bump pointer: internal (bootstrap security findings built, D-377)

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Bootstrap hardening after a security review, and the MSI channel installs again (D-377)
2026-10-25 21:19:38 +00:00 · 2026-10-22 18:07:54 +02:00 · 2026-10-22 18:07:51 +02:00 · 2026-10-22 16:53:00 +02:00 · 2026-10-22 16:11:10 +02:00 · 2026-10-22 15:33:56 +02:00
513 changed files with 33132 additions and 5387 deletions
@@ -4,15 +4,16 @@

 .DESCRIPTION
    CI's member of the URL registry (Shared Constants.cs, web lib/config.ts, MCP src/config.ts):
-    every own host the workflows, the .github/scripts helpers and the local release build talk to,
-    plus the Authenticode timestamp server, is defined here once. Assert-HostsFromRegistry.ps1
-    (Workflow gates) fails on any of these hosts spelled out elsewhere under .github/.
+    every own host the workflows and the .github/scripts helpers talk to, plus the Authenticode
+    timestamp server, is defined here once. Assert-HostsFromRegistry.ps1 (Workflow gates) fails
+    on any of these hosts spelled out elsewhere under .github/.

    The storage URLs derive from the account name, so blob and table can never point at two
    different accounts.

-    A file in the repository rather than a GitHub variable: the local release build reads it too,
-    and bearer tokens are sent to these URLs -- where a token goes stays a reviewed line in git.
+    A file in the repository rather than a GitHub variable: the helpers read it themselves, so
+    they behave the same in every job and in a local run, and bearer tokens are sent to these
+    URLs -- where a token goes stays a reviewed line in git.

 .PARAMETER ExportToGitHubEnv
    Write every entry to $GITHUB_ENV instead of returning it, so the following steps of the job
@@ -9,8 +9,8 @@
    live here so they cannot drift between call sites.

    Identity comes from whatever `az login` established: the federated GitHub OIDC principal
-    in CI (azure/login, subject repo:okieselbach/AutopilotMonitor:ref:refs/heads/main), the
-    operator's own account for the local build. No secret is read, stored or passed around.
+    in CI (azure/login in a job of the `production` or `release` environment), the operator's
+    own account when a helper runs locally. No secret is read, stored or passed around.
    Under GitHub Actions the token is masked in the run log before it is returned.

    x-ms-version is MANDATORY here, not decoration: Entra-authorized requests are rejected
@@ -0,0 +1,72 @@
+<#
+.SYNOPSIS
+    Runs the bootstrap integration tests once as SYSTEM, the account the bootstrap runs as on a device.
+
+.DESCRIPTION
+    Registers a one-time scheduled task as SYSTEM that runs
+    scripts/Bootstrap/Bootstrap.Integration.Tests.ps1 under Windows PowerShell 5.1, waits for it,
+    prints its output and fails when the run did not happen as SYSTEM or a test failed. Run as
+    SYSTEM, the tests use the real folder permissions, including Administrators as owner.
+
+    CI only (bootstrap-script-gates.yml): it needs an elevated runner and Pester installed for all
+    users.
+#>
+[CmdletBinding()]
+param(
+    [string]$RepoRoot = (Resolve-Path (Join-Path $PSScriptRoot '../..')).Path,
+    [int]$TimeoutMinutes = 20
+)
+
+$ErrorActionPreference = 'Stop'
+
+$work = Join-Path ([System.IO.Path]::GetTempPath()) "apm-system-pass-$PID"
+New-Item -ItemType Directory -Force -Path $work | Out-Null
+$runner = Join-Path $work 'run.ps1'
+$output = Join-Path $work 'output.txt'
+$result = Join-Path $work 'result.txt'
+$tests = Join-Path $RepoRoot 'scripts\Bootstrap\Bootstrap.Integration.Tests.ps1'
+
+$runnerText = @'
+$ErrorActionPreference = 'Stop'
+$identity = [System.Security.Principal.WindowsIdentity]::GetCurrent().User.Value
+try {
+    Import-Module Pester -MinimumVersion 5.5.0
+    $configuration = New-PesterConfiguration
+    $configuration.Run.Path = '__TESTS__'
+    $configuration.Run.PassThru = $true
+    $configuration.Output.Verbosity = 'Detailed'
+    $run = Invoke-Pester -Configuration $configuration
+    Set-Content -LiteralPath '__RESULT__' -Value ('{0}|{1}|{2}' -f $identity, $run.PassedCount, $run.FailedCount)
+} catch {
+    Set-Content -LiteralPath '__RESULT__' -Value ('{0}|error|{1}' -f $identity, $_.Exception.Message)
+}
+'@
+Set-Content -LiteralPath $runner -Encoding ASCII -Value ($runnerText.Replace('__TESTS__', $tests).Replace('__RESULT__', $result))
+
+$taskName = "apm-bootstrap-system-pass-$PID"
+$arguments = "-NoProfile -ExecutionPolicy Bypass -Command `"& '$runner' *> '$output'`""
+$action = New-ScheduledTaskAction -Execute "$env:SystemRoot\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe" -Argument $arguments
+$principal = New-ScheduledTaskPrincipal -UserId 'S-1-5-18' -LogonType ServiceAccount -RunLevel Highest
+Register-ScheduledTask -TaskName $taskName -Action $action -Principal $principal -Force | Out-Null
+try {
+    Start-ScheduledTask -TaskName $taskName
+    $deadline = (Get-Date).AddMinutes($TimeoutMinutes)
+    do {
+        Start-Sleep -Seconds 5
+        $state = (Get-ScheduledTask -TaskName $taskName).State
+    } while ($state -eq 'Running' -and (Get-Date) -lt $deadline)
+    if ($state -eq 'Running') {
+        Stop-ScheduledTask -TaskName $taskName
+        throw "The SYSTEM pass did not finish within $TimeoutMinutes minutes."
+    }
+} finally {
+    Unregister-ScheduledTask -TaskName $taskName -Confirm:$false
+}
+
+if (Test-Path -LiteralPath $output) { Get-Content -LiteralPath $output }
+if (-not (Test-Path -LiteralPath $result)) { throw 'The SYSTEM pass wrote no result.' }
+$identity, $passed, $failed = (Get-Content -LiteralPath $result -Raw).Trim().Split('|', 3)
+if ($identity -ne 'S-1-5-18') { throw "The SYSTEM pass ran as $identity, not as SYSTEM." }
+if ($passed -eq 'error') { throw "The SYSTEM pass could not run the tests: $failed" }
+if ([int]$failed -gt 0 -or [int]$passed -eq 0) { throw "SYSTEM pass: $passed passed, $failed failed." }
+Write-Host "SYSTEM pass: $passed passed, 0 failed."
@@ -17,7 +17,7 @@
    cosmetics.

    Steps, in order:
-      1. Parse $ScriptVersion from the loader and the bootstrap source.
+      1. Parse the $ScriptVersion line from the loader and the bootstrap source.
      2. Render the -Dev variants by literal substitution of the URL/manifest
         defaults. A missing anchor is a hard failure -- a silently un-substituted
         dev script would point the dev fleet at the stable agent.
@@ -25,17 +25,21 @@
         carries the same $ScriptVersion, abort. Otherwise the docs badge,
         version.json.bootstrapVersion and the portal's "your script is outdated"
         hint would all keep asserting a version that is no longer what ships.
-      4. Build the publish set (loader, bootstrap, both dev renders, the extras).
+      4. Build the publish set: both installers, then both loaders, then the extras.
+         A loader that went live before the installer it requires would refuse the
+         installer still being served. -Channel dev keeps only the two -Dev renders.
      5. Authenticode-sign every script (see -SigningToken). Signing is the LAST
         transformation: it covers the exact CRLF/UTF-8 bytes that get uploaded,
         and nothing may touch them afterwards or the signature breaks.
-      6. Upload every script blob with Cache-Control: no-cache (they rotate in
+      6. Run the loader's own identity check on the exact bytes of both installers:
+         what fails here, every device would refuse.
+      7. Upload every script blob with Cache-Control: no-cache (they rotate in
         place), mirrored fail-soft to the legacy account.
-      7. Reconcile the version oracles: version.json.bootstrapVersion and
-         .loaderVersion (read-modify-write under If-Match, so a concurrent agent
+      8. Reconcile the version oracles (release channel only): version.json.bootstrapVersion
+         and .loaderVersion (read-modify-write under If-Match, so a concurrent agent
         release cannot lose its agent fields) and
         AdminConfiguration.LatestBootstrapV2ScriptVersion.
-      8. Verify through the alias -- re-download each blob and compare SHA-256.
+      9. Verify through the alias -- re-download each blob and compare SHA-256.

    Comparisons against a published script always strip its signature block first
    (Get-ComparableText). A signature carries a timestamp, so signed bytes differ on
@@ -67,6 +71,11 @@
    Optional directory that receives a copy of every published file exactly as uploaded.
    Used by CI to offer the signed scripts as a build artifact for local inspection.

+.PARAMETER Channel
+    release (default): every script, plus version.json and the portal's script version.
+    dev: only Start-AutopilotMonitor-Dev.ps1 and Install-AutopilotMonitor-Dev.ps1, so a
+    script change can run on dev devices, signed, before it goes to customers.
+
 .EXAMPLE
    ./Publish-BootstrapScripts.ps1 -DryRun

@@ -83,6 +92,8 @@ param(
    [string]$CertificateName,
    [string]$ExpectedPublisher,
    [string]$SignedOutputDir,
+    [ValidateSet('release', 'dev')]
+    [string]$Channel = 'release',
    [switch]$DryRun
 )

@@ -293,7 +304,9 @@ function Assert-VersionBump {

 function Get-BootstrapScriptVersion {
    param([string]$Content, [string]$Origin, [switch]$Optional)
-    if ($Content -match '\$ScriptVersion\s*=\s*"([\d\.\-a-zA-Z]+)"') { return $Matches[1] }
+    # The assignment line itself, as the loader reads it: a comment or help text that mentions
+    # $ScriptVersion must not count.
+    if ($Content -match '(?m)^\$ScriptVersion[ \t]*=[ \t]*"([\d\.\-a-zA-Z]+)"[ \t]*\r?$') { return $Matches[1] }
    # Unreadable SOURCE is fatal. An unreadable PUBLISHED copy must not be: that is exactly
    # the state a republish is meant to repair, and a guard that blocks the repair is worse
    # than no guard.
@@ -301,6 +314,19 @@ function Get-BootstrapScriptVersion {
    throw "Could not parse ScriptVersion from $Origin"
 }

+# The loader's own check, run on the exact bytes that will be served: dot-sourced in this
+# function's scope, so none of the loader's variables reach the publisher's.
+function Assert-LoaderAcceptsInstaller {
+    param([object]$Item, [string]$WorkDir)
+    New-Item -ItemType Directory -Force -Path $WorkDir | Out-Null
+    $path = Join-Path $WorkDir $Item.BlobName
+    [System.IO.File]::WriteAllBytes($path, [byte[]]$Item.Bytes)
+    . $LoaderSource
+    if (-not (Test-InstallerIdentity -Path $path)) {
+        throw "The loader would refuse $($Item.BlobName) (role or minimum version). Nothing was uploaded."
+    }
+}
+
 # What the script actually DOES, with comments and layout removed: the PowerShell token
 # stream minus comments, newlines and line continuations. Lets the version-bump guard tell
 # a behaviour change (must be versioned -- consumers act on the version) apart from a
@@ -353,8 +379,11 @@ $devLoaderContent = $loaderContent.Replace($stableLoaderLiteral, $devLoaderLiter
 Write-Host "Rendered $LoaderDevBlob (points at $DevBlob)"

 # ------------------------------------------------------------------ 3. bump guards
-Assert-VersionBump -BlobName $BootstrapBlob -SourceContent $sourceContent -SourceOrigin $BootstrapSource -SourceVersion $scriptVersion
-Assert-VersionBump -BlobName $LoaderBlob    -SourceContent $loaderContent -SourceOrigin $LoaderSource    -SourceVersion $loaderVersion
+# The versions are what customers act on, so the guard watches the release blobs only.
+if ($Channel -eq 'release') {
+    Assert-VersionBump -BlobName $BootstrapBlob -SourceContent $sourceContent -SourceOrigin $BootstrapSource -SourceVersion $scriptVersion
+    Assert-VersionBump -BlobName $LoaderBlob    -SourceContent $loaderContent -SourceOrigin $LoaderSource    -SourceVersion $loaderVersion
+}

 # ------------------------------------------------------------------ 4. publish set
 # Sources beyond the bootstrap pair, read straight from the repo.
@@ -369,10 +398,15 @@ $extraSources = @(
 # Text is the unsigned publish form and stays the reference for every comparison against a
 # published copy; Bytes is what goes on the wire and carries the signature after step 4.
 $publishSet = [System.Collections.Generic.List[object]]::new()
-$publishSet.Add([pscustomobject]@{ BlobName = $LoaderBlob;    Text = $loaderContent;    Bytes = (Get-PublishBytes $loaderContent) })
-$publishSet.Add([pscustomobject]@{ BlobName = $LoaderDevBlob; Text = $devLoaderContent; Bytes = (Get-PublishBytes $devLoaderContent) })
 $publishSet.Add([pscustomobject]@{ BlobName = $BootstrapBlob; Text = $sourceContent;    Bytes = $sourceBytes })
 $publishSet.Add([pscustomobject]@{ BlobName = $DevBlob;       Text = $devContent;       Bytes = (Get-PublishBytes $devContent) })
+$publishSet.Add([pscustomobject]@{ BlobName = $LoaderBlob;    Text = $loaderContent;    Bytes = (Get-PublishBytes $loaderContent) })
+$publishSet.Add([pscustomobject]@{ BlobName = $LoaderDevBlob; Text = $devLoaderContent; Bytes = (Get-PublishBytes $devLoaderContent) })
+if ($Channel -eq 'dev') {
+    $publishSet = [System.Collections.Generic.List[object]]@($publishSet | Where-Object { $_.BlobName -in @($DevBlob, $LoaderDevBlob) })
+    $extraSources = @()
+    Write-Host "Channel dev: publishing $DevBlob and $LoaderDevBlob only"
+}
 foreach ($extra in $extraSources) {
    $extraPath = Join-Path $RepoRoot $extra.Path
    if (-not (Test-Path $extraPath)) {
@@ -391,13 +425,18 @@ if ($SigningEnabled) {
    Write-Host '::warning::No signing token supplied -- dry run continues with unsigned scripts.'
 }

+# ------------------------------------------------------------------ 6. loader check
+foreach ($item in @($publishSet | Where-Object { $_.BlobName -in @($BootstrapBlob, $DevBlob) })) {
+    Assert-LoaderAcceptsInstaller -Item $item -WorkDir (Join-Path ([System.IO.Path]::GetTempPath()) "apm-publish-check-$PID")
+}
+
 $legacySas = if ($LegacySasToken) { $LegacySasToken.TrimStart('?') } else { '' }

 # Acquired lazily: a dry run must stay runnable without any Azure login -- the PR gate
 # (bootstrap-script-gates.yml) executes this script with -DryRun and never logs in.
 $authHeaders = if ($DryRun) { $null } else { & (Join-Path $PSScriptRoot 'Get-StorageAuthHeaders.ps1') }

-# ------------------------------------------------------------------ 6. upload
+# ------------------------------------------------------------------ 7. upload
 foreach ($item in $publishSet) {
    # Explicit type, not a convenience: an Object[] body is uploaded as space-separated
    # decimals rather than raw bytes, and every hash check still passes because [byte[]]
@@ -464,11 +503,12 @@ foreach ($item in $publishSet) {
    }
 }

-# ------------------------------------------------------------------ 7. version oracles
+# ------------------------------------------------------------------ 8. version oracles
 # version.json is the agent manifest; only bootstrapVersion belongs to us. Read from the
 # blob (not the alias) for an authoritative ETag, write back under If-Match so a concurrent
-# agent release cannot lose its version/sha256 fields.
-if (-not $DryRun) {
+# agent release cannot lose its version/sha256 fields. They describe the release scripts, so
+# a dev publish leaves them alone.
+if (-not $DryRun -and $Channel -eq 'release') {
    try {
        $manifestResp = Invoke-WebRequest -Uri "$ContainerUrl/version.json" -Method Get -UseBasicParsing
        $manifestRaw = if ($manifestResp.Content -is [byte[]]) {
@@ -512,7 +552,9 @@ if (-not $DryRun) {
    }
 }

-if ($DryRun) {
+if ($Channel -ne 'release') {
+    Write-Host "Channel dev: version.json and AdminConfiguration.LatestBootstrapV2ScriptVersion stay as they are"
+} elseif ($DryRun) {
    Write-Host "  [dry-run] would set AdminConfiguration.LatestBootstrapV2ScriptVersion = $scriptVersion"
 } else {
    $tableHeaders = @{
@@ -525,7 +567,7 @@ if ($DryRun) {
    Write-Host "AdminConfiguration.LatestBootstrapV2ScriptVersion = $scriptVersion"
 }

-# ------------------------------------------------------------------ 8. verify via alias
+# ------------------------------------------------------------------ 9. verify via alias
 if (-not $DryRun) {
    $pending = [System.Collections.ArrayList]::new()
    $publishSet | ForEach-Object { [void]$pending.Add($_) }
@@ -555,7 +597,7 @@ if (-not $DryRun) {
 if ($env:GITHUB_STEP_SUMMARY) {
    $mode = if ($DryRun) { 'DRY RUN -- nothing uploaded' } else { 'published + verified via the download alias' }
    $summary = @(
-        "### Bootstrap scripts: $mode",
+        "### Bootstrap scripts: $mode (channel $Channel)",
        '',
        "Loader script version: **$loaderVersion** | Bootstrap script version: **$scriptVersion**",
        "Signed: **$(if ($SigningEnabled) { "yes, certificate '$CertificateName'" } else { 'NO (unsigned dry run)' })**",
@@ -0,0 +1,176 @@
+<#
+.SYNOPSIS
+    Checks the bootstrap's folders against a real standard user.
+
+.DESCRIPTION
+    Creates a temporary local standard user and, with that user's token, tries what any local user
+    on an enrolling device could try against the folders the loader and the installer create:
+    write, change, rename and delete files, add entries, move or delete the folder. Every attempt
+    must be denied. Folders the user creates first, or entries the user plants in an unprotected
+    agent folder of an older installer, must make the installer stop instead of installing into
+    them. A control attempt proves the user can write where users may.
+
+    The folders come from the installer's own functions, in a scratch copy of ProgramData that
+    carries the real ProgramData permissions.
+
+    CI only (bootstrap-script-gates.yml): it needs an elevated runner, and it creates a local
+    account and removes it again.
+#>
+[CmdletBinding()]
+param(
+    [string]$RepoRoot = (Resolve-Path (Join-Path $PSScriptRoot '../..')).Path
+)
+
+$ErrorActionPreference = 'Stop'
+
+# The user's token, for impersonation in this process (a CI helper; customer scripts never
+# compile code).
+Add-Type -Namespace ApmCi -Name Native -MemberDefinition @'
+[DllImport("advapi32.dll", SetLastError = true, CharSet = CharSet.Unicode)]
+public static extern bool LogonUser(string user, string domain, string password, int logonType, int logonProvider, out Microsoft.Win32.SafeHandles.SafeAccessTokenHandle token);
+'@
+
+. (Join-Path $RepoRoot 'scripts\Bootstrap\Install-AutopilotMonitor.ps1')
+
+$results = New-Object System.Collections.Generic.List[object]
+
+function Invoke-AsUser {
+    param([scriptblock]$Action)
+    [System.Security.Principal.WindowsIdentity]::RunImpersonated($script:token, [Action]$Action)
+}
+
+# An attempt the user must not get through: it has to fail with "access denied", not with
+# any other error that would only hide a broken test.
+function Assert-Denied {
+    param([string]$Name, [scriptblock]$Attempt)
+    $outcome = 'allowed'
+    try {
+        Invoke-AsUser $Attempt
+    } catch {
+        $base = $_.Exception.GetBaseException()
+        $outcome = if ($base -is [System.UnauthorizedAccessException] -or $base.HResult -eq -2147024891) { 'denied' } else { "error: $($base.Message)" }
+    }
+    $results.Add([pscustomobject]@{ Check = $Name; Expected = 'denied'; Actual = $outcome })
+}
+
+function Assert-That {
+    param([string]$Name, [bool]$Condition, [string]$Detail = '')
+    $results.Add([pscustomobject]@{ Check = $Name; Expected = 'true'; Actual = $(if ($Condition) { 'true' } else { "false $Detail".Trim() }) })
+}
+
+# What a bootstrap running as SYSTEM leaves as owner; the default for other admin-created
+# entries differs between Windows editions.
+function Set-AdministratorsOwner {
+    param([string]$Path)
+    $security = (Get-Item -LiteralPath $Path -Force).GetAccessControl('Owner')
+    $security.SetOwner((New-Object System.Security.Principal.SecurityIdentifier('S-1-5-32-544')))
+    (Get-Item -LiteralPath $Path -Force).SetAccessControl($security)
+}
+
+$name = 'apm-ci-' + [guid]::NewGuid().ToString('N').Substring(0, 8)
+$password = [guid]::NewGuid().ToString('N') + 'Aa1!'
+$root = Join-Path $env:SystemDrive ('apm-ci-' + [guid]::NewGuid().ToString('N').Substring(0, 8))
+$pd = Join-Path $root 'ProgramData'
+
+New-LocalUser -Name $name -Password (ConvertTo-SecureString $password -AsPlainText -Force) -AccountNeverExpires -PasswordNeverExpires | Out-Null
+try {
+    try { Add-LocalGroupMember -SID 'S-1-5-32-545' -Member $name } catch { if ($_.FullyQualifiedErrorId -notlike 'MemberExists*') { throw } }
+    $token = $null
+    # Interactive logon first (what a local user has); network logon where a server allows no
+    # local logon for Users.
+    if (-not [ApmCi.Native]::LogonUser($name, '.', $password, 2, 0, [ref]$token) -and
+        -not [ApmCi.Native]::LogonUser($name, '.', $password, 3, 0, [ref]$token)) {
+        throw "LogonUser failed with Win32 error $([System.Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::GetLastWin32Error())."
+    }
+    $script:token = $token
+    $userSid = (New-Object System.Security.Principal.NTAccount($name)).Translate([System.Security.Principal.SecurityIdentifier])
+    $script:probe = $null
+    Invoke-AsUser { $script:probe = [System.Security.Principal.WindowsIdentity]::GetCurrent() }
+    Assert-That 'impersonation runs as the test user' ($script:probe.User -eq $userSid) "$($script:probe.User)"
+    Assert-That 'the test user is no administrator' (-not (New-Object System.Security.Principal.WindowsPrincipal($script:probe)).IsInRole([System.Security.Principal.WindowsBuiltInRole]::Administrator))
+
+    # A scratch ProgramData with the real one's permissions.
+    New-Item -ItemType Directory -Path $pd -Force | Out-Null
+    $security = New-Object System.Security.AccessControl.DirectorySecurity
+    $security.SetSecurityDescriptorSddlForm((Get-Acl -LiteralPath $env:ProgramData).GetSecurityDescriptorSddlForm('Access'), 'Access')
+    # Nothing from the drive root, whose default lets authenticated users change subfolders.
+    $security.SetAccessRuleProtection($true, $false)
+    (Get-Item -LiteralPath $pd).SetAccessControl($security)
+
+    # Control: the user may create in ProgramData, so every denial below is the folders' doing.
+    $control = Join-Path $pd 'user-may-create-here'
+    Invoke-AsUser { [System.IO.Directory]::CreateDirectory($control) | Out-Null; [System.IO.File]::WriteAllText((Join-Path $control 'x.txt'), 'x') }
+    Assert-That 'control: the user can create in ProgramData' (Test-Path -LiteralPath (Join-Path $control 'x.txt'))
+
+    # The loader's run folder with a downloaded installer in it.
+    $run = New-RunFolder -Parent $pd -Prefix 'AutopilotMonitor-Loader-'
+    $download = Join-Path $run 'Install-AutopilotMonitor.ps1'
+    [System.IO.File]::WriteAllText($download, 'verified installer')
+    Assert-Denied 'run folder: add a file' { [System.IO.File]::WriteAllText((Join-Path $run 'planted.ps1'), 'x') }
+    Assert-Denied 'run folder: add a folder or link' { [System.IO.Directory]::CreateDirectory((Join-Path $run 'planted')) | Out-Null }
+    Assert-Denied 'run folder: change the download' { [System.IO.File]::AppendAllText($download, 'tampered') }
+    Assert-Denied 'run folder: replace the download' { [System.IO.File]::WriteAllText($download, 'replaced') }
+    Assert-Denied 'run folder: rename the download' { [System.IO.File]::Move($download, $download + '.old') }
+    Assert-Denied 'run folder: delete the download' { [System.IO.File]::Delete($download) }
+    Assert-Denied 'run folder: rename the folder' { [System.IO.Directory]::Move($run, $run + '-moved') }
+    Assert-Denied 'run folder: delete the folder' { [System.IO.Directory]::Delete($run, $true) }
+    Assert-That 'run folder: the download is unchanged' ([System.IO.File]::ReadAllText($download) -eq 'verified installer')
+
+    # The agent folder an install prepares.
+    $base = Join-Path $pd 'AutopilotMonitor'
+    Initialize-AgentBase -Path $base
+    $logs = [System.IO.Directory]::CreateDirectory((Join-Path $base 'Logs')).FullName
+    [System.IO.File]::WriteAllText((Join-Path $logs 'bootstrap-script.log'), 'log')
+    Assert-Denied 'agent folder: add a file' { [System.IO.File]::WriteAllText((Join-Path $base 'planted.dll'), 'x') }
+    Assert-Denied 'agent folder: add a folder or link' { [System.IO.Directory]::CreateDirectory((Join-Path $base 'Agent')) | Out-Null }
+    Assert-Denied 'agent folder: change a log' { [System.IO.File]::AppendAllText((Join-Path $logs 'bootstrap-script.log'), 'x') }
+    Assert-Denied 'agent folder: delete a log' { [System.IO.File]::Delete((Join-Path $logs 'bootstrap-script.log')) }
+    Assert-Denied 'agent folder: rename the folder' { [System.IO.Directory]::Move($base, $base + '-moved') }
+    $owner = (Get-Item -LiteralPath $base).GetAccessControl('Owner').GetOwner([System.Security.Principal.SecurityIdentifier]).Value
+    Assert-That 'agent folder: owned by Administrators' ($owner -eq 'S-1-5-32-544') $owner
+    [System.IO.Directory]::Delete($base, $true)
+
+    # The user creates the agent folder first: the installer must neither install into it nor
+    # remove it.
+    Invoke-AsUser { [System.IO.Directory]::CreateDirectory($base) | Out-Null; [System.IO.File]::WriteAllText((Join-Path $base 'planted.dll'), 'x') }
+    Assert-That 'squatted agent folder: seen as another account''s' ((Get-FolderState $base) -eq 'Foreign')
+    $refused = $false
+    try { Initialize-AgentBase -Path $base } catch { $refused = $_.Exception.Message -like '*(Foreign); not installing into it.' }
+    Assert-That 'squatted agent folder: the install refuses it' $refused
+    Assert-That 'squatted agent folder: a skip leaves it' ((Remove-AgentBaseOnSkip -Path $base) -like '*left as it is (Foreign).')
+    Assert-That 'squatted agent folder: the planted file stays' (Test-Path -LiteralPath (Join-Path $base 'planted.dll'))
+    [System.IO.Directory]::Delete($base, $true)
+
+    # An agent folder an older installer created without protection: the user plants a file,
+    # the install protects the folder and stops at the planted file.
+    [System.IO.Directory]::CreateDirectory($base) | Out-Null
+    [System.IO.File]::WriteAllText((Join-Path $base 'old-installer.log'), 'old')
+    Set-AdministratorsOwner $base
+    Set-AdministratorsOwner (Join-Path $base 'old-installer.log')
+    Invoke-AsUser { [System.IO.File]::WriteAllText((Join-Path $base 'planted.dll'), 'x') }
+    $refused = $false
+    try { Initialize-AgentBase -Path $base } catch { $refused = $_.Exception.Message -like '*holds entries another account created*' }
+    Assert-That 'planted entry: the install stops' $refused
+    Assert-That 'planted entry: own leftovers are gone, the planted file stays' ((-not (Test-Path -LiteralPath (Join-Path $base 'old-installer.log'))) -and (Test-Path -LiteralPath (Join-Path $base 'planted.dll')))
+    Assert-Denied 'planted entry: the protected folder takes no more' { [System.IO.File]::WriteAllText((Join-Path $base 'second.dll'), 'x') }
+    [System.IO.Directory]::Delete($base, $true)
+
+    # The user creates a run folder name first: it is never used.
+    $squatted = Join-Path $pd 'AutopilotMonitor-Loader-00000000'
+    Invoke-AsUser { [System.IO.Directory]::CreateDirectory($squatted) | Out-Null }
+    $script:names = [System.Collections.Generic.Queue[string]]::new([string[]]@('00000000', '11111111'))
+    function New-RunFolderName { return $script:names.Dequeue() }
+    $fresh = New-RunFolder -Parent $pd -Prefix 'AutopilotMonitor-Loader-'
+    Assert-That 'squatted run folder: a new name is drawn' ($fresh -eq (Join-Path $pd 'AutopilotMonitor-Loader-11111111')) $fresh
+    $squattedOwner = (Get-Item -LiteralPath $squatted).GetAccessControl('Owner').GetOwner([System.Security.Principal.SecurityIdentifier])
+    Assert-That 'squatted run folder: still the user''s, untouched' ($squattedOwner -eq $userSid)
+} finally {
+    if ($script:token) { $script:token.Dispose() }
+    Remove-LocalUser -Name $name -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
+    if (Test-Path -LiteralPath $root) { Remove-Item -LiteralPath $root -Recurse -Force -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue }
+}
+
+$results | Format-Table -AutoSize | Out-String -Width 200 | Write-Host
+$failed = @($results | Where-Object { $_.Actual -ne $_.Expected })
+if ($failed.Count -gt 0) { throw "Attacker test: $($failed.Count) of $($results.Count) checks failed." }
+Write-Host "Attacker test: all $($results.Count) checks passed."
@@ -15,21 +15,28 @@ permissions:

 jobs:
  gates:
-    name: Bootstrap guard tests (PS 5.1)
-    runs-on: windows-latest
+    name: Bootstrap guard tests (PS 5.1, ${{ matrix.os }})
+    strategy:
+      fail-fast: false
+      matrix:
+        # Folder permissions and Windows PowerShell 5.1 come with the OS, so both server images.
+        os: [windows-2022, windows-2025]
+    runs-on: ${{ matrix.os }}
    steps:
      - uses: actions/checkout@3d3c42e5aac5ba805825da76410c181273ba90b1 # v7.0.1
        with:
          persist-credentials: false

+      # For all users: the SYSTEM pass below runs Pester as SYSTEM.
      - name: Install Pester 5+
        shell: powershell
        run: |
-          Install-PackageProvider -Name NuGet -MinimumVersion 2.8.5.201 -Force -Scope CurrentUser | Out-Null
-          Install-Module Pester -Scope CurrentUser -Force -SkipPublisherCheck -MinimumVersion 5.5.0
+          Install-PackageProvider -Name NuGet -MinimumVersion 2.8.5.201 -Force -Scope AllUsers | Out-Null
+          Install-Module Pester -Scope AllUsers -Force -SkipPublisherCheck -MinimumVersion 5.5.0

      # Windows PowerShell 5.1 on purpose: that is the runtime IME uses to execute
      # platform scripts, so guard/relax logic is verified without resetting a device.
+      # The runner is elevated, so the integration tests use the real folder permissions.
      - name: Run Pester
        shell: powershell
        run: |
@@ -40,11 +47,20 @@ jobs:
          $c.Output.Verbosity = 'Detailed'
          Invoke-Pester -Configuration $c

+      # On a device the bootstrap runs as SYSTEM: the integration tests once more as SYSTEM.
+      - name: Integration tests as SYSTEM
+        shell: powershell
+        run: ./.github/scripts/Invoke-BootstrapSystemPass.ps1
+
+      - name: Folder permissions against a real standard user
+        shell: powershell
+        run: ./.github/scripts/Test-BootstrapAttacker.ps1
+
      - name: Guard scripts stay pure ASCII
        shell: powershell
        run: |
          $failed = $false
-          Get-ChildItem 'scripts/Bootstrap' -Filter '*.ps1' | ForEach-Object {
+          Get-ChildItem 'scripts/Bootstrap' -Filter '*.ps1' -Recurse | ForEach-Object {
            $bytes = [System.IO.File]::ReadAllBytes($_.FullName)
            for ($i = 0; $i -lt $bytes.Length; $i++) {
              if ($bytes[$i] -gt 127) {
@@ -57,6 +73,15 @@ jobs:
          if ($failed) { exit 1 }
          Write-Host 'All bootstrap scripts are pure ASCII.'

+      - uses: actions/setup-dotnet@a98b56852c35b8e3190ac28c8c2271da59106c68 # v6.0.0
+        with:
+          dotnet-version: '10.0.x'
+
+      # The names and log lines the scripts share with the agent, checked against the agent's
+      # own code.
+      - name: Script contracts with the agent
+        run: dotnet test src/Agent/AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests --configuration Release --filter "Category=BootstrapContract" --logger "console;verbosity=normal"
+
      # The publish chain renders the -Dev variant by literal substitution and refuses to
      # ship when an anchor moved. Running it dry here surfaces that (and any drift against
      # the alias) on the PR instead of on the push that would have published.
@@ -7,6 +7,14 @@ on:
        description: 'Build number override (leave empty to auto-increment from buildcounter.txt)'
        required: false
        type: string
+      channel:
+        description: 'release = versioned line (+ stable on cutover). dev = lab channel only (Agent-v2-dev.zip, version-v2-dev.json, Agent-dev.zip, version-dev.json); needs publish_as_stable=false and create_release=false'
+        required: true
+        type: choice
+        options:
+          - release
+          - dev
+        default: release
      upload_blob:
        description: 'Upload to versioned namespace (Agent-v2.zip + version-v2.json)'
        required: true
@@ -60,6 +68,15 @@ env:
  VERSIONED_ZIP: AutopilotMonitor-Agent-v2.zip
  STABLE_ZIP: AutopilotMonitor-Agent.zip
  STABLE_MANIFEST: version.json
+  # Lab channel (channel=dev): the names the dev renders of the bootstrap scripts read.
+  CHANNEL: ${{ inputs.channel }}
+  DEV_VERSIONED_ZIP: AutopilotMonitor-Agent-v2-dev.zip
+  DEV_MANIFEST: version-v2-dev.json
+  DEV_STABLE_ZIP: AutopilotMonitor-Agent-dev.zip
+  DEV_STABLE_MANIFEST: version-dev.json
+  # Signed catalog over every other file of the payload. Must equal
+  # Constants.AgentPayloadCatalogFileName; CodeSigningParityTests keeps them in step.
+  PAYLOAD_CATALOG: AutopilotMonitor.Agent.cat
  # Authenticode via Azure Key Vault; identity and vault come from repository variables, the
  # timestamp server (CODE_SIGN_TIMESTAMP_URL) from the endpoint registry like every host here.
  # CODE_SIGN_EXPECTED_SUBJECT is optional and pins the publisher in the verify step.
@@ -106,6 +123,22 @@ jobs:
          }
          Write-Host "Code-signing configuration present (certificate '$env:CODE_SIGN_CERTIFICATE_NAME')"

+      # The dev channel is a lab channel: it never touches stable, AdminConfiguration, the
+      # bootstrap scripts or a GitHub Release. Refused here, before a build number is burnt.
+      - name: Check channel inputs
+        shell: pwsh
+        env:
+          PUBLISH_AS_STABLE: ${{ inputs.publish_as_stable }}
+          CREATE_RELEASE: ${{ inputs.create_release }}
+        run: |
+          if ($env:CHANNEL -notin @('release', 'dev')) {
+            throw "Unknown channel '$($env:CHANNEL)'."
+          }
+          if ($env:CHANNEL -eq 'dev' -and ($env:PUBLISH_AS_STABLE -eq 'true' -or $env:CREATE_RELEASE -eq 'true')) {
+            throw "channel=dev publishes the lab channel only: run it with publish_as_stable=false and create_release=false."
+          }
+          Write-Host "Channel: $env:CHANNEL"
+
      - name: Login to Azure (OIDC)
        uses: azure/login@a641126d1b8aa4d1fa005f4f92df94a3a4c4c906 # v3.1.0
        with:
@@ -222,14 +255,17 @@ jobs:
          retention-days: 1

  # Trust zone: only this repository's scripts, pinned actions and the pinned signing tool
-  # run here -- never a restore or build. The build output arrives as data.
+  # run here -- never a restore or build. The build output arrives as data. The runner
+  # image's Windows SDK signtool is used read-only, to verify third-party signatures.
  #
-  # No `environment:` yet: the code-signing credential is still bound to the ref, and a job
-  # carries exactly one OIDC subject, so an environment here would break the signing login.
+  # Runs in the `release` environment: both identities trust its subject, and it admits main
+  # only. No federated credential trusts the ref, so a job without an environment can neither
+  # sign nor write storage, whatever its permissions say.
  release:
    name: Sign and publish
    needs: [reserve, build]
    runs-on: windows-latest
+    environment: release
    permissions:
      contents: write      # tag + GitHub Release
      id-token: write      # code-signing and storage logins, keyless Sigstore signing
@@ -353,8 +389,7 @@ jobs:
            throw "azuresigntool failed with exit code $LASTEXITCODE -- aborting before anything is published."
          }

-      - name: Create release artifact
-        id: artifact
+      - name: Stage release payload
        shell: pwsh
        run: |
          $version = $env:AGENT_VERSION
@@ -399,6 +434,98 @@ jobs:
          }
          Write-Host "Version check passed: EXE = manifest = reserved = $version"

+      # Third-party code enters the payload only with its vendor's own signature: every PE that
+      # is not ours needs a valid EMBEDDED Authenticode signature from an allowed vendor. Embedded
+      # only (signtool verify /pa, no /a): Get-AuthenticodeSignature prefers the runner's Windows
+      # catalogs and reports "Microsoft Windows" for files Windows happens to ship as well. An
+      # unsigned file or a new vendor stops the release until a person decides. This guards the
+      # bytes we did not write; a build that alters our own code is D-346's remaining risk.
+      - name: Check third-party signatures
+        shell: pwsh
+        run: |
+          $ErrorActionPreference = 'Stop'
+          $allowedVendors = @('Microsoft Corporation', 'Json.NET (.NET Foundation)')
+
+          $signtool = Get-ChildItem "${env:ProgramFiles(x86)}\Windows Kits\10\bin\*\x64\signtool.exe" -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue |
+            Where-Object { $_.Directory.Parent.Name -match '^\d+(\.\d+){1,3}$' } |
+            Sort-Object { [version]$_.Directory.Parent.Name } -Descending |
+            Select-Object -First 1
+          if (-not $signtool) { throw "signtool.exe not found in the runner image's Windows SDK." }
+          Write-Host "Using $($signtool.FullName)"
+
+          $failed = $false
+          $checked = 0
+          foreach ($file in Get-ChildItem -Path 'staging/agent' -Recurse -File) {
+            # A PE by content (MZ header), not by extension.
+            $head = [byte[]]::new(2)
+            $stream = [System.IO.File]::OpenRead($file.FullName)
+            try { $read = $stream.Read($head, 0, 2) } finally { $stream.Dispose() }
+            if ($read -lt 2 -or $head[0] -ne 0x4D -or $head[1] -ne 0x5A) { continue }
+            if ($file.Name -like 'AutopilotMonitor.*') { continue }   # ours: the verify step pins them
+
+            $checked++
+            $output = & $signtool.FullName verify /pa $file.FullName 2>&1
+            if ($LASTEXITCODE -ne 0) {
+              Write-Host "::error file=$($file.Name)::No valid embedded vendor signature. $(($output | Out-String).Trim())"
+              $failed = $true
+              continue
+            }
+            $subject = [System.Security.Cryptography.X509Certificates.X509Certificate]::CreateFromSignedFile($file.FullName).Subject
+            $vendor = if ($subject -match '(?:^|,\s*)O=("[^"]*"|[^,]*)') { $Matches[1].Trim('"') } else { '' }
+            if ($vendor -notin $allowedVendors) {
+              Write-Host "::error file=$($file.Name)::Signed by '$subject' -- vendor '$vendor' is not on the allowlist."
+              $failed = $true
+              continue
+            }
+            Write-Host "$($file.Name): embedded signature valid, vendor $vendor"
+          }
+
+          if ($failed) { throw "Third-party signature check failed. Nothing was published." }
+          Write-Host "All $checked third-party PE files carry a valid signature from an allowed vendor."
+
+      # The payload contract: one catalog, signed like our binaries, holding the SHA-256 of every
+      # other file in the ZIP. Installer, OOBE script and self-updater accept a payload only when
+      # this catalog is ours and matches the extracted files exactly. Created AFTER signing and
+      # BEFORE the ZIP -- the same load-bearing position as the signing step above.
+      - name: Create and sign payload catalog
+        shell: pwsh
+        env:
+          DOTNET_ROLL_FORWARD: LatestMajor
+        run: |
+          $ErrorActionPreference = 'Stop'
+          $stagingDir = 'staging/agent'
+          $catalog = Join-Path $env:RUNNER_TEMP $env:PAYLOAD_CATALOG
+          if (Test-Path (Join-Path $stagingDir $env:PAYLOAD_CATALOG)) {
+            throw "$stagingDir already contains $env:PAYLOAD_CATALOG."
+          }
+
+          New-FileCatalog -Path $stagingDir -CatalogFilePath $catalog -CatalogVersion 2.0 | Out-Null
+
+          & azuresigntool.exe sign --verbose `
+            --azure-key-vault-url "$env:CODE_SIGN_KEY_VAULT_URL" `
+            --azure-key-vault-accesstoken "$env:CODE_SIGN_AKV_ACCESS_TOKEN" `
+            --azure-key-vault-certificate "$env:CODE_SIGN_CERTIFICATE_NAME" `
+            --timestamp-rfc3161 "$env:CODE_SIGN_TIMESTAMP_URL" `
+            --file-digest sha256 `
+            --description "Autopilot Monitor Agent" `
+            --description-url "$env:WWW_BASE_URL" `
+            $catalog
+          if ($LASTEXITCODE -ne 0) {
+            throw "azuresigntool failed on the payload catalog with exit code $LASTEXITCODE -- aborting before anything is published."
+          }
+
+          Copy-Item -Path $catalog -Destination $stagingDir
+          $count = (Test-FileCatalog -Path $stagingDir -CatalogFilePath $catalog -FilesToSkip $env:PAYLOAD_CATALOG -Detailed).CatalogItems.Count
+          Write-Host "Payload catalog signed: $count files"
+
+      - name: Create release artifact
+        id: artifact
+        shell: pwsh
+        run: |
+          $version = $env:AGENT_VERSION
+          $stagingDir = "staging/agent"
+          $manifest = Get-Content "$env:AGENT_OUTPUT/$env:MANIFEST_NAME" -Raw | ConvertFrom-Json
+
          $versionedZip = "AutopilotMonitor-Agent-v$version.zip"
          Compress-Archive -Path "$stagingDir/*" -DestinationPath $versionedZip
          Write-Host "Created GitHub-Release artifact: $versionedZip"
@@ -488,6 +615,52 @@ jobs:
          }
          Write-Host "All $($files.Count) binaries signed with certificate $($thumbprints.Keys -join ', ')"

