Compare commits

...

164 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Oliver Kieselbach b8312ee0c6 bump pointer: internal (D-384 released: installer 2.9, bootstrap MSI 1.4.0, docs, web, MCP)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-23 02:49:58 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach d639d9dda9 Bootstrap MSI 1.4: the action runs only the exact loader the package embeds (SHA-256 baked in at build time)
The automated security review of the previous commit found that a publisher pin alone
would run any validly signed script of ours placed at the copy's path, such as an older
loader without the held handle. The build now bakes the SHA-256 of the signed loader into
the action (wix build -d LoaderSha256=...; the package refuses to build without it), and
the action compares the bytes it read against it before the signature check.

- Package.wxs: hash check, preprocessor guard, comment
- build-msi.yml: the build step hashes the signed loader and passes it to wix
- Bootstrap.Integration.Tests.ps1: the harness substitutes the hash of the loader it serves;
  a copy that is not the embedded loader, however validly signed, runs nothing
- BootstrapContractTests: the hash condition, the guard and the build step are pinned
- internal: D-384, footprint doc and plan updated

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-23 02:09:56 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach f44e8aadb0 Bootstrap MSI 1.4 keeps its loader copy under ProgramData and runs only what it checked; installer 2.9 removes the copy (D-384)
MSI 1.3 (D-377) installed the loader under Program Files, where nothing removed it: a
customer found the file on every device. Everything of ours lives under ProgramData.

- Package.wxs 1.4.0: the loader copy goes back to <base>\Msi (new component GUID); the
  deferred SYSTEM action, started in System32, reads the copy once, checks our signature
  and the publisher pin on those bytes and runs those bytes from memory, so a file a user
  planted at that path leads to nothing and no handle keeps the installer from removing
  the copy. Every bracket and brace is escaped for the Windows Installer formatter.
- Install-AutopilotMonitor.ps1 2.9: Remove-MsiTransportFolder removes the copy in the
  agent-present branch (install and skip clear the base already) and an agent folder that
  is then empty; Remove-LegacyMsiLoaderFolder removes MSI 1.3's folder under Program Files
  in every outcome while devices still enroll with 1.3.
- Tests: installer unit tests for both functions; the loader's MSI contract; the harness
  asserts after every run that nothing exists outside ProgramData, runs the MSI 1.4 action
  read from Package.wxs (valid, foreign, unsigned, changed; install, skip, marker only,
  agent present) and expects MSI 1.3's folder gone; BootstrapContractTests pin the
  directory chain, the publisher pin, the escapes and the working directory.
- build-msi.yml: smoke job installs the built MSI on windows-2022/2025 with the deployment
  marker set and expects nothing under ProgramData or Program Files, then uninstalls.
- internal: D-384, footprint doc, plan, lessons, backlog.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-23 02:01:15 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach e5b7003799 bump pointer: internal (ConfigMgr Watcher opt-in, D-382 updated)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-23 01:45:59 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 6db3cb9741 ConfigMgr Watcher: the ConfigMgr client check is opt-in per tenant (D-382)
The check from d4e67cdb now runs only for tenants that enable it, like the
RealmJoin Watcher: TenantConfiguration.EnableConfigMgrWatcher feeds
AnalyzerConfiguration.EnableConfigMgrWatcher (default off, ConfigVersion
42). With the setting off, DefaultComponentFactory does not create the
ConfigMgrClientHost, so other tenants' devices run no check at all.

- Portal: toggle "ConfigMgr Watcher" in Agent Settings, section field map,
  tenant config report.
- Privacy page: the check is named as optional.
- Shared manifest and the web and MCP wire types regenerated.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-23 01:45:22 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach a213290eb6 bump pointer: internal (D-382 V1-style ConfigMgr detection, D-384 dropped, B-b2u, lesson)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-23 00:45:12 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach d4e67cdbb5 ConfigMgr client detection is back in the V2 agent (D-382)
The V1 agent reported whether the Configuration Manager client is
installed; the check was lost when the V2 agent replaced the V1 enrollment
tracker. ConfigMgrClientProbe reads what V1 read (the CCM key, CCMSetup
LastValidVersion, the assigned site code, the %windir%\CCM folder, the
CcmExec service state) and keeps the V1 confidence score.
ConfigMgrClientDetector, polled by ConfigMgrClientHost every minute, emits
configmgr_client_detected with the V1 payload when the client is first seen
and again when its reported state changes, at most 10 times per run; a
restart into the same state stays silent.

- Session Info shows the latest detection; the V1 sentence about disturbed
  event sequences is gone.
- Privacy page: device context names the Configuration Manager client.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-23 00:44:16 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach e4d3e8ed30 bump pointer: internal (D-382 to D-384, provider-stall concept doc, configmgr-client-status plan phase 1a)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-22 23:55:23 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach d4774ed043 Provider-stall tripwire counts device-preparation providers only while device preparation is open (D-383)
A ConfigMgr client installed as a Win32 app registers its device-preparation
policy provider after its own install, with InstallationState=1, and nothing
completes it. The tripwire then reported a stall long after device
preparation had ended.

- EspPhaseSnapshot.DevicePreparationOpen decides whether device preparation
  can still hold the ESP (it runs or failed, or the phase is unknown).
  EvaluateStallTransition takes it as a parameter; the detector reads the
  phase through an injectable reader.
- The cross-restart fingerprint applies the same filter, so a restart does
  not report the same stall again.
- The message names the wait: Setup/Apps providers hold the ESP without any
  timeout, device-preparation providers until their timeout.
- The diagnosis names a stalled provider only for a failure in its ESP
  category; the waiting list of an unfinished session stays unfiltered.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-22 23:55:00 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach b9cc515258 bump pointer: internal (deploy of D-379, D-380, D-381 recorded)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-22 23:14:11 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach fef1f54c09 bump pointer: internal (configmgr-client-status plan draft)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-22 22:59:25 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 60dc850317 web: AGENTS.md heading level, page lastmod regenerated for /about and /privacy
Both were left uncommitted in the working tree; committed as they stand.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-22 22:59:25 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach da58ac0a27 bump pointer: internal (B-ne6 join volume)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-22 22:51:57 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach d1d15db4fe bump pointer: internal (backlog B-ne6 from the security review of D-381)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-22 22:49:30 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach a3810b74a7 bump pointer: internal (SignalR revoke bound to the sign-in tenant, D-381)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-22 22:40:47 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 80d50a6d92 A live SignalR connection is addressed by its sign-in tenant; a revoke reaches only the tenant whose grant it ends (D-381)
Security finding (CWE-863): the SignalR user id was the bare UPN and every revoke cut that UPN across the
hub. A tenant admin could add any UPN (a Global Admin, another customer's operator) and remove, disable or
demote it in a loop, restarting that person's live connections in every tenant.

- Negotiate binds the user id to the sign-in tenant plus principal key from the validated request context
  (SignalRGroupHelper.UserId); a caller without a principal key negotiates without a user id, since every
  revocable join gate needs the key.
- ISignalRNotificationService.DisconnectUserAsync takes the tenant and the key. LiveStreamRevoker is its
  only caller and names the tenant each grant resolved under: member routes the route's tenant,
  self-service routes the managing tenant, Global Admin routes the tenant of the UPN's identity binding.
  Replacing or deleting a binding now cuts the streams signed in under the previous one.
- A self-service assignment confers scope only while its assignee is bound to the owning tenant, so a
  self-service grant resolves under the owner alone and the owner's revokes never need another tenant.
- Remove, disable and enable of a UPN without a row in the tenant answer 404 and change nothing: no audit,
  no push revoke, no end of an assignment, no cut.
- GlobalAdminService.DisableGlobalAdminAsync and its repository method had no caller and are removed.
- Tests pin the finding's attack, the 404s, the self-service gate, the binding routes and the call sites;
  each part was mutated back to the old behaviour and failed its tests.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-22 22:39:26 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 5371de3856 bump pointer: internal (D-380 verify items in B-pxg)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-22 22:24:55 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 483dc3de94 The onboarding seat belongs to the first activation and to the recorded member alone (D-380)
Two follow-up findings of the security scan against D-378.

- IsPromotableUpn is a shape test (contains '@', no whitespace, no #EXT#); the "System" prefix
  test is gone. It rejected real members such as systemadmin@… although every sentinel already
  fails the '@' test, so such a tenant got no seat and fell back to first-caller-wins.
- BuildAuthResult keys the first-user guard off a recorded OnboardedBy, not off its promotability:
  a recorded value nobody can seat still blocks every other roleless caller.
- RevokeAsync records the revoke (PreviewWhitelist row "revoked") before it deletes the activation,
  fail-loud; a re-approve never clears it, and activation seats nobody while it exists. A member
  the tenant removed stays removed whatever a Global Admin's revoke + re-approve does.
- Every successful first-admin seat (activation and first sign-in) writes the tenant's audit entry
  CREATE TenantAdmin, fail-soft, through a new longest TenantAdminsService constructor.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-22 22:22:57 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 06b69aa0d8 The logparser pattern test ends at the first timeout or a 2 s budget, honours cancellation, caps the pattern at 2,000 characters, runs interpreted and admits two tests per instance (D-379)
Security finding (ReDoS / CWE-1333): a Tenant Admin of any tenant or a Global Reader could send a catastrophic pattern with 200 non-matching lines to POST rules/gather/test-pattern and cost ~200 s of a worker thread per request (one swallowed 1 s timeout per line), repeat it up to the portal budget and disconnect at once — nothing cancelled the work, nothing limited concurrency, the pattern length was bounded only by the body cap, and RegexOptions.Compiled emitted IL for every caller pattern.

- TestLogPatternFunction: the first RegexMatchTimeoutException ends the test, a 2 s EvaluationBudget ends it when every line is merely slow, and the invocation CancellationToken (client disconnect, host shutdown) ends it between two lines — without throwing. Lines after the stop get no row; LogPatternTestResult.StopReason (regex_timeout | time_budget | cancelled) and a note name the stop and the unevaluated range. A timeout on the last line is a complete test.
- ValidateRequest rejects patterns over 2,000 characters (the MCP schema's cap) before any Regex is built.
- BuildAgentRegex keeps the agent's semantic options and its 1 s match timeout but drops Compiled: the flag changes speed only, never a match result.
- TestLogPatternGate (singleton, limit 2) is entered before the regex is built; without a free slot the function answers 429 RateLimited with Retry-After: 3 and never queues. Stops and refusals log at Warning.
- Shared: LogPatternTestResult.StopReason (additive); manifests and wire types regenerated. MCP: the tool description says that the first timeout ends the test.
- Tests: pattern cap, interpreted construction with the agent's timeout, catastrophic pattern stops after one timeout (was ~200 s), last-line timeout is no stop, budget and cancellation stops, gate slots.

Submodule pointers: internal (plan, D-379, backlog B-66p/B-j42), .claude/commands (platform-health marker).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-22 21:35:14 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 351c8d4b3a bump pointer: internal (activation race fix live, D-378)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-22 21:01:23 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach e704aa7359 Activation seats the onboarding admin before it activates the tenant; the first-user seat belongs to that member alone (D-378)
Security finding (CWE-367): the activation wrote the approved row first and the OnboardedBy
admin row a few storage round-trips later. In between the tenant was activated with no
members, and auth/me seated any roleless caller of that moment as Admin; every member of the
customer's Entra tenant could poll auth/me across the auto-approve moment.

- TenantApprovalService: uncached pre-check, then the OnboardedBy Admin row (conditional
  insert, best-effort, fresh config read), then the activation row (still the arbiter), then
  the welcome mail. The two tables cannot share a batch, so "before" is the guarantee.
- AuthFunction.BuildAuthResult: with a promotable OnboardedBy the first-user auto-admin goes
  to that UPN only; other roleless callers stay roleless. Without one (rows from before the
  field existed) the first sign-in still becomes the admin. The grant logs at Warning.
- Both first-admin writers use IAdminRepository.TryAddTenantMemberAsync (AddEntityAsync,
  409 = left untouched) instead of an upsert; TenantAdminsService.TryAddTenantAdminAsync
  replaces AddTenantAdminAsync. PreviewWhitelistService.IsApprovedFreshAsync is the pre-check.
- Dead after this: IsTenantAdminAsync on the service, the repository interface and the table
  repository, plus its test.
- Tests pin the write order, the designated-member guard (unit and auth/me end to end) and the
  conditional write; each part was mutated back to the old code and failed its tests.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-22 20:47:53 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 622a2437a0 bump pointer: internal (plan note on the customer wording correction, D-377)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-22 19:01:17 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 5ceab7e611 bump pointer: internal (bootstrap security findings released, D-377)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-22 18:52:47 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 8a7cd5ed98 bump pointer: internal (MSI field check and lab name both MSI paths)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-22 18:51:18 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 15804e2817 bump pointer: internal (bootstrap MSI agent start report closed)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-22 18:20:39 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 194958d3cd bump pointer: internal (bootstrap security findings built, D-377)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-22 18:07:54 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 40323ca57e Bootstrap hardening after a security review, and the MSI channel installs again (D-377)
Findings of a Claude security scan against b4af8c7, each measured first, plus
the MSI channel incident a parallel session found.

- Installer 2.8 extracts the agent ZIP with its own containment check
  (Expand-AgentPayload): every entry is resolved against the payload folder
  before the first write, a rooted or escaping name refuses the package. The
  inbox Expand-Archive of Windows PowerShell 5.1 already refuses such entries
  (measured), so the finding was not exploitable as reported; the guarantee is
  now the script's own, pinned by tests, and Expand-Archive is banned.
- Installer 2.8 also moves PowerShell's own location out of the agent folder
  (Set-Location): on the MSI channel the location pointed at the deleted Msi
  folder and the agent start failed with error 267 since 2.7 went live. When
  the agent program never started, the Agent folder is removed again so a later
  run can install; the stderr line is flattened to one line.
- Run folders younger than an hour stay (a loader may still run there); the
  loader's log is taken only from a run folder that is ours.
- Loader 1.4 (minimum installer 2.8) checks before every download attempt that
  its run folder is still a real folder of ours, opens the download for reading
  before the signature and identity checks and holds it until the run ends, so
  what it checked is what runs and nothing can replace or delete it meanwhile.
- Agent: the protected folder security names Administrators as owner; a folder
  with another owner or a reparse point is not taken as protected, reparse points
  are refused, the base is created protected, install mode protects base and
  Agent and refuses to install when it cannot; every start re-checks both.
- Bootstrap MSI 1.3.0 installs its loader under Program Files, where a standard
  user cannot create the folder first.
- Tests: containment table, hour rule, held handle, owner and junction tests
  (ElevatedFact for the owner assignment), MSI location contract; harness
  scenarios for an escaping package (installer and OOBE script), the hour rule,
  the Program Files layout and an agent that does not start, with the install
  stand-in starting a real program from PowerShell's location. OOBE golden
  regenerated.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-22 18:07:51 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 1b4a87d467 bump pointer: internal (onboarding role fix live, D-376)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-22 16:53:00 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach a43a4e474a New tenants' first admin keeps the Admin role right after activation (D-376)
After auto-activation, a third of new tenants' first admins were answered by
auth/me without a role and sent from the activation page to /progress. The
auto-approve worker promotes the onboarding member on another instance, so the
portal's caches never hear of it: auth/me combined a cached "no row" (refreshed
1.5 s after every activation poll by feedback/status) with a fresh member list,
and neither the role nor the first-user auto-admin applied.

- TenantAdminsService caches only an enabled membership; a missing or disabled
  row is read on every call. IsTenantAdminAsync reads through the same cache.
- auth/me takes the caller's row and "the tenant has any row" from one uncached
  partition read (GetMembershipSnapshotAsync); disabled and application rows
  still count as members.
- PreviewWhitelistService caches only an activation; "not activated" is read on
  every call, so the activation page leaves at the first poll after approval.
  IsApprovedFreshAsync is folded into IsApprovedAsync.
- Removed the dead ClearCacheForTenant, GetMemberRoleAsync and
  CanManageBootstrapAsync.

Tests reproduce the sequence over the real caches (auth/me and the first
dashboard request); each part fails against the old caching.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-22 16:11:10 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 82dafc5e8f bump pointer: internal (bootstrap loader 1.3 / installer 2.7 released, D-375)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-22 15:33:56 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach b4af8c77be Bootstrap integration tests read the publish script's output as text
GitHub Actions runs powershell steps with $ErrorActionPreference = 'stop', and
under Windows PowerShell 5.1 a stderr line of a native process redirected with
2>&1 then ends the test: the three publish refusals failed in CI although the
publish refused as it should. The publish dry runs now start pwsh through
System.Diagnostics.Process like every other scenario. Local run under 'stop':
199 of 199.

[skip actions]: published by a dispatch of publish-scripts.yml, channel dev first.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-22 13:59:45 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 0bfab326e5 bump pointer: internal (bootstrap loader 1.3 / installer 2.7 built, D-375)
[skip actions]: the scripts go out by a dispatch of publish-scripts.yml, channel dev first.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-22 13:35:10 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 3a898b5071 Bootstrap leaves nothing behind: loader 1.3 and installer 2.7 (D-375)
- Loader 1.3 downloads into a protected run folder of its own
  (%ProgramData%\AutopilotMonitor-Loader-<8 hex>), runs the installer only when it
  is signed by the pinned publisher and declares the installer role and version
  2.7 or later, removes the folder after a successful run and never touches the
  agent folder. Unbound arguments now reach the installer by name; the array
  splat bound them by position.
- Installer 2.7 refuses without elevation and decides before it writes: guards
  read HKLM through the 64-bit view (a 32-bit host never saw the deployment
  marker), guard 5 is covered by the agent check. An agent's folder stays as it
  is, a skip without agent removes the folder, an install starts from an emptied,
  protected folder and stages the ZIP in a run folder. It moves the MSI's working
  directory out, writes stderr only on failure and removes the copy older loaders
  left at the fixed path.
- Help texts of both scripts state what customers need; .CHANGELOG, which made
  Get-Help ignore the help, gives way to the Platform Changelog.
- OOBE go-script: the installer's shared helpers, its own elevation check
  (#Requires is ignored under irm | iex), a run folder.
- Publish: version read line-anchored, the loader's own check on the exact
  publish bytes, installers before loaders, -Channel dev (dispatch input).
- Bootstrap MSI 1.2.0; Test-ShouldBootstrapAgent reads the 64-bit view;
  Uninstall removes loader run folders and keeps the Deployed marker.
- Tests: Pester unit suites, an integration harness running the real scripts
  (loader 1.2 and the MSI 1.0 runner frozen in TestData), BootstrapContractTests;
  the gate runs on windows-2022 and windows-2025, once more as SYSTEM, and against
  a real standard user.

[skip actions]: published by a dispatch of publish-scripts.yml, channel dev first.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-22 13:34:54 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 9377671349 Customers metrics: each new customer links to its tenant in Tenant Management
The signup list under the chart now links every domain to
/admin/tenants/management?tenantId=…, the deep link the ops events
"View tenant" button already uses, so the list opens narrowed to that tenant.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-22 10:31:27 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 902560692b bump pointer: internal (agent v2.0.1490 docs, web and MCP deployed, D-374)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-22 10:20:44 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 3946eddcea bump pointer: .claude/commands (ux-insights expected values)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-22 10:18:30 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 48e27fb2d6 bump pointer: internal (Mark as Succeeded released as agent v2.0.1490, D-374)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-22 09:29:17 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 41b33895c5 bump pointer: internal (Mark as Succeeded ends a running agent, D-374)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-22 08:53:18 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 157273726d Mark as Succeeded ends a running agent, and the agent acts on an admin mark once (D-374)
The backend repeats AdminAction on every telemetry response while the session
row carries it. The agent handled each echo anew: a new admin_marked_session
with an immediate upload, whose response carried the next echo. With a running
agent on a Mark-Succeeded session that looped at the device rate limit until
the agent ended; Mark-Failed ended the agent and stayed bounded.

- ServerControlPlane: AdminActionLatch admits the first AdminAction of a
  process; every later one only logs at Debug.
- AdminAction=Succeeded runs the agent's own termination pipeline with outcome
  Succeeded, like Failed: what the portal's confirmation dialog and the docs
  promise, and what the restart path already did.
- HandleAdminActionTests: Succeeded terminates; repeated echoes, a later
  different outcome and concurrent callers are handled once.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-22 08:51:49 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 0d994773d8 bump pointer: internal, .claude/commands (entry channel released)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-21 18:30:14 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 7dd9f81c31 bump pointer: internal, .claude/commands (entry channel, D-373)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-21 18:23:50 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 7d07cb7805 Marketing clicks and page views on www carry the channel their page load came in through (D-373)
On the public host a telemetry initializer adds the referrer's host and
the utm_source, utm_medium and utm_campaign tags of the entry URL to every
page view and custom event. Both come from the document itself
(document.referrer and the navigation entry), so nothing is stored and no
identifier is added; metrics, dependencies and the portal stay as they are.

The hero and final get-started buttons and the three Pro plan links now
navigate client-side, so landing, plans, get-started and the sign-in click
stay one page load. A guard fails on a plain <a> to /get-started or /plans.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-21 18:23:03 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 485a5b4604 bump pointer: internal (TPM-PSS precision released)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-21 13:08:15 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 2109133aee bump pointer: internal, .claude/commands (TPM-PSS TLS probe, D-372)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-21 12:23:07 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 7ac7a5e8ba TPM-PSS distress carries a TLS probe: protocol, whether the certificate went out, who answered (D-372)
tls= was empty on every report: .NET Framework's SecureChannelFailure
carries no inner Win32 code. After a terminal SecureChannelFailure the
agent now opens one direct SslStream connection to the backend host with
the client certificate (system-default protocols, normal server
validation, never a proxy) and sends one GET of the agent config with the
agent's headers - the platform asks for the certificate only once it has
seen the path. The message carries tlsp=<protocol>,<m|->,<answer>:
b<status> only when the probe's own correlation id comes back (shared
ResponseOriginClassifier), cc<status> for the platform's "Client
Certificate Required" page, st/x/io otherwise; or unreachable,
hs(<SSPI code>), hs(srvcert), timeout, error. A server certificate not
issued by Microsoft appends ,i=<issuer CN> (TLS inspection).

The probe runs beside the TPM and Schannel reads, all three within 10 s
(4 s per network step), on the failure path only. The Schannel window now
ends when the failure is detected (ReadBetween), so the probe's own
handshake never shows up in sch=. A connect that fails after its timeout
is observed (an unobserved task exception would write crash artefacts);
an answer that began is kept when the server does not close.

Live, .NET Framework 4.8 against production without a certificate:
tls12,-,cc403.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-21 12:22:56 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 014b3e1e83 bump pointer: .claude/commands (platform-health catalog notes)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-21 12:18:26 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach b948d32c9a bump pointer: internal, .claude/commands (TPM-PSS precision, D-372)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-21 11:26:43 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 40d3922fe0 TPM-PSS distress says where the device stood when the failure began: ESP phase, OOBE flag, boot; a later success compares reboot and certificate (D-372)
The first reports with context all carried OobeState=completed: Windows'
OOBE flag flips at the desktop, was read at send time after minutes of
retries, and marks the later successful starts too, so it separated
nothing.

Agent: EspPhaseSnapshot reads the ESP registry once with the tracker's
own parser (device_preparation / device_setup / account_setup while
running, <category>_failed, *_done, esp_done, none, unavailable).
DistressDeviceContext (OOBE flag, ESP phase, boot from the uptime
counter) is captured before a registration's first attempt and travels
with the TPM-PSS report; other reports sample it at send time. The
reporter takes a DistressDetail (TPM version, context). sch= is always
set: the events, none, unreadable or timeout. The failed-run record keeps
the ESP phase and OOBE flag, and beside it - never on the wire - the boot
time and the client-certificate thumbprint; the next successful start's
agent_started reports priorRegistrationLastEspPhase, LastOobeState,
RebootedSince (boots more than 2 min apart) and CertChanged, and every
start reports espPhaseAtAgentStart.

Shared/backend: DistressReport.EspPhase (kept as [a-z_] up to 32) and
DeviceBootUtc (kept within 30 days before and 5 minutes after the report),
stored, logged and on the custom event; the TPM panel item carries the ESP
phase. The GA distress detail names the OOBE flag as such and shows ESP
phase and device boot.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-21 11:26:41 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 37bd4c73f5 chore(deps-dev): bump vite to 8.3.4 in web and MCP
Closes Dependabot alerts #123 and #124 (GHSA-698v-4r3x-3vcv, launch-editor
escapeCmdArgs() omits % escaping on Windows). Lockfile-only: vite is a
transitive dev dependency of vitest, whose range already allows 8.3.x.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-20 21:21:07 +02:00
dependabot[bot] 9f4c1efe26 chore(deps): bump hono (#190)
Bumps the mcp-security group with 1 update in the /src/McpServer/autopilot-monitor-mcp directory: [hono](https://github.com/honojs/hono).


Updates `hono` from 4.13.7 to 4.13.13
- [Release notes](https://github.com/honojs/hono/releases)
- [Commits](https://github.com/honojs/hono/compare/v4.13.7...v4.13.13)

---
updated-dependencies:
- dependency-name: hono
  dependency-version: 4.13.13
  dependency-type: indirect
  dependency-group: mcp-security
...

Signed-off-by: dependabot[bot] <support@github.com>
Co-authored-by: dependabot[bot] <49699333+dependabot[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-10-20 21:11:26 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 13a34fb7f1 bump pointer: internal (CI credential isolation released)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-20 18:44:57 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 60a41e9778 CI: signing jobs run in the release environment
The code-signing identity trusts only environment:release now, so build-agent
release, build-msi sign-loader and release, and publish-scripts publish run in it.
Every job that federates to Azure carries an environment; the ref is no longer a
trusted subject. Help texts of the storage and endpoint helpers follow: the local
build publishes nothing since D-354.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-20 18:30:02 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 9aa5e46e22 bump pointer: internal (TPM-PSS distress released, D-370)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-20 17:36:32 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 3ba4a10031 bump pointer: internal, .claude/commands (TPM-PSS distress, D-370)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-20 16:56:56 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach fd0ae98868 TPM-PSS distress says when and where, the tenant panel shows devices that connected later (D-370)
A TpmPssUnsupported report classifies the registration start that failed,
not the device: devices with older TPM firmware fail during setup and
connect after it, on 24H2, 25H2 and 26H2 alike.

Agent: every distress report carries the OS build and the Windows setup
state at send time; the TPM-PSS report adds the TPM manufacturer and
firmware and a language-neutral message with the NCrypt codes of the PSS
signs, the native code of the failed handshake and up to two Schannel
System-log events since the registration started (numeric properties
only). The TPM and System-log reads run in parallel for at most 5 s. The
send is awaited, since the run exits right after it. An attempt that got
an answer resets the last exception, so the probe never classifies an
earlier attempt. The run's last error carries the native code. Win32_Tpm
is read by one shared TpmInfoReader (tpm_status unchanged).

Shared/backend: one body cap for both sides (DistressReportMaxBytes 2048);
the agent shortens its message to stay within it. The endpoint keeps OS
build and setup state only in their format, stores the three fields and
adds them to the log and the custom event. GET audit/tpm-pss-unsupported
returns TPM version, OS build, setup state and connectedAt: the last
upload of a certificate-authenticated session of the serial after the
device's last report (bootstrap sessions excluded, six serials per
SessionsIndex query). The bell says the device could not connect and may
connect after setup and a restart.

Web: the Incompatible TPM panel shows TPM and Status columns, uses the
generated types and no longer says "never" or names a Windows version; the
GA distress detail shows the new fields, Cloud PC and the certificate.

Tests: probe message, Schannel tokens, native codes, payload cap, awaited
send, context bound, last-exception reset, connectedAt rule, filter
comparison limit, repository round trip, panel render. A device serial
from production data in a test fixture is replaced.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-20 16:56:43 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 8101aa1e50 bump pointer: internal (push encryption claim in the docs)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-20 15:02:55 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach cf3647da49 bump pointer: internal (docs descriptions within GitBook's 200-character limit)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-20 14:34:40 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach cafb1e9a33 bump pointer: internal (push customer release live, D-368, D-369)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-20 14:28:33 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach d38265071d bump pointer: internal, .claude/commands (push customer release built, D-368, D-369)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-20 14:14:12 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 40d88ef1e0 Push notifications for every tenant: one Push channel per scope that gates every send, app-role members equal, alerts name the tenant (D-368, D-369)
- Tenant Admins add the Push channel; Telegram and e-mail stay Global-Admin-only
- One Push channel per scope on the tenant and ops paths; the dispatcher fans Push out once per send
- The channel also gates session-watch completions and the device test; paired devices stay listed while it is off
- Members whose role comes from an Entra app role pair and receive like table members; a paused device resumes at the owner's next sign-in
- SLA and failure-streak alerts name the tenant; the id moves to a Tenant ID fact
- The legacy single webhook accepts URL webhook providers only
- Portal: Conditional Access hint in the channel editor, neutral role texts
- Landing: push section with the Notify me when done animation and the hero announcement; SignalR is "live updates"
- Privacy, about and FAQ describe push notifications

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-20 14:13:58 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 14d1266b89 bump pointer: internal (target prefetch removal verified in production, D-366)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-20 10:48:43 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 0730373e9b bump pointer: internal (target prefetch removed, D-366)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-20 10:31:17 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 03f4470db6 The sign-in return no longer prefetches the target route (D-366)
Measured in production with 300 ms latency, router.prefetch loaded only the route tree while auth/me was in flight, and the replace still fetched the route payload after auth/me: no gain on the critical path, one to three extra requests per sign-in return.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-20 10:31:16 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 697077c7e5 bump pointer: internal (sign-in return and preflight cache released, D-366, D-367)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-20 10:18:35 +02:00
dependabot[bot] befc101d8f chore(deps-dev): bump knip (#187)
Bumps the web group in /src/Web/autopilot-monitor-web with 1 update: [knip](https://github.com/webpro-nl/knip/tree/HEAD/packages/knip).


Updates `knip` from 6.40.0 to 6.41.0
- [Release notes](https://github.com/webpro-nl/knip/releases)
- [Commits](https://github.com/webpro-nl/knip/commits/knip@6.41.0/packages/knip)

---
updated-dependencies:
- dependency-name: knip
  dependency-version: 6.41.0
  dependency-type: direct:development
  update-type: version-update:semver-minor
  dependency-group: web
...

