext(ctx, `
SELECT COUNT(*) FROM information_schema.columns
WHERE table_name = 'renewal_policies' AND column_name = $1
`, name).Scan(&n)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("information_schema query for column %q failed: %v", name, err)
}
return n > 0
}
if !hasColumn("retry_interval_seconds") {
t.Error("renewal_policies.retry_interval_seconds is missing — migration 000017 did not apply, or it was applied before the rename block")
}
if hasColumn("retry_interval_minutes") {
t.Error("renewal_policies.retry_interval_minutes still exists — the rename in migration 000017 must drop the old name (cat-o-retry_interval_unit_mismatch)")
}
}
// TestMigration000017_NotificationCreatedAt verifies the U-3 ride-along
// column add: notification_events.created_at NOT NULL DEFAULT NOW()
// (cat-o-notification_created_at_dead_field). Pre-U-3 the Go domain had
// the field but the DB lacked the column, so the JSON API serialised
// 0001-01-01.
func TestMigration000017_NotificationCreatedAt(t *testing.T) {
tdb := getTestDB(t)
db := tdb.freshSchema(t)
ctx := context.Background()
var dataType, isNullable, columnDefault sql.NullString
err := db.QueryRowContext(ctx, `
SELECT data_type, is_nullable, column_default
FROM information_schema.columns
WHERE table_name = 'notification_events' AND column_name = 'created_at'
`).Scan(&dataType, &isNullable, &columnDefault)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("information_schema query for created_at failed: %v\n"+
"Migration 000017 should have added notification_events.created_at TIMESTAMPTZ NOT NULL DEFAULT NOW().", err)
}
if dataType.String != "timestamp with time zone" {
t.Errorf("notification_events.created_at data_type = %q, want %q",
dataType.String, "timestamp with time zone")
}
if isNullable.String != "NO" {
t.Errorf("notification_events.created_at is_nullable = %q, want NO (the column must be NOT NULL so legacy rows get the DEFAULT)",
isNullable.String)
}
if columnDefault.String == "" {
t.Error("notification_events.created_at has no DEFAULT — legacy rows added before migration 000017 would fail the NOT NULL gate without one")
}
}
// TestMigration000017_HealthCheckOrphansDropped verifies the U-3
// ride-along column drop: network_scan_targets lost the orphan
// health_check_enabled / health_check_interval_seconds columns
// (cat-o-health_check_column_orphans). These were declared by an early
// migration but never wired into Go code — schema noise that confused
// operators reading raw SQL. Migration 000017 drops them.
func TestMigration000017_HealthCheckOrphansDropped(t *testing.T) {
tdb := getTestDB(t)
db := tdb.freshSchema(t)
ctx := context.Background()
hasColumn := func(name string) bool {
t.Helper()
var n int
err := db.QueryRowContext(ctx, `
SELECT COUNT(*) FROM information_schema.columns
WHERE table_name = 'network_scan_targets' AND column_name = $1
`, name).Scan(&n)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("information_schema query for column %q failed: %v", name, err)
}
return n > 0
}
for _, col := range []string{"health_check_enabled", "health_check_interval_seconds"} {
if hasColumn(col) {
t.Errorf("network_scan_targets.%s still exists — migration 000017 must drop it (cat-o-health_check_column_orphans)", col)
}
}
}
@@ -0,0 +1,46 @@
-- Migration 000017 (down): reverse the U-3 bundle.
--
-- Operators almost certainly never need this — each block in the up
-- migration was a strict improvement (column-name truth, dead-schema
-- removal, missing-column add). The down migration exists for
-- documentation and disaster-recovery completeness only.
--
-- Idempotent: each block uses the standard IF EXISTS / IF NOT EXISTS
-- guards plus a DO $$ guard on the rename to handle re-application.
-- Reverses the up migration's blocks in reverse order.
-- (3) Re-add the orphan health_check columns at their original defaults.
--
-- Note: re-adding does NOT restore the auto-health-check feature —
-- that code was never written. The column values revert to the
-- DEFAULT FALSE / 300 baseline that operators saw pre-U-3.
ALTER TABLE network_scan_targets
ADD COLUMN IF NOT EXISTS health_check_enabled BOOLEAN DEFAULT FALSE,
ADD COLUMN IF NOT EXISTS health_check_interval_seconds INTEGER DEFAULT 300;
-- (2) Drop the notification_events.created_at column.
--
-- This re-introduces the cat-o-notification_created_at_dead_field bug
-- (Go field with no DB column → API serializes 0001-01-01). Only roll
-- back if you've also rolled back the Go-side INSERT path that sets
-- created_at, otherwise INSERTs will fail with "column created_at does
-- not exist".
ALTER TABLE notification_events
DROP COLUMN IF EXISTS created_at;
-- (1) Rename the renewal_policies column back to the misleading name.
--
-- Re-introduces cat-o-retry_interval_unit_mismatch. Operators running
-- raw SQL revert to the 60x confusion. No data conversion (values are
-- still seconds; the column label lies again).
DO $$
BEGIN
IF EXISTS (
SELECT 1 FROM information_schema.columns
WHERE table_name = 'renewal_policies'
AND column_name = 'retry_interval_seconds'
) THEN
ALTER TABLE renewal_policies
RENAME COLUMN retry_interval_seconds TO retry_interval_minutes;
END IF;
END $$;
@@ -0,0 +1,81 @@
-- Migration 000017: DB coupling cleanup (U-3 bundle).
