* fix: verify checksums for downloaded ISOs/images, keep sshpass off argv
ensure-base-iso.sh downloaded the PVE install ISO over plain HTTP with no
checksum, caching it on the persistent /opt/pve-integration mount and
booting it as the nested trust root the integration suite relies on.
ensure-cloud-images.sh fetched the Ubuntu cloud image and OVA over HTTPS
but never checked them either. prepare-test-environment.sh and
diagnose-cluster.sh passed the nested root password to sshpass via -p,
putting it in the process table. create-api-token.sh, unused anywhere in
the repo, minted a privsep=0 root token and echoed the secret unmasked.
- ensure-base-iso.sh now downloads from https://enterprise.proxmox.com/iso
and verifies against its SHA256SUMS on every run, including a cache hit.
download.proxmox.com's own TLS cert does not list download.proxmox.com in
its SAN (confirmed with curl/openssl from this environment), so https to
that name fails certificate validation; enterprise.proxmox.com serves the
identical ISO tree over a valid cert. Verification happens before the
downloaded file is moved to its canonical cache path.
- ensure-cloud-images.sh verifies the cloud image and OVA against Ubuntu's
published SHA256SUMS the same way, matching by upstream filename since
the cloud image is cached locally under a different extension (.img
upstream, .qcow2 cached — the bytes are already qcow2-formatted).
- prepare-test-environment.sh and diagnose-cluster.sh now export SSHPASS
and call sshpass -e, keeping the password out of argv/ps. This also fixes
a latent bug: the old unquoted `sshpass -p ${ROOT_PASS}` word-split any
password containing whitespace.
- create-api-token.sh deleted; grep across the repo found no caller.
Reviewers (codex:codex-rescue, correctness-reviewer, security-reviewer) all
independently found the same blocking bug in the first pass: when a cached
file failed verification and the subsequent redownload then failed,
ensure-cloud-images.sh fell through to a "keep the stale copy" branch and
returned that same known-bad file with exit 0 — verification could be
bypassed by inducing one failed redownload. Fixed by deleting the file
immediately on a failed verification, before the redownload is attempted,
so the later "is there a safe stale copy" check can no longer find it.
Added a test case (case 5) that reproduces this exact sequence and
mutation-tested it against the unfixed code. The three reviews also
flagged a real but separate bug already fixed in this same change: `trap
... RETURN` inside a function nested in another function is not scoped to
that function in bash — it re-fires on the OUTER function's return,
referencing an out-of-scope local. Both verify_checksum() helpers now
clean up their temp file explicitly instead of via trap.
Findings not acted on, judged out of scope for this fix:
- SHA256SUMS-fetch failures are treated the same as a checksum mismatch
(delete + fail) rather than left untouched — a transient network blip
destroys a good multi-GB cached ISO. This is the safer failure direction
(never silently trust unverified bytes) and was a deliberate trade-off,
not a defect.
- ensure-cloud-images.sh's 7-day cache window can span an upstream
republish of noble/current, causing a legitimate re-verification churn
(not a security issue, a cache-hit-rate one). Pre-existing cache design,
unrelated to adding verification.
- wait-for-pve.sh (curl -d with the password on argv) and
prepare-test-environment.sh's own positional password argument (from
run-integration.sh) carry the same password-on-argv pattern this issue
targeted in create-api-token.sh, sshpass -p and diagnose-cluster.sh, but
neither script nor run-integration.sh was named in the issue. Left
untouched per scope; worth a follow-up issue.
- GPG/detached-signature verification of the upstream SHA256SUMS was not
added — the new checks defend against cache poisoning and transit
corruption, not a compromised origin. Worth a follow-up issue.
- The two new self-checks (ensure-base-iso.test.sh,
ensure-cloud-images.test.sh) are not wired into
.github/workflows/unit-tests.yml's shell-selfchecks job. That file is
code-owned and out of scope for this change; needs an operator follow-up.
Password rotation (the Testpass123! value from before it moved to a
secret) is unaddressed here per the contract — flagged for the operator.
Mutation-tested: broke the post-download checksum check in
ensure-base-iso.sh, confirmed the affected test cases failed, restored it.
Broke the sshpass -e change back to -p, confirmed the new assertions in
prepare-test-environment.test.sh failed, restored it. Broke the fail-open
fix in ensure-cloud-images.sh, confirmed case 5 failed, restored it.