Signed-off-by: dependabot[bot] <support@github.com>
Co-authored-by: dependabot[bot] <49699333+dependabot[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-10-20 10:03:08 +02:00
dependabot[bot] 7250baca02 chore(deps-dev): bump jscpd (#189)
Bumps the quality-tooling group in /tools/quality with 1 update: [jscpd](https://github.com/kucherenko/jscpd/tree/HEAD/rust/jscpd).


Updates `jscpd` from 5.4.0 to 5.4.1
- [Release notes](https://github.com/kucherenko/jscpd/releases)
- [Commits](https://github.com/kucherenko/jscpd/commits/v5.4.1/rust/jscpd)

---
updated-dependencies:
- dependency-name: jscpd
  dependency-version: 5.4.1
  dependency-type: direct:development
  update-type: version-update:semver-patch
  dependency-group: quality-tooling
...

Signed-off-by: dependabot[bot] <support@github.com>
Co-authored-by: dependabot[bot] <49699333+dependabot[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-10-20 10:02:53 +02:00
dependabot[bot] fa1809d910 chore(deps): bump the mcp group (#188)
Bumps the mcp group in /src/McpServer/autopilot-monitor-mcp with 4 updates: [express](https://github.com/expressjs/express), [zod](https://github.com/colinhacks/zod), [knip](https://github.com/webpro-nl/knip/tree/HEAD/packages/knip) and [typescript-eslint](https://github.com/typescript-eslint/typescript-eslint/tree/HEAD/packages/typescript-eslint).


Updates `express` from 5.2.1 to 5.3.0
- [Release notes](https://github.com/expressjs/express/releases)
- [Changelog](https://github.com/expressjs/express/blob/master/History.md)
- [Commits](https://github.com/expressjs/express/compare/v5.2.1...v5.3.0)

Updates `zod` from 4.6.5 to 4.6.7
- [Release notes](https://github.com/colinhacks/zod/releases)
- [Commits](https://github.com/colinhacks/zod/compare/v4.6.5...v4.6.7)

Updates `knip` from 6.40.0 to 6.41.0
- [Release notes](https://github.com/webpro-nl/knip/releases)
- [Commits](https://github.com/webpro-nl/knip/commits/knip@6.41.0/packages/knip)

Updates `typescript-eslint` from 8.71.1 to 8.71.2
- [Release notes](https://github.com/typescript-eslint/typescript-eslint/releases)
- [Changelog](https://github.com/typescript-eslint/typescript-eslint/blob/main/packages/typescript-eslint/CHANGELOG.md)
- [Commits](https://github.com/typescript-eslint/typescript-eslint/commits/v8.71.2/packages/typescript-eslint)

---
updated-dependencies:
- dependency-name: express
  dependency-version: 5.3.0
  dependency-type: direct:production
  update-type: version-update:semver-minor
  dependency-group: mcp
- dependency-name: zod
  dependency-version: 4.6.7
  dependency-type: direct:production
  update-type: version-update:semver-patch
  dependency-group: mcp
- dependency-name: knip
  dependency-version: 6.41.0
  dependency-type: direct:development
  update-type: version-update:semver-minor
  dependency-group: mcp
- dependency-name: typescript-eslint
  dependency-version: 8.71.2
  dependency-type: direct:development
  update-type: version-update:semver-patch
  dependency-group: mcp
...

Signed-off-by: dependabot[bot] <support@github.com>
Co-authored-by: dependabot[bot] <49699333+dependabot[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-10-20 10:02:41 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 9a718539fd bump pointer: internal, .claude/commands (sign-in return and preflight cache, D-366, D-367)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-20 02:46:15 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach a1ba1fd1ab Sign-in returns no longer show the public landing, and API preflights are cached for two hours (D-366, D-367)
- MSAL's in-flight redirect state stays in its tab. storeAuthStateInCookie mirrored it into origin-wide cookies that MSAL reads first, so two tabs signing in at once overwrote each other and the first one failed with state_mismatch, stuck on the landing. A guard test pins the cache config.
- AuthGate keeps the auth-pending overlay for as long as the browser is signed in, so it lifts only once the target route has committed; it used to lift when loading ended and exposed the landing for the whole client navigation. The target's route payload is prefetched while auth/me is in flight.
- A sign-in return that carried a code but ends without an account starts one fresh sign-in from "/", keeping the saved deep link; any further failure in the tab hands over to ProtectedRoute's sign-in card on the deep link, which waits for a click. The auth response is read at module load (the router writes its hydration-time URL back), the tab's temporary MSAL keys are purged before a retry and before the card's sign-in, and loading holds while a redirect leaves the page. New events: auth_redirect_recovered, auth_redirect_recovery_exhausted, auth_redirect_failed (error codes only).
- host.json adds Access-Control-Max-Age: 7200 through the http customHeaders. The Functions host answers every preflight itself and its CORS policy carries no max-age; its custom-headers middleware runs outside the CORS middleware, so the header lands on the preflight too. A guard test pins the entry to exactly that header. The CORS startup log goes: it read settings this host does not use, at a level that never reached the telemetry.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-20 02:46:03 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 94399170d8 bump pointer: internal (GA Customers dashboard released, D-365)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-20 01:36:02 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 824bc64f96 bump pointer: internal (GA Customers dashboard, D-365; IME diff note)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-20 01:17:21 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach a7c3c16054 Global Admin sees new customers per day and the growth over time under Metrics > Customers (D-365)
The section reads the tenant configurations from config/all and derives everything in the browser: no endpoint, no counter, no backfill.

- Customers: new tenants per UTC day (per Monday-anchored week beyond 90 days), the window's best day, weekly average, the last 7 days, the total and the cumulative gain; 7/30/90/365 days in ?days=; clicking a column lists that bucket's tenants with their edition. A signup is a configuration row with a domain. The section is the first Metrics entry and the target of /admin/metrics.
- Charts: AppBarChart takes a category formatter, a custom tooltip, a column click and whole-number ticks; AppLineChart can hide its legend and use whole-number ticks. Existing callers get the same props as before.
- The Monday-of-week helper moves from the Fleet Health timeline into lib/timeWindow; the Stat tile duplicated in two metrics sections becomes one component, and the duplicate baseline loses that entry.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-20 01:15:29 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 525be338b8 bump pointer: internal (self-service assignee membership gate released, D-364)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-19 18:52:44 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 734ca2b8fc bump pointer: internal (D-364 dead code removed, texts approved, lesson)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-19 17:33:23 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 2a74395874 Dead delegated-admin and repository members go: status transition, single-row reads, MCP-user flag
None of them had a production caller. DelegatedAdminService.GetAssignmentsForUpnAsync and GetAssigneesForTenantAsync, DelegatedAdminService.SetStatusAsync with IAdminRepository.SetDelegatedAdminStatusAsync (only a test called it; the operator revoke is RemoveAsync), and IAdminRepository.GetDelegatedAdminAsync and IsMcpUserAsync, which only had their own implementation.

Revoke_InvalidatesCache now pins the revoke the operator route runs (RemoveAsync); Disable_InvalidatesCache covers SetEnabledAsync.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-19 17:32:55 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 012eb8c057 bump pointer: internal (self-service assignee membership gate, D-364)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-19 16:52:56 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 0c1b83268c A self-service assignee reads the managed tenants only while an enabled member of the managing tenant (D-364)
Removing or disabling a member under Access Management left their assignment to the tenant's self-service group in place, and the delegated scope never re-checked the membership, so the person kept reading every managed customer.

- Scope: an assignment to msp-{owner} confers the group's tenants only while the assignee holds an enabled TenantAdmins row in the owner (inside the cached row resolution, fail-closed, Warning when ignored). Operator groups and direct grants are unchanged.
- Access Management: remove and disable end the self-service assignment (DelegatedGroupAccess DELETE under every managed tenant, reason member-removed / member-disabled) before the existing stream cut. Re-enabling restores nothing.
- Assigning requires an enabled member and re-reads the membership after the write; the Global Admin group route follows the same rule for a self-service group (enabled member of the owner, bound to it, read-only).
- The SignalR group join resolves the delegated scope uncached, so the re-join right after a revoke cannot be admitted by another instance's warm cache.
- Web: Delegated Access offers only enabled members and says that removing or disabling a member ends their access; the Global Admin page hides the role select for self-service groups.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-19 16:52:39 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 1088b36b8b A malformed device error code no longer fails the session events read
ErrorCodeCatalog.TryLookupDetailed normalised any 0x-prefixed value without
checking its characters and then ran int.Parse on the low word, so a value
such as 0x8007zzzz threw FormatException. The backend enricher runs that
lookup over device-authored event data on every GET /api/sessions/{id}/events,
so one such event answered HTTP 500 for every reader of the session timeline.

- The catalog parses the hex body once with uint.TryParse (hex digits only)
  and derives the HRESULT_FROM_WIN32 low word from the number; it now returns
  null for any input instead of throwing.
- ErrorCodeEnricher.EnrichEvents isolates each event: a failed lookup leaves
  that event unenriched, logs a warning and the page still returns 200.
- Web errorCodeMap.ts gets the same hex-only check: parseInt read
  0x8007643z as 1603 and labelled the garbage ERROR_INSTALL_FAILURE.
  MCP already validated; a test pins it.

Tests: the reported shapes return null, an exhaustive sweep of short tails
after every prefix never throws, and the enricher keeps the rest of the page
enriched when one event fails. Against the previous catalog 10 of the new
tests fail.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-15 17:02:53 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach dfd1b86e01 bump pointer: internal (delegated reach on operator routes live, D-363)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-15 15:21:56 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach b8a663e11d bump pointer: internal (delegated reach on operator routes, D-363)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-15 14:03:58 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 38b499b80b Operator reads on global routes stay with platform roles; the middleware decides on the tenantId the handler reads (D-363)
Five platform reads take ?tenantId= only as a filter, but their QueryParam
scoping also admitted a delegated (MSP) reader of the named tenant:
global/session-reports, global/rule-submissions, global/metrics/mcp-usage,
global/metrics/mcp-usage/daily and global/metrics/verdict-calibration. They
carry operator data (admin notes, contact data and reviews, an organization's
accounts, classifier diagnostics), so they are catalogued None now; the
handlers still read ?tenantId= themselves, and Global Admins and Global
Readers keep the filter.

- A catalog ratchet in PolicyEnforcementMiddlewareTests lists every platform
  route a delegated caller reaches; a new one fails the build until it is
  added on purpose. The TenantScoping.QueryParam doc states the rule.
- The middleware took the cross-tenant decision on the first ?tenantId=
  value while the handlers read all values comma-joined. It now decides on
  the joined string, with ASP.NET Core's parser (the handlers parse Url.Query,
  where System.Uri has already escaped a stray '%').
- The rule pages show a delegated reader the admin-only hint instead of the
  submission list, as they already did for an Operator or Viewer.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-15 14:03:47 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 9252b8081f bump pointer: internal (rating feedback ops event live)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-15 13:44:17 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach ba92811f45 bump pointer: internal, .claude/commands (rating feedback ops event, D-362)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-15 13:24:38 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 0b813891e4 Rating feedback raises its own ops event; Alert Rules in the Ops menu with a search (D-362)
A rating from the feedback bubble reached only the direct Telegram ping: it was the one customer
submission without an ops event and a bell. It now raises FeedbackRatingReceived (Tenant, Info) and a
Global Admin bell, so an alert rule can route it to the Push channel. Message and details carry the
stars and the comment length, never the comment or the sender; the Telegram ping stays until it is
retired. The answer route admits members only (MemberRead, like feedback/general): it now feeds an
operator alert, and the bubble only ever asks members.

The alert rules page was linked from no menu. Ops > Alert Rules points at it, and a search in its
header narrows the rules by event type and category; it filters the display only, so a save keeps
every rule. navSectionReachability.test.ts holds the sidebar and the section registries together in
both directions. The ops events page and the rules search share one SearchInput.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-15 13:24:18 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach dc4f6ed28b bump pointer: internal (tenant onboarding checklist)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-15 11:56:06 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 3564e5ba88 bump pointer: internal (app failure-rate base live)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-15 10:43:08 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach de00471da9 bump pointer: internal (app failure-rate base released)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-15 10:07:31 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 9b3e9e3900 fix: app failure rates show the finished installs they are computed from
The device model table on the app detail page put the terminal-only failure
rate (failed / (failed + succeeded)) next to an Installs count that also held
in-progress, incomplete and skipped rows, so 11 failed of 28 read as 50%
without a way to check it.

- Version and device-model rows carry Succeeded on the wire.
- The device model table shows Finished (the rate's base) with a muted
  "+N not counted"; the Total card names the same rows.
- The PDF report gets Finished and Not counted columns in both tables and
  the hint on Total installs.
- The device-model sample floor counts exactly the rate's base; skipped rows
  no longer count toward it.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-15 10:06:37 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 58e9f19f82 fix(web): a What's new link opens the panel after the sign-in round trip too
A portal link with ?whats-new= opened without a session flashed the panel,
went through the sign-in, and came back without it: MSAL lands on the
origin root and AuthGate reaches the saved link by a client-side
navigation, while WhatsNewPanelHost (root layout, stays mounted) read the
parameter only once on mount. It now follows the search parameter and
opens once per arrival; a protected page waits for the session, so the
panel no longer flashes before the redirect or counts the open twice.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-14 20:01:10 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 8e000f1849 bump pointer: internal (usage metrics breakdown released)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-14 18:40:09 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 77de8c92c6 bump pointer: internal (usage metrics breakdown, D-361)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-14 18:20:56 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 17fc23f8cb feat: usage metrics split enrollments by type, join and deployment mode (D-361)
Usage Metrics (tenant page and the platform section) shows the window's
sessions in three groups that each sum to the session count:
Autopilot v1 or Device Preparation, Entra or hybrid joined, and the
Autopilot deployment mode (user-driven, self-deploying, pre-provisioned).
Type and mode follow the fleet enrollment class; user-driven no longer
counts the IsUserDriven flag, which every registration sets. The counts
come from the session rows on each request, so every retained session is
covered without a counter.

- DeploymentTypeMetrics gains the new counts and shares; the usage
  projection reads EnrollmentType, IsSelfDeployingProfile, IsHybridJoin
- platform and tenant compute share one builder per block
- Platform Usage takes ?days= like the other analytics pages
- the usage pages share their blocks (components/UsageMetricsBlocks.tsx);
  enrollment class labels and the time-attribution segments each live in
  one place, the duplication baseline shrinks by seven clones

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-14 18:19:48 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach e046571350 bump pointer: internal (push deep links confirmed)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-14 17:45:47 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 6b5c55998f bump pointer: internal (push deep links live)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-14 17:38:49 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 6df57459c2 bump pointer: internal (push deep links, D-360)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-14 17:19:34 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach caeb7a3e58 feat: every alert links to its subject; ops alerts open their own event (D-360)
A push carries only category, event and severity for an ops alert, so the
portal link is the way to the details, and ops alerts had none: the event
id was minted inside the save and never reached the dispatch.

Backend: SaveOpsEventAsync sets OpsEventEntry.Id (OpsEventId,
{Category}_{RowKey}); WriteAsync hands it to the dispatch, and BuildAlert
adds "Open in the portal" -> /admin/ops/?eventId=<id> on the plain and the
payload path, so every ops channel (push, Telegram, Teams, Slack, Discord,
e-mail, JSON) gets it. GET global/ops-events?id= is a point read (400 for a
malformed id, an empty list for a deleted one). hardware_rejected links to
the hardware whitelist (one path constant, also for the bell); the session
watch link names the session's tenant; TenantSignup's portalPath keeps its
tenant query. Only a session link makes a push session-bound: tag and Topic
no longer key on any "id=" in the link.

Web: /admin/ops?eventId= opens that event's detail from the point read
(matched by id), and the detail links to the tenant and to the event's
related page (same-origin paths only) besides the session, which now
carries the tenant. CopyButton and the cursor pager footer are shared
components instead of four and three copies; the duplicate baseline shrinks
by five entries.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-14 17:19:22 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach bf37fe46c1 bump pointer: internal (session block visibility RELEASED)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-14 16:43:24 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 3678995a9b bump pointer: internal (session block visibility, D-359)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-14 16:27:56 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 7a917eeaee feat: a session the platform blocked says so (D-359)
When the event limit or the platform operator blocks a session's device, the
session now carries a block record: Block* fields on the session and its index
row, a server-authored device_blocked timeline event, an interim analyze run for
that event and, on the auto path, an audit entry. The block list itself stays
platform-only.

- Portal: a card above the failure snapshot says the monitoring was paused
  (orange) or ended (red), when, until when and, for the event limit, the
  session's event count against the limit. The Blocked pill reads the record for
  every role; Global Admin mode still adds the live block list.
- A Kill is device-wide until it expires, so its record carries the end and the
  card says new enrollments on the device are not monitored until then.
- Status: the stalled and timeout reasons name the block instead of a silent
  agent; the classification is unchanged.
- Rules: ANALYZE-ENRL-006 explains the pause right after it (on_event
  device_blocked); ANALYZE-ENRL-002 no longer fires for a blocked session.
- MCP: the coverage block of get_session_summary names the block as a gap.
- The agent-facing block message no longer says "by an administrator".
- BlockCause == event_limit replaces ExcessiveEventsAutoActioned as the
  auto-action's idempotency marker.
- Privacy page: the event limit next to rate limiting.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-14 16:27:55 +02:00
dependabot[bot] d5a83374d0 chore(deps): bump the web group (#186)
Bumps the web group in /src/Web/autopilot-monitor-web with 5 updates:

| Package | From | To |
| --- | --- | --- |
| [@microsoft/applicationinsights-web](https://github.com/microsoft/ApplicationInsights-JS) | `3.4.4` | `3.4.5` |
| [next](https://github.com/vercel/next.js) | `16.3.8` | `16.4.0` |
| [@next/bundle-analyzer](https://github.com/vercel/next.js/tree/HEAD/packages/next-bundle-analyzer) | `16.3.8` | `16.4.0` |
| [eslint-config-next](https://github.com/vercel/next.js/tree/HEAD/packages/eslint-config-next) | `16.3.8` | `16.4.0` |
| [knip](https://github.com/webpro-nl/knip/tree/HEAD/packages/knip) | `6.39.0` | `6.40.0` |


Updates `@microsoft/applicationinsights-web` from 3.4.4 to 3.4.5
- [Release notes](https://github.com/microsoft/ApplicationInsights-JS/releases)
- [Changelog](https://github.com/microsoft/ApplicationInsights-JS/blob/main/RELEASES.md)
- [Commits](https://github.com/microsoft/ApplicationInsights-JS/compare/v3.4.4...v3.4.5)

Updates `next` from 16.3.8 to 16.4.0
- [Release notes](https://github.com/vercel/next.js/releases)
- [Commits](https://github.com/vercel/next.js/compare/v16.3.8...v16.4.0)

Updates `@next/bundle-analyzer` from 16.3.8 to 16.4.0
- [Release notes](https://github.com/vercel/next.js/releases)
- [Commits](https://github.com/vercel/next.js/commits/v16.4.0/packages/next-bundle-analyzer)

Updates `eslint-config-next` from 16.3.8 to 16.4.0
- [Release notes](https://github.com/vercel/next.js/releases)
- [Commits](https://github.com/vercel/next.js/commits/v16.4.0/packages/eslint-config-next)

Updates `knip` from 6.39.0 to 6.40.0
- [Release notes](https://github.com/webpro-nl/knip/releases)
- [Commits](https://github.com/webpro-nl/knip/commits/knip@6.40.0/packages/knip)

---
updated-dependencies:
- dependency-name: "@microsoft/applicationinsights-web"
  dependency-version: 3.4.5
  dependency-type: direct:production
  update-type: version-update:semver-patch
  dependency-group: web
- dependency-name: next
  dependency-version: 16.4.0
  dependency-type: direct:production
  update-type: version-update:semver-minor
  dependency-group: web
- dependency-name: "@next/bundle-analyzer"
  dependency-version: 16.4.0
  dependency-type: direct:development
  update-type: version-update:semver-minor
  dependency-group: web
- dependency-name: eslint-config-next
  dependency-version: 16.4.0
  dependency-type: direct:development
  update-type: version-update:semver-minor
  dependency-group: web
- dependency-name: knip
  dependency-version: 6.40.0
  dependency-type: direct:development
  update-type: version-update:semver-minor
  dependency-group: web
...

Signed-off-by: dependabot[bot] <support@github.com>
Co-authored-by: dependabot[bot] <49699333+dependabot[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-10-14 15:12:49 +02:00
dependabot[bot] 596a9ffc2b chore(deps): bump the mcp group (#185)
Bumps the mcp group in /src/McpServer/autopilot-monitor-mcp with 4 updates: [@modelcontextprotocol/server](https://github.com/modelcontextprotocol/typescript-sdk), [@modelcontextprotocol/client](https://github.com/modelcontextprotocol/typescript-sdk), [knip](https://github.com/webpro-nl/knip/tree/HEAD/packages/knip) and [typescript-eslint](https://github.com/typescript-eslint/typescript-eslint/tree/HEAD/packages/typescript-eslint).


Updates `@modelcontextprotocol/server` from 2.3.0 to 2.3.1
- [Release notes](https://github.com/modelcontextprotocol/typescript-sdk/releases)
- [Commits](https://github.com/modelcontextprotocol/typescript-sdk/compare/@modelcontextprotocol/server@2.3.0...@modelcontextprotocol/server@2.3.1)

Updates `@modelcontextprotocol/client` from 2.3.0 to 2.3.1
- [Release notes](https://github.com/modelcontextprotocol/typescript-sdk/releases)
- [Commits](https://github.com/modelcontextprotocol/typescript-sdk/compare/@modelcontextprotocol/client@2.3.0...@modelcontextprotocol/client@2.3.1)

Updates `knip` from 6.39.0 to 6.40.0
- [Release notes](https://github.com/webpro-nl/knip/releases)
- [Commits](https://github.com/webpro-nl/knip/commits/knip@6.40.0/packages/knip)

Updates `typescript-eslint` from 8.71.0 to 8.71.1
- [Release notes](https://github.com/typescript-eslint/typescript-eslint/releases)
- [Changelog](https://github.com/typescript-eslint/typescript-eslint/blob/main/packages/typescript-eslint/CHANGELOG.md)
- [Commits](https://github.com/typescript-eslint/typescript-eslint/commits/v8.71.1/packages/typescript-eslint)

---
updated-dependencies:
- dependency-name: "@modelcontextprotocol/server"
  dependency-version: 2.3.1
  dependency-type: direct:production
  update-type: version-update:semver-patch
  dependency-group: mcp
- dependency-name: "@modelcontextprotocol/client"
  dependency-version: 2.3.1
  dependency-type: direct:development
  update-type: version-update:semver-patch
  dependency-group: mcp
- dependency-name: knip
  dependency-version: 6.40.0
  dependency-type: direct:development
  update-type: version-update:semver-minor
  dependency-group: mcp
- dependency-name: typescript-eslint
  dependency-version: 8.71.1
  dependency-type: direct:development
  update-type: version-update:semver-patch
  dependency-group: mcp
...

Signed-off-by: dependabot[bot] <support@github.com>
Co-authored-by: dependabot[bot] <49699333+dependabot[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-10-14 15:12:31 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 0e1428922f bump pointer: internal (diagnosis plan RELEASED)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-14 12:36:43 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 10314cd8f2 bump pointer: internal (diagnosis plan: live, visual check open)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-14 11:35:28 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 9ee882ab68 bump pointer: internal (diagnosis plan: customer docs approved and committed)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-14 10:55:13 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach eefa365b6c bump pointer: internal (diagnosis plan: docs drafted)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-14 03:30:35 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 21ca9eb068 bump pointer: internal (only an InProgress session stalls)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-14 03:28:53 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach af86e8f7cc Sessions: only an In Progress session stalls
A stall report never overwrote a guard: the ingest branch for session_stalled
runs after the completion and failure chain, and the transition gate let
Stalled through over every status but Pending. An offline batch carrying
session_stalled next to enrollment_complete left a finished enrollment
Stalled until the timeout sweep reclassified it, and a sweep that lost the
race against a completion could do the same.

IsTerminalTransitionAllowed now allows Stalled only over InProgress, on the
normal and the ETag-retry path alike; the separate Pending guard is folded
into it.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-14 03:28:52 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 8c5fbd5739 bump pointer: internal (diagnosis headline concept doc, backlog side findings, plan phase 6 internal), .claude/commands (rule-builder presentation)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-14 03:19:30 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 55b667ad2c bump pointer: internal (D-358, diagnosis plan phase 5), .claude/commands (GetAppFleetContext marker, open_fleet_sessions)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-14 03:14:56 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 325632e780 Diagnosis: the culprit app in the tenant's other enrollments, and the rule line beside each finding (D-358)
GET apps/fleet-context (MemberRead, QueryParam) counts one app over the
tenant's last 7 days: installed, skipped, failed, incomplete, in progress,
collision rows left out, the three most frequent failure codes. It reads
the apps dashboard's partition query, leaves out the asking session and,
with the culprit's app id, another app of the same name; no session point
reads. AppFleetContextService caches the app's rows per tenant, channel,
name and minute for 60 s (single flight).

The classification is the analytics view's: MetricsMath.IsInstalled
replaces six inline copies, AppsAnalyticsHelper.IsSameApp and
TopFailureCodes are shared by analytics, sessions and the fleet context.

The diagnosis page shows the result as a tile in "Around the failure"
only when other enrollments exist (the read fails soft), with "Show
sessions" on the app page where that page shows the viewed tenant. An
expanded finding shows "Fired in N enrollments in the last 14 days"
through useRuleFireStats and RecentFiresLine, both extracted from the
session page, whose cross-tenant check now ignores case.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-14 03:14:55 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 9ad3cb2df1 bump pointer: internal (diagnosis plan phase 4, D-356/D-357 amended, drift guards), .claude/commands (diagnosis telemetry rows)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-14 02:30:53 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 127d5c1173 Diagnosis: the page answers what happened, for every status with a verdict (D-356, D-357)
The diagnosis page is rebuilt on the server headline instead of rule
confidence: a verdict card per status and cause (culprit tiles, ESP
phases, what an unfinished enrollment still waits for), the
circumstances around it, the steps of the finding that explains it,
where the time went, all open findings grouped by role, team notes and
the deduplicated errors and warnings. It reuses the session page's hook
set, refetches the headline on live activity and opens for Failed,
Stalled, AwaitingUser, Incomplete and Succeeded with open findings, also
from read-only and cross-tenant views.

Rule text: lib/ruleText.ts prunes a finding's explanation and steps like
the notifications do (shared cases in tests/fixtures/rule-text-display,
also run by RuleTemplateInterpolator.InterpolateForNotification), then
parses the markdown and fills values into text nodes only. The session
page's analysis section, the rule card and the dry run render through it;
components/findings/EvidenceChips replaces the two evidence-link copies
and covers correlation pairs.

Vocabularies: DiagnosisPrerequisites names the engine's completion
prerequisites (manifest diagnosis.prerequisites, parity fact against
DecisionEngine.CompletionPrerequisites); the page's texts for every
diagnosis vocabulary are exhaustive over the manifest types.

Fixed on the way: useSessionSignalR held the first render's callbacks,
so ruleResultsReady was lost on an already connected hub; a deep link to
an event dropped its hash before the event loaded; the global analyze
rule update answered 500 for an invalid presentation (now 400); the
rule editor kept the presentation block on create and in JSON mode.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-14 02:30:29 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 6df88abdb3 bump pointer: internal (D-357, diagnosis plan phase 3), .claude/commands (GetSessionDiagnosis marker)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-14 00:48:07 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 5c3d158d85 Sessions: GET sessions/{id}/diagnosis returns the session's verdict (D-357)
A typed headline built on demand from the session row and every event:
outcome = status; cause from the verdict path (derived for older rows,
flagged as a caveat), and for an explicit failure from the ESP evidence
(failed step, error code, culprit apps, AppX candidate, stuck policy
providers). Plus the ESP phase rollup, the ESP profile, what an unfinished
session still waited for, and observation caveats. Never from rule
confidence: Stalled, AwaitingUser and reconciled sessions get no terminal
rule run.

- App facts come from the session's own app events (the app table has no
  intent or targeting); only required apps count, a later install clears
  an app, a zero error code is none, and a 0x87d1041c ESP failure ranks
  the NotDetected app first (real IME payload shape).
- The event read is strict: a storage error is a 500, never a verdict
  built from no evidence. 400 for a non-GUID id, 404 for an unknown session.
- Helpers/EventDataReader replaces three private Data-string copies
  (classifier, failure snapshot, time attribution) and the list parsing in
  EspBlockingSets; EspBlockingSets.FromLatest replaces two backward walks.
- Six vocabularies in the shared manifest section `diagnosis`; parity facts
  pin the full and the minimal shape; route in the policy catalog.
- MCP get_session_summary carries it as `headline` right after coverage,
  null when the call fails.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-14 00:48:05 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 3bedc65ed5 bump pointer: internal (D-356 amended, diagnosis plan phase 2)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-13 23:36:33 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach e5cb3c4f5e Rules: every analyze rule carries a presentation block (D-356)
All 54 shipped analyze rules get role, summary, subject and key facts as
{{signal.key}} templates, each with a minor version bump so the self-seed
picks them up. Values were checked against stored findings, the rows that
receive the block at read time.

- ENRL-001 repeats the outcome only: the 0x87D1041C paragraph and the
  placeholder note are gone, labels read "ESP step that failed" / "ESP
  error code", remediation is "Find the cause". This changes its alert text.
- ENRL-002 says the sweep "closed" the session (it can end Incomplete).
- ID-002 and ID-004 gain evidence-only conditions (unexpected account
  names; IME token failure count and codes); firing and confidence are
  unchanged.
- Resolution: facts sharing a label are alternatives, an exact repeat of
  label and value is left out (new shared fixture case, web module and
  its generated MCP copy).
- Ratchet: every built-in presentation passes the save validator, uses
  qualified tokens only, and each token names a condition of the rule and
  a key its source records (RuleTemplateInterpolator.TokenRegex internal).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-13 23:36:21 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach d7b094852d bump pointer: internal (D-356, diagnosis plan phase 1)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-13 22:49:00 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 516cdc71a7 Rules: optional presentation block, {{signal.key}} tokens, one resolution for web and MCP (D-356)
Analyze rules can describe how a finding is shown: a role (outcome, cause, context,
advisory), a one-line summary, the subject it is about and up to six key facts. Like the
explanation, the block is stored raw on the result and resolved where it is rendered.