+      # The devices' check, run on the FINAL ZIP rather than the staging folder: whatever the
+      # archiver did (Compress-Archive skips hidden files) fails here instead of on a device.
+      # Windows PowerShell 5.1 and the installer's own functions (dot-sourced; its entry guard
+      # keeps that side-effect free) -- the very code the installer and the OOBE go-script run.
+      - name: Verify payload catalog (device check)
+        shell: powershell
+        env:
+          RELEASE_ZIP: ${{ steps.artifact.outputs.versioned_zip_release }}
+        run: |
+          $ErrorActionPreference = 'Stop'
+          Add-Type -AssemblyName System.IO.Compression.FileSystem
+
+          $payload = Join-Path $env:RUNNER_TEMP 'verify-payload'
+          if (Test-Path $payload) { throw "$payload already exists." }
+          [System.IO.Compression.ZipFile]::ExtractToDirectory((Resolve-Path $env:RELEASE_ZIP).Path, $payload)
+
+          . (Resolve-Path $env:BOOTSTRAP_SOURCE).Path
+          if (-not [string]::IsNullOrWhiteSpace($env:CODE_SIGN_EXPECTED_SUBJECT) -and $ExpectedPublisher -ne $env:CODE_SIGN_EXPECTED_SUBJECT) {
+            throw "Installer pin '$ExpectedPublisher' differs from CODE_SIGN_EXPECTED_SUBJECT '$env:CODE_SIGN_EXPECTED_SUBJECT'."
+          }
+          if ($AgentCatalogName -ne $env:PAYLOAD_CATALOG) {
+            throw "Installer catalog name '$AgentCatalogName' differs from PAYLOAD_CATALOG '$env:PAYLOAD_CATALOG'."
+          }
+
+          # Assign first, then flatten: the function returns its list as ONE object (comma
+          # operator), so @(Get-AgentPayloadRejections ...) would nest it inside another array.
+          $problems = Get-AgentPayloadRejections -Path $payload -ExpectedPublisher $ExpectedPublisher -CatalogName $AgentCatalogName
+          $problems = @($problems)
+
+          # Release-only checks a device need not repeat: a timestamp (without it the signature
+          # dies with the certificate) and the same certificate as the binaries.
+          $signature = Get-AuthenticodeSignature (Join-Path $payload $AgentCatalogName)
+          if (-not $signature.TimeStamperCertificate) {
+            $problems += 'catalog signature carries no RFC-3161 timestamp -- it would expire with the certificate'
+          }
+          $exeSigner = (Get-AuthenticodeSignature (Join-Path $payload 'AutopilotMonitor.Agent.exe')).SignerCertificate
+          if ($signature.SignerCertificate -and $exeSigner -and $signature.SignerCertificate.Thumbprint -ne $exeSigner.Thumbprint) {
+            $problems += 'catalog and agent exe carry different signing certificates'
+          }
+
+          if ($problems.Count -gt 0) {
+            $problems | ForEach-Object { Write-Host "::error::$_" }
+            throw "Payload catalog verification failed. Nothing was published."
+          }
+          Write-Host "Payload catalog verified on the final ZIP with the installer's own check, signer $($signature.SignerCertificate.Subject)"
+
      - name: Upload to Azure Blob Storage
        if: inputs.upload_blob
        shell: pwsh
@@ -531,6 +704,18 @@ jobs:
            }
          }

+          # Dev channel: lab blobs only, under the names the dev renders of the bootstrap scripts
+          # read. Nothing else is touched -- no versioned or stable line, no AdminConfiguration, no
+          # scripts; the channel check in `reserve` already refused publish_as_stable/create_release.
+          if ($env:CHANNEL -eq 'dev') {
+            Send-Blob -Local $env:VERSIONED_ZIP -BlobName $env:DEV_VERSIONED_ZIP -ContentType "application/zip"
+            Send-Blob -Local $env:MANIFEST_NAME -BlobName $env:DEV_MANIFEST -ContentType "application/json"
+            Send-Blob -Local $env:VERSIONED_ZIP -BlobName $env:DEV_STABLE_ZIP -ContentType "application/zip"
+            Send-Blob -Local $env:MANIFEST_NAME -BlobName $env:DEV_STABLE_MANIFEST -ContentType "application/json"
+            Write-Host "DEV CHANNEL: lab blobs written, nothing else touched."
+            exit 0
+          }
+
          # Versioned namespace (always)
          Send-Blob -Local $env:VERSIONED_ZIP -BlobName $env:VERSIONED_ZIP -ContentType "application/zip"
          Send-Blob -Local $env:MANIFEST_NAME -BlobName $env:MANIFEST_NAME -ContentType "application/json"
@@ -636,7 +821,7 @@ jobs:
            - **Published as stable:** ${{ inputs.publish_as_stable }}

            ### Provenance
-            The executables are Authenticode-signed and timestamped. The ZIP and both executables carry a [GitHub Artifact Attestation](https://github.com/okieselbach/AutopilotMonitor/attestations) (Sigstore keyless). Verify:
+            The executables are Authenticode-signed and timestamped. Every file in the ZIP is listed in `AutopilotMonitor.Agent.cat`, a catalog signed with the same certificate, and third-party libraries carry their vendor's signature. The ZIP and both executables carry a [GitHub Artifact Attestation](https://github.com/okieselbach/AutopilotMonitor/attestations) (Sigstore keyless). Verify:
            ```
            gh attestation verify AutopilotMonitor-Agent-v${{ needs.reserve.outputs.version }}.zip --repo okieselbach/AutopilotMonitor
            ```
@@ -39,11 +39,11 @@ jobs:
  # need the embedded loader to carry a signature of its own.
  #
  # Trust zone: only this repository's scripts, pinned actions and the pinned signing tool run
-  # here. No `environment:` yet: the code-signing credential is still bound to the ref, and a
-  # job carries exactly one OIDC subject.
+  # here. The `release` environment is the only subject the code-signing identity trusts.
  sign-loader:
    name: Sign bootstrap loader
    runs-on: windows-latest
+    environment: release
    permissions:
      contents: read
      id-token: write   # code-signing login
@@ -198,12 +198,13 @@ jobs:
          if-no-files-found: error
          retention-days: 1

-  # Trust zone: signs, verifies and publishes the MSI as data; never builds. No
-  # `environment:` yet, for the same reason as sign-loader.
+  # Trust zone: signs, verifies and publishes the MSI as data; never builds. Environment
+  # `release`, like sign-loader.
  release:
    name: Sign and publish MSI
    needs: build
    runs-on: windows-latest
+    environment: release
    permissions:
      contents: read
      id-token: write      # code-signing and storage logins, keyless Sigstore signing
@@ -14,7 +14,12 @@ on:
      - 'scripts/Bootstrap/**'
      - 'scripts/CustomerSetup/**'
      - '.github/scripts/Publish-BootstrapScripts.ps1'
+      - '.github/scripts/Invoke-BootstrapSystemPass.ps1'
+      - '.github/scripts/Test-BootstrapAttacker.ps1'
      - '.github/workflows/bootstrap-script-gates.yml'
+      # The integration tests run the generated OOBE script and the MSI's command line.
+      - 'src/Backend/AutopilotMonitor.Functions.Tests/TestData/oobe-bootstrap-golden.ps1'
+      - 'src/Agent/AutopilotMonitor.BootstrapMsi/Package.wxs'
  workflow_dispatch:

 permissions:
@@ -23,6 +23,14 @@ on:
        required: true
        type: boolean
        default: false
+      channel:
+        description: 'release: every script. dev: only the two -Dev scripts, to try a change on dev devices first'
+        required: true
+        type: choice
+        options:
+          - release
+          - dev
+        default: release

 permissions:
  contents: read
@@ -54,6 +62,8 @@ jobs:
    name: Publish to the download alias
    needs: gates
    runs-on: windows-latest
+    # Both identities trust only the `release` environment, which admits main only.
+    environment: release
    # Job-scoped: only the publish job federates to Azure, the gates job never holds an
    # OIDC token it does not need.
    permissions:
@@ -74,9 +84,7 @@ jobs:
          }

      # First, and only to fetch the Key Vault token: azure/login sets the default az
-      # account and the storage login below has to be the one that stays. See D-223 --
-      # both federated credentials are bound to the ref, so this job must never carry a
-      # GitHub `environment:`.
+      # account and the storage login below has to be the one that stays.
      - name: Login to Azure (code-signing identity)
        uses: azure/login@a641126d1b8aa4d1fa005f4f92df94a3a4c4c906 # v3.1.0
        with:
@@ -113,13 +121,16 @@ jobs:
          DOTNET_ROLL_FORWARD: LatestMajor
        run: dotnet tool install --no-cache --global AzureSignTool --version 7.0.1