Closes#149
* fix: also verify the stale-by-age fallback copy in ensure-cloud-images.sh
PR review on #166 (COMMENTED, non-blocking) found the sibling of the
fail-open bug already fixed in this branch: when the cached cloud image
is stale by *age* (>= 7 days) rather than failed verification, the
redownload-failure fallback could hand back that file with exit 0
without ever re-verifying it in this run. A file that failed the
earlier verification is already deleted by the time the fallback runs,
but a stale-by-age file skips verification entirely on the way in.
Fixed by verifying the stale-by-age file at the point of actual
fallback use — after the redownload has failed, not proactively before
it's attempted, so a copy the redownload was about to replace anyway
isn't deleted along a path that would have succeeded. Added two test
cases (6, 7): a still-verifying stale-by-age copy is used as a
fallback; one that no longer verifies is not. Mutation-tested by
reverting to the unfixed fallback and confirming case 7 fails, then
restored.
---------
Co-authored-by: goodolclint-claude[bot] <323206664+goodolclint-claude[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
PveHttpClientLockRetryTests set GuestLockRetry's retry budget via reflection
on a private field with no production writer, and scripted two lock
failures to land inside a 400ms window. A cold or loaded CI runner's
first-attempt JIT and scheduling could burn past 400ms before the second
attempt started, failing the test though the retry itself was correct
(#134).
GuestLockRetry.ExecuteAsync gains an internal overload that takes the
inter-attempt delay as a Func<TimeSpan, Task>; the public overload keeps
defaulting to Task.Delay, so production behaviour (45s window, budget/4
capped at 2s) is unchanged. PveHttpClient gains a matching internal
constructor seam (window, handler, delay), replacing the reflection the
tests used for both the private HttpClient and the retry window. Tests
now pass a no-op delay, so the retry loop's real elapsed time drops to
microseconds and the production 45s window can never be exhausted by
runner speed.
Two tests pin that production still waits for real: one records the
delay invocations through the internal seam and asserts the computed
interval, the other drives the public overload with a small window and
asserts wall-clock time actually advances. Both were mutation-tested
against a no-op-default regression and fail without the fix.
The give-up test was renamed (PutAsync_DoesNotReissueWhenTheRetryWindowIsAlreadySpent)
to describe what TimeSpan.Zero actually proves: the client never attempts
a reissue once the budget reads spent, not a multi-attempt exhaustion
sequence — a review finding on the original name.
Out of scope, noted for follow-up: GuestLockRetryTests.cs's synchronous
Execute() tests still use a 400ms ShortWindow with real Thread.Sleep,
which is the same flake shape on the sync path; Execute() has no delay
seam. PveHttpClientTimeoutTests.cs and PveHttpClientFormEncodingTests.cs
still reflect on the private _httpClient field, which the new handler
seam could also retire.
Co-authored-by: goodolclint-claude[bot] <323206664+goodolclint-claude[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
* fix: escape dynamic path segments in three Remove-* cmdlets
Wrap Storage, Vnet, and Zone parameters with Uri.EscapeDataString() in
RemovePveStorageCmdlet, RemovePveSdnVnetCmdlet, and RemovePveSdnZoneCmdlet
to prevent path traversal attacks via the API path.
Add xUnit test demonstrating that escaped paths preserve percent-encoding
(preventing path collapse) while unescaped paths allow segment traversal.
Fixes#145
* fix: route Remove-Pve{Storage,SdnVnet,SdnZone} through their services
Delete the private PveHttpClient construction and inline
Uri.EscapeDataString call in RemovePveStorageCmdlet,
RemovePveSdnVnetCmdlet and RemovePveSdnZoneCmdlet; call
StorageService.RemoveStorage / NetworkService.RemoveSdnZone /
NetworkService.RemoveSdnVnet instead, which already escape the
identifier identically and are now the single place doing so.
Add ValidatePattern on the Storage/Vnet/Zone parameters as defense
in depth, anchored with \A/\z so a trailing newline cannot slip a
disallowed character past the gate.