- Templates: a qualified token {{signal.key}} reads one key of one condition's evidence,
  so counts, durations and correlation fields are reachable. RuleEvidenceKeys (Shared,
  exported to the manifest) lists the keys each condition source records; tests pin it
  against the evaluators.
- Backend: PresentationJson on AnalyzeRules and RuleResults, RuleVersion on results,
  ValidatePresentation on create/update, and results stored without a presentation get
  the current rule's at read time.
- Web + MCP: lib/rulePresentation.ts resolves the block (unrecorded facts left out, summary
  falls back to the explanation). The MCP now runs generated copies of the web modules
  instead of a hand-kept mirror (npm run generate:mcp-logic, freshness tests in both
  suites); the duplicate baseline shrinks by one.
- MCP output: get_session and get_session_summary return the resolved block (issues gain
  ruleId, role, summary, subject, facts); test_analyze_rule previews it; validate_rule
  checks qualified tokens against the key catalog and lints the subject.
- Shared case files: rule-template-interpolation gains the qualified-token cases,
  rule-presentation is new.

No rule carries a presentation yet; renderers behave as before until rules gain one.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-13 22:48:46 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 4a822767d4 bump pointer: internal (catalog check opens files exclusively, B-ute)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-13 20:33:02 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach f82eabd6eb bump pointer: internal (payload catalog released, B-5q2)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-13 20:06:21 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 1892da30e4 Agent: the bootstrap provenance also reads the log names from before 2026-08-18
The first device on 2.0.1486 reported no bootstrap log at all. Installers up to v2.3 write
bootstrap_agent.log, and the MSI's own downloader (before the loader of 2026-09-08)
msi-bootstrap.log; the reader knew only the names from the rename of 2026-08-18 on, so the
old directly assigned installers that agent_started is meant to count read as "no bootstrap".

- The installer log is the more recently written of bootstrap-script.log and
  bootstrap_agent.log; the MSI channel also covers msi-bootstrap.log, which has no version.
- Tests: the old installer name, both installer logs (the newer one counts), the old MSI
  downloader.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-13 20:04:06 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach fd44518e14 Bootstrap: installer v2.6 and the OOBE go-script verify the payload catalog (D-354, phase B)
- Install-AutopilotMonitor.ps1 v2.6: Get-AgentPayloadRejections (Test-FileCatalog
  -Detailed; signature Valid, signer -like the pin, files exactly as catalogued) and
  Install-VerifiedAgentPayload (extract into Agent-Install, verify there, then move into
  the agent folder; a rejection deletes the staging folder, so the next run starts clean).
  Replaces the name-filtered Get-UnverifiedAgentBinaries; the dead "already installed"
  branch behind guard 5 is gone.
- OOBE go-script: embeds the installer's marked block verbatim (EmbeddedResource) and
  verifies before --install; pin and catalog name come from the Shared constants; the
  golden is updated, new tests pin the embedding and the order check-before-install.
- build-agent.yml: the release verify step dot-sources the installer and runs its own
  function on the final ZIP.
- Pester: every decision branch, a real unsigned catalog, the staging flow (64/64).
- Privacy page: the catalog claim; LAST_UPDATED.

Merge only after a catalog ZIP is live on stable (plan step V0): pushing this to main
publishes the installer to every loader on its next run.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-13 19:43:25 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach d95640c597 Agent: protected DACL on the agent data directory (D-355)
%ProgramData%\AutopilotMonitor inherited ProgramData's "Users may create files and
folders" entry, so a standard user could add files to the folder the SYSTEM agent and its
boot task start from. The agent outlives the device phase of OOBE (user phase, desktop,
reboots until the enrollment ends), and the payload catalog is checked at install time
only.

- AgentDirectoryAcl.EnsureProtected: protected DACL, SYSTEM and Administrators full
  control, Users read and execute, inherited by every subfolder; idempotent, never blocks
  the agent.
- Install mode applies it after the agent directories exist; every runtime start
  re-checks it, which also reaches agents that arrived by self-update.
- Tests: protected shape, apply once then leave alone, existing subfolders take it over,
  a widened or unprotected DACL is not taken as protected, a missing folder is not created.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-13 19:26:44 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach b5e9f45a46 bump pointer: internal (payload catalog lab VM result)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-13 18:57:58 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach b4dabcce94 bump pointer: internal (payload catalog dev rehearsal)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-13 18:32:25 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 6bbdcc0313 bump pointer: internal (agent payload catalog plan status)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-13 18:09:51 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 283c094986 Agent payload: signed catalog, vendor check, dev channel in CI (D-354, phase A)
- build-agent.yml: input channel (release | dev; dev writes the lab blobs only and
  refuses stable/release). Every third-party PE needs its vendor's embedded Authenticode
  signature (signtool verify /pa, read-only). AutopilotMonitor.Agent.cat, a signed
  SHA-256 catalog over every payload file, is created after Authenticode and before the
  ZIP; the device check runs under Windows PowerShell 5.1 on the final ZIP.
- Agent: SelfUpdater step 5b verifies the staged payload against the catalog before any
  file is swapped (PayloadCatalogVerifier, Test-FileCatalog in-process; a rejection means
  no update, skip reason catalog_rejected). agent_started reports which bootstrap
  installed the agent, read from the bootstrap logs (BootstrapProvenanceReader).
- Payload: System.Management.Automation.dll (never loaded, the GAC copy binds first) and
  AutopilotMonitor.Shared.xml no longer ship; PDBs stay.
- Shared: CodeSigningPublisherPattern, AgentPayloadCatalogFileName;
  CodeSigningParityTests pins them against installer, loader and workflow.
- Submodules: infra (build.ps1 local only), internal (D-354, plan, docs), commands.

Installer v2.6 and the OOBE script follow once a catalog ZIP is on stable: a merged
installer change is live on the next loader run.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-13 17:48:29 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 47728fbcd4 bump pointer: internal (external identities released)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-13 01:44:18 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach d5f885c4b4 bump pointer: internal (external identities never claim a tenant, D-353)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-13 01:21:38 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach dd4975b73e Auth: an external identity never claims a tenant (D-353)
A caller whose token shows it is not a member of the token's tenant (acct = 1, a #EXT# user name,
or an idp naming another tenant, a personal Microsoft account or an external sign-in provider) no
longer seeds DomainName/OnboardedBy or queues the activation, is never the first-user Tenant Admin,
and cannot set the activation-page address in the roleless signup window. Positive evidence only:
a token without these signals stays a member's, and tid/idp are read under their inbound-mapped
names as well. Activation promotes OnboardedBy only; the UpdatedBy fallback is gone and a stored
#EXT# UPN is refused. Explicit grants (TenantAdmins row, app role) still apply.

The once-per-interval log gate of the client-app binding becomes Helpers/LogThrottle and also
throttles the new warning, which the polling activation page would otherwise repeat.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-13 01:19:56 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 18310b05aa bump pointer: internal (MCP input bounds released)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-13 00:29:24 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 40894ed5e7 bump pointer: internal (MCP input bounds, D-352)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-13 00:10:02 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 6894e71668 MCP: bound caller-sized search input; scoring cost no longer grows with the keyword count
search_events, search_knowledge and search_docs take a query of at most 1,000
characters; search_events takes at most 20 keywords of 100 characters and
scores at most 32 distinct keywords, caller keywords first, reporting the rest
as keywordsDropped with a note. The error-code fallback takes at most 10 codes,
search_docs.section at most 100 characters.

The event scorer compiles the query once (compileConcepts): each event field is
split into words once and its words are looked up by the key of their first
three characters, so scoring an event costs the same whatever the number of
keywords. The matching rule is unchanged; a seeded differential test pins it
against the per-keyword rule. scoreEvents yields to the event loop every 256
events and stops once the caller has gone.

Every paginated tool's continuation goes through one ContinuationSchema
(at most 4,096 characters), and buildQuery appends instead of set: both
URLSearchParams.set paths were quadratic in caller-sized input.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-13 00:07:28 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach a28fdc874f bump pointer: internal (watch at the seal + app badge released)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-12 22:45:24 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 7480a2e218 Push receiver: an app badge counts unread alerts; an open history reads them
Every stored history entry starts unread. After a new entry the worker sets the
app badge to the unread count through applyBadge, fire and forget: inside
Safari's declarative push event the setAppBadge promise never settles, so it is
never awaited and never handed to waitUntil (pushSw.test.ts pins it). The
history page marks everything read on every visible load, clears the badge,
closes the notifications whose entries the history holds and shows "New" on
what arrived since the last visit. Unpair clears the badge; the wipe push
leaves it to the next open. The payload repeats mutable inside notification,
where Safari 18.4-26.1 reads it, and carries no app_badge.

Bumps internal (plan, D-350, D-351, concept doc).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-12 22:22:56 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 96fc88462d Push: the session watch fires at the WhiteGlove seal
"Notify me when done" now also fires on the first genuine pre-provisioning
seal ("Pre-provisioning finished") on the gate of the Pre-Provisioning
Completed alert, and the watch is consumed there; watching the user phase takes
a new click. A watch placed on a sealed session lives 30 days instead of 48
hours. EventIngestProcessor.WatchOutcomeFor is the one gate, the watch text
comes from PushSessionWatchService.WatchMessage. The portal button re-reads the
watch on every status change and names what it waits for. The Success hint
says it covers a finished pre-provisioning; the receiver labels the
preprovisioning_* alerts.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-12 22:22:44 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 6b86549fd0 bump pointers: internal, .claude/commands (client-cert interception released)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-12 18:30:15 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach e8e350bf14 bump pointer: internal (B-k87 done)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-12 17:55:27 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 4e519fa4b7 Backend: the correlation-id gate anchors with \z
.NET's $ also matches before a final newline, so "7c9e6679\n" passed the allow-list that guards
the inbound X-Correlation-ID against CRLF and log forgery and was echoed. Such a value does not
arrive over HTTP, but the gate now holds what its comment promises; a new test case pins it
(red with $).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-12 17:55:26 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 52f6a177f9 bump pointers: internal, .claude/commands (client-cert interception, D-349)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-12 17:45:02 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach caafaeafd4 Tests: the push recording handler survives the parallel fan-out
PushDeliveryService sends with Parallel.ForEachAsync, and RecordingHandler appended to plain
lists without a lock: two concurrent sends could lose a request (Delivered 2, recorded 1), so
Tenant_alert_also_reaches_platform_devices_whose_owners_home_tenant_it_is failed now and then
(once in six full runs while it was traced). A request and its body are now recorded together
under the lock.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-12 17:43:52 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach bfb6c12384 Agent: an intercepted connection is no longer an auth failure
A security client that inspects TLS strips the device certificate on the way to the backend;
the platform then answers 403 "Client Certificate Required" itself, or a proxy answers with
its own page. The agent counted these like backend rejections: five in a row shut it down,
the scheduled task restarted it at every boot, and only the 48-hour emergency break removed it.

- Origin of every 401/403: only a response that echoes the request's X-Correlation-ID is the
  backend's verdict and counts toward the auth shutdown; the stopped-app page still counts;
  anything else is foreign (client_certificate_required or foreign_response) and never counts.
- Telemetry: a foreign answer keeps the batch and pauses uploads with a backoff from 30 s up to
  15 min, without a timer; collectors and the decision engine keep running, the terminal phase
  gets one upload attempt, and the agent still leaves the device when the enrollment ends.
- Distress type ClientCertificateNotReceived (9), once per process, with operation, status,
  page title and the issuer of the server certificate; both handlers observe it through a
  validation callback that returns exactly sslPolicyErrors == None.
- Registration: an intercepted start retries on at most InterceptedRegistrationRetryBoots
  further boots (config channel, default 1, agent clamp 0..5, ConfigVersion 41), then ends
  monitoring like the emergency break. The break, this give-up and the config kill signal now
  share Program.EndMonitoringAtStart.
- Evidence: telemetry_upload_blocked carries reason, operation, statusCode, pageTitle,
  serverCertIssuer and firstBlockedAtUtc; agent_started carries priorRegistration* after failed
  starts (a local network fingerprint; only whether it changed leaves the device);
  agent_metrics_snapshot counts 2xx responses without the echo.
- Backend: distress type 9, the buffer default, InterceptedRuns on the registration-failure
  summary; tests pin the correlation echo on 401/403 and the middleware's place in the pipeline.
- Web: distress labels for TPM Incompatible and Cert Not Received; config report row.
- MCP: session coverage names intercepted uploads and the failed registrations before the start.

D-349

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-12 17:42:59 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach cd4199b1d1 bump pointer: internal (about page in the evidence-loop plan)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-12 00:53:02 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach d203ceee32 About: the evidence loop and AI investigation
- What is Autopilot Monitor?: the evidence of every enrollment is recorded while it runs;
  analyze rules flag the patterns they know, and for the rest the AI assistant over the
  built-in MCP server investigates the session (clients that work with files down to the
  raw IME logs of an uploaded diagnostics package) and drafts the rule for the next one
- Key Features: "AI Investigation & Rule Authoring", full width as the seventh card
- Technology & Platform → Integrations: the MCP server (read-only)

The claims carry the same qualifiers as the landing and the docs (D-348).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-12 00:52:03 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 59c012b42e chore 2026-10-12 00:49:40 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 86a122f31f bump pointer: internal (evidence loop released)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-12 00:46:13 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 14af0a05cd bump pointers: internal, .claude/commands (evidence loop, D-348)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-12 00:37:03 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach ee41ea80cf Landing, /ai and portal: the evidence loop
- Landing: section evidence_loop right after the stats ("Never debug the same failure
  twice." — capture, detect, investigate, learn), hero sub-line, Compare row "Unknown
  failures", capabilities tile. The terminal demo continues with the rule step: validate_rule
  and both test_analyze_rule verdicts are the real results of a dry-run against the demo's
  two sessions, anonymized like the rest; the window scrolls with the newest line.
- /ai: "Facts first. Raw logs when it matters." with the way back to the raw line; new
  section rules ("From finding to rule") with the anonymized trace of the same dry-run;
  the step card is shared with Connect.
- Portal: a failed session without any rule finding offers the AI investigation in Analysis
  and Guided Diagnosis (the debug-session prompt for clients with MCP prompts, a copyable
  full prompt for every other client). A failed session without a diagnostics package on a
  tenant without a usable upload links to the diagnostics settings. The analyze-rule editor
  tests a draft against a session on the existing dry-run route; create, save and test now
  share one rule body.
- llms.txt (evidence loop, two docs links without a redirect), about FAQ, marketing guard
  sections, three tracking events; jscpd baseline -1 for the removed payload clone.

D-348

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-12 00:37:03 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 20ae3d8c09 MCP: list the rule dry-run tools only for roles that can run them
GET /api/auth/mcp reports the caller's client-capped member role in the token's tenant
(tenantRole; reported, never a grant). The MCP server registers test_analyze_rule and
test_log_pattern only for a platform role or a Tenant Admin: their routes are
TenantAdminOrGlobalReader, so Operators and Viewers only ever got a 403. validate_rule,
author-rule and the authoring guide hand a draft to a Tenant Admin otherwise, and
investigate-failed-session and debug-session end by drafting a rule for a cause that can
recur. Catalog ratchet lowered for tenant users (51,000) and delegated callers (55,500).

D-348

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-12 00:37:03 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach d0f62a6aaf web(geo): sign-in before the loading card on Geographic Performance
Both geo pages returned their CalculatingCard before rendering their own
ProtectedRoute. MSAL keeps the account in sessionStorage, so a new tab,
bookmark or typed URL starts signed out: the tenant scope never settled,
the fetch never started, and ProtectedRoute never mounted to fire the
login redirect. The page spun on "Calculating geographic metrics… 0s
elapsed" forever with no API call.

ProtectedRoute now wraps each page's default export, so the content only
mounts once signed in. Verified in a signed-out headless Edge: production
stays on the card, the fix redirects to login.microsoftonline.com.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-12 00:28:08 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 683142dd27 bump pointer: internal (docs meta descriptions live)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-11 20:24:56 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach e3f9ad5704 bump pointer: internal (CI endpoint registry released)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-10 21:56:41 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 0f98d9ca17 CodeQL: ignore action-pins.yml like ci.yml does
The workflow gates file was missing from both paths-ignore lists, so every gate
change re-ran the full CodeQL analysis for nothing.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-10 21:56:40 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach bfe345ca93 bump pointer: internal (CI endpoint registry: redirect URIs)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-10 21:39:50 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 587ed74d96 deploy-web: Entra redirect URIs from the endpoint registry
Both were repository variables holding the www origin; lib/msalConfig.ts uses them
only as the static-render fallback and window.location.origin in the browser.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-10 21:39:49 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach d5222fcb93 bump pointer: infra, internal (CI endpoint registry: D-347)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-10 21:32:38 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 8d24c5680b CI: one endpoint registry for every host the workflows use
.github/scripts/Get-Endpoints.ps1 defines the storage account (blob and table
derived from its name), the containers, the AdminConfiguration row, the legacy
mirror, the download alias, API, MCP, portal, www, docs and the timestamp
server. Workflows load it once per job; the script publisher and the local
release build call it; the dev-render anchors are built from the alias entry.

deploy-web takes NEXT_PUBLIC_API_BASE_URL and NEXT_PUBLIC_PLATFORM_STATS_MANIFEST_URL
from the registry instead of repository variables and refuses an empty value.
A new Workflow gates job fails on any host spelled out in a workflow or CI
helper; the enforced list is derived from the registry.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-10 21:32:36 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 818f5f1091 bump pointer: internal (CI credential zones verified)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-10 20:56:56 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 485bda3658 bump pointer: internal (CI credential zones: 2b on 2026-10-19, B-2s7 done)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-10 20:44:56 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 0b82faa7bd bump pointer: internal (CI credential zones: D-346, deploy identity on environments)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-10 20:21:58 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach c26542776e CI: credential-free build jobs, trust jobs that never build
Every job that runs third-party code (restore, build, tests, npm ci, next build,
wix) now holds only a read-only token and hands its output on as one archive.
Signing, publishing and deploying happen in separate jobs on a fresh runner that
run only this repository's scripts and pinned actions, unpack artifacts outside
the checkout and take no build-job output into a script.

- build-agent: reserve -> build -> release
- build-msi: sign-loader -> build -> release
- deploy-backend: reserve -> build -> deploy (publish output as one tar.gz)
- deploy-web: build -> deploy (SWA token only, no id-token) -> record
- combine-rules: validate (read-only, PRs too) -> publish (push to main only)
- deploy-mcp: same shape; documents docker build as its boundary

Deploy-only jobs run in the production environment. The jobs that sign stay
without an environment for now: a job carries one OIDC subject, and the signing
identity still trusts the ref. oidc-login-test.yml is removed; combine-rules no
longer triggers on the dev branch.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-10 20:21:04 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 80cd6c52f4 bump pointer: internal (B-vky)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-10 19:46:09 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach e40471e61a Agent release: run all agent test suites before the release build
build-agent.yml tested only DecisionCore (648 of 4,154 agent tests). It now runs
the DecisionCore, Agent.V2.Core and SummaryDialog suites before building the
release binaries, with the reserved build number.