+      # A push publishes the release channel; only a dispatch can choose dev.
      - name: Publish bootstrap + customer scripts
        shell: pwsh
        env:
          DOTNET_ROLL_FORWARD: LatestMajor
+          PUBLISH_CHANNEL: ${{ inputs.channel || 'release' }}
        run: |
          $dryRun = '${{ inputs.dry_run }}' -eq 'true'
          ./.github/scripts/Publish-BootstrapScripts.ps1 `
+            -Channel $env:PUBLISH_CHANNEL `
            -LegacySasToken '${{ secrets.AZURE_BLOB_AGENT_LEGACY_SAS_TOKEN }}' `
            -SigningToken $env:CODE_SIGN_AKV_ACCESS_TOKEN `
            -KeyVaultUrl $env:CODE_SIGN_KEY_VAULT_URL `
@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@
  "description": "Detects when a Win32 app detection script fails or returns unexpected results.",
  "severity": "warning",
  "category": "apps",
-  "version": "1.2.0",
+  "version": "1.3.0",
  "enabled": true,
  "evaluateOn": [
    "enrollment_end",
@@ -38,6 +38,26 @@
      ]
    }
  ],
+  "presentation": {
+    "role": "cause",
+    "summary": "{{detection_failure.appName}} was not detected after its install",
+    "subject": {
+      "kind": "app",
+      "key": "{{detection_failure.appId}}",
+      "name": "{{detection_failure.appName}}"
+    },
+    "facts": [
+      {
+        "label": "Detection",
+        "value": "{{detection_failure.value}}"
+      },
+      {
+        "label": "Error",
+        "value": "{{detection_failure.errorCode}}",
+        "format": "errorCode"
+      }
+    ]
+  },
  "tags": [
    "apps",
    "detection",
@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@
  "description": "Detects app installation failures with specific exit codes or HRESULT error codes and suggests fixes.",
  "severity": "high",
  "category": "apps",
-  "version": "1.2.0",
+  "version": "1.3.0",
  "enabled": true,
  "evaluateOn": [
    "enrollment_end",
@@ -41,6 +41,27 @@
      ]
    }
  ],
+  "presentation": {
+    "role": "cause",
+    "summary": "{{install_error.appName}} failed to install",
+    "subject": {
+      "kind": "app",
+      "key": "{{install_error.appId}}",
+      "name": "{{install_error.appName}}"
+    },
+    "facts": [
+      {
+        "label": "Exit code",
+        "value": "{{install_error.exitCode}}",
+        "format": "code"
+      },
+      {
+        "label": "Error",
+        "value": "{{install_error.errorCode}}",
+        "format": "errorCode"
+      }
+    ]
+  },
  "tags": [
    "apps",
    "msi",
@@ -33,9 +33,25 @@
      ]
    }
  ],
+  "presentation": {
+    "role": "cause",
+    "summary": "{{dependency_failure.appName}} failed because a dependency did not install",
+    "subject": {
+      "kind": "app",
+      "key": "{{dependency_failure.appId}}",
+      "name": "{{dependency_failure.appName}}"
+    },
+    "facts": [
+      {
+        "label": "Error",
+        "value": "{{dependency_failure.errorCode}}",
+        "format": "errorCode"
+      }
+    ]
+  },
  "tags": [
    "apps",
    "dependency"
  ],
-  "version": "1.1.0"
+  "version": "1.2.0"
 }
@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@
  "description": "Detects when disk space is critically low during enrollment, which can cause app installation failures. Confidence increases when app installations actually failed while disk space was low.",
  "severity": "critical",
  "category": "apps",
-  "version": "1.2.0",
+  "version": "1.3.0",
  "enabled": true,
  "evaluateOn": [
    "enrollment_end",
@@ -71,6 +71,27 @@
      ]
    }
  ],
+  "presentation": {
+    "role": "cause",
+    "summary": "Free disk space dropped to {{low_disk.value}} GB",
+    "subject": {
+      "kind": "device",
+      "key": "disk",
+      "name": "Disk space"
+    },
+    "facts": [
+      {
+        "label": "Free space (GB)",
+        "value": "{{low_disk.value}}",
+        "format": "number"
+      },
+      {
+        "label": "Measured",
+        "value": "{{low_disk.timestamp}}",
+        "format": "timestamp"
+      }
+    ]
+  },
  "tags": [
    "apps",
    "disk-space",
@@ -33,10 +33,26 @@
      ]
    }
  ],
+  "presentation": {
+    "role": "cause",
+    "summary": "The content download of {{download_timeout.appName}} timed out or failed",
+    "subject": {
+      "kind": "app",
+      "key": "{{download_timeout.appId}}",
+      "name": "{{download_timeout.appName}}"
+    },
+    "facts": [
+      {
+        "label": "Error",
+        "value": "{{download_timeout.errorCode}}",
+        "format": "errorCode"
+      }
+    ]
+  },
  "tags": [
    "apps",
    "download",
    "timeout"
  ],
-  "version": "1.1.0"
+  "version": "1.2.0"
 }
@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@
  "description": "Detects when the same app installation is attempted 3 or more times during one enrollment — a retry loop caused by unhonored reboot requests, repeated failures, or detection mismatches.",
  "severity": "high",
  "category": "apps",
-  "version": "1.2.0",
+  "version": "1.3.0",
  "enabled": true,
  "evaluateOn": [
    "enrollment_end",
@@ -35,6 +35,27 @@
      ]
    }
  ],
+  "presentation": {
+    "role": "cause",
+    "summary": "{{install_retry_loop.appName}} was started {{install_retry_loop.count}} times",
+    "subject": {
+      "kind": "app",
+      "key": "{{install_retry_loop.groupKey}}",
+      "name": "{{install_retry_loop.appName}}"
+    },
+    "facts": [
+      {
+        "label": "Install starts",
+        "value": "{{install_retry_loop.count}}",
+        "format": "number"
+      },
+      {
+        "label": "First start",
+        "value": "{{install_retry_loop.timestamp}}",
+        "format": "timestamp"
+      }
+    ]
+  },
  "tags": [
    "apps",
    "reboot",
@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@
  "description": "Detects when the app tracking summary reports multiple failed app installations.",
  "severity": "high",
  "category": "apps",
-  "version": "1.2.0",
+  "version": "1.3.0",
  "enabled": true,
  "evaluateOn": [
    "enrollment_end",
@@ -50,6 +50,17 @@
      ]
    }
  ],
+  "presentation": {
+    "role": "cause",
+    "summary": "{{summary_errors.value}} app installations failed",
+    "facts": [
+      {
+        "label": "Failed apps",
+        "value": "{{summary_errors.value}}",
+        "format": "number"
+      }
+    ]
+  },
  "tags": [
    "apps",
    "summary",
@@ -32,11 +32,32 @@
      ]
    }
  ],
+  "presentation": {
+    "role": "cause",
+    "summary": "{{slow_app_install.appName}} took {{slow_app_install.durationFormatted}} to install",
+    "subject": {
+      "kind": "app",
+      "key": "{{slow_app_install.appId}}",
+      "name": "{{slow_app_install.appName}}"
+    },
+    "facts": [
+      {
+        "label": "Install time",
+        "value": "{{slow_app_install.durationSeconds}}",
+        "format": "duration"
+      },
+      {
+        "label": "Started",
+        "value": "{{slow_app_install.startTimestamp}}",
+        "format": "timestamp"
+      }
+    ]
+  },
  "tags": [
    "apps",
    "performance",
    "slow-install",
    "warning"
  ],
-  "version": "1.1.0"
+  "version": "1.2.0"
 }
@@ -1,6 +1,7 @@
 {
  "$schema": "../schema/analyze-rule.schema.json",
  "ruleId": "ANALYZE-APP-010",
+  "version": "1.1.0",
  "title": "App Reverted to Error After Successful Install",
  "description": "Detects when a specific app (matched by appId) was first reported as successfully installed but subsequently reported an IME enforcement error — while enrollment completed successfully. The app may be broken post-enrollment.",
  "severity": "warning",
@@ -56,5 +57,31 @@
    { "title": "Troubleshoot Win32 app installations", "url": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/troubleshoot/mem/intune/app-management/troubleshoot-win32-app-install" },
    { "title": "Intune Management Extension logs", "url": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/mem/intune/apps/intune-management-extension" }
  ],
+  "presentation": {
+    "role": "cause",
+    "summary": "{{app_regression.eventA_appName}} installed, then reported an error",
+    "subject": {
+      "kind": "app",
+      "key": "{{app_regression.joinValue}}",
+      "name": "{{app_regression.eventA_appName}}"
+    },
+    "facts": [
+      {
+        "label": "Installed",
+        "value": "{{app_regression.eventA_timestamp}}",
+        "format": "timestamp"
+      },
+      {
+        "label": "Error after",
+        "value": "{{app_regression.timeDeltaSeconds}}",
+        "format": "duration"
+      },
+      {
+        "label": "Error",
+        "value": "{{app_regression.eventB_errorCode}}",
+        "format": "errorCode"
+      }
+    ]
+  },
  "tags": ["apps", "win32", "enforcement", "post-install", "correlation"]
 }
@@ -43,6 +43,32 @@
      "url": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/mem/intune/apps/apps-win32-app-management#step-4-return-codes"
    }
  ],
+  "presentation": {
+    "role": "advisory",
+    "summary": "{{enforcement_error_resolved.eventA_appName}} reported an install error but was detected as installed",
+    "subject": {
+      "kind": "app",
+      "key": "{{enforcement_error_resolved.joinValue}}",
+      "name": "{{enforcement_error_resolved.eventA_appName}}"
+    },
+    "facts": [
+      {
+        "label": "Exit code",
+        "value": "{{enforcement_error_resolved.eventA_exitCode}}",
+        "format": "code"
+      },
+      {
+        "label": "Error",
+        "value": "{{enforcement_error_resolved.eventA_errorCode}}",
+        "format": "errorCode"
+      },
+      {
+        "label": "Detected installed after",
+        "value": "{{enforcement_error_resolved.timeDeltaSeconds}}",
+        "format": "duration"
+      }
+    ]
+  },
  "tags": [
    "apps",
    "enforcement",
@@ -50,5 +76,5 @@
    "unmapped",
    "resolved"
  ],
-  "version": "1.1.0"
+  "version": "1.2.0"
 }
@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@
  "description": "Detects when the Enrollment Status Page failed because Intune could not verify an app was installed (HRESULT 0x87D1041C). The installer ran but the detection rule did not match afterwards.",
  "severity": "critical",
  "category": "apps",
-  "version": "1.2.0",
+  "version": "1.3.0",
  "enabled": true,
  "evaluateOn": [
    "enrollment_end",
@@ -82,6 +82,26 @@
      "url": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/mem/intune/apps/apps-win32-add#step-4-detection-rules"
    }
  ],
+  "presentation": {
+    "role": "cause",
+    "summary": "{{app_with_detection_failure.appName}} installed, but its detection rule did not find it",
+    "subject": {
+      "kind": "app",
+      "key": "{{app_with_detection_failure.appId}}",
+      "name": "{{app_with_detection_failure.appName}}"
+    },
+    "facts": [
+      {
+        "label": "ESP error",
+        "value": "{{esp_failure_errorcode.value}}",
+        "format": "errorCode"
+      },
+      {
+        "label": "Detection",
+        "value": "{{app_with_detection_failure.value}}"
+      }
+    ]
+  },
  "tags": [
    "apps",
    "detection",
@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@
  "description": "Detects when the Enrollment Status Page failed on the Apps subcategory and the agent's AppX deployment log scan identified a suspected MSIX/Store package. Store/MSIX apps install outside the Win32 pipeline, so the regular per-app tracking sees nothing — this correlation names the likely culprit.",
  "severity": "warning",
  "category": "apps",
-  "version": "1.2.1",
+  "version": "1.3.0",
  "enabled": true,
  "evaluateOn": [
    "enrollment_end",
@@ -123,6 +123,36 @@
      "url": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/mem/intune/apps/store-apps-microsoft"
    }
  ],
+  "presentation": {
+    "role": "cause",
+    "summary": "A Store or MSIX app failed during the ESP: {{appx_candidate.value}}",
+    "subject": {
+      "kind": "app",
+      "key": "{{appx_candidate.value}}",
+      "name": "{{appx_candidate.value}}"
+    },
+    "facts": [
+      {
+        "label": "ESP error",
+        "value": "{{appx_esp_errorcode.value}}",
+        "format": "errorCode"
+      },
+      {
+        "label": "ESP phase",
+        "value": "{{appx_esp_category.value}}"
+      },
+      {
+        "label": "Package",
+        "value": "{{appx_top_candidate_package.value}}",
+        "format": "code"
+      },
+      {
+        "label": "Candidates",
+        "value": "{{appx_candidate_count.value}}",
+        "format": "number"
+      }
+    ]
+  },
  "tags": [
    "apps",
    "appx",
@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@
  "description": "The IME reported its user-session completion line, but at least one required app stayed pending — without ever failing or even starting to install — so the agent kept deferring the enrollment completion signal. Typically an assignment/requirement problem (requirement rules never met, dependency never satisfied, or the app needs a context that is not available during ESP, e.g. a VPN client waiting for user sign-in to a portal).",
  "severity": "high",
  "category": "apps",
-  "version": "1.0.0",
+  "version": "1.1.0",
  "author": "Autopilot Monitor",
  "enabled": true,
  "trigger": "correlation",
@@ -76,5 +76,20 @@
    }
  ],
  "markSessionAsFailedDefault": false,
+  "presentation": {
+    "role": "cause",
+    "summary": "Completion waited on {{apps_pending.value}} pending app(s)",
+    "facts": [
+      {
+        "label": "Pending apps",
+        "value": "{{apps_pending.value}}",
+        "format": "number"
+      },
+      {
+        "label": "Apps",
+        "value": "{{pending_app_names.value}}"
+      }
+    ]
+  },
  "tags": ["apps", "esp", "completion", "assignment", "pending"]
 }
@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@
  "description": "One or more required user-ESP apps never started installing while the ESP AccountSetup apps gate waited on them — the agent observed the ESP page exit with those apps still in a non-terminal, never-started state. Unlike ANALYZE-APP-015 (which reports that completion was DEFERRED because of a pending app, and stays silent once the session reaches a terminal verdict) this rule reports the delivery gap itself and fires regardless of the final outcome: an enrollment that Windows called done while required apps never ran is a successful enrollment with missing software, and the operator must see it.",
  "severity": "warning",
  "category": "apps",
-  "version": "1.0.0",
+  "version": "1.1.0",
  "author": "Autopilot Monitor",
  "enabled": true,
  "evaluateOn": [
@@ -102,6 +102,26 @@
    }
  ],
  "markSessionAsFailedDefault": false,
+  "presentation": {
+    "role": "cause",
+    "summary": "Required apps never started installing; first: {{appName.value}}",
+    "subject": {
+      "kind": "app",
+      "key": "{{appName.appId}}",
+      "name": "{{appName.value}}"
+    },
+    "facts": [
+      {
+        "label": "First app",
+        "value": "{{appName.value}}"
+      },
+      {
+        "label": "State",
+        "value": "{{state.value}}",
+        "format": "code"
+      }
+    ]
+  },
  "tags": [
    "apps",
    "esp",
@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@
  "description": "Detects Win32 app installs that failed because the Windows Installer was busy with another installation (HRESULT 0x80070652 / MSI exit code 1618, ERROR_INSTALL_ALREADY_RUNNING). The IME retries on a fixed budget (~15-17 minutes across several attempts) and then reports the app as failed; when the app is ESP-blocking, the Device Setup Apps subcategory terminates with it.",
  "severity": "high",
  "category": "apps",
-  "version": "1.0.0",
+  "version": "1.1.0",
  "author": "Autopilot Monitor",
  "enabled": true,
  "baseConfidence": 70,
@@ -81,6 +81,27 @@
      "url": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/troubleshoot/mem/intune/app-management/troubleshoot-win32-app-install"
    }
  ],
+  "presentation": {
+    "role": "cause",
+    "summary": "{{mutex_blocked_install.appName}} was blocked by another installation",
+    "subject": {
+      "kind": "app",
+      "key": "{{mutex_blocked_install.appId}}",
+      "name": "{{mutex_blocked_install.appName}}"
+    },
+    "facts": [
+      {
+        "label": "Exit code",
+        "value": "{{installer_exit_1618.value}}",
+        "format": "code"
+      },
+      {
+        "label": "ESP error",
+        "value": "{{esp_failed_with_mutex_code.value}}",
+        "format": "errorCode"
+      }
+    ]
+  },
  "tags": [
    "apps",
    "msiexec",
@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@
  "description": "Detects Win32 apps whose installer exit code maps to Soft reboot or Hard reboot in the app's Intune return-code table (the '[Win32App] lpExitCode is defined as ...' line). Hard reboot stops app processing and restarts the device in Device Setup - the mid-enrollment restart and second sign-in; Soft reboot leaves the app pending until the next restart while the ESP moves on. Confidence rises for Hard reboot and when a reboot was actually observed in the session.",
  "severity": "warning",
  "category": "apps",
-  "version": "1.0.0",
+  "version": "1.1.0",
  "author": "Autopilot Monitor",
  "enabled": true,
  "evaluateOn": [
@@ -86,6 +86,31 @@
    }
  ],
  "markSessionAsFailedDefault": false,
+  "presentation": {
+    "role": "context",
+    "summary": "{{reboot_return_code.appName}} asked for a restart",
+    "subject": {
+      "kind": "app",
+      "key": "{{reboot_return_code.appId}}",
+      "name": "{{reboot_return_code.appName}}"
+    },
+    "facts": [
+      {
+        "label": "Return code",
+        "value": "{{reboot_return_code.exitCode}}",
+        "format": "code"
+      },
+      {
+        "label": "Return code class",
+        "value": "{{reboot_return_code.value}}"
+      },
+      {
+        "label": "Restarts",
+        "value": "{{reboot_observed.count}}",
+        "format": "number"
+      }
+    ]
+  },
  "tags": [
    "apps",
    "reboot",
@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@
  "description": "Correlates an active proxy configuration with app content download failures (Delivery Optimization timeout or download error), suggesting the proxy is blocking or throttling Intune content delivery.",
  "severity": "high",
  "category": "apps",
-  "version": "1.2.0",
+  "version": "1.3.0",
  "enabled": true,
  "evaluateOn": [
    "enrollment_end",
@@ -67,6 +67,30 @@
      ]
    }
  ],
+  "presentation": {
+    "role": "cause",
+    "summary": "App downloads failed while a {{proxy_active.value}} proxy was configured",
+    "subject": {
+      "kind": "network",
+      "key": "proxy",
+      "name": "Proxy"
+    },
+    "facts": [
+      {
+        "label": "Proxy type",
+        "value": "{{proxy_active.value}}"
+      },
+      {
+        "label": "Failed app",
+        "value": "{{download_failure.appName}}"
+      },
+      {
+        "label": "Error",
+        "value": "{{download_failure.errorCode}}",
+        "format": "errorCode"
+      }
+    ]
+  },
  "tags": [
    "correlation",
    "apps",
@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@
  "description": "Detects when Windows Hello for Business provisioning did not start within the expected timeframe after ESP completion.",
  "severity": "warning",
  "category": "device",
-  "version": "1.1.0",
+  "version": "1.2.0",
  "enabled": true,
  "baseConfidence": 60,
  "conditions": [
@@ -30,5 +30,21 @@
      ]
    }
  ],
+  "presentation": {
+    "role": "cause",
+    "summary": "Windows Hello provisioning did not start in time",
+    "subject": {
+      "kind": "device",
+      "key": "windows-hello",
+      "name": "Windows Hello"
+    },
+    "facts": [
+      {
+        "label": "Timed out",
+        "value": "{{hello_timeout.timestamp}}",
+        "format": "timestamp"
+      }
+    ]
+  },
  "tags": ["device", "hello", "timeout"]
 }
@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@
  "description": "Detects when memory usage stays above 90% across at least 3 performance snapshots during enrollment, indicating sustained memory pressure that can cause app installation failures or system instability.",
  "severity": "warning",
  "category": "device",
-  "version": "2.1.0",
+  "version": "2.2.0",
  "enabled": true,
  "evaluateOn": [
    "enrollment_end",
@@ -65,6 +65,22 @@
      ]
    }
  ],
+  "presentation": {
+    "role": "context",
+    "summary": "Memory use was above 90% in {{sustained_high_memory.count}} snapshots",
+    "subject": {
+      "kind": "device",
+      "key": "memory",
+      "name": "Memory"
+    },
+    "facts": [
+      {
+        "label": "Snapshots above 90%",
+        "value": "{{sustained_high_memory.count}}",
+        "format": "number"
+      }
+    ]
+  },
  "tags": [
    "device",
    "memory",
@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@
  "description": "Detects devices enrolling with an OS build that has reached end of support: Windows 11 22H2 (build 22621) or older, which includes every Windows 10 build. Maintenance note: raise the build cutoff to 22631 after Windows 11 23H2 reaches end of support on 2026-11-10.",
  "severity": "warning",
  "category": "device",
-  "version": "2.1.0",
+  "version": "2.2.0",
  "enabled": true,
  "evaluateOn": [
    "enrollment_end",
@@ -56,6 +56,26 @@
      "url": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/lifecycle/products/windows-11-home-and-pro"
    }
  ],
+  "presentation": {
+    "role": "advisory",
+    "summary": "Windows build {{old_build.value}} is out of support",
+    "subject": {
+      "kind": "device",
+      "key": "os",
+      "name": "Windows version"
+    },
+    "facts": [
+      {
+        "label": "OS",
+        "value": "{{os_version.value}}"
+      },
+      {
+        "label": "Build",
+        "value": "{{old_build.value}}",
+        "format": "code"
+      }
+    ]
+  },
  "tags": [
    "device",
    "os-version",
@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@
  "description": "Detects a Windows quality/cumulative update that FAILED to install or download during the OOBE / ESP enrollment window (WindowsUpdateClient EventID 20 from the System log, 31 from the Operational channel). A cumulative update failing mid-OOBE is a known cause of enrollment errors and is otherwise invisible in the Intune console.",
  "severity": "high",
  "category": "device",
-  "version": "1.2.0",
+  "version": "1.3.0",
  "enabled": true,
  "evaluateOn": [
    "enrollment_end",
@@ -113,6 +113,27 @@
    }
  ],
  "markSessionAsFailedDefault": false,
+  "presentation": {
+    "role": "cause",
+    "summary": "A Windows update failed during setup: {{wu_update_title.value}}",
+    "subject": {
+      "kind": "device",
+      "key": "windows-update",
+      "name": "Windows Update"
+    },
+    "facts": [
+      {
+        "label": "Error",
+        "value": "{{wu_hresult.value}}",
+        "format": "errorCode"
+      },
+      {
+        "label": "Symbol",
+        "value": "{{wu_hresult_symbol.value}}",
+        "format": "code"
+      }
+    ]
+  },
  "tags": [
    "device",
    "windows-update",
@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@
  "description": "Informational: a Windows quality/cumulative update installed during the OOBE / ESP enrollment window (WindowsUpdateClient EventID 19). Surfaces updates applied mid-enrollment — useful context when correlating enrollment duration, reboots, or later issues with a specific KB.",
  "severity": "info",
  "category": "device",
-  "version": "1.1.0",
+  "version": "1.2.0",
  "enabled": true,
  "evaluateOn": [
    "enrollment_end",
@@ -61,6 +61,22 @@
    }
  ],
  "markSessionAsFailedDefault": false,
+  "presentation": {
+    "role": "context",
+    "summary": "A Windows update installed during setup: {{wu_update_title.value}}",
+    "subject": {
+      "kind": "device",
+      "key": "windows-update",
+      "name": "Windows Update"
+    },
+    "facts": [
+      {
+        "label": "Installed",
+        "value": "{{wu_installed.timestamp}}",
+        "format": "timestamp"
+      }
+    ]
+  },
  "tags": [
    "device",
    "windows-update",
@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@
  "description": "Informational: the OS build (CurrentBuild.UBR) changed across a reboot during enrollment — an update was installed, regardless of which servicing path delivered it. Deterministic corroboration that works even when the Windows Update event channel shows nothing (registry comparison across restart cannot be lost to timing or logging-path differences).",
  "severity": "info",
  "category": "device",
-  "version": "1.1.0",
+  "version": "1.2.0",
  "enabled": true,
  "evaluateOn": [
    "enrollment_end",
@@ -69,6 +69,27 @@
    }
  ],
  "markSessionAsFailedDefault": false,
+  "presentation": {
+    "role": "context",
+    "summary": "Windows was updated from build {{previous_build.value}} to {{current_build.value}}",
+    "subject": {
+      "kind": "device",
+      "key": "os",
+      "name": "Windows version"
+    },
+    "facts": [
+      {
+        "label": "Build before",
+        "value": "{{previous_build.value}}",
+        "format": "code"
+      },
+      {
+        "label": "Build after",
+        "value": "{{current_build.value}}",
+        "format": "code"
+      }
+    ]
+  },
  "tags": [
    "device",
    "windows-update",
@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@
  "description": "The device's real-time clock deviates from NTP by more than two minutes. Microsoft documents that a clock off by several minutes causes TPM attestation errors (self-deploying/pre-provisioning) and ESP timeouts.",
  "severity": "warning",
  "category": "device",
-  "version": "1.1.1",
+  "version": "1.2.0",
  "author": "Autopilot Monitor",
  "enabled": true,
  "evaluateOn": [
@@ -59,6 +59,26 @@
    }
  ],
  "markSessionAsFailedDefault": false,
+  "presentation": {
+    "role": "cause",
+    "subject": {
+      "kind": "device",
+      "key": "clock",
+      "name": "System clock"
+    },
+    "facts": [
+      {
+        "label": "Clock offset (s)",
+        "value": "{{clock_behind.value}}",
+        "format": "number"
+      },
+      {
+        "label": "Clock offset (s)",
+        "value": "{{clock_ahead.value}}",
+        "format": "number"
+      }
+    ]
+  },
  "tags": [
    "device",
    "ntp",
@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@
  "description": "The device's clock changed by five or more minutes mid-session (clock jump) or ran five or more minutes off server time for the whole session (sustained offset), measured against the server receive frame of every uploaded event. Complements ANALYZE-DEV-007, which is a one-shot NTP check at agent startup and misses devices where NTP was unreachable or the clock changed later. IME-log-derived events are excluded from the measurement.",
  "severity": "warning",
  "category": "device",
-  "version": "1.0.0",
+  "version": "1.1.0",
  "author": "Autopilot Monitor",
  "enabled": true,
  "evaluateOn": [
@@ -57,6 +57,26 @@
    }
  ],
  "markSessionAsFailedDefault": false,
+  "presentation": {
+    "role": "cause",
+    "subject": {
+      "kind": "device",
+      "key": "clock",
+      "name": "System clock"
+    },
+    "facts": [
+      {
+        "label": "Clock jump (min)",
+        "value": "{{clock_jump.jumpMinutes}}",
+        "format": "number"
+      },
+      {
+        "label": "Clock offset (min)",
+        "value": "{{sustained_offset.offsetMinutes}}",
+        "format": "number"
+      }
+    ]
+  },
  "tags": [
    "device",
    "clock-skew",
@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@
  "description": "Detects that the device's battery dropped to 15% or less while enrolling on battery power (power_state_change threshold event from the agent's live power watcher). A device dying mid-enrollment leaves a half-provisioned state that typically needs a full reset; this rule surfaces the risk while there is still time to plug the device in. Uses a single required condition on the agent-stamped thresholdPercent field (the data field 'transition' on the event is unrelated to this rule's 'trigger' property).",
  "severity": "high",
  "category": "device",
-  "version": "1.0.0",
+  "version": "1.1.0",
  "enabled": true,
  "evaluateOn": [
    "enrollment_end",
@@ -39,6 +39,27 @@
    }
  ],
  "markSessionAsFailedDefault": false,
+  "presentation": {
+    "role": "context",
+    "summary": "The battery fell below {{battery_threshold_15.value}}% during setup",
+    "subject": {
+      "kind": "device",
+      "key": "power",
+      "name": "Power"
+    },
+    "facts": [
+      {
+        "label": "Battery below (%)",
+        "value": "{{battery_threshold_15.value}}",
+        "format": "number"
+      },
+      {
+        "label": "Reported",
+        "value": "{{battery_threshold_15.timestamp}}",
+        "format": "timestamp"
+      }
+    ]
+  },
  "tags": [
    "device",
    "power",
@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@
  "description": "Detects that the device lost AC power and switched to battery while the enrollment was running (power_state_change event with transition ac_to_battery from the agent's live power watcher). Uses a single required condition so the match is pinned to one event instance; the event payload carries the battery percentage at the moment of the switch. The agent debounces power flapping (5s) so a brief unplug/replug does not produce this event.",
  "severity": "warning",
  "category": "device",
-  "version": "1.0.0",
+  "version": "1.1.0",
  "enabled": true,
  "evaluateOn": [
    "enrollment_end",
@@ -39,6 +39,22 @@
    }
  ],
  "markSessionAsFailedDefault": false,
+  "presentation": {
+    "role": "context",
+    "summary": "The device switched from AC to battery power during setup",
+    "subject": {
+      "kind": "device",
+      "key": "power",
+      "name": "Power"
+    },
+    "facts": [
+      {
+        "label": "Switched",
+        "value": "{{switched_to_battery.timestamp}}",
+        "format": "timestamp"
+      }
+    ]
+  },
  "tags": [
    "device",
    "power",
@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@
  "description": "Detects that the device completed a sleep, hibernate or Modern Standby episode of at least 5 minutes while the enrollment was running (system_sleep_episode event from the agent's system timeline watcher, recorded retroactively at wake from the Windows event log). The watcher also backfills pre-agent episodes from the last 24 h for timeline context (backfilled=true); those ended before the enrollment started and are excluded via the same-event filter backfilled equals false — a separate condition could not do that, because each condition scans all events on its own and a pre-session hibernate would still satisfy the duration test. A single required condition keeps the match pinned to one event instance so the interpolated duration is the matched value. Short Modern Standby screen-off scenarios (under 60 s of real sleep) never emit the event, and this rule adds a 5-minute floor so brief lid-close moments do not fire it.",
  "severity": "info",
  "category": "device",
-  "version": "1.1.0",
+  "version": "1.2.0",
  "enabled": true,
  "evaluateOn": [
    "enrollment_end",
@@ -42,6 +42,27 @@
    }
  ],
  "markSessionAsFailedDefault": false,
+  "presentation": {
+    "role": "context",
+    "summary": "The device went to sleep during setup",
+    "subject": {
+      "kind": "device",
+      "key": "power",
+      "name": "Power"
+    },
+    "facts": [
+      {
+        "label": "Asleep for",
+        "value": "{{slept_during_enrollment.value}}",
+        "format": "duration"
+      },
+      {
+        "label": "Recorded",
+        "value": "{{slept_during_enrollment.timestamp}}",
+        "format": "timestamp"
+      }
+    ]
+  },
  "tags": [
    "device",
    "power",
@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@
  "description": "Detects that the Windows quality update page at the end of OOBE (Enrollment Status Page setting \"Install Windows quality updates\") reported a failed download or install and recorded no successful install afterwards — the page's own failure names on the oobe_update_page events. Setup usually continues, so the failure is otherwise invisible: the device finishes OOBE without the monthly security update. An OS build change across a restart (os_build_changed) vetoes the finding, and so does the agent's names_capped marker — once the page's event names were capped, a missing success name proves nothing. A downloadInstallFailureHelper entry alone is no failure: updates that installed fine log it too.",
  "severity": "warning",
  "category": "device",
-  "version": "1.0.0",
+  "version": "1.1.0",
  "enabled": true,
  "evaluateOn": [
    "enrollment_end"
@@ -109,6 +109,22 @@
    }
  ],
  "markSessionAsFailedDefault": false,
+  "presentation": {
+    "role": "context",
+    "summary": "The Windows quality update at the end of OOBE failed",
+    "subject": {
+      "kind": "device",
+      "key": "oobe-update",
+      "name": "OOBE quality update"
+    },
+    "facts": [
+      {
+        "label": "Failed step",
+        "value": "{{update_failure.value}}",
+        "format": "code"
+      }
+    ]
+  },
  "tags": [
    "device",
    "windows-update",
@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@
  "description": "Detects that the Windows quality update page at the end of OOBE found no update to install although the device is out of date, on a device whose update page counts an earlier failed download or install (oobe_update_page: NDUPDownloadInstallPreviousFailureCount above 0, osUpdatesWithNDUPPI false, getDaysOutOfDateSucceeded above 0). No failure and no install success are recorded in this session — a failure in this session is ANALYZE-DEV-013 — and the agent's names_capped marker vetoes the finding, because a missing name proves nothing once the page's names were capped. The device finishes OOBE without the monthly security update.",
  "severity": "warning",
  "category": "device",
-  "version": "1.0.0",
+  "version": "1.1.0",
  "enabled": true,
  "evaluateOn": [
    "enrollment_end"
@@ -110,6 +110,27 @@
    }
  ],
  "markSessionAsFailedDefault": false,
+  "presentation": {
+    "role": "context",
+    "summary": "No quality update was offered although the device is {{days_out_of_date.value}} days out of date",
+    "subject": {
+      "kind": "device",
+      "key": "oobe-update",
+      "name": "OOBE quality update"
+    },
+    "facts": [
+      {
+        "label": "Days out of date",
+        "value": "{{days_out_of_date.value}}",
+        "format": "number"
+      },
+      {
+        "label": "Earlier update failures",
+        "value": "{{previous_failures.value}}",
+        "format": "number"
+      }
+    ]
+  },
  "tags": [
    "device",
    "windows-update",
@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@
  "description": "Detects that the Windows quality update page at the end of OOBE started its Windows Update scan but ended without a scan result (oobe_update_page: startWUScanStartedSuccedded, an OobeNDUP stop and no ExpeditedUpdate_getUpdateResults name), on a device that is out of date and allowed to update. In the observed sessions the page ended two minutes after the scan started, on devices more than a year behind. The device finishes OOBE without the monthly security update. The agent's names_capped marker vetoes the finding: once the page's event names were capped, a missing scan result proves nothing.",
  "severity": "warning",
  "category": "device",
-  "version": "1.0.0",
+  "version": "1.1.0",
  "enabled": true,
  "evaluateOn": [
    "enrollment_end"
@@ -108,6 +108,22 @@
    }
  ],
  "markSessionAsFailedDefault": false,
+  "presentation": {
+    "role": "context",
+    "summary": "The OOBE update check ended without a result",
+    "subject": {
+      "kind": "device",
+      "key": "oobe-update",
+      "name": "OOBE quality update"
+    },
+    "facts": [
+      {
+        "label": "Days out of date",
+        "value": "{{days_out_of_date.value}}",
+        "format": "number"
+      }
+    ]
+  },
  "tags": [
    "device",
    "windows-update",
@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@
  "description": "Detects when the Autopilot enrollment has explicitly failed.",
  "severity": "critical",
  "category": "enrollment",
-  "version": "1.1.2",
+  "version": "1.2.0",
  "enabled": true,
  "baseConfidence": 95,
  "conditions": [
@@ -57,19 +57,40 @@
  "confidenceFactors": [
    { "signal": "failed_app", "condition": "exists", "weight": 5 }
  ],
-  "explanation": "The Autopilot enrollment has explicitly failed.\n\n**Key facts extracted from this session's events:**\n\n- **Failure reason:** `{{reason}}`\n- **First failed app:** `{{appName}}`\n- **ESP failed subcategory:** `{{failedSubcategory}}`\n- **ESP HRESULT:** `{{errorCode}}`\n\nWhen an ESP Apps-subcategory failure is paired with HRESULT `0x87D1041C`, the device-side install most likely completed but the Intune detection rule did not match afterwards — see the **App Detection Failure During ESP** rule (ANALYZE-APP-013) in this same analysis for the actionable root cause and remediation steps. Any field still shown as a literal `{{…}}` placeholder was simply not recorded for this session — for example, a non-ESP failure path has no ESP failed-subcategory or HRESULT.",
+  "explanation": "The Autopilot enrollment has explicitly failed.\n\n**Key facts from this session's events:**\n\n- **Failure reason:** `{{reason}}`\n- **First failed app:** `{{appName}}`\n- **ESP step that failed:** `{{failedSubcategory}}`\n- **ESP error code:** `{{errorCode}}`\n\nA more specific finding in this analysis usually names the cause, such as an app, ESP or timeout finding.",
  "remediation": [
    {
-      "title": "Investigate enrollment failure",
+      "title": "Find the cause",
      "steps": [
-        "Start with the more specific ANALYZE-APP-* / ANALYZE-ESP-* rules that fired alongside this one — they correlate specific HRESULTs to actionable causes (e.g. 0x87D1041C → detection rule mismatch in ANALYZE-APP-013)",
-        "Read the `reason` field on the enrollment_failed event for the immediate trigger (e.g. esp_terminal_failure, hello_timeout, max_lifetime)",
-        "If a HRESULT is present, look it up against the ESP error catalog (Microsoft Learn: Autopilot ESP error codes)",
-        "Review other analyze rule results for correlated issues (disk space, network, app failures)",
-        "Check the device event timeline for the sequence of events leading to failure",
-        "Verify the Autopilot profile and ESP configuration in Intune"
+        "Open the finding in this analysis that names the cause (an app, ESP or timeout finding) and follow its steps",
+        "If no other finding fired, look up the ESP error code and check the failed ESP step in the session timeline",
+        "Verify the Autopilot profile and the ESP settings in Intune"
      ]
    }
  ],
+  "presentation": {
+    "role": "outcome",
+    "summary": "The enrollment failed at the ESP step {{esp_failure_subcategory.value}} with {{esp_failure_errorcode.value}}",
+    "facts": [
+      {
+        "label": "Reason",
+        "value": "{{enrollment_failed_reason.value}}",
+        "format": "code"
+      },
+      {
+        "label": "ESP step",
+        "value": "{{esp_failure_subcategory.value}}"
+      },
+      {
+        "label": "ESP error",
+        "value": "{{esp_failure_errorcode.value}}",
+        "format": "errorCode"
+      },
+      {
+        "label": "First failed app",
+        "value": "{{failed_app.appName}}"
+      }
+    ]
+  },
  "tags": ["enrollment", "failed", "critical"]
 }
@@ -2,10 +2,10 @@
  "$schema": "../schema/analyze-rule.schema.json",
  "ruleId": "ANALYZE-ENRL-002",
  "title": "Session Timed Out",
-  "description": "Detects when the enrollment session was force-failed by the server-side inactivity timeout (no agent telemetry for the configured SessionTimeoutHours window) without ever completing or explicitly failing.",
+  "description": "Detects when the server-side inactivity timeout closed the enrollment session (no agent telemetry for the configured SessionTimeoutHours window) before it ever completed or explicitly failed.",
  "severity": "high",
  "category": "enrollment",
-  "version": "1.2.0",
+  "version": "1.4.0",
  "enabled": true,
  "baseConfidence": 80,
  "preconditions": [
@@ -20,6 +20,12 @@
      "eventType": "enrollment_failed",
      "operator": "not_exists",
      "description": "Suppress when an explicit enrollment_failed exists — that path is already covered by ANALYZE-ENRL-001; avoid double-reporting the same session."
+    },
+    {
+      "source": "event_data",
+      "eventType": "device_blocked",
+      "operator": "not_exists",
+      "description": "Suppress when the platform blocked the session's device: the silence is the refused uploads, which ANALYZE-ENRL-006 explains — 'the agent died or the device went offline' would be wrong."
    }
  ],
  "conditions": [
@@ -58,7 +64,7 @@
      "required": false
    }
  ],
-  "explanation": "The enrollment session was force-failed by the server-side maintenance sweep after `{{timeoutHours}}` hour(s) of agent inactivity — the device stopped sending telemetry and never reported completion or an explicit failure.\n\nThis usually means the agent process died or the device went offline mid-enrollment (power off, network loss, bluescreen, reimage) rather than a clean enrollment failure. Because there is no terminal `enrollment_failed` event, the more specific app/ESP rules cannot pinpoint a cause — the evidence simply stops at the last event before the gap.\n\n**If the evidence shows the user desktop was reached and all tracked apps completed**, the device most likely got all its content but the ESP never signaled completion — on hybrid-joined devices the usual culprit is the user session never establishing Entra affinity (Account Setup re-running on every logon). Check whether the hybrid user-affinity finding also fired for this session.",
+  "explanation": "The server-side maintenance sweep closed this session after `{{timeoutHours}}` hour(s) of agent inactivity — the device stopped sending telemetry and never reported completion or an explicit failure.\n\nThis usually means the agent process died or the device went offline mid-enrollment (power off, network loss, bluescreen, reimage) rather than a clean enrollment failure. Because there is no terminal `enrollment_failed` event, the more specific app/ESP rules cannot pinpoint a cause — the evidence simply stops at the last event before the gap.\n\n**If the evidence shows the user desktop was reached and all tracked apps completed**, the device most likely got all its content but the ESP never signaled completion — on hybrid-joined devices the usual culprit is the user session never establishing Entra affinity (Account Setup re-running on every logon). Check whether the hybrid user-affinity finding also fired for this session.",
  "remediation": [
    {
      "title": "Investigate the silent session",
@@ -78,5 +84,21 @@
      ]
    }
  ],
+  "presentation": {
+    "role": "outcome",
+    "summary": "No completion or failure arrived within {{timeoutHours.value}} hours",
+    "facts": [
+      {
+        "label": "Timeout (hours)",
+        "value": "{{timeoutHours.value}}",
+        "format": "number"
+      },
+      {
+        "label": "Desktop reached",
+        "value": "{{desktop_was_reached.timestamp}}",
+        "format": "timestamp"
+      }
+    ]
+  },
  "tags": ["enrollment", "timeout", "stalled"]
 }
@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@
  "description": "A TPM-attestation-related error code documented in the Microsoft Autopilot known-issues list was observed (0x800705B4, 0x801C03EA, 0x81039001, 0x81039023, 0x81039024, 0x80070490). These block self-deploying and pre-provisioning deployments during 'Securing your hardware'. Observability: attestation precedes MDM enrollment, so in the normal deployment model (agent installed via IME after enrollment) these codes are rarely visible — the rule primarily serves bootstrap-token deployments.",
  "severity": "high",
  "category": "enrollment",
-  "version": "1.1.0",
+  "version": "1.2.0",
  "author": "Autopilot Monitor",
  "enabled": true,
  "evaluateOn": [
@@ -80,6 +80,27 @@
    }
  ],
  "markSessionAsFailedDefault": false,
+  "presentation": {
+    "role": "cause",
+    "summary": "TPM attestation failed with a known Autopilot error code",
+    "subject": {
+      "kind": "device",
+      "key": "tpm",
+      "name": "TPM attestation"
+    },
+    "facts": [
+      {
+        "label": "Error code",
+        "value": "{{tpm_hresult_esp_failure.value}}",
+        "format": "errorCode"
+      },
+      {
+        "label": "Error code",
+        "value": "{{tpm_hresult_esp_advisory.value}}",
+        "format": "errorCode"
+      }
+    ]
+  },
  "tags": [
    "enrollment",
    "tpm",
@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@
  "description": "An enrollment-blocking error code documented in the Microsoft Autopilot known-issues/troubleshooting pages was observed (0x80180014, 0x80180018, 0xC1036501, 0x801C03F3, 0x80070774). Each has a specific, documented cause and fix. Observability: a blocked MDM enrollment normally means no agent gets installed at all (IME install happens after enrollment) — this rule can realistically only fire for bootstrap-token deployments (pre-MDM reporting) or mixed retry scenarios.",
  "severity": "high",
  "category": "enrollment",
-  "version": "1.1.0",
+  "version": "1.2.0",
  "author": "Autopilot Monitor",
  "enabled": true,
  "evaluateOn": [
@@ -78,6 +78,27 @@
    }
  ],
  "markSessionAsFailedDefault": false,
+  "presentation": {
+    "role": "cause",
+    "summary": "MDM enrollment was blocked with a known Autopilot error code",
+    "subject": {
+      "kind": "device",
+      "key": "mdm-enrollment",
+      "name": "MDM enrollment"
+    },
+    "facts": [
+      {
+        "label": "Error code",
+        "value": "{{enrl_hresult_esp_failure.value}}",
+        "format": "errorCode"
+      },
+      {
+        "label": "Error code",
+        "value": "{{enrl_hresult_esp_advisory.value}}",
+        "format": "errorCode"
+      }
+    ]
+  },
  "tags": [
    "enrollment",
    "mdm",
@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@
  "description": "A Microsoft Entra hybrid join Autopilot deployment hit error 0x80004005 — a documented build-dependent known issue, resolved by KB5065789 (25H2, build >= 26200.6725), KB5065426 (24H2, build >= 26100.6584), and KB5070312 (23H2, build >= 22631.6276).",
  "severity": "high",
  "category": "enrollment",
-  "version": "1.1.0",
+  "version": "1.2.0",
  "author": "Autopilot Monitor",
  "enabled": true,
  "evaluateOn": [
@@ -103,6 +103,27 @@
    }
  ],
  "markSessionAsFailedDefault": false,
+  "presentation": {
+    "role": "cause",
+    "summary": "Hybrid join hit 0x80004005, a known timeout fixed by Windows updates",
+    "subject": {
+      "kind": "device",
+      "key": "hybrid-join",
+      "name": "Hybrid join"
+    },
+    "facts": [
+      {
+        "label": "Error code",
+        "value": "{{e_fail_esp_failure.value}}",
+        "format": "errorCode"
+      },
+      {
+        "label": "Error code",
+        "value": "{{e_fail_esp_advisory.value}}",
+        "format": "errorCode"
+      }
+    ]
+  },
  "tags": [
    "enrollment",
    "hybrid-join",
@@ -0,0 +1,107 @@
+{
+  "$schema": "../schema/analyze-rule.schema.json",
+  "ruleId": "ANALYZE-ENRL-006",
+  "title": "Monitoring Paused by a Protective Limit",
+  "description": "Detects when the platform blocked the session's device — automatically after an unusually high event volume, or by the platform operator — so the session's telemetry stopped reaching Autopilot Monitor.",
+  "severity": "warning",
+  "category": "enrollment",
+  "version": "1.0.0",
+  "author": "Autopilot Monitor",
+  "enabled": true,
+  "evaluateOn": [
+    "enrollment_end",
+    "on_event:device_blocked"
+  ],
+  "trigger": "single",
+  "baseConfidence": 90,
+  "confidenceThreshold": 50,
+  "conditions": [
+    {
+      "signal": "device_blocked",
+      "source": "event_type",
+      "eventType": "device_blocked",
+      "operator": "exists",
+      "value": "",
+      "required": true
+    },
+    {
+      "signal": "event_count",
+      "source": "event_data",
+      "eventType": "device_blocked",
+      "dataField": "eventCount",
+      "operator": "exists",
+      "value": "",
+      "required": false
+    },
+    {
+      "signal": "event_limit",
+      "source": "event_data",
+      "eventType": "device_blocked",
+      "dataField": "threshold",
+      "operator": "exists",
+      "value": "",
+      "required": false
+    },
+    {
+      "signal": "blocked_until",
+      "source": "event_data",
+      "eventType": "device_blocked",
+      "dataField": "blockedUntil",
+      "operator": "exists",
+      "value": "",
+      "required": false
+    }
+  ],
+  "explanation": "Autopilot Monitor stopped accepting telemetry from this session. A protective limit keeps a single device that sends far more events than an enrollment normally does from distorting your fleet data or overloading the platform. When a session crosses it, the device's uploads are paused for a limited time; in severe cases the agent ends monitoring and removes itself. The platform operator can apply the same pause by hand.\n\nA pause does not affect the enrollment itself: the agent keeps running and only holds back its uploads, so Windows Autopilot and Intune carry on as usual. While the pause lasts, no events from this session reach Autopilot Monitor, so the timeline and the final status reflect the last state the agent reported before it. A paused session does not affect the device's next enrollment, which starts unblocked. When the agent ended monitoring, the device stays unmonitored until the end time shown on the session page, new enrollments included.",
+  "remediation": [
+    {
+      "title": "Find what made the session so busy",
+      "steps": [
+        "Open the event timeline and look at which event type repeats most often before the pause — for example a network connection that drops and reconnects every few minutes, or a download that reports progress continuously",
+        "Fix the underlying condition (for example a loose dock, cable or Wi-Fi), then re-enroll the device if you need a complete record of the enrollment",
+        "If no event type stands out, report the session from its page so it can be looked at"
+      ]
+    },
+    {
+      "title": "What happens next",
+      "steps": [
+        "A pause ends on its own at the time shown on the session page; an agent that is still running then resumes uploading",
+        "After a pause, a new enrollment on this device starts unblocked",
+        "After the agent ended monitoring, wait for the end time shown on the session page before re-enrolling if you want the new enrollment monitored"
+      ]
+    }
+  ],
+  "relatedDocs": [
+    {
+      "title": "Autopilot Monitor: Protective Limits",
+      "url": "https://docs.autopilotmonitor.com/concepts/protective-limits"
+    }
+  ],
+  "presentation": {
+    "role": "outcome",
+    "summary": "Monitoring was paused by a protective limit",
+    "facts": [
+      {
+        "label": "Paused at",
+        "value": "{{device_blocked.timestamp}}",
+        "format": "timestamp"
+      },
+      {
+        "label": "Events in this session",
+        "value": "{{event_count.value}}",
+        "format": "number"
+      },
+      {
+        "label": "Event limit",
+        "value": "{{event_limit.value}}",
+        "format": "number"
+      },
+      {
+        "label": "Paused until",
+        "value": "{{blocked_until.value}}",
+        "format": "timestamp"
+      }
+    ]
+  },
+  "tags": ["enrollment", "protective-limit", "blocked"]
+}
@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@
  "description": "Detects when the DeviceSetup phase of the ESP took longer than 30 minutes, indicating a stuck or very slow blocking app. Confidence increases when the phase exceeds 60 minutes.",
  "severity": "high",
  "category": "esp",
-  "version": "1.2.0",
+  "version": "1.3.0",
  "enabled": true,
  "evaluateOn": [
    "enrollment_end",
@@ -47,6 +47,27 @@
      ]
    }
  ],
+  "presentation": {
+    "role": "cause",
+    "summary": "Device setup took {{esp_stalled.durationFormatted}}",
+    "subject": {
+      "kind": "esp",
+      "key": "{{esp_stalled.phase}}",
+      "name": "Device setup"
+    },
+    "facts": [
+      {
+        "label": "Duration",
+        "value": "{{esp_stalled.durationSeconds}}",
+        "format": "duration"
+      },
+      {
+        "label": "Started",
+        "value": "{{esp_stalled.phaseStartTimestamp}}",
+        "format": "timestamp"
+      }
+    ]
+  },
  "tags": [
    "esp",
    "blocking",
@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@
  "description": "Detects when the Certificates subcategory of the Enrollment Status Page reported a failure, even if the enrollment later appears to have succeeded. Users can click 'Continue anyway' on an ESP error, which masks the underlying certificate provisioning failure — this rule surfaces the transition so it stays visible.",
  "severity": "high",
  "category": "esp",
-  "version": "1.1.0",
+  "version": "1.2.0",
  "author": "Autopilot Monitor",
  "enabled": true,
  "evaluateOn": [
@@ -58,6 +58,22 @@
    }
  ],
  "markSessionAsFailedDefault": false,
+  "presentation": {
+    "role": "cause",
+    "summary": "The ESP certificates step failed",
+    "subject": {
+      "kind": "esp",
+      "key": "Certificates",
+      "name": "Certificates"
+    },
+    "facts": [
+      {
+        "label": "Failed at",
+        "value": "{{certificates_subcategory_failed.timestamp}}",
+        "format": "timestamp"
+      }
+    ]
+  },
  "tags": [
    "esp",
    "certificates",
@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@
  "description": "Detects an ESP terminal failure where the ESP gave up while a blocking app was still installing (the agent's own esp_apps_timeout verdict — no per-app HRESULT was reported) on a profile that allows 'Continue anyway'. The enrollment is reported as failed, but the user most likely dismissed the error screen and reached the desktop — a soft failure rather than an unusable device. An ESP failure that carries a specific error code (a failed installer, a detection mismatch) is a different case and stays with the rule that explains that code.",
  "severity": "warning",
  "category": "esp",
-  "version": "1.1.0",
+  "version": "1.2.0",
  "enabled": true,
  "baseConfidence": 80,
  "conditions": [
@@ -81,5 +81,30 @@
      ]
    }
  ],
+  "presentation": {
+    "role": "cause",
+    "summary": "The ESP gave up while {{appName.value}} was still installing ('Continue anyway' allowed)",
+    "subject": {
+      "kind": "app",
+      "key": "{{appName.appId}}",
+      "name": "{{appName.value}}"
+    },
+    "facts": [
+      {
+        "label": "ESP error",
+        "value": "{{enrollment_failed.errorCode}}",
+        "format": "errorCode"
+      },
+      {
+        "label": "ESP time limit (min)",
+        "value": "{{espSyncFailureTimeoutMinutes.value}}",
+        "format": "number"
+      },
+      {
+        "label": "ESP step",
+        "value": "{{failedSubcategory.value}}"
+      }
+    ]
+  },
  "tags": ["esp", "timeout", "continue-anyway", "soft-failure", "enrollment"]
 }
@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@
  "description": "Attributes an observed enrollment reboot to device-assigned MDM policies that Windows flagged as reboot-required. Fires ONLY when both facts are present in the session: at least one actually-observed reboot (system_reboot_detected) AND reboot-required policy flags (mdm_policy_reboot_required). Policy flags alone — e.g. from a user-policy sync during AccountSetup — force no reboot and stay advisory-silent.",
  "severity": "warning",
  "category": "esp",
-  "version": "1.3.0",
+  "version": "1.4.0",
  "author": "Autopilot Monitor",
  "enabled": true,
  "evaluateOn": [
@@ -94,6 +94,31 @@
    }
  ],
  "markSessionAsFailedDefault": false,
+  "presentation": {
+    "role": "context",
+    "summary": "A device policy forced a restart during setup: {{reboot_forcing_policy_uri.value}}",
+    "subject": {
+      "kind": "policy",
+      "key": "{{reboot_forcing_policy_uri.value}}"
+    },
+    "facts": [
+      {
+        "label": "First policy",
+        "value": "{{reboot_forcing_policy_uri.value}}",
+        "format": "code"
+      },
+      {
+        "label": "Policies",
+        "value": "{{multiple_reboot_uris.value}}",
+        "format": "number"
+      },
+      {
+        "label": "Restarts",
+        "value": "{{reboot_observed.count}}",
+        "format": "number"
+      }
+    ]
+  },
  "tags": [
    "esp",
    "reboot",
@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@
  "description": "Detects the recovery story: the ESP reported a terminal failure (typically DeviceSetup/Apps), the user most likely pressed 'Try again' on the failure page, the failed step re-ran and completed successfully. The earlier failure did not stick — the enrollment continued past it.",
  "severity": "info",
  "category": "esp",
-  "version": "1.1.0",
+  "version": "1.2.0",
  "enabled": true,
  "evaluateOn": [
    "enrollment_end",
@@ -98,6 +98,34 @@
      ]
    }
  ],
+  "presentation": {
+    "role": "context",
+    "summary": "The ESP failed in the {{category.value}} phase, then recovered",
+    "subject": {
+      "kind": "esp",
+      "key": "{{failedSubcategory.value}}",
+      "name": "{{failedSubcategory.value}}"
+    },
+    "facts": [
+      {
+        "label": "ESP phase",
+        "value": "{{category.value}}"
+      },
+      {
+        "label": "ESP step",
+        "value": "{{failedSubcategory.value}}"
+      },
+      {
+        "label": "Likely apps",
+        "value": "{{likelyCulpritApps.value}}"
+      },
+      {
+        "label": "Recovered after (min)",
+        "value": "{{minutesSinceFailure.value}}",
+        "format": "number"
+      }
+    ]
+  },
  "tags": [
    "esp",
    "recovery",
@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@
    "enrollment_end",
    "whiteglove_sealed"
  ],
-  "version": "1.3.0",
+  "version": "1.4.0",
  "baseConfidence": 75,
  "conditions": [
    {
@@ -55,6 +55,15 @@
      ]
    }
  ],
+  "presentation": {
+    "role": "advisory",
+    "summary": "The expected machine certificate was not found",
+    "subject": {
+      "kind": "device",
+      "key": "machine-certificate",
+      "name": "Machine certificate"
+    }
+  },
  "tags": [
    "identity",
    "certificates",
@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@
  "description": "Detects when the LocalAdminAnalyzer flags unexpected local user accounts or profile directories on the device. This is a known Autopilot bypass technique where admin accounts are created before or during enrollment to gain persistent local admin access.",
  "severity": "high",
  "category": "identity",
-  "version": "1.3.0",
+  "version": "1.4.0",
  "author": "Autopilot Monitor",
  "enabled": true,
  "evaluateOn": [
@@ -41,6 +41,30 @@
      "operator": "equals",
      "value": "error",
      "required": false
+    },
+    {
+      "signal": "unexpected_accounts",
+      "source": "event_data",
+      "eventType": "local_admin_analysis",
+      "dataField": "checks.unexpected_accounts",
+      "operator": "not_equals",
+      "value": "",
+      "filterField": "finding",
+      "filterOperator": "equals",
+      "filterValue": "unexpected_local_admins_detected",
+      "required": false
+    },
+    {
+      "signal": "unexpected_admin_members",
+      "source": "event_data",
+      "eventType": "local_admin_analysis",
+      "dataField": "checks.unexpected_admin_members",
+      "operator": "not_equals",
+      "value": "",
+      "filterField": "finding",
+      "filterOperator": "equals",
+      "filterValue": "unexpected_local_admins_detected",
+      "required": false
    }
  ],
  "confidenceFactors": [
@@ -85,6 +109,26 @@
    }
  ],
  "relatedDocs": [],
+  "presentation": {
+    "role": "advisory",
+    "summary": "Unexpected local accounts: {{unexpected_accounts.value}}",
+    "subject": {
+      "kind": "account",
+      "key": "{{unexpected_accounts.value}}"
+    },
+    "facts": [
+      {
+        "label": "Unexpected accounts",
+        "value": "{{unexpected_accounts.value}}",
+        "format": "code"
+      },
+      {
+        "label": "In Administrators",
+        "value": "{{unexpected_admin_members.value}}",
+        "format": "code"
+      }
+    ]
+  },
  "tags": [
    "identity",
    "security",
@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@
  "description": "Fires when the vulnerability correlation finds critical-severity CVEs or CISA KEV entries in installed software. This indicates the device has software with known, actively exploited vulnerabilities.",
  "severity": "critical",
  "category": "security",
-  "version": "1.1.0",
+  "version": "1.2.0",
  "author": "Autopilot Monitor",
  "enabled": true,
  "evaluateOn": [
@@ -72,6 +72,27 @@
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/"
    }
  ],
+  "presentation": {
+    "role": "advisory",
+    "summary": "Installed software has {{critical_vulnerabilities.value}} critical vulnerabilities",
+    "subject": {
+      "kind": "device",
+      "key": "vulnerabilities",
+      "name": "Installed software"
+    },
+    "facts": [
+      {
+        "label": "Critical CVEs",
+        "value": "{{critical_vulnerabilities.value}}",
+        "format": "number"
+      },
+      {
+        "label": "Known exploited",
+        "value": "{{kev_matches.value}}",
+        "format": "number"
+      }
+    ]
+  },
  "tags": [
    "vulnerability",
    "cve",
@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@
  "description": "On a hybrid-joined device the real user reached the desktop, but the Intune Management Extension never acquired a Microsoft Entra user token for that user within the wait window — repeatedly across reboots when the warning recurs. Without a user token the signed-in user has no Entra user affinity: user-targeted apps and policies cannot apply, Windows Hello for Business cannot provision, and with a user ESP the Account Setup page re-runs on every logon.",
  "severity": "high",
  "category": "identity",
-  "version": "2.0.0",
+  "version": "2.1.0",
  "author": "Autopilot Monitor",
  "enabled": true,
  "trigger": "correlation",
@@ -44,6 +44,24 @@
      "operator": "not_exists",
      "value": "",
      "required": true
+    },
+    {
+      "signal": "token_failure_count",
+      "source": "event_data",
+      "eventType": "entra_user_affinity_pending",
+      "dataField": "tokenFailureCount",
+      "operator": "exists",
+      "value": "",
+      "required": false
+    },
+    {
+      "signal": "token_failure_codes",
+      "source": "event_data",
+      "eventType": "entra_user_affinity_pending",
+      "dataField": "tokenFailureCodes",
+      "operator": "not_equals",
+      "value": "",
+      "required": false
    }
  ],
  "confidenceFactors": [
@@ -96,5 +114,36 @@
    }
  ],
  "markSessionAsFailedDefault": false,
+  "presentation": {
+    "role": "cause",
+    "summary": "The user reached the desktop, but Entra user affinity never formed",
+    "subject": {
+      "kind": "account",
+      "key": "entra-user-affinity",
+      "name": "Entra user affinity"
+    },
+    "facts": [
+      {
+        "label": "Token failures",
+        "value": "{{token_failure_count.value}}",
+        "format": "number"
+      },
+      {
+        "label": "Token error codes",
+        "value": "{{token_failure_codes.value}}",
+        "format": "code"
+      },
+      {
+        "label": "Reported in agent runs",
+        "value": "{{user_affinity_pending.count}}",
+        "format": "number"
+      },
+      {
+        "label": "Desktop reached",
+        "value": "{{user_desktop_reached.timestamp}}",
+        "format": "timestamp"
+      }
+    ]
+  },
  "tags": ["identity", "hybrid-join", "entra-id", "user-affinity", "esp"]
 }
@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@
  "description": "Detects diagnostics package uploads that were answered by a security appliance's HTML block page instead of the Autopilot Monitor backend. A forward proxy / secure web gateway (SWG) with SSL inspection is intercepting the upload endpoint, so exactly the sessions where diagnostics matter most (OnFailure uploads) are the ones losing them.",
  "severity": "warning",
  "category": "network",
-  "version": "1.0.0",
+  "version": "1.1.0",
  "author": "Autopilot Monitor",
  "enabled": true,
