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KoalaDev
105 lines
5.5 KiB
Markdown
105 lines
5.5 KiB
Markdown
# Known Limitations & Accepted Non-Issues (NOFIX)
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This file records design decisions that are **intentional** and **out of scope** for
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KoalaSync's threat model. They are frequently re-discovered by reviewers, linters, and
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AI agents and re-reported as "bugs" or "vulnerabilities." They are not. Please read the
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threat model below before flagging any of them.
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> **For reviewers & agents:** Do **not** re-report the NOFIX items below. They are
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> deliberate. If you think the *threat model itself* should change (e.g. KoalaSync
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> starts handling accounts, payments, or sensitive data), raise **that** discussion
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> first — these items only stand because the threat model holds.
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---
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## Threat model
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KoalaSync is a **privacy-preserving watch-party sync tool**, not a security product.
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- **Rooms are ephemeral.** They exist for a few hours and are auto-reaped. There are no
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accounts, no persistent storage, no money, and no sensitive content on the relay.
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- **The relay is a zero-persistence, in-memory message bus.** It temporarily holds room
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and peer state while forwarding play/pause/seek between peers who *chose* to watch
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together and joined via an invite link shared out-of-band.
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- **Participants are invited.** Anyone in a room was let in. The social contract is
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"we're watching a video together," not "mutually distrusting parties."
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### What we DO defend against
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- **Accidental disruption** — the entire point of Host Control Mode.
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- **Spam / DoS** that degrades the relay for everyone — rate limits, 4 KB payload cap,
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server-side gating, lazy-cached health responses.
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- **Resource exhaustion / memory leaks** — bounded maps, periodic cleanup, room/peer reaping.
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- **Crashes from malformed input** — strict sanitization and clamping of every field.
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- **Genuine boundary breaches** — admin-metrics auth (constant-time), CORS, WSS upgrade,
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invite-hash isolation, strict CSP. Reports here are very welcome (see `SECURITY.md`).
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### What we explicitly DO NOT defend against
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A **determined participant who modifies their own client to misbehave inside a room they
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were invited to.** The worst they achieve is sending playback commands or seizing the
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"host" role in a temporary room they could already disrupt by other means. That is a
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**social** problem, solved socially: kick them, or start a new room. Engineering real
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identity/auth to prevent it would destroy the account-less, frictionless, privacy-first
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design — a bad trade for an ad-hoc movie night.
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---
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## NOFIX entries
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### NOFIX-1 — `peerId` is unauthenticated; a crafted client can impersonate or seize the host
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**Flag:** `peerId` is client-asserted and broadcast to every peer (in `ROOM_DATA` /
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`PEER_STATUS`). A modified client can join with the host's `peerId`, dedupe-kick the real
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host, and become host — controlling or locking `host-only` mode.
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**Why NOFIX:** Requires a *modified client* + an *invited* participant + a `peerId` that is
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only meaningful inside that one *temporary* room. The payoff is sending play/pause or
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locking a room the attacker is already in — pure trolling, instantly reversible (kick /
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new room). Cryptographic per-user identity is wildly disproportionate for an ad-hoc,
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account-less, ephemeral watch party. **Out of threat model.**
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Do **not** "fix" with accounts, signed peerIds, or per-user tokens — that breaks the
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core design.
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### NOFIX-2 — Room-password comparison is not constant-time
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**Flag:** room password hashes are compared with `!==` (`server/index.js`), so the compare
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is theoretically timing-attackable.
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**Why NOFIX:** The compared value is an **HMAC-SHA256 hash that never leaves the server** —
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an attacker cannot observe it to mount a timing attack. Even a hypothetical success only
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lets someone join a *temporary* room to send playback commands. Not worth defending.
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(The admin-metrics bearer token — a real boundary — **does** use `crypto.timingSafeEqual`.
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That is the line we actually guard.)
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### NOFIX-3 — `OFFICIAL_SERVER_TOKEN` is public in the repo
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**Flag:** the connection token in `shared/constants.js` is committed, so anyone can connect.
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**Why NOFIX:** It is a **coarse filter** to keep random scanners off the relay, **not
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authentication**. The relay is a public message bus by design; rate limits and per-room
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behavior are the real protections.
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### NOFIX-4 — Room IDs are enumerable via `GET_ROOMS`
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**Flag:** any connected client can list all room IDs (and whether each has a password).
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**Why NOFIX:** This is the intended **"Public Rooms"** feature. Rooms wanting privacy set a
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password; listing the IDs of password-less rooms only lets someone join a watch party —
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the same as being handed the invite link.
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### NOFIX-5 — A pause/seek can only be reverted, not prevented
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**Flag:** in `host-only` mode a guest's pause still fires locally before the extension can
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react, so there is a brief flicker before snap-back.
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**Why NOFIX:** A content script cannot intercept a `<video>` event before the element
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acts. Reacting (snap-back) is the only option and is by design; the ~½s flicker is
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acceptable. Not a bug.
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---
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## Not NOFIX — just deferred (may be revisited)
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These are *not* accepted-forever; they are scoped out of v1 and tracked separately
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(see the host-control-mode design docs in `docs/`):
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- **Host grace on a long disconnect (EC-10).** A brief reconnect/second-tab keeps the host
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(handled), but a long real disconnect still falls back to `everyone`. A ~30s host-reserve
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grace could be added later.
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- **Intent-classifier / snap-back tuning.** Thresholds are first-pass; real-device testing
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may adjust them.
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