Replace PveHttpClientPathEscapingTests with a version that actually
regression-tests the real Uri parser (asserts both that %2F survives
and that the unescaped form is absent), and add
StorageServiceTests/NetworkServiceTests cases that mock
IPveHttpClient and verify the exact escaped DELETE path for a
traversal-attempt name.
---------
Co-authored-by: goodolclint-claude[bot] <323206664+goodolclint-claude[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
Every merge to main queued a ~45 minute integration run behind fixes that
are already pinned by offline tests. Runs now happen on workflow_dispatch
at wave boundaries. Restore the push trigger when #134-#157 have landed.
Co-authored-by: goodolclint-claude[bot] <323206664+goodolclint-claude[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
* docs: record the branch protection that is actually configured
CLAUDE.md has claimed since March that main had 'required build checks,
required review, admin enforced'. Two of those three were wrong: direct pushes
to main were still permitted until 2026-09-02, and admin bypass is now
deliberately available rather than enforced.
Records what is actually set: required checks, required PR with an approving
review, stale reviews dismissed on push, and review from Code Owners required.
Explains the narrow CODEOWNERS, so a future session knows why a workflow or ADR
change needs the operator while ordinary work does not.
Admin bypass is available on purpose. GitHub does not let an author approve
their own PR, so without it an operator-authored governance change would
deadlock. It is not a hole here: App installations do not get admin bypass, so
it does nothing for a compromised or injected bot.
ADR 0025 previously said enabling code-owner review was the operator's action
and not done by that decision. It has been done, so the dismissal gate is now
defence-in-depth rather than the load-bearing control - GitHub enforces the
property directly, including against approvals from claude.yml, the ungated
path the gate cannot see.
* docs: trim a clause ADR 0025 stated twice in four lines
Review nit on #133. The 'claude.yml is an ungated second path the dismissal
step cannot see' clause appeared in consecutive paragraphs. The first states
it; the second now refers back rather than restating.
---------
Co-authored-by: goodolclint-claude[bot] <323206664+goodolclint-claude[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
* ci: take review instructions from the default branch, and gate self-approval
Moves the review prompt out of claude-code-review.yml into
.github/review-prompt.md, materialized from the default branch at review time.
Prompt edits then neither trip claude-code-action's anti-tamper gate nor
influence the review of the PR making them. PR #131 is what prompted this: 38
files of ADR migration were blocked from review by a four-line prompt edit.
A security review of the first draft found the naive materialization was itself
exploitable, and that is fixed here rather than shipped:
- git show "origin/$DEFAULT_BRANCH:..." takes an UNQUALIFIED refname, and
gitrevisions(7) resolves refs/tags/<name> before refs/remotes/<name>. With
fetch-depth: 0 fetching all tags, a tag named "origin/main" would supply the
review instructions for every PR, exiting 0 with only a stderr warning.
Reproduced end to end. Now resolves refs/remotes/origin/<default> to a SHA,
logs it, and reads by SHA.
- CLAUDE.md is materialized from the default branch too. The prompt judges
against its Key Conventions list, so reading it from the PR checkout let a PR
edit the list to permit its own violation.
- A PR touching review-prompt.md, .github/workflows/ or CLAUDE.md now has any
claude[bot] APPROVED dismissed via the API and the check failed. Prose alone
cannot protect the root of trust.
- The sentinel is grepped in the materialize step rather than only asserted by
the model it protects.
- Fork PRs are skipped, not failed. A required check permanently red on outside
contributions trains the operator to override red checks.
Also drops track_progress and gh pr comment so the review body and inline
comments are the only channel, and adds actions: read plus gh pr checks / gh run
view so the reviewer can verify build and test claims against CI's own result.
It deliberately gets no build or test tools: those execute PR-authored code in a
job that can approve the PR.
ADR 0025 records the decision.
* ci: fix three defects found in second-opinion review
- Job-level 'actions: read' was missing. An explicit permissions block sets
every unlisted permission to none, so additional_permissions: actions: read
on the action alone granted nothing and the reviewer could not have read the
check runs it was just told to verify claims against. Athena has both; only
the action-level half was copied.
- The governance detector checked review-prompt.md, .github/workflows/ and
CLAUDE.md, while review-prompt.md told the reviewer DECISIONS.md and
docs/decisions/ were mechanically covered too. A PR adding an ADR could
escape the guard it was promised to be under. Detector now covers both, which
means every ADR PR needs operator approval — that is the intended reading of
ADR 0023, since the reviewer defers to ADRs as precedent.