  "baseConfidence": 75,
@@ -71,6 +71,15 @@
      "url": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/autopilot/networking-requirements"
    }
  ],
+  "presentation": {
+    "role": "advisory",
+    "summary": "A web security gateway blocked the diagnostics upload",
+    "subject": {
+      "kind": "network",
+      "key": "security-gateway",
+      "name": "Web security gateway"
+    }
+  },
  "tags": [
    "network",
    "proxy",
@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@
  "description": "Detects when the Microsoft 365 Apps (Office Click-to-Run) install failed. The V2 OfficeInstallDetector watches the C2R client directly (registry, Delivery Optimization, process) and emits office_install_failed when the C2R INSTALL scenario records an error code. Completion is proven by the core Office binaries on disk; an install window that closes without that proof ends silently, never as a failure. This catches Office failures the deployment status hides: the Intune built-in app type is marked done once the configuration is delivered, and a Win32 or RealmJoin package once its installer exits, while C2R keeps installing in the background.",
  "severity": "warning",
  "category": "apps",
-  "version": "1.1.1",
+  "version": "1.2.0",
  "enabled": true,
  "evaluateOn": [
    "enrollment_end",
@@ -52,6 +52,22 @@
      ]
    }
  ],
+  "presentation": {
+    "role": "cause",
+    "summary": "Microsoft 365 Apps failed to install",
+    "subject": {
+      "kind": "app",
+      "key": "office-c2r",
+      "name": "Microsoft 365 Apps"
+    },
+    "facts": [
+      {
+        "label": "Error",
+        "value": "{{error_code_present.value}}",
+        "format": "errorCode"
+      }
+    ]
+  },
  "tags": [
    "apps",
    "office",
@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@
  "description": "Detects devices where the Windows UEFI CA 2023 certificate has not been deployed to the Secure Boot DB. The 2011 certificates expired in June 2026 — affected devices no longer receive Secure Boot security updates until the 2023 certificate is deployed. Since v3 the agent reads the firmware db/KEK variables directly: when the firmware itself confirms the 2023 certificate, the rule is suppressed even if the Windows servicing status has not caught up yet.",
  "severity": "warning",
  "category": "security",
-  "version": "3.1.0",
+  "version": "3.2.0",
  "enabled": true,
  "evaluateOn": [
    "enrollment_end",
@@ -132,6 +132,35 @@
      "url": "https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/topic/kb5036210"
    }
  ],
+  "presentation": {
+    "role": "advisory",
+    "summary": "The Windows UEFI CA 2023 certificate is not deployed",
+    "subject": {
+      "kind": "device",
+      "key": "secure-boot",
+      "name": "Secure Boot"
+    },
+    "facts": [
+      {
+        "label": "CA 2023 status",
+        "value": "{{ca2023_not_updated.value}}",
+        "format": "code"
+      },
+      {
+        "label": "Error",
+        "value": "{{ca2023_error.value}}",
+        "format": "code"
+      },
+      {
+        "label": "CA 2023 in firmware DB",
+        "value": "{{db_ca2023_firmware_missing.value}}"
+      },
+      {
+        "label": "KEK 2023 in firmware",
+        "value": "{{kek_2023_missing.value}}"
+      }
+    ]
+  },
  "tags": [
    "security",
    "secureboot",
@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@
  "description": "Fires when the AutoLogon analyzer reports a DefaultPassword value present in Winlogon. A plaintext AutoLogon password stored in the registry is readable by any local administrator and is a credential exposure — more severe than AutoLogon alone (the Sysinternals Autologon tool deliberately avoids this by storing the secret in the LSA instead).",
  "severity": "high",
  "category": "security",
-  "version": "1.1.0",
+  "version": "1.2.0",
  "enabled": true,
  "evaluateOn": [
    "enrollment_end",
@@ -49,6 +49,15 @@
      "url": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/autologon"
    }
  ],
+  "presentation": {
+    "role": "advisory",
+    "summary": "A plaintext AutoLogon password is stored in the registry",
+    "subject": {
+      "kind": "device",
+      "key": "autologon",
+      "name": "AutoLogon"
+    }
+  },
  "tags": [
    "security",
    "autologon",
@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@
  "description": "Optional kiosk allow-list for AutoLogon. Fires when AutoLogon is enabled for a default user that is NOT on your configured list of approved kiosk / shared-device accounts. Disabled until configured because a normal Autopilot enrollment leaves Windows' own ESP auto-logon for the enrolling user (AutoLogon enabled, a default user, no plaintext password) — so AutoLogon-enabled alone is not graded by default; only a plaintext DefaultPassword on disk (ANALYZE-SEC-003) is. Enable this rule with your expected kiosk account name(s) if you want to surface AutoLogon configured for any other user.",
  "severity": "warning",
  "category": "security",
-  "version": "1.1.0",
+  "version": "1.2.0",
  "enabled": false,
  "evaluateOn": [
    "enrollment_end",
@@ -59,6 +59,21 @@
      "url": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/troubleshoot/windows-server/user-profiles-and-logon/turn-on-automatic-logon"
    }
  ],
+  "presentation": {
+    "role": "advisory",
+    "summary": "AutoLogon is enabled for an unexpected user: {{unexpected_autologon_user.value}}",
+    "subject": {
+      "kind": "account",
+      "key": "{{unexpected_autologon_user.value}}"
+    },
+    "facts": [
+      {
+        "label": "AutoLogon user",
+        "value": "{{unexpected_autologon_user.value}}",
+        "format": "code"
+      }
+    ]
+  },
  "tags": [
    "security",
    "autologon",
@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@
  "description": "Detects provisioning packages (PPKG) that are not on the built-in allow-list. The agent emits one or more provisioning_package_scan events whose artifacts[] arrays list every PPKG (registry package, .ppkg file, or Recovery\\Customizations residue; a large set is split across several events). This rule iterates that array across all of them and fires for any artifact whose identity does not match the allow-list regex. The default allow-list covers the Windows OS-inbox packages (Cosa, Power.EnergyEstimationEngine, Power.Settings, SecureStart) plus common OEM factory-preload families (Intel PPM power profiles, AMD Power profiles, Lenovo ThinkPad power/battery packages, Microsoft Surface defaults and carrier packages) so clean factory devices stay quiet. OEM imaging leftovers (e.g. USMT.PPKG, InstallOrder.ini) and generically named packages deliberately still alert — on a pure-Autopilot device they are worth a look. To allow your own vendor/recovery packages, enable the template rule ANALYZE-SEC-006, extend its allow-list, then disable this rule.",
  "severity": "warning",
  "category": "security",
-  "version": "2.2.0",
+  "version": "2.3.0",
  "enabled": true,
  "evaluateOn": [
    "enrollment_end",
@@ -38,6 +38,27 @@
      ]
    }
  ],
+  "presentation": {
+    "role": "advisory",
+    "summary": "Provisioning package not on the allow list: {{ppkg_not_allowlisted.value}}",
+    "subject": {
+      "kind": "device",
+      "key": "provisioning-packages",
+      "name": "Provisioning packages"
+    },
+    "facts": [
+      {
+        "label": "Package",
+        "value": "{{ppkg_not_allowlisted.value}}",
+        "format": "code"
+      },
+      {
+        "label": "Unexpected packages",
+        "value": "{{ppkg_not_allowlisted.matchCount}}",
+        "format": "number"
+      }
+    ]
+  },
  "tags": [
    "security",
    "provisioning-package",
@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@
  "description": "Template version of ANALYZE-SEC-005 with a customizable allow-list. Iterates the provisioning_package_scan artifacts[] array and fires for any PPKG whose identity is not on YOUR allow-list regex. The placeholder ships with the same OS-inbox defaults as ANALYZE-SEC-005 — extend it with your own vendor/recovery packages. This rule is OFF by default: enable it, set your allow-list, then disable ANALYZE-SEC-005 so only packages outside your list alert.",
  "severity": "warning",
  "category": "security",
-  "version": "2.2.0",
+  "version": "2.3.0",
  "enabled": false,
  "evaluateOn": [
    "enrollment_end",
@@ -45,6 +45,27 @@
      ]
    }
  ],
+  "presentation": {
+    "role": "advisory",
+    "summary": "Provisioning package not on the allow list: {{ppkg_not_allowlisted.value}}",
+    "subject": {
+      "kind": "device",
+      "key": "provisioning-packages",
+      "name": "Provisioning packages"
+    },
+    "facts": [
+      {
+        "label": "Package",
+        "value": "{{ppkg_not_allowlisted.value}}",
+        "format": "code"
+      },
+      {
+        "label": "Unexpected packages",
+        "value": "{{ppkg_not_allowlisted.matchCount}}",
+        "format": "number"
+      }
+    ]
+  },
  "tags": [
    "security",
    "provisioning-package",
@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@
  "description": "Fires when the provisioning-package scan hit a per-source collection cap (too many .ppkg files, registry packages, or Recovery\\Customizations residue files to capture them all). When that happens the allow-list rules (ANALYZE-SEC-005/006) could not evaluate every package, so a non-allow-listed package may have gone unseen. A device with that many provisioning packages is itself unusual and worth a manual look.",
  "severity": "warning",
  "category": "security",
-  "version": "1.1.0",
+  "version": "1.2.0",
  "enabled": true,
  "evaluateOn": [
    "enrollment_end",
@@ -36,6 +36,15 @@
      ]
    }
  ],
+  "presentation": {
+    "role": "advisory",
+    "summary": "The provisioning package scan hit its capture limit",
+    "subject": {
+      "kind": "device",
+      "key": "provisioning-packages",
+      "name": "Provisioning packages"
+    }
+  },
  "tags": [
    "security",
    "provisioning-package",
@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@
  "description": "Detects devices enrolling with Secure Boot turned off. Secure Boot is a firmware-level protection against boot-time malware and is a prerequisite for several Windows security features (VBS/Credential Guard, device health attestation) and common Intune compliance policies. Devices that support Secure Boot but have it disabled should be flagged during enrollment. Legacy BIOS devices (no Secure Boot capability) are excluded — the agent marks those with a note field when the SecureBoot registry state key is absent.",
  "severity": "warning",
  "category": "security",
-  "version": "1.1.0",
+  "version": "1.2.0",
  "author": "Autopilot Monitor",
  "enabled": true,
  "evaluateOn": [
@@ -82,6 +82,15 @@
      "url": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-hardware/manufacture/desktop/disabling-secure-boot"
    }
  ],
+  "presentation": {
+    "role": "advisory",
+    "summary": "Secure Boot is disabled",
+    "subject": {
+      "kind": "device",
+      "key": "secure-boot",
+      "name": "Secure Boot"
+    }
+  },
  "tags": [
    "security",
    "secureboot",
@@ -133,6 +133,7 @@
          "items": { "$ref": "#/$defs/relatedDoc" },
          "default": []
        },
+        "presentation": { "$ref": "#/$defs/rulePresentation" },
        "tags": {
          "type": "array",
          "description": "Tags for filtering and categorization.",
@@ -352,6 +353,83 @@
      "required": ["title", "url"],
      "additionalProperties": false
    },
+    "rulePresentation": {
+      "type": "object",
+      "description": "How a finding of this rule is shown: its role, a one-line summary, what it is about and its key facts. Every string is a {{token}} template resolved from the finding's evidence when it is rendered; a fact whose value was not recorded is left out.",
+      "properties": {
+        "role": {
+          "type": "string",
+          "enum": ["outcome", "cause", "context", "advisory"],
+          "description": "outcome: restates the session outcome (shown in the verdict, not as a finding row). cause: can explain why a session failed or is stuck. context: a circumstance such as standby, a restart or battery power. advisory: hygiene or security without bearing on the outcome."
+        },
+        "summary": {
+          "type": "string",
+          "minLength": 1,
+          "maxLength": 160,
+          "description": "One line for the finding row, for example \"{{install_retry_loop.appName}} was started {{install_retry_loop.count}} times\". When a token was not recorded, the first sentence of the explanation is shown instead."
+        },
+        "subject": { "$ref": "#/$defs/ruleSubject" },
+        "facts": {
+          "type": "array",
+          "description": "Key facts shown as label/value pairs, in this order.",
+          "maxItems": 6,
+          "items": { "$ref": "#/$defs/ruleFact" }
+        }
+      },
+      "required": ["role"],
+      "additionalProperties": false
+    },
+    "ruleSubject": {
+      "type": "object",
+      "description": "What the finding is about. Findings with the same kind and resolved key are grouped, for example every finding about one app. Use qualified tokens of one signal for key and name, such as {{failed_app.appId}} and {{failed_app.appName}}, so both come from the same event.",
+      "properties": {
+        "kind": {
+          "type": "string",
+          "enum": ["app", "policy", "account", "script", "device", "network", "esp", "session"],
+          "description": "The kind of thing the key identifies."
+        },
+        "key": {
+          "type": "string",
+          "minLength": 1,
+          "maxLength": 200,
+          "description": "Template of the grouping key."
+        },
+        "name": {
+          "type": "string",
+          "minLength": 1,
+          "maxLength": 200,
+          "description": "Template of the display name; the key is shown when it is missing."
+        }
+      },
+      "required": ["kind", "key"],
+      "additionalProperties": false
+    },
+    "ruleFact": {
+      "type": "object",
+      "description": "One key fact of a finding.",
+      "properties": {
+        "label": {
+          "type": "string",
+          "minLength": 1,
+          "maxLength": 40,
+          "description": "Short label, for example \"Install starts\"."
+        },
+        "value": {
+          "type": "string",
+          "minLength": 1,
+          "maxLength": 200,
+          "description": "Template of the value, for example {{install_retry_loop.count}}."
+        },
+        "format": {
+          "type": "string",
+          "enum": ["text", "code", "errorCode", "duration", "number", "timestamp"],
+          "description": "How the value is shown. errorCode adds the error-code catalog meaning, duration reads seconds, timestamp an ISO 8601 time.",
+          "default": "text"
+        }
+      },
+      "required": ["label", "value"],
+      "additionalProperties": false
+    },
    "templateVariable": {
      "type": "object",
      "description": "A variable in a rule condition that must be customized per-tenant before the rule can be used.",
@@ -0,0 +1,823 @@
+# Integration tests (Pester 5+) for the bootstrap chain: the real loader and installer, each
+# started the way Intune and the bootstrap MSI start them -- powershell.exe -File, in a process
+# of its own -- against a scratch ProgramData and TEMP. Loader 1.2 and the MSI 1.0.x runner run
+# from TestData, frozen from git: devices keep running them until customers replace them.
+#
+# What these tests do not cover is swapped out by global aliases, which win over cmdlets and
+# over functions a script defines: downloads (served from a scratch folder), signatures, the
+# catalog check, the guard decision, the deployment marker, the agent task, the agent's
+# --install (a real program start from PowerShell's location, with the agent's work left out)
+# and sleeps. Every swap writes a trace line, and the tests check the lines they rely on, so a
+# swap that stops working turns a test red instead of reaching the real machine.
+#
+# Run elevated (CI also runs it as SYSTEM), the folder permissions are the real ones. Without
+# elevation the test account may not make Administrators the owner, so the protected DACL is
+# swapped for one without that owner change, and folders the account owns count as ours.
+# Entries whose name starts with "foreign" count as another account's.
+#
+# This file MUST remain pure ASCII (PS 5.1 reads BOM-less files as ANSI).
+
+BeforeAll {
+    $script:repoRoot = (Resolve-Path (Join-Path $PSScriptRoot '..\..')).Path
+    $script:loaderPath = Join-Path $PSScriptRoot 'Start-AutopilotMonitor.ps1'
+    $script:installerPath = Join-Path $PSScriptRoot 'Install-AutopilotMonitor.ps1'
+    $script:loader12Path = Join-Path $PSScriptRoot 'TestData\Start-AutopilotMonitor-1.2.ps1'
+    $script:msiRunnerPath = Join-Path $PSScriptRoot 'TestData\Invoke-BootstrapDownload-1.0.ps1'
+    # The backend's pin of the generated OOBE script, test values filled in.
+    $script:oobeScriptPath = Join-Path $script:repoRoot 'src\Backend\AutopilotMonitor.Functions.Tests\TestData\oobe-bootstrap-golden.ps1'
+    $script:powershell = Join-Path $env:SystemRoot 'System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe'
+    $script:isElevated = (New-Object System.Security.Principal.WindowsPrincipal([System.Security.Principal.WindowsIdentity]::GetCurrent())).IsInRole([System.Security.Principal.WindowsBuiltInRole]::Administrator)
+    $script:payloadFiles = @('AutopilotMonitor.Agent.Core.dll', 'AutopilotMonitor.Agent.cat', 'AutopilotMonitor.Agent.exe', 'AutopilotMonitor.Agent.exe.config')
+
+    # The agent package: text files under the agent's names. --install is swapped out, so
+    # nothing in it ever runs.
+    $payload = Join-Path $TestDrive 'payload'
+    New-Item -ItemType Directory -Path $payload | Out-Null
+    foreach ($name in $script:payloadFiles) { Set-Content -LiteralPath (Join-Path $payload $name) -Value "stub $name" }
+    $script:agentZip = Join-Path $TestDrive 'AutopilotMonitor-Agent.zip'
+    Compress-Archive -Path (Join-Path $payload '*') -DestinationPath $script:agentZip
+    $script:agentZipSha256 = (Get-FileHash -LiteralPath $script:agentZip -Algorithm SHA256).Hash.ToLowerInvariant()
+
+    $script:wrapperText = @'
+$global:HarnessDir = $PSScriptRoot
+$global:HarnessOptions = [System.IO.File]::ReadAllText((Join-Path $PSScriptRoot 'options.json')) | ConvertFrom-Json
+
+function global:Write-HarnessTrace {
+    param([string]$Name, [string]$Detail)
+    [System.IO.File]::AppendAllText((Join-Path $global:HarnessDir 'trace.txt'), "$Name|$Detail`r`n")
+}
+
+function global:Get-HarnessServerFile {
+    param([string]$Uri)
+    $source = Join-Path $global:HarnessOptions.Server ($Uri.Substring($Uri.LastIndexOf('/') + 1))
+    if (-not [System.IO.File]::Exists($source)) { throw "The remote server returned an error: (404) Not Found. ($Uri)" }
+    return $source
+}
+
+function global:HarnessInvokeWebRequest {
+    [CmdletBinding()]
+    param([string]$Uri, [string]$OutFile, [switch]$UseBasicParsing, [int]$TimeoutSec, [string]$Method)
+    Write-HarnessTrace 'Invoke-WebRequest' $Uri
+    [System.IO.File]::Copy((Get-HarnessServerFile $Uri), $OutFile, $true)
+}
+
+function global:HarnessInvokeRestMethod {
+    [CmdletBinding()]
+    param([string]$Uri, [switch]$UseBasicParsing, [int]$TimeoutSec)
+    Write-HarnessTrace 'Invoke-RestMethod' $Uri
+    return ([System.IO.File]::ReadAllText((Get-HarnessServerFile $Uri)) | ConvertFrom-Json)
+}
+
+function global:HarnessGetAuthenticodeSignature {
+    [CmdletBinding()]
+    param([string]$FilePath)
+    Write-HarnessTrace 'Get-AuthenticodeSignature' $FilePath
+    return [pscustomobject]@{
+        Status            = $global:HarnessOptions.SignatureStatus
+        SignerCertificate = [pscustomobject]@{ Subject = $global:HarnessOptions.SignerSubject; Thumbprint = 'HARNESS' }
+    }
+}
+
+function global:HarnessTestFileCatalog {
+    [CmdletBinding()]
+    param([string]$Path, [string]$CatalogFilePath, [string[]]$FilesToSkip, [switch]$Detailed)
+    Write-HarnessTrace 'Test-FileCatalog' $Path
+    return [pscustomobject]@{
+        Status       = $(if ($global:HarnessOptions.CatalogValid) { 'Valid' } else { 'ValidationFailed' })
+        Signature    = [pscustomobject]@{ Status = 'Valid'; SignerCertificate = [pscustomobject]@{ Subject = 'CN=glueckkanja AG, O=glueckkanja AG, C=DE' } }
+        CatalogItems = @{}
+        PathItems    = @{}
+    }
+}
+
+function global:HarnessGetBootstrapDecision {
+    param([int]$MaxBootstrapWindowHours, [int]$OobeProfileMaxAgeMinutes)
+    Write-HarnessTrace 'Get-BootstrapDecision' "MaxBootstrapWindowHours=$MaxBootstrapWindowHours"
+    $install = [bool]$global:HarnessOptions.Install
+    return [pscustomobject]@{ Install = $install; ReasonCode = $(if ($install) { $null } else { 'ProfilesFound' }); RelaxActive = $false }
+}
+
+function global:HarnessGetRegistryValue64 {
+    param([string]$SubKey, [string]$Name)
+    Write-HarnessTrace 'Get-RegistryValue64' "$SubKey\$Name"
+    if ($SubKey -eq 'SOFTWARE\AutopilotMonitor' -and $Name -eq 'Deployed') { return $global:HarnessOptions.Marker }
+    return $null
+}
+
+function global:HarnessGetScheduledTask {
+    [CmdletBinding()]
+    param([string]$TaskName)
+    Write-HarnessTrace 'Get-ScheduledTask' $TaskName
+    if ($global:HarnessOptions.TaskPresent) { return [pscustomobject]@{ TaskName = $TaskName } }
+    throw (New-Object System.Management.Automation.ErrorRecord((New-Object System.Exception "No MSFT_ScheduledTask objects found with property 'TaskName' equal to '$TaskName'."), 'CmdletizationQuery_NotFound_TaskName,Get-ScheduledTask', [System.Management.Automation.ErrorCategory]::ObjectNotFound, $TaskName))
+}
+
+function global:HarnessInvokeAgentInstallMode {
+    param([string]$ExePath, [string[]]$Arguments = @('--install'))
+    Write-HarnessTrace 'Invoke-AgentInstallMode' ('{0} {1} exists={2}' -f $ExePath, ($Arguments -join ' '), [System.IO.File]::Exists($ExePath))
+    # A real program start from PowerShell's own location, as the agent start is: a location
+    # that no longer exists fails here with error 267, as it did on the MSI channel. With
+    # AgentStartFails the stub payload itself is started, a text file that never runs.
+    if ($global:HarnessOptions.AgentStartFails) {
+        & $ExePath @Arguments | Out-Host
+        return $LASTEXITCODE
+    }
+    & "$env:SystemRoot\System32\cmd.exe" /c "exit $([int]$global:HarnessOptions.InstallExitCode)" | Out-Host
+    return $LASTEXITCODE
+}
+
+function global:HarnessGetProcess {
+    [CmdletBinding()]
+    param([string[]]$Name)
+    if ($Name -contains 'AutopilotMonitor.Agent') {
+        Write-HarnessTrace 'Get-Process' 'AutopilotMonitor.Agent'
+        return [pscustomobject]@{ Id = 4242; StartTime = Get-Date }
+    }
+    return Microsoft.PowerShell.Management\Get-Process @PSBoundParameters
+}
+
+function global:HarnessStartSleep {
+    [CmdletBinding()]
+    param([int]$Seconds, [int]$Milliseconds)
+    Write-HarnessTrace 'Start-Sleep' "$Seconds s $Milliseconds ms"
+}
+
+function global:HarnessTestIsElevated {
+    Write-HarnessTrace 'Test-IsElevated' "$($global:HarnessOptions.Elevated)"
+    return [bool]$global:HarnessOptions.Elevated
+}
+
+# The protected DACL without the owner change a standard account may not make.
+function global:HarnessNewProtectedDirectorySecurity {
+    $security = New-Object System.Security.AccessControl.DirectorySecurity
+    $security.SetAccessRuleProtection($true, $false)
+    $inherit = [System.Security.AccessControl.InheritanceFlags]'ContainerInherit, ObjectInherit'
+    $propagation = [System.Security.AccessControl.PropagationFlags]::None
+    foreach ($sid in @([System.Security.Principal.WindowsIdentity]::GetCurrent().User, (New-Object System.Security.Principal.SecurityIdentifier('S-1-5-18')))) {
+        $security.AddAccessRule((New-Object System.Security.AccessControl.FileSystemAccessRule($sid, 'FullControl', $inherit, $propagation, 'Allow')))
+    }
+    $security.AddAccessRule((New-Object System.Security.AccessControl.FileSystemAccessRule((New-Object System.Security.Principal.SecurityIdentifier('S-1-5-32-545')), 'ReadAndExecute', $inherit, $propagation, 'Allow')))
+    return $security
+}
+
+function global:HarnessTestIsOwnedByUs {
+    param([string]$Path)
+    if ([System.IO.Path]::GetFileName($Path) -like 'foreign*') { return $false }
+    try {
+        $owner = (Get-Item -LiteralPath $Path -Force -ErrorAction Stop).GetAccessControl([System.Security.AccessControl.AccessControlSections]::Owner).GetOwner([System.Security.Principal.SecurityIdentifier])
+        return ($owner.Value -eq 'S-1-5-18' -or $owner.Value -eq 'S-1-5-32-544' -or $owner -eq [System.Security.Principal.WindowsIdentity]::GetCurrent().User)
+    } catch {
+        return $false
+    }
+}
+
+$swaps = @{
+    'Invoke-WebRequest'         = 'HarnessInvokeWebRequest'
+    'Invoke-RestMethod'         = 'HarnessInvokeRestMethod'
+    'Get-AuthenticodeSignature' = 'HarnessGetAuthenticodeSignature'
+    'Test-FileCatalog'          = 'HarnessTestFileCatalog'
+    'Get-BootstrapDecision'     = 'HarnessGetBootstrapDecision'
+    'Get-RegistryValue64'       = 'HarnessGetRegistryValue64'
+    'Get-ScheduledTask'         = 'HarnessGetScheduledTask'
+    'Invoke-AgentInstallMode'   = 'HarnessInvokeAgentInstallMode'
+    'Get-Process'               = 'HarnessGetProcess'
+    'Start-Sleep'               = 'HarnessStartSleep'
+    'Test-IsOwnedByUs'          = 'HarnessTestIsOwnedByUs'
+}
+if ($global:HarnessOptions.SwapElevation) { $swaps['Test-IsElevated'] = 'HarnessTestIsElevated' }
+if ($global:HarnessOptions.SwapDacl) { $swaps['New-ProtectedDirectorySecurity'] = 'HarnessNewProtectedDirectorySecurity' }
+foreach ($name in $swaps.Keys) { Set-Alias -Name $name -Value $swaps[$name] -Scope Global -Force }
+
+# The OOBE script arrives as irm | iex, which ignores #Requires.
+if ($global:HarnessOptions.Iex) {
+    Invoke-Expression ([System.IO.File]::ReadAllText($global:HarnessOptions.Script))
+} else {
+    & $global:HarnessOptions.Script @args
+}
+exit $LASTEXITCODE
+'@
+
+    # A ZIP with exactly these entry names.
+    function New-ZipWithEntries {
+        param([string]$Path, [string[]]$Names)
+        Add-Type -AssemblyName System.IO.Compression
+        Add-Type -AssemblyName System.IO.Compression.FileSystem
+        $archive = [System.IO.Compression.ZipFile]::Open($Path, [System.IO.Compression.ZipArchiveMode]::Create)
+        try {
+            foreach ($name in $Names) {
+                $writer = New-Object System.IO.StreamWriter($archive.CreateEntry($name).Open())
+                try { $writer.Write("content of $name") } finally { $writer.Dispose() }
+            }
+        } finally { $archive.Dispose() }
+    }
+
+    # Serves a package with one entry that points outside the payload folder, with the
+    # matching manifest hash, under the stable names.
+    function Set-EscapingPackage {
+        param($Scenario)
+        $zip = Join-Path $Scenario.Server 'AutopilotMonitor-Agent.zip'
+        Remove-Item -LiteralPath $zip
+        New-ZipWithEntries -Path $zip -Names @('AutopilotMonitor.Agent.exe', 'AutopilotMonitor.Agent.cat', '../../../outside.txt')
+        $sha = (Get-FileHash -LiteralPath $zip -Algorithm SHA256).Hash.ToLowerInvariant()
+        Set-Content -LiteralPath (Join-Path $Scenario.Server 'version.json') -Value ('{"version":"2.0.9999","sha256":"' + $sha + '"}')
+    }
+
+    function New-Scenario {
+        $root = Join-Path $TestDrive ('s' + [guid]::NewGuid().ToString('N').Substring(0, 7))
+        $scenario = [pscustomobject]@{
+            Root        = $root
+            ProgramData = Join-Path $root 'ProgramData'
+            Base        = Join-Path $root 'ProgramData\AutopilotMonitor'
+            Temp        = Join-Path $root 'Temp'
+            Server      = Join-Path $root 'Server'
+            Outside     = Join-Path $root 'Outside'
+            Ime         = Join-Path $root 'Ime'
+        }
+        foreach ($dir in @($scenario.ProgramData, $scenario.Temp, $scenario.Server, $scenario.Outside, $scenario.Ime)) {
+            New-Item -ItemType Directory -Path $dir -Force | Out-Null
+        }
+        Copy-Item -LiteralPath $script:installerPath -Destination (Join-Path $scenario.Server 'Install-AutopilotMonitor.ps1')
+        Copy-Item -LiteralPath $script:agentZip -Destination (Join-Path $scenario.Server 'AutopilotMonitor-Agent.zip')
+        Set-Content -LiteralPath (Join-Path $scenario.Server 'version.json') -Value ('{"version":"2.0.9999","sha256":"' + $script:agentZipSha256 + '"}')
+        return $scenario
+    }
+
+    function Invoke-Scenario {
+        param(
+            $Scenario,
+            [string]$Script,
+            [string[]]$Arguments = @(),
+            [string]$WorkingDirectory,
+            [hashtable]$Options = @{}
+        )
+        $settings = @{
+            Script          = $Script
+            Server          = $Scenario.Server
+            Install         = $true
+            Marker          = $null
+            TaskPresent     = $false
+            InstallExitCode = 0
+            SignatureStatus = 'Valid'
+            SignerSubject   = 'CN=glueckkanja AG, O=glueckkanja AG, C=DE'
+            CatalogValid    = $true
+            Elevated        = $true
+            Iex             = $false
+            AgentStartFails = $false
+        }
+        foreach ($key in $Options.Keys) { $settings[$key] = $Options[$key] }
+        $settings.SwapElevation = ([bool]$settings.Elevated -ne $script:isElevated)
+        $settings.SwapDacl = -not $script:isElevated
+
+        $harness = Join-Path $Scenario.Root 'Harness'
+        New-Item -ItemType Directory -Path $harness -Force | Out-Null
+        $tracePath = Join-Path $harness 'trace.txt'
+        if (Test-Path -LiteralPath $tracePath) { Remove-Item -LiteralPath $tracePath }
+        [System.IO.File]::WriteAllText((Join-Path $harness 'options.json'), ($settings | ConvertTo-Json))
+        [System.IO.File]::WriteAllText((Join-Path $harness 'run.ps1'), $script:wrapperText)
+
+        $psi = New-Object System.Diagnostics.ProcessStartInfo
+        $psi.FileName = $script:powershell
+        $quoted = @($Arguments | ForEach-Object { if ($_ -match '\s') { '"' + $_ + '"' } else { $_ } })
+        $psi.Arguments = ('-NoProfile -ExecutionPolicy Bypass -File "{0}" {1}' -f (Join-Path $harness 'run.ps1'), ($quoted -join ' ')).Trim()
+        $psi.WorkingDirectory = $(if ($WorkingDirectory) { $WorkingDirectory } else { $Scenario.Root })
+        $psi.UseShellExecute = $false
+        $psi.RedirectStandardOutput = $true
+        $psi.RedirectStandardError = $true
+        $psi.EnvironmentVariables['ProgramData'] = $Scenario.ProgramData
+        $psi.EnvironmentVariables['ALLUSERSPROFILE'] = $Scenario.ProgramData
+        $psi.EnvironmentVariables['TEMP'] = $Scenario.Temp
+        $psi.EnvironmentVariables['TMP'] = $Scenario.Temp
+        $process = [System.Diagnostics.Process]::Start($psi)
+        $stdout = $process.StandardOutput.ReadToEndAsync()
+        $stderr = $process.StandardError.ReadToEndAsync()
+        if (-not $process.WaitForExit(300000)) { $process.Kill(); throw 'The harness run did not end within five minutes.' }
+        $process.WaitForExit()
+
+        return [pscustomobject]@{
+            ExitCode = $process.ExitCode
+            StdOut   = $stdout.Result
+            StdErr   = $stderr.Result
+            Trace    = @(if (Test-Path -LiteralPath $tracePath) { Get-Content -LiteralPath $tracePath })
+        }
+    }
+
+    # Every entry below $Root, links as links and never followed; run-folder ids as <id>.
+    # -Content adds a hash per file, for "exactly as it was".
+    function Get-Tree {
+        param([string]$Root, [switch]$Content)
+        $entries = New-Object System.Collections.Generic.List[string]
+        $walk = {
+            param([string]$Folder)
+            foreach ($entry in [System.IO.Directory]::GetFileSystemEntries($Folder)) {
+                $relative = $entry.Substring($Root.Length + 1) -replace '-[0-9a-f]{8}(?=\\|$)', '-<id>'
+                $attributes = [System.IO.File]::GetAttributes($entry)
+                if (($attributes -band [System.IO.FileAttributes]::ReparsePoint) -ne 0) { $entries.Add("$relative -> link"); continue }
+                if (($attributes -band [System.IO.FileAttributes]::Directory) -ne 0) { $entries.Add("$relative\"); & $walk $entry; continue }
+                if ($Content) { $relative += ' ' + (Get-FileHash -LiteralPath $entry -Algorithm SHA256).Hash.Substring(0, 16) }
+                $entries.Add($relative)
+            }
+        }
+        if ([System.IO.Directory]::Exists($Root)) { & $walk $Root }
+        return (Join-Tree $entries)
+    }
+
+    function Join-Tree {
+        param([string[]]$Entries)
+        $sorted = [string[]]@($Entries | Where-Object { $_ })
+        [System.Array]::Sort($sorted, [System.StringComparer]::Ordinal)
+        return ($sorted -join "`n")
+    }
+
+    function Get-StdErrLines {
+        param($Run)
+        return @($Run.StdErr -split "`r?`n" | Where-Object { $_ })
+    }
+
+    function New-Junction {
+        param([string]$Link, [string]$Target)
+        cmd.exe /c mklink /J "$Link" "$Target" | Out-Null
+    }
+
+    function Add-File {
+        param([string]$Path, [string]$Value = 'x')
+        New-Item -ItemType Directory -Path (Split-Path $Path) -Force | Out-Null
+        Set-Content -LiteralPath $Path -Value $Value
+    }
+
+    # A base with what earlier bootstrap versions and agents could leave behind, plus a file
+    # no version knows yet and a junction out of it.
+    function Add-Leftovers {
+        param($Scenario)
+        Add-File (Join-Path $Scenario.Base 'Install-AutopilotMonitor.ps1')
+        Add-File (Join-Path $Scenario.Base 'Logs\bootstrap-loader.log')
+        Add-File (Join-Path $Scenario.Base 'Logs\bootstrap-script.log')
+        Add-File (Join-Path $Scenario.Base 'Agent-Install\Agent\AutopilotMonitor.Agent.Core.dll')
+        Add-File (Join-Path $Scenario.Base 'future-version-file.bin')
+        Add-File (Join-Path $Scenario.Outside 'target\sentinel.txt') 'must survive'
+        New-Junction -Link (Join-Path $Scenario.Base 'linked') -Target (Join-Path $Scenario.Outside 'target')
+    }
+
+    $script:installedTree = @(
+        'AutopilotMonitor\'
+        'AutopilotMonitor\Agent\'
+        'AutopilotMonitor\Agent\AutopilotMonitor.Agent.Core.dll'
+        'AutopilotMonitor\Agent\AutopilotMonitor.Agent.cat'
+        'AutopilotMonitor\Agent\AutopilotMonitor.Agent.exe'
+        'AutopilotMonitor\Agent\AutopilotMonitor.Agent.exe.config'
+        'AutopilotMonitor\Logs\'
+    )
+}
+
+Describe 'loader 1.4' {
+    It 'installs and leaves only the agent folder, with its log carried over' {
+        $s = New-Scenario
+        $run = Invoke-Scenario $s -Script $script:loaderPath -Arguments @('-MaxBootstrapWindowHours', '24')
+
+        $run.ExitCode | Should -Be 0
+        $run.StdErr | Should -BeNullOrEmpty
+        Get-Tree $s.ProgramData | Should -Be (Join-Tree ($script:installedTree + 'AutopilotMonitor\Logs\bootstrap-loader.log' + 'AutopilotMonitor\Logs\bootstrap-script.log'))
+        Get-Tree $s.Temp | Should -BeNullOrEmpty
+        $run.Trace | Should -Contain 'Get-BootstrapDecision|MaxBootstrapWindowHours=24'
+        $run.Trace | Should -Contain 'Invoke-WebRequest|https://download.autopilotmonitor.com/agent/Install-AutopilotMonitor.ps1'
+        $run.Trace | Should -Contain 'Invoke-WebRequest|https://download.autopilotmonitor.com/agent/AutopilotMonitor-Agent.zip'
+        $run.Trace | Should -Contain 'Invoke-RestMethod|https://download.autopilotmonitor.com/agent/version.json'
+        @($run.Trace | Where-Object { $_ -like 'Test-FileCatalog|*' }).Count | Should -Be 1
+        @($run.Trace | Where-Object { $_ -like 'Invoke-AgentInstallMode|*\AutopilotMonitor\Agent\AutopilotMonitor.Agent.exe --install exists=True' }).Count | Should -Be 1
+        $run.StdOut | Should -Match 'Bootstrap Completed Successfully'
+        Get-Content -LiteralPath (Join-Path $s.Base 'Logs\bootstrap-loader.log') -Raw | Should -Match '=== Autopilot Monitor bootstrap loader v1\.4 started'
+        if ($script:isElevated) {
+            (Get-Item -LiteralPath $s.Base).GetAccessControl('Owner').GetOwner([System.Security.Principal.SecurityIdentifier]).Value | Should -Be 'S-1-5-32-544'
+        }
+    }
+
+    It 'skips and leaves nothing behind, also what older versions left and files no version knows' {
+        $s = New-Scenario
+        Add-Leftovers $s
+        $run = Invoke-Scenario $s -Script $script:loaderPath -Options @{ Install = $false }
+
+        $run.ExitCode | Should -Be 0
+        $run.StdErr | Should -BeNullOrEmpty
+        Get-Tree $s.ProgramData | Should -BeNullOrEmpty
+        Get-Content -LiteralPath (Join-Path $s.Outside 'target\sentinel.txt') | Should -Be 'must survive'
+        $run.StdOut | Should -Match 'No agent on this device: .* removed\.'
+        @($run.Trace | Where-Object { $_ -like 'Invoke-WebRequest|*Agent.zip' }).Count | Should -Be 0
+    }
+
+    It 'leaves the folder of an agent exactly as it is, self-update leftovers included' {
+        $s = New-Scenario
+        Add-File (Join-Path $s.Base 'Agent\AutopilotMonitor.Agent.exe') 'running agent'
+        Add-File (Join-Path $s.Base 'Agent\AutopilotMonitor.Agent.Core.dll.old') 'previous version'
+        Add-File (Join-Path $s.Base 'Updates\AutopilotMonitor-Agent-Update.zip') 'update'
+        Add-File (Join-Path $s.Base 'Agent-Update\AutopilotMonitor.Agent.Core.dll') 'staged'
+        Add-File (Join-Path $s.Base 'Logs\agent.log') 'agent log'
+        Add-File (Join-Path $s.Base 'State\session.id') 'session'
+        $before = Get-Tree $s.ProgramData -Content
+        $run = Invoke-Scenario $s -Script $script:loaderPath
+
+        $run.ExitCode | Should -Be 0
+        $run.StdErr | Should -BeNullOrEmpty
+        Get-Tree $s.ProgramData -Content | Should -Be $before
+        $run.StdOut | Should -Match 'Agent present \(agent executable\)'
+        @($run.Trace | Where-Object { $_ -like 'Invoke-AgentInstallMode|*' }).Count | Should -Be 0
+    }
+
+    It 'leaves the folder alone when only the deployment marker <Case>' -TestCases @(
+        @{ Case = 'is there (logs kept after enrollment)'; Options = @{ Marker = '2026-10-01T08:00:00Z' } }
+        @{ Case = 'is missing but the agent task exists'; Options = @{ TaskPresent = $true } }
+    ) {
+        $s = New-Scenario
+        Add-File (Join-Path $s.Base 'Logs\agent.log') 'kept log'
+        $before = Get-Tree $s.ProgramData -Content
+        $run = Invoke-Scenario $s -Script $script:loaderPath -Options $Options
+
+        $run.ExitCode | Should -Be 0
+        $run.StdErr | Should -BeNullOrEmpty
+        Get-Tree $s.ProgramData -Content | Should -Be $before
+    }
+
+    It 'keeps its log when the installer fails; a later run removes it, a run within the hour leaves it' {
+        $s = New-Scenario
+        Remove-Item -LiteralPath (Join-Path $s.Server 'version.json')
+        $failed = Invoke-Scenario $s -Script $script:loaderPath
+
+        $failed.ExitCode | Should -Be 0
+        @(Get-StdErrLines $failed).Count | Should -Be 1
+        $failed.StdErr | Should -Match '^AutopilotMonitor bootstrap failed: No SHA-256 hash available'
+        Get-Tree $s.ProgramData | Should -Be (Join-Tree @(
+            'AutopilotMonitor-Loader-<id>\'
+            'AutopilotMonitor-Loader-<id>\bootstrap-loader.log'
+            'AutopilotMonitor\'
+            'AutopilotMonitor\Logs\'
+            'AutopilotMonitor\Logs\bootstrap-loader.log'
+            'AutopilotMonitor\Logs\bootstrap-script.log'
+        ))
+
+        Set-Content -LiteralPath (Join-Path $s.Server 'version.json') -Value ('{"version":"2.0.9999","sha256":"' + $script:agentZipSha256 + '"}')
+        $kept = (Get-ChildItem -LiteralPath $s.ProgramData -Directory -Filter 'AutopilotMonitor-Loader-*').FullName
+
+        # Minutes later the folder may still belong to a running loader: it stays.
+        $soon = Invoke-Scenario $s -Script $script:loaderPath
+        $soon.ExitCode | Should -Be 0
+        $soon.StdErr | Should -BeNullOrEmpty
+        Test-Path -LiteralPath $kept | Should -BeTrue
+        Get-Tree $s.Base | Should -Be (Join-Tree ((@($script:installedTree) | ForEach-Object { $_ -replace '^AutopilotMonitor\\', '' } | Where-Object { $_ }) + 'Logs\bootstrap-loader.log' + 'Logs\bootstrap-script.log'))
+
+        [System.IO.Directory]::SetCreationTimeUtc($kept, [System.DateTime]::UtcNow.AddHours(-2))
+        $later = Invoke-Scenario $s -Script $script:loaderPath -Options @{ Install = $false }
+        $later.ExitCode | Should -Be 0
+        Test-Path -LiteralPath $kept | Should -BeFalse
+    }
+
+    It 'runs nothing it cannot verify: <Case>' -TestCases @(
+        @{ Case = 'unsigned'; Options = @{ SignatureStatus = 'NotSigned' }; Edit = $null }
+        @{ Case = 'another publisher'; Options = @{ SignerSubject = 'CN=Somebody Else, O=Somebody Else Ltd, C=US' }; Edit = $null }
+        @{ Case = 'an installer below 2.8'; Options = @{}; Edit = @('$ScriptVersion = "2.8"', '$ScriptVersion = "2.7"') }
+        @{ Case = 'not the installer'; Options = @{}; Edit = @('$ScriptRole = "AutopilotMonitor-Installer"', '$ScriptRole = "AutopilotMonitor-Other"') }
+    ) {
+        $s = New-Scenario
+        if ($Edit) {
+            $served = Join-Path $s.Server 'Install-AutopilotMonitor.ps1'
+            $text = [System.IO.File]::ReadAllText($served)
+            $text.Contains($Edit[0]) | Should -BeTrue
+            [System.IO.File]::WriteAllText($served, $text.Replace($Edit[0], $Edit[1]))
+        }
+        $run = Invoke-Scenario $s -Script $script:loaderPath -Options $Options
+
+        $run.ExitCode | Should -Be 0
+        $run.StdErr | Should -BeNullOrEmpty
+        @($run.Trace | Where-Object { $_ -like 'Invoke-WebRequest|*Install-AutopilotMonitor.ps1' }).Count | Should -Be 3
+        @($run.Trace | Where-Object { $_ -like 'Get-BootstrapDecision|*' }).Count | Should -Be 0
+        Get-Tree $s.ProgramData | Should -Be (Join-Tree @('AutopilotMonitor-Loader-<id>\', 'AutopilotMonitor-Loader-<id>\bootstrap-loader.log'))
+    }
+
+    It 'refuses to run without SYSTEM or administrator rights and creates nothing' {
+        $s = New-Scenario
+        $run = Invoke-Scenario $s -Script $script:loaderPath -Options @{ Elevated = $false }
+
+        $run.ExitCode | Should -Be 0
+        @(Get-StdErrLines $run) | Should -Be 'AutopilotMonitor loader: not running as SYSTEM or administrator; nothing was downloaded or changed.'
+        Get-Tree $s.ProgramData | Should -BeNullOrEmpty
+        @($run.Trace | Where-Object { $_ -like 'Invoke-WebRequest|*' }).Count | Should -Be 0
+    }
+}
+
+Describe 'installer assigned directly' {
+    BeforeEach {
+        $s = New-Scenario
+        $imeCopy = Join-Path $s.Ime '0f1e2d3c-4b5a-6978-8796-a5b4c3d2e1f0.ps1'
+        Copy-Item -LiteralPath $script:installerPath -Destination $imeCopy
+    }
+
+    It 'installs, and the copy IME runs stays where IME put it' {
+        $run = Invoke-Scenario $s -Script $imeCopy
+
+        $run.ExitCode | Should -Be 0
+        $run.StdErr | Should -BeNullOrEmpty
+        Get-Tree $s.ProgramData | Should -Be (Join-Tree ($script:installedTree + 'AutopilotMonitor\Logs\bootstrap-script.log'))
+        Test-Path -LiteralPath $imeCopy | Should -BeTrue
+        Get-Tree $s.Temp | Should -BeNullOrEmpty
+    }
+
+    It 'skips and leaves nothing behind' {
+        Add-Leftovers $s
+        $run = Invoke-Scenario $s -Script $imeCopy -Options @{ Install = $false }
+
+        $run.ExitCode | Should -Be 0
+        $run.StdErr | Should -BeNullOrEmpty
+        Get-Tree $s.ProgramData | Should -BeNullOrEmpty
+        Get-Content -LiteralPath (Join-Path $s.Outside 'target\sentinel.txt') | Should -Be 'must survive'
+    }
+
+    # An agent that ran owns its folder, even after a failed --install; one that never started
+    # leaves only payload, which a later run would take for an agent.
+    It 'fails with exit code 1 and exactly one line on stderr: <Case>' -TestCases @(
+        @{ Case = 'the download fails'; Missing = 'AutopilotMonitor-Agent.zip'; Options = @{}; Message = 'AutopilotMonitor bootstrap failed: The remote server returned an error: (404) Not Found.*'; AgentFolder = 'gone' }
+        @{ Case = 'the payload fails its catalog'; Missing = $null; Options = @{ CatalogValid = $false }; Message = 'AutopilotMonitor bootstrap failed: Payload verification FAILED*'; AgentFolder = 'gone' }
+        @{ Case = 'the agent install fails'; Missing = $null; Options = @{ InstallExitCode = 7 }; Message = 'AutopilotMonitor bootstrap failed: Agent install failed with exit code 7'; AgentFolder = 'stays' }
+        @{ Case = 'the agent does not start'; Missing = $null; Options = @{ AgentStartFails = $true }; Message = "AutopilotMonitor bootstrap failed: Program 'AutopilotMonitor.Agent.exe' failed to run*"; AgentFolder = 'gone' }
+    ) {
+        if ($Missing) { Remove-Item -LiteralPath (Join-Path $s.Server $Missing) }
+        $run = Invoke-Scenario $s -Script $imeCopy -Options $Options
+
+        $run.ExitCode | Should -Be 1
+        @(Get-StdErrLines $run).Count | Should -Be 1
+        @(Get-StdErrLines $run)[0] | Should -BeLike $Message
+        Get-Tree $s.ProgramData | Should -Not -Match 'Agent-Install'
+        Test-Path -LiteralPath (Join-Path $s.Base 'Agent') | Should -Be ($AgentFolder -eq 'stays')
+        Test-Path -LiteralPath (Join-Path $s.Base 'Logs\bootstrap-script.log') | Should -BeTrue
+    }
+
+    It 'refuses an agent package with an entry outside the payload folder and writes nothing outside' {
+        Set-EscapingPackage $s
+        $run = Invoke-Scenario $s -Script $imeCopy
+
+        $run.ExitCode | Should -Be 1
+        @(Get-StdErrLines $run).Count | Should -Be 1
+        @(Get-StdErrLines $run)[0] | Should -BeLike 'AutopilotMonitor bootstrap failed: The agent package has an entry that would be written outside the payload folder*'
+        Get-Tree $s.Root | Should -Not -Match 'outside\.txt'
+        Get-Tree $s.ProgramData | Should -Be (Join-Tree @('AutopilotMonitor\', 'AutopilotMonitor\Logs\', 'AutopilotMonitor\Logs\bootstrap-script.log'))
+    }
+
+    It 'refuses to run without SYSTEM or administrator rights and changes nothing' {
+        Add-File (Join-Path $s.Base 'Logs\bootstrap-script.log') 'earlier run'
+        $before = Get-Tree $s.ProgramData -Content
+        $run = Invoke-Scenario $s -Script $imeCopy -Options @{ Elevated = $false }
+
+        $run.ExitCode | Should -Be 1
+        @(Get-StdErrLines $run) | Should -Be 'AutopilotMonitor bootstrap: not running as SYSTEM or administrator; nothing was changed.'
+        Get-Tree $s.ProgramData -Content | Should -Be $before
+    }
+
+    It 'does not install into a folder that holds another account''s entries, and leaves them' {
+        Add-File (Join-Path $s.Base 'foreign-planted.dll') 'planted'
+        Add-File (Join-Path $s.Base 'Logs\bootstrap-script.log') 'earlier run'
+        $run = Invoke-Scenario $s -Script $imeCopy
+
+        $run.ExitCode | Should -Be 1
+        @(Get-StdErrLines $run).Count | Should -Be 1
+        $run.StdErr | Should -Match 'holds entries another account created'
+        Get-Tree $s.ProgramData | Should -Be (Join-Tree @('AutopilotMonitor\', 'AutopilotMonitor\foreign-planted.dll'))
+        @($run.Trace | Where-Object { $_ -like 'Invoke-WebRequest|*' }).Count | Should -Be 0
+    }
+
+    It 'leaves another account''s entries and their folder when it skips' {
+        Add-File (Join-Path $s.Base 'foreign-planted.dll') 'planted'
+        Add-File (Join-Path $s.Base 'Logs\bootstrap-script.log') 'earlier run'
+        $run = Invoke-Scenario $s -Script $imeCopy -Options @{ Install = $false }
+
+        $run.ExitCode | Should -Be 0
+        $run.StdErr | Should -BeNullOrEmpty
+        Get-Tree $s.ProgramData | Should -Be (Join-Tree @('AutopilotMonitor\', 'AutopilotMonitor\foreign-planted.dll'))
+    }
+
+    It 'never follows an agent folder that is a link: <Case>' -TestCases @(
+        @{ Case = 'install'; Install = $true; ExitCode = 1 }
+        @{ Case = 'skip'; Install = $false; ExitCode = 0 }
+    ) {
+        Add-File (Join-Path $s.Outside 'target\sentinel.txt') 'must survive'
+        New-Junction -Link $s.Base -Target (Join-Path $s.Outside 'target')
+        $run = Invoke-Scenario $s -Script $imeCopy -Options @{ Install = $Install }
+
+        $run.ExitCode | Should -Be $ExitCode
+        Get-Tree $s.ProgramData | Should -Be 'AutopilotMonitor -> link'
+        Get-Tree (Join-Path $s.Outside 'target') | Should -Be 'sentinel.txt'
+    }
+}
+
+Describe 'loader 1.2, frozen' {
+    It 'installs with the current installer, which removes its copy and keeps the loader start line' {
+        $s = New-Scenario
+        $run = Invoke-Scenario $s -Script $script:loader12Path
+
+        $run.ExitCode | Should -Be 0
+        $run.StdErr | Should -BeNullOrEmpty
+        Get-Tree $s.ProgramData | Should -Be (Join-Tree ($script:installedTree + 'AutopilotMonitor\Logs\bootstrap-loader.log' + 'AutopilotMonitor\Logs\bootstrap-script.log'))
+        $log = @(Get-Content -LiteralPath (Join-Path $s.Base 'Logs\bootstrap-loader.log'))
+        $log[0] | Should -Match '^\[\d{4}-\d\d-\d\d \d\d:\d\d:\d\d\] === Autopilot Monitor bootstrap loader v1\.2 started \(carried over by the bootstrapper\) ===$'
+    }
+
+    It 'leaves the folder of an agent as it is, but not the copy the old loader saved there' {
+        $s = New-Scenario
+        Add-File (Join-Path $s.Base 'Agent\AutopilotMonitor.Agent.exe') 'running agent'
+        Add-File (Join-Path $s.Base 'Logs\agent.log') 'agent log'
+        $run = Invoke-Scenario $s -Script $script:loader12Path
+
+        $run.ExitCode | Should -Be 0
+        $run.StdErr | Should -BeNullOrEmpty
+        Get-Tree $s.ProgramData | Should -Be (Join-Tree @(
+            'AutopilotMonitor\', 'AutopilotMonitor\Agent\', 'AutopilotMonitor\Agent\AutopilotMonitor.Agent.exe'
+            'AutopilotMonitor\Logs\', 'AutopilotMonitor\Logs\agent.log', 'AutopilotMonitor\Logs\bootstrap-loader.log'
+        ))
+        Get-Content -LiteralPath (Join-Path $s.Base 'Agent\AutopilotMonitor.Agent.exe') | Should -Be 'running agent'
+    }
+
+    It 'skips with the current installer and leaves nothing behind' {
+        $s = New-Scenario
+        Add-Leftovers $s
+        $run = Invoke-Scenario $s -Script $script:loader12Path -Options @{ Install = $false }
+
+        $run.ExitCode | Should -Be 0
+        $run.StdErr | Should -BeNullOrEmpty
+        Get-Tree $s.ProgramData | Should -BeNullOrEmpty
+        Get-Content -LiteralPath (Join-Path $s.Outside 'target\sentinel.txt') | Should -Be 'must survive'
+    }
+}
+
+Describe 'bootstrap MSI layouts, started in the folder the MSI installed' {
+    It '<Name> skips and leaves <Left>' -TestCases @(
+        @{ Name = 'MSI 1.3 (loader in Program Files)'; File = 'Start-AutopilotMonitor.ps1'; Source = 'loader'; Location = 'program-files'; Arguments = @('-LogFileName', 'bootstrap-msi.log'); Left = 'nothing'; Tree = @() }
+        @{ Name = 'MSI 1.2 (loader 1.3)'; File = 'Start-AutopilotMonitor.ps1'; Source = 'loader'; Arguments = @('-LogFileName', 'bootstrap-msi.log'); Left = 'nothing'; Tree = @() }
+        @{ Name = 'MSI 1.1 (loader 1.2)'; File = 'Start-AutopilotMonitor.ps1'; Source = 'loader12'; Arguments = @('-LogFileName', 'bootstrap-msi.log'); Left = 'nothing'; Tree = @() }
+        @{ Name = 'MSI 1.0 (own runner)'; File = 'Invoke-BootstrapDownload.ps1'; Source = 'msiRunner'; Arguments = @(); Left = 'only the log the runner holds open'; Tree = @('AutopilotMonitor\', 'AutopilotMonitor\Logs\', 'AutopilotMonitor\Logs\bootstrap-msi.log') }
+    ) {
+        $s = New-Scenario
+        $msi = if ($Location -eq 'program-files') { Join-Path $s.Root 'ProgramFiles\AutopilotMonitor\Bootstrap' } else { Join-Path $s.Base 'Msi' }
+        New-Item -ItemType Directory -Path $msi -Force | Out-Null
+        $sourcePath = @{ loader = $script:loaderPath; loader12 = $script:loader12Path; msiRunner = $script:msiRunnerPath }[$Source]
+        Copy-Item -LiteralPath $sourcePath -Destination (Join-Path $msi $File)
+        $run = Invoke-Scenario $s -Script (Join-Path $msi $File) -Arguments $Arguments -WorkingDirectory $msi -Options @{ Install = $false }
+
+        $run.ExitCode | Should -Be 0
+        $run.StdErr | Should -BeNullOrEmpty
+        Get-Tree $s.ProgramData | Should -Be (Join-Tree $Tree)
+    }
+
+    It '<Name> installs' -TestCases @(
+        @{ Name = 'MSI 1.3 (loader in Program Files)'; File = 'Start-AutopilotMonitor.ps1'; Source = 'loader'; Location = 'program-files'; Arguments = @('-LogFileName', 'bootstrap-msi.log') }
+        @{ Name = 'MSI 1.2 (loader 1.3)'; File = 'Start-AutopilotMonitor.ps1'; Source = 'loader'; Arguments = @('-LogFileName', 'bootstrap-msi.log') }
+        @{ Name = 'MSI 1.1 (loader 1.2)'; File = 'Start-AutopilotMonitor.ps1'; Source = 'loader12'; Arguments = @('-LogFileName', 'bootstrap-msi.log') }
+        @{ Name = 'MSI 1.0 (own runner)'; File = 'Invoke-BootstrapDownload.ps1'; Source = 'msiRunner'; Arguments = @() }
+    ) {
+        $s = New-Scenario
+        $msi = if ($Location -eq 'program-files') { Join-Path $s.Root 'ProgramFiles\AutopilotMonitor\Bootstrap' } else { Join-Path $s.Base 'Msi' }
+        New-Item -ItemType Directory -Path $msi -Force | Out-Null
+        $sourcePath = @{ loader = $script:loaderPath; loader12 = $script:loader12Path; msiRunner = $script:msiRunnerPath }[$Source]
+        Copy-Item -LiteralPath $sourcePath -Destination (Join-Path $msi $File)
+        $run = Invoke-Scenario $s -Script (Join-Path $msi $File) -Arguments $Arguments -WorkingDirectory $msi
+
+        $run.ExitCode | Should -Be 0
+        $run.StdErr | Should -BeNullOrEmpty
+        Get-Tree $s.ProgramData | Should -Be (Join-Tree ($script:installedTree + 'AutopilotMonitor\Logs\bootstrap-msi.log' + 'AutopilotMonitor\Logs\bootstrap-script.log'))
+    }
+}
+
+Describe 'OOBE script, as the backend generates it' {
+    It 'installs the agent with the bootstrap token and leaves only the agent folder' {
+        $s = New-Scenario
+        Add-Leftovers $s
+        $run = Invoke-Scenario $s -Script $script:oobeScriptPath -Options @{ Iex = $true }
+
+        $run.ExitCode | Should -Be 0
+        $run.StdErr | Should -BeNullOrEmpty
+        Get-Tree $s.ProgramData | Should -Be (Join-Tree ($script:installedTree + 'AutopilotMonitor\Logs\oobe_bootstrap.log'))
+        Get-Tree $s.Temp | Should -BeNullOrEmpty
+        Get-Content -LiteralPath (Join-Path $s.Outside 'target\sentinel.txt') | Should -Be 'must survive'
+        $run.Trace | Should -Contain ('Invoke-AgentInstallMode|' + $s.Base + '\Agent\AutopilotMonitor.Agent.exe --install --no-auth --bootstrap-token 22222222-2222-2222-2222-222222222222 --tenant-id 11111111-1111-1111-1111-111111111111 exists=True')
+        @($run.Trace | Where-Object { $_ -like 'Test-FileCatalog|*' }).Count | Should -Be 1
+    }
+
+    It 'only runs --install again when the agent is there' {
+        $s = New-Scenario
+        Add-File (Join-Path $s.Base 'Agent\AutopilotMonitor.Agent.exe') 'running agent'
+        Add-File (Join-Path $s.Base 'State\session.id') 'session'
+        $run = Invoke-Scenario $s -Script $script:oobeScriptPath -Options @{ Iex = $true }
+
+        $run.ExitCode | Should -Be 0
+        Get-Tree $s.ProgramData | Should -Be (Join-Tree @(
+            'AutopilotMonitor\', 'AutopilotMonitor\Agent\', 'AutopilotMonitor\Agent\AutopilotMonitor.Agent.exe'
+            'AutopilotMonitor\Logs\', 'AutopilotMonitor\Logs\oobe_bootstrap.log', 'AutopilotMonitor\State\', 'AutopilotMonitor\State\session.id'
+        ))
+        @($run.Trace | Where-Object { $_ -like 'Invoke-WebRequest|*' }).Count | Should -Be 0
+        @($run.Trace | Where-Object { $_ -like 'Invoke-AgentInstallMode|*' }).Count | Should -Be 1
+    }
+
+    It 'refuses an agent package with an entry outside the payload folder and writes nothing outside' {
+        $s = New-Scenario
+        Set-EscapingPackage $s
+        $run = Invoke-Scenario $s -Script $script:oobeScriptPath -Options @{ Iex = $true }
+
+        $run.ExitCode | Should -Be 1
+        $run.StdOut | Should -Match 'The agent package has an entry that would be written outside the payload folder'
+        Get-Tree $s.Root | Should -Not -Match 'outside\.txt'
+        Get-Tree $s.ProgramData | Should -Be (Join-Tree @('AutopilotMonitor\', 'AutopilotMonitor\Logs\', 'AutopilotMonitor\Logs\oobe_bootstrap.log'))
+    }
+
+    It 'refuses to run without SYSTEM or administrator rights and creates nothing' {
+        $s = New-Scenario
+        $run = Invoke-Scenario $s -Script $script:oobeScriptPath -Options @{ Iex = $true; Elevated = $false }
+
+        $run.ExitCode | Should -Be 1
+        $run.StdOut | Should -Match 'Run this script from PowerShell as SYSTEM or administrator\. Nothing was changed\.'
+        Get-Tree $s.ProgramData | Should -BeNullOrEmpty
+    }
+}
+
+Describe 'publish pipeline and dev channel' {
+    BeforeAll {
+        $script:rendered = Join-Path $TestDrive 'rendered'
+        $script:pwsh = (Get-Command pwsh -CommandType Application -ErrorAction Stop | Select-Object -First 1).Source
+        $script:publish = Join-Path $script:repoRoot '.github\scripts\Publish-BootstrapScripts.ps1'
+
+        # Output read as text from a process of its own: a stderr line must not become an error
+        # record, which ends the test under the 'Stop' preference CI runs with.
+        function Invoke-Publish {
+            param([string[]]$Arguments)
+            $psi = New-Object System.Diagnostics.ProcessStartInfo
+            $psi.FileName = $script:pwsh
+            $psi.Arguments = ('-NoProfile -File "{0}" {1}' -f $script:publish, ($Arguments -join ' ')).Trim()
+            $psi.UseShellExecute = $false
+            $psi.RedirectStandardOutput = $true
+            $psi.RedirectStandardError = $true
+            $process = [System.Diagnostics.Process]::Start($psi)
+            $stdout = $process.StandardOutput.ReadToEndAsync()
+            $stderr = $process.StandardError.ReadToEndAsync()
+            $process.WaitForExit()
+            return [pscustomobject]@{ ExitCode = $process.ExitCode; Output = @(($stdout.Result + "`n" + $stderr.Result) -split "`r?`n") }
+        }
+
+        $dryRun = Invoke-Publish @('-DryRun', '-SignedOutputDir', ('"' + $script:rendered + '"'))
+        if ($dryRun.ExitCode -ne 0) { throw "Publish dry run failed: $($dryRun.Output -join [Environment]::NewLine)" }
+        $script:publishOutput = $dryRun.Output
+    }
+
+    # A loader that went live first would refuse the installer still being served.
+    It 'puts both installers before both loaders' {
+        $order = @($script:publishOutput | Where-Object { $_ -match '\[dry-run\] (\S+\.ps1) ' } | ForEach-Object { $Matches[1] })
+        $order[0..3] | Should -Be @('Install-AutopilotMonitor.ps1', 'Install-AutopilotMonitor-Dev.ps1', 'Start-AutopilotMonitor.ps1', 'Start-AutopilotMonitor-Dev.ps1')
+        @($script:publishOutput | Where-Object { $_ -like '*Installer accepted: AutopilotMonitor-Installer v*' }).Count | Should -Be 2
+    }
+
+    It 'refuses to publish an installer the loader would refuse: <Case>' -TestCases @(
+        @{ Case = 'below the minimum version'; Old = '$ScriptVersion = "2.8"'; New = '$ScriptVersion = "2.7"' }
+        @{ Case = 'without its role line'; Old = '$ScriptRole = "AutopilotMonitor-Installer"'; New = '# no role' }
+        @{ Case = 'with a second version line'; Old = '$ScriptVersion = "2.8"'; New = "`$ScriptVersion = `"2.8`"`n`$ScriptVersion = `"2.9`"" }
+    ) {
+        $root = Join-Path $TestDrive ('repo' + [guid]::NewGuid().ToString('N').Substring(0, 6))
+        New-Item -ItemType Directory -Path (Join-Path $root 'scripts\Bootstrap') -Force | Out-Null
+        Copy-Item -LiteralPath $script:loaderPath -Destination (Join-Path $root 'scripts\Bootstrap')
+        $text = [System.IO.File]::ReadAllText($script:installerPath)
+        $text.Contains($Old) | Should -BeTrue
+        [System.IO.File]::WriteAllText((Join-Path $root 'scripts\Bootstrap\Install-AutopilotMonitor.ps1'), $text.Replace($Old, $New))
+
+        $refused = Invoke-Publish @('-DryRun', '-Channel', 'dev', '-RepoRoot', ('"' + $root + '"'))
+
+        $refused.ExitCode | Should -Not -Be 0
+        ($refused.Output -join "`n") | Should -Match 'The loader would refuse Install-AutopilotMonitor-Dev\.ps1'
+        ($refused.Output -join "`n") | Should -Not -Match '\[dry-run\]'
+    }
+
+    It 'the dev loader fetches the dev installer, which installs the dev agent' {
+        $s = New-Scenario
+        Copy-Item -LiteralPath (Join-Path $script:rendered 'Install-AutopilotMonitor-Dev.ps1') -Destination $s.Server
+        Copy-Item -LiteralPath $script:agentZip -Destination (Join-Path $s.Server 'AutopilotMonitor-Agent-dev.zip')
+        Set-Content -LiteralPath (Join-Path $s.Server 'version-dev.json') -Value ('{"version":"2.0.9999","sha256":"' + $script:agentZipSha256 + '"}')
+        Remove-Item -LiteralPath (Join-Path $s.Server 'Install-AutopilotMonitor.ps1'), (Join-Path $s.Server 'AutopilotMonitor-Agent.zip'), (Join-Path $s.Server 'version.json')
+        $devLoader = Join-Path $s.Ime 'Start-AutopilotMonitor-Dev.ps1'
+        Copy-Item -LiteralPath (Join-Path $script:rendered 'Start-AutopilotMonitor-Dev.ps1') -Destination $devLoader
+        $run = Invoke-Scenario $s -Script $devLoader
+
+        $run.ExitCode | Should -Be 0
+        $run.StdErr | Should -BeNullOrEmpty
+        @($run.Trace | Where-Object { $_ -like 'Invoke-*' }) | Should -Be @(
+            'Invoke-WebRequest|https://download.autopilotmonitor.com/agent/Install-AutopilotMonitor-Dev.ps1'
+            'Invoke-RestMethod|https://download.autopilotmonitor.com/agent/version-dev.json'
+            'Invoke-WebRequest|https://download.autopilotmonitor.com/agent/AutopilotMonitor-Agent-dev.zip'
+            ('Invoke-AgentInstallMode|' + $s.Base + '\Agent\AutopilotMonitor.Agent.exe --install exists=True')
+        )
+        Get-Tree $s.ProgramData | Should -Be (Join-Tree ($script:installedTree + 'AutopilotMonitor\Logs\bootstrap-loader.log' + 'AutopilotMonitor\Logs\bootstrap-script.log'))
+    }
+
+    It 'the stable loader in its published form runs the stable installer in its published form' {
+        $s = New-Scenario
+        Copy-Item -LiteralPath (Join-Path $script:rendered 'Install-AutopilotMonitor.ps1') -Destination $s.Server -Force
+        $loader = Join-Path $s.Ime 'Start-AutopilotMonitor.ps1'
+        Copy-Item -LiteralPath (Join-Path $script:rendered 'Start-AutopilotMonitor.ps1') -Destination $loader
+        [System.IO.File]::ReadAllText($loader).Contains("`r`n") | Should -BeTrue
+        $run = Invoke-Scenario $s -Script $loader
+
+        $run.ExitCode | Should -Be 0
+        $run.StdErr | Should -BeNullOrEmpty
+        $run.StdOut | Should -Match 'Installer accepted: AutopilotMonitor-Installer v2\.8'
+        $run.StdOut | Should -Match 'Bootstrap Completed Successfully'
+    }
+}
@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@
 # The script under test is dot-sourced; its entry guard prevents the loader from
 # executing, so loading it here is side-effect free. Network and signature checks
 # are mocked -- what is verified is the DECISION: what does the loader accept, what
-# does it refuse, and how often does it retry.
+# does it refuse, how often does it retry, and what does it leave behind.
 #
 # Run under Windows PowerShell 5.1 to match the IME runtime:
 #   powershell.exe -NoProfile -Command "& { $c = New-PesterConfiguration; $c.Run.Path = 'scripts\Bootstrap'; $c.Output.Verbosity = 'Detailed'; Invoke-Pester -Configuration $c }"
@@ -20,6 +20,20 @@ BeforeAll {
        } else { $null }
        return [pscustomobject]@{ Status = $Status; SignerCertificate = $cert }
    }
+
+    # Arguments as PowerShell hands them to a script, names marked as names; an array of
+    # plain strings would bind by position instead.
+    function ConvertTo-ScriptArguments { return , $args }
+
+    function Get-ScriptAst {
+        param([string]$Path)
+        $tokens = $null; $errors = $null
+        $ast = [System.Management.Automation.Language.Parser]::ParseFile($Path, [ref]$tokens, [ref]$errors)
+        return [pscustomobject]@{ Ast = $ast; Tokens = $tokens; Errors = $errors }
+    }
+
+    $script:loaderPath = Join-Path $PSScriptRoot 'Start-AutopilotMonitor.ps1'
+    $script:installerPath = Join-Path $PSScriptRoot 'Install-AutopilotMonitor.ps1'
 }