--
-- Closes three audit findings that share the migrations/ surface and the
-- "schema vs Go vs label drifts in different directions" pattern:
--
-- * cat-o-retry_interval_unit_mismatch (P1):
-- renewal_policies.retry_interval_minutes column stored seconds, named
-- minutes. Operators running raw SQL got 60x confusion.
--
-- * cat-o-notification_created_at_dead_field (P2):
-- internal/domain/notification.go::NotificationEvent.CreatedAt was
-- tagged json:"created_at" with no DB column behind it. Every API
-- response serialized 0001-01-01T00:00:00Z. Visible zero-value
-- timestamp on every notification row in the dashboard.
--
-- * cat-o-health_check_column_orphans (P1):
-- migration 000011 added network_scan_targets.health_check_enabled +
-- .health_check_interval_seconds. No Go field decoded either column;
-- no handler exposed them; OpenAPI schema didn't carry them. The
-- auto-health-check feature was never wired through. Removing dead
-- schema is cheaper than completing dead code; if the feature gets
-- revived, a future migration can re-add the columns alongside the
-- Go-side wiring.
--
-- Idempotency: RunMigrations at internal/repository/postgres/db.go has
-- no applied-tracking table — every server restart re-applies every
-- migration in sequence. Each block in this file MUST be safe to re-run
-- on a database that has already had it applied. The RENAME COLUMN in
-- block (1) is wrapped in a DO $$ guard that checks information_schema
-- before renaming; the ADD COLUMN in (2) and the DROP COLUMNs in (3)
-- use the standard IF NOT EXISTS / IF EXISTS clauses.
--
-- See the U-3 closure entry in
-- coverage-gap-audit-2026-04-24-v5/unified-audit.md and CHANGELOG.md
-- for the full rationale, the bundled-fix list, and the architectural
-- shift to runtime-only migration application.
-- (1) cat-o-retry_interval_unit_mismatch — rename column to match unit.
--
-- The values stored in this column have always been seconds (validator
-- at internal/service/renewal_policy.go enforces a [60, 86400] range
-- inclusive — 60 seconds to 24 hours, unambiguously seconds). The
-- column name was the bug; data conversion is a no-op. The Go field
-- has always been tagged json:"retry_interval_seconds", so the API
-- shape is unchanged.
DO $$
BEGIN
IF EXISTS (
SELECT 1 FROM information_schema.columns
WHERE table_name = 'renewal_policies'
AND column_name = 'retry_interval_minutes'
) THEN
ALTER TABLE renewal_policies
RENAME COLUMN retry_interval_minutes TO retry_interval_seconds;
END IF;
END $$;
-- (2) cat-o-notification_created_at_dead_field — add the missing column.
--
-- DEFAULT NOW() back-fills existing rows with the migration apply
-- timestamp. Acceptable trade-off: those rows had no real CreatedAt
-- info anyway (the field was a Go-only zero-value), and approximating
-- them with the migration time gives the dashboard a usable rendering
-- instead of '0001-01-01'. NOT NULL is enforced because the repo
-- INSERT path will set CreatedAt on every new row post-fix.
ALTER TABLE notification_events
ADD COLUMN IF NOT EXISTS created_at TIMESTAMPTZ NOT NULL DEFAULT NOW();
-- (3) cat-o-health_check_column_orphans — drop unwired columns.
--
-- migrations/000011_health_checks.up.sql added these two columns with
-- the intent of wiring auto-health-checks for network-scan-discovered
-- endpoints. The Go side was never written; no handler reads or writes
-- them; the OpenAPI NetworkScanTarget schema doesn't expose them. The
-- columns have been carrying their default values (false / 300) on
-- every row since shipping. Dropping them removes dead schema; the
-- network_scan_targets row size shrinks marginally and operators stop
-- seeing flag/interval columns that don't actually do anything.
ALTER TABLE network_scan_targets
DROP COLUMN IF EXISTS health_check_enabled,
DROP COLUMN IF EXISTS health_check_interval_seconds;
+1 -1
View File
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
-- Seed data for certificate control plane
-- Default renewal policy
INSERT INTO renewal_policies (id, name, renewal_window_days, auto_renew, max_retries, retry_interval_minutes, alert_thresholds_days)
INSERT INTO renewal_policies (id, name, renewal_window_days, auto_renew, max_retries, retry_interval_seconds, alert_thresholds_days)
VALUES (
'rp-default',
'default',
+1 -1
View File
@@ -29,7 +29,7 @@ ON CONFLICT (id) DO NOTHING;
-- ============================================================
-- 2. Policies
-- ============================================================
INSERT INTO renewal_policies (id, name, renewal_window_days, auto_renew, max_retries, retry_interval_minutes, alert_thresholds_days, created_at, updated_at) VALUES
INSERT INTO renewal_policies (id, name, renewal_window_days, auto_renew, max_retries, retry_interval_seconds, alert_thresholds_days, created_at, updated_at) VALUES
('rp-standard', 'Standard 30-day', 30, true, 3, 60, '[30, 14, 7, 0]'::jsonb, NOW() - INTERVAL '180 days', NOW() - INTERVAL '180 days'),
('rp-urgent', 'Urgent 14-day', 14, true, 5, 30, '[14, 7, 3, 0]'::jsonb, NOW() - INTERVAL '180 days', NOW() - INTERVAL '180 days'),
('rp-manual', 'Manual Only', 30, false, 0, 0, '[30, 14, 7, 0]'::jsonb, NOW() - INTERVAL '180 days', NOW() - INTERVAL '180 days')