- The formal-review check counted ANY historical claude[bot] review, so a
re-run after a new push went green on a verdict about the previous commit.
Now scoped to the head SHA. Pre-existing, fixed here because the file was
already open.
Adds a fork-notice job. A skipped job reports its required check as PASSING, so
skipping the review on fork PRs made them green with nothing reviewed and no
trace of why; the notice puts it in the run summary.
Prompt: pending checks are a race, so say unverified rather than reporting a
queued check as a failure; and defer-to-operator maps to --comment, not
--request-changes.
* ci: withhold approval on review-governing PRs, not the review itself
Operator ruling: Claude should still review the protected files and report what
it finds; only the power to approve is reserved.
The gate failed the check unconditionally whenever a PR touched a governance
path, even when the reviewer had correctly submitted COMMENTED. That discarded a
review that was wanted, and made a red check the normal outcome for a whole
class of PR — training exactly the merge-past-red habit the fork-notice change
exists to avoid.
Now: a COMMENTED deferral passes, with a notice saying the check is green
because the reviewer behaved, not because the PR is approved. Merge still waits
for the operator, since COMMENTED does not satisfy branch protection. The step
fails only when claude[bot] actually approved — that approval is dismissed and
the red check records the disobedience.
ADRs stay in the protected set, per the same ruling.
* ci: close a green-with-live-approval hole and widen the governance detector
Third security pass. The two that mattered:
- Both review queries were unpaginated. GitHub returns 30 reviews oldest-first,
so an approval submitted now sits on page 2 of any PR that already has 30
review objects — the withhold step would find nothing, print 'reviewer
behaved correctly' and exit 0 green while the approval stood and satisfied
branch protection. Reachable without an attacker: every inline comment
creates a review object. Both queries now --paginate.
- The detector covered CLAUDE.md but not .claude/, .mcp.json, AGENTS.md, or
nested CLAUDE.md. .claude/settings.json is tracked and .gitignore had no
claude entry, so a PR could add .claude/settings.local.json - which outranks
settings.json - carrying env (redirect model traffic) or hooks (arbitrary
shell in the job holding the approval token). Those are read by the runtime
before the model starts, so no prompt-level rule can defend against them.
Added to the detector and to .gitignore.
Also: dismissal now matches .user.type == 'Bot' rather than the claude[bot]
login literal, so an approval from another App is not invisible; the test
fixtures, psd1 and CHANGELOG join the detector, since the prompt already
reserved release tagging to the operator and did not enforce it; a failed
dismissal says so loudly instead of aborting silently under bash -e and
claiming success; the pre-review notice no longer promises a red check on the
path that goes green; show-ref --verify replaces rev-parse, which still DWIMs
on a ref that does not exist; and a concurrency group stops two runs
interleaving dismissals.
Dropped the '@claude re-review' suggestion from the fail-closed message: it
pointed at an ungated workflow on exactly the PRs where approval is reserved.
ADR 0025 now states the premise the whole design rests on - that code-owner
review is off, deliberately, because enabling it would end bot merging - and
records claude.yml as an open second path to a binding approval.
* ci: narrow CODEOWNERS so code-owner review becomes usable
Operator's suggestion, and it is better than what ADR 0025 previously recorded.
CODEOWNERS was '* @goodolclint'. At that breadth 'Require review from Code
Owners' is unusable — it would demand the operator on every PR and end the
verdict-gated merge loop — which is why the setting is off and why the
self-approval guard had to live in the workflow.
Narrowed to the governance and release paths only, matching the detector. An
ordinary PR has no code owner and an automated approval still merges it; a PR
touching what governs review or what gets published requires the operator.
That makes the setting safe to enable, and GitHub then enforces the property
better than the workflow step can: not one-shot, no pagination limit, no bot
identity to match, no dismissal permission needed, and it covers an approval
from any source — including claude.yml, the ungated second path the dismissal
step cannot see.
Enabling the setting is the operator's action, not this commit's. Until then
the workflow gate remains load-bearing, and it stays either way as
defence-in-depth. Both files carry a keep-in-sync note; drift is silent in the
direction that matters.