 Describe 'Test-BootstrapSignature' {
@@ -69,22 +83,110 @@ Describe 'Test-BootstrapSignature' {
    }
 }

+Describe 'Get-InstallerIdentity' {
+    BeforeAll {
+        $script:roleLine = '$ScriptRole = "AutopilotMonitor-Installer"'
+    }
+
+    It 'reads the role and the version of LF text' {
+        $id = Get-InstallerIdentity -Text ("param()`n`$ScriptVersion = `"2.7`"`n" + $script:roleLine + "`n")
+        $id.Role | Should -BeExactly 'AutopilotMonitor-Installer'
+        $id.Version | Should -Be ([version]'2.7')
+    }
+
+    It 'reads CRLF text that ends in an Authenticode signature block' {
+        $text = (@('$ScriptVersion = "2.7"', $script:roleLine, '# SIG # Begin signature block', '# MIIFxwYJKoZIhvcNAQcCoIIFuDCCBbQCAQExCzAJBgUrDgMCGgUAMGkGCisGAQQB', '# SIG # End signature block') -join "`r`n") + "`r`n"
+        (Get-InstallerIdentity -Text $text).Version | Should -Be ([version]'2.7')
+    }
+
+    It 'compares versions as numbers, so 2.10 is above 2.7' {
+        $id = Get-InstallerIdentity -Text ("`$ScriptVersion = `"2.10`"`n" + $script:roleLine + "`n")
+        $id.Version -gt [version]'2.7' | Should -BeTrue
+    }
+
+    It 'returns nothing for <Case>' -TestCases @(
+        @{ Case = 'a missing role line'; Lines = @('$ScriptVersion = "2.7"') }
+        @{ Case = 'a missing version line'; Lines = @('$ScriptRole = "AutopilotMonitor-Installer"') }
+        @{ Case = 'a role line in a comment'; Lines = @('# $ScriptRole = "AutopilotMonitor-Installer"', '$ScriptVersion = "2.7"') }
+        @{ Case = 'an indented version line'; Lines = @('$ScriptRole = "AutopilotMonitor-Installer"', '    $ScriptVersion = "2.7"') }
+        @{ Case = 'a second version line'; Lines = @('$ScriptRole = "AutopilotMonitor-Installer"', '$ScriptVersion = "2.7"', '$ScriptVersion = "9.9"') }
+        @{ Case = 'a second role line'; Lines = @('$ScriptRole = "AutopilotMonitor-Installer"', '$ScriptRole = "Other"', '$ScriptVersion = "2.7"') }
+        @{ Case = 'a pre-release version'; Lines = @('$ScriptRole = "AutopilotMonitor-Installer"', '$ScriptVersion = "2.7-beta"') }
+        @{ Case = 'a version line with more code'; Lines = @('$ScriptRole = "AutopilotMonitor-Installer"', '$ScriptVersion = "2.7"; $x = 1') }
+    ) {
+        Get-InstallerIdentity -Text (($Lines -join "`n") + "`n") | Should -BeNullOrEmpty
+    }
+
+    # The pair the loader and the installer in this repository must keep: the published
+    # installer has to pass the loader that ships with it.
+    It 'accepts the installer in this repository' {
+        $id = Get-InstallerIdentity -Text ([System.IO.File]::ReadAllText($script:installerPath))
+        $id.Role | Should -BeExactly $ExpectedInstallerRole
+        $id.Version -ge $MinimumInstallerVersion | Should -BeTrue
+    }
+}
+
+Describe 'Test-InstallerIdentity' {
+    BeforeEach {
+        Mock Write-Log { }
+        $script:candidate = Join-Path $TestDrive ("installer-" + [guid]::NewGuid().ToString('N') + '.ps1')
+    }
+
+    It 'accepts version <Version>' -TestCases @(@{ Version = '2.8' }, @{ Version = '2.10' }, @{ Version = '3.0.1' }) {
+        [System.IO.File]::WriteAllText($script:candidate, "`$ScriptVersion = `"$Version`"`n`$ScriptRole = `"AutopilotMonitor-Installer`"`n")
+        Test-InstallerIdentity -Path $script:candidate | Should -BeTrue
+    }
+
+    # Every installer the publisher ever signed keeps a valid signature; the minimum keeps the
+    # older ones from running.
+    It 'refuses an installer below the minimum version' {
+        [System.IO.File]::WriteAllText($script:candidate, "`$ScriptVersion = `"2.7`"`n`$ScriptRole = `"AutopilotMonitor-Installer`"`n")
+        Test-InstallerIdentity -Path $script:candidate | Should -BeFalse
+        Should -Invoke Write-Log -ParameterFilter { $Message -like '*below the minimum 2.8*' }
+    }
+
+    # The publisher signs other scripts too.
+    It 'refuses another role' {
+        [System.IO.File]::WriteAllText($script:candidate, "`$ScriptVersion = `"2.8`"`n`$ScriptRole = `"AutopilotMonitor-Uninstaller`"`n")
+        Test-InstallerIdentity -Path $script:candidate | Should -BeFalse
+    }
+
+    It 'refuses a script without the identity lines' {
+        [System.IO.File]::WriteAllText($script:candidate, "Write-Host 'signed, but not the installer'`n")
+        Test-InstallerIdentity -Path $script:candidate | Should -BeFalse
+    }
+
+    It 'refuses a file it cannot read' {
+        Test-InstallerIdentity -Path (Join-Path $TestDrive 'missing.ps1') | Should -BeFalse
+    }
+}
+
 Describe 'Get-VerifiedBootstrapScript' {
    BeforeEach {
        Mock Write-Log { }
        Mock Start-Sleep { }
-        Mock Invoke-WebRequest { }
+        Mock Invoke-WebRequest { [System.IO.File]::WriteAllText($OutFile, 'downloaded') }
+        Mock Test-InstallerIdentity { $true }
+        # The test account owns the folder; the loader asks for SYSTEM or Administrators.
+        Mock Test-IsOwnedByUs { $true }
+        $script:run = Join-Path $TestDrive ('run-' + [guid]::NewGuid().ToString('N').Substring(0, 8))
+        New-Item -ItemType Directory -Path $script:run | Out-Null
+        $script:dest = Join-Path $script:run 'Install-AutopilotMonitor.ps1'
+        $RunState = [pscustomobject]@{ LogFile = $null; Installer = $null }
+    }
+    AfterEach {
+        if ($RunState.Installer) { $RunState.Installer.Dispose() }
    }

    It 'returns after the first attempt when the download verifies' {
        Mock Test-BootstrapSignature { $true }
-        Get-VerifiedBootstrapScript -Url 'https://example.invalid/s.ps1' -Destination 'TestDrive:\s.ps1' | Should -BeTrue
+        Get-VerifiedBootstrapScript -Url 'https://example.invalid/s.ps1' -Destination $script:dest -RunFolder $script:run | Should -BeTrue
        Should -Invoke Invoke-WebRequest -Times 1 -Exactly
    }

    It 'gives up after three attempts when verification keeps failing' {
        Mock Test-BootstrapSignature { $false }
-        Get-VerifiedBootstrapScript -Url 'https://example.invalid/s.ps1' -Destination 'TestDrive:\s.ps1' | Should -BeFalse
+        Get-VerifiedBootstrapScript -Url 'https://example.invalid/s.ps1' -Destination $script:dest -RunFolder $script:run | Should -BeFalse
        Should -Invoke Invoke-WebRequest -Times 3 -Exactly
    }

@@ -93,27 +195,247 @@ Describe 'Get-VerifiedBootstrapScript' {
    It 'retries a failed verification and accepts a later attempt' {
        $script:calls = 0
        Mock Test-BootstrapSignature { $script:calls++; return ($script:calls -ge 2) }
-        Get-VerifiedBootstrapScript -Url 'https://example.invalid/s.ps1' -Destination 'TestDrive:\s.ps1' | Should -BeTrue
+        Get-VerifiedBootstrapScript -Url 'https://example.invalid/s.ps1' -Destination $script:dest -RunFolder $script:run | Should -BeTrue
        Should -Invoke Invoke-WebRequest -Times 2 -Exactly
    }

    It 'retries a transport failure' {
        $script:downloads = 0
-        Mock Invoke-WebRequest { $script:downloads++; if ($script:downloads -eq 1) { throw 'connection reset' } }
+        Mock Invoke-WebRequest { $script:downloads++; if ($script:downloads -eq 1) { throw 'connection reset' }; [System.IO.File]::WriteAllText($OutFile, 'downloaded') }
        Mock Test-BootstrapSignature { $true }
-        Get-VerifiedBootstrapScript -Url 'https://example.invalid/s.ps1' -Destination 'TestDrive:\s.ps1' | Should -BeTrue
+        Get-VerifiedBootstrapScript -Url 'https://example.invalid/s.ps1' -Destination $script:dest -RunFolder $script:run | Should -BeTrue
        Should -Invoke Invoke-WebRequest -Times 2 -Exactly
    }

-    It 'never executes anything when no attempt verifies' {
+    It 'refuses a validly signed script that is not the current installer' {
+        Mock Test-BootstrapSignature { $true }
+        Mock Test-InstallerIdentity { $false }
+        Get-VerifiedBootstrapScript -Url 'https://example.invalid/s.ps1' -Destination $script:dest -RunFolder $script:run | Should -BeFalse
+        Should -Invoke Invoke-WebRequest -Times 3 -Exactly
+    }
+
+    # The identity lines count only once the signature proves they are the publisher's.
+    It 'reads the identity only after the signature passed' {
        Mock Test-BootstrapSignature { $false }
-        Get-VerifiedBootstrapScript -Url 'https://example.invalid/s.ps1' -Destination 'TestDrive:\s.ps1' | Should -BeFalse
+        Get-VerifiedBootstrapScript -Url 'https://example.invalid/s.ps1' -Destination $script:dest -RunFolder $script:run | Should -BeFalse
+        Should -Invoke Test-InstallerIdentity -Times 0 -Exactly
+    }
+
+    It 'stops without downloading when the run folder is no longer a folder of ours' {
+        Mock Test-IsOwnedByUs { $false }
+        Mock Test-BootstrapSignature { $true }
+        Get-VerifiedBootstrapScript -Url 'https://example.invalid/s.ps1' -Destination $script:dest -RunFolder $script:run | Should -BeFalse
+        Should -Invoke Invoke-WebRequest -Times 0 -Exactly
+    }
+
+    # The file that was checked is the file that runs: nobody can replace it in between.
+    It 'keeps the verified file open, so it cannot be replaced or deleted' {
+        Mock Test-BootstrapSignature { $true }
+        Get-VerifiedBootstrapScript -Url 'https://example.invalid/s.ps1' -Destination $script:dest -RunFolder $script:run | Should -BeTrue
+        $RunState.Installer | Should -Not -BeNullOrEmpty
+        { [System.IO.File]::WriteAllText($script:dest, 'replaced') } | Should -Throw
+        { [System.IO.File]::Delete($script:dest) } | Should -Throw
+        [System.IO.File]::ReadAllText($script:dest) | Should -Be 'downloaded'
+    }
+
+    It 'holds nothing when no attempt verifies' {
+        Mock Test-BootstrapSignature { $false }
+        Get-VerifiedBootstrapScript -Url 'https://example.invalid/s.ps1' -Destination $script:dest -RunFolder $script:run | Should -BeFalse
+        $RunState.Installer | Should -BeNullOrEmpty
+        { [System.IO.File]::Delete($script:dest) } | Should -Not -Throw
+    }
+}
+
+Describe 'Get-DownloadSecurityProtocol' {
+    It 'keeps the system default, which includes TLS 1.3' {
+        Get-DownloadSecurityProtocol -Current ([Net.SecurityProtocolType]::SystemDefault) | Should -Be ([Net.SecurityProtocolType]::SystemDefault)
+    }
+
+    It 'adds TLS 1.2 to an explicit list' {
+        Get-DownloadSecurityProtocol -Current ([Net.SecurityProtocolType]'Ssl3, Tls') | Should -Be ([Net.SecurityProtocolType]'Ssl3, Tls, Tls12')
+    }
+}
+
+Describe 'Remove-LoaderRunFiles' {
+    BeforeEach {
+        Mock Write-Host { }
+        $run = Join-Path $TestDrive ("run-" + [guid]::NewGuid().ToString('N'))
+        New-Item -ItemType Directory -Path $run | Out-Null
+        $installer = Join-Path $run 'Install-AutopilotMonitor.ps1'
+        $log = Join-Path $run 'bootstrap-loader.log'
+        Set-Content -Path $installer -Value 'downloaded'
+        Set-Content -Path $log -Value 'log'
+        $RunState = [pscustomobject]@{ LogFile = $log; Installer = $null }
+    }
+
+    It 'removes the download, the log and the folder' {
+        Remove-LoaderRunFiles -RunFolder $run -InstallerPath $installer
+        Test-Path -LiteralPath $run | Should -BeFalse
+        $RunState.LogFile | Should -BeNullOrEmpty
+    }
+
+    It 'releases the held download before deleting it' {
+        $RunState.Installer = New-Object System.IO.FileStream($installer, [System.IO.FileMode]::Open, [System.IO.FileAccess]::Read, [System.IO.FileShare]::Read)
+        Remove-LoaderRunFiles -RunFolder $run -InstallerPath $installer
+        Test-Path -LiteralPath $run | Should -BeFalse
+        $RunState.Installer | Should -BeNullOrEmpty
+    }
+
+    It 'keeps the log and the folder with -KeepLog, but never the download' {
+        Remove-LoaderRunFiles -RunFolder $run -InstallerPath $installer -KeepLog
+        @(Get-ChildItem -LiteralPath $run -Force | ForEach-Object Name) | Should -Be @('bootstrap-loader.log')
+    }
+
+    It 'leaves a folder that holds anything else, without throwing' {
+        Set-Content -Path (Join-Path $run 'other.txt') -Value 'other'
+        { Remove-LoaderRunFiles -RunFolder $run -InstallerPath $installer } | Should -Not -Throw
+        @(Get-ChildItem -LiteralPath $run -Force | ForEach-Object Name) | Should -Be @('other.txt')
+        Should -Invoke Write-Host -ParameterFilter { "$Object" -like 'INFO: run folder*' }
+    }
+}
+
+Describe 'Start-BootstrapLoader' {
+    BeforeEach {
+        $script:savedProgramData = $env:ProgramData
+        $env:ProgramData = Join-Path $TestDrive ("pd-" + [guid]::NewGuid().ToString('N'))
+        New-Item -ItemType Directory -Path $env:ProgramData | Out-Null
+        $script:runFolder = Join-Path $env:ProgramData 'AutopilotMonitor-Loader-0a1b2c3d'
+        $script:marker = Join-Path $TestDrive ("ran-" + [guid]::NewGuid().ToString('N') + '.txt')
+
+        $RunState = [pscustomobject]@{ LogFile = $null; Installer = $null }
+        $InstallerArguments = @()
+
+        Mock Write-Host { }
+        Mock Start-Sleep { }
+        Mock Test-IsElevated { $true }
+        # A standard user cannot make Administrators the owner, so the run folder is a plain
+        # one here; New-RunFolder itself is tested with the installer, which shares it.
+        Mock New-RunFolder { [System.IO.Directory]::CreateDirectory($script:runFolder) | Out-Null; return $script:runFolder }
+    }
+
+    AfterEach {
+        $env:ProgramData = $script:savedProgramData
+    }
+
+    It 'refuses to run without SYSTEM or administrator rights and creates nothing' {
+        Mock Test-IsElevated { $false }
+        $stderr = New-Object System.IO.StringWriter
+        $previous = [Console]::Error
+        [Console]::SetError($stderr)
+        try { Start-BootstrapLoader } finally { [Console]::SetError($previous) }
+        $stderr.ToString() | Should -Match 'not running as SYSTEM or administrator'
+        Should -Invoke New-RunFolder -Times 0 -Exactly
+        @(Get-ChildItem -LiteralPath $env:ProgramData -Force).Count | Should -Be 0
+    }
+
+    It 'runs nothing and keeps only its log when no download verifies' {
+        Mock Get-VerifiedBootstrapScript { [System.IO.File]::WriteAllText($Destination, "Set-Content -LiteralPath '$($script:marker)' -Value ran"); $false }
+        Start-BootstrapLoader
+        Test-Path -LiteralPath $script:marker | Should -BeFalse
+        @(Get-ChildItem -LiteralPath $script:runFolder -Force | ForEach-Object Name) | Should -Be @('bootstrap-loader.log')
+        Get-Content -LiteralPath (Join-Path $script:runFolder 'bootstrap-loader.log') -Raw | Should -Match 'Nothing was executed'
+    }
+
+    It 'runs the verified installer with the passed arguments by name and removes its folder after exit 0' {
+        $agentLog = Join-Path $env:ProgramData 'AutopilotMonitor\Logs\agent.log'
+        New-Item -ItemType Directory -Path (Split-Path $agentLog) -Force | Out-Null
+        Set-Content -Path $agentLog -Value 'agent'
+        Mock Get-VerifiedBootstrapScript {
+            [System.IO.File]::WriteAllText($Destination, "param([string]`$AgentDownloadUrl = 'default', [int]`$MaxBootstrapWindowHours = 12)`nSet-Content -LiteralPath '$($script:marker)' -Value `"`$AgentDownloadUrl `$MaxBootstrapWindowHours`"`nexit 0`n")
+            $true
+        }
+        $InstallerArguments = ConvertTo-ScriptArguments -MaxBootstrapWindowHours 24
+
+        Start-BootstrapLoader
+
+        Get-Content -LiteralPath $script:marker | Should -Be 'default 24'
+        Test-Path -LiteralPath $script:runFolder | Should -BeFalse
+        Get-Content -LiteralPath $agentLog | Should -Be 'agent'
+    }
+
+    It 'keeps its log but not the installer when the installer fails' {
+        Mock Get-VerifiedBootstrapScript { [System.IO.File]::WriteAllText($Destination, "exit 1`n"); $true }
+        Start-BootstrapLoader
+        @(Get-ChildItem -LiteralPath $script:runFolder -Force | ForEach-Object Name) | Should -Be @('bootstrap-loader.log')
+        Get-Content -LiteralPath (Join-Path $script:runFolder 'bootstrap-loader.log') -Raw | Should -Match 'Installer finished \(exit code 1\)'
+    }
+
+    It 'keeps its log when the installer throws' {
+        Mock Get-VerifiedBootstrapScript { [System.IO.File]::WriteAllText($Destination, "throw 'installer broke'`n"); $true }
+        Start-BootstrapLoader
+        Get-Content -LiteralPath (Join-Path $script:runFolder 'bootstrap-loader.log') -Raw | Should -Match 'Installer threw: installer broke'
+    }
+
+    # An installer that ends without an exit code must not inherit a 0 from earlier work.
+    It 'does not take an earlier exit code for the installer''s' {
+        Mock Get-VerifiedBootstrapScript { [System.IO.File]::WriteAllText($Destination, "Write-Output 'no exit code'`n"); $true }
+        $global:LASTEXITCODE = 0
+        Start-BootstrapLoader
+        Test-Path -LiteralPath (Join-Path $script:runFolder 'bootstrap-loader.log') | Should -BeTrue
+    }
+
+    It 'names its version first in its log, in the form the installer carries over' {
+        Mock Get-VerifiedBootstrapScript { $false }
+        Start-BootstrapLoader
+        $first = (Get-Content -LiteralPath (Join-Path $script:runFolder 'bootstrap-loader.log'))[0]
+        $first | Should -Match '^\[\d{4}-\d\d-\d\d \d\d:\d\d:\d\d\] === Autopilot Monitor bootstrap loader v\d+(\.\d+){0,3} started'
+    }
+}
+
+Describe 'loader contract' {
+    BeforeAll {
+        $script:loader = Get-ScriptAst $script:loaderPath
+    }
+
+    It 'parses without errors' {
+        $script:loader.Errors.Count | Should -Be 0
+    }
+
+    # Unbound arguments reach the installer only while the script is not an advanced one.
+    It 'stays a plain script, so unbound arguments are kept for the installer' {
+        $script:loader.Ast.ParamBlock.Attributes.Count | Should -Be 0
+        @($script:loader.Ast.ParamBlock.Parameters.Attributes | Where-Object { $_.TypeName.Name -eq 'Parameter' }) | Should -BeNullOrEmpty
+    }
+
+    # The six functions also run in the installer and, embedded, in the OOBE script.
+    It 'carries the shared functions word for word as the installer has them' {
+        $installer = Get-ScriptAst $script:installerPath
+        foreach ($name in @('Test-IsElevated', 'New-ProtectedDirectorySecurity', 'Test-IsReparsePoint', 'Test-IsOwnedByUs', 'New-RunFolderName', 'New-RunFolder')) {
+            $mine = $script:loader.Ast.Find({ param($a) $a -is [System.Management.Automation.Language.FunctionDefinitionAst] -and $a.Name -eq $name }, $true)
+            $theirs = $installer.Ast.Find({ param($a) $a -is [System.Management.Automation.Language.FunctionDefinitionAst] -and $a.Name -eq $name }, $true)
+            $mine | Should -Not -BeNullOrEmpty -Because $name
+            $mine.Extent.Text | Should -BeExactly $theirs.Extent.Text -Because $name
+        }
+    }
+
+    It 'calls no command beyond the few it needs' {
+        $own = @($script:loader.Ast.FindAll({ param($a) $a -is [System.Management.Automation.Language.FunctionDefinitionAst] }, $true) | ForEach-Object { $_.Name })
+        $allowed = $own + @('Add-Content', 'ForEach-Object', 'Get-AuthenticodeSignature', 'Get-Date', 'Get-Item', 'Invoke-WebRequest', 'Join-Path', 'New-Object', 'Out-Null', 'Start-Sleep', 'Test-Path', 'Write-Host')
+        $used = @($script:loader.Ast.FindAll({ param($a) $a -is [System.Management.Automation.Language.CommandAst] }, $true) | ForEach-Object { $_.GetCommandName() } | Where-Object { $_ } | Sort-Object -Unique)
+        @($used | Where-Object { $allowed -notcontains $_ }) | Should -BeNullOrEmpty
+    }
+
+    It 'deletes only the download, its log and its own empty folder' {
+        $deletes = @($script:loader.Ast.FindAll({ param($a) $a -is [System.Management.Automation.Language.InvokeMemberExpressionAst] -and $a.Member.Extent.Text -eq 'Delete' }, $true))
+        $deletes.Count | Should -Be 3
+        foreach ($delete in $deletes) {
+            if ($delete.Expression.Extent.Text -eq '[System.IO.Directory]') {
+                $delete.Arguments[1].Extent.Text | Should -Be '$false'
+            } else {
+                $delete.Expression.Extent.Text | Should -Be '[System.IO.File]'
+            }
+        }
+    }
+
+    It 'never names the agent folder' {
+        $strings = @($script:loader.Tokens | Where-Object { $_ -is [System.Management.Automation.Language.StringToken] } | ForEach-Object { $_.Value })
+        @($strings | Where-Object { $_ -match '(^|\\)AutopilotMonitor($|\\)' }) | Should -BeNullOrEmpty
    }
 }

 Describe 'publish contract' {
    BeforeAll {
-        $script:loaderText = Get-Content (Join-Path $PSScriptRoot 'Start-AutopilotMonitor.ps1') -Raw
+        $script:loaderText = Get-Content $script:loaderPath -Raw
    }

    # Publish-BootstrapScripts.ps1 renders the -Dev loader by substituting this exact
@@ -127,7 +449,7 @@ Describe 'publish contract' {
    # The publisher parses this to write version.json.loaderVersion and to run the
    # version-bump guard.
    It 'declares a parsable ScriptVersion' {
-        $script:loaderText -match '\$ScriptVersion\s*=\s*"([\d\.\-a-zA-Z]+)"' | Should -BeTrue
+        $script:loaderText -match '(?m)^\$ScriptVersion = "\d+(\.\d+){1,3}"\r?$' | Should -BeTrue
    }

    It 'pins the expected publisher by subject, not by thumbprint' {
@@ -144,4 +466,12 @@ Describe 'publish contract' {
        $wxs.Contains('[INSTALLFOLDER]Start-AutopilotMonitor.ps1') | Should -BeTrue
        $wxs.Contains('-LogFileName bootstrap-msi.log') | Should -BeTrue
    }
+
+    # The file a SYSTEM custom action runs must not sit where a standard user could have
+    # created the folder first: Program Files, never ProgramData.
+    It 'is installed by the bootstrap MSI under Program Files' {
+        $wxs = Get-Content (Join-Path $PSScriptRoot '..\..\src\Agent\AutopilotMonitor.BootstrapMsi\Package.wxs') -Raw
+        $wxs | Should -Match '<StandardDirectory Id="ProgramFiles64Folder">'
+        $wxs | Should -Not -Match 'CommonAppDataFolder'
+    }
 }
@@ -1,107 +1,174 @@
 <#
 .SYNOPSIS
-    Stage 1 of the Autopilot Monitor bootstrap: fetches the current installer and runs it.
+    Downloads the current Autopilot Monitor installer and runs it.

 .DESCRIPTION
-    This is the file an administrator assigns in Intune, and the same file the bootstrap MSI
-    installs and runs -- one implementation for both delivery channels; the MSI is only the
-    packaging. It carries no enrollment logic at all: it downloads the published
-    Install-AutopilotMonitor.ps1, proves that it was signed by Autopilot Monitor, and runs it
-    in this process.
+    Assign this script in Intune once; the bootstrap MSI runs the same script. It downloads
+    Install-AutopilotMonitor.ps1 from download.autopilotmonitor.com and runs it only when the
+    file carries a valid signature from glueckkanja AG and is installer version 2.7 or later.
+    Because the installer is fetched on every run, this script does not need replacing when
+    the installer changes.

-    Why two stages: the installer holds every guard, relax rule and download path, and those
-    change. Whoever assigns the installer directly has to replace their Intune copy each
-    time; whoever assigns this loader never does, because the part that changes lives on the
-    server. Assigning the installer directly stays supported and unchanged.
+    The download and the log go into %ProgramData%\AutopilotMonitor-Loader-<random>, which only
+    SYSTEM and administrators can change. The loader keeps the downloaded file open from the
+    check to the end of the run, so what it checked is what runs. After a successful run the
+    folder is removed; after a failure it keeps the log for diagnosis, and a later installer
+    run removes it.

-    This file is deliberately boring. It is the one piece that cannot be fixed remotely, so
-    it does the least it can: download, verify, invoke, log.
+    The exit code is always 0, so the loader never fails enrollment. Without SYSTEM or
+    administrator rights it stops with an error and changes nothing.

-    Verification is by Authenticode publisher, not by hash. A hash oracle would have to be
-    fetched from the same host as the script itself, so it could not survive a compromise of
-    that host, while the expected publisher below travels with this file. It pins the
-    certificate SUBJECT and not a thumbprint, so a certificate renewal does not brick a
-    loader that is already deployed on devices.
-
-    Fail-soft: the loader always exits 0 and never throws into the caller. A device that
-    cannot reach the download endpoint is a device without monitoring, never a failed
-    enrollment step. Verification failures are the same: nothing runs, and the reason is in
-    the log. Refusing to execute unverified code as SYSTEM is the point of this file.
-
-    This file MUST remain pure ASCII (PS 5.1 reads BOM-less files as ANSI).
+    Any other arguments are passed to the installer, for example -MaxBootstrapWindowHours 24.

 .PARAMETER BootstrapUrl
-    Installer URL. Defaults to the published stable installer; the -Dev variant of this
-    loader is rendered from that default at publish time.
+    Installer to download. Default: the published installer.

 .PARAMETER LogFileName
-    Log file inside the agent log directory. The MSI channel passes bootstrap-msi.log so the
-    delivery channel stays visible in a diagnostics package; the diag tooling keys on these
-    names, so do not rename them.
-
-.PARAMETER BootstrapArguments
-    Everything else is passed through to the installer unchanged, so any parameter the
-    installer accepts can be set here without this file knowing about it.
-
-.EXAMPLE
-    .\Start-AutopilotMonitor.ps1
-
-.EXAMPLE
-    .\Start-AutopilotMonitor.ps1 -MaxBootstrapWindowHours 24
+    Name of the log file. Default: bootstrap-loader.log.