The order matters: Agent.V2.Core.Tests references the agent exe, so its build
compiles the agent. Run after the release build or without BUILD_NUMBER, it
rewrites the exe with another version (a fresh checkout stamped 2.0.1 in a local
simulation). Run first with the number, it stamps the release version and the
Build Agent step stays an up-to-date no-op (same FileVersion, same write time).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-10 19:39:01 +02:00
Oliver Kieselbach 7908d54999 bump pointer: internal (dead-code and duplicate gates released)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-10 19:17:04 +02:00
646 changed files with 43125 additions and 7036 deletions
@@ -0,0 +1,84 @@
<#
.SYNOPSIS
Fails when a workflow or a CI helper spells out a host instead of reading Get-Endpoints.ps1.
.DESCRIPTION
The CI counterpart of the URL-registry guard tests (HardcodedUrlGuardTests,
hardcodedUrls.guard.test.ts, hardcoded-urls.guard.test.ts). Enforced: every host the registry
defines -- derived from it, so the list cannot fall behind -- plus any Azure storage, App Service
or autopilotmonitor.com host, so a new or misspelled account is caught as well.
Scans .github/workflows/*.yml and .github/scripts/*.ps1 except the registry itself. Comment lines
and PowerShell block comments do not count: comments may cite URLs.
.PARAMETER Root
Repository root to scan. Defaults to the parent of .github/scripts.
#>
[CmdletBinding()]
param(
[string]$Root
)
$ErrorActionPreference = 'Stop'
if (-not $Root) {
$Root = (Resolve-Path (Join-Path $PSScriptRoot '../..')).Path
}
$endpoints = & (Join-Path $PSScriptRoot 'Get-Endpoints.ps1')
$registryHosts = $endpoints.Values | ForEach-Object { ([uri]$_).Host } | Sort-Object -Unique
$patterns = @($registryHosts | ForEach-Object { [regex]::Escape($_) }) + @(
'[a-z0-9-]+\.(blob|table|queue|file)\.core\.windows\.net'
'[a-z0-9-]+\.azurewebsites\.net'
'([a-z0-9-]+\.)*autopilotmonitor\.com'
)
$hostPattern = [regex]::new('(' + ($patterns -join '|') + ')', 'IgnoreCase')
$files = @(
Get-ChildItem -Path (Join-Path $Root '.github/workflows') -File -Filter '*.yml'
Get-ChildItem -Path (Join-Path $Root '.github/workflows') -File -Filter '*.yaml'
Get-ChildItem -Path (Join-Path $Root '.github/scripts') -File -Filter '*.ps1' |
Where-Object Name -ne 'Get-Endpoints.ps1'
)
$findings = 0
foreach ($file in $files) {
$relative = [System.IO.Path]::GetRelativePath($Root, $file.FullName) -replace '\\', '/'
$isPowerShell = $file.Extension -eq '.ps1'
$inBlock = $false
$lineNumber = 0
foreach ($line in [System.IO.File]::ReadAllLines($file.FullName)) {
$lineNumber++
$code = $line
if ($isPowerShell) {
if ($inBlock) {
$end = $code.IndexOf('#>')
if ($end -lt 0) { continue }
$code = $code.Substring($end + 2)
$inBlock = $false
}
$start = $code.IndexOf('<#')
if ($start -ge 0) {
$end = $code.IndexOf('#>', $start + 2)
if ($end -lt 0) {
$code = $code.Substring(0, $start)
$inBlock = $true
} else {
$code = $code.Remove($start, $end + 2 - $start)
}
}
}
if ($code.TrimStart().StartsWith('#')) { continue }
$match = $hostPattern.Match($code)
if ($match.Success) {
Write-Host "::error file=$relative,line=$lineNumber::$($match.Value) is spelled out here -- take it from .github/scripts/Get-Endpoints.ps1."
$findings++
}
}
}
if ($findings -gt 0) {
throw "$findings host literal(s) outside the endpoint registry."
}
Write-Host "No host literal outside .github/scripts/Get-Endpoints.ps1 ($($files.Count) files scanned)."
+72
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,72 @@
<#
.SYNOPSIS
The one place the workflows and the release scripts take their hosts from.
.DESCRIPTION
CI's member of the URL registry (Shared Constants.cs, web lib/config.ts, MCP src/config.ts):
every own host the workflows and the .github/scripts helpers talk to, plus the Authenticode
timestamp server, is defined here once. Assert-HostsFromRegistry.ps1 (Workflow gates) fails
on any of these hosts spelled out elsewhere under .github/.
The storage URLs derive from the account name, so blob and table can never point at two
different accounts.
A file in the repository rather than a GitHub variable: the helpers read it themselves, so
they behave the same in every job and in a local run, and bearer tokens are sent to these
URLs -- where a token goes stays a reviewed line in git.
.PARAMETER ExportToGitHubEnv
Write every entry to $GITHUB_ENV instead of returning it, so the following steps of the job
read them as environment variables ($env:AGENT_CONTAINER_URL, ${{ env.AGENT_CONTAINER_URL }}).
.OUTPUTS
[ordered] hashtable, keyed by the names the environment variables carry.
.EXAMPLE
$endpoints = & "$PSScriptRoot/Get-Endpoints.ps1"
Invoke-WebRequest -Uri "$($endpoints.AGENT_CONTAINER_URL)/version.json"
#>
[CmdletBinding()]
param(
[switch]$ExportToGitHubEnv
)
$ErrorActionPreference = 'Stop'
$storageAccount = 'autopilotmonitoreu'
# Pre-migration account in another tenant; only the fail-soft legacy mirror still writes there.
$legacyStorageAccount = 'autopilotmonitor'
$blob = "https://$storageAccount.blob.core.windows.net"
$table = "https://$storageAccount.table.core.windows.net"
$endpoints = [ordered]@{
STORAGE_BLOB_URL = $blob
STORAGE_TABLE_URL = $table
AGENT_CONTAINER_URL = "$blob/agent"
VERSIONS_CONTAINER_URL = "$blob/versions"
STATS_CONTAINER_URL = "$blob/stats"
# Platform settings row; CI writes only its agent and bootstrap version columns.
ADMIN_CONFIG_URL = "$table/AdminConfiguration(PartitionKey='GlobalConfig',RowKey='config')"
LEGACY_AGENT_CONTAINER_URL = "https://$legacyStorageAccount.blob.core.windows.net/agent"
# Front Door in front of the agent container: what customer scripts download from.
DOWNLOAD_ALIAS_URL = 'https://download.autopilotmonitor.com/agent'
API_BASE_URL = 'https://autopilotmonitor-api-eu.azurewebsites.net'
MCP_BASE_URL = 'https://mcp.autopilotmonitor.com'
PORTAL_BASE_URL = 'https://portal.autopilotmonitor.com'
WWW_BASE_URL = 'https://www.autopilotmonitor.com'
DOCS_BASE_URL = 'https://docs.autopilotmonitor.com'
CODE_SIGN_TIMESTAMP_URL = 'http://timestamp.acs.microsoft.com'
}
if ($ExportToGitHubEnv) {
if ([string]::IsNullOrWhiteSpace($env:GITHUB_ENV)) {
throw '-ExportToGitHubEnv only works inside a GitHub Actions step.'
}
$endpoints.GetEnumerator() | ForEach-Object { "$($_.Key)=$($_.Value)" } |
Out-File -FilePath $env:GITHUB_ENV -Encoding utf8 -Append
$endpoints.GetEnumerator() | ForEach-Object { Write-Host "$($_.Key) = $($_.Value)" }
return
}
return $endpoints
+2 -2
View File
@@ -9,8 +9,8 @@
live here so they cannot drift between call sites.
Identity comes from whatever `az login` established: the federated GitHub OIDC principal
in CI (azure/login, subject repo:okieselbach/AutopilotMonitor:ref:refs/heads/main), the
operator's own account for the local build. No secret is read, stored or passed around.
in CI (azure/login in a job of the `production` or `release` environment), the operator's
own account when a helper runs locally. No secret is read, stored or passed around.
Under GitHub Actions the token is masked in the run log before it is returned.
x-ms-version is MANDATORY here, not decoration: Entra-authorized requests are rejected
@@ -0,0 +1,72 @@
<#
.SYNOPSIS
Runs the bootstrap integration tests once as SYSTEM, the account the bootstrap runs as on a device.
.DESCRIPTION
Registers a one-time scheduled task as SYSTEM that runs
scripts/Bootstrap/Bootstrap.Integration.Tests.ps1 under Windows PowerShell 5.1, waits for it,
prints its output and fails when the run did not happen as SYSTEM or a test failed. Run as
SYSTEM, the tests use the real folder permissions, including Administrators as owner.
CI only (bootstrap-script-gates.yml): it needs an elevated runner and Pester installed for all
users.
#>
[CmdletBinding()]
param(
[string]$RepoRoot = (Resolve-Path (Join-Path $PSScriptRoot '../..')).Path,
[int]$TimeoutMinutes = 20
)
$ErrorActionPreference = 'Stop'
$work = Join-Path ([System.IO.Path]::GetTempPath()) "apm-system-pass-$PID"
New-Item -ItemType Directory -Force -Path $work | Out-Null
$runner = Join-Path $work 'run.ps1'
$output = Join-Path $work 'output.txt'
$result = Join-Path $work 'result.txt'
$tests = Join-Path $RepoRoot 'scripts\Bootstrap\Bootstrap.Integration.Tests.ps1'
$runnerText = @'
$ErrorActionPreference = 'Stop'
$identity = [System.Security.Principal.WindowsIdentity]::GetCurrent().User.Value
try {
Import-Module Pester -MinimumVersion 5.5.0
$configuration = New-PesterConfiguration
$configuration.Run.Path = '__TESTS__'
$configuration.Run.PassThru = $true
$configuration.Output.Verbosity = 'Detailed'
$run = Invoke-Pester -Configuration $configuration
Set-Content -LiteralPath '__RESULT__' -Value ('{0}|{1}|{2}' -f $identity, $run.PassedCount, $run.FailedCount)
} catch {
Set-Content -LiteralPath '__RESULT__' -Value ('{0}|error|{1}' -f $identity, $_.Exception.Message)
}
'@
Set-Content -LiteralPath $runner -Encoding ASCII -Value ($runnerText.Replace('__TESTS__', $tests).Replace('__RESULT__', $result))
$taskName = "apm-bootstrap-system-pass-$PID"
$arguments = "-NoProfile -ExecutionPolicy Bypass -Command `"& '$runner' *> '$output'`""
$action = New-ScheduledTaskAction -Execute "$env:SystemRoot\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe" -Argument $arguments
$principal = New-ScheduledTaskPrincipal -UserId 'S-1-5-18' -LogonType ServiceAccount -RunLevel Highest
Register-ScheduledTask -TaskName $taskName -Action $action -Principal $principal -Force | Out-Null
try {
Start-ScheduledTask -TaskName $taskName
$deadline = (Get-Date).AddMinutes($TimeoutMinutes)
do {
Start-Sleep -Seconds 5
$state = (Get-ScheduledTask -TaskName $taskName).State
} while ($state -eq 'Running' -and (Get-Date) -lt $deadline)
if ($state -eq 'Running') {
Stop-ScheduledTask -TaskName $taskName
throw "The SYSTEM pass did not finish within $TimeoutMinutes minutes."
}
} finally {
Unregister-ScheduledTask -TaskName $taskName -Confirm:$false
}
if (Test-Path -LiteralPath $output) { Get-Content -LiteralPath $output }
if (-not (Test-Path -LiteralPath $result)) { throw 'The SYSTEM pass wrote no result.' }
$identity, $passed, $failed = (Get-Content -LiteralPath $result -Raw).Trim().Split('|', 3)
if ($identity -ne 'S-1-5-18') { throw "The SYSTEM pass ran as $identity, not as SYSTEM." }
if ($passed -eq 'error') { throw "The SYSTEM pass could not run the tests: $failed" }
if ([int]$failed -gt 0 -or [int]$passed -eq 0) { throw "SYSTEM pass: $passed passed, $failed failed." }
Write-Host "SYSTEM pass: $passed passed, 0 failed."
+74 -28
View File
@@ -17,7 +17,7 @@
cosmetics.
Steps, in order:
1. Parse $ScriptVersion from the loader and the bootstrap source.
1. Parse the $ScriptVersion line from the loader and the bootstrap source.
2. Render the -Dev variants by literal substitution of the URL/manifest
defaults. A missing anchor is a hard failure -- a silently un-substituted
dev script would point the dev fleet at the stable agent.
@@ -25,17 +25,21 @@
carries the same $ScriptVersion, abort. Otherwise the docs badge,
version.json.bootstrapVersion and the portal's "your script is outdated"
hint would all keep asserting a version that is no longer what ships.
4. Build the publish set (loader, bootstrap, both dev renders, the extras).
4. Build the publish set: both installers, then both loaders, then the extras.
A loader that went live before the installer it requires would refuse the
installer still being served. -Channel dev keeps only the two -Dev renders.
5. Authenticode-sign every script (see -SigningToken). Signing is the LAST
transformation: it covers the exact CRLF/UTF-8 bytes that get uploaded,
and nothing may touch them afterwards or the signature breaks.
6. Upload every script blob with Cache-Control: no-cache (they rotate in
6. Run the loader's own identity check on the exact bytes of both installers:
what fails here, every device would refuse.
7. Upload every script blob with Cache-Control: no-cache (they rotate in
place), mirrored fail-soft to the legacy account.
7. Reconcile the version oracles: version.json.bootstrapVersion and
.loaderVersion (read-modify-write under If-Match, so a concurrent agent
8. Reconcile the version oracles (release channel only): version.json.bootstrapVersion
and .loaderVersion (read-modify-write under If-Match, so a concurrent agent
release cannot lose its agent fields) and
AdminConfiguration.LatestBootstrapV2ScriptVersion.
8. Verify through the alias -- re-download each blob and compare SHA-256.
9. Verify through the alias -- re-download each blob and compare SHA-256.
Comparisons against a published script always strip its signature block first
(Get-ComparableText). A signature carries a timestamp, so signed bytes differ on
@@ -67,6 +71,11 @@
Optional directory that receives a copy of every published file exactly as uploaded.
Used by CI to offer the signed scripts as a build artifact for local inspection.
.PARAMETER Channel
release (default): every script, plus version.json and the portal's script version.
dev: only Start-AutopilotMonitor-Dev.ps1 and Install-AutopilotMonitor-Dev.ps1, so a
script change can run on dev devices, signed, before it goes to customers.
.EXAMPLE
./Publish-BootstrapScripts.ps1 -DryRun
@@ -81,9 +90,10 @@ param(
[string]$SigningToken,
[string]$KeyVaultUrl,
[string]$CertificateName,
[string]$TimestampUrl = 'http://timestamp.acs.microsoft.com',
[string]$ExpectedPublisher,
[string]$SignedOutputDir,
[ValidateSet('release', 'dev')]
[string]$Channel = 'release',
[switch]$DryRun
)
@@ -93,10 +103,13 @@ if (-not $RepoRoot) {
$RepoRoot = (Resolve-Path (Join-Path $PSScriptRoot '../..')).Path
}
$ContainerUrl = 'https://autopilotmonitoreu.blob.core.windows.net/agent'
$LegacyContainerUrl = 'https://autopilotmonitor.blob.core.windows.net/agent'
$AliasUrl = 'https://download.autopilotmonitor.com/agent'
$TableUrl = "https://autopilotmonitoreu.table.core.windows.net/AdminConfiguration(PartitionKey='GlobalConfig',RowKey='config')"
# Every host, the timestamp server included, from the one endpoint registry.
$Endpoints = & (Join-Path $PSScriptRoot 'Get-Endpoints.ps1')
$ContainerUrl = $Endpoints.AGENT_CONTAINER_URL
$LegacyContainerUrl = $Endpoints.LEGACY_AGENT_CONTAINER_URL
$AliasUrl = $Endpoints.DOWNLOAD_ALIAS_URL
$TableUrl = $Endpoints.ADMIN_CONFIG_URL
$TimestampUrl = $Endpoints.CODE_SIGN_TIMESTAMP_URL
$BootstrapSource = Join-Path $RepoRoot 'scripts/Bootstrap/Install-AutopilotMonitor.ps1'
$BootstrapBlob = 'Install-AutopilotMonitor.ps1'
@@ -210,7 +223,7 @@ function Set-PublishSetSignature {
--timestamp-rfc3161 $TimestampUrl `
--file-digest sha256 `
--description 'Autopilot Monitor bootstrap' `
--description-url 'https://www.autopilotmonitor.com' `
--description-url $Endpoints.WWW_BASE_URL `
$paths
# Native tool: PowerShell does not throw on a non-zero exit, and an unnoticed signing
@@ -291,7 +304,9 @@ function Assert-VersionBump {
function Get-BootstrapScriptVersion {
param([string]$Content, [string]$Origin, [switch]$Optional)
if ($Content -match '\$ScriptVersion\s*=\s*"([\d\.\-a-zA-Z]+)"') { return $Matches[1] }
# The assignment line itself, as the loader reads it: a comment or help text that mentions
# $ScriptVersion must not count.
if ($Content -match '(?m)^\$ScriptVersion[ \t]*=[ \t]*"([\d\.\-a-zA-Z]+)"[ \t]*\r?$') { return $Matches[1] }
# Unreadable SOURCE is fatal. An unreadable PUBLISHED copy must not be: that is exactly
# the state a republish is meant to repair, and a guard that blocks the repair is worse
# than no guard.
@@ -299,6 +314,19 @@ function Get-BootstrapScriptVersion {
throw "Could not parse ScriptVersion from $Origin"
}
# The loader's own check, run on the exact bytes that will be served: dot-sourced in this
# function's scope, so none of the loader's variables reach the publisher's.
function Assert-LoaderAcceptsInstaller {
param([object]$Item, [string]$WorkDir)
New-Item -ItemType Directory -Force -Path $WorkDir | Out-Null
$path = Join-Path $WorkDir $Item.BlobName
[System.IO.File]::WriteAllBytes($path, [byte[]]$Item.Bytes)
. $LoaderSource
if (-not (Test-InstallerIdentity -Path $path)) {
throw "The loader would refuse $($Item.BlobName) (role or minimum version). Nothing was uploaded."
}
}
# What the script actually DOES, with comments and layout removed: the PowerShell token
# stream minus comments, newlines and line continuations. Lets the version-bump guard tell
# a behaviour change (must be versioned -- consumers act on the version) apart from a
@@ -327,8 +355,10 @@ $loaderVersion = Get-BootstrapScriptVersion -Content $loaderContent -Origin $Loa
Write-Host "Loader script version: $loaderVersion"
# ------------------------------------------------------------------ 2. dev render
$stableUrlLiteral = '$AgentDownloadUrl = "https://download.autopilotmonitor.com/agent/AutopilotMonitor-Agent.zip"'
$devUrlLiteral = '$AgentDownloadUrl = "https://download.autopilotmonitor.com/agent/AutopilotMonitor-Agent-dev.zip"'
# The anchors are the customer scripts' own text, built from the alias in the registry. Should
# the alias ever move, the scripts have to move with it -- until they do, the render stops here.
$stableUrlLiteral = '$AgentDownloadUrl = "' + $AliasUrl + '/AutopilotMonitor-Agent.zip"'
$devUrlLiteral = '$AgentDownloadUrl = "' + $AliasUrl + '/AutopilotMonitor-Agent-dev.zip"'
$stableManLiteral = '$VersionJsonName = "version.json"'
$devManLiteral = '$VersionJsonName = "version-dev.json"'
@@ -339,8 +369,8 @@ $devContent = $sourceContent.Replace($stableUrlLiteral, $devUrlLiteral).Replace(
Write-Host "Rendered $DevBlob (dev agent URL + version-dev.json)"
# The dev loader must fetch the dev bootstrap, or a dev device would run the stable chain.
$stableLoaderLiteral = '$BootstrapUrl = "https://download.autopilotmonitor.com/agent/Install-AutopilotMonitor.ps1"'
$devLoaderLiteral = '$BootstrapUrl = "https://download.autopilotmonitor.com/agent/Install-AutopilotMonitor-Dev.ps1"'
$stableLoaderLiteral = '$BootstrapUrl = "' + $AliasUrl + '/Install-AutopilotMonitor.ps1"'
$devLoaderLiteral = '$BootstrapUrl = "' + $AliasUrl + '/Install-AutopilotMonitor-Dev.ps1"'
if ($loaderContent.IndexOf($stableLoaderLiteral) -lt 0) {
throw "Loader dev-render: anchor literal missing in $LoaderSource"
@@ -349,8 +379,11 @@ $devLoaderContent = $loaderContent.Replace($stableLoaderLiteral, $devLoaderLiter
Write-Host "Rendered $LoaderDevBlob (points at $DevBlob)"
# ------------------------------------------------------------------ 3. bump guards
Assert-VersionBump -BlobName $BootstrapBlob -SourceContent $sourceContent -SourceOrigin $BootstrapSource -SourceVersion $scriptVersion
Assert-VersionBump -BlobName $LoaderBlob -SourceContent $loaderContent -SourceOrigin $LoaderSource -SourceVersion $loaderVersion
# The versions are what customers act on, so the guard watches the release blobs only.
if ($Channel -eq 'release') {
Assert-VersionBump -BlobName $BootstrapBlob -SourceContent $sourceContent -SourceOrigin $BootstrapSource -SourceVersion $scriptVersion
Assert-VersionBump -BlobName $LoaderBlob -SourceContent $loaderContent -SourceOrigin $LoaderSource -SourceVersion $loaderVersion
}
# ------------------------------------------------------------------ 4. publish set
# Sources beyond the bootstrap pair, read straight from the repo.
@@ -365,10 +398,15 @@ $extraSources = @(
# Text is the unsigned publish form and stays the reference for every comparison against a
# published copy; Bytes is what goes on the wire and carries the signature after step 4.
$publishSet = [System.Collections.Generic.List[object]]::new()
$publishSet.Add([pscustomobject]@{ BlobName = $LoaderBlob; Text = $loaderContent; Bytes = (Get-PublishBytes $loaderContent) })
$publishSet.Add([pscustomobject]@{ BlobName = $LoaderDevBlob; Text = $devLoaderContent; Bytes = (Get-PublishBytes $devLoaderContent) })
$publishSet.Add([pscustomobject]@{ BlobName = $BootstrapBlob; Text = $sourceContent; Bytes = $sourceBytes })
$publishSet.Add([pscustomobject]@{ BlobName = $DevBlob; Text = $devContent; Bytes = (Get-PublishBytes $devContent) })
$publishSet.Add([pscustomobject]@{ BlobName = $LoaderBlob; Text = $loaderContent; Bytes = (Get-PublishBytes $loaderContent) })
$publishSet.Add([pscustomobject]@{ BlobName = $LoaderDevBlob; Text = $devLoaderContent; Bytes = (Get-PublishBytes $devLoaderContent) })
if ($Channel -eq 'dev') {
$publishSet = [System.Collections.Generic.List[object]]@($publishSet | Where-Object { $_.BlobName -in @($DevBlob, $LoaderDevBlob) })
$extraSources = @()
Write-Host "Channel dev: publishing $DevBlob and $LoaderDevBlob only"
}
foreach ($extra in $extraSources) {
$extraPath = Join-Path $RepoRoot $extra.Path
if (-not (Test-Path $extraPath)) {
@@ -387,13 +425,18 @@ if ($SigningEnabled) {
Write-Host '::warning::No signing token supplied -- dry run continues with unsigned scripts.'
}
# ------------------------------------------------------------------ 6. loader check
foreach ($item in @($publishSet | Where-Object { $_.BlobName -in @($BootstrapBlob, $DevBlob) })) {
Assert-LoaderAcceptsInstaller -Item $item -WorkDir (Join-Path ([System.IO.Path]::GetTempPath()) "apm-publish-check-$PID")
}
$legacySas = if ($LegacySasToken) { $LegacySasToken.TrimStart('?') } else { '' }
# Acquired lazily: a dry run must stay runnable without any Azure login -- the PR gate
# (bootstrap-script-gates.yml) executes this script with -DryRun and never logs in.
$authHeaders = if ($DryRun) { $null } else { & (Join-Path $PSScriptRoot 'Get-StorageAuthHeaders.ps1') }
# ------------------------------------------------------------------ 6. upload
# ------------------------------------------------------------------ 7. upload
foreach ($item in $publishSet) {
# Explicit type, not a convenience: an Object[] body is uploaded as space-separated
# decimals rather than raw bytes, and every hash check still passes because [byte[]]
@@ -460,11 +503,12 @@ foreach ($item in $publishSet) {
}
}
# ------------------------------------------------------------------ 7. version oracles
# ------------------------------------------------------------------ 8. version oracles
# version.json is the agent manifest; only bootstrapVersion belongs to us. Read from the
# blob (not the alias) for an authoritative ETag, write back under If-Match so a concurrent
# agent release cannot lose its version/sha256 fields.
if (-not $DryRun) {
# agent release cannot lose its version/sha256 fields. They describe the release scripts, so
# a dev publish leaves them alone.
if (-not $DryRun -and $Channel -eq 'release') {
try {
$manifestResp = Invoke-WebRequest -Uri "$ContainerUrl/version.json" -Method Get -UseBasicParsing
$manifestRaw = if ($manifestResp.Content -is [byte[]]) {
@@ -508,7 +552,9 @@ if (-not $DryRun) {
}
}
if ($DryRun) {
if ($Channel -ne 'release') {
Write-Host "Channel dev: version.json and AdminConfiguration.LatestBootstrapV2ScriptVersion stay as they are"
} elseif ($DryRun) {
Write-Host " [dry-run] would set AdminConfiguration.LatestBootstrapV2ScriptVersion = $scriptVersion"
} else {
$tableHeaders = @{
@@ -521,7 +567,7 @@ if ($DryRun) {
Write-Host "AdminConfiguration.LatestBootstrapV2ScriptVersion = $scriptVersion"
}
# ------------------------------------------------------------------ 8. verify via alias
# ------------------------------------------------------------------ 9. verify via alias
if (-not $DryRun) {
$pending = [System.Collections.ArrayList]::new()
$publishSet | ForEach-Object { [void]$pending.Add($_) }
@@ -551,7 +597,7 @@ if (-not $DryRun) {
if ($env:GITHUB_STEP_SUMMARY) {
$mode = if ($DryRun) { 'DRY RUN -- nothing uploaded' } else { 'published + verified via the download alias' }
$summary = @(
"### Bootstrap scripts: $mode",
"### Bootstrap scripts: $mode (channel $Channel)",
'',
"Loader script version: **$loaderVersion** | Bootstrap script version: **$scriptVersion**",
"Signed: **$(if ($SigningEnabled) { "yes, certificate '$CertificateName'" } else { 'NO (unsigned dry run)' })**",
+176
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,176 @@
<#
.SYNOPSIS
Checks the bootstrap's folders against a real standard user.
.DESCRIPTION
Creates a temporary local standard user and, with that user's token, tries what any local user
on an enrolling device could try against the folders the loader and the installer create:
write, change, rename and delete files, add entries, move or delete the folder. Every attempt
must be denied. Folders the user creates first, or entries the user plants in an unprotected
agent folder of an older installer, must make the installer stop instead of installing into
them. A control attempt proves the user can write where users may.
The folders come from the installer's own functions, in a scratch copy of ProgramData that
carries the real ProgramData permissions.
CI only (bootstrap-script-gates.yml): it needs an elevated runner, and it creates a local
account and removes it again.
#>
[CmdletBinding()]
param(
[string]$RepoRoot = (Resolve-Path (Join-Path $PSScriptRoot '../..')).Path
)
$ErrorActionPreference = 'Stop'
# The user's token, for impersonation in this process (a CI helper; customer scripts never
# compile code).
Add-Type -Namespace ApmCi -Name Native -MemberDefinition @'
[DllImport("advapi32.dll", SetLastError = true, CharSet = CharSet.Unicode)]
public static extern bool LogonUser(string user, string domain, string password, int logonType, int logonProvider, out Microsoft.Win32.SafeHandles.SafeAccessTokenHandle token);
'@
. (Join-Path $RepoRoot 'scripts\Bootstrap\Install-AutopilotMonitor.ps1')
$results = New-Object System.Collections.Generic.List[object]
function Invoke-AsUser {
param([scriptblock]$Action)
[System.Security.Principal.WindowsIdentity]::RunImpersonated($script:token, [Action]$Action)
}
# An attempt the user must not get through: it has to fail with "access denied", not with
# any other error that would only hide a broken test.
function Assert-Denied {
param([string]$Name, [scriptblock]$Attempt)
$outcome = 'allowed'
try {
Invoke-AsUser $Attempt
} catch {
$base = $_.Exception.GetBaseException()
$outcome = if ($base -is [System.UnauthorizedAccessException] -or $base.HResult -eq -2147024891) { 'denied' } else { "error: $($base.Message)" }
}
$results.Add([pscustomobject]@{ Check = $Name; Expected = 'denied'; Actual = $outcome })
}
function Assert-That {
param([string]$Name, [bool]$Condition, [string]$Detail = '')
$results.Add([pscustomobject]@{ Check = $Name; Expected = 'true'; Actual = $(if ($Condition) { 'true' } else { "false $Detail".Trim() }) })
}
# What a bootstrap running as SYSTEM leaves as owner; the default for other admin-created
# entries differs between Windows editions.
function Set-AdministratorsOwner {
param([string]$Path)
$security = (Get-Item -LiteralPath $Path -Force).GetAccessControl('Owner')
$security.SetOwner((New-Object System.Security.Principal.SecurityIdentifier('S-1-5-32-544')))
(Get-Item -LiteralPath $Path -Force).SetAccessControl($security)
}
$name = 'apm-ci-' + [guid]::NewGuid().ToString('N').Substring(0, 8)
$password = [guid]::NewGuid().ToString('N') + 'Aa1!'
$root = Join-Path $env:SystemDrive ('apm-ci-' + [guid]::NewGuid().ToString('N').Substring(0, 8))
$pd = Join-Path $root 'ProgramData'
New-LocalUser -Name $name -Password (ConvertTo-SecureString $password -AsPlainText -Force) -AccountNeverExpires -PasswordNeverExpires | Out-Null
try {
try { Add-LocalGroupMember -SID 'S-1-5-32-545' -Member $name } catch { if ($_.FullyQualifiedErrorId -notlike 'MemberExists*') { throw } }
$token = $null
# Interactive logon first (what a local user has); network logon where a server allows no
# local logon for Users.
if (-not [ApmCi.Native]::LogonUser($name, '.', $password, 2, 0, [ref]$token) -and
-not [ApmCi.Native]::LogonUser($name, '.', $password, 3, 0, [ref]$token)) {
throw "LogonUser failed with Win32 error $([System.Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::GetLastWin32Error())."
}
$script:token = $token
$userSid = (New-Object System.Security.Principal.NTAccount($name)).Translate([System.Security.Principal.SecurityIdentifier])
$script:probe = $null
Invoke-AsUser { $script:probe = [System.Security.Principal.WindowsIdentity]::GetCurrent() }
Assert-That 'impersonation runs as the test user' ($script:probe.User -eq $userSid) "$($script:probe.User)"
Assert-That 'the test user is no administrator' (-not (New-Object System.Security.Principal.WindowsPrincipal($script:probe)).IsInRole([System.Security.Principal.WindowsBuiltInRole]::Administrator))
# A scratch ProgramData with the real one's permissions.
New-Item -ItemType Directory -Path $pd -Force | Out-Null
$security = New-Object System.Security.AccessControl.DirectorySecurity
$security.SetSecurityDescriptorSddlForm((Get-Acl -LiteralPath $env:ProgramData).GetSecurityDescriptorSddlForm('Access'), 'Access')
# Nothing from the drive root, whose default lets authenticated users change subfolders.
$security.SetAccessRuleProtection($true, $false)
(Get-Item -LiteralPath $pd).SetAccessControl($security)
# Control: the user may create in ProgramData, so every denial below is the folders' doing.
$control = Join-Path $pd 'user-may-create-here'
Invoke-AsUser { [System.IO.Directory]::CreateDirectory($control) | Out-Null; [System.IO.File]::WriteAllText((Join-Path $control 'x.txt'), 'x') }
Assert-That 'control: the user can create in ProgramData' (Test-Path -LiteralPath (Join-Path $control 'x.txt'))