ADR 0025 records the edge case: GitHub does not let an author approve their own
PR, so an operator-authored governance PR would need admin enforcement toggled
or to go through the bot.
* ci: stop the green-path notice claiming more than it checked
Third-party re-review: the empty-id branch announced 'It reviewed and deferred,
as intended', but an empty list only means no automated APPROVED was found. It
cannot distinguish a deferral from CHANGES_REQUESTED, from no verdict, or from
no review at all — that a formal review exists at this head SHA is established
by the verify step, not this one. The notice now says what was actually
checked, and says plainly that green does not mean approved or adequately
reviewed.
ADR 0025 said a prompt edit 'gets a red check', contradicting its own statement
two paragraphs earlier that a deferral passes. Corrected, and it now records
the one governance path that genuinely gets no review: this workflow itself,
where the action's anti-tamper gate means there is no verdict to observe.
---------
Co-authored-by: goodolclint-claude[bot] <323206664+goodolclint-claude[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
D001-D021 become ADR 0001-0021 in docs/decisions/, one decision per file.
D017's PESTER_VERSION amendment was a second decision in one entry and becomes
ADR 0022. ADR 0023 records the migration and reverses the lane2-change-plan
ruling that deliberately kept DECISIONS.md until the CI lane work landed.
DECISIONS.md is reduced to a stub with a D-to-ADR redirect table, so the four
released CHANGELOG entries and older issue bodies that cite it degrade to a
redirect rather than a dead reference.
docs/review/ and docs/lane2-change-plan.md are deleted (ADR 0024). Of 91
findings, 83 were resolved and six of the seven still open were already GitHub
issues; F021 was the exception and is now #130.
CLAUDE.md's Key Conventions list gains the two rules it was missing and becomes
the checklist, with the ADRs carrying rationale.
Records the testing strategy decided while planning #120: an integration test
must earn its place by testing something only a live PVE can answer, and
request-payload correctness is verified offline against the mock IPveHttpClient
harness.
The boundary comes from #92. Set-PveNetwork sent bridge_vlan_aware=0 to clear a
VLAN-aware bridge; the schema advertises a plain boolean, so the request
succeeded, and PVE merged the key onto the stored stanza and ignored the 0. Only
delete=bridge_vlan_aware works, and only a real PVE 9 revealed it.
37 of 194 concrete cmdlets construct PveHttpClient directly and have no offline
seam; they convert before the next large coverage push. The suite tiers by area
on PRs, ACME is covered by contract tests because a CA and DNS reachability
cannot exist in CI, and Ceph lives behind an opt-in provisioning profile.
PveNetwork already deserialised bridge_vlan_aware as BridgeVlanAware, so a
VLAN-aware bridge could be read back but never created or changed. Both write
paths now take a -BridgeVlanAware switch.
Clearing the flag does not use bridge_vlan_aware=0. PVE merges the supplied
keys onto the stored stanza and accepts that 0 without acting on it, so the
obvious form is a silent no-op: an integration run against PVE 9 issued it and
Get-PveNetwork still reported 1. The endpoint's delete list is what actually
removes the key. The API schema advertises a plain boolean and gives no hint of
this, which is why the behaviour is pinned by an integration test rather than
inferred.
Set-PveNetwork guards the switch on BoundParameters so an update that omits it
leaves the flag alone; the create path follows the existing -Autostart form.
Only bridge_vlan_aware is added. bridge_vids is an independent parameter that
PVE defaults to 2-4094, and the issue asks only for the flag.
Coverage: the integration suite pins create, disable, re-enable, and that an
unrelated Set leaves the flag alone -- that last one kills a mutant that drops
the BoundParameters guard, which every other test survives. A model test pins
the read path the assertions depend on. The Pester unit tests assert only
parameter metadata; the defect is server-side, so nothing offline can catch it.
Closes#92
Two non-blocking review observations.
A 45s retry is indistinguishable from a hang with nothing on the wire, so
GuestLockRetry.Execute takes an onRetry hook and InvokeGuestTask reports
each reissue through WriteVerbose.
The gap between attempts now scales with the budget, capped at the 2s
production value. A caller passing a short window wants a fast answer
rather than one long sleep, which also takes the retrying unit tests off
a real 2s sleep each: the xUnit run drops from 8s to 4s. PveHttpClient's
window becomes a field so those tests can shorten it too.