 .NOTES
-    Author  : Oliver Kieselbach (autopilotmonitor.com)
-    Runtime : Windows PowerShell 5.1, SYSTEM context, during Autopilot enrollment
-
-.CHANGELOG
-    2026-09-08  v1.2  Log the signer CN instead of the full EV subject; the full subject is
-                      logged only when the publisher is why a script was rejected.
-    2026-09-08  v1.1  Also used by the bootstrap MSI, which replaced its own copy of this
-                      logic; -LogFileName keeps the channel visible in diagnostics.
-    2026-09-08  v1.0  Initial version: two-stage bootstrap, publisher-pinned verification.
+    Requires Windows PowerShell 5.1.
+    Changes: https://docs.autopilotmonitor.com/changelog/platform-changelog
 #>

-[CmdletBinding()]
 param(
-    [Parameter(Mandatory = $false)]
    [string]$BootstrapUrl = "https://download.autopilotmonitor.com/agent/Install-AutopilotMonitor.ps1",

-    [Parameter(Mandatory = $false)]
    [ValidatePattern('^[A-Za-z0-9._-]+$')]
-    [string]$LogFileName = "bootstrap-loader.log",
-
-    [Parameter(Mandatory = $false, ValueFromRemainingArguments = $true)]
-    [string[]]$BootstrapArguments
+    [string]$LogFileName = "bootstrap-loader.log"
 )

-# Script version (bump on meaningful changes; see .CHANGELOG above)
-$ScriptVersion = "1.2"
+# Unbound arguments reach the installer by name. [CmdletBinding()] or a [Parameter()]
+# attribute would reject them instead.
+$InstallerArguments = $args

-# The publisher every downloaded stage-2 script must carry. A -like pattern on the subject,
-# NOT a thumbprint: certificates are renewed, deployed loaders are not.
+$ScriptVersion = "1.4"
+
+# A subject pattern, not a thumbprint, so a certificate renewal keeps deployed loaders working.
 $ExpectedPublisher = "*O=glueckkanja AG*"

-$LoaderBasePath = "$env:ProgramData\AutopilotMonitor"
-$LoaderLogPath  = "$LoaderBasePath\Logs"
-$LogFile        = "$LoaderLogPath\$LogFileName"
-$BootstrapPath  = "$LoaderBasePath\Install-AutopilotMonitor.ps1"
+$ExpectedInstallerRole = "AutopilotMonitor-Installer"
+$MinimumInstallerVersion = [version]"2.8"
+
+$RunFolderPrefix = "AutopilotMonitor-Loader-"

 $DownloadAttempts = 3
 $RetryDelaySeconds = 10

-# Write-Host as well as the file: the Intune script output is what an administrator sees in
-# the portal, the file is what a support case reads.
+# The log file, and the handle that keeps the verified installer unchanged until the run ends.
+$RunState = [pscustomobject]@{ LogFile = $null; Installer = $null }
+
 function Write-Log {
    param([string]$Message)
    $timestamp = Get-Date -Format "yyyy-MM-dd HH:mm:ss"
    $logMessage = "[$timestamp] $Message"
    Write-Host $logMessage
-    Add-Content -Path $LogFile -Value $logMessage -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
+    if ($RunState.LogFile) {
+        Add-Content -Path $RunState.LogFile -Value $logMessage -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
+    }
 }

-# True only when the file is signed, the signature validates against the machine's trust
-# chain, and the signer is us. Any error is a false -- an unreadable signature is an
-# unverified script.
+### Shared with Install-AutopilotMonitor.ps1, word for word.
+
+function Test-IsElevated {
+    $identity = [System.Security.Principal.WindowsIdentity]::GetCurrent()
+    return (New-Object System.Security.Principal.WindowsPrincipal($identity)).IsInRole([System.Security.Principal.WindowsBuiltInRole]::Administrator)
+}
+
+function New-ProtectedDirectorySecurity {
+    $security = New-Object System.Security.AccessControl.DirectorySecurity
+    $security.SetAccessRuleProtection($true, $false)
+    $inherit = [System.Security.AccessControl.InheritanceFlags]'ContainerInherit, ObjectInherit'
+    $propagation = [System.Security.AccessControl.PropagationFlags]::None
+    $system = New-Object System.Security.Principal.SecurityIdentifier([System.Security.Principal.WellKnownSidType]::LocalSystemSid, $null)
+    $admins = New-Object System.Security.Principal.SecurityIdentifier([System.Security.Principal.WellKnownSidType]::BuiltinAdministratorsSid, $null)
+    $users = New-Object System.Security.Principal.SecurityIdentifier([System.Security.Principal.WellKnownSidType]::BuiltinUsersSid, $null)
+    $security.AddAccessRule((New-Object System.Security.AccessControl.FileSystemAccessRule($system, 'FullControl', $inherit, $propagation, 'Allow')))
+    $security.AddAccessRule((New-Object System.Security.AccessControl.FileSystemAccessRule($admins, 'FullControl', $inherit, $propagation, 'Allow')))
+    $security.AddAccessRule((New-Object System.Security.AccessControl.FileSystemAccessRule($users, 'ReadAndExecute', $inherit, $propagation, 'Allow')))
+    $security.SetOwner($admins)
+    return $security
+}
+
+function Test-IsReparsePoint {
+    param([string]$Path)
+    return (([System.IO.File]::GetAttributes($Path) -band [System.IO.FileAttributes]::ReparsePoint) -ne 0)
+}
+
+function Test-IsOwnedByUs {
+    param([string]$Path)
+    try {
+        $owner = (Get-Item -LiteralPath $Path -Force -ErrorAction Stop).GetAccessControl([System.Security.AccessControl.AccessControlSections]::Owner).GetOwner([System.Security.Principal.SecurityIdentifier])
+        return ($owner.IsWellKnown([System.Security.Principal.WellKnownSidType]::LocalSystemSid) -or
+                $owner.IsWellKnown([System.Security.Principal.WellKnownSidType]::BuiltinAdministratorsSid))
+    } catch {
+        return $false
+    }
+}
+
+function New-RunFolderName {
+    $bytes = New-Object byte[] 4
+    $generator = [System.Security.Cryptography.RandomNumberGenerator]::Create()
+    try { $generator.GetBytes($bytes) } finally { $generator.Dispose() }
+    return -join ($bytes | ForEach-Object { $_.ToString('x2') })
+}
+
+function New-RunFolder {
+    param([string]$Parent, [string]$Prefix)
+    for ($attempt = 1; $attempt -le 3; $attempt++) {
+        $path = Join-Path $Parent ($Prefix + (New-RunFolderName))
+        if (Test-Path -LiteralPath $path) { continue }
+        [System.IO.Directory]::CreateDirectory($path, (New-ProtectedDirectorySecurity)) | Out-Null
+        if (-not (Test-IsReparsePoint $path) -and (Test-IsOwnedByUs $path)) { return $path }
+    }
+    throw "Could not create a run folder under $Parent."
+}
+
+### End of the shared functions.
+
+# Keeps the system default (0, which includes TLS 1.3); otherwise adds TLS 1.2.
+function Get-DownloadSecurityProtocol {
+    param([Net.SecurityProtocolType]$Current)
+    if ([int]$Current -eq 0) { return $Current }
+    return ($Current -bor [Net.SecurityProtocolType]::Tls12)
+}
+
+# Exactly one role line and one version line, each at the start of a line; $null otherwise.
+function Get-InstallerIdentity {
+    param([string]$Text)
+    $roles = [regex]::Matches($Text, '(?m)^\$ScriptRole[ \t]*=[ \t]*"([A-Za-z0-9.-]+)"[ \t]*\r?$')
+    $versions = [regex]::Matches($Text, '(?m)^\$ScriptVersion[ \t]*=[ \t]*"(\d+(?:\.\d+){1,3})"[ \t]*\r?$')
+    if ($roles.Count -ne 1 -or $versions.Count -ne 1) { return $null }
+    return [pscustomobject]@{ Role = $roles[0].Groups[1].Value; Version = [version]$versions[0].Groups[1].Value }
+}
+
+# Runs after the signature check, so the lines it reads are signed.
+function Test-InstallerIdentity {
+    param([string]$Path)
+    try {
+        $identity = Get-InstallerIdentity -Text ([System.IO.File]::ReadAllText($Path))
+    }
+    catch {
+        Write-Log "Identity check failed to run: $($_.Exception.Message)"
+        return $false
+    }
+    if ($null -eq $identity) {
+        Write-Log "REJECTED: the script does not declare exactly one role line and one version line."
+        return $false
+    }
+    if ($identity.Role -ne $ExpectedInstallerRole) {
+        Write-Log "REJECTED: role '$($identity.Role)' is not '$ExpectedInstallerRole'."
+        return $false
+    }
+    if ($identity.Version -lt $MinimumInstallerVersion) {
+        Write-Log "REJECTED: installer version $($identity.Version) is below the minimum $MinimumInstallerVersion."
+        return $false
+    }
+    Write-Log "Installer accepted: $($identity.Role) v$($identity.Version)."
+    return $true
+}
+
+# A valid signature from the expected publisher; any error counts as unverified.
 function Test-BootstrapSignature {
    param([string]$Path)

@@ -118,9 +185,7 @@ function Test-BootstrapSignature {
        return $false
    }

-    # The full subject of an EV certificate is a line of street address and registration
-    # numbers. The CN answers the only question the log has to answer; the full subject is
-    # logged when it is the reason for a rejection.
+    # The CN is enough for the log; the full subject is logged when it causes a rejection.
    $subject = if ($sig.SignerCertificate) { $sig.SignerCertificate.Subject } else { "<unsigned>" }
    $signer = if ($subject -match 'CN=([^,]+)') { $Matches[1] } else { $subject }
    Write-Log "Signature status: $($sig.Status). Signer: $signer"
@@ -138,20 +203,28 @@ function Test-BootstrapSignature {
    return $true
 }

-# Downloads the installer and returns $true once a downloaded copy passes verification.
-# Verification lives inside the retry loop on purpose: a truncated or proxy-mangled body
-# fails the signature check, and that is worth another attempt.
+# A download that fails verification, such as a truncated one, is retried too. The run folder
+# is checked before every attempt: one that is no longer a real folder of ours stops the run.
+# The downloaded file is opened for reading before it is checked and stays open until the run
+# ends, so no one can change or replace what was checked.
 function Get-VerifiedBootstrapScript {
-    param([string]$Url, [string]$Destination)
+    param([string]$Url, [string]$Destination, [string]$RunFolder)

    for ($attempt = 1; $attempt -le $DownloadAttempts; $attempt++) {
+        if ((Test-IsReparsePoint $RunFolder) -or -not (Test-IsOwnedByUs $RunFolder)) {
+            Write-Log "REJECTED: the run folder $RunFolder is no longer a folder of ours. Nothing was downloaded."
+            return $false
+        }
        try {
            Write-Log "Download attempt $attempt/$DownloadAttempts from $Url"
            Invoke-WebRequest -Uri $Url -OutFile $Destination -UseBasicParsing -TimeoutSec 60 -ErrorAction Stop

-            if (Test-BootstrapSignature -Path $Destination) {
+            $held = New-Object System.IO.FileStream($Destination, [System.IO.FileMode]::Open, [System.IO.FileAccess]::Read, [System.IO.FileShare]::Read)
+            if ((Test-BootstrapSignature -Path $Destination) -and (Test-InstallerIdentity -Path $Destination)) {
+                $RunState.Installer = $held
                return $true
            }
+            $held.Dispose()
        }
        catch {
            Write-Log "Download attempt $attempt failed: $($_.Exception.Message)"
@@ -165,51 +238,87 @@ function Get-VerifiedBootstrapScript {
    return $false
 }

-# Main flow. Only invoked when the script is run directly (see entry guard at the bottom),
-# so the Pester suite can dot-source this file without bootstrapping anything.
-function Start-BootstrapLoader {
-    New-Item -ItemType Directory -Force -Path $LoaderLogPath -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue | Out-Null
-
-    Write-Log "=== Autopilot Monitor bootstrap loader v$ScriptVersion started (user=$env:USERNAME, pid=$PID) ==="
-
-    # PS 5.1 on an OOBE device still defaults to TLS 1.0 for this process.
+# The download always goes. After an installer exit 0 the log and the folder go too;
+# otherwise they stay for diagnosis.
+function Remove-LoaderRunFiles {
+    param([string]$RunFolder, [string]$InstallerPath, [switch]$KeepLog)
+    if ($RunState.Installer) {
+        $RunState.Installer.Dispose()
+        $RunState.Installer = $null
+    }
    try {
-        [Net.ServicePointManager]::SecurityProtocol = [Net.ServicePointManager]::SecurityProtocol -bor [Net.SecurityProtocolType]::Tls12
+        if ([System.IO.File]::Exists($InstallerPath)) { [System.IO.File]::Delete($InstallerPath) }
+        if ($KeepLog) { return }
+        $logFile = $RunState.LogFile
+        $RunState.LogFile = $null
+        if ($logFile -and [System.IO.File]::Exists($logFile)) { [System.IO.File]::Delete($logFile) }
+        [System.IO.Directory]::Delete($RunFolder, $false)
    }
    catch {
-        Write-Log "INFO: could not raise the TLS protocol: $($_.Exception.Message)"
-    }
-
-    if (-not (Get-VerifiedBootstrapScript -Url $BootstrapUrl -Destination $BootstrapPath)) {
-        Write-Log "No verified installer available after $DownloadAttempts attempt(s). Nothing was executed."
-        return
-    }
-
-    Write-Log "Executing $BootstrapPath"
-
-    # Same process, so the execution policy this loader runs under applies to stage 2 as
-    # well and no second policy decision can strand the installer. Splatting an array of
-    # remaining arguments keeps this file free of any knowledge about the installer's
-    # parameters.
-    $arguments = @()
-    if ($BootstrapArguments) { $arguments = $BootstrapArguments }
-
-    try {
-        & $BootstrapPath @arguments
-        Write-Log "Installer finished (exit code $LASTEXITCODE)."
-    }
-    catch {
-        Write-Log "Installer threw: $($_.Exception.Message)"
+        Write-Host "INFO: run folder $RunFolder was not fully removed: $($_.Exception.Message)"
    }
 }

-# Entry guard: dot-sourcing (Pester) loads the functions without running the loader.
+function Start-BootstrapLoader {
+    if (-not (Test-IsElevated)) {
+        $message = "AutopilotMonitor loader: not running as SYSTEM or administrator; nothing was downloaded or changed."
+        Write-Host $message
+        [Console]::Error.WriteLine($message)
+        return
+    }
+
+    try {
+        [Net.ServicePointManager]::SecurityProtocol = Get-DownloadSecurityProtocol -Current ([Net.ServicePointManager]::SecurityProtocol)
+    }
+    catch {
+        Write-Host "INFO: could not adjust the TLS protocols: $($_.Exception.Message)"
+    }
+
+    try {
+        $runFolder = New-RunFolder -Parent $env:ProgramData -Prefix $RunFolderPrefix
+    }
+    catch {
+        Write-Host "AutopilotMonitor loader: no run folder ($($_.Exception.Message)). Nothing was downloaded or executed."
+        return
+    }
+
+    $RunState.LogFile = Join-Path $runFolder $LogFileName
+    Write-Log "=== Autopilot Monitor bootstrap loader v$ScriptVersion started (user=$env:USERNAME, pid=$PID) ==="
+    Write-Log ("PowerShell {0}, {1}, language mode {2}, run folder {3}" -f $PSVersionTable.PSVersion, $(if ([Environment]::Is64BitProcess) { '64-bit' } else { '32-bit' }), $ExecutionContext.SessionState.LanguageMode, $runFolder)
+
+    $installerPath = Join-Path $runFolder 'Install-AutopilotMonitor.ps1'
+    $succeeded = $false
+    try {
+        if (-not (Get-VerifiedBootstrapScript -Url $BootstrapUrl -Destination $installerPath -RunFolder $runFolder)) {
+            Write-Log "No verified installer available after $DownloadAttempts attempt(s). Nothing was executed."
+            return
+        }
+
+        Write-Log "Executing $installerPath"
+
+        # Same process, so the execution policy that admitted this script covers the installer.
+        # The exit code is reset so that an installer that throws cannot report an older one.
+        $global:LASTEXITCODE = $null
+        try {
+            & $installerPath @InstallerArguments
+            Write-Log "Installer finished (exit code $LASTEXITCODE)."
+            $succeeded = ($LASTEXITCODE -eq 0)
+        }
+        catch {
+            Write-Log "Installer threw: $($_.Exception.Message)"
+        }
+    }
+    finally {
+        Remove-LoaderRunFiles -RunFolder $runFolder -InstallerPath $installerPath -KeepLog:(-not $succeeded)
+    }
+}
+
+# Dot-sourcing (tests) loads the functions without running the loader.
 if ($MyInvocation.InvocationName -ne '.') {
    try {
        Start-BootstrapLoader
    }
    catch {
-        # Nothing above should throw; if it does, it must not become a failed Intune script.
        Write-Log "Loader failed: $($_.Exception.Message)"
    }
    exit 0
@@ -1,9 +1,9 @@
 # Autopilot Monitor Bootstrap Guard Test
 # Dry-run only: does not exit, does not install, only reports what WOULD happen.
-# Mirrors Install-AutopilotMonitor.ps1 (v2.3) incl. the relax exemption for
+# Mirrors Install-AutopilotMonitor.ps1 (v2.7) incl. the relax exemption for
 # guards 2+3, triggered by "Windows Backup for Organizations" (OOBE InProgress)
-# or a positively identified Windows 365 Cloud PC, and the guard 4 (uptime)
-# exemption while the Cloud PC relax is active.
+# or a positively identified Windows 365 Cloud PC, the guard 4 (uptime)
+# exemption while the Cloud PC relax is active, and the agent check.

 param(
    [string]$AgentBinPath = 'C:\ProgramData\AutopilotMonitor\Agent',
@@ -29,20 +29,47 @@ function Write-Step {
    Write-Host "$prefix $Message"
 }

+# HKLM through the 64-bit view, as the installer reads it: a 32-bit host would read WOW6432Node.
 function Get-RegistryValueSafe {
    param(
-        [string]$Path,
+        [string]$SubKey,
        [string]$Name
    )

    try {
-        return (Get-ItemProperty -Path $Path -Name $Name -ErrorAction Stop).$Name
+        $hive = [Microsoft.Win32.RegistryKey]::OpenBaseKey([Microsoft.Win32.RegistryHive]::LocalMachine, [Microsoft.Win32.RegistryView]::Registry64)
+        try {
+            $key = $hive.OpenSubKey($SubKey)
+            if ($null -eq $key) { return $null }
+            try { return $key.GetValue($Name) } finally { $key.Close() }
+        } finally {
+            $hive.Close()
+        }
    }
    catch {
        return $null
    }
 }

+function Test-RegistryKeySafe {
+    param([string]$SubKey)
+
+    try {
+        $hive = [Microsoft.Win32.RegistryKey]::OpenBaseKey([Microsoft.Win32.RegistryHive]::LocalMachine, [Microsoft.Win32.RegistryView]::Registry64)
+        try {
+            $key = $hive.OpenSubKey($SubKey)
+            if ($null -eq $key) { return $false }
+            $key.Close()
+            return $true
+        } finally {
+            $hive.Close()
+        }
+    }
+    catch {
+        return $false
+    }
+}
+
 # Positive OOBE check via WinRT Windows.System.Profile.SystemSetupInfo.OutOfBoxExperienceState.
 # Requires Windows 10, version 1809 (10.0.17763.0). Older builds / errors -> $false (SKIP-safe).
 # Docs: https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/uwp/api/windows.system.profile.systemsetupinfo
@@ -58,7 +85,7 @@ function Test-OobeInProgress {

 # Positive Windows 365 Cloud PC detection: two local markers, BOTH required (AND),
 # because each alone has look-alikes. Mirrors Test-IsCloudPc in the bootstrapper.
-$cloudPcRegMarker = Test-Path 'HKLM:\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows365'
+$cloudPcRegMarker = Test-RegistryKeySafe -SubKey 'SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows365'
 $cloudPcSvcMarker = $null -ne (Get-Service -Name 'CloudManagedDesktopExtension' -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue)
 $isCloudPc = ($cloudPcRegMarker -and $cloudPcSvcMarker)

@@ -73,7 +100,7 @@ Write-Host '=== Autopilot Monitor Bootstrap Guard Test (Dry Run) ==='
 Write-Host ''

 # Guard 1: Agent was already deployed on this device (survives self-destruct)
-$deployed = Get-RegistryValueSafe -Path 'HKLM:\SOFTWARE\AutopilotMonitor' -Name 'Deployed'
+$deployed = Get-RegistryValueSafe -SubKey 'SOFTWARE\AutopilotMonitor' -Name 'Deployed'
 if ($deployed) {
    Write-Step -Status 'SKIP' -Message "Guard 1: Agent was previously deployed at '$deployed'."
    $wouldInstall = $false
@@ -146,7 +173,7 @@ if ($profilePaths.Count -gt 0 -and -not $oobeRelax) {
 }

 # Guard 3: LastLoggedOnUser (unless OOBE-relax holds)
-$lastLoggedOnUser = (Get-ItemProperty -Path 'HKLM:\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Authentication\LogonUI' -Name 'LastLoggedOnUser' -EA SilentlyContinue).LastLoggedOnUser
+$lastLoggedOnUser = Get-RegistryValueSafe -SubKey 'SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Authentication\LogonUI' -Name 'LastLoggedOnUser'
 if ($lastLoggedOnUser -and $lastLoggedOnUser -notmatch 'defaultuser\d*' -and -not $oobeRelax) {
    Write-Step -Status 'SKIP' -Message "Guard 3: LastLoggedOnUser found ($lastLoggedOnUser). Device appears productive."
    $wouldInstall = $false
@@ -183,13 +210,19 @@ catch {
    Write-Step -Status 'WARN' -Message 'Guard 4: Could not determine LastBootUpTime / uptime.'
 }

-# Guard 5: Agent binary already present
+# Agent check: an installed agent (its executable or its task; the marker is guard 1) is
+# left as it is.
+$agentTask = Get-ScheduledTask -TaskName 'AutopilotMonitor-Agent' -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
 if (Test-Path $AgentExePath) {
-    Write-Step -Status 'SKIP' -Message "Guard 5: Agent already installed at '$AgentExePath'."
+    Write-Step -Status 'SKIP' -Message "Agent check: Agent already installed at '$AgentExePath'."
    $wouldInstall = $false
    $reasons.Add("Agent binary already present: $AgentExePath")
+} elseif ($agentTask) {
+    Write-Step -Status 'SKIP' -Message "Agent check: Agent task 'AutopilotMonitor-Agent' exists."
+    $wouldInstall = $false
+    $reasons.Add("Agent task present: AutopilotMonitor-Agent")
 } else {
-    Write-Step -Status 'PASS' -Message "Guard 5: Agent binary not present at '$AgentExePath'."
+    Write-Step -Status 'PASS' -Message "Agent check: No agent binary at '$AgentExePath' and no agent task."
 }

 Write-Host ''
@@ -0,0 +1,55 @@
+# Invoke-BootstrapDownload.ps1 - thin runner embedded in the Bootstrap MSI.
+#
+# The MSI is only a delivery vehicle (MDM LOB channel installs earlier than the IME
+# script/app batches during Autopilot Device Preparation). This runner downloads the
+# CURRENT Install-AutopilotMonitor.ps1 from the download endpoint and executes it, so
+# every piece of real bootstrap logic (guards, relax rules, agent download) stays
+# server-updatable without re-shipping the MSI.
+#
+# Fail-soft by design: the runner always exits 0 so a transient network failure never
+# marks the LOB install as failed; diagnostics go to bootstrap-msi.log.
+# ASCII only - no special characters in this file.
+
+$ErrorActionPreference = 'Stop'
+$baseDir = Join-Path $env:ProgramData 'AutopilotMonitor'
+$logDir  = Join-Path $baseDir 'Logs'
+New-Item -ItemType Directory -Force -Path $logDir | Out-Null
+$log = Join-Path $logDir 'bootstrap-msi.log'
+
+function Write-Log([string]$message) {
+    Add-Content -Path $log -Value ("[{0}] {1}" -f (Get-Date -Format 'yyyy-MM-dd HH:mm:ss'), $message)
+}
+
+try {
+    Write-Log "MSI bootstrap runner started (user=$env:USERNAME, pid=$PID)."
+
+    if (Test-Path 'HKLM:\SOFTWARE\AutopilotMonitor\Deployed') {
+        Write-Log 'Deployed marker present - skipping, another channel already installed the agent.'
+        exit 0
+    }
+
+    [Net.ServicePointManager]::SecurityProtocol = [Net.SecurityProtocolType]::Tls12
+    $url  = 'https://download.autopilotmonitor.com/agent/Install-AutopilotMonitor.ps1'
+    $dest = Join-Path $baseDir 'Install-AutopilotMonitor.ps1'
+
+    for ($attempt = 1; $attempt -le 3; $attempt++) {
+        try {
+            Invoke-WebRequest -UseBasicParsing -Uri $url -OutFile $dest
+            break
+        } catch {
+            Write-Log "Download attempt $attempt failed: $_"
+            if ($attempt -eq 3) { throw }
+            Start-Sleep -Seconds 10
+        }
+    }
+
+    Write-Log "Bootstrap script downloaded to $dest - executing."
+    # PS 5.1 file redirection (*>>) writes UTF-16LE, which garbles a log otherwise
+    # written via Add-Content (ANSI). Route through Add-Content for one encoding.
+    & $dest *>&1 | ForEach-Object { $_.ToString() } | Add-Content -Path $log
+    Write-Log "Bootstrap script finished (exit code $LASTEXITCODE)."
+    exit 0
+} catch {
+    Write-Log ("MSI bootstrap runner failed: " + ($_ | Out-String))
+    exit 0
+}
@@ -0,0 +1,216 @@
+<#
+.SYNOPSIS
+    Stage 1 of the Autopilot Monitor bootstrap: fetches the current installer and runs it.
+
+.DESCRIPTION
+    This is the file an administrator assigns in Intune, and the same file the bootstrap MSI
+    installs and runs -- one implementation for both delivery channels; the MSI is only the
+    packaging. It carries no enrollment logic at all: it downloads the published
+    Install-AutopilotMonitor.ps1, proves that it was signed by Autopilot Monitor, and runs it
+    in this process.
+
+    Why two stages: the installer holds every guard, relax rule and download path, and those
+    change. Whoever assigns the installer directly has to replace their Intune copy each
+    time; whoever assigns this loader never does, because the part that changes lives on the
+    server. Assigning the installer directly stays supported and unchanged.
+
+    This file is deliberately boring. It is the one piece that cannot be fixed remotely, so
+    it does the least it can: download, verify, invoke, log.
+
+    Verification is by Authenticode publisher, not by hash. A hash oracle would have to be
+    fetched from the same host as the script itself, so it could not survive a compromise of
+    that host, while the expected publisher below travels with this file. It pins the
+    certificate SUBJECT and not a thumbprint, so a certificate renewal does not brick a
+    loader that is already deployed on devices.
+
+    Fail-soft: the loader always exits 0 and never throws into the caller. A device that
+    cannot reach the download endpoint is a device without monitoring, never a failed
+    enrollment step. Verification failures are the same: nothing runs, and the reason is in
+    the log. Refusing to execute unverified code as SYSTEM is the point of this file.
+
+    This file MUST remain pure ASCII (PS 5.1 reads BOM-less files as ANSI).
+
+.PARAMETER BootstrapUrl
+    Installer URL. Defaults to the published stable installer; the -Dev variant of this
+    loader is rendered from that default at publish time.
+
+.PARAMETER LogFileName
+    Log file inside the agent log directory. The MSI channel passes bootstrap-msi.log so the
+    delivery channel stays visible in a diagnostics package; the diag tooling keys on these
+    names, so do not rename them.
+
+.PARAMETER BootstrapArguments
+    Everything else is passed through to the installer unchanged, so any parameter the
+    installer accepts can be set here without this file knowing about it.
+
+.EXAMPLE
+    .\Start-AutopilotMonitor.ps1
+
+.EXAMPLE
+    .\Start-AutopilotMonitor.ps1 -MaxBootstrapWindowHours 24
+
+.NOTES
+    Author  : Oliver Kieselbach (autopilotmonitor.com)
+    Runtime : Windows PowerShell 5.1, SYSTEM context, during Autopilot enrollment
+
+.CHANGELOG
+    2026-09-08  v1.2  Log the signer CN instead of the full EV subject; the full subject is
+                      logged only when the publisher is why a script was rejected.
+    2026-09-08  v1.1  Also used by the bootstrap MSI, which replaced its own copy of this
+                      logic; -LogFileName keeps the channel visible in diagnostics.
+    2026-09-08  v1.0  Initial version: two-stage bootstrap, publisher-pinned verification.
+#>
+
+[CmdletBinding()]
+param(
+    [Parameter(Mandatory = $false)]
+    [string]$BootstrapUrl = "https://download.autopilotmonitor.com/agent/Install-AutopilotMonitor.ps1",
+
+    [Parameter(Mandatory = $false)]
+    [ValidatePattern('^[A-Za-z0-9._-]+$')]
+    [string]$LogFileName = "bootstrap-loader.log",
+
+    [Parameter(Mandatory = $false, ValueFromRemainingArguments = $true)]
+    [string[]]$BootstrapArguments
+)
+
+# Script version (bump on meaningful changes; see .CHANGELOG above)
+$ScriptVersion = "1.2"
+
+# The publisher every downloaded stage-2 script must carry. A -like pattern on the subject,
+# NOT a thumbprint: certificates are renewed, deployed loaders are not.
+$ExpectedPublisher = "*O=glueckkanja AG*"
+
+$LoaderBasePath = "$env:ProgramData\AutopilotMonitor"
+$LoaderLogPath  = "$LoaderBasePath\Logs"
+$LogFile        = "$LoaderLogPath\$LogFileName"
+$BootstrapPath  = "$LoaderBasePath\Install-AutopilotMonitor.ps1"
+
+$DownloadAttempts = 3
+$RetryDelaySeconds = 10
+
+# Write-Host as well as the file: the Intune script output is what an administrator sees in
+# the portal, the file is what a support case reads.
+function Write-Log {
+    param([string]$Message)
+    $timestamp = Get-Date -Format "yyyy-MM-dd HH:mm:ss"
+    $logMessage = "[$timestamp] $Message"
+    Write-Host $logMessage
+    Add-Content -Path $LogFile -Value $logMessage -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
+}
+
+# True only when the file is signed, the signature validates against the machine's trust
+# chain, and the signer is us. Any error is a false -- an unreadable signature is an
+# unverified script.
+function Test-BootstrapSignature {
+    param([string]$Path)
+
+    try {
+        $sig = Get-AuthenticodeSignature -FilePath $Path -ErrorAction Stop
+    }
+    catch {
+        Write-Log "Signature check failed to run: $($_.Exception.Message)"
+        return $false
+    }
+
+    if ($null -eq $sig) {
+        Write-Log "Signature check returned nothing."
+        return $false
+    }
+
+    # The full subject of an EV certificate is a line of street address and registration
+    # numbers. The CN answers the only question the log has to answer; the full subject is
+    # logged when it is the reason for a rejection.
+    $subject = if ($sig.SignerCertificate) { $sig.SignerCertificate.Subject } else { "<unsigned>" }
+    $signer = if ($subject -match 'CN=([^,]+)') { $Matches[1] } else { $subject }
+    Write-Log "Signature status: $($sig.Status). Signer: $signer"
+
+    if ($sig.Status -ne 'Valid') {
+        Write-Log "REJECTED: expected signature status 'Valid'."
+        return $false
+    }
+    if ($subject -notlike $ExpectedPublisher) {
+        Write-Log "REJECTED: signer does not match the expected publisher. Full subject: $subject"
+        return $false
+    }
+
+    Write-Log "Signature accepted (thumbprint $($sig.SignerCertificate.Thumbprint))."
+    return $true
+}
+
+# Downloads the installer and returns $true once a downloaded copy passes verification.
+# Verification lives inside the retry loop on purpose: a truncated or proxy-mangled body
+# fails the signature check, and that is worth another attempt.
+function Get-VerifiedBootstrapScript {
+    param([string]$Url, [string]$Destination)
+
+    for ($attempt = 1; $attempt -le $DownloadAttempts; $attempt++) {
+        try {
+            Write-Log "Download attempt $attempt/$DownloadAttempts from $Url"
+            Invoke-WebRequest -Uri $Url -OutFile $Destination -UseBasicParsing -TimeoutSec 60 -ErrorAction Stop
+
+            if (Test-BootstrapSignature -Path $Destination) {
+                return $true
+            }
+        }
+        catch {
+            Write-Log "Download attempt $attempt failed: $($_.Exception.Message)"
+        }
+
+        if ($attempt -lt $DownloadAttempts) {
+            Start-Sleep -Seconds $RetryDelaySeconds
+        }
+    }
+
+    return $false
+}
+
+# Main flow. Only invoked when the script is run directly (see entry guard at the bottom),
+# so the Pester suite can dot-source this file without bootstrapping anything.
+function Start-BootstrapLoader {
+    New-Item -ItemType Directory -Force -Path $LoaderLogPath -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue | Out-Null
+
+    Write-Log "=== Autopilot Monitor bootstrap loader v$ScriptVersion started (user=$env:USERNAME, pid=$PID) ==="
+
+    # PS 5.1 on an OOBE device still defaults to TLS 1.0 for this process.
+    try {
+        [Net.ServicePointManager]::SecurityProtocol = [Net.ServicePointManager]::SecurityProtocol -bor [Net.SecurityProtocolType]::Tls12
+    }
+    catch {
+        Write-Log "INFO: could not raise the TLS protocol: $($_.Exception.Message)"
+    }
+
+    if (-not (Get-VerifiedBootstrapScript -Url $BootstrapUrl -Destination $BootstrapPath)) {
+        Write-Log "No verified installer available after $DownloadAttempts attempt(s). Nothing was executed."
+        return
+    }
+
+    Write-Log "Executing $BootstrapPath"
+
+    # Same process, so the execution policy this loader runs under applies to stage 2 as
+    # well and no second policy decision can strand the installer. Splatting an array of
+    # remaining arguments keeps this file free of any knowledge about the installer's
+    # parameters.
+    $arguments = @()
+    if ($BootstrapArguments) { $arguments = $BootstrapArguments }
+
+    try {
+        & $BootstrapPath @arguments
+        Write-Log "Installer finished (exit code $LASTEXITCODE)."
+    }
+    catch {
+        Write-Log "Installer threw: $($_.Exception.Message)"
+    }
+}
+
+# Entry guard: dot-sourcing (Pester) loads the functions without running the loader.
+if ($MyInvocation.InvocationName -ne '.') {
+    try {
+        Start-BootstrapLoader
+    }
+    catch {
+        # Nothing above should throw; if it does, it must not become a failed Intune script.
+        Write-Log "Loader failed: $($_.Exception.Message)"
+    }
+    exit 0
+}
@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@
    This script removes all traces of the Autopilot Monitor agent:
    - Stops and removes the Scheduled Task
    - Deletes C:\ProgramData\AutopilotMonitor folder
+    - Deletes C:\ProgramData\AutopilotMonitor-Loader-* folders that a failed loader run kept

    Normally the agent self-destructs after enrollment completion.
    Use this script only for manual cleanup or troubleshooting.
@@ -16,7 +17,8 @@
 .NOTES
    - Requires Administrator privileges
    - Safe to run multiple times
-    - No Registry cleanup needed (agent doesn't use Registry)
+    - Keeps HKLM\SOFTWARE\AutopilotMonitor\Deployed: the bootstrap reads it and never
+      installs the agent on this device again
 #>

 [CmdletBinding()]
@@ -67,6 +69,17 @@ catch {
    Write-Host "  [INFO] You may need to manually delete: $AgentBasePath" -ForegroundColor Yellow
 }

+# Delete loader run folders kept by failed runs
+foreach ($runFolder in @(Get-ChildItem -Path $env:ProgramData -Directory -Filter 'AutopilotMonitor-Loader-*' -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue)) {
+    try {
+        Remove-Item -LiteralPath $runFolder.FullName -Recurse -Force -ErrorAction Stop
+        Write-Host "  [OK] Loader run folder deleted: $($runFolder.FullName)" -ForegroundColor Green
+    }
+    catch {
+        Write-Host "  [FAIL] Error deleting $($runFolder.FullName): $($_.Exception.Message)" -ForegroundColor Red
+    }
+}
+
 Write-Host ""
 Write-Host "===== Cleanup Completed =====" -ForegroundColor Cyan
 Write-Host "Autopilot Monitor agent has been removed from this device." -ForegroundColor Green
@@ -0,0 +1,121 @@
+using System;
+using System.IO;
+using System.Reflection;
+using System.Text;
+using System.Text.RegularExpressions;
+using AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Runtime;
+using AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Security;
+using AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests.Harness;
+using AutopilotMonitor.Shared;
+using Xunit;
+
+namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests.Bootstrap
+{
+    /// <summary>
+    /// What the bootstrap scripts and the agent must agree on: the names by which the installer
+    /// recognizes an installed agent, the folders and log files, and the log lines the agent reads
+    /// back as its provenance. Every script value is read from the script's own text, so a rename
+    /// on either side fails here. The bootstrap script gates run this class on every change to
+    /// the scripts.
+    /// </summary>
+    [Trait("Category", "BootstrapContract")]
+    public sealed class BootstrapContractTests : IDisposable
+    {
+        private static readonly string BootstrapDir = Path.Combine(RepoPaths.Root(), "scripts", "Bootstrap");
+        private static readonly string Installer = File.ReadAllText(Path.Combine(BootstrapDir, "Install-AutopilotMonitor.ps1"));
+        private static readonly string Loader = File.ReadAllText(Path.Combine(BootstrapDir, "Start-AutopilotMonitor.ps1"));
+        private static readonly string OobeScript = File.ReadAllText(Path.Combine(
+            RepoPaths.Root(), "src", "Backend", "AutopilotMonitor.Functions.Tests", "TestData", "oobe-bootstrap-golden.ps1"));
+
+        private readonly string _logs = Path.Combine(Path.GetTempPath(), "apm-bootstrap-contract-" + Guid.NewGuid().ToString("N"));
+
+        public BootstrapContractTests() => Directory.CreateDirectory(_logs);
+
+        public void Dispose()
+        {
+            try { Directory.Delete(_logs, recursive: true); } catch { /* best effort */ }
+        }
+
+        /// <summary>The value of the one top-level <c>$Name = "value"</c> line of a script.</summary>
+        private static string Assignment(string script, string name)
+        {
+            var matches = Regex.Matches(script, @"(?m)^\$" + name + @"[ \t]*=[ \t]*""([^""]*)""[ \t]*\r?$");
+            Assert.True(matches.Count == 1, $"expected exactly one top-level ${name} line, found {matches.Count}");
+            return matches[0].Groups[1].Value;
+        }
+
+        private static string ScriptPath(string agentPath) => agentPath.Replace("%ProgramData%", "$env:ProgramData");
+
+        private static string AgentSubdirectory() =>
+            (string)typeof(AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Program)
+                .GetField("DefaultAgentSubdirectory", BindingFlags.NonPublic | BindingFlags.Static)
+                .GetRawConstantValue();
+
+        private void WriteLog(string name, string line) =>
+            File.WriteAllText(Path.Combine(_logs, name), line + "\r\n", Encoding.ASCII);
+
+        [Fact]
+        public void The_installer_recognizes_an_agent_by_the_names_the_agent_uses()
+        {
+            Assert.Equal(DeploymentMarker.RegistryKeyPath, Assignment(Installer, "DeploymentMarkerKey"));
+            Assert.Equal(DeploymentMarker.RegistryValueName, Assignment(Installer, "DeploymentMarkerValue"));
+            Assert.Equal(Constants.ScheduledTaskName, Assignment(Installer, "AgentTaskName"));
+            Assert.Equal(typeof(AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Program).Assembly.GetName().Name + ".exe", Assignment(Installer, "AgentExeName"));
+        }
+
+        [Fact]
+        public void The_installer_works_in_the_folders_the_agent_uses()
+        {
+            var basePath = Assignment(Installer, "AgentBasePath");
+
+            Assert.Equal(ScriptPath(Constants.AgentDataDirectory), basePath);
+            Assert.Equal(ScriptPath(Constants.LogDirectory), Assignment(Installer, "AgentLogPath").Replace("$AgentBasePath", basePath));
+            Assert.Equal(basePath + "\\" + AgentSubdirectory(), Assignment(Installer, "AgentBinPath").Replace("$AgentBasePath", basePath));
+        }
+
+        [Fact]
+        public void Every_bootstrap_logs_under_the_name_the_agent_reads()
+        {
+            Assert.Equal("$AgentLogPath\\" + BootstrapProvenanceReader.InstallerLogName, Assignment(Installer, "LogFile"));
+            Assert.Matches(@"\[string\]\$LogFileName = """ + Regex.Escape(BootstrapProvenanceReader.LoaderLogName) + @"""", Loader);
+            Assert.Contains("$LogFile          = \"$AgentLogPath\\" + BootstrapProvenanceReader.OobeLogName + "\"", OobeScript);
+
+            var wxs = File.ReadAllText(Path.Combine(RepoPaths.Root(), "src", "Agent", "AutopilotMonitor.BootstrapMsi", "Package.wxs"));
+            Assert.Contains("-LogFileName " + BootstrapProvenanceReader.MsiLoaderLogName, wxs);
+        }
+
+        [Fact]
+        public void The_agent_reads_the_versions_the_current_scripts_write()
+        {
+            var installerVersion = Assignment(Installer, "ScriptVersion");
+            var loaderVersion = Assignment(Loader, "ScriptVersion");
+            Assert.Contains("Write-Log \"Bootstrap script version: v$ScriptVersion\"", Installer);
+            Assert.Contains("Write-Log \"=== Autopilot Monitor bootstrap loader v$ScriptVersion started (user=$env:USERNAME, pid=$PID) ===\"", Loader);
+
+            WriteLog(BootstrapProvenanceReader.InstallerLogName, $"[2026-10-22 10:00:01] Bootstrap script version: v{installerVersion}");
+            WriteLog(BootstrapProvenanceReader.LoaderLogName, $"[2026-10-22 10:00:00] === Autopilot Monitor bootstrap loader v{loaderVersion} started (user=SYSTEM, pid=4242) ===");
+
+            var provenance = BootstrapProvenanceReader.Read(_logs);
+
+            Assert.Equal(installerVersion, provenance.ScriptVersion);
+            Assert.Equal("loader", provenance.LoaderLog);
+            Assert.Equal(loaderVersion, provenance.LoaderVersion);
+        }
+
+        // The installer carries only the start line over from loaders before 1.3, rebuilt from a
+        // pattern; the agent has to read that line as the loader's version.
+        [Fact]
+        public void The_agent_reads_the_start_line_the_installer_carries_over_from_an_older_loader()
+        {
+            const string suffix = " (carried over by the bootstrapper) ===`r`n";
+            Assert.Contains("$starts[$starts.Count - 1].Value + \"" + suffix + "\"", Installer);
+
+            WriteLog(BootstrapProvenanceReader.MsiLoaderLogName, "[2026-10-22 10:00:00] === Autopilot Monitor bootstrap loader v1.2 started (carried over by the bootstrapper) ===");
+
+            var provenance = BootstrapProvenanceReader.Read(_logs);
+
+            Assert.Equal("msi", provenance.LoaderLog);
+            Assert.Equal("1.2", provenance.LoaderVersion);
+        }
+    }
+}
@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
+using System.Security.Principal;
+using Xunit;
+
+namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests.Harness
+{
+    /// <summary>
+    /// A fact that needs an elevated process, such as making the Administrators group the owner
+    /// of a folder. Skipped in a non-elevated local run; the CI runners are elevated.
+    /// </summary>
+    public sealed class ElevatedFactAttribute : FactAttribute
+    {
+        public ElevatedFactAttribute()
+        {
+            using (var identity = WindowsIdentity.GetCurrent())
+            {
+                if (!new WindowsPrincipal(identity).IsInRole(WindowsBuiltInRole.Administrator))
+                    Skip = "needs an elevated process (assigning Administrators as the folder owner)";
+            }
+        }
+    }
+}
@@ -17,6 +17,8 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests.Harness
            public DistressErrorType ErrorType { get; set; }
            public string Message { get; set; } = default!;
            public int? HttpStatusCode { get; set; }
+            public string? TpmVersion { get; set; }
+            public DistressDeviceContext? Context { get; set; }
        }

        public List<Call> Calls { get; } = new List<Call>();
@@ -32,9 +34,9 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests.Harness
        {
        }