# The loader's run folder with a downloaded installer in it.
$run = New-RunFolder -Parent $pd -Prefix 'AutopilotMonitor-Loader-'
$download = Join-Path $run 'Install-AutopilotMonitor.ps1'
[System.IO.File]::WriteAllText($download, 'verified installer')
Assert-Denied 'run folder: add a file' { [System.IO.File]::WriteAllText((Join-Path $run 'planted.ps1'), 'x') }
Assert-Denied 'run folder: add a folder or link' { [System.IO.Directory]::CreateDirectory((Join-Path $run 'planted')) | Out-Null }
Assert-Denied 'run folder: change the download' { [System.IO.File]::AppendAllText($download, 'tampered') }
Assert-Denied 'run folder: replace the download' { [System.IO.File]::WriteAllText($download, 'replaced') }
Assert-Denied 'run folder: rename the download' { [System.IO.File]::Move($download, $download + '.old') }
Assert-Denied 'run folder: delete the download' { [System.IO.File]::Delete($download) }
Assert-Denied 'run folder: rename the folder' { [System.IO.Directory]::Move($run, $run + '-moved') }
Assert-Denied 'run folder: delete the folder' { [System.IO.Directory]::Delete($run, $true) }
Assert-That 'run folder: the download is unchanged' ([System.IO.File]::ReadAllText($download) -eq 'verified installer')
# The agent folder an install prepares.
$base = Join-Path $pd 'AutopilotMonitor'
Initialize-AgentBase -Path $base
$logs = [System.IO.Directory]::CreateDirectory((Join-Path $base 'Logs')).FullName
[System.IO.File]::WriteAllText((Join-Path $logs 'bootstrap-script.log'), 'log')
Assert-Denied 'agent folder: add a file' { [System.IO.File]::WriteAllText((Join-Path $base 'planted.dll'), 'x') }
Assert-Denied 'agent folder: add a folder or link' { [System.IO.Directory]::CreateDirectory((Join-Path $base 'Agent')) | Out-Null }
Assert-Denied 'agent folder: change a log' { [System.IO.File]::AppendAllText((Join-Path $logs 'bootstrap-script.log'), 'x') }
Assert-Denied 'agent folder: delete a log' { [System.IO.File]::Delete((Join-Path $logs 'bootstrap-script.log')) }
Assert-Denied 'agent folder: rename the folder' { [System.IO.Directory]::Move($base, $base + '-moved') }
$owner = (Get-Item -LiteralPath $base).GetAccessControl('Owner').GetOwner([System.Security.Principal.SecurityIdentifier]).Value
Assert-That 'agent folder: owned by Administrators' ($owner -eq 'S-1-5-32-544') $owner
[System.IO.Directory]::Delete($base, $true)
# The user creates the agent folder first: the installer must neither install into it nor
# remove it.
Invoke-AsUser { [System.IO.Directory]::CreateDirectory($base) | Out-Null; [System.IO.File]::WriteAllText((Join-Path $base 'planted.dll'), 'x') }
Assert-That 'squatted agent folder: seen as another account''s' ((Get-FolderState $base) -eq 'Foreign')
$refused = $false
try { Initialize-AgentBase -Path $base } catch { $refused = $_.Exception.Message -like '*(Foreign); not installing into it.' }
Assert-That 'squatted agent folder: the install refuses it' $refused
Assert-That 'squatted agent folder: a skip leaves it' ((Remove-AgentBaseOnSkip -Path $base) -like '*left as it is (Foreign).')
Assert-That 'squatted agent folder: the planted file stays' (Test-Path -LiteralPath (Join-Path $base 'planted.dll'))
[System.IO.Directory]::Delete($base, $true)
# An agent folder an older installer created without protection: the user plants a file,
# the install protects the folder and stops at the planted file.
[System.IO.Directory]::CreateDirectory($base) | Out-Null
[System.IO.File]::WriteAllText((Join-Path $base 'old-installer.log'), 'old')
Set-AdministratorsOwner $base
Set-AdministratorsOwner (Join-Path $base 'old-installer.log')
Invoke-AsUser { [System.IO.File]::WriteAllText((Join-Path $base 'planted.dll'), 'x') }
$refused = $false
try { Initialize-AgentBase -Path $base } catch { $refused = $_.Exception.Message -like '*holds entries another account created*' }
Assert-That 'planted entry: the install stops' $refused
Assert-That 'planted entry: own leftovers are gone, the planted file stays' ((-not (Test-Path -LiteralPath (Join-Path $base 'old-installer.log'))) -and (Test-Path -LiteralPath (Join-Path $base 'planted.dll')))
Assert-Denied 'planted entry: the protected folder takes no more' { [System.IO.File]::WriteAllText((Join-Path $base 'second.dll'), 'x') }
[System.IO.Directory]::Delete($base, $true)
# The user creates a run folder name first: it is never used.
$squatted = Join-Path $pd 'AutopilotMonitor-Loader-00000000'
Invoke-AsUser { [System.IO.Directory]::CreateDirectory($squatted) | Out-Null }
$script:names = [System.Collections.Generic.Queue[string]]::new([string[]]@('00000000', '11111111'))
function New-RunFolderName { return $script:names.Dequeue() }
$fresh = New-RunFolder -Parent $pd -Prefix 'AutopilotMonitor-Loader-'
Assert-That 'squatted run folder: a new name is drawn' ($fresh -eq (Join-Path $pd 'AutopilotMonitor-Loader-11111111')) $fresh
$squattedOwner = (Get-Item -LiteralPath $squatted).GetAccessControl('Owner').GetOwner([System.Security.Principal.SecurityIdentifier])
Assert-That 'squatted run folder: still the user''s, untouched' ($squattedOwner -eq $userSid)
} finally {
if ($script:token) { $script:token.Dispose() }
Remove-LocalUser -Name $name -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
if (Test-Path -LiteralPath $root) { Remove-Item -LiteralPath $root -Recurse -Force -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue }
}
$results | Format-Table -AutoSize | Out-String -Width 200 | Write-Host
$failed = @($results | Where-Object { $_.Actual -ne $_.Expected })
if ($failed.Count -gt 0) { throw "Attacker test: $($failed.Count) of $($results.Count) checks failed." }
Write-Host "Attacker test: all $($results.Count) checks passed."
+20 -3
View File
@@ -1,12 +1,15 @@
name: Workflow gates
# Two checks over the workflow files themselves:
# Three checks over the workflow files and their helper scripts:
# * verify-pins -- every third-party action is referenced by a full commit SHA plus a
# version comment (stricter than zizmor's unpinned-uses audit).
# * zizmor -- static analysis of every workflow (permissions, credential
# persistence, template injection, ...). Configuration and the
# reasoned ignores live in zizmor.yml at the repository root; the
# same run is expected locally before a workflow change is committed.
# * hosts -- no workflow or .github/scripts helper spells out a host; every one
# comes from .github/scripts/Get-Endpoints.ps1, CI's member of the URL
# registry (the C#, web and MCP registries have guard tests of their own).
#
# Every third-party action must be referenced by a full commit SHA, never by a tag.
# Tags are mutable: whoever controls an action repository can repoint v4 at new code,
@@ -34,10 +37,10 @@ name: Workflow gates
on:
push:
branches: [main]
paths: ['.github/workflows/**', '.github/dependabot.yml', 'zizmor.yml']
paths: ['.github/workflows/**', '.github/scripts/**', '.github/dependabot.yml', 'zizmor.yml']
pull_request:
branches: [main]
paths: ['.github/workflows/**', '.github/dependabot.yml', 'zizmor.yml']
paths: ['.github/workflows/**', '.github/scripts/**', '.github/dependabot.yml', 'zizmor.yml']
workflow_dispatch:
permissions:
@@ -106,3 +109,17 @@ jobs:
with:
version: 1.30.1
min-severity: low
hosts:
name: Hosts only from the endpoint registry
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@3d3c42e5aac5ba805825da76410c181273ba90b1 # v7.0.1
with:
persist-credentials: false
# The enforced host list is derived from the registry itself, plus every Azure storage,
# App Service and autopilotmonitor.com host, so it cannot fall behind a new entry.
- name: No host literal outside .github/scripts/Get-Endpoints.ps1
shell: pwsh
run: ./.github/scripts/Assert-HostsFromRegistry.ps1
+30 -5
View File
@@ -15,21 +15,28 @@ permissions:
jobs:
gates:
name: Bootstrap guard tests (PS 5.1)
runs-on: windows-latest
name: Bootstrap guard tests (PS 5.1, ${{ matrix.os }})
strategy:
fail-fast: false
matrix:
# Folder permissions and Windows PowerShell 5.1 come with the OS, so both server images.
os: [windows-2022, windows-2025]
runs-on: ${{ matrix.os }}
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@3d3c42e5aac5ba805825da76410c181273ba90b1 # v7.0.1
with:
persist-credentials: false
# For all users: the SYSTEM pass below runs Pester as SYSTEM.
- name: Install Pester 5+
shell: powershell
run: |
Install-PackageProvider -Name NuGet -MinimumVersion 2.8.5.201 -Force -Scope CurrentUser | Out-Null
Install-Module Pester -Scope CurrentUser -Force -SkipPublisherCheck -MinimumVersion 5.5.0
Install-PackageProvider -Name NuGet -MinimumVersion 2.8.5.201 -Force -Scope AllUsers | Out-Null
Install-Module Pester -Scope AllUsers -Force -SkipPublisherCheck -MinimumVersion 5.5.0
# Windows PowerShell 5.1 on purpose: that is the runtime IME uses to execute
# platform scripts, so guard/relax logic is verified without resetting a device.
# The runner is elevated, so the integration tests use the real folder permissions.
- name: Run Pester
shell: powershell
run: |
@@ -40,11 +47,20 @@ jobs:
$c.Output.Verbosity = 'Detailed'
Invoke-Pester -Configuration $c
# On a device the bootstrap runs as SYSTEM: the integration tests once more as SYSTEM.
- name: Integration tests as SYSTEM
shell: powershell
run: ./.github/scripts/Invoke-BootstrapSystemPass.ps1
- name: Folder permissions against a real standard user
shell: powershell
run: ./.github/scripts/Test-BootstrapAttacker.ps1
- name: Guard scripts stay pure ASCII
shell: powershell
run: |
$failed = $false
Get-ChildItem 'scripts/Bootstrap' -Filter '*.ps1' | ForEach-Object {
Get-ChildItem 'scripts/Bootstrap' -Filter '*.ps1' -Recurse | ForEach-Object {
$bytes = [System.IO.File]::ReadAllBytes($_.FullName)
for ($i = 0; $i -lt $bytes.Length; $i++) {
if ($bytes[$i] -gt 127) {
@@ -57,6 +73,15 @@ jobs:
if ($failed) { exit 1 }
Write-Host 'All bootstrap scripts are pure ASCII.'
- uses: actions/setup-dotnet@a98b56852c35b8e3190ac28c8c2271da59106c68 # v6.0.0
with:
dotnet-version: '10.0.x'
# The names and log lines the scripts share with the agent, checked against the agent's
# own code.
- name: Script contracts with the agent
run: dotnet test src/Agent/AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests --configuration Release --filter "Category=BootstrapContract" --logger "console;verbosity=normal"
# The publish chain renders the -Dev variant by literal substitution and refuses to
# ship when an anchor moved. Running it dry here surfaces that (and any drift against
# the alias) on the PR instead of on the push that would have published.
+378 -68
View File
@@ -7,6 +7,14 @@ on:
description: 'Build number override (leave empty to auto-increment from buildcounter.txt)'
required: false
type: string
channel:
description: 'release = versioned line (+ stable on cutover). dev = lab channel only (Agent-v2-dev.zip, version-v2-dev.json, Agent-dev.zip, version-dev.json); needs publish_as_stable=false and create_release=false'
required: true
type: choice
options:
- release
- dev
default: release
upload_blob:
description: 'Upload to versioned namespace (Agent-v2.zip + version-v2.json)'
required: true
@@ -32,10 +40,11 @@ on:
required: false
type: string
# Every job states its own permissions. This default is what the build job runs with: it
# executes third-party code (MSBuild targets, analyzers, test frameworks) and must never hold
# more than a read-only token.
permissions:
contents: write
id-token: write # keyless Sigstore signing (artifact attestation)
attestations: write # store the provenance attestation
contents: read
# Shared with publish-scripts.yml: both write version.json (this workflow the agent fields,
# the script publisher bootstrapVersion under If-Match). Serialising them keeps a script push
@@ -48,7 +57,9 @@ env:
LINE_MAJOR: 2
AGENT_PROJECT: src/Agent/AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2/AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.csproj
DIALOG_PROJECT: src/Agent/AutopilotMonitor.SummaryDialog/AutopilotMonitor.SummaryDialog.csproj
TEST_PROJECT: src/Agent/AutopilotMonitor.DecisionCore.Tests/AutopilotMonitor.DecisionCore.Tests.csproj
DECISIONCORE_TEST_PROJECT: src/Agent/AutopilotMonitor.DecisionCore.Tests/AutopilotMonitor.DecisionCore.Tests.csproj
CORE_TEST_PROJECT: src/Agent/AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests/AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests.csproj
DIALOG_TEST_PROJECT: src/Agent/AutopilotMonitor.SummaryDialog.Tests/AutopilotMonitor.SummaryDialog.Tests.csproj
CSPROJ_PATH: src/Agent/AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2/AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.csproj
BOOTSTRAP_SOURCE: scripts/Bootstrap/Install-AutopilotMonitor.ps1
AGENT_OUTPUT: src/Agent/AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2/bin/Release/net48
@@ -57,18 +68,37 @@ env:
VERSIONED_ZIP: AutopilotMonitor-Agent-v2.zip
STABLE_ZIP: AutopilotMonitor-Agent.zip
STABLE_MANIFEST: version.json
# Authenticode via Azure Key Vault; identity and vault come from repository variables.
# Lab channel (channel=dev): the names the dev renders of the bootstrap scripts read.
CHANNEL: ${{ inputs.channel }}
DEV_VERSIONED_ZIP: AutopilotMonitor-Agent-v2-dev.zip
DEV_MANIFEST: version-v2-dev.json
DEV_STABLE_ZIP: AutopilotMonitor-Agent-dev.zip
DEV_STABLE_MANIFEST: version-dev.json
# Signed catalog over every other file of the payload. Must equal
# Constants.AgentPayloadCatalogFileName; CodeSigningParityTests keeps them in step.
PAYLOAD_CATALOG: AutopilotMonitor.Agent.cat
# Authenticode via Azure Key Vault; identity and vault come from repository variables, the
# timestamp server (CODE_SIGN_TIMESTAMP_URL) from the endpoint registry like every host here.
# CODE_SIGN_EXPECTED_SUBJECT is optional and pins the publisher in the verify step.
CODE_SIGN_CLIENT_ID: ${{ vars.CODE_SIGN_CLIENT_ID }}
CODE_SIGN_CERTIFICATE_NAME: ${{ vars.CODE_SIGN_CERTIFICATE_NAME }}
CODE_SIGN_KEY_VAULT_URL: ${{ vars.CODE_SIGN_KEY_VAULT_URL }}
CODE_SIGN_EXPECTED_SUBJECT: ${{ vars.CODE_SIGN_EXPECTED_SUBJECT }}
CODE_SIGN_TIMESTAMP_URL: http://timestamp.acs.microsoft.com
jobs:
build:
runs-on: windows-latest
name: Build Agent
# Runs only this repository's scripts. The deploy identity trusts the `production`
# environment, which admits main only.
reserve:
name: Reserve build number
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
environment: production
permissions:
contents: read
id-token: write # OIDC federated login for the counter write
outputs:
build_number: ${{ steps.version.outputs.build_number }}
version: ${{ steps.version.outputs.version }}
tag: ${{ steps.version.outputs.tag }}
steps:
- name: Checkout repository
@@ -76,6 +106,11 @@ jobs:
with:
persist-credentials: false
# Every host in this workflow comes from the one endpoint registry.
- name: Load endpoints
shell: pwsh
run: ./.github/scripts/Get-Endpoints.ps1 -ExportToGitHubEnv
# Every released build is signed; a missing variable stops the run before a build
# number is burnt.
- name: Check code-signing configuration
@@ -88,33 +123,22 @@ jobs:
}
Write-Host "Code-signing configuration present (certificate '$env:CODE_SIGN_CERTIFICATE_NAME')"
# Logs in FIRST and only to fetch the Key Vault token: azure/login sets the default az
# account, so the storage login below has to be the last one. Both federated credentials
# are bound to the ref, so this job must never be given an `environment:` -- that would
# change the OIDC subject claim and break both logins.
- name: Login to Azure (code-signing identity)
uses: azure/login@a641126d1b8aa4d1fa005f4f92df94a3a4c4c906 # v3.1.0
with:
client-id: ${{ env.CODE_SIGN_CLIENT_ID }}
tenant-id: ${{ secrets.AZURE_TENANT_ID }}
allow-no-subscriptions: true
- name: Acquire Key Vault token for signing
# The dev channel is a lab channel: it never touches stable, AdminConfiguration, the
# bootstrap scripts or a GitHub Release. Refused here, before a build number is burnt.
- name: Check channel inputs
shell: pwsh
env:
PUBLISH_AS_STABLE: ${{ inputs.publish_as_stable }}
CREATE_RELEASE: ${{ inputs.create_release }}
run: |
$ErrorActionPreference = 'Stop'
$token = az account get-access-token --scope https://vault.azure.net/.default --query accessToken --output tsv
if ($LASTEXITCODE -ne 0 -or [string]::IsNullOrWhiteSpace($token)) {
throw "Could not acquire a Key Vault token for the code-signing identity."
if ($env:CHANNEL -notin @('release', 'dev')) {
throw "Unknown channel '$($env:CHANNEL)'."
}
Write-Host "::add-mask::$token"
"CODE_SIGN_AKV_ACCESS_TOKEN=$token" | Out-File -FilePath $env:GITHUB_ENV -Encoding utf8 -Append
if ($env:CHANNEL -eq 'dev' -and ($env:PUBLISH_AS_STABLE -eq 'true' -or $env:CREATE_RELEASE -eq 'true')) {
throw "channel=dev publishes the lab channel only: run it with publish_as_stable=false and create_release=false."
}
Write-Host "Channel: $env:CHANNEL"
# Every storage write below (counter blob, agent ZIP, manifests, AdminConfiguration)
# is authorized by this federated identity -- no SAS secret. One login covers the whole
# job: the federated credential is bound to the ref, and a release run takes ~2 minutes,
# well inside the token lifetime. Only the legacy mirror still needs a SAS: that account
# lives in the pre-migration tenant, where this principal has no identity.
- name: Login to Azure (OIDC)
uses: azure/login@a641126d1b8aa4d1fa005f4f92df94a3a4c4c906 # v3.1.0
with:
@@ -122,18 +146,6 @@ jobs:
tenant-id: ${{ secrets.AZURE_TENANT_ID }}
subscription-id: ${{ secrets.AZURE_SUBSCRIPTION_ID }}
# SDK 10 = single build toolchain (parity with local build.ps1 / global.json).
- name: Setup .NET
uses: actions/setup-dotnet@a98b56852c35b8e3190ac28c8c2271da59106c68 # v6.0.0
with:
dotnet-version: '10.0.x'
# Version pinned; roll-forward because the tool targets an older runtime than the SDK above.
- name: Install AzureSignTool
env:
DOTNET_ROLL_FORWARD: LatestMajor
run: dotnet tool install --no-cache --global AzureSignTool --version 7.0.1
# Build numbers come from the shared counter blob -- one counter and one
# implementation for CI and the local build (.github/scripts/Request-BuildNumber.ps1).
# Reserve-before-build with ETag-CAS: concurrent builds can never mint the same
@@ -155,7 +167,7 @@ jobs:
$override = [int]$env:BUILD_NUMBER_OVERRIDE
}
$counterUrl = "https://autopilotmonitoreu.blob.core.windows.net/agent/buildcounter-v$($env:LINE_MAJOR).txt"
$counterUrl = "$env:AGENT_CONTAINER_URL/buildcounter-v$($env:LINE_MAJOR).txt"
$buildNumber = & ./.github/scripts/Request-BuildNumber.ps1 -CounterUrl $counterUrl -Override $override
$csproj = Get-Content $env:CSPROJ_PATH -Raw
@@ -172,22 +184,169 @@ jobs:
"version=$version" >> $env:GITHUB_OUTPUT
"tag=v$version" >> $env:GITHUB_OUTPUT
# Build zone: no login, no secret, no id-token. Its only output is the artifact; the
# release job treats that as data and never builds.
build:
name: Build and test
needs: reserve
runs-on: windows-latest
steps:
- name: Checkout repository
uses: actions/checkout@3d3c42e5aac5ba805825da76410c181273ba90b1 # v7.0.1
with:
persist-credentials: false
# SDK 10 = single build toolchain (parity with local build.ps1 / global.json).
- name: Setup .NET
uses: actions/setup-dotnet@a98b56852c35b8e3190ac28c8c2271da59106c68 # v6.0.0
with:
dotnet-version: '10.0.x'
- name: Restore dependencies
run: |
dotnet restore ${{ env.AGENT_PROJECT }}
dotnet restore ${{ env.DIALOG_PROJECT }}
dotnet restore ${{ env.TEST_PROJECT }}
dotnet restore ${{ env.DECISIONCORE_TEST_PROJECT }}
dotnet restore ${{ env.CORE_TEST_PROJECT }}
dotnet restore ${{ env.DIALOG_TEST_PROJECT }}
# Every agent suite runs before the release build. ORDER AND BUILD_NUMBER ARE LOAD-BEARING:
# Agent.V2.Core.Tests references the agent exe, so the test build compiles it. With the
# reserved number it stamps the release version and the Build Agent step is up to date; run
# after that step or without the number, it would rewrite the binaries with another version.
- name: Run agent tests (all suites)
shell: pwsh
env:
BUILD_NUMBER: ${{ needs.reserve.outputs.build_number }}
run: |
foreach ($project in @($env:DECISIONCORE_TEST_PROJECT, $env:CORE_TEST_PROJECT, $env:DIALOG_TEST_PROJECT)) {
dotnet test $project --configuration Release --no-restore --verbosity quiet
if ($LASTEXITCODE -ne 0) { throw "Tests failed: $project" }
}
- name: Build Agent
run: dotnet build ${{ env.AGENT_PROJECT }} --configuration Release --no-restore
env:
BUILD_NUMBER: ${{ steps.version.outputs.build_number }}
BUILD_NUMBER: ${{ needs.reserve.outputs.build_number }}
- name: Build SummaryDialog
run: dotnet build ${{ env.DIALOG_PROJECT }} --configuration Release --no-restore
- name: Run Agent unit tests
run: dotnet test ${{ env.TEST_PROJECT }} --configuration Release --no-restore --verbosity quiet
# One archive per output folder, unsigned. ZipFile rather than Compress-Archive, which
# skips hidden files.
- name: Package build output
shell: pwsh
run: |
$ErrorActionPreference = 'Stop'
Add-Type -AssemblyName System.IO.Compression.FileSystem
$outDir = Join-Path $env:RUNNER_TEMP 'agent-unsigned'
New-Item -Path $outDir -ItemType Directory -Force | Out-Null
[System.IO.Compression.ZipFile]::CreateFromDirectory((Join-Path $env:GITHUB_WORKSPACE $env:AGENT_OUTPUT), (Join-Path $outDir 'agent.zip'))
[System.IO.Compression.ZipFile]::CreateFromDirectory((Join-Path $env:GITHUB_WORKSPACE $env:DIALOG_OUTPUT), (Join-Path $outDir 'dialog.zip'))
Get-ChildItem $outDir | ForEach-Object { Write-Host "$($_.Name): $([math]::Round($_.Length / 1MB, 2)) MB" }
- name: Upload unsigned build output
uses: actions/upload-artifact@043fb46d1a93c77aae656e7c1c64a875d1fc6a0a # v7.0.1
with:
name: agent-unsigned
path: ${{ runner.temp }}/agent-unsigned
if-no-files-found: error
retention-days: 1
# Trust zone: only this repository's scripts, pinned actions and the pinned signing tool
# run here -- never a restore or build. The build output arrives as data. The runner
# image's Windows SDK signtool is used read-only, to verify third-party signatures.
#
# Runs in the `release` environment: both identities trust its subject, and it admits main
# only. No federated credential trusts the ref, so a job without an environment can neither
# sign nor write storage, whatever its permissions say.
release:
name: Sign and publish
needs: [reserve, build]
runs-on: windows-latest
environment: release
permissions:
contents: write # tag + GitHub Release
id-token: write # code-signing and storage logins, keyless Sigstore signing
attestations: write # store the provenance attestation
env:
AGENT_VERSION: ${{ needs.reserve.outputs.version }}
steps:
- name: Checkout repository
uses: actions/checkout@3d3c42e5aac5ba805825da76410c181273ba90b1 # v7.0.1
with:
persist-credentials: false
# Storage, legacy mirror, docs link, timestamp server: all from the endpoint registry.
- name: Load endpoints
shell: pwsh
run: ./.github/scripts/Get-Endpoints.ps1 -ExportToGitHubEnv
- name: Download unsigned build output
uses: actions/download-artifact@3e5f45b2cfb9172054b4087a40e8e0b5a5461e7c # v8.0.1
with:
name: agent-unsigned
path: ${{ runner.temp }}/agent-unsigned
# Only the two expected archives, each into its own fresh output folder; the .NET
# extractor refuses entries that would land outside it. Never unpack into the checkout
# root: an archive could otherwise replace the scripts this job runs below.
- name: Unpack build output
shell: pwsh
run: |
$ErrorActionPreference = 'Stop'
Add-Type -AssemblyName System.IO.Compression.FileSystem
foreach ($pair in @(@('agent.zip', $env:AGENT_OUTPUT), @('dialog.zip', $env:DIALOG_OUTPUT))) {
$archive = Join-Path $env:RUNNER_TEMP "agent-unsigned/$($pair[0])"
$target = Join-Path $env:GITHUB_WORKSPACE $pair[1]
if (Test-Path $target) { throw "$($pair[1]) already exists -- refusing to unpack over it." }
[System.IO.Compression.ZipFile]::ExtractToDirectory($archive, $target)
Write-Host "Unpacked $($pair[0]) into $($pair[1])"
}
# Logs in FIRST and only to fetch the Key Vault token: azure/login sets the default az
# account, so the storage login below has to be the last one.
- name: Login to Azure (code-signing identity)
uses: azure/login@a641126d1b8aa4d1fa005f4f92df94a3a4c4c906 # v3.1.0
with:
client-id: ${{ env.CODE_SIGN_CLIENT_ID }}
tenant-id: ${{ secrets.AZURE_TENANT_ID }}
allow-no-subscriptions: true
- name: Acquire Key Vault token for signing
shell: pwsh
run: |
$ErrorActionPreference = 'Stop'
$token = az account get-access-token --scope https://vault.azure.net/.default --query accessToken --output tsv
if ($LASTEXITCODE -ne 0 -or [string]::IsNullOrWhiteSpace($token)) {
throw "Could not acquire a Key Vault token for the code-signing identity."
}
Write-Host "::add-mask::$token"
"CODE_SIGN_AKV_ACCESS_TOKEN=$token" | Out-File -FilePath $env:GITHUB_ENV -Encoding utf8 -Append
# Every storage write below (agent ZIP, manifests, AdminConfiguration) is authorized by
# this federated identity -- no SAS secret. Only the legacy mirror still needs a SAS:
# that account lives in the pre-migration tenant, where this principal has no identity.
- name: Login to Azure (OIDC)
uses: azure/login@a641126d1b8aa4d1fa005f4f92df94a3a4c4c906 # v3.1.0
with:
client-id: ${{ secrets.AZURE_CLIENT_ID }}
tenant-id: ${{ secrets.AZURE_TENANT_ID }}
subscription-id: ${{ secrets.AZURE_SUBSCRIPTION_ID }}
# Runtime for AzureSignTool only; nothing is built in this job.
- name: Setup .NET
uses: actions/setup-dotnet@a98b56852c35b8e3190ac28c8c2271da59106c68 # v6.0.0
with:
dotnet-version: '10.0.x'
# Version pinned; roll-forward because the tool targets an older runtime than the SDK above.
- name: Install AzureSignTool
env:
DOTNET_ROLL_FORWARD: LatestMajor
run: dotnet tool install --no-cache --global AzureSignTool --version 7.0.1
# Authenticode over everything we author; third-party assemblies keep their own signature.
#
@@ -223,18 +382,17 @@ jobs:
--timestamp-rfc3161 "$env:CODE_SIGN_TIMESTAMP_URL" `
--file-digest sha256 `
--description "Autopilot Monitor Agent" `
--description-url "https://www.autopilotmonitor.com" `
--description-url "$env:WWW_BASE_URL" `
($targets | ForEach-Object { $_.FullName })
if ($LASTEXITCODE -ne 0) {
throw "azuresigntool failed with exit code $LASTEXITCODE -- aborting before anything is published."
}
- name: Create release artifact
id: artifact
- name: Stage release payload
shell: pwsh
run: |
$version = "${{ steps.version.outputs.version }}"
$version = $env:AGENT_VERSION
$stagingDir = "staging/agent"
if (-not (Test-Path "$env:AGENT_OUTPUT/AutopilotMonitor.Agent.exe")) {
@@ -276,6 +434,98 @@ jobs:
}
Write-Host "Version check passed: EXE = manifest = reserved = $version"
# Third-party code enters the payload only with its vendor's own signature: every PE that
# is not ours needs a valid EMBEDDED Authenticode signature from an allowed vendor. Embedded
# only (signtool verify /pa, no /a): Get-AuthenticodeSignature prefers the runner's Windows
# catalogs and reports "Microsoft Windows" for files Windows happens to ship as well. An
# unsigned file or a new vendor stops the release until a person decides. This guards the
# bytes we did not write; a build that alters our own code is D-346's remaining risk.
- name: Check third-party signatures
shell: pwsh
run: |
$ErrorActionPreference = 'Stop'
$allowedVendors = @('Microsoft Corporation', 'Json.NET (.NET Foundation)')
$signtool = Get-ChildItem "${env:ProgramFiles(x86)}\Windows Kits\10\bin\*\x64\signtool.exe" -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue |
Where-Object { $_.Directory.Parent.Name -match '^\d+(\.\d+){1,3}$' } |
Sort-Object { [version]$_.Directory.Parent.Name } -Descending |
Select-Object -First 1
if (-not $signtool) { throw "signtool.exe not found in the runner image's Windows SDK." }
Write-Host "Using $($signtool.FullName)"
$failed = $false
$checked = 0
foreach ($file in Get-ChildItem -Path 'staging/agent' -Recurse -File) {
# A PE by content (MZ header), not by extension.
$head = [byte[]]::new(2)
$stream = [System.IO.File]::OpenRead($file.FullName)
try { $read = $stream.Read($head, 0, 2) } finally { $stream.Dispose() }
if ($read -lt 2 -or $head[0] -ne 0x4D -or $head[1] -ne 0x5A) { continue }
if ($file.Name -like 'AutopilotMonitor.*') { continue } # ours: the verify step pins them
$checked++
$output = & $signtool.FullName verify /pa $file.FullName 2>&1
if ($LASTEXITCODE -ne 0) {
Write-Host "::error file=$($file.Name)::No valid embedded vendor signature. $(($output | Out-String).Trim())"
$failed = $true
continue
}
$subject = [System.Security.Cryptography.X509Certificates.X509Certificate]::CreateFromSignedFile($file.FullName).Subject
$vendor = if ($subject -match '(?:^|,\s*)O=("[^"]*"|[^,]*)') { $Matches[1].Trim('"') } else { '' }
if ($vendor -notin $allowedVendors) {
Write-Host "::error file=$($file.Name)::Signed by '$subject' -- vendor '$vendor' is not on the allowlist."
$failed = $true
continue
}
Write-Host "$($file.Name): embedded signature valid, vendor $vendor"
}
if ($failed) { throw "Third-party signature check failed. Nothing was published." }
Write-Host "All $checked third-party PE files carry a valid signature from an allowed vendor."
# The payload contract: one catalog, signed like our binaries, holding the SHA-256 of every
# other file in the ZIP. Installer, OOBE script and self-updater accept a payload only when
# this catalog is ours and matches the extracted files exactly. Created AFTER signing and
# BEFORE the ZIP -- the same load-bearing position as the signing step above.
- name: Create and sign payload catalog