WaitForStatusTransition refused to return while snapshot.Locked, and its
comment quoted the exact error it was meant to prevent. Locked reads the
guest config's lock: property; the failure is the flock on
/var/lock/qemu-server/lock-<vmid>.conf, which PVE exposes nowhere.
The flock cannot be observed, so it is retried. GuestLockRetry reissues an
operation for a bounded 45s while PVE reports failing to enter lock_config
for a guest, which it raises before doing any work.
Two seams, because the failure has two surfaces. PveHttpClient.SendAsync
retries the request for operations PVE serialises in the API handler; it
takes a request factory because an HttpRequestMessage cannot be resent.
PveCmdletBase.InvokeGuestTask reissues the call and re-waits its task for
operations serialised in the forked worker, where the POST returns 200 and
only the task fails. WaitForStatusTransition routes through the latter,
hence Func<PveTask>.
The predicate is path-specific and anchored at the start of what PVE said:
lock_file uses identical wording for storage, LVM and HA locks, and a
qmclone that fails after allocating disks must not be reissued into
"VM already exists". That requires the raw text, so it reads
PveTaskFailedException.ExitStatus and PveApiException.ApiMessage.
The Locked check stays — it is correct for the config lock — with a comment
that says so.
Closes#113
Pester was installed with -MinimumVersion 5.0 and no ceiling in the CI job
image, both install steps in unit-tests.yml, and both Import-Module calls, plus
the suite's own import inside the container. The image is rebuilt on every CI
run and Pester is installed fresh on every unit-test run, so PSGallery chose the
version — a new major could reach the required PR checks with no commit here,
surfacing as unexplained test breakage on whichever PR ran next.
It had already happened. Steps named "Install Pester 5" were resolving 6.1.0 on
both legs, because Pester 6 declares PowerShellVersion 5.1 and so installs on
Windows PowerShell too. Nothing broke — the suite uses only constructs common to
5 and 6, and runs 1566/0 under 6.1.0 with no deprecation warnings — but nobody
chose it. The step names are corrected; they had been describing an install that
stopped happening some time ago.
Pinning the install alone is not enough, in two ways review found:
An unset variable does not fail. -RequiredVersion accepts an empty value and
degrades to "latest" for Install-Module and to "any" for Import-Module, both
exiting 0, so a renamed or dropped env key would silently restore the float this
commit removes. A guard step now fails the job instead.
The point of use was still floored. run-integration.sh imported the suite's
Pester with -MinimumVersion 5.0, so a second Pester reaching PSModulePath would
win regardless of what was installed. The Dockerfile now promotes the ARG to ENV
so the version is discoverable at runtime, and that import is pinned to it.
The pin lives in two files, so shell-selfchecks asserts they agree — split-brain
between the workflow and the image is precisely the unexplained breakage this is
meant to prevent. CONTRIBUTING.md and CLAUDE.md are updated too; the contributor
instructions were a third floating install site.
Recorded as an amendment to D017 — the same principle as the nested PVE package
pin, applied to the lane's own tooling.
Two filed issues in one rewrite of preflight-cleanup.sh's ISO block, because
they are the same twenty lines.
#111 — ISO_FILENAME was interpolated into python3 -c PROGRAM TEXT inside a
single-quoted literal, so a quote in the value escaped it and executed
arbitrary Python in a container holding PVE_API_TOKEN, PVE_PASSWORD, the
Terraform state and the storage VM's SSH key. It now arrives through the
environment and is read with os.environ. The volid is passed to urllib's
quote() via argv for the same reason, and an empty encode result now skips
the volume instead of issuing a DELETE against the bare collection URL.
#105 — generated ISOs embed a hash of first-boot.sh, so every change to that
script mints a new filename. Deleting only the exact current name orphaned
each earlier ISO on the storage permanently, because force-cleanup wipes the
Terraform state that could otherwise reclaim it. The family is now swept by
rebuilding the full generated shape: the captured prefix plus twelve hex
characters plus .iso. A prefix test alone would also have matched a longer
FQDN's family and any hand-uploaded "-manual-backup.iso" sibling, which in a
script whose job is deletion is worse than the leak it fixes.