-        public override Task TrySendAsync(DistressErrorType errorType, string message, int? httpStatusCode = null)
+        public override Task TrySendAsync(DistressErrorType errorType, string message, int? httpStatusCode = null, DistressDetail? detail = null)
        {
-            Calls.Add(new Call { ErrorType = errorType, Message = message, HttpStatusCode = httpStatusCode });
+            Calls.Add(new Call { ErrorType = errorType, Message = message, HttpStatusCode = httpStatusCode, TpmVersion = detail?.TpmVersion, Context = detail?.Context });
            return Send?.Invoke() ?? Task.CompletedTask;
        }
    }
@@ -0,0 +1,82 @@
+using System.Collections.Generic;
+using AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Enrollment.SystemSignals;
+using Xunit;
+
+namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests.Monitoring
+{
+    /// <summary>
+    /// The ESP phase a report names, derived from the three ESP registry values. Both value shapes
+    /// Windows writes are covered: flat status texts (older builds) and nested subcategory objects.
+    /// </summary>
+    public sealed class EspPhaseSnapshotTests
+    {
+        private const string DoneFlag = "{\"categorySucceeded\":true}";
+        private const string FailedFlag = "{\"categorySucceeded\":false}";
+        private const string NestedRunning =
+            "{\"SecurityPoliciesSubcategory\":{\"subcategoryState\":\"succeeded\",\"subcategoryStatusText\":\"Complete\"}," +
+            "\"AppsSubcategory\":{\"subcategoryState\":\"inProgress\",\"subcategoryStatusText\":\"Installing (1 of 3)\"}}";
+        private const string NestedAllDoneNoFlag =
+            "{\"SecurityPoliciesSubcategory\":{\"subcategoryState\":\"succeeded\"},\"AppsSubcategory\":{\"subcategoryState\":\"notRequired\"}}";
+        private const string NestedFailedNoFlag =
+            "{\"SecurityPoliciesSubcategory\":{\"subcategoryState\":\"succeeded\"},\"AppsSubcategory\":{\"subcategoryState\":\"failed\"}}";
+        private const string FlatRunning = "{\"CertificatesSubcategory\":\"Certificates (0 of 1 applied)\",\"AppsSubcategory\":\"Identifying\"}";
+
+        private static string Derive(string? preparation, string? deviceSetup, string? accountSetup)
+            => EspPhaseSnapshot.Derive(new List<string> { preparation!, deviceSetup!, accountSetup! });
+
+        [Fact]
+        public void No_value_is_none()
+        {
+            Assert.Equal("none", Derive(null, null, null));
+        }
+
+        [Fact]
+        public void Running_category_names_its_phase()
+        {
+            Assert.Equal("device_preparation", Derive(NestedRunning, null, null));
+            Assert.Equal("device_setup", Derive(DoneFlag, NestedRunning, null));
+            Assert.Equal("account_setup", Derive(DoneFlag, DoneFlag, NestedRunning));
+        }
+
+        [Fact]
+        public void Flat_status_texts_are_read_too()
+        {
+            Assert.Equal("device_setup", Derive(DoneFlag, FlatRunning, null));
+        }
+
+        [Fact]
+        public void Done_categories_name_the_last_one_reached()
+        {
+            Assert.Equal("device_preparation_done", Derive(DoneFlag, null, null));
+            Assert.Equal("device_setup_done", Derive(DoneFlag, DoneFlag, null));
+            Assert.Equal("esp_done", Derive(DoneFlag, DoneFlag, DoneFlag));
+        }
+
+        [Fact]
+        public void All_subcategories_done_counts_as_done_without_the_flag()
+        {
+            // Some builds never set categorySucceeded although every subcategory finished.
+            Assert.Equal("esp_done", Derive(DoneFlag, NestedAllDoneNoFlag, NestedAllDoneNoFlag));
+        }
+
+        [Fact]
+        public void A_failure_wins_over_everything_after_it()
+        {
+            Assert.Equal("device_setup_failed", Derive(DoneFlag, FailedFlag, NestedRunning));
+            Assert.Equal("account_setup_failed", Derive(DoneFlag, DoneFlag, NestedFailedNoFlag));
+        }
+
+        [Fact]
+        public void Unparseable_value_counts_as_running()
+        {
+            Assert.Equal("device_setup", Derive(DoneFlag, "{not json", null));
+        }
+
+        [Fact]
+        public void Read_on_this_machine_returns_a_known_token()
+        {
+            var phase = EspPhaseSnapshot.Read();
+            Assert.Matches("^[a-z_]+$", phase);
+        }
+    }
+}
@@ -0,0 +1,199 @@
+using System;
+using System.Collections.Generic;
+using System.IO;
+using System.Linq;
+using System.Text;
+using AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Runtime;
+using Xunit;
+
+namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests.Monitoring.Runtime
+{
+    /// <summary>
+    /// The bootstrap provenance in <c>agent_started</c>. Fixture lines are the scripts' real
+    /// formats: installer <c>[ts] Bootstrap script version: vX.Y</c>
+    /// (Install-AutopilotMonitor.ps1), loader <c>[ts] === Autopilot Monitor bootstrap loader vX.Y
+    /// started (user=..., pid=...) ===</c> (Start-AutopilotMonitor.ps1), the MSI's downloader before
+    /// the loader <c>[ts] MSI bootstrap runner started (user=..., pid=...).</c>.
+    /// </summary>
+    public sealed class BootstrapProvenanceReaderTests : IDisposable
+    {
+        private readonly string _dir = Path.Combine(Path.GetTempPath(), "apm-provenance-" + Guid.NewGuid().ToString("N"));
+
+        public BootstrapProvenanceReaderTests() => Directory.CreateDirectory(_dir);
+
+        public void Dispose()
+        {
+            try { Directory.Delete(_dir, recursive: true); } catch { /* best effort */ }
+        }
+
+        private void Write(string name, params string[] lines) =>
+            File.WriteAllText(Path.Combine(_dir, name), string.Join("\r\n", lines) + "\r\n", Encoding.ASCII);
+
+        private static string InstallerRun(string version) => $"[2026-10-13 09:00:00] Bootstrap script version: v{version}";
+
+        private static string LoaderRun(string version) =>
+            $"[2026-10-13 08:59:58] === Autopilot Monitor bootstrap loader v{version} started (user=SECRETUSER, pid=4242) ===";
+
+        [Fact]
+        public void Loader_path_reports_installer_and_loader_versions()
+        {
+            Write(BootstrapProvenanceReader.LoaderLogName, LoaderRun("1.2"), "[2026-10-13 08:59:59] Installer signature verified");
+            Write(BootstrapProvenanceReader.InstallerLogName, "[2026-10-13 09:00:00] ===== Autopilot Monitor Bootstrap Started =====", InstallerRun("2.5"));
+
+            var p = BootstrapProvenanceReader.Read(_dir);
+
+            Assert.True(p.ScriptLogPresent);
+            Assert.Equal("2.5", p.ScriptVersion);
+            Assert.Equal("loader", p.LoaderLog);
+            Assert.Equal("1.2", p.LoaderVersion);
+            Assert.False(p.OobeLogPresent);
+        }
+
+        [Fact]
+        public void The_last_run_wins_when_the_log_grew_over_several_runs()
+        {
+            Write(BootstrapProvenanceReader.InstallerLogName, InstallerRun("2.3"), "x", InstallerRun("2.4"), "y", InstallerRun("2.5"), "z");
+
+            Assert.Equal("2.5", BootstrapProvenanceReader.Read(_dir).ScriptVersion);
+        }
+
+        [Fact]
+        public void A_directly_assigned_installer_has_no_loader_log()
+        {
+            Write(BootstrapProvenanceReader.InstallerLogName, InstallerRun("2.4"));
+
+            var p = BootstrapProvenanceReader.Read(_dir);
+
+            Assert.Equal("2.4", p.ScriptVersion);
+            Assert.Null(p.LoaderLog);
+            Assert.Null(p.LoaderVersion);
+        }
+
+        [Fact]
+        public void An_installer_from_before_the_version_line_is_present_but_without_version()
+        {
+            Write(BootstrapProvenanceReader.InstallerLogName, "[2026-03-01 09:00:00] ===== Autopilot Monitor Bootstrap Started =====");
+
+            var p = BootstrapProvenanceReader.Read(_dir);
+
+            Assert.True(p.ScriptLogPresent);
+            Assert.Null(p.ScriptVersion);
+        }
+
+        [Fact]
+        public void An_installer_from_before_the_log_rename_is_read_under_its_old_name()
+        {
+            Write(BootstrapProvenanceReader.LegacyInstallerLogName, InstallerRun("2.3"));
+
+            var p = BootstrapProvenanceReader.Read(_dir);
+
+            Assert.True(p.ScriptLogPresent);
+            Assert.Equal("2.3", p.ScriptVersion);
+        }
+
+        [Fact]
+        public void With_both_installer_logs_the_most_recently_written_one_counts()
+        {
+            Write(BootstrapProvenanceReader.InstallerLogName, InstallerRun("2.6"));
+            Write(BootstrapProvenanceReader.LegacyInstallerLogName, InstallerRun("2.3"));
+            File.SetLastWriteTimeUtc(Path.Combine(_dir, BootstrapProvenanceReader.InstallerLogName), DateTime.UtcNow.AddDays(-3));
+            File.SetLastWriteTimeUtc(Path.Combine(_dir, BootstrapProvenanceReader.LegacyInstallerLogName), DateTime.UtcNow.AddMinutes(-1));
+
+            Assert.Equal("2.3", BootstrapProvenanceReader.Read(_dir).ScriptVersion);
+        }
+
+        [Fact]
+        public void The_msi_downloader_from_before_the_loader_counts_as_msi_without_version()
+        {
+            Write(BootstrapProvenanceReader.LegacyMsiLoaderLogName, "[2026-08-01 09:00:00] MSI bootstrap runner started (user=SECRETUSER, pid=4242).");
+
+            var p = BootstrapProvenanceReader.Read(_dir);
+
+            Assert.Equal("msi", p.LoaderLog);
+            Assert.Null(p.LoaderVersion);
+        }
+
+        [Fact]
+        public void The_msi_loader_log_is_told_apart_from_the_intune_loader()
+        {
+            Write(BootstrapProvenanceReader.MsiLoaderLogName, LoaderRun("1.1"));
+
+            var p = BootstrapProvenanceReader.Read(_dir);
+
+            Assert.Equal("msi", p.LoaderLog);
+            Assert.Equal("1.1", p.LoaderVersion);
+        }
+
+        [Fact]
+        public void With_both_loader_logs_the_most_recently_written_one_counts()
+        {
+            Write(BootstrapProvenanceReader.LoaderLogName, LoaderRun("1.0"));
+            Write(BootstrapProvenanceReader.MsiLoaderLogName, LoaderRun("1.2"));
+            File.SetLastWriteTimeUtc(Path.Combine(_dir, BootstrapProvenanceReader.LoaderLogName), DateTime.UtcNow.AddDays(-3));
+            File.SetLastWriteTimeUtc(Path.Combine(_dir, BootstrapProvenanceReader.MsiLoaderLogName), DateTime.UtcNow.AddMinutes(-1));
+
+            var p = BootstrapProvenanceReader.Read(_dir);
+
+            Assert.Equal("msi", p.LoaderLog);
+            Assert.Equal("1.2", p.LoaderVersion);
+        }
+
+        [Fact]
+        public void The_oobe_go_script_is_recognised_by_its_log()
+        {
+            Write(BootstrapProvenanceReader.OobeLogName, "[2026-10-13 09:00:00] ===== Autopilot Monitor OOBE Bootstrap =====");
+
+            Assert.True(BootstrapProvenanceReader.Read(_dir).OobeLogPresent);
+        }
+
+        [Fact]
+        public void Only_the_tail_of_a_large_log_is_read()
+        {
+            var filler = Enumerable.Repeat(new string('.', 200), 600).ToArray();   // ~120 KB
+            var lines = new List<string> { InstallerRun("2.1") };
+            lines.AddRange(filler);
+            lines.Add(InstallerRun("2.5"));
+            Write(BootstrapProvenanceReader.InstallerLogName, lines.ToArray());
+
+            Assert.Equal("2.5", BootstrapProvenanceReader.Read(_dir).ScriptVersion);
+        }
+
+        [Fact]
+        public void A_missing_directory_reads_as_unknown_and_never_throws()
+        {
+            var p = BootstrapProvenanceReader.Read(Path.Combine(_dir, "does-not-exist"));
+
+            Assert.False(p.ScriptLogPresent);
+            Assert.Null(p.ScriptVersion);
+            Assert.Null(p.LoaderLog);
+            Assert.False(p.OobeLogPresent);
+        }
+
+        [Fact]
+        public void The_event_keys_carry_versions_only_never_the_account_name()
+        {
+            Write(BootstrapProvenanceReader.LoaderLogName, LoaderRun("1.2"));
+            Write(BootstrapProvenanceReader.InstallerLogName, InstallerRun("2.5"));
+            var data = new Dictionary<string, object>();
+
+            BootstrapProvenanceReader.Read(_dir).AddTo(data);
+
+            Assert.Equal(true, data["bootstrapScriptLogPresent"]);
+            Assert.Equal("2.5", data["bootstrapScriptVersion"]);
+            Assert.Equal("loader", data["bootstrapLoaderLog"]);
+            Assert.Equal("1.2", data["bootstrapLoaderVersion"]);
+            Assert.Equal(false, data["oobeBootstrapLogPresent"]);
+            Assert.DoesNotContain(data.Values, v => v is string s && s.Contains("SECRETUSER"));
+        }
+
+        [Fact]
+        public void Keys_that_were_not_found_are_left_out()
+        {
+            var data = new Dictionary<string, object>();
+
+            BootstrapProvenanceReader.Read(_dir).AddTo(data);
+
+            Assert.Equal(new[] { "bootstrapScriptLogPresent", "oobeBootstrapLogPresent" }, data.Keys.OrderBy(k => k).ToArray());
+        }
+    }
+}
@@ -0,0 +1,101 @@
+using System;
+using System.Collections.Generic;
+using System.IO;
+using AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Runtime;
+using AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Security;
+using Xunit;
+
+namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests.Monitoring.Runtime
+{
+    /// <summary>
+    /// Step 5b of the self-update: the staged payload must match its signed catalog before a
+    /// single file is swapped in. The verifier is replaced through the static hook; each test
+    /// restores it, as in <see cref="SelfUpdaterGracefulShutdownTests"/>.
+    /// </summary>
+    public sealed class SelfUpdaterPayloadCatalogTests : IDisposable
+    {
+        private const string StagingDir = @"C:\ProgramData\AutopilotMonitor\Agent-Update";
+
+        private readonly Func<string, PayloadCatalogVerdict> _savedVerifier;
+        private readonly List<string> _log = new List<string>();
+
+        public SelfUpdaterPayloadCatalogTests()
+        {
+            _savedVerifier = SelfUpdater.VerifyPayloadCatalog;
+        }
+
+        public void Dispose() => SelfUpdater.VerifyPayloadCatalog = _savedVerifier;
+
+        [Fact]
+        public void Production_default_is_the_real_verifier()
+        {
+            Assert.Equal(typeof(PayloadCatalogVerifier), _savedVerifier.Method.DeclaringType);
+            Assert.Equal(nameof(PayloadCatalogVerifier.Verify), _savedVerifier.Method.Name);
+        }
+
+        [Fact]
+        public void Accepted_payload_lets_the_update_continue()
+        {
+            string? checkedDir = null;
+            SelfUpdater.VerifyPayloadCatalog = dir => { checkedDir = dir; return PayloadCatalogVerdict.Accept(); };
+
+            var ok = SelfUpdater.VerifyStagedPayload(StagingDir, _log.Add, out var reason);
+
+            Assert.True(ok);
+            Assert.Null(reason);
+            Assert.Equal(StagingDir, checkedDir);
+            Assert.Contains(_log, line => line.Contains("payload catalog verified"));
+        }
+
+        [Fact]
+        public void Rejected_payload_stops_the_update_and_hands_over_the_reason()
+        {
+            SelfUpdater.VerifyPayloadCatalog = _ =>
+                PayloadCatalogVerdict.Reject("payload differs from catalog (missing: none; extra: evil.dll; changed: none)");
+
+            var ok = SelfUpdater.VerifyStagedPayload(StagingDir, _log.Add, out var reason);
+
+            Assert.False(ok);
+            Assert.Contains("extra: evil.dll", reason);
+            Assert.Contains(_log, line => line.Contains("REJECTED"));
+        }
+
+        [Fact]
+        public void A_throwing_verifier_is_a_rejection_not_a_pass()
+        {
+            SelfUpdater.VerifyPayloadCatalog = _ => throw new InvalidOperationException("runspace broke");
+
+            var ok = SelfUpdater.VerifyStagedPayload(StagingDir, _log.Add, out var reason);
+
+            Assert.False(ok);
+            Assert.Contains("runspace broke", reason);
+        }
+
+        [Fact]
+        public void The_catalog_check_runs_before_any_file_is_swapped()
+        {
+            // Source-level pin: CheckAndApplyUpdateAsync has no seam for the download, so the
+            // ordering that makes the check meaningful is pinned on the source itself.
+            var source = File.ReadAllText(Path.Combine(FindRepoRoot(),
+                "src", "Agent", "AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core", "Monitoring", "Runtime", "SelfUpdater.cs"));
+
+            var check = source.IndexOf("if (!VerifyStagedPayload(stagingDir, log, out var catalogRejection))", StringComparison.Ordinal);
+            var swap = source.IndexOf("var swapOk = SwapFiles(agentDir, stagingDir, log);", StringComparison.Ordinal);
+
+            Assert.True(check > 0, "step 5b not found in SelfUpdater.cs");
+            Assert.True(swap > check, "SwapFiles must come after the catalog check");
+            Assert.Contains("WriteSkipMarker(\"catalog_rejected\"", source);
+        }
+
+        private static string FindRepoRoot()
+        {
+            var dir = new DirectoryInfo(AppContext.BaseDirectory);
+            while (dir != null && !File.Exists(Path.Combine(dir.FullName, "AutopilotMonitor.sln")))
+            {
+                dir = dir.Parent;
+            }
+            Assert.NotNull(dir);
+            return dir.FullName;
+        }
+    }
+}
@@ -164,6 +164,70 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests.Program
            Assert.Null(persistence.LoadRegistrationFailure());
        }

+        [Fact]
+        public void Success_after_a_failed_start_tells_reboot_certificate_and_where_the_failure_began()
+        {
+            using var tmp = new TempDirectory();
+            var persistence = new SessionIdPersistence(tmp.Path);
+            var at = new DateTime(2026, 10, 21, 7, 0, 0, DateTimeKind.Utc);
+            var failedBoot = at.AddMinutes(-16);
+
+            BackendSessionRegistration.RecordFailedRun(
+                persistence, SessionRegistrationResult.Failed("An error occurred while sending the request."),
+                at, at.AddSeconds(90), true, true, "Succeeded", "fp-a", NewLogger(tmp.Path),
+                new AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Transport.DistressDeviceContext("completed", "account_setup", failedBoot),
+                certThumbprint: "6B98620E8BE952FEA7CD9200B899A9A8CCADD1E5");
+
+            // The record carries phase and OOBE flag; boot and thumbprint stay beside it.
+            var summary = persistence.LoadRegistrationFailure()!;
+            Assert.Equal("account_setup", summary.EspPhase);
+            Assert.Equal("completed", summary.OobeState);
+
+            var prior = BackendSessionRegistration.ClearAfterSuccess(
+                persistence, () => "fp-a", NewLogger(tmp.Path),
+                currentBootUtc: at.AddHours(1), currentCertThumbprint: "6b98620e8be952fea7cd9200b899a9a8ccadd1e5");
+
+            Assert.NotNull(prior);
+            Assert.Equal("account_setup", prior!.LastEspPhase);
+            Assert.Equal("completed", prior.LastOobeState);
+            Assert.True(prior.RebootedSince);
+            Assert.False(prior.CertChanged);
+            Assert.False(prior.NetworkChanged);
+        }
+
+        [Fact]
+        public void Same_boot_and_unknown_sides_are_reported_as_such()
+        {
+            var boot = new DateTime(2026, 10, 21, 6, 40, 0, DateTimeKind.Utc);
+            Assert.False(BackendSessionRegistration.RebootedSince(boot, boot.AddSeconds(30)));
+            Assert.True(BackendSessionRegistration.RebootedSince(boot, boot.AddMinutes(5)));
+            Assert.Null(BackendSessionRegistration.RebootedSince(null, boot));
+            Assert.Null(BackendSessionRegistration.RebootedSince(boot, null));
+            Assert.True(BackendSessionRegistration.CertificateChanged("AA", "BB"));
+            Assert.Null(BackendSessionRegistration.CertificateChanged(null, "BB"));
+            Assert.Null(BackendSessionRegistration.CertificateChanged("AA", ""));
+        }
+
+        [Fact]
+        public void Record_from_an_older_agent_leaves_the_new_comparisons_unknown()
+        {
+            using var tmp = new TempDirectory();
+            var persistence = new SessionIdPersistence(tmp.Path);
+            var at = new DateTime(2026, 10, 21, 7, 0, 0, DateTimeKind.Utc);
+
+            // Written without context, boot or thumbprint — the shape agents up to 2.0.1487 leave.
+            BackendSessionRegistration.RecordFailedRun(
+                persistence, SessionRegistrationResult.Failed("x"), at, at.AddSeconds(5), true, true, null, null, NewLogger(tmp.Path));
+
+            var prior = BackendSessionRegistration.ClearAfterSuccess(
+                persistence, () => null, NewLogger(tmp.Path), at.AddHours(1), "AA");
+
+            Assert.NotNull(prior);
+            Assert.Null(prior!.LastEspPhase);
+            Assert.Null(prior.RebootedSince);
+            Assert.Null(prior.CertChanged);
+        }
+
        [Fact]
        public void Recording_without_persistence_is_a_no_op()
        {
@@ -3,6 +3,8 @@ using System;
 using System.Collections.Generic;
 using System.IO;
 using System.Linq;
+using System.Threading;
+using System.Threading.Tasks;
 using AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Configuration;
 using AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Logging;
 using AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Orchestration;
@@ -16,14 +18,16 @@ using Xunit;
 namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests.Program
 {
    /// <summary>
-    /// Regression gate for the "soft admin-action" semantics change: backend
-    /// <c>AdminAction=Succeeded</c> is purely informational (timeline entry only, agent keeps
-    /// running its own path) while <c>AdminAction=Failed</c> drives the agent's own soft-shutdown
-    /// pipeline via the injected <c>onAdminFailed</c> callback — without forcing self-destruct.
-    /// Previously both were routed through the full <c>ServerActionDispatcher</c> +
-    /// <c>terminationHandler.Handle</c> path, which (a) hijacked the agent's own completion flow
-    /// for Succeeded and (b) crashed with <c>InvalidOperationException: SignalIngress has been
-    /// stopped</c> when a terminal-drain response arrived after the ingress was torn down.
+    /// Regression gate for the soft admin-action semantics: backend <c>AdminAction=Succeeded</c>
+    /// and <c>AdminAction=Failed</c> (portal Mark-Succeeded / Mark-Failed) both drive the agent's
+    /// own soft-shutdown pipeline via the injected <c>onAdminTerminal</c> callback with that
+    /// outcome — without forcing self-destruct — and only the first AdminAction of a process is
+    /// acted on. The backend repeats AdminAction on every telemetry response; acting on each echo
+    /// re-emitted <c>admin_marked_session</c> with an immediate upload whose response carried the
+    /// next echo. Earlier, both outcomes were routed through the full
+    /// <c>ServerActionDispatcher</c> path, which crashed with
+    /// <c>InvalidOperationException: SignalIngress has been stopped</c> when a terminal-drain
+    /// response arrived after the ingress was torn down.
    /// </summary>
    public sealed class HandleAdminActionTests
    {
@@ -34,13 +38,16 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests.Program
            ApiBaseUrl = "http://localhost",
        };

+        private static global::AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Runtime.ServerControlPlane.AdminActionLatch NewLatch() =>
+            new global::AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Runtime.ServerControlPlane.AdminActionLatch();
+
        private sealed class Rig : IDisposable
        {
            public TempDirectory Tmp { get; } = new TempDirectory();
            public AgentLogger Logger { get; }
            public FakeSignalIngressSink Ingress { get; } = new FakeSignalIngressSink();
            public InformationalEventPost Post { get; }
-            public List<EnrollmentTerminatedEventArgs> OnAdminFailedCalls { get; } = new List<EnrollmentTerminatedEventArgs>();
+            public List<EnrollmentTerminatedEventArgs> OnAdminTerminalCalls { get; } = new List<EnrollmentTerminatedEventArgs>();

            public Rig()
            {
@@ -48,7 +55,7 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests.Program
                Post = new InformationalEventPost(Ingress, new VirtualClock(new DateTime(2026, 4, 23, 10, 0, 0, DateTimeKind.Utc)));
            }

-            public Action<EnrollmentTerminatedEventArgs> OnAdminFailed => args => OnAdminFailedCalls.Add(args);
+            public Action<EnrollmentTerminatedEventArgs> OnAdminTerminal => args => OnAdminTerminalCalls.Add(args);

            public IEnumerable<FakeSignalIngressSink.PostedSignal> EventsOfType(string eventType) =>
                Ingress.Posted.Where(p =>
@@ -61,15 +68,16 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests.Program
        }

        [Fact]
-        public void Succeeded_emits_admin_marked_session_as_Info_and_does_not_invoke_onAdminFailed()
+        public void Succeeded_emits_admin_marked_session_as_Info_and_terminates_with_Succeeded()
        {
            using var rig = new Rig();

            global::AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Runtime.ServerControlPlane.HandleAdminAction(
                adminAction: "Succeeded",
-                stageNameAccessor: () => "Completed",
+                latch: NewLatch(),
+                stageNameAccessor: () => "EspAccountSetup",
                post: rig.Post,
-                onAdminFailed: rig.OnAdminFailed,
+                onAdminTerminal: rig.OnAdminTerminal,
                agentConfig: Config(),
                logger: rig.Logger);

@@ -78,24 +86,29 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests.Program
            Assert.True(emitted[0].Payload!.TryGetValue(SignalPayloadKeys.Severity, out var sev));
            Assert.Equal(EventSeverity.Info.ToString(), sev);

-            // Informational only — agent keeps running its own path.
-            Assert.Empty(rig.OnAdminFailedCalls);
+            Assert.Single(rig.OnAdminTerminalCalls);
+            var args = rig.OnAdminTerminalCalls[0];
+            Assert.Equal(EnrollmentTerminationOutcome.Succeeded, args.Outcome);
+            Assert.Equal(EnrollmentTerminationReason.DecisionTerminalStage, args.Reason);
+            Assert.Equal("EspAccountSetup", args.StageName);
+            Assert.Contains("Admin marked session as Succeeded", args.Details);

-            // No server_action_* noise — Succeeded isn't a ServerAction.
+            // No server_action_* noise — an admin mark isn't a ServerAction.
            Assert.Empty(rig.EventsOfType("server_action_received"));
            Assert.Empty(rig.EventsOfType("server_action_executed"));
        }

        [Fact]
-        public void Failed_emits_admin_marked_session_as_Warning_and_invokes_onAdminFailed_once()
+        public void Failed_emits_admin_marked_session_as_Warning_and_terminates_with_Failed()
        {
            using var rig = new Rig();

            global::AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Runtime.ServerControlPlane.HandleAdminAction(
                adminAction: "Failed",
+                latch: NewLatch(),
                stageNameAccessor: () => "DeviceSetup",
                post: rig.Post,
-                onAdminFailed: rig.OnAdminFailed,
+                onAdminTerminal: rig.OnAdminTerminal,
                agentConfig: Config(),
                logger: rig.Logger);

@@ -104,8 +117,8 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests.Program
            Assert.True(emitted[0].Payload!.TryGetValue(SignalPayloadKeys.Severity, out var sev));
            Assert.Equal(EventSeverity.Warning.ToString(), sev);

-            Assert.Single(rig.OnAdminFailedCalls);
-            var args = rig.OnAdminFailedCalls[0];
+            Assert.Single(rig.OnAdminTerminalCalls);
+            var args = rig.OnAdminTerminalCalls[0];
            Assert.Equal(EnrollmentTerminationOutcome.Failed, args.Outcome);
            Assert.Equal(EnrollmentTerminationReason.DecisionTerminalStage, args.Reason);
            Assert.Equal("DeviceSetup", args.StageName);
@@ -119,13 +132,15 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests.Program

            global::AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Runtime.ServerControlPlane.HandleAdminAction(
                adminAction: "succeeded",
+                latch: NewLatch(),
                stageNameAccessor: () => null,
                post: rig.Post,
-                onAdminFailed: rig.OnAdminFailed,
+                onAdminTerminal: rig.OnAdminTerminal,
                agentConfig: Config(),
                logger: rig.Logger);

-            Assert.Empty(rig.OnAdminFailedCalls);
+            Assert.Single(rig.OnAdminTerminalCalls);
+            Assert.Equal(EnrollmentTerminationOutcome.Succeeded, rig.OnAdminTerminalCalls[0].Outcome);
        }

        [Fact]
@@ -137,28 +152,30 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests.Program

            global::AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Runtime.ServerControlPlane.HandleAdminAction(
                adminAction: "Quarantined",
+                latch: NewLatch(),
                stageNameAccessor: () => null,
                post: rig.Post,
-                onAdminFailed: rig.OnAdminFailed,
+                onAdminTerminal: rig.OnAdminTerminal,
                agentConfig: Config(),
                logger: rig.Logger);

-            Assert.Single(rig.OnAdminFailedCalls);
-            Assert.Equal(EnrollmentTerminationOutcome.Failed, rig.OnAdminFailedCalls[0].Outcome);
+            Assert.Single(rig.OnAdminTerminalCalls);
+            Assert.Equal(EnrollmentTerminationOutcome.Failed, rig.OnAdminTerminalCalls[0].Outcome);
        }

        [Fact]
-        public void Failed_with_null_onAdminFailed_does_not_throw()
+        public void Null_onAdminTerminal_does_not_throw()
        {
-            // Defensive path: onAdminFailed can be null if the terminate handler wasn't wired yet.
+            // Defensive path: onAdminTerminal can be null if the terminate handler wasn't wired yet.
            using var rig = new Rig();

            var ex = Record.Exception(() =>
                global::AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Runtime.ServerControlPlane.HandleAdminAction(
                    adminAction: "Failed",
+                    latch: NewLatch(),
                    stageNameAccessor: () => null,
                    post: rig.Post,
-                    onAdminFailed: null!,
+                    onAdminTerminal: null!,
                    agentConfig: Config(),
                    logger: rig.Logger));

@@ -176,14 +193,15 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests.Program

            global::AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Runtime.ServerControlPlane.HandleAdminAction(
                adminAction: "Failed",
+                latch: NewLatch(),
                stageNameAccessor: () => throw new InvalidOperationException("not started"),
                post: rig.Post,
-                onAdminFailed: rig.OnAdminFailed,
+                onAdminTerminal: rig.OnAdminTerminal,
                agentConfig: Config(),
                logger: rig.Logger);

-            Assert.Single(rig.OnAdminFailedCalls);
-            Assert.Null(rig.OnAdminFailedCalls[0].StageName);
+            Assert.Single(rig.OnAdminTerminalCalls);
+            Assert.Null(rig.OnAdminTerminalCalls[0].StageName);
        }

        [Fact]
@@ -202,18 +220,22 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests.Program
            var ex = Record.Exception(() =>
                global::AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Runtime.ServerControlPlane.HandleAdminAction(
                    adminAction: "Succeeded",
+                    latch: NewLatch(),
                    stageNameAccessor: () => null,
                    post: stoppedPost,
-                    onAdminFailed: rig.OnAdminFailed,
+                    onAdminTerminal: rig.OnAdminTerminal,
                    agentConfig: Config(),
                    logger: rig.Logger));

            Assert.Null(ex);
-            Assert.Empty(rig.OnAdminFailedCalls);
+
+            // A lost timeline entry never cancels the admin's decision.
+            Assert.Single(rig.OnAdminTerminalCalls);
+            Assert.Equal(EnrollmentTerminationOutcome.Succeeded, rig.OnAdminTerminalCalls[0].Outcome);
        }

        [Fact]
-        public void Failed_emit_race_still_invokes_onAdminFailed()
+        public void Failed_emit_race_still_terminates()
        {
            // If the timeline emit fails due to a stopped ingress, the agent's own soft-shutdown
            // must still run — the admin's decision to Mark-Failed outranks a lost timeline entry.
@@ -225,14 +247,85 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests.Program

            global::AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Runtime.ServerControlPlane.HandleAdminAction(
                adminAction: "Failed",
+                latch: NewLatch(),
                stageNameAccessor: () => "DeviceSetup",
                post: stoppedPost,
-                onAdminFailed: rig.OnAdminFailed,
+                onAdminTerminal: rig.OnAdminTerminal,
                agentConfig: Config(),
                logger: rig.Logger);

-            Assert.Single(rig.OnAdminFailedCalls);
-            Assert.Equal(EnrollmentTerminationOutcome.Failed, rig.OnAdminFailedCalls[0].Outcome);
+            Assert.Single(rig.OnAdminTerminalCalls);
+            Assert.Equal(EnrollmentTerminationOutcome.Failed, rig.OnAdminTerminalCalls[0].Outcome);
+        }
+
+        [Theory]
+        [InlineData("Succeeded")]
+        [InlineData("Failed")]
+        public void Repeated_echo_is_handled_once(string adminAction)
+        {
+            // The backend repeats AdminAction on every telemetry response. Each echo handled anew
+            // emitted another immediate-upload timeline entry whose response carried the next echo.
+            using var rig = new Rig();
+            var latch = NewLatch();
+
+            for (var i = 0; i < 3; i++)
+            {
+                global::AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Runtime.ServerControlPlane.HandleAdminAction(
+                    adminAction: adminAction,
+                    latch: latch,
+                    stageNameAccessor: () => "EspAccountSetup",
+                    post: rig.Post,
+                    onAdminTerminal: rig.OnAdminTerminal,
+                    agentConfig: Config(),
+                    logger: rig.Logger);
+            }
+
+            Assert.Single(rig.EventsOfType("admin_marked_session"));
+            Assert.Single(rig.OnAdminTerminalCalls);
+        }
+
+        [Fact]
+        public void First_admin_action_of_the_process_wins()
+        {
+            // The first mark already started the shutdown with its outcome; a later change of
+            // mind in the portal only updates the session row on the backend.
+            using var rig = new Rig();
+            var latch = NewLatch();
+
+            foreach (var adminAction in new[] { "Succeeded", "Failed" })
+            {
+                global::AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Runtime.ServerControlPlane.HandleAdminAction(
+                    adminAction: adminAction,
+                    latch: latch,
+                    stageNameAccessor: () => null,
+                    post: rig.Post,
+                    onAdminTerminal: rig.OnAdminTerminal,
+                    agentConfig: Config(),
+                    logger: rig.Logger);
+            }
+
+            var emitted = rig.EventsOfType("admin_marked_session").ToList();
+            Assert.Single(emitted);
+            Assert.True(emitted[0].Payload!.TryGetValue(SignalPayloadKeys.Severity, out var sev));
+            Assert.Equal(EventSeverity.Info.ToString(), sev);
+
+            Assert.Single(rig.OnAdminTerminalCalls);
+            Assert.Equal(EnrollmentTerminationOutcome.Succeeded, rig.OnAdminTerminalCalls[0].Outcome);
+        }
+
+        [Fact]
+        public void Latch_admits_exactly_one_of_concurrent_callers()
+        {
+            // Responses are raised on whichever thread ran the drain, so two can overlap.
+            var latch = NewLatch();
+            var admitted = 0;
+
+            Parallel.For(0, 64, _ =>
+            {
+                if (latch.TryEnter()) Interlocked.Increment(ref admitted);
+            });
+
+            Assert.Equal(1, admitted);
        }

        private sealed class ThrowingSink : ISignalIngressSink
@@ -44,6 +44,22 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests.Program
            Assert.Equal("Succeeded", data["remoteConfigOutcome"]);
        }