shell: pwsh
env:
DOTNET_ROLL_FORWARD: LatestMajor
run: |
$ErrorActionPreference = 'Stop'
$stagingDir = 'staging/agent'
$catalog = Join-Path $env:RUNNER_TEMP $env:PAYLOAD_CATALOG
if (Test-Path (Join-Path $stagingDir $env:PAYLOAD_CATALOG)) {
throw "$stagingDir already contains $env:PAYLOAD_CATALOG."
}
New-FileCatalog -Path $stagingDir -CatalogFilePath $catalog -CatalogVersion 2.0 | Out-Null
& azuresigntool.exe sign --verbose `
--azure-key-vault-url "$env:CODE_SIGN_KEY_VAULT_URL" `
--azure-key-vault-accesstoken "$env:CODE_SIGN_AKV_ACCESS_TOKEN" `
--azure-key-vault-certificate "$env:CODE_SIGN_CERTIFICATE_NAME" `
--timestamp-rfc3161 "$env:CODE_SIGN_TIMESTAMP_URL" `
--file-digest sha256 `
--description "Autopilot Monitor Agent" `
--description-url "$env:WWW_BASE_URL" `
$catalog
if ($LASTEXITCODE -ne 0) {
throw "azuresigntool failed on the payload catalog with exit code $LASTEXITCODE -- aborting before anything is published."
}
Copy-Item -Path $catalog -Destination $stagingDir
$count = (Test-FileCatalog -Path $stagingDir -CatalogFilePath $catalog -FilesToSkip $env:PAYLOAD_CATALOG -Detailed).CatalogItems.Count
Write-Host "Payload catalog signed: $count files"
- name: Create release artifact
id: artifact
shell: pwsh
run: |
$version = $env:AGENT_VERSION
$stagingDir = "staging/agent"
$manifest = Get-Content "$env:AGENT_OUTPUT/$env:MANIFEST_NAME" -Raw | ConvertFrom-Json
$versionedZip = "AutopilotMonitor-Agent-v$version.zip"
Compress-Archive -Path "$stagingDir/*" -DestinationPath $versionedZip
Write-Host "Created GitHub-Release artifact: $versionedZip"
@@ -365,17 +615,66 @@ jobs:
}
Write-Host "All $($files.Count) binaries signed with certificate $($thumbprints.Keys -join ', ')"
# The devices' check, run on the FINAL ZIP rather than the staging folder: whatever the
# archiver did (Compress-Archive skips hidden files) fails here instead of on a device.
# Windows PowerShell 5.1 and the installer's own functions (dot-sourced; its entry guard
# keeps that side-effect free) -- the very code the installer and the OOBE go-script run.
- name: Verify payload catalog (device check)
shell: powershell
env:
RELEASE_ZIP: ${{ steps.artifact.outputs.versioned_zip_release }}
run: |
$ErrorActionPreference = 'Stop'
Add-Type -AssemblyName System.IO.Compression.FileSystem
$payload = Join-Path $env:RUNNER_TEMP 'verify-payload'
if (Test-Path $payload) { throw "$payload already exists." }
[System.IO.Compression.ZipFile]::ExtractToDirectory((Resolve-Path $env:RELEASE_ZIP).Path, $payload)
. (Resolve-Path $env:BOOTSTRAP_SOURCE).Path
if (-not [string]::IsNullOrWhiteSpace($env:CODE_SIGN_EXPECTED_SUBJECT) -and $ExpectedPublisher -ne $env:CODE_SIGN_EXPECTED_SUBJECT) {
throw "Installer pin '$ExpectedPublisher' differs from CODE_SIGN_EXPECTED_SUBJECT '$env:CODE_SIGN_EXPECTED_SUBJECT'."
}
if ($AgentCatalogName -ne $env:PAYLOAD_CATALOG) {
throw "Installer catalog name '$AgentCatalogName' differs from PAYLOAD_CATALOG '$env:PAYLOAD_CATALOG'."
}
# Assign first, then flatten: the function returns its list as ONE object (comma
# operator), so @(Get-AgentPayloadRejections ...) would nest it inside another array.
$problems = Get-AgentPayloadRejections -Path $payload -ExpectedPublisher $ExpectedPublisher -CatalogName $AgentCatalogName
$problems = @($problems)
# Release-only checks a device need not repeat: a timestamp (without it the signature
# dies with the certificate) and the same certificate as the binaries.
$signature = Get-AuthenticodeSignature (Join-Path $payload $AgentCatalogName)
if (-not $signature.TimeStamperCertificate) {
$problems += 'catalog signature carries no RFC-3161 timestamp -- it would expire with the certificate'
}
$exeSigner = (Get-AuthenticodeSignature (Join-Path $payload 'AutopilotMonitor.Agent.exe')).SignerCertificate
if ($signature.SignerCertificate -and $exeSigner -and $signature.SignerCertificate.Thumbprint -ne $exeSigner.Thumbprint) {
$problems += 'catalog and agent exe carry different signing certificates'
}
if ($problems.Count -gt 0) {
$problems | ForEach-Object { Write-Host "::error::$_" }
throw "Payload catalog verification failed. Nothing was published."
}
Write-Host "Payload catalog verified on the final ZIP with the installer's own check, signer $($signature.SignerCertificate.Subject)"
- name: Upload to Azure Blob Storage
if: inputs.upload_blob
shell: pwsh
env:
ZIP_SHA256: ${{ steps.artifact.outputs.sha256 }}
EXE_SHA256: ${{ steps.artifact.outputs.exe_sha256 }}
run: |
$containerUrl = "https://autopilotmonitoreu.blob.core.windows.net/agent"
$containerUrl = $env:AGENT_CONTAINER_URL
$authHeaders = & ./.github/scripts/Get-StorageAuthHeaders.ps1
# Legacy mirror (transition until customers moved to the download.-alias):
# blobs are ALSO pushed to the old account so the bootstrap URL baked into
# customers' Intune scripts keeps serving current bits. Fail-soft -- a
# legacy hiccup must never fail a release. Counter lives ONLY on eu.
$legacyContainerUrl = "https://autopilotmonitor.blob.core.windows.net/agent"
$legacyContainerUrl = $env:LEGACY_AGENT_CONTAINER_URL
$legacySasToken = "${{ secrets.AZURE_BLOB_AGENT_LEGACY_SAS_TOKEN }}".TrimStart('?')
function Send-Blob {
@@ -405,6 +704,18 @@ jobs:
}
}
# Dev channel: lab blobs only, under the names the dev renders of the bootstrap scripts
# read. Nothing else is touched -- no versioned or stable line, no AdminConfiguration, no
# scripts; the channel check in `reserve` already refused publish_as_stable/create_release.
if ($env:CHANNEL -eq 'dev') {
Send-Blob -Local $env:VERSIONED_ZIP -BlobName $env:DEV_VERSIONED_ZIP -ContentType "application/zip"
Send-Blob -Local $env:MANIFEST_NAME -BlobName $env:DEV_MANIFEST -ContentType "application/json"
Send-Blob -Local $env:VERSIONED_ZIP -BlobName $env:DEV_STABLE_ZIP -ContentType "application/zip"
Send-Blob -Local $env:MANIFEST_NAME -BlobName $env:DEV_STABLE_MANIFEST -ContentType "application/json"
Write-Host "DEV CHANNEL: lab blobs written, nothing else touched."
exit 0
}
# Versioned namespace (always)
Send-Blob -Local $env:VERSIONED_ZIP -BlobName $env:VERSIONED_ZIP -ContentType "application/zip"
Send-Blob -Local $env:MANIFEST_NAME -BlobName $env:MANIFEST_NAME -ContentType "application/json"
@@ -426,7 +737,6 @@ jobs:
-SigningToken $env:CODE_SIGN_AKV_ACCESS_TOKEN `
-KeyVaultUrl $env:CODE_SIGN_KEY_VAULT_URL `
-CertificateName $env:CODE_SIGN_CERTIFICATE_NAME `
-TimestampUrl $env:CODE_SIGN_TIMESTAMP_URL `
-ExpectedPublisher $env:CODE_SIGN_EXPECTED_SUBJECT
}
@@ -437,10 +747,10 @@ jobs:
if ('${{ inputs.publish_as_stable }}' -ne 'true') {
Write-Host "SKIPPED: AdminConfiguration update (versioned-only run -- stable namespace unchanged)"
} else {
$sha256 = "${{ steps.artifact.outputs.sha256 }}"
$exeSha256 = "${{ steps.artifact.outputs.exe_sha256 }}"
$agentVersion = "${{ steps.version.outputs.version }}"
$tableUrl = "https://autopilotmonitoreu.table.core.windows.net/AdminConfiguration(PartitionKey='GlobalConfig',RowKey='config')"
$sha256 = $env:ZIP_SHA256
$exeSha256 = $env:EXE_SHA256
$agentVersion = $env:AGENT_VERSION
$tableUrl = $env:ADMIN_CONFIG_URL
$tableBody = @{
LatestAgentV2Version = $agentVersion
LatestAgentV2Sha256 = $sha256
@@ -474,7 +784,7 @@ jobs:
- name: Upload build artifact
uses: actions/upload-artifact@043fb46d1a93c77aae656e7c1c64a875d1fc6a0a # v7.0.1
with:
name: AutopilotMonitor-Agent-v${{ steps.version.outputs.version }}
name: AutopilotMonitor-Agent-v${{ needs.reserve.outputs.version }}
path: ${{ steps.artifact.outputs.versioned_zip_release }}
- name: Upload version metadata
@@ -497,30 +807,30 @@ jobs:
shell: pwsh
env:
GH_TOKEN: ${{ github.token }}
RELEASE_TAG: ${{ steps.version.outputs.tag }}
RELEASE_NAME: Autopilot Monitor Agent ${{ steps.version.outputs.version }}
RELEASE_TAG: ${{ needs.reserve.outputs.tag }}
RELEASE_NAME: Autopilot Monitor Agent ${{ needs.reserve.outputs.version }}
RELEASE_PRERELEASE: ${{ inputs.prerelease }}
RELEASE_ZIP: ${{ steps.artifact.outputs.versioned_zip_release }}
RELEASE_NOTES: ${{ inputs.release_notes }}
RELEASE_BODY_TAIL: |
### Version Info
- **Version:** ${{ steps.version.outputs.version }}
- **Build Number:** ${{ steps.version.outputs.build_number }}
- **Version:** ${{ needs.reserve.outputs.version }}
- **Build Number:** ${{ needs.reserve.outputs.build_number }}
- **SHA-256:** `${{ steps.artifact.outputs.sha256 }}`
- **Built from:** ${{ github.sha }}
- **Published as stable:** ${{ inputs.publish_as_stable }}
### Provenance
The executables are Authenticode-signed and timestamped. The ZIP and both executables carry a [GitHub Artifact Attestation](https://github.com/okieselbach/AutopilotMonitor/attestations) (Sigstore keyless). Verify:
The executables are Authenticode-signed and timestamped. Every file in the ZIP is listed in `AutopilotMonitor.Agent.cat`, a catalog signed with the same certificate, and third-party libraries carry their vendor's signature. The ZIP and both executables carry a [GitHub Artifact Attestation](https://github.com/okieselbach/AutopilotMonitor/attestations) (Sigstore keyless). Verify:
```
gh attestation verify AutopilotMonitor-Agent-v${{ steps.version.outputs.version }}.zip --repo okieselbach/AutopilotMonitor
gh attestation verify AutopilotMonitor-Agent-v${{ needs.reserve.outputs.version }}.zip --repo okieselbach/AutopilotMonitor
```
run: |
$ErrorActionPreference = 'Stop'
$notes = "$env:RELEASE_NOTES".Trim()
if ($notes -eq '') {
$notes = "Minor enhancements and bug fixes. See the [Agent Changelog](https://docs.autopilotmonitor.com/changelog/agent-changelog) for details.`n<!-- release-notes: none -->"
$notes = "Minor enhancements and bug fixes. See the [Agent Changelog]($env:DOCS_BASE_URL/changelog/agent-changelog) for details.`n<!-- release-notes: none -->"
}
# Previous release for the compare link. Fail-soft: the first release has none,
+276 -70
View File
@@ -11,32 +11,42 @@ on:
workflow_dispatch:
inputs:
upload_blob:
description: 'Upload to blob (customer-facing via download.autopilotmonitor.com/agent/)'
description: 'Upload to blob (customer-facing through the download alias)'
required: true
type: boolean
default: true
# Every job states its own permissions. This default is what the build job runs with: wix is
# third-party code and must never hold more than a read-only token.
permissions:
contents: read
id-token: write # keyless Sigstore signing (artifact attestation)
attestations: write # store the provenance attestation
env:
MSI_PROJECT_DIR: src/Agent/AutopilotMonitor.BootstrapMsi
RUNNER_SCRIPT: scripts/Bootstrap/Start-AutopilotMonitor.ps1
STABLE_MSI: AutopilotMonitor-Bootstrap.msi
# Authenticode via Azure Key Vault; identity and vault come from repository variables.
# Authenticode via Azure Key Vault; identity and vault come from repository variables, the
# timestamp server (CODE_SIGN_TIMESTAMP_URL) from the endpoint registry like every host here.
# CODE_SIGN_EXPECTED_SUBJECT is optional and pins the publisher in the verify steps.
CODE_SIGN_CLIENT_ID: ${{ vars.CODE_SIGN_CLIENT_ID }}
CODE_SIGN_CERTIFICATE_NAME: ${{ vars.CODE_SIGN_CERTIFICATE_NAME }}
CODE_SIGN_KEY_VAULT_URL: ${{ vars.CODE_SIGN_KEY_VAULT_URL }}
CODE_SIGN_EXPECTED_SUBJECT: ${{ vars.CODE_SIGN_EXPECTED_SUBJECT }}
CODE_SIGN_TIMESTAMP_URL: http://timestamp.acs.microsoft.com
jobs:
build:
# Signs the loader BEFORE the build: wix embeds the file as it finds it, so a loader signed
# afterwards would leave the copy inside the MSI unsigned. Devices under an AllSigned policy
# need the embedded loader to carry a signature of its own.
#
# Trust zone: only this repository's scripts, pinned actions and the pinned signing tool run
# here. The `release` environment is the only subject the code-signing identity trusts.
sign-loader:
name: Sign bootstrap loader
runs-on: windows-latest
name: Build Bootstrap MSI
environment: release
permissions:
contents: read
id-token: write # code-signing login
steps:
- name: Checkout repository
@@ -44,6 +54,11 @@ jobs:
with:
persist-credentials: false
# Every host in this workflow comes from the one endpoint registry.
- name: Load endpoints
shell: pwsh
run: ./.github/scripts/Get-Endpoints.ps1 -ExportToGitHubEnv
# The loader executes as SYSTEM on every enrolling device — a parse error or
# non-ASCII mojibake (PS 5.1 codepage roulette) must fail the build, not the fleet.
# bootstrap-script-gates.yml runs the same checks plus Pester on pushes; this job
@@ -60,6 +75,236 @@ jobs:
}
Write-Host "Runner script parse + ASCII check passed"
# Every published MSI is signed; a missing variable stops the run before the build.
- name: Check code-signing configuration
shell: pwsh
run: |
foreach ($name in 'CODE_SIGN_CLIENT_ID', 'CODE_SIGN_CERTIFICATE_NAME', 'CODE_SIGN_KEY_VAULT_URL') {
if ([string]::IsNullOrWhiteSpace([Environment]::GetEnvironmentVariable($name))) {
throw "Repository variable $name is not set. Every published MSI must be Authenticode-signed."
}
}
- name: Login to Azure (code-signing identity)
uses: azure/login@a641126d1b8aa4d1fa005f4f92df94a3a4c4c906 # v3.1.0
with:
client-id: ${{ env.CODE_SIGN_CLIENT_ID }}
tenant-id: ${{ secrets.AZURE_TENANT_ID }}
allow-no-subscriptions: true
- name: Acquire Key Vault token for signing
shell: pwsh
run: |
$ErrorActionPreference = 'Stop'
$token = az account get-access-token --scope https://vault.azure.net/.default --query accessToken --output tsv
if ($LASTEXITCODE -ne 0 -or [string]::IsNullOrWhiteSpace($token)) {
throw "Could not acquire a Key Vault token for the code-signing identity."
}
Write-Host "::add-mask::$token"
"CODE_SIGN_AKV_ACCESS_TOKEN=$token" | Out-File -FilePath $env:GITHUB_ENV -Encoding utf8 -Append
# Version pinned; roll-forward because the tool targets an older runtime than the SDK.
- name: Install AzureSignTool
env:
DOTNET_ROLL_FORWARD: LatestMajor
run: dotnet tool install --no-cache --global AzureSignTool --version 7.0.1
# A missing timestamp fails the run: without it the signature dies with the certificate.
- name: Sign bootstrap loader (Authenticode)
shell: pwsh
env:
DOTNET_ROLL_FORWARD: LatestMajor
run: |
$ErrorActionPreference = 'Stop'
& azuresigntool.exe sign --verbose `
--azure-key-vault-url "$env:CODE_SIGN_KEY_VAULT_URL" `
--azure-key-vault-accesstoken "$env:CODE_SIGN_AKV_ACCESS_TOKEN" `
--azure-key-vault-certificate "$env:CODE_SIGN_CERTIFICATE_NAME" `
--timestamp-rfc3161 "$env:CODE_SIGN_TIMESTAMP_URL" `
--file-digest sha256 `
--description 'Autopilot Monitor bootstrap runner' `
--description-url $env:WWW_BASE_URL `
$env:RUNNER_SCRIPT
if ($LASTEXITCODE -ne 0) { throw "azuresigntool failed with exit code $LASTEXITCODE" }
$sig = Get-AuthenticodeSignature -FilePath $env:RUNNER_SCRIPT
if ($sig.Status -ne 'Valid') { throw "Signature on $env:RUNNER_SCRIPT is '$($sig.Status)', expected 'Valid'." }
if (-not $sig.TimeStamperCertificate) { throw "Signature on $env:RUNNER_SCRIPT carries no timestamp." }
if ($env:CODE_SIGN_EXPECTED_SUBJECT -and $sig.SignerCertificate.Subject -notlike $env:CODE_SIGN_EXPECTED_SUBJECT) {
throw "$env:RUNNER_SCRIPT was signed by '$($sig.SignerCertificate.Subject)', expected '$env:CODE_SIGN_EXPECTED_SUBJECT'."
}
Write-Host "$env:RUNNER_SCRIPT : Valid, timestamped, signer $($sig.SignerCertificate.Subject.Split(',')[0])"
- name: Upload signed loader
uses: actions/upload-artifact@043fb46d1a93c77aae656e7c1c64a875d1fc6a0a # v7.0.1
with:
name: bootstrap-loader-signed
path: ${{ env.RUNNER_SCRIPT }}
if-no-files-found: error
retention-days: 1
# Build zone: no login, no secret, no id-token. Its only output is the artifact; the
# release job treats that as data and never builds.
build:
name: Build MSI
needs: sign-loader
runs-on: windows-latest
steps:
- name: Checkout repository
uses: actions/checkout@3d3c42e5aac5ba805825da76410c181273ba90b1 # v7.0.1
with:
persist-credentials: false
- name: Download signed loader
uses: actions/download-artifact@3e5f45b2cfb9172054b4087a40e8e0b5a5461e7c # v8.0.1
with:
name: bootstrap-loader-signed
path: ${{ runner.temp }}/loader
# The signed copy replaces the checkout's unsigned one before wix embeds it.
- name: Put the signed loader in place
shell: pwsh
run: |
$ErrorActionPreference = 'Stop'
Copy-Item -Path (Join-Path $env:RUNNER_TEMP 'loader/Start-AutopilotMonitor.ps1') -Destination $env:RUNNER_SCRIPT -Force
$sig = Get-AuthenticodeSignature -FilePath $env:RUNNER_SCRIPT
if ($sig.Status -ne 'Valid') { throw "Loader to embed is '$($sig.Status)', expected 'Valid'." }
Write-Host "Embedding the signed loader ($((Get-Item $env:RUNNER_SCRIPT).Length) bytes)"
# Exact version, not a "5.*" range: wix writes the bytes of the MSI that customers
# install, so a compromised or simply broken point release must not flow into a build
# unnoticed. Bumping is a reviewed commit.
- name: Install WiX toolset
run: dotnet tool install --global wix --version 5.0.2
- name: Build MSI
shell: pwsh
run: |
# The MSI's action runs only the exact bytes the package embeds: the hash of the
# signed loader goes into the command here, so no other signed script of ours runs
# in its place on a device.
$loaderSha256 = (Get-FileHash -LiteralPath $env:RUNNER_SCRIPT -Algorithm SHA256).Hash.ToLowerInvariant()
Write-Host "Embedded loader SHA-256: $loaderSha256"
# wix resolves File/@Source relative to the working directory, not the wxs —
# build from inside the project dir (same as the local build documented in the wxs).
$out = Join-Path (Get-Location) $env:STABLE_MSI
Push-Location $env:MSI_PROJECT_DIR
wix build Package.wxs -arch x64 -d LoaderSha256=$loaderSha256 -o $out
Pop-Location
if (-not (Test-Path $env:STABLE_MSI)) { Write-Error "wix build produced no MSI"; exit 1 }
Write-Host "Built $env:STABLE_MSI ($([math]::Round((Get-Item $env:STABLE_MSI).Length / 1KB)) KB)"
- name: Upload unsigned MSI
uses: actions/upload-artifact@043fb46d1a93c77aae656e7c1c64a875d1fc6a0a # v7.0.1
with:
name: bootstrap-msi-unsigned
path: ${{ env.STABLE_MSI }}
if-no-files-found: error
retention-days: 1
# The real chain on a runner, before anything is signed or published: msiexec installs the
# MSI from the build, its action checks the loader copy and runs it, the loader fetches the
# published installer, which finds the deployment marker set here and removes the copy. The
# marker is the installer's first guard, so no agent is ever installed on the runner. Needs
# the published installer to be 2.9 or later, which removes the copy in every outcome.
smoke:
name: Install on a runner (${{ matrix.os }})
needs: build
strategy:
fail-fast: false
matrix:
os: [windows-2022, windows-2025]
runs-on: ${{ matrix.os }}
steps:
- name: Checkout repository
uses: actions/checkout@3d3c42e5aac5ba805825da76410c181273ba90b1 # v7.0.1
with:
persist-credentials: false
- name: Download unsigned MSI
uses: actions/download-artifact@3e5f45b2cfb9172054b4087a40e8e0b5a5461e7c # v8.0.1
with:
name: bootstrap-msi-unsigned
path: ${{ runner.temp }}/msi
- name: Install with the deployment marker set, check the footprint, uninstall
shell: pwsh
run: |
$ErrorActionPreference = 'Stop'
$msi = Join-Path $env:RUNNER_TEMP "msi/$env:STABLE_MSI"
$wxs = Get-Content "$env:MSI_PROJECT_DIR/Package.wxs" -Raw
if ($wxs -notmatch 'Version="(\d+\.\d+\.\d+)"') { throw 'Could not parse Version from Package.wxs' }
$version = $Matches[1]
New-Item -Path 'HKLM:\SOFTWARE\AutopilotMonitor' -Force | Out-Null
Set-ItemProperty -Path 'HKLM:\SOFTWARE\AutopilotMonitor' -Name 'Deployed' -Value ((Get-Date).ToUniversalTime().ToString('o'))
function Invoke-Msiexec {
param([string]$Verb, [string]$Log)
$p = Start-Process -FilePath msiexec.exe -ArgumentList "/$Verb `"$msi`" /qn /l*v `"$Log`"" -Wait -PassThru
if ($p.ExitCode -ne 0) { Get-Content $Log | Select-Object -Last 60; throw "msiexec /$Verb exited with $($p.ExitCode)" }
}
function Get-Registration {
Get-ChildItem 'HKLM:\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Uninstall' | Get-ItemProperty | Where-Object { $_.DisplayName -eq 'Autopilot Monitor Bootstrap' }
}
function Show-Tree {
param([string]$Path)
Get-ChildItem -LiteralPath $Path -Recurse -Force | ForEach-Object { Write-Host " $($_.FullName)" }
}
$installLog = Join-Path $env:RUNNER_TEMP 'msi-install.log'
Invoke-Msiexec -Verb i -Log $installLog
$registered = Get-Registration
if (-not $registered) { throw 'The product is not registered after the install.' }
if ($registered.DisplayVersion -ne $version) { throw "Registered version $($registered.DisplayVersion), Package.wxs says $version." }
if ((Get-Content $installLog -Raw) -notmatch 'RunBootstrap') { throw 'The install log does not show the action.' }
Write-Host "Registered: $($registered.DisplayName) $($registered.DisplayVersion)"
# Only the installer removes the copy the MSI put under ProgramData: its absence
# proves the action ran the loader and the loader ran the installer.
foreach ($path in @("$env:ProgramW6432\AutopilotMonitor", "$env:ProgramData\AutopilotMonitor")) {
if (Test-Path -LiteralPath $path) { Show-Tree $path; throw "$path exists after the run." }
}
$runFolders = @(Get-ChildItem -LiteralPath $env:ProgramData -Directory -Filter 'AutopilotMonitor-Loader-*' -Force)
if ($runFolders.Count -ne 0) {
foreach ($folder in $runFolders) {
Show-Tree $folder.FullName
Get-ChildItem -LiteralPath $folder.FullName -Filter '*.log' | ForEach-Object { Get-Content -LiteralPath $_.FullName }
}
throw 'A loader run folder stays: the loader did not end with exit 0.'
}
Write-Host 'After the install: nothing under ProgramData or Program Files.'
Invoke-Msiexec -Verb x -Log (Join-Path $env:RUNNER_TEMP 'msi-uninstall.log')
if (Get-Registration) { throw 'The product is still registered after the uninstall.' }
Remove-Item -Path 'HKLM:\SOFTWARE\AutopilotMonitor' -Recurse -Force
Write-Host 'Uninstalled; the registration is gone.'
# Trust zone: signs, verifies and publishes the MSI as data; never builds. Environment
# `release`, like sign-loader.
release:
name: Sign and publish MSI
needs: smoke
runs-on: windows-latest
environment: release
permissions:
contents: read
id-token: write # code-signing and storage logins, keyless Sigstore signing
attestations: write # store the provenance attestation
steps:
- name: Checkout repository
uses: actions/checkout@3d3c42e5aac5ba805825da76410c181273ba90b1 # v7.0.1
with:
persist-credentials: false
- name: Load endpoints
shell: pwsh
run: ./.github/scripts/Get-Endpoints.ps1 -ExportToGitHubEnv
# Read from this job's own checkout, never handed over by the build job.
- name: Read MSI version from Package.wxs
id: version
shell: pwsh
@@ -73,20 +318,19 @@ jobs:
Write-Host "MSI version (from Package.wxs): $version"
"version=$version" >> $env:GITHUB_OUTPUT
# Every published MSI is signed; a missing variable stops the run before the build.
- name: Check code-signing configuration
- name: Download unsigned MSI
uses: actions/download-artifact@3e5f45b2cfb9172054b4087a40e8e0b5a5461e7c # v8.0.1
with:
name: bootstrap-msi-unsigned
path: ${{ runner.temp }}/msi
# Only the expected file leaves the download folder.
- name: Take the MSI from the build
shell: pwsh
run: |
foreach ($name in 'CODE_SIGN_CLIENT_ID', 'CODE_SIGN_CERTIFICATE_NAME', 'CODE_SIGN_KEY_VAULT_URL') {
if ([string]::IsNullOrWhiteSpace([Environment]::GetEnvironmentVariable($name))) {
throw "Repository variable $name is not set. Every published MSI must be Authenticode-signed."
}
}
run: Copy-Item -Path (Join-Path $env:RUNNER_TEMP "msi/$env:STABLE_MSI") -Destination $env:STABLE_MSI -ErrorAction Stop
# Logs in FIRST and only to fetch the Key Vault token: azure/login sets the default az
# account, so the storage login below has to be the last one. Both federated credentials
# are bound to the ref, so this job must never be given an `environment:` -- that would
# change the OIDC subject claim and break both logins.
# account, so the storage login below has to be the last one.
- name: Login to Azure (code-signing identity)
uses: azure/login@a641126d1b8aa4d1fa005f4f92df94a3a4c4c906 # v3.1.0
with:
@@ -113,50 +357,12 @@ jobs:
tenant-id: ${{ secrets.AZURE_TENANT_ID }}
subscription-id: ${{ secrets.AZURE_SUBSCRIPTION_ID }}
# Exact version, not a "5.*" range: wix writes the bytes of the MSI that customers
# install, so a compromised or simply broken point release must not flow into a build
# unnoticed. Bumping is a reviewed commit.
- name: Install WiX toolset
run: dotnet tool install --global wix --version 5.0.2
# Version pinned; roll-forward because the tool targets an older runtime than the SDK.
- name: Install AzureSignTool
env:
DOTNET_ROLL_FORWARD: LatestMajor
run: dotnet tool install --no-cache --global AzureSignTool --version 7.0.1
# BEFORE the build: wix embeds the file as it finds it, so a loader signed afterwards
# would leave the copy inside the MSI unsigned. Devices under an AllSigned policy need
# the embedded loader to carry a signature of its own.
- name: Sign bootstrap loader (Authenticode)
shell: pwsh
env:
DOTNET_ROLL_FORWARD: LatestMajor
run: |
$ErrorActionPreference = 'Stop'
& azuresigntool.exe sign --verbose `
--azure-key-vault-url "$env:CODE_SIGN_KEY_VAULT_URL" `
--azure-key-vault-accesstoken "$env:CODE_SIGN_AKV_ACCESS_TOKEN" `
--azure-key-vault-certificate "$env:CODE_SIGN_CERTIFICATE_NAME" `
--timestamp-rfc3161 "$env:CODE_SIGN_TIMESTAMP_URL" `
--file-digest sha256 `
--description 'Autopilot Monitor bootstrap runner' `
--description-url 'https://www.autopilotmonitor.com' `
$env:RUNNER_SCRIPT
if ($LASTEXITCODE -ne 0) { throw "azuresigntool failed with exit code $LASTEXITCODE" }
- name: Build MSI
shell: pwsh
run: |
# wix resolves File/@Source relative to the working directory, not the wxs —
# build from inside the project dir (same as the local build documented in the wxs).
$out = Join-Path (Get-Location) $env:STABLE_MSI
Push-Location $env:MSI_PROJECT_DIR
wix build Package.wxs -arch x64 -o $out
Pop-Location
if (-not (Test-Path $env:STABLE_MSI)) { Write-Error "wix build produced no MSI"; exit 1 }
Write-Host "Built $env:STABLE_MSI ($([math]::Round((Get-Item $env:STABLE_MSI).Length / 1KB)) KB)"
# Signing rewrites the MSI, so it runs before the hash and the upload. A missing
# timestamp fails the run: without it the signature dies with the certificate.
- name: Sign MSI (Authenticode)
@@ -172,30 +378,30 @@ jobs:
--timestamp-rfc3161 "$env:CODE_SIGN_TIMESTAMP_URL" `
--file-digest sha256 `
--description 'Autopilot Monitor Bootstrap' `
--description-url 'https://www.autopilotmonitor.com' `
--description-url $env:WWW_BASE_URL `
$env:STABLE_MSI
if ($LASTEXITCODE -ne 0) { throw "azuresigntool failed with exit code $LASTEXITCODE" }
# The MSI and the loader it carries -- verified here, before anything is published.
foreach ($file in @($env:STABLE_MSI, $env:RUNNER_SCRIPT)) {
$sig = Get-AuthenticodeSignature -FilePath $file
if ($sig.Status -ne 'Valid') { throw "Signature on $file is '$($sig.Status)', expected 'Valid'." }
if (-not $sig.TimeStamperCertificate) { throw "Signature on $file carries no timestamp." }
if ($env:CODE_SIGN_EXPECTED_SUBJECT -and $sig.SignerCertificate.Subject -notlike $env:CODE_SIGN_EXPECTED_SUBJECT) {
throw "$file was signed by '$($sig.SignerCertificate.Subject)', expected '$env:CODE_SIGN_EXPECTED_SUBJECT'."
}
Write-Host "$file : Valid, timestamped, signer $($sig.SignerCertificate.Subject.Split(',')[0])"
# The loader was verified in sign-loader; here the MSI, before anything is published.
$sig = Get-AuthenticodeSignature -FilePath $env:STABLE_MSI
if ($sig.Status -ne 'Valid') { throw "Signature on $env:STABLE_MSI is '$($sig.Status)', expected 'Valid'." }
if (-not $sig.TimeStamperCertificate) { throw "Signature on $env:STABLE_MSI carries no timestamp." }
if ($env:CODE_SIGN_EXPECTED_SUBJECT -and $sig.SignerCertificate.Subject -notlike $env:CODE_SIGN_EXPECTED_SUBJECT) {
throw "$env:STABLE_MSI was signed by '$($sig.SignerCertificate.Subject)', expected '$env:CODE_SIGN_EXPECTED_SUBJECT'."
}
Write-Host "$env:STABLE_MSI : Valid, timestamped, signer $($sig.SignerCertificate.Subject.Split(',')[0])"
Write-Host "SHA-256: $((Get-FileHash $env:STABLE_MSI -Algorithm SHA256).Hash.ToLowerInvariant())"
- name: Upload to Azure Blob Storage
if: inputs.upload_blob
shell: pwsh
env:
MSI_VERSION: ${{ steps.version.outputs.version }}
run: |
$containerUrl = "https://autopilotmonitoreu.blob.core.windows.net/agent"
$containerUrl = $env:AGENT_CONTAINER_URL
$authHeaders = & ./.github/scripts/Get-StorageAuthHeaders.ps1
$version = "${{ steps.version.outputs.version }}"
$version = $env:MSI_VERSION
# Same Send-Blob contract as build-agent.yml: no-cache on every blob because the
# stable name rotates in place behind the download alias. No legacy mirror — the
@@ -226,14 +432,14 @@ jobs:
shell: pwsh
run: |
$localSize = (Get-Item $env:STABLE_MSI).Length
$resp = Invoke-WebRequest -Uri "https://download.autopilotmonitor.com/agent/$env:STABLE_MSI" -Method Head -UseBasicParsing
$resp = Invoke-WebRequest -Uri "$env:DOWNLOAD_ALIAS_URL/$env:STABLE_MSI" -Method Head -UseBasicParsing
if ($resp.StatusCode -ne 200) { Write-Error "Alias HEAD returned $($resp.StatusCode)"; exit 1 }
$remoteSize = [long]$resp.Headers['Content-Length'][0]
if ($remoteSize -ne $localSize) {
Write-Error "Size mismatch: alias serves $remoteSize bytes, local MSI is $localSize bytes"
exit 1
}
Write-Host "Alias verified: https://download.autopilotmonitor.com/agent/$env:STABLE_MSI ($remoteSize bytes)"
Write-Host "Alias verified: $env:DOWNLOAD_ALIAS_URL/$env:STABLE_MSI ($remoteSize bytes)"