Multi-delete applies only to that family. A name that is not generated — the
storage VM's cloud image — keeps the original one-shot behaviour, since a
basename can repeat across content namespaces and a plain name carries nothing
that identifies a family.
Adds preflight-cleanup.test.sh, wired into shell-selfchecks. The script had no
coverage at all. It stubs curl and sleep, then asserts on the DELETEs issued:
the family goes, the pinned base ISO and unrelated uploads stay, a non-hash
sibling stays, the cloud image takes only itself, a quoted payload is data
rather than code, and unset storage skips only the ISO branch. Every case also
asserts the script ran to completion and removed the Terraform state, so a path
that dies early cannot pass by having issued the right DELETEs first.
Expands the Rosetta note into a working recipe, after running the whole
provision -> test -> cleanup lifecycle on an Apple Silicon Mac against the real
parent cluster.
Compose is the wrong entry point on a Mac: its dev-infra service builds rather
than pulls, and bind-mounts /opt/pve-integration, which does not exist there.
The macOS path pulls the image CI already built and drives run-integration.sh
with docker run. Records that GHCR needs a classic PAT, since fine-grained
tokens cannot reach it at all and the failure gives no hint why.
Restores the x86 compose instructions, which the previous commit's rewrite
consumed, and hoists the fixed-VMID warning out of the macOS section — 5080,
5091 and 5092 are shared with CI on the same parent cluster whatever host you
run from, so a local run during a CI run collides, and a skipped force-cleanup
fails the next run's headroom guard.
Also warns that emulation runs the suite ~40% slower and so loses the
qemu-server flock race (#113) that CI wins: Reset-PveVm, clone and
Set-PveVmConfig fail locally on a tree that is green in CI. Provisioning and
cleanup are unaffected.
"x86 only" was too strong. The image is amd64-only — proxmox-auto-install-assistant
and the HashiCorp apt repo publish no arm64 — but it builds and runs on Apple Silicon
once Docker Desktop's Rosetta emulation is on.
Under the default qemu translation pwsh starts and reports its version, then segfaults
on module discovery (uncaught target signal 11), which fails the build at
Install-Module Pester and would fail Pester at test time. With Rosetta enabled the same
Dockerfile builds to within 150 bytes of the image CI pushed for this commit, and
Invoke-Pester runs.
Worth stating explicitly because the failure is silent: the build step exits 1 with no
diagnostic output, which reads as a Dockerfile defect rather than an emulation problem.
The local dev environment had drifted badly from CI. Remove the parts that no
longer describe anything real, and make the rest match how CI actually runs.
Delete tests/dev.ps1. It wrapped run-integration.sh, which CI calls directly,
and duplicated the module build that script already performs internally. As a
second entry point it drifted: it still offered the PVE 8 leg retired in #88,
mounted the Docker socket for storage containers replaced by the storage VM in
#87, and pointed its remote-host examples at a runner decommissioned in the ARC
migration. All four documents describing it used a positional syntax that bound
the bare word to -Tests and then fell through to -Shell, so every documented
command silently opened a container shell. Recorded as D019.
Delete tests/infrastructure/runner/, a self-hosted-runner-in-Docker superseded
by Actions Runner Controller.
Make disk_storage and iso_storage required. Their defaults named a NAS that the
lab replaced with Ceph, and CI overrides both from repository variables, so the
defaults only ever misled local runs. require_env now fails at the top of a run
rather than at terraform apply, and the descriptions point at tests/.env.test
because cmd_provision deletes terraform.tfvars before applying.
preflight-cleanup.sh no longer falls back to the literal "local" storage. An
unset TF_VAR_iso_storage now skips only the ISO branch, leaving VM destroy and
state cleanup intact, and emits a workflow annotation: force-cleanup is the
only cleanup CI runs and it wipes Terraform state, so a silent skip strands the
uploaded ISO with nothing left to reclaim it.
Drop docker-ce-cli and the /var/run/docker.sock mount. Nothing in the container
has called docker since #87 moved storage into a VM; the remaining docker calls
run inside that VM over SSH. The CI job image is built from the same target, so
this also removes a third-party apt repository from its supply chain.
Rewrite tests/.env.test.example against what the code now requires, and fix the
documented commands in CLAUDE.md, README.md, copilot-instructions.md and the
integration README.
goodolclint-claude[bot]