+        [Fact]
+        public void EmitAgentStarted_CarriesTheBootstrapProvenance()
+        {
+            // Values depend on the machine's %ProgramData%\AutopilotMonitor\Logs (see
+            // BootstrapProvenanceReaderTests); the two presence flags are always on the wire.
+            using var rig = new EmitterRig();
+            rig.RemoteConfig.SetFakeOutcome(RemoteConfigFetchOutcome.Succeeded, configVersion: 28);
+
+            LifecycleEmitters.EmitAgentStarted(
+                rig.Post, rig.AgentConfig, rig.PreviousExit, "2.0.806", rig.RemoteConfig, rig.Logger);
+
+            var data = AssertSingleEmit(rig.Sink, expectedEventType: "agent_started");
+            Assert.IsType<bool>(data["bootstrapScriptLogPresent"]);
+            Assert.IsType<bool>(data["oobeBootstrapLogPresent"]);
+        }
+
        [Fact]
        public void EmitAgentStarted_OnFallbackToDefaults_FlagsRemoteConfigFalse()
        {
@@ -0,0 +1,200 @@
+using System;
+using System.ComponentModel;
+using System.IO;
+using System.Net;
+using System.Threading;
+using System.Threading.Tasks;
+using AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Logging;
+using AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Transport;
+using AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Security;
+using AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests.Harness;
+using AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Runtime;
+using AutopilotMonitor.Shared.Models;
+using Xunit;
+
+namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests.Program
+{
+    /// <summary>
+    /// The TPM-PSS report after a terminal SecureChannelFailure: it leaves before the run exits,
+    /// carries the handshake code, the Schannel events and the TPM firmware, and a slow or failing
+    /// context read never holds it back.
+    /// </summary>
+    public sealed class TpmPssReportTests
+    {
+        private static AgentLogger NewLogger(TempDirectory tmp)
+            => new AgentLogger(Path.Combine(tmp.Path, "logs"), AgentLogLevel.Debug);
+
+        private static TpmPssProbeResult Probe(bool pssWorks = false, string provider = "Microsoft Platform Crypto Provider") =>
+            new TpmPssProbeResult(
+                pkcs1Sha256Works: true, pssSha256Works: pssWorks, pssSha384Works: pssWorks,
+                providerName: provider, keySizeBits: 2048,
+                pssSha256Error: pssWorks ? null : "salt", pssSha384Error: pssWorks ? null : "not supported",
+                pssSha256ErrorCode: pssWorks ? (int?)null : unchecked((int)0x80290423),
+                pssSha384ErrorCode: pssWorks ? (int?)null : unchecked((int)0x80090029));
+
+        private static Exception TlsFailure() =>
+            new WebException("Could not create SSL/TLS secure channel.",
+                new Win32Exception(unchecked((int)0x80090326)), WebExceptionStatus.SecureChannelFailure, null);
+
+        private static Func<Task<(string TpmVersion, string SchannelEvents, string TlsProbe)>> Context(
+            string tpm, string schannel, string tlsProbe = null!) =>
+            () => Task.FromResult((tpm, schannel, tlsProbe));
+
+        [Fact]
+        public async Task Broken_tpm_report_completes_only_after_the_send()
+        {
+            using var tmp = new TempDirectory();
+            var sendGate = new TaskCompletionSource<bool>();
+            var reporter = new FakeDistressReporter { Send = () => sendGate.Task };
+
+            var report = BackendSessionRegistration.ReportProbeResultAsync(
+                Probe(), TlsFailure(), reporter, NewLogger(tmp), Context("IFX 7.63.3353.0", "36888:40/1205", "tls12,-,cc403"));
+
+            var call = Assert.Single(reporter.Calls);
+            Assert.False(report.IsCompleted);
+            Assert.Equal(DistressErrorType.TpmPssUnsupported, call.ErrorType);
+            Assert.Equal("IFX 7.63.3353.0", call.TpmVersion);
+            Assert.Equal(
+                "pkcs1=ok pss256=fail(0x80290423) pss384=fail(0x80090029) tls=0x80090326 tlsp=tls12,-,cc403 sch=36888:40/1205 prov=PCP key=2048",
+                call.Message);
+
+            sendGate.SetResult(true);
+            await report;
+        }
+
+        [Fact]
+        public async Task Failing_context_read_still_sends()
+        {
+            using var tmp = new TempDirectory();
+            var reporter = new FakeDistressReporter();
+
+            await BackendSessionRegistration.ReportProbeResultAsync(
+                Probe(), TlsFailure(), reporter, NewLogger(tmp),
+                () => throw new InvalidOperationException("WMI gone"));
+
+            var call = Assert.Single(reporter.Calls);
+            Assert.Null(call.TpmVersion);
+            Assert.Contains("sch=unreadable", call.Message);
+        }
+
+        [Fact]
+        public async Task Working_pss_sends_nothing()
+        {
+            using var tmp = new TempDirectory();
+            var reporter = new FakeDistressReporter();
+
+            await BackendSessionRegistration.ReportProbeResultAsync(
+                Probe(pssWorks: true), TlsFailure(), reporter, NewLogger(tmp), Context("IFX 7.85", null!));
+
+            Assert.Empty(reporter.Calls);
+        }
+
+        [Fact]
+        public async Task Software_key_with_broken_pss_sends_nothing()
+        {
+            using var tmp = new TempDirectory();
+            var reporter = new FakeDistressReporter();
+
+            await BackendSessionRegistration.ReportProbeResultAsync(
+                Probe(provider: "Microsoft Software Key Storage Provider"), TlsFailure(), reporter, NewLogger(tmp), Context(null!, null!));
+
+            Assert.Empty(reporter.Calls);
+        }
+
+        [Fact]
+        public async Task Context_reads_return_what_finished_within_the_bound()
+        {
+            using var tmp = new TempDirectory();
+            using var slowRelease = new ManualResetEventSlim(false);
+            using var fastReturned = new ManualResetEventSlim(false);
+            try
+            {
+                // The bound ends only after the fast read returned (plus a grace for its task to
+                // complete) — independent of how busy the thread pool is.
+                var bound = Task.Run(async () =>
+                {
+                    fastReturned.Wait(TimeSpan.FromSeconds(30));
+                    await Task.Delay(500);
+                });
+
+                var (tpm, schannel, tlsProbe) = await BackendSessionRegistration.ReadDiagnosticContextAsync(
+                    () => { fastReturned.Set(); return "IFX 7.63.3353.0"; },
+                    () => { slowRelease.Wait(TimeSpan.FromSeconds(30)); return "late"; },
+                    () => { slowRelease.Wait(TimeSpan.FromSeconds(30)); return "tls12,-,cc403"; },
+                    bound,
+                    NewLogger(tmp));
+
+                Assert.Equal("IFX 7.63.3353.0", tpm);
+                Assert.Equal(BackendSessionRegistration.SchannelReadTimeout, schannel);
+                Assert.Equal(BackendSessionRegistration.SchannelReadTimeout, tlsProbe);
+            }
+            finally
+            {
+                slowRelease.Set();
+            }
+        }
+
+        [Fact]
+        public async Task Context_read_that_throws_counts_as_missing()
+        {
+            using var tmp = new TempDirectory();
+
+            var (tpm, schannel, tlsProbe) = await BackendSessionRegistration.ReadDiagnosticContextAsync(
+                () => throw new InvalidOperationException("no WMI"),
+                () => "36887:116",
+                () => "tls13,-,cc403",
+                Task.Delay(TimeSpan.FromSeconds(30)),
+                NewLogger(tmp));
+
+            Assert.Null(tpm);
+            Assert.Equal("36887:116", schannel);
+            Assert.Equal("tls13,-,cc403", tlsProbe);
+        }
+
+        [Fact]
+        public async Task Schannel_read_that_throws_is_reported_as_unreadable_not_as_empty()
+        {
+            using var tmp = new TempDirectory();
+
+            var (_, schannel, _) = await BackendSessionRegistration.ReadDiagnosticContextAsync(
+                () => "IFX 7.63.3353.0",
+                () => throw new UnauthorizedAccessException("System log"),
+                () => "tls12,-,cc403",
+                Task.Delay(TimeSpan.FromSeconds(30)),
+                NewLogger(tmp));
+
+            Assert.Equal(SchannelEventReader.Unreadable, schannel);
+        }
+
+        [Fact]
+        public async Task Tls_probe_that_throws_is_reported_as_error_not_left_out()
+        {
+            using var tmp = new TempDirectory();
+
+            var (_, _, tlsProbe) = await BackendSessionRegistration.ReadDiagnosticContextAsync(
+                () => "IFX 7.63.3353.0",
+                () => "none",
+                () => throw new InvalidOperationException("socket"),
+                Task.Delay(TimeSpan.FromSeconds(30)),
+                NewLogger(tmp));
+
+            Assert.Equal("error", tlsProbe);
+        }
+
+        [Fact]
+        public async Task Report_carries_the_context_the_run_started_in()
+        {
+            using var tmp = new TempDirectory();
+            var reporter = new FakeDistressReporter();
+            var startContext = new DistressDeviceContext("in_progress", "device_setup",
+                new DateTime(2026, 10, 21, 6, 40, 0, DateTimeKind.Utc));
+
+            await BackendSessionRegistration.ReportProbeResultAsync(
+                Probe(), TlsFailure(), reporter, NewLogger(tmp), Context("IFX 7.63.3353.0", "none"), startContext);
+
+            var call = Assert.Single(reporter.Calls);
+            Assert.Same(startContext, call.Context);
+            Assert.Contains("sch=none", call.Message);
+        }
+    }
+}
@@ -0,0 +1,167 @@
+using System;
+using System.IO;
+using System.Linq;
+using System.Security.AccessControl;
+using System.Security.Principal;
+using AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Security;
+using AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests.Harness;
+using Xunit;
+
+namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests.Security
+{
+    /// <summary>
+    /// The agent folders keep standard users from adding files where the SYSTEM agent starts from.
+    /// Works on a temp folder the test owns; as owner, or as an elevated administrator, it can
+    /// always hand itself the rights back to clean up. Tests that assign the Administrators group
+    /// as owner need an elevated process and skip without one.
+    /// </summary>
+    public sealed class AgentDirectoryAclTests : IDisposable
+    {
+        private const FileSystemRights WriteRights =
+            FileSystemRights.WriteData | FileSystemRights.AppendData | FileSystemRights.WriteAttributes
+            | FileSystemRights.WriteExtendedAttributes | FileSystemRights.Delete | FileSystemRights.DeleteSubdirectoriesAndFiles
+            | FileSystemRights.ChangePermissions | FileSystemRights.TakeOwnership;
+
+        private static readonly SecurityIdentifier Users = new SecurityIdentifier(WellKnownSidType.BuiltinUsersSid, null);
+        private static readonly SecurityIdentifier Administrators = new SecurityIdentifier(WellKnownSidType.BuiltinAdministratorsSid, null);
+
+        private readonly string _root = Path.Combine(Path.GetTempPath(), "apm-acl-" + Guid.NewGuid().ToString("N"));
+
+        public AgentDirectoryAclTests() => Directory.CreateDirectory(_root);
+
+        public void Dispose()
+        {
+            try
+            {
+                var me = WindowsIdentity.GetCurrent().User!;
+                var directory = new DirectoryInfo(_root);
+                var security = directory.GetAccessControl();
+                security.AddAccessRule(new FileSystemAccessRule(me, FileSystemRights.FullControl,
+                    InheritanceFlags.ContainerInherit | InheritanceFlags.ObjectInherit, PropagationFlags.None, AccessControlType.Allow));
+                directory.SetAccessControl(security);
+                Directory.Delete(_root, recursive: true);
+            }
+            catch
+            {
+                // best effort: a leftover temp folder must not fail the run
+            }
+        }
+
+        private static FileSystemRights UsersRights(string path) =>
+            new DirectoryInfo(path).GetAccessControl()
+                .GetAccessRules(includeExplicit: true, includeInherited: true, typeof(SecurityIdentifier))
+                .Cast<FileSystemAccessRule>()
+                .Where(r => r.AccessControlType == AccessControlType.Allow && Users.Equals(r.IdentityReference))
+                .Aggregate((FileSystemRights)0, (all, r) => all | r.FileSystemRights);
+
+        private static SecurityIdentifier OwnerOf(string path) =>
+            (SecurityIdentifier)new DirectoryInfo(path).GetAccessControl(AccessControlSections.Owner).GetOwner(typeof(SecurityIdentifier));
+
+        [Fact]
+        public void The_protected_security_inherits_nothing_gives_users_read_only_and_names_administrators_as_owner()
+        {
+            var security = AgentDirectoryAcl.BuildProtectedSecurity();
+
+            Assert.True(security.AreAccessRulesProtected);
+            var users = security.GetAccessRules(true, true, typeof(SecurityIdentifier)).Cast<FileSystemAccessRule>()
+                .Single(r => Users.Equals(r.IdentityReference));
+            // An allow rule always carries Synchronize; .NET adds it on construction.
+            Assert.Equal(FileSystemRights.ReadAndExecute, users.FileSystemRights & ~FileSystemRights.Synchronize);
+            Assert.Equal((FileSystemRights)0, users.FileSystemRights & WriteRights);
+            Assert.Equal(Administrators, security.GetOwner(typeof(SecurityIdentifier)));
+        }
+
+        [ElevatedFact]
+        public void A_folder_is_protected_once_and_then_left_alone()
+        {
+            var first = AgentDirectoryAcl.EnsureProtected(_root);
+            var second = AgentDirectoryAcl.EnsureProtected(_root);
+
+            Assert.Equal(AgentDirectoryAclOutcome.Applied, first.Outcome);
+            Assert.Equal(AgentDirectoryAclOutcome.AlreadyProtected, second.Outcome);
+            Assert.True(AgentDirectoryAcl.IsProtectedAsExpected(new DirectoryInfo(_root).GetAccessControl(AccessControlSections.Access | AccessControlSections.Owner)));
+            Assert.Equal((FileSystemRights)0, UsersRights(_root) & WriteRights);
+            Assert.Equal(Administrators, OwnerOf(_root));
+        }
+
+        // The owner can always hand itself the rights back, so a folder another account created
+        // first is theirs until the owner changes, whatever its DACL says.
+        [ElevatedFact]
+        public void A_folder_owned_by_another_account_gets_administrators_as_owner()
+        {
+            var directory = new DirectoryInfo(_root);
+            var mine = directory.GetAccessControl(AccessControlSections.Owner);
+            mine.SetOwner(WindowsIdentity.GetCurrent().User!);
+            directory.SetAccessControl(mine);
+            Assert.NotEqual(Administrators, OwnerOf(_root));
+
+            var result = AgentDirectoryAcl.EnsureProtected(_root);
+
+            Assert.Equal(AgentDirectoryAclOutcome.Applied, result.Outcome);
+            Assert.Equal(Administrators, OwnerOf(_root));
+        }
+
+        [ElevatedFact]
+        public void Existing_subfolders_take_over_the_protection()
+        {
+            // Install mode protects the base after Agent, Spool and Logs already exist.
+            var agent = Directory.CreateDirectory(Path.Combine(_root, "Agent")).FullName;
+
+            AgentDirectoryAcl.EnsureProtected(_root);
+
+            Assert.Equal((FileSystemRights)0, UsersRights(agent) & WriteRights);
+            Assert.NotEqual((FileSystemRights)0, UsersRights(agent) & FileSystemRights.ReadAndExecute);
+        }
+
+        [Fact]
+        public void An_unprotected_or_widened_dacl_is_not_taken_as_protected()
+        {
+            var unprotected = AgentDirectoryAcl.BuildProtectedSecurity();
+            unprotected.SetAccessRuleProtection(isProtected: false, preserveInheritance: true);
+            Assert.False(AgentDirectoryAcl.IsProtectedAsExpected(unprotected));
+
+            var widened = AgentDirectoryAcl.BuildProtectedSecurity();
+            widened.AddAccessRule(new FileSystemAccessRule(Users, FileSystemRights.Modify,
+                InheritanceFlags.ContainerInherit | InheritanceFlags.ObjectInherit, PropagationFlags.None, AccessControlType.Allow));
+            Assert.False(AgentDirectoryAcl.IsProtectedAsExpected(widened));
+        }
+
+        [Fact]
+        public void A_dacl_under_another_owner_is_not_taken_as_protected()
+        {
+            var mine = AgentDirectoryAcl.BuildProtectedSecurity();
+            mine.SetOwner(WindowsIdentity.GetCurrent().User!);
+
+            Assert.False(AgentDirectoryAcl.IsProtectedAsExpected(mine));
+        }
+
+        [Fact]
+        public void A_junction_is_refused_and_its_target_left_alone()
+        {
+            var target = Directory.CreateDirectory(Path.Combine(_root, "target")).FullName;
+            var link = Path.Combine(_root, "link");
+            NtfsLinks.CreateJunction(link, target);
+            try
+            {
+                var result = AgentDirectoryAcl.EnsureProtected(link);
+
+                Assert.Equal(AgentDirectoryAclOutcome.Failed, result.Outcome);
+                Assert.Contains("junction", result.Error);
+                Assert.False(new DirectoryInfo(target).GetAccessControl().AreAccessRulesProtected);
+            }
+            finally
+            {
+                NtfsLinks.RemoveLink(link);
+            }
+        }
+
+        [Fact]
+        public void A_missing_folder_is_reported_not_created()
+        {
+            var missing = Path.Combine(_root, "does-not-exist");
+
+            Assert.Equal(AgentDirectoryAclOutcome.Missing, AgentDirectoryAcl.EnsureProtected(missing).Outcome);
+            Assert.False(Directory.Exists(missing));
+        }
+    }
+}
@@ -0,0 +1,142 @@
+using System.Collections.Generic;
+using System.IO;
+using AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Security;
+using AutopilotMonitor.Shared;
+using Xunit;
+
+namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests.Security
+{
+    /// <summary>
+    /// The decision over what <c>Test-FileCatalog -Detailed</c> reports. The runspace itself is
+    /// exercised on a lab device (plan agent-payload-catalog, V1/V3), never in the test host.
+    /// </summary>
+    public sealed class PayloadCatalogVerifierTests
+    {
+        private const string OurSubject = "CN=glueckkanja AG, O=glueckkanja AG, L=Offenbach, S=Hessen, C=DE";
+
+        private static Dictionary<string, string> Files(params string[] namesAndHashes)
+        {
+            var map = new Dictionary<string, string>();
+            for (var i = 0; i < namesAndHashes.Length; i += 2) map[namesAndHashes[i]] = namesAndHashes[i + 1];
+            return map;
+        }
+
+        private static PayloadCatalogFacts Facts(
+            string status = "Valid", string? signatureStatus = "Valid", string? subject = OurSubject,
+            Dictionary<string, string>? catalog = null, Dictionary<string, string>? path = null)
+            => new PayloadCatalogFacts(status, signatureStatus, subject,
+                catalog ?? Files("a.dll", "AA"), path ?? Files("a.dll", "AA"));
+
+        private static PayloadCatalogVerdict Evaluate(PayloadCatalogFacts facts)
+            => PayloadCatalogVerifier.Evaluate(facts, Constants.CodeSigningPublisherPattern);
+
+        [Fact]
+        public void Signed_by_us_and_matching_is_accepted()
+        {
+            var verdict = Evaluate(Facts());
+
+            Assert.True(verdict.Accepted);
+            Assert.Null(verdict.Reason);
+        }
+
+        [Fact]
+        public void Matching_hashes_under_an_unsigned_catalog_are_rejected()
+        {
+            // Status covers the hashes only: an unsigned catalog over matching files reports Valid.
+            var verdict = Evaluate(Facts(signatureStatus: "NotSigned", subject: null));
+
+            Assert.False(verdict.Accepted);
+            Assert.Contains("catalog signature status NotSigned", verdict.Reason);
+        }
+
+        [Fact]
+        public void A_validly_signed_catalog_from_another_publisher_is_rejected()
+        {
+            var verdict = Evaluate(Facts(subject: "CN=Contoso Ltd, O=Contoso Ltd, C=US"));
+
+            Assert.False(verdict.Accepted);
+            Assert.Contains("does not match", verdict.Reason);
+        }
+
+        [Fact]
+        public void Missing_signature_details_are_a_rejection_not_a_pass()
+        {
+            Assert.False(Evaluate(Facts(signatureStatus: null, subject: null)).Accepted);
+            Assert.False(Evaluate(Facts(subject: "")).Accepted);
+        }
+
+        [Fact]
+        public void A_differing_payload_names_missing_extra_and_changed_files()
+        {
+            var verdict = Evaluate(Facts(
+                status: "ValidationFailed",
+                catalog: Files("a.dll", "AA", "b.dll", "BB", "c.config", "CC"),
+                path: Files("a.dll", "AA", "b.dll", "XX", "evil.dll", "EE")));
+
+            Assert.False(verdict.Accepted);
+            Assert.Contains("missing: c.config", verdict.Reason);
+            Assert.Contains("extra: evil.dll", verdict.Reason);
+            Assert.Contains("changed: b.dll", verdict.Reason);
+        }
+
+        [Fact]
+        public void Long_difference_lists_are_capped()
+        {
+            var path = Files("a.dll", "AA");
+            for (var i = 0; i < 12; i++) path[$"extra{i:00}.txt"] = "00";
+
+            var verdict = Evaluate(Facts(status: "ValidationFailed", path: path));
+
+            Assert.Contains("(+7 more)", verdict.Reason);
+        }
+
+        [Fact]
+        public void Signature_and_payload_problems_are_both_reported()
+        {
+            var verdict = Evaluate(Facts(status: "ValidationFailed", signatureStatus: "HashMismatch", subject: null,
+                path: Files("a.dll", "AA", "x.dll", "11")));
+
+            Assert.Contains("catalog signature status HashMismatch", verdict.Reason);
+            Assert.Contains("extra: x.dll", verdict.Reason);
+        }
+
+        [Theory]
+        [InlineData(OurSubject, true)]
+        [InlineData("cn=glueckkanja ag, o=glueckkanja ag, c=de", true)]   // -like is case-insensitive
+        [InlineData("CN=x, O=glueckkanja AG Holding, C=DE", true)]        // the pattern is open-ended by design
+        [InlineData("CN=glueckkanja AG, O=Contoso, C=DE", false)]
+        [InlineData("", false)]
+        [InlineData(null, false)]
+        public void Publisher_pattern_behaves_like_powershell_like(string? subject, bool expected)
+        {
+            Assert.Equal(expected, PayloadCatalogVerifier.MatchesPublisherPattern(subject, Constants.CodeSigningPublisherPattern));
+        }
+
+        [Fact]
+        public void Regex_metacharacters_in_the_pattern_are_literal()
+        {
+            Assert.True(PayloadCatalogVerifier.MatchesPublisherPattern("O=Json.NET (.NET Foundation)", "*O=Json.NET (.NET Foundation)*"));
+            Assert.False(PayloadCatalogVerifier.MatchesPublisherPattern("O=JsonXNET (.NET Foundation)", "*O=Json.NET (.NET Foundation)*"));
+        }
+
+        [Fact]
+        public void A_payload_without_catalog_is_rejected_before_any_runspace_starts()
+        {
+            var dir = Path.Combine(Path.GetTempPath(), "apm-catalog-test-" + System.Guid.NewGuid().ToString("N"));
+            Directory.CreateDirectory(dir);
+            try
+            {
+                File.WriteAllText(Path.Combine(dir, "readme.txt"), "x");
+
+                var verdict = PayloadCatalogVerifier.Verify(dir);
+
+                Assert.False(verdict.Accepted);
+                Assert.Contains("missing", verdict.Reason);
+            }
+            finally
+            {
+                Directory.Delete(dir, recursive: true);
+            }
+        }
+    }
+}
@@ -0,0 +1,74 @@
+using System;
+using System.Diagnostics.Eventing.Reader;
+using AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Security;
+using Xunit;
+
+namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests.Security
+{
+    public sealed class SchannelEventReaderTests
+    {
+        [Fact]
+        public void Token_is_event_id_with_numeric_properties()
+        {
+            Assert.Equal("36888:40/1205", SchannelEventReader.FormatToken(36888, new[] { "40", "1205" }));
+        }
+
+        [Fact]
+        public void Token_drops_text_properties()
+        {
+            // Newer builds add target name and certificate subjects; they stay on the device.
+            Assert.Equal("36887:116", SchannelEventReader.FormatToken(
+                36887, new[] { "116", "autopilotmonitor-api.example.test", "CN=device", "" }));
+        }
+
+        [Fact]
+        public void Token_without_numbers_is_the_event_id()
+        {
+            Assert.Equal("36871", SchannelEventReader.FormatToken(36871, new[] { "TLS 1.2" }));
+            Assert.Equal("36871", SchannelEventReader.FormatToken(36871, null!));
+        }
+
+        [Fact]
+        public void Token_keeps_at_most_three_numbers()
+        {
+            Assert.Equal("36888:1/2/3", SchannelEventReader.FormatToken(36888, new[] { "1", "2", "3", "4" }));
+        }
+
+        [Fact]
+        public void Token_rejects_non_ascii_digits()
+        {
+            Assert.Equal("36888", SchannelEventReader.FormatToken(36888, new[] { "٤٠" }));
+        }
+
+        [Fact]
+        public void Query_is_accepted_by_the_event_log_service()
+        {
+            // A malformed XPath would only surface as "unreadable" through ReadBetween (it never
+            // throws), so the query itself is run here.
+            using (var reader = new EventLogReader(new EventLogQuery(
+                "System", PathType.LogName, SchannelEventReader.BuildXPath(DateTime.UtcNow.AddDays(-1), DateTime.UtcNow)) { ReverseDirection = true }))
+            {
+                using (reader.ReadEvent()) { }
+            }
+        }
+
+        [Fact]
+        public void No_events_after_now()
+        {
+            Assert.Equal(SchannelEventReader.NoEvents,
+                SchannelEventReader.ReadBetween(DateTime.UtcNow.AddHours(1), DateTime.UtcNow.AddHours(2)));
+        }
+
+        [Fact]
+        public void Window_ends_where_the_diagnostics_begin()
+        {
+            var xpath = SchannelEventReader.BuildXPath(
+                new DateTime(2026, 10, 21, 6, 40, 0, DateTimeKind.Utc),
+                new DateTime(2026, 10, 21, 6, 55, 30, 250, DateTimeKind.Utc));
+
+            Assert.Contains(
+                "TimeCreated[@SystemTime >= '2026-10-21T06:40:00.000Z' and @SystemTime <= '2026-10-21T06:55:30.250Z']",
+                xpath);
+        }
+    }
+}
@@ -332,6 +332,74 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests.Security
            Assert.Contains("transient attempt 6", result.ErrorMessage);
        }

+        [Fact]
+        public async Task Terminal_callback_gets_the_last_attempts_exception()
+        {
+            using var tmp = new TempDirectory();
+            var logger = NewLogger(tmp);
+            var config = NewConfig();
+            Exception? seen = null;
+
+            var apiClient = new FakeApiClient(attempt =>
+                throw new InvalidOperationException($"transient attempt {attempt}"));
+
+            await SessionRegistrationHelper.RegisterWithRetryAsync(
+                apiClient, config, agentVersion: "0.0.0", logger: logger,
+                backoffDelay: _ => Task.CompletedTask,
+                onTerminalTransportFailure: ex => { seen = ex; return Task.CompletedTask; });
+
+            Assert.Equal("transient attempt 6", seen?.Message);
+        }
+
+        [Fact]
+        public async Task Terminal_callback_skipped_when_the_last_attempt_answered()
+        {
+            // Five transport failures, then the backend answers without success: the run did not
+            // end in a transport failure, so nothing may classify the old exception.
+            using var tmp = new TempDirectory();
+            var logger = NewLogger(tmp);
+            var config = NewConfig();
+            var callbackRan = false;
+
+            var apiClient = new FakeApiClient(attempt =>
+            {
+                if (attempt < 6) throw new InvalidOperationException($"transient attempt {attempt}");
+                return new RegisterSessionResponse { Success = false, Message = "backend 500" };
+            });
+
+            var result = await SessionRegistrationHelper.RegisterWithRetryAsync(
+                apiClient, config, agentVersion: "0.0.0", logger: logger,
+                backoffDelay: _ => Task.CompletedTask,
+                onTerminalTransportFailure: _ => { callbackRan = true; return Task.CompletedTask; });
+
+            Assert.Equal(SessionRegistrationOutcome.Failed, result.Outcome);
+            Assert.Equal("backend 500", result.ErrorMessage);
+            Assert.False(callbackRan);
+        }
+
+        [Fact]
+        public async Task Failure_message_carries_the_native_code_of_the_tls_failure()
+        {
+            using var tmp = new TempDirectory();
+            var logger = NewLogger(tmp);
+            var config = NewConfig();
+
+            var apiClient = new FakeApiClient(_ =>
+                throw new System.Net.Http.HttpRequestException(
+                    "An error occurred while sending the request.",
+                    new System.Net.WebException(
+                        "Could not create SSL/TLS secure channel.",
+                        new System.ComponentModel.Win32Exception(unchecked((int)0x80090326)),
+                        System.Net.WebExceptionStatus.SecureChannelFailure,
+                        null)));
+
+            var result = await SessionRegistrationHelper.RegisterWithRetryAsync(
+                apiClient, config, agentVersion: "0.0.0", logger: logger,
+                backoffDelay: _ => Task.CompletedTask);
+
+            Assert.Equal("An error occurred while sending the request. (win32 0x80090326)", result.ErrorMessage);
+        }
+
        [Fact]
        public async Task Waits_for_network_link_before_first_attempt()
        {
@@ -0,0 +1,151 @@
+using System.Security.Authentication;
+using System.Text;
+using AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Security;
+using AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests.Transport;
+using AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Transport;
+using Xunit;
+
+namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests.Security
+{
+    /// <summary>
+    /// The TLS probe's request and the reading of its answer: only an echo of the probe's own
+    /// correlation id counts as the backend, the platform's "Client Certificate Required" page says
+    /// the certificate did not arrive, and a device value can never split the request.
+    /// </summary>
+    public sealed class TlsHandshakeProbeTests
+    {
+        private const string SentId = "0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef";
+
+        private static TlsProbeTarget Target(string serial = "SN-1") => new TlsProbeTarget
+        {
+            BaseUrl = "https://api.example.test",
+            TenantId = "00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000001",
+            Manufacturer = "Contoso",
+            Model = "Book 1",
+            SerialNumber = serial,
+            AgentVersion = "2.0.1500",
+        };
+
+        private static byte[] Raw(string statusLine, string headers, string body) =>
+            Encoding.UTF8.GetBytes(statusLine + "\r\n" + headers + "\r\n" + body);
+
+        [Fact]
+        public void Request_asks_for_the_agent_config_with_the_agent_headers()
+        {
+            var request = TlsHandshakeProbe.BuildRequest(Target(), "api.example.test", SentId);
+
+            Assert.StartsWith(
+                "GET /api/agent/config?tenantId=00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000001 HTTP/1.1\r\nHost: api.example.test\r\n",
+                request);
+            Assert.Contains("\r\nX-Correlation-ID: " + SentId + "\r\n", request);
+            Assert.Contains("\r\nX-Device-Manufacturer: Contoso\r\n", request);
+            Assert.Contains("\r\nX-Device-Model: Book 1\r\n", request);
+            Assert.Contains("\r\nX-Device-SerialNumber: SN-1\r\n", request);
+            Assert.Contains("\r\nX-Agent-Version: 2.0.1500\r\n", request);
+            Assert.EndsWith("\r\nConnection: close\r\n\r\n", request);
+        }
+
+        [Fact]
+        public void Device_value_with_a_line_break_cannot_add_a_header()
+        {
+            var request = TlsHandshakeProbe.BuildRequest(Target("SN\r\nX-Injected: 1"), "api.example.test", SentId);
+
+            Assert.DoesNotContain("\r\nX-Injected", request);
+            Assert.Contains("\r\nX-Device-SerialNumber: SN??X-Injected: 1\r\n", request);
+        }
+
+        [Fact]
+        public void Echoed_correlation_id_means_the_backend_answered()
+        {
+            var raw = Raw("HTTP/1.1 401 Unauthorized", "X-Correlation-ID: " + SentId + "\r\nContent-Type: application/json\r\n", "{}");
+
+            Assert.Equal("b401", TlsHandshakeProbe.ClassifyAnswer(raw, SentId));
+        }
+
+        [Fact]
+        public void Backend_success_is_read_as_backend()
+        {
+            var raw = Raw("HTTP/1.1 200 OK", "x-correlation-id: " + SentId + "\r\n", "{\"ok\":true}");
+
+            Assert.Equal("b200", TlsHandshakeProbe.ClassifyAnswer(raw, SentId));
+        }
+
+        [Fact]
+        public void Platform_certificate_required_page_means_the_certificate_did_not_arrive()
+        {
+            var raw = Raw("HTTP/1.1 403 Forbidden", "Content-Type: text/html\r\n", InterceptionFixtures.CertificateRequiredPage);
+
+            Assert.Equal("cc403", TlsHandshakeProbe.ClassifyAnswer(raw, SentId));
+        }
+
+        [Fact]
+        public void Certificate_required_page_with_an_echo_is_still_the_backend()
+        {
+            var raw = Raw("HTTP/1.1 403 Forbidden", "X-Correlation-ID: " + SentId + "\r\n", InterceptionFixtures.CertificateRequiredPage);
+
+            Assert.Equal("b403", TlsHandshakeProbe.ClassifyAnswer(raw, SentId));
+        }
+
+        [Fact]
+        public void Echo_of_another_id_is_someone_else()
+        {
+            var raw = Raw("HTTP/1.1 403 Forbidden", "X-Correlation-ID: ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff\r\n", "<html>Access denied</html>");
+
+            Assert.Equal("x403", TlsHandshakeProbe.ClassifyAnswer(raw, SentId));
+        }
+
+        [Fact]
+        public void Stopped_app_page_is_reported_as_stopped()
+        {
+            var raw = Raw("HTTP/1.1 403 Forbidden", "Content-Type: text/html\r\n", InterceptionFixtures.StoppedAppPage);
+
+            Assert.Equal("st403", TlsHandshakeProbe.ClassifyAnswer(raw, SentId));
+        }
+
+        [Theory]
+        [InlineData("")]
+        [InlineData("garbage")]
+        [InlineData("HTTP/1.1 abc\r\n\r\n")]
+        public void No_parsable_answer_is_reported_as_no_response(string text)
+        {
+            Assert.Equal("io(noresponse)", TlsHandshakeProbe.ClassifyAnswer(Encoding.ASCII.GetBytes(text), SentId));
+        }
+
+        [Fact]
+        public void Microsoft_issued_server_certificate_adds_nothing()
+        {
+            using var cert = ServerCertificateObserverTests.SelfSigned(
+                "CN=Microsoft Azure RSA TLS Issuing CA 03, O=Microsoft Corporation, C=US");
+
+            Assert.Null(TlsHandshakeProbe.ForeignIssuer(cert));
+            Assert.Null(TlsHandshakeProbe.ForeignIssuer(null!));
+        }
+
+        [Fact]
+        public void Inspection_issuer_is_named_in_a_compact_token()
+        {
+            using var cert = ServerCertificateObserverTests.SelfSigned("CN=Contoso Inspection CA (2026), O=Contoso Ltd");
+
+            Assert.Equal("Contoso_Inspection_CA__2026_", TlsHandshakeProbe.ForeignIssuer(cert));
+        }
+
+        [Fact]
+        public void Long_issuer_is_capped()
+        {
+            using var cert = ServerCertificateObserverTests.SelfSigned("CN=" + new string('A', 80) + ", O=Fabrikam");
+
+            Assert.Equal(new string('A', TlsHandshakeProbe.MaxIssuerLength), TlsHandshakeProbe.ForeignIssuer(cert));
+        }
+
+        [Theory]
+        [InlineData(SslProtocols.Tls12, "tls12")]
+        [InlineData((SslProtocols)12288, "tls13")]
+        [InlineData(SslProtocols.Tls11, "tls11")]
+        [InlineData(SslProtocols.Tls, "tls10")]
+        [InlineData(SslProtocols.None, "p0")]
+        public void Protocol_token_names_the_negotiated_version(SslProtocols protocol, string expected)
+        {
+            Assert.Equal(expected, TlsHandshakeProbe.ProtocolToken(protocol));
+        }
+    }
+}
@@ -0,0 +1,94 @@
+using AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Security;
+using Xunit;
+
+namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests.Security
+{
+    /// <summary>
+    /// The TPM-PSS distress message: codes instead of localized error texts, so reports from
+    /// German, Czech and English devices read the same and the 256-char budget holds the
+    /// handshake code and the Schannel events.
+    /// </summary>
+    public sealed class TpmPssProbeResultTests
+    {
+        private const int SaltSizeMismatch = unchecked((int)0x80290423);
+        private const int NotSupported = unchecked((int)0x80090029);
+
+        private static TpmPssProbeResult BrokenPcp(string provider = "Microsoft Platform Crypto Provider") =>
+            new TpmPssProbeResult(
+                pkcs1Sha256Works: true,
+                pssSha256Works: false,
+                pssSha384Works: false,
+                providerName: provider,
+                keySizeBits: 2048,
+                pssSha256Error: "Die angeforderte Salt-Größe für die Signierung mit RSAPSS entspricht nicht dem, was TPM verwendet.",
+                pssSha384Error: "Der angeforderte Vorgang wird nicht unterstützt.",
+                pssSha256ErrorCode: SaltSizeMismatch,
+                pssSha384ErrorCode: NotSupported);
+
+        [Fact]
+        public void Message_carries_codes_handshake_and_schannel_events()
+        {
+            var message = BrokenPcp().ToDistressMessage("0x80090326", "36888:40/1205,36887:116", "tls12,-,cc403");
+
+            Assert.Equal(
+                "pkcs1=ok pss256=fail(0x80290423) pss384=fail(0x80090029) tls=0x80090326 tlsp=tls12,-,cc403 sch=36888:40/1205,36887:116 prov=PCP key=2048",
+                message);
+        }
+
+        [Fact]
+        public void Message_never_carries_the_localized_error_text()
+        {
+            var message = BrokenPcp().ToDistressMessage();
+
+            Assert.DoesNotContain("Salt", message);
+            Assert.Equal("pkcs1=ok pss256=fail(0x80290423) pss384=fail(0x80090029) prov=PCP key=2048", message);
+        }
+
+        [Fact]
+        public void Working_signatures_and_failures_without_a_code()
+        {
+            var result = new TpmPssProbeResult(
+                pkcs1Sha256Works: true, pssSha256Works: true, pssSha384Works: false,
+                providerName: "Microsoft Software Key Storage Provider", keySizeBits: 0,
+                pssSha256Error: null, pssSha384Error: "empty signature");
+
+            Assert.Equal("pkcs1=ok pss256=ok pss384=fail prov=KSP", result.ToDistressMessage());
+        }
+
+        [Fact]
+        public void Message_stays_within_the_distress_cap()
+        {
+            var longEvents = string.Join(",", System.Linq.Enumerable.Repeat("36888:4294967295/4294967295/4294967295", 10));
+
+            var message = BrokenPcp(new string('P', 200)).ToDistressMessage("0x80090326", longEvents);
+
+            Assert.Equal(TpmPssProbeResult.MaxDistressMessageLength, message.Length);
+        }
+
+        [Theory]
+        [InlineData("Microsoft Platform Crypto Provider", "PCP")]
+        [InlineData("microsoft platform crypto provider", "PCP")]
+        [InlineData("Microsoft Software Key Storage Provider", "KSP")]
+        [InlineData("Contoso Smart Card Provider", "Contoso Smart Card Provider")]
+        [InlineData("", "(unknown)")]
+        public void Provider_names_are_shortened(string provider, string expected)
+        {
+            Assert.Equal(expected, TpmPssProbeResult.ShortProviderName(provider));
+        }
+
+        [Fact]
+        public void Long_provider_name_is_cut_to_32_chars()
+        {
+            Assert.Equal(32, TpmPssProbeResult.ShortProviderName(new string('x', 40)).Length);
+        }
+
+        [Fact]
+        public void Tpm_backed_broken_key_is_the_reportable_footprint()
+        {
+            var result = BrokenPcp();
+
+            Assert.True(result.IsTpmPssBroken);
+            Assert.True(result.IsTpmBacked);
+        }
+    }
+}
@@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
+using AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Telemetry.DeviceInfo;
+using Xunit;
+
+namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests.Telemetry.DeviceInfo
+{
+    public sealed class TpmInfoLabelTests
+    {
+        [Theory]
+        [InlineData("IFX", "7.63.3353.0", "IFX 7.63.3353.0")]
+        [InlineData("STM ", "73.4.17568.4452", "STM 73.4.17568.4452")] // ManufacturerIdTxt is space-padded
+        [InlineData("INTC", null, "INTC")]
+        [InlineData(null, "403.1.0.0", "403.1.0.0")]
+        [InlineData(" ", " ", null)]
+        [InlineData(null, null, null)]
+        public void Label_is_trimmed_manufacturer_and_firmware(string? name, string? version, string? expected)
+        {
+            Assert.Equal(expected, TpmInfo.FormatLabel(name!, version!));
+        }
+    }
+}
@@ -0,0 +1,124 @@
+using System;
+using System.Text;
+using AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Enrollment.SystemSignals;
+using AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Interop;
+using AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Telemetry.DeviceInfo;
+using AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Transport;
+using AutopilotMonitor.Shared;
+using AutopilotMonitor.Shared.Models;
+using Newtonsoft.Json;
+using Xunit;
+
+namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests.Transport
+{
+    /// <summary>
+    /// What a distress report carries and that it fits the backend's body cap: the endpoint drops
+    /// a larger body with 200, so an oversized report would be lost without a trace.
+    /// </summary>
+    public sealed class DistressReporterPayloadTests
+    {
+        private static DistressReporter NewReporter(string field = "x", string agentVersion = "2.0.1500")
+            => new DistressReporter(
+                baseUrl: "https://example.test",
+                tenantId: "11111111-2222-3333-4444-555555555555",
+                manufacturer: field,
+                model: field,
+                serialNumber: field,
+                agentVersion: agentVersion,
+                logger: null!);
+
+        [Fact]
+        public void Without_a_context_the_report_samples_the_device_when_sent()
+        {
+            using (var reporter = NewReporter())
+            {
+                var report = reporter.BuildReport(DistressErrorType.AuthCertificateRejected, "m", 401, detail: null);
+
+                var osBuild = DeviceInfoProvider.GetOsBuild();
+                Assert.Equal(string.IsNullOrEmpty(osBuild) ? null : osBuild, report.OsBuild);
+                Assert.Equal(OobeStateReader.Read(), report.OobeState);
+                Assert.Equal(EspPhaseSnapshot.Read(), report.EspPhase);
+                Assert.NotNull(report.DeviceBootUtc);
+                Assert.True(report.DeviceBootUtc <= DateTime.UtcNow);
+                Assert.Null(report.TpmVersion);
+            }
+        }
+
+        [Fact]
+        public void A_given_context_wins_over_the_send_time_sample()
+        {
+            // A failed registration samples the device before its first attempt; the report must
+            // carry that, not where the device stands minutes later.
+            var boot = new DateTime(2026, 10, 21, 6, 40, 0, DateTimeKind.Utc);
+            using (var reporter = NewReporter())
+            {
+                var report = reporter.BuildReport(DistressErrorType.TpmPssUnsupported, "m", null, new DistressDetail
+                {
+                    Context = new DistressDeviceContext("in_progress", "device_setup", boot),
+                });
+
+                Assert.Equal("in_progress", report.OobeState);
+                Assert.Equal("device_setup", report.EspPhase);
+                Assert.Equal(boot, report.DeviceBootUtc);
+            }
+        }
+
+        [Fact]
+        public void Tpm_version_passes_through_capped_at_48()
+        {
+            using (var reporter = NewReporter())
+            {
+                Assert.Equal("IFX 7.63.3353.0",
+                    reporter.BuildReport(DistressErrorType.TpmPssUnsupported, "m", null, new DistressDetail { TpmVersion = "IFX 7.63.3353.0" }).TpmVersion);
+                Assert.Equal(48,
+                    reporter.BuildReport(DistressErrorType.TpmPssUnsupported, "m", null, new DistressDetail { TpmVersion = new string('v', 60) }).TpmVersion!.Length);
+            }
+        }
+
+        [Fact]
+        public void Largest_ascii_report_fits_the_cap_untouched()
+        {
+            // Every field at the agent's own caps; the agent version as built (not cut to 32).
+            using (var reporter = NewReporter(new string('A', 64), "2.0.1486+d95640c597cb90849803dd65afda19e2d7a39444"))
+            {
+                var report = reporter.BuildReport(DistressErrorType.ClientCertificateNotReceived, new string('m', 256), 403,
+                    new DistressDetail { TpmVersion = new string('t', 48) });
+                report.CertThumbprint = new string('F', 40);
+                report.CertSubject = new string('S', 96);
+                report.CertIssuer = new string('I', 96);
+                report.CertNotBefore = DateTime.UtcNow;
+                report.CertNotAfter = DateTime.UtcNow;
+                report.OsBuild = "26300.97111";
+                report.OobeState = "unknown_2147483647".Substring(0, 16);
+                report.EspPhase = "device_preparation_failed";
+                report.DeviceBootUtc = DateTime.UtcNow;
+
+                var json = DistressReporter.SerializeWithinCap(report);
+
+                Assert.Equal(256, report.Message!.Length);
+                Assert.True(Encoding.UTF8.GetByteCount(json) <= Constants.DistressReportMaxBytes,
+                    $"{Encoding.UTF8.GetByteCount(json)} bytes");
+            }
+        }
+
+        [Fact]
+        public void Oversized_report_gives_up_message_characters_to_fit()
+        {
+            // Three-byte characters everywhere — far past the cap before trimming.
+            using (var reporter = NewReporter(new string('€', 64)))
+            {
+                var report = reporter.BuildReport(DistressErrorType.ClientCertificateNotReceived, new string('€', 256), 403, null);
+                report.CertSubject = new string('€', 96);
+                report.CertIssuer = new string('€', 96);
+                Assert.True(Encoding.UTF8.GetByteCount(JsonConvert.SerializeObject(report)) > Constants.DistressReportMaxBytes);
+
+                var json = DistressReporter.SerializeWithinCap(report);
+
+                Assert.True(Encoding.UTF8.GetByteCount(json) <= Constants.DistressReportMaxBytes,
+                    $"{Encoding.UTF8.GetByteCount(json)} bytes");
+                Assert.True(report.Message!.Length < 256);
+                Assert.Equal(report.Message, JsonConvert.DeserializeObject<DistressReport>(json)!.Message);
+            }
+        }
+    }
+}
@@ -0,0 +1,73 @@
+using System;
+using System.ComponentModel;
+using System.Net;
+using System.Net.Http;
+using System.Security.Authentication;
+using AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Transport;
+using Xunit;
+
+namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests.Transport
+{
+    public sealed class TransportErrorCodesTests
+    {
+        private const int IllegalMessage = unchecked((int)0x80090326);
+
+        // The .NET Framework shape of a failed TLS handshake through HttpClient.
+        private static Exception TlsFailureChain(params Exception[] innermost) =>
+            new HttpRequestException(
+                "An error occurred while sending the request.",
+                new WebException(
+                    "The request was aborted: Could not create SSL/TLS secure channel.",
+                    new AuthenticationException("A call to SSPI failed, see inner exception.", innermost.Length > 0 ? innermost[0] : null),
+                    WebExceptionStatus.SecureChannelFailure,
+                    null));
+
+        [Fact]
+        public void Hex_is_eight_digits_with_prefix()
+        {
+            Assert.Equal("0x80090326", TransportErrorCodes.Hex(IllegalMessage));
+            Assert.Equal("0x00002746", TransportErrorCodes.Hex(10054));
+        }
+
+        [Fact]
+        public void Innermost_win32_code_of_a_tls_failure()
+        {
+            var chain = TlsFailureChain(new Win32Exception(IllegalMessage));
+
+            Assert.Equal("0x80090326", TransportErrorCodes.InnermostNativeCode(chain));
+        }
+
+        [Fact]
+        public void Innermost_wins_over_an_outer_win32_exception()
+        {
+            // The outer code is whatever the last Win32 error was; only the innermost counts.
+            var chain = new Win32Exception("outer", new Win32Exception(IllegalMessage));
+
+            Assert.Equal("0x80090326", TransportErrorCodes.InnermostNativeCode(chain));
+        }
+
+        [Fact]
+        public void No_win32_exception_no_code()
+        {
+            Assert.Null(TransportErrorCodes.InnermostNativeCode(TlsFailureChain()));
+            Assert.Null(TransportErrorCodes.InnermostNativeCode(null!));
+        }
+
+        [Fact]
+        public void Message_gets_the_code_appended()
+        {
+            var chain = TlsFailureChain(new Win32Exception(IllegalMessage));
+
+            Assert.Equal(
+                "An error occurred while sending the request. (win32 0x80090326)",
+                TransportErrorCodes.MessageWithNativeCode(chain));
+        }
+
+        [Fact]
+        public void Message_without_a_code_stays_as_is()
+        {
+            Assert.Equal("boom", TransportErrorCodes.MessageWithNativeCode(new InvalidOperationException("boom")));
+            Assert.Null(TransportErrorCodes.MessageWithNativeCode(null!));
+        }
+    }
+}
@@ -62,8 +62,15 @@
  <ItemGroup>
    <Reference Include="System.Net.Http" />
    <Reference Include="System.Management" />
+    <!--
+      Compile against the GAC copy, never ship it (Private=false). The runtime binds this
+      strong-named assembly from the device's GAC before it probes the app folder, and every
+      Windows 10/11 has it (Windows PowerShell 5.1 runs on it), so a shipped copy was never
+      loaded. It was the build machine's file: unsigned on any other machine, and half the ZIP.
+    -->
    <Reference Include="System.Management.Automation">
      <HintPath>$(windir)\Microsoft.NET\assembly\GAC_MSIL\System.Management.Automation\v4.0_3.0.0.0__31bf3856ad364e35\System.Management.Automation.dll</HintPath>
+      <Private>false</Private>
    </Reference>
    <Reference Include="System.ServiceProcess" />
    <Reference Include="System.IO.Compression" />
@@ -0,0 +1,107 @@
+using System;
+using System.Collections.Generic;
+using System.Linq;
+using System.Text.Json;
+using Microsoft.Win32;
+
+namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Enrollment.SystemSignals
+{
+    /// <summary>
+    /// One-shot read of the Autopilot ESP phase from the values <see cref="ProvisioningStatusTracker"/>
+    /// watches (<c>HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Provisioning\AutopilotSettings</c>), for reports taken
+    /// without the tracker — a failed registration has no session and no tracker yet.
+    /// <para>
+    /// <b>Contract:</b> observational only, never decision-engine input. Unlike the tracker it has
+    /// no settle or fallback timers: a category whose <c>categorySucceeded</c> Windows never sets
+    /// counts as done once all its subcategories read succeeded or notRequired.
+    /// </para>
+    /// </summary>
+    internal static class EspPhaseSnapshot
+    {
+        internal const string None = "none";
+        internal const string Unavailable = "unavailable";
+
+        internal enum CategoryState { Absent, Running, Done, Failed }
+
+        // ESP order: device preparation, device setup, account setup.
+        private static readonly (string ValueName, string Phase)[] Categories =
+        {
+            ("DevicePreparationCategory.Status", "device_preparation"),
+            ("DeviceSetupCategory.Status", "device_setup"),
+            ("AccountSetupCategory.Status", "account_setup"),
+        };
+
+        /// <summary>
+        /// <c>device_preparation</c> / <c>device_setup</c> / <c>account_setup</c> while that
+        /// category runs, <c>&lt;category&gt;_failed</c>, <c>device_preparation_done</c> /
+        /// <c>device_setup_done</c> when the next category has not appeared (yet, or skipped),
+        /// <c>esp_done</c>, <c>none</c> without any ESP value, <c>unavailable</c> when the
+        /// registry cannot be read. Never throws.
+        /// </summary>
+        public static string Read()
+        {
+            try
+            {
+                using (var key = Registry.LocalMachine.OpenSubKey(ProvisioningStatusTracker.ProvisioningStatusRegistryPath, writable: false))
+                {
+                    if (key == null) return None;
+                    return Derive(Categories.Select(c => key.GetValue(c.ValueName) as string).ToList());
+                }
+            }
+            catch
+            {
+                return Unavailable;
+            }
+        }
+
+        /// <param name="statusJson">The three category values in ESP order; null where absent.</param>
+        internal static string Derive(IReadOnlyList<string> statusJson)
+        {
+            var states = Categories.Select((_, i) => Classify(i < statusJson.Count ? statusJson[i] : null)).ToList();
+
+            for (var i = 0; i < Categories.Length; i++)
+                if (states[i] == CategoryState.Failed) return Categories[i].Phase + "_failed";
+            for (var i = 0; i < Categories.Length; i++)
+                if (states[i] == CategoryState.Running) return Categories[i].Phase;
+
+            var lastDone = states.FindLastIndex(s => s == CategoryState.Done);
+            if (lastDone < 0) return None;
+            return lastDone == Categories.Length - 1 ? "esp_done" : Categories[lastDone].Phase + "_done";
+        }
+
+        /// <summary>
+        /// One category value: done (<c>categorySucceeded=true</c>, or every subcategory succeeded
+        /// or notRequired), failed (<c>false</c>, or a failed subcategory), running (anything
+        /// else that is present, also unparseable JSON), absent (no value).
+        /// </summary>
+        internal static CategoryState Classify(string json)
+        {
+            if (string.IsNullOrWhiteSpace(json)) return CategoryState.Absent;
+            try
+            {
+                using (var doc = JsonDocument.Parse(json))
+                {
+                    var root = doc.RootElement;
+                    if (root.ValueKind != JsonValueKind.Object) return CategoryState.Running;
+
+                    var succeeded = ProvisioningStatusTracker.SafeGetBool(root, "categorySucceeded");
+                    if (succeeded == true) return CategoryState.Done;
+                    if (succeeded == false) return CategoryState.Failed;
+
+                    var subcategories = ProvisioningStatusTracker.ParseSubcategories(root);
+                    if (subcategories.Any(s => string.Equals(s.State, "failed", StringComparison.OrdinalIgnoreCase)))
+                        return CategoryState.Failed;
+                    if (subcategories.Count > 0 && subcategories.All(s =>
+                            string.Equals(s.State, "succeeded", StringComparison.OrdinalIgnoreCase)
+                            || string.Equals(s.State, "notRequired", StringComparison.OrdinalIgnoreCase)))
+                        return CategoryState.Done;
+                    return CategoryState.Running;
+                }
+            }
+            catch (JsonException)
+            {
+                return CategoryState.Running;
+            }
+        }
+    }
+}
--- a/Show More
+++ b/Show More