# Sigstore keyless provenance, same as the agent ZIP; covers the signed bytes. Skipped
# on runs that publish nothing -- no log entry for bytes nobody receives. Verify:
-2
View File
@@ -46,7 +46,6 @@ on:
- '.github/workflows/deploy-mcp.yml'
- '.github/workflows/deploy-web.yml'
- '.github/workflows/indexnow-notify.yml'
- '.github/workflows/oidc-login-test.yml'
- '.github/workflows/pester.yml'
- '.github/workflows/publish-scripts.yml'
pull_request:
@@ -80,7 +79,6 @@ on:
- '.github/workflows/deploy-mcp.yml'
- '.github/workflows/deploy-web.yml'
- '.github/workflows/indexnow-notify.yml'
- '.github/workflows/oidc-login-test.yml'
- '.github/workflows/pester.yml'
- '.github/workflows/publish-scripts.yml'
workflow_dispatch:
+2 -2
View File
@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@ on:
# Every other workflow: none of them changes the C# or TypeScript CodeQL analyzes.
# paths-ignore cannot negate, so they are listed one by one; codeql.yml itself and
# .github/codeql/ stay out of the list. A new workflow file is opt-in — add it here too.
- '.github/workflows/action-pins.yml'
- '.github/workflows/bootstrap-script-gates.yml'
- '.github/workflows/build-agent.yml'
- '.github/workflows/build-msi.yml'
@@ -37,7 +38,6 @@ on:
- '.github/workflows/deploy-mcp.yml'
- '.github/workflows/deploy-web.yml'
- '.github/workflows/indexnow-notify.yml'
- '.github/workflows/oidc-login-test.yml'
- '.github/workflows/pester.yml'
- '.github/workflows/publish-scripts.yml'
pull_request:
@@ -60,6 +60,7 @@ on:
# Every other workflow: none of them changes the C# or TypeScript CodeQL analyzes.
# paths-ignore cannot negate, so they are listed one by one; codeql.yml itself and
# .github/codeql/ stay out of the list. A new workflow file is opt-in — add it here too.
- '.github/workflows/action-pins.yml'
- '.github/workflows/bootstrap-script-gates.yml'
- '.github/workflows/build-agent.yml'
- '.github/workflows/build-msi.yml'
@@ -69,7 +70,6 @@ on:
- '.github/workflows/deploy-mcp.yml'
- '.github/workflows/deploy-web.yml'
- '.github/workflows/indexnow-notify.yml'
- '.github/workflows/oidc-login-test.yml'
- '.github/workflows/pester.yml'
- '.github/workflows/publish-scripts.yml'
schedule:
+35 -13
View File
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
name: Validate & Combine Rules
on:
push:
branches: [main, dev]
branches: [main]
paths:
- 'rules/gather/**'
- 'rules/analyze/**'
@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@ on:
- 'rules/schema/**'
- 'rules/scripts/**'
- 'rules/guardrails.json'
- '.github/workflows/combine-rules.yml'
pull_request:
paths:
- 'rules/gather/**'
@@ -17,24 +18,27 @@ on:
- 'rules/schema/**'
- 'rules/scripts/**'
- 'rules/guardrails.json'
- '.github/workflows/combine-rules.yml'
permissions:
contents: read
jobs:
validate-and-combine:
# Pull requests and pushes alike; read-only, because the validator is third-party code.
validate:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
permissions:
contents: write
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@3d3c42e5aac5ba805825da76410c181273ba90b1 # v7.0.1
with:
persist-credentials: false
- uses: actions/setup-node@820762786026740c76f36085b0efc47a31fe5020 # v7.0.0
with:
node-version: '22'
# Lockfile and no lifecycle scripts: this job holds contents:write and pushes to
# main, so an install-time script from a hijacked package would run with a token that
# can rewrite the repository. rules/scripts/package-lock.json pins ajv, ajv-formats
# and every transitive package (Dependabot keeps it current); ajv is pure JS and
# needs no install hooks.
# Lockfile and no lifecycle scripts: rules/scripts/package-lock.json pins ajv,
# ajv-formats and every transitive package (Dependabot keeps it current); ajv is pure
# JS and needs no install hooks.
- name: Install the rules validator from the lockfile
working-directory: rules/scripts
run: npm ci --ignore-scripts
@@ -48,13 +52,31 @@ jobs:
- name: Combine rules into dist/
run: node rules/scripts/combine.js
# Plain git instead of a third-party action: this step runs with contents:write on
# main, so no code we do not control gets to push. Checkout leaves the job's
# GITHUB_TOKEN in the remote credential helper, which is all `git push` needs.
# The one job that can push to main, and it installs nothing: combine.js needs only node's
# built-ins, so no package code ever runs next to the write token. Keep it that way -- a
# dependency in combine.js would need its own job.
publish:
needs: validate
if: github.ref == 'refs/heads/main' && github.event_name == 'push'
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
permissions:
contents: write
steps:
# Checkout leaves the job's GITHUB_TOKEN in the remote credential helper, which is all
# `git push` needs.
- uses: actions/checkout@3d3c42e5aac5ba805825da76410c181273ba90b1 # v7.0.1
- uses: actions/setup-node@820762786026740c76f36085b0efc47a31fe5020 # v7.0.0
with:
node-version: '22'
- name: Combine rules into dist/
run: node rules/scripts/combine.js
# Plain git instead of a third-party action, so no code we do not control gets to push.
# NOTE: combine.js writes THREE outputs; committing only dist/ would silently discard
# the two generated TS modules and leave the guardrails-in-sync CI check red.
- name: Commit generated outputs
if: github.ref == 'refs/heads/main' && github.event_name == 'push'
run: |
set -euo pipefail
git config user.name "github-actions[bot]"
+104 -19
View File
@@ -3,26 +3,41 @@ name: Deploy Backend (Azure Functions)
on:
workflow_dispatch:
# Every job states its own permissions. This default is what the build job runs with: restore
# and build execute third-party code (NuGet MSBuild targets, the Functions worker SDK) and must
# never hold more than a read-only token.
permissions:
id-token: write # OIDC federated login (secret-less)
contents: read
# Hosts (API, versions container) come from .github/scripts/Get-Endpoints.ps1.
env:
FUNCTION_APP: autopilotmonitor-api-eu
HEALTH_URL: https://autopilotmonitor-api-eu.azurewebsites.net/api/health
VERSIONS_CONTAINER: https://autopilotmonitoreu.blob.core.windows.net/versions
CSPROJ_PATH: src/Backend/AutopilotMonitor.Functions/AutopilotMonitor.Functions.csproj
jobs:
build-and-deploy:
# Runs only this repository's scripts. The deploy identity trusts the `production`
# environment, which admits main only.
reserve:
name: Reserve build number
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
name: Build and Deploy Backend
environment: production
permissions:
contents: read
id-token: write # OIDC federated login (secret-less)
outputs:
build_number: ${{ steps.version.outputs.build_number }}
version: ${{ steps.version.outputs.version }}
build_utc: ${{ steps.version.outputs.build_utc }}
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@3d3c42e5aac5ba805825da76410c181273ba90b1 # v7.0.1
with:
persist-credentials: false
- name: Load endpoints
shell: pwsh
run: ./.github/scripts/Get-Endpoints.ps1 -ExportToGitHubEnv
- name: Login to Azure (OIDC)
uses: azure/login@a641126d1b8aa4d1fa005f4f92df94a3a4c4c906 # v3.1.0
with:
@@ -30,11 +45,6 @@ jobs:
tenant-id: ${{ secrets.AZURE_TENANT_ID }}
subscription-id: ${{ secrets.AZURE_SUBSCRIPTION_ID }}
- name: Setup .NET 10
uses: actions/setup-dotnet@a98b56852c35b8e3190ac28c8c2271da59106c68 # v6.0.0
with:
dotnet-version: '10.0.x'
# Same counter mechanism as the agent line: reserve-before-build with ETag-CAS
# against a per-component counter blob. BuildTimestampUtc is pinned here rather
# than left to MSBuild's default so the published manifest and the value baked
@@ -43,7 +53,7 @@ jobs:
id: version
shell: pwsh
run: |
$buildNumber = & ./.github/scripts/Request-BuildNumber.ps1 -CounterUrl "${{ env.VERSIONS_CONTAINER }}/backend.txt"
$buildNumber = & ./.github/scripts/Request-BuildNumber.ps1 -CounterUrl "$env:VERSIONS_CONTAINER_URL/backend.txt"
$csproj = Get-Content ${{ env.CSPROJ_PATH }} -Raw
if ($csproj -notmatch '<VersionPrefix>(\d+\.\d+)</VersionPrefix>') {
@@ -57,20 +67,90 @@ jobs:
"version=$version" >> $env:GITHUB_OUTPUT
"build_utc=$buildUtc" >> $env:GITHUB_OUTPUT
# Build zone: no login, no secret, no id-token. Its only output is the artifact; the
# deploy job treats that as data and never builds.
build:
name: Build
needs: reserve
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@3d3c42e5aac5ba805825da76410c181273ba90b1 # v7.0.1
with:
persist-credentials: false
- name: Setup .NET 10
uses: actions/setup-dotnet@a98b56852c35b8e3190ac28c8c2271da59106c68 # v6.0.0
with:
dotnet-version: '10.0.x'
- name: Restore dependencies
run: dotnet restore ${{ env.CSPROJ_PATH }}
- name: Build
run: dotnet build ${{ env.CSPROJ_PATH }} --configuration Release --no-restore -p:SourceRevisionId=${{ github.sha }} -p:BuildNumber=${{ steps.version.outputs.build_number }} -p:BuildTimestampUtc=${{ steps.version.outputs.build_utc }}
run: dotnet build ${{ env.CSPROJ_PATH }} --configuration Release --no-restore -p:SourceRevisionId=${{ github.sha }} -p:BuildNumber=${{ needs.reserve.outputs.build_number }} -p:BuildTimestampUtc=${{ needs.reserve.outputs.build_utc }}
- name: Publish
run: dotnet publish ${{ env.CSPROJ_PATH }} --configuration Release --output ./publish --no-build -p:SourceRevisionId=${{ github.sha }} -p:BuildNumber=${{ steps.version.outputs.build_number }} -p:BuildTimestampUtc=${{ steps.version.outputs.build_utc }}
run: dotnet publish ${{ env.CSPROJ_PATH }} --configuration Release --output ./publish --no-build -p:SourceRevisionId=${{ github.sha }} -p:BuildNumber=${{ needs.reserve.outputs.build_number }} -p:BuildTimestampUtc=${{ needs.reserve.outputs.build_utc }}
# One archive, not a folder upload: upload-artifact skips hidden files, and the
# isolated worker cannot start without the publish output's .azurefunctions/ folder.
- name: Package publish output
run: tar -czf "$RUNNER_TEMP/backend-publish.tgz" -C publish .
- name: Upload publish output
uses: actions/upload-artifact@043fb46d1a93c77aae656e7c1c64a875d1fc6a0a # v7.0.1
with:
name: backend-publish
path: ${{ runner.temp }}/backend-publish.tgz
if-no-files-found: error
retention-days: 1
# Trust zone: only this repository's scripts and pinned actions run here, never a restore
# or build. The package is unpacked outside the checkout, so nothing in it can replace the
# scripts this job runs.
deploy:
name: Deploy and verify
needs: [reserve, build]
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
environment: production
permissions:
contents: read
id-token: write # OIDC federated login (secret-less)
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@3d3c42e5aac5ba805825da76410c181273ba90b1 # v7.0.1
with:
persist-credentials: false
- name: Load endpoints
shell: pwsh
run: ./.github/scripts/Get-Endpoints.ps1 -ExportToGitHubEnv
- name: Download publish output
uses: actions/download-artifact@3e5f45b2cfb9172054b4087a40e8e0b5a5461e7c # v8.0.1
with:
name: backend-publish
path: ${{ runner.temp }}/backend-artifact
# GNU tar refuses members with '..' and strips leading '/'.
- name: Unpack publish output
run: |
mkdir "$RUNNER_TEMP/publish"
tar -xzf "$RUNNER_TEMP/backend-artifact/backend-publish.tgz" -C "$RUNNER_TEMP/publish"
- name: Login to Azure (OIDC)
uses: azure/login@a641126d1b8aa4d1fa005f4f92df94a3a4c4c906 # v3.1.0
with:
client-id: ${{ secrets.AZURE_CLIENT_ID }}
tenant-id: ${{ secrets.AZURE_TENANT_ID }}
subscription-id: ${{ secrets.AZURE_SUBSCRIPTION_ID }}
- name: Deploy to Azure Functions
uses: Azure/functions-action@c5060b3b8bb1ebbcb531abd00c822ecbaa8ea656 # v1.5.7
with:
app-name: ${{ env.FUNCTION_APP }}
package: ./publish
package: ${{ runner.temp }}/publish
# A green deploy step only means the package was accepted. This gate makes the
# workflow assert what is actually being served, so the manifest published below
@@ -78,16 +158,18 @@ jobs:
# /api/health is IP rate-limited at 30/min; one poll per 10s stays well under.
- name: Verify deployed build is live
shell: pwsh
env:
EXPECTED_VERSION: ${{ needs.reserve.outputs.version }}
run: |
$expectedCommit = '${{ github.sha }}'.Substring(0, 7)
$expectedVersion = '${{ steps.version.outputs.version }}'
$expectedVersion = $env:EXPECTED_VERSION
$deadline = [DateTime]::UtcNow.AddMinutes(3)
$attempt = 0
while ([DateTime]::UtcNow -lt $deadline) {
$attempt++
try {
$health = Invoke-RestMethod -Uri '${{ env.HEALTH_URL }}' -Method Get -TimeoutSec 30
$health = Invoke-RestMethod -Uri "$env:API_BASE_URL/api/health" -Method Get -TimeoutSec 30
if ($health.commitHash -eq $expectedCommit -and $health.version -eq $expectedVersion) {
Write-Host "Live after $attempt attempt(s): $($health.version) @ $($health.commitHash), built $($health.buildUtc)"
exit 0
@@ -107,18 +189,21 @@ jobs:
# (rollback, stale instance) rather than a half-finished pipeline.
- name: Publish version manifest
shell: pwsh
env:
BACKEND_VERSION: ${{ needs.reserve.outputs.version }}
BACKEND_BUILD_UTC: ${{ needs.reserve.outputs.build_utc }}
run: |
$manifest = [ordered]@{
component = 'backend'
version = '${{ steps.version.outputs.version }}'
version = $env:BACKEND_VERSION
commit = '${{ github.sha }}'.Substring(0, 7)
buildUtc = '${{ steps.version.outputs.build_utc }}'
buildUtc = $env:BACKEND_BUILD_UTC
deployedUtc = [DateTime]::UtcNow.ToString('o')
runId = '${{ github.run_id }}'
} | ConvertTo-Json
$authHeaders = & ./.github/scripts/Get-StorageAuthHeaders.ps1
$url = "${{ env.VERSIONS_CONTAINER }}/backend.json"
$url = "$env:VERSIONS_CONTAINER_URL/backend.json"
# no-cache: rotating pointer, must never be served stale by any fronting cache.
Invoke-RestMethod -Uri $url -Method Put -Headers ($authHeaders + @{ 'x-ms-blob-type' = 'BlockBlob'; 'x-ms-blob-cache-control' = 'no-cache' }) -Body $manifest -ContentType 'application/json' | Out-Null
Write-Host "Published versions/backend.json"
+14 -5
View File
@@ -16,20 +16,29 @@ env:
# reference — with a sha-only tag `az containerapp update` saw the same image
# and silently created no revision (2026-08-28).
IMAGE_TAG: ${{ github.sha }}-${{ github.run_number }}
HEALTH_URL: https://mcp.autopilotmonitor.com/health
VERSIONS_CONTAINER: https://autopilotmonitoreu.blob.core.windows.net/versions
PACKAGE_JSON: src/McpServer/autopilot-monitor-mcp/package.json
# Hosts (MCP, versions container) come from .github/scripts/Get-Endpoints.ps1.
jobs:
# One job on purpose, unlike the other deploys: all third-party code (npm ci, the build, the
# embedding precompute) runs inside `docker build`, whose containers see neither the az
# login nor the registry credentials nor this job's OIDC request token. That container is
# the boundary -- never move npm onto the runner here, or the build gets the job's
# credentials. The deploy identity trusts the `production` environment, which admits main only.
build-and-deploy:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
name: Build and Deploy MCP Server
environment: production
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@3d3c42e5aac5ba805825da76410c181273ba90b1 # v7.0.1
with:
persist-credentials: false
- name: Load endpoints
shell: pwsh
run: ./.github/scripts/Get-Endpoints.ps1 -ExportToGitHubEnv
# The published customer documentation lives in its own PUBLIC repo and is
# baked into the image as the search_docs corpus (see the Dockerfile). No
# token is needed. Checking it out here rather than vendoring it keeps the
@@ -62,7 +71,7 @@ jobs:
id: version
shell: pwsh
run: |
$buildNumber = & ./.github/scripts/Request-BuildNumber.ps1 -CounterUrl "${{ env.VERSIONS_CONTAINER }}/mcp.txt"
$buildNumber = & ./.github/scripts/Request-BuildNumber.ps1 -CounterUrl "$env:VERSIONS_CONTAINER_URL/mcp.txt"
$pkgVersion = (Get-Content ${{ env.PACKAGE_JSON }} -Raw | ConvertFrom-Json).version
$prefix = ($pkgVersion -split '\.')[0..1] -join '.'
@@ -117,7 +126,7 @@ jobs:
while ([DateTime]::UtcNow -lt $deadline) {
$attempt++
try {
$health = Invoke-RestMethod -Uri '${{ env.HEALTH_URL }}' -Method Get -TimeoutSec 60
$health = Invoke-RestMethod -Uri "$env:MCP_BASE_URL/health" -Method Get -TimeoutSec 60
if ($health.commit -eq $expectedCommit -and $health.version -eq $expectedVersion) {
Write-Host "Live after $attempt attempt(s): $($health.version) @ $($health.commit), docs $($health.docs.commit) ($($health.docs.chunks) chunks)"
exit 0
@@ -148,7 +157,7 @@ jobs:
} | ConvertTo-Json
$authHeaders = & ./.github/scripts/Get-StorageAuthHeaders.ps1
$url = "${{ env.VERSIONS_CONTAINER }}/mcp.json"
$url = "$env:VERSIONS_CONTAINER_URL/mcp.json"
# no-cache: rotating pointer, must never be served stale by any fronting cache.
Invoke-RestMethod -Uri $url -Method Put -Headers ($authHeaders + @{ 'x-ms-blob-type' = 'BlockBlob'; 'x-ms-blob-cache-control' = 'no-cache' }) -Body $manifest -ContentType 'application/json' | Out-Null
Write-Host "Published versions/mcp.json"
+117 -31
View File
@@ -5,6 +5,11 @@ name: Deploy Web (Static Web App)
# path ci.yml tests (setup-node 22 + npm ci + next build) instead of Oryx guessing inside the
# action's container, and the exported site is attested like the agent ZIP and the MSI.
#
# Three jobs, each holding only what it needs: build runs all third-party code without any
# credential, deploy holds the SWA token alone, record attests, verifies and writes the
# manifest. A failed record job is re-run on its own; it writes only once the live site
# serves this commit.
#
# PR preview environments were dropped with the action: their per-PR URLs are never
# registered as redirect URIs, so nobody could log in on them anyway.
@@ -17,23 +22,29 @@ on:
- '.github/workflows/deploy-web.yml'
workflow_dispatch:
# Every job states its own permissions. This default is what the build job runs with: npm ci
# (install scripts included) and next build execute third-party code and must never hold more
# than a read-only token.
permissions:
contents: read
id-token: write # keyless Sigstore signing (artifact attestation)
attestations: write # store the provenance attestation
# Hosts (API, portal, storage) come from .github/scripts/Get-Endpoints.ps1, never from a
# repository variable.
env:
PORTAL_VERSION_URL: https://portal.autopilotmonitor.com/version.json
VERSIONS_CONTAINER: https://autopilotmonitoreu.blob.core.windows.net/versions
WEB_DIR: src/Web/autopilot-monitor-web
# Exact version: `npx --package` resolves from the registry at run time, so the pin is the
# only thing that keeps the deploy step's code fixed. Bump deliberately.
SWA_CLI_VERSION: 2.0.10
jobs:
build_and_deploy_job:
# Build zone: no login, no id-token. The one secret here is the Application Insights
# connection string, which ships inside the public bundle anyway.
build:
name: Build
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
name: Build and Deploy Job
outputs:
docs_sha: ${{ steps.docs.outputs.sha }}
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@3d3c42e5aac5ba805825da76410c181273ba90b1 # v7.0.1
with:
@@ -41,14 +52,9 @@ jobs:
lfs: false
fetch-depth: 0 # Full history needed for git-based sitemap lastmod dates
# Only the version manifest at the very end needs Azure; logging in here rather than
# next to that step keeps a credential problem from surfacing after a live deploy.
- name: Login to Azure (OIDC)
uses: azure/login@a641126d1b8aa4d1fa005f4f92df94a3a4c4c906 # v3.1.0
with:
client-id: ${{ secrets.AZURE_CLIENT_ID }}
tenant-id: ${{ secrets.AZURE_TENANT_ID }}
subscription-id: ${{ secrets.AZURE_SUBSCRIPTION_ID }}
- name: Load endpoints
shell: pwsh
run: ./.github/scripts/Get-Endpoints.ps1 -ExportToGitHubEnv
# The customer docs repo is the single source of the "What's new" panel: the prebuild
# step (scripts/whats-new/build-whats-new.js) turns changelog/*.md into
@@ -105,12 +111,6 @@ jobs:
# and the default app for browsers without a stored selection (legacy|primary).
NEXT_PUBLIC_ENTRA_LEGACY_CLIENT_ID: ${{ vars.NEXT_PUBLIC_ENTRA_LEGACY_CLIENT_ID }}
NEXT_PUBLIC_ENTRA_DEFAULT_APP: ${{ vars.NEXT_PUBLIC_ENTRA_DEFAULT_APP }}
NEXT_PUBLIC_ENTRA_REDIRECT_URI: ${{ vars.NEXT_PUBLIC_ENTRA_REDIRECT_URI }}
NEXT_PUBLIC_ENTRA_POST_LOGOUT_REDIRECT_URI: ${{ vars.NEXT_PUBLIC_ENTRA_POST_LOGOUT_REDIRECT_URI }}
NEXT_PUBLIC_API_BASE_URL: ${{ vars.NEXT_PUBLIC_API_BASE_URL }}
# Browsers load the live stats through it, and the build reads it once to bake the
# numbers of this moment into the landing page's static HTML (lib/platformStats.ts).
NEXT_PUBLIC_PLATFORM_STATS_MANIFEST_URL: ${{ vars.NEXT_PUBLIC_PLATFORM_STATS_MANIFEST_URL }}
NEXT_PUBLIC_APPINSIGHTS_CONNECTION_STRING: ${{ secrets.NEXT_PUBLIC_APPINSIGHTS_CONNECTION_STRING }}
# Build stamp for public/version.json (scripts/generate-version.js in prebuild);
# the verify step below polls the deployed file for exactly this commit.
@@ -120,6 +120,18 @@ jobs:
# Star counter from the step above; empty when the lookup failed.
NEXT_PUBLIC_GITHUB_STARS: ${{ steps.stars.outputs.count }}
run: |
# All from the endpoint registry (Load endpoints). Empty, the portal would silently call
# localhost:7071. The stats manifest is what browsers load the live numbers from, and the
# build reads it once to bake the numbers of this moment into the landing page's static
# HTML (lib/platformStats.ts). The redirect URIs are only the fallback for the static
# render; in the browser lib/msalConfig.ts uses window.location.origin.
export NEXT_PUBLIC_API_BASE_URL="$API_BASE_URL"
export NEXT_PUBLIC_PLATFORM_STATS_MANIFEST_URL="$STATS_CONTAINER_URL"
export NEXT_PUBLIC_ENTRA_REDIRECT_URI="$WWW_BASE_URL"
export NEXT_PUBLIC_ENTRA_POST_LOGOUT_REDIRECT_URI="$WWW_BASE_URL"
test -n "$NEXT_PUBLIC_API_BASE_URL" || { echo "::error::API_BASE_URL is empty - the portal would call localhost"; exit 1; }
test -n "$NEXT_PUBLIC_PLATFORM_STATS_MANIFEST_URL" || { echo "::error::STATS_CONTAINER_URL is empty"; exit 1; }
test -n "$NEXT_PUBLIC_ENTRA_REDIRECT_URI" || { echo "::error::WWW_BASE_URL is empty"; exit 1; }
npm run build
test -f out/version.json || { echo "out/version.json missing - export did not run"; exit 1; }
test -f out/whats-new.json || { echo "out/whats-new.json missing - whats-new prebuild did not run"; exit 1; }
@@ -136,19 +148,37 @@ jobs:
echo "archive=$archive" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
sha256sum "$archive"
# Sigstore keyless provenance: binds the export digest to this workflow run (repo, ref,
# commit, workflow file) in a public transparency log.
# Verify: gh attestation verify portal-<sha>.tar.gz --repo okieselbach/AutopilotMonitor
- name: Attest build provenance (portal export)
uses: actions/attest-build-provenance@4d101475d8b20a2381f78447822ac1eab6504dd8 # v4.2.2
with:
subject-path: ${{ steps.package.outputs.archive }}
- name: Upload build artifact
uses: actions/upload-artifact@043fb46d1a93c77aae656e7c1c64a875d1fc6a0a # v7.0.1
with:
name: portal-${{ github.sha }}
path: ${{ steps.package.outputs.archive }}
if-no-files-found: error
# Holds the SWA deployment token and nothing else -- deliberately no id-token: the SWA CLI
# is third-party npm code whose dependencies resolve at run time.
deploy:
name: Deploy to Static Web App
needs: build
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
environment: production
steps:
# For staticwebapp.config.json only.
- uses: actions/checkout@3d3c42e5aac5ba805825da76410c181273ba90b1 # v7.0.1
with:
persist-credentials: false
- name: Download build artifact
uses: actions/download-artifact@3e5f45b2cfb9172054b4087a40e8e0b5a5461e7c # v8.0.1
with:
name: portal-${{ github.sha }}
path: ${{ runner.temp }}/portal
- name: Unpack export
run: |
mkdir "$WEB_DIR/out"
tar -xzf "$RUNNER_TEMP/portal/portal-${GITHUB_SHA::7}.tar.gz" -C "$WEB_DIR/out"
# Upload only -- out/ is already built. --swa-config-location points at the app root,
# where staticwebapp.config.json lives (next export does not copy it into out/).
@@ -163,6 +193,48 @@ jobs:
--env production \
--no-use-keychain
# Trust zone: only this repository's scripts and pinned actions run here. The deploy
# identity trusts the `production` environment, which admits main only.
record:
name: Attest, verify and record
needs: [build, deploy]
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
environment: production
permissions:
contents: read
id-token: write # keyless Sigstore signing, OIDC login for the manifest
attestations: write # store the provenance attestation
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@3d3c42e5aac5ba805825da76410c181273ba90b1 # v7.0.1
with:
persist-credentials: false
- name: Load endpoints
shell: pwsh
run: ./.github/scripts/Get-Endpoints.ps1 -ExportToGitHubEnv
- name: Download build artifact
uses: actions/download-artifact@3e5f45b2cfb9172054b4087a40e8e0b5a5461e7c # v8.0.1
with:
name: portal-${{ github.sha }}
path: ${{ runner.temp }}/portal
- name: Locate the export archive
id: archive
run: |
path="$RUNNER_TEMP/portal/portal-${GITHUB_SHA::7}.tar.gz"
test -f "$path" || { echo "::error::Export archive for this commit is missing"; exit 1; }
echo "path=$path" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
# Sigstore keyless provenance: binds the export digest to this workflow run (repo, ref,
# commit, workflow file) in a public transparency log.
# Verify: gh attestation verify portal-<sha>.tar.gz --repo okieselbach/AutopilotMonitor
- name: Attest build provenance (portal export)
uses: actions/attest-build-provenance@4d101475d8b20a2381f78447822ac1eab6504dd8 # v4.2.2
with:
subject-path: ${{ steps.archive.outputs.path }}
# The CLI reporting success proves the upload, not that the production host serves the
# new build -- verify against the live /version.json (Cache-Control: no-store via
# staticwebapp.config.json) before publishing the version manifest.
@@ -176,7 +248,7 @@ jobs:
while ([DateTime]::UtcNow -lt $deadline) {
$attempt++
try {
$v = Invoke-RestMethod -Uri '${{ env.PORTAL_VERSION_URL }}' -Method Get -TimeoutSec 30 -Headers @{ 'Cache-Control' = 'no-cache' }
$v = Invoke-RestMethod -Uri "$env:PORTAL_BASE_URL/version.json" -Method Get -TimeoutSec 30 -Headers @{ 'Cache-Control' = 'no-cache' }
if ($v.commit -eq $expectedCommit) {
Write-Host "Live after $attempt attempt(s): web @ $($v.commit), built $($v.buildUtc)"
exit 0
@@ -190,22 +262,36 @@ jobs:
throw "Portal did not serve commit $expectedCommit within 5 minutes -- deployment not verified, version manifest NOT published"
- name: Login to Azure (OIDC)
uses: azure/login@a641126d1b8aa4d1fa005f4f92df94a3a4c4c906 # v3.1.0
with:
client-id: ${{ secrets.AZURE_CLIENT_ID }}
tenant-id: ${{ secrets.AZURE_TENANT_ID }}
subscription-id: ${{ secrets.AZURE_SUBSCRIPTION_ID }}
# Cross-component deploy record, written last and only on a verified deploy --
# same contract as versions/backend.json and versions/mcp.json. docsCommit says which
# docs revision the live What's new panel was generated from (as for the MCP corpus).
# The docs commit comes from the build job, so it arrives as data and is checked
# against the shape of a commit id before it is used.
- name: Publish version manifest
shell: pwsh
env:
DOCS_SHA: ${{ needs.build.outputs.docs_sha }}
run: |
if ($env:DOCS_SHA -notmatch '^[0-9a-f]{40}$') {
throw "The build job handed over no valid docs commit -- version manifest NOT published."
}
$manifest = [ordered]@{
component = 'web'
commit = '${{ github.sha }}'.Substring(0, 7)
deployedUtc = [DateTime]::UtcNow.ToString('o')
runId = '${{ github.run_id }}'
docsCommit = '${{ steps.docs.outputs.sha }}'.Substring(0, 7)
docsCommit = $env:DOCS_SHA.Substring(0, 7)
} | ConvertTo-Json
$authHeaders = & ./.github/scripts/Get-StorageAuthHeaders.ps1
$url = "${{ env.VERSIONS_CONTAINER }}/web.json"
$url = "$env:VERSIONS_CONTAINER_URL/web.json"
# no-cache: rotating pointer, must never be served stale by any fronting cache.
Invoke-RestMethod -Uri $url -Method Put -Headers ($authHeaders + @{ 'x-ms-blob-type' = 'BlockBlob'; 'x-ms-blob-cache-control' = 'no-cache' }) -Body $manifest -ContentType 'application/json' | Out-Null
Write-Host "Published versions/web.json"
+15 -5
View File
@@ -3,24 +3,34 @@ name: IndexNow Notify (Bing/Yandex)
on:
workflow_dispatch:
# The job only talks to public endpoints; it never needs a repository token.
permissions: {}
# Read-only, for the checkout of the endpoint registry; beyond that the job only talks to
# public endpoints.
permissions:
contents: read
jobs:
notify:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
name: Submit URLs to IndexNow
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@3d3c42e5aac5ba805825da76410c181273ba90b1 # v7.0.1
with:
persist-credentials: false
- name: Load endpoints
shell: pwsh
run: ./.github/scripts/Get-Endpoints.ps1 -ExportToGitHubEnv
- name: Notify IndexNow
run: |
URLS=$(curl -s https://www.autopilotmonitor.com/sitemap.xml | grep -oP '<loc>\K[^<]+')
URLS=$(curl -s "$WWW_BASE_URL/sitemap.xml" | grep -oP '<loc>\K[^<]+')
URL_JSON=$(echo "$URLS" | jq -R -s 'split("\n") | map(select(length > 0))')
RESPONSE=$(curl -s -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}" -X POST "https://api.indexnow.org/indexnow" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d "{
\"host\": \"www.autopilotmonitor.com\",
\"host\": \"${WWW_BASE_URL#https://}\",
\"key\": \"8f1710b5-f14b-477e-938b-6c01ef851661\",
\"keyLocation\": \"https://www.autopilotmonitor.com/IndexNow.txt\",
\"keyLocation\": \"$WWW_BASE_URL/IndexNow.txt\",
\"urlList\": $URL_JSON
}")
echo "IndexNow response: HTTP $RESPONSE"
-28
View File
@@ -1,28 +0,0 @@
# TEMPORARY: proves the secret-less OIDC federated login works end-to-end.
# Delete after the cross-tenant migration is verified (or keep as a cheap smoke test).
name: OIDC Login Test
on:
workflow_dispatch:
permissions:
id-token: write
contents: read
jobs:
login-test:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
name: Federated login + read check
steps:
- name: Login to Azure (OIDC)
uses: azure/login@a641126d1b8aa4d1fa005f4f92df94a3a4c4c906 # v3.1.0
with:
client-id: ${{ secrets.AZURE_CLIENT_ID }}
tenant-id: ${{ secrets.AZURE_TENANT_ID }}
subscription-id: ${{ secrets.AZURE_SUBSCRIPTION_ID }}
- name: Prove identity and RBAC scope
run: |
az account show --query "{subscription:name, subscriptionId:id, tenantId:tenantId, user:user.name}" -o json
echo "--- function app visible with Contributor scope? ---"
az functionapp list --query "[].name" -o json
+5
View File
@@ -14,7 +14,12 @@ on:
- 'scripts/Bootstrap/**'
- 'scripts/CustomerSetup/**'
- '.github/scripts/Publish-BootstrapScripts.ps1'
- '.github/scripts/Invoke-BootstrapSystemPass.ps1'
- '.github/scripts/Test-BootstrapAttacker.ps1'
- '.github/workflows/bootstrap-script-gates.yml'
# The integration tests run the generated OOBE script and the MSI's command line.
- 'src/Backend/AutopilotMonitor.Functions.Tests/TestData/oobe-bootstrap-golden.ps1'
- 'src/Agent/AutopilotMonitor.BootstrapMsi/Package.wxs'
workflow_dispatch:
permissions:
+16 -6
View File
@@ -23,6 +23,14 @@ on:
required: true
type: boolean
default: false
channel:
description: 'release: every script. dev: only the two -Dev scripts, to try a change on dev devices first'
required: true
type: choice
options:
- release
- dev
default: release
permissions:
contents: read
@@ -36,13 +44,13 @@ concurrency:
# Authenticode for the customer scripts. Same identity and same repository variables as
# build-agent.yml -- the loader on every device pins this publisher, so the two must not
# drift apart.
# drift apart. The publisher takes every host, the timestamp server included, from
# .github/scripts/Get-Endpoints.ps1.
env:
CODE_SIGN_CLIENT_ID: ${{ vars.CODE_SIGN_CLIENT_ID }}
CODE_SIGN_CERTIFICATE_NAME: ${{ vars.CODE_SIGN_CERTIFICATE_NAME }}
CODE_SIGN_KEY_VAULT_URL: ${{ vars.CODE_SIGN_KEY_VAULT_URL }}
CODE_SIGN_EXPECTED_SUBJECT: ${{ vars.CODE_SIGN_EXPECTED_SUBJECT }}
CODE_SIGN_TIMESTAMP_URL: http://timestamp.acs.microsoft.com
jobs:
# $/ is the self-repository form: this repository at the running commit, never a
@@ -54,6 +62,8 @@ jobs:
name: Publish to the download alias
needs: gates
runs-on: windows-latest
# Both identities trust only the `release` environment, which admits main only.
environment: release
# Job-scoped: only the publish job federates to Azure, the gates job never holds an
# OIDC token it does not need.
permissions:
@@ -74,9 +84,7 @@ jobs:
}
# First, and only to fetch the Key Vault token: azure/login sets the default az
# account and the storage login below has to be the one that stays. See D-223 --
# both federated credentials are bound to the ref, so this job must never carry a
# GitHub `environment:`.
# account and the storage login below has to be the one that stays.
- name: Login to Azure (code-signing identity)
uses: azure/login@a641126d1b8aa4d1fa005f4f92df94a3a4c4c906 # v3.1.0
with:
@@ -113,18 +121,20 @@ jobs:
DOTNET_ROLL_FORWARD: LatestMajor
run: dotnet tool install --no-cache --global AzureSignTool --version 7.0.1
# A push publishes the release channel; only a dispatch can choose dev.
- name: Publish bootstrap + customer scripts
shell: pwsh
env:
DOTNET_ROLL_FORWARD: LatestMajor
PUBLISH_CHANNEL: ${{ inputs.channel || 'release' }}
run: |
$dryRun = '${{ inputs.dry_run }}' -eq 'true'
./.github/scripts/Publish-BootstrapScripts.ps1 `
-Channel $env:PUBLISH_CHANNEL `
-LegacySasToken '${{ secrets.AZURE_BLOB_AGENT_LEGACY_SAS_TOKEN }}' `
-SigningToken $env:CODE_SIGN_AKV_ACCESS_TOKEN `
-KeyVaultUrl $env:CODE_SIGN_KEY_VAULT_URL `
-CertificateName $env:CODE_SIGN_CERTIFICATE_NAME `
-TimestampUrl $env:CODE_SIGN_TIMESTAMP_URL `
-ExpectedPublisher $env:CODE_SIGN_EXPECTED_SUBJECT `
-SignedOutputDir "$env:RUNNER_TEMP/signed-scripts" `
-DryRun:$dryRun
+1 -1
Submodule infra updated: f93e475b78...0085deab45
+21 -1
View File
@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@
"description": "Detects when a Win32 app detection script fails or returns unexpected results.",
"severity": "warning",
"category": "apps",
"version": "1.2.0",
"version": "1.3.0",
"enabled": true,
"evaluateOn": [
"enrollment_end",
@@ -38,6 +38,26 @@
]
}
],
"presentation": {
"role": "cause",
"summary": "{{detection_failure.appName}} was not detected after its install",
"subject": {
"kind": "app",
"key": "{{detection_failure.appId}}",
"name": "{{detection_failure.appName}}"
},
"facts": [
{
"label": "Detection",
"value": "{{detection_failure.value}}"
},
{
"label": "Error",
"value": "{{detection_failure.errorCode}}",
"format": "errorCode"
}
]
},
"tags": [
"apps",
"detection",
+22 -1
View File
@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@
"description": "Detects app installation failures with specific exit codes or HRESULT error codes and suggests fixes.",
"severity": "high",
"category": "apps",
"version": "1.2.0",
"version": "1.3.0",
"enabled": true,
"evaluateOn": [
"enrollment_end",
@@ -41,6 +41,27 @@
]
}
],
"presentation": {
"role": "cause",
"summary": "{{install_error.appName}} failed to install",
"subject": {
"kind": "app",
"key": "{{install_error.appId}}",
"name": "{{install_error.appName}}"
},
"facts": [
{
"label": "Exit code",
"value": "{{install_error.exitCode}}",
"format": "code"
},
{
"label": "Error",
"value": "{{install_error.errorCode}}",
"format": "errorCode"
}
]
},
"tags": [
"apps",
"msi",
+17 -1
View File
@@ -33,9 +33,25 @@
]
}
],
"presentation": {
"role": "cause",
"summary": "{{dependency_failure.appName}} failed because a dependency did not install",
"subject": {
"kind": "app",
"key": "{{dependency_failure.appId}}",
"name": "{{dependency_failure.appName}}"
},
"facts": [
{
"label": "Error",
"value": "{{dependency_failure.errorCode}}",
"format": "errorCode"
}
]
},
"tags": [
"apps",
"dependency"
],
"version": "1.1.0"
"version": "1.2.0"
}
+22 -1
View File
@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@
"description": "Detects when disk space is critically low during enrollment, which can cause app installation failures. Confidence increases when app installations actually failed while disk space was low.",
"severity": "critical",
"category": "apps",
"version": "1.2.0",
"version": "1.3.0",
"enabled": true,
"evaluateOn": [
"enrollment_end",
@@ -71,6 +71,27 @@
]
}
],
"presentation": {
"role": "cause",
"summary": "Free disk space dropped to {{low_disk.value}} GB",
"subject": {
"kind": "device",
"key": "disk",
"name": "Disk space"
},
"facts": [
{
"label": "Free space (GB)",
"value": "{{low_disk.value}}",
"format": "number"
},
{
"label": "Measured",
"value": "{{low_disk.timestamp}}",
"format": "timestamp"
}
]
},
"tags": [
"apps",
"disk-space",
+17 -1
View File
@@ -33,10 +33,26 @@
]
}
],
"presentation": {
"role": "cause",
"summary": "The content download of {{download_timeout.appName}} timed out or failed",
"subject": {
"kind": "app",
"key": "{{download_timeout.appId}}",
"name": "{{download_timeout.appName}}"
},
"facts": [
{
"label": "Error",
"value": "{{download_timeout.errorCode}}",
"format": "errorCode"
}
]
},
"tags": [
"apps",
"download",
"timeout"
],
"version": "1.1.0"
"version": "1.2.0"
}
+22 -1
View File
@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@
"description": "Detects when the same app installation is attempted 3 or more times during one enrollment — a retry loop caused by unhonored reboot requests, repeated failures, or detection mismatches.",
"severity": "high",
"category": "apps",
"version": "1.2.0",
"version": "1.3.0",
"enabled": true,
"evaluateOn": [
"enrollment_end",
@@ -35,6 +35,27 @@
]
}
],
"presentation": {
"role": "cause",
"summary": "{{install_retry_loop.appName}} was started {{install_retry_loop.count}} times",
"subject": {
"kind": "app",
"key": "{{install_retry_loop.groupKey}}",
"name": "{{install_retry_loop.appName}}"
},
"facts": [
{
"label": "Install starts",
"value": "{{install_retry_loop.count}}",
"format": "number"
},
{
"label": "First start",
"value": "{{install_retry_loop.timestamp}}",
"format": "timestamp"
}
]
},
"tags": [
"apps",
"reboot",
+12 -1
View File
@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@
"description": "Detects when the app tracking summary reports multiple failed app installations.",
"severity": "high",
"category": "apps",
"version": "1.2.0",
"version": "1.3.0",
"enabled": true,
"evaluateOn": [
"enrollment_end",
@@ -50,6 +50,17 @@
]
}
],
"presentation": {
"role": "cause",
"summary": "{{summary_errors.value}} app installations failed",
"facts": [
{
"label": "Failed apps",
"value": "{{summary_errors.value}}",
"format": "number"
}
]
},
"tags": [
"apps",
"summary",
+22 -1
View File
@@ -32,11 +32,32 @@
]
}
],
"presentation": {
"role": "cause",
"summary": "{{slow_app_install.appName}} took {{slow_app_install.durationFormatted}} to install",
"subject": {
"kind": "app",
"key": "{{slow_app_install.appId}}",
"name": "{{slow_app_install.appName}}"
},
"facts": [
{
"label": "Install time",
"value": "{{slow_app_install.durationSeconds}}",
"format": "duration"
},
{
"label": "Started",
"value": "{{slow_app_install.startTimestamp}}",
"format": "timestamp"
}
]
},
"tags": [
"apps",
"performance",
"slow-install",
"warning"
],
"version": "1.1.0"
"version": "1.2.0"
}
+27
View File
@@ -1,6 +1,7 @@
{
"$schema": "../schema/analyze-rule.schema.json",
"ruleId": "ANALYZE-APP-010",
"version": "1.1.0",
"title": "App Reverted to Error After Successful Install",
"description": "Detects when a specific app (matched by appId) was first reported as successfully installed but subsequently reported an IME enforcement error — while enrollment completed successfully. The app may be broken post-enrollment.",
"severity": "warning",
@@ -56,5 +57,31 @@
{ "title": "Troubleshoot Win32 app installations", "url": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/troubleshoot/mem/intune/app-management/troubleshoot-win32-app-install" },
{ "title": "Intune Management Extension logs", "url": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/mem/intune/apps/intune-management-extension" }
],
"presentation": {
"role": "cause",
"summary": "{{app_regression.eventA_appName}} installed, then reported an error",
"subject": {
"kind": "app",
"key": "{{app_regression.joinValue}}",
"name": "{{app_regression.eventA_appName}}"
},
"facts": [
{
"label": "Installed",
"value": "{{app_regression.eventA_timestamp}}",
"format": "timestamp"
},
{
"label": "Error after",
"value": "{{app_regression.timeDeltaSeconds}}",
"format": "duration"
},
{
"label": "Error",
"value": "{{app_regression.eventB_errorCode}}",
"format": "errorCode"
}
]
},
"tags": ["apps", "win32", "enforcement", "post-install", "correlation"]
}
+27 -1
View File
@@ -43,6 +43,32 @@
"url": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/mem/intune/apps/apps-win32-app-management#step-4-return-codes"
}
],
"presentation": {
"role": "advisory",
"summary": "{{enforcement_error_resolved.eventA_appName}} reported an install error but was detected as installed",
"subject": {
"kind": "app",
"key": "{{enforcement_error_resolved.joinValue}}",
"name": "{{enforcement_error_resolved.eventA_appName}}"
},
"facts": [
{
"label": "Exit code",
"value": "{{enforcement_error_resolved.eventA_exitCode}}",
"format": "code"
},
{
"label": "Error",
"value": "{{enforcement_error_resolved.eventA_errorCode}}",
"format": "errorCode"
},
{
"label": "Detected installed after",
"value": "{{enforcement_error_resolved.timeDeltaSeconds}}",
"format": "duration"
}
]
},
"tags": [
"apps",
"enforcement",
@@ -50,5 +76,5 @@
"unmapped",
"resolved"
],
"version": "1.1.0"
"version": "1.2.0"
}
+21 -1
View File
@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@
"description": "Detects when the Enrollment Status Page failed because Intune could not verify an app was installed (HRESULT 0x87D1041C). The installer ran but the detection rule did not match afterwards.",
"severity": "critical",
"category": "apps",
"version": "1.2.0",
"version": "1.3.0",
"enabled": true,
"evaluateOn": [
"enrollment_end",
@@ -82,6 +82,26 @@
"url": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/mem/intune/apps/apps-win32-add#step-4-detection-rules"
}
],
"presentation": {
"role": "cause",
"summary": "{{app_with_detection_failure.appName}} installed, but its detection rule did not find it",
"subject": {
"kind": "app",
"key": "{{app_with_detection_failure.appId}}",
"name": "{{app_with_detection_failure.appName}}"
},
"facts": [
{
"label": "ESP error",
"value": "{{esp_failure_errorcode.value}}",
"format": "errorCode"
},
{
"label": "Detection",
"value": "{{app_with_detection_failure.value}}"
}
]
},
"tags": [
"apps",
"detection",
+31 -1
View File
@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@
"description": "Detects when the Enrollment Status Page failed on the Apps subcategory and the agent's AppX deployment log scan identified a suspected MSIX/Store package. Store/MSIX apps install outside the Win32 pipeline, so the regular per-app tracking sees nothing — this correlation names the likely culprit.",
"severity": "warning",
"category": "apps",
"version": "1.2.1",
"version": "1.3.0",
"enabled": true,
"evaluateOn": [
"enrollment_end",
@@ -123,6 +123,36 @@
"url": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/mem/intune/apps/store-apps-microsoft"
}
],
"presentation": {
"role": "cause",
"summary": "A Store or MSIX app failed during the ESP: {{appx_candidate.value}}",
"subject": {
"kind": "app",
"key": "{{appx_candidate.value}}",
"name": "{{appx_candidate.value}}"
},
"facts": [
{
"label": "ESP error",
"value": "{{appx_esp_errorcode.value}}",
"format": "errorCode"
},
{
"label": "ESP phase",
"value": "{{appx_esp_category.value}}"
},
{
"label": "Package",
"value": "{{appx_top_candidate_package.value}}",
"format": "code"
},
{
"label": "Candidates",
"value": "{{appx_candidate_count.value}}",
"format": "number"
}
]
},
"tags": [
"apps",
"appx",
+16 -1
View File
@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@
"description": "The IME reported its user-session completion line, but at least one required app stayed pending — without ever failing or even starting to install — so the agent kept deferring the enrollment completion signal. Typically an assignment/requirement problem (requirement rules never met, dependency never satisfied, or the app needs a context that is not available during ESP, e.g. a VPN client waiting for user sign-in to a portal).",
"severity": "high",
"category": "apps",
"version": "1.0.0",
"version": "1.1.0",
"author": "Autopilot Monitor",
"enabled": true,
"trigger": "correlation",
@@ -76,5 +76,20 @@
}
],
"markSessionAsFailedDefault": false,
"presentation": {
"role": "cause",
"summary": "Completion waited on {{apps_pending.value}} pending app(s)",
"facts": [
{
"label": "Pending apps",
"value": "{{apps_pending.value}}",
"format": "number"
},
{
"label": "Apps",
"value": "{{pending_app_names.value}}"
}
]
},
"tags": ["apps", "esp", "completion", "assignment", "pending"]
}
+21 -1
View File
@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@
"description": "One or more required user-ESP apps never started installing while the ESP AccountSetup apps gate waited on them — the agent observed the ESP page exit with those apps still in a non-terminal, never-started state. Unlike ANALYZE-APP-015 (which reports that completion was DEFERRED because of a pending app, and stays silent once the session reaches a terminal verdict) this rule reports the delivery gap itself and fires regardless of the final outcome: an enrollment that Windows called done while required apps never ran is a successful enrollment with missing software, and the operator must see it.",
"severity": "warning",
"category": "apps",
"version": "1.0.0",
"version": "1.1.0",
"author": "Autopilot Monitor",
"enabled": true,
"evaluateOn": [
@@ -102,6 +102,26 @@
}
],
"markSessionAsFailedDefault": false,
"presentation": {
"role": "cause",
"summary": "Required apps never started installing; first: {{appName.value}}",
"subject": {
"kind": "app",
"key": "{{appName.appId}}",
"name": "{{appName.value}}"
},
"facts": [
{
"label": "First app",
"value": "{{appName.value}}"
},
{
"label": "State",
"value": "{{state.value}}",
"format": "code"
}
]
},
"tags": [
"apps",
"esp",
+22 -1
View File
@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@
"description": "Detects Win32 app installs that failed because the Windows Installer was busy with another installation (HRESULT 0x80070652 / MSI exit code 1618, ERROR_INSTALL_ALREADY_RUNNING). The IME retries on a fixed budget (~15-17 minutes across several attempts) and then reports the app as failed; when the app is ESP-blocking, the Device Setup Apps subcategory terminates with it.",
"severity": "high",
"category": "apps",
"version": "1.0.0",
"version": "1.1.0",
"author": "Autopilot Monitor",
"enabled": true,
"baseConfidence": 70,
@@ -81,6 +81,27 @@
"url": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/troubleshoot/mem/intune/app-management/troubleshoot-win32-app-install"
}
],
"presentation": {
"role": "cause",
"summary": "{{mutex_blocked_install.appName}} was blocked by another installation",
"subject": {
"kind": "app",
"key": "{{mutex_blocked_install.appId}}",
"name": "{{mutex_blocked_install.appName}}"
},
"facts": [
{
"label": "Exit code",
"value": "{{installer_exit_1618.value}}",
"format": "code"
},
{
"label": "ESP error",
"value": "{{esp_failed_with_mutex_code.value}}",
"format": "errorCode"
}
]
},
"tags": [
"apps",
"msiexec",
+26 -1
View File
@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@
"description": "Detects Win32 apps whose installer exit code maps to Soft reboot or Hard reboot in the app's Intune return-code table (the '[Win32App] lpExitCode is defined as ...' line). Hard reboot stops app processing and restarts the device in Device Setup - the mid-enrollment restart and second sign-in; Soft reboot leaves the app pending until the next restart while the ESP moves on. Confidence rises for Hard reboot and when a reboot was actually observed in the session.",
"severity": "warning",
"category": "apps",
"version": "1.0.0",
"version": "1.1.0",
"author": "Autopilot Monitor",
"enabled": true,
"evaluateOn": [
@@ -86,6 +86,31 @@
}
],
"markSessionAsFailedDefault": false,
"presentation": {
"role": "context",
"summary": "{{reboot_return_code.appName}} asked for a restart",
"subject": {
"kind": "app",
"key": "{{reboot_return_code.appId}}",
"name": "{{reboot_return_code.appName}}"
},
"facts": [
{
"label": "Return code",
"value": "{{reboot_return_code.exitCode}}",
"format": "code"
},
{
"label": "Return code class",
"value": "{{reboot_return_code.value}}"
},
{
"label": "Restarts",
"value": "{{reboot_observed.count}}",
"format": "number"
}
]
},
"tags": [
"apps",
"reboot",
+25 -1
View File
@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@
"description": "Correlates an active proxy configuration with app content download failures (Delivery Optimization timeout or download error), suggesting the proxy is blocking or throttling Intune content delivery.",
"severity": "high",
"category": "apps",
"version": "1.2.0",
"version": "1.3.0",
"enabled": true,
"evaluateOn": [
"enrollment_end",
@@ -67,6 +67,30 @@
]
}
],
"presentation": {
"role": "cause",
"summary": "App downloads failed while a {{proxy_active.value}} proxy was configured",
"subject": {
"kind": "network",
"key": "proxy",
"name": "Proxy"
},
"facts": [
{
"label": "Proxy type",
"value": "{{proxy_active.value}}"
},
{
"label": "Failed app",
"value": "{{download_failure.appName}}"
},
{
"label": "Error",
"value": "{{download_failure.errorCode}}",
"format": "errorCode"
}
]
},
"tags": [
"correlation",
"apps",
+17 -1
View File
@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@
"description": "Detects when Windows Hello for Business provisioning did not start within the expected timeframe after ESP completion.",
"severity": "warning",
"category": "device",
"version": "1.1.0",
"version": "1.2.0",
"enabled": true,
"baseConfidence": 60,
"conditions": [
@@ -30,5 +30,21 @@
]
}
],
"presentation": {
"role": "cause",
"summary": "Windows Hello provisioning did not start in time",
"subject": {
"kind": "device",
"key": "windows-hello",
"name": "Windows Hello"
},
"facts": [
{
"label": "Timed out",
"value": "{{hello_timeout.timestamp}}",
"format": "timestamp"
}
]
},
"tags": ["device", "hello", "timeout"]
}
+17 -1
View File
@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@
"description": "Detects when memory usage stays above 90% across at least 3 performance snapshots during enrollment, indicating sustained memory pressure that can cause app installation failures or system instability.",
"severity": "warning",
"category": "device",
"version": "2.1.0",
"version": "2.2.0",
"enabled": true,
"evaluateOn": [
"enrollment_end",
@@ -65,6 +65,22 @@
]
}
],
"presentation": {
"role": "context",
"summary": "Memory use was above 90% in {{sustained_high_memory.count}} snapshots",
"subject": {
"kind": "device",
"key": "memory",
"name": "Memory"
},
"facts": [
{
"label": "Snapshots above 90%",
"value": "{{sustained_high_memory.count}}",
"format": "number"
}
]
},
"tags": [
"device",
"memory",
+21 -1
View File
@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@
"description": "Detects devices enrolling with an OS build that has reached end of support: Windows 11 22H2 (build 22621) or older, which includes every Windows 10 build. Maintenance note: raise the build cutoff to 22631 after Windows 11 23H2 reaches end of support on 2026-11-10.",
"severity": "warning",
"category": "device",
"version": "2.1.0",
"version": "2.2.0",
"enabled": true,
"evaluateOn": [
"enrollment_end",
@@ -56,6 +56,26 @@
"url": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/lifecycle/products/windows-11-home-and-pro"
}
],
"presentation": {
"role": "advisory",
"summary": "Windows build {{old_build.value}} is out of support",
"subject": {
"kind": "device",
"key": "os",
"name": "Windows version"
},
"facts": [
{
"label": "OS",
"value": "{{os_version.value}}"
},
{
"label": "Build",
"value": "{{old_build.value}}",
"format": "code"
}
]
},
"tags": [
"device",
"os-version",
+22 -1
View File
@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@
"description": "Detects a Windows quality/cumulative update that FAILED to install or download during the OOBE / ESP enrollment window (WindowsUpdateClient EventID 20 from the System log, 31 from the Operational channel). A cumulative update failing mid-OOBE is a known cause of enrollment errors and is otherwise invisible in the Intune console.",
"severity": "high",
"category": "device",
"version": "1.2.0",
"version": "1.3.0",
"enabled": true,
"evaluateOn": [
"enrollment_end",
@@ -113,6 +113,27 @@
}
],
"markSessionAsFailedDefault": false,
"presentation": {
"role": "cause",
"summary": "A Windows update failed during setup: {{wu_update_title.value}}",
"subject": {
"kind": "device",
"key": "windows-update",
"name": "Windows Update"
},
"facts": [
{
"label": "Error",
"value": "{{wu_hresult.value}}",
"format": "errorCode"
},
{
"label": "Symbol",
"value": "{{wu_hresult_symbol.value}}",
"format": "code"
}
]
},
"tags": [
"device",
"windows-update",
+17 -1
View File
@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@
"description": "Informational: a Windows quality/cumulative update installed during the OOBE / ESP enrollment window (WindowsUpdateClient EventID 19). Surfaces updates applied mid-enrollment — useful context when correlating enrollment duration, reboots, or later issues with a specific KB.",
"severity": "info",
"category": "device",
"version": "1.1.0",
"version": "1.2.0",
"enabled": true,
"evaluateOn": [
"enrollment_end",
@@ -61,6 +61,22 @@
}
],
"markSessionAsFailedDefault": false,
"presentation": {
"role": "context",
"summary": "A Windows update installed during setup: {{wu_update_title.value}}",
"subject": {
"kind": "device",
"key": "windows-update",
"name": "Windows Update"
},
"facts": [
{
"label": "Installed",
"value": "{{wu_installed.timestamp}}",
"format": "timestamp"
}
]
},
"tags": [
"device",
"windows-update",
+22 -1
View File
@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@
"description": "Informational: the OS build (CurrentBuild.UBR) changed across a reboot during enrollment — an update was installed, regardless of which servicing path delivered it. Deterministic corroboration that works even when the Windows Update event channel shows nothing (registry comparison across restart cannot be lost to timing or logging-path differences).",
"severity": "info",
"category": "device",
"version": "1.1.0",
"version": "1.2.0",
"enabled": true,
"evaluateOn": [
"enrollment_end",
@@ -69,6 +69,27 @@
}
],
"markSessionAsFailedDefault": false,
"presentation": {
"role": "context",
"summary": "Windows was updated from build {{previous_build.value}} to {{current_build.value}}",
"subject": {
"kind": "device",
"key": "os",
"name": "Windows version"
},
"facts": [
{
"label": "Build before",
"value": "{{previous_build.value}}",
"format": "code"
},
{
"label": "Build after",
"value": "{{current_build.value}}",
"format": "code"
}
]
},
"tags": [
"device",
"windows-update",
+21 -1
View File
@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@
"description": "The device's real-time clock deviates from NTP by more than two minutes. Microsoft documents that a clock off by several minutes causes TPM attestation errors (self-deploying/pre-provisioning) and ESP timeouts.",
"severity": "warning",
"category": "device",
"version": "1.1.1",
"version": "1.2.0",
"author": "Autopilot Monitor",
"enabled": true,
"evaluateOn": [
@@ -59,6 +59,26 @@
}
],
"markSessionAsFailedDefault": false,
"presentation": {
"role": "cause",
"subject": {
"kind": "device",
"key": "clock",
"name": "System clock"
},
"facts": [
{
"label": "Clock offset (s)",
"value": "{{clock_behind.value}}",
"format": "number"
},
{
"label": "Clock offset (s)",
"value": "{{clock_ahead.value}}",
"format": "number"
}
]
},
"tags": [
"device",
"ntp",
+21 -1
View File
@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@
"description": "The device's clock changed by five or more minutes mid-session (clock jump) or ran five or more minutes off server time for the whole session (sustained offset), measured against the server receive frame of every uploaded event. Complements ANALYZE-DEV-007, which is a one-shot NTP check at agent startup and misses devices where NTP was unreachable or the clock changed later. IME-log-derived events are excluded from the measurement.",
"severity": "warning",
"category": "device",
"version": "1.0.0",
"version": "1.1.0",
"author": "Autopilot Monitor",
"enabled": true,
"evaluateOn": [
@@ -57,6 +57,26 @@
}
],
"markSessionAsFailedDefault": false,
"presentation": {
"role": "cause",
"subject": {
"kind": "device",
"key": "clock",
"name": "System clock"
},
"facts": [
{
"label": "Clock jump (min)",
"value": "{{clock_jump.jumpMinutes}}",
"format": "number"
},
{
"label": "Clock offset (min)",
"value": "{{sustained_offset.offsetMinutes}}",
"format": "number"
}
]
},
"tags": [
"device",
"clock-skew",
+22 -1
View File
@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@
"description": "Detects that the device's battery dropped to 15% or less while enrolling on battery power (power_state_change threshold event from the agent's live power watcher). A device dying mid-enrollment leaves a half-provisioned state that typically needs a full reset; this rule surfaces the risk while there is still time to plug the device in. Uses a single required condition on the agent-stamped thresholdPercent field (the data field 'transition' on the event is unrelated to this rule's 'trigger' property).",
"severity": "high",
"category": "device",
"version": "1.0.0",
"version": "1.1.0",
"enabled": true,
"evaluateOn": [
"enrollment_end",
@@ -39,6 +39,27 @@
}
],
"markSessionAsFailedDefault": false,
"presentation": {
"role": "context",
"summary": "The battery fell below {{battery_threshold_15.value}}% during setup",
"subject": {
"kind": "device",
"key": "power",
"name": "Power"
},
"facts": [
{
"label": "Battery below (%)",
"value": "{{battery_threshold_15.value}}",
"format": "number"
},
{
"label": "Reported",
"value": "{{battery_threshold_15.timestamp}}",
"format": "timestamp"
}
]
},
"tags": [
"device",
"power",
+17 -1
View File
@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@
"description": "Detects that the device lost AC power and switched to battery while the enrollment was running (power_state_change event with transition ac_to_battery from the agent's live power watcher). Uses a single required condition so the match is pinned to one event instance; the event payload carries the battery percentage at the moment of the switch. The agent debounces power flapping (5s) so a brief unplug/replug does not produce this event.",
"severity": "warning",
"category": "device",
"version": "1.0.0",
"version": "1.1.0",
"enabled": true,
"evaluateOn": [
"enrollment_end",
@@ -39,6 +39,22 @@
}
],
"markSessionAsFailedDefault": false,
"presentation": {
"role": "context",
"summary": "The device switched from AC to battery power during setup",
"subject": {
"kind": "device",
"key": "power",
"name": "Power"
},
"facts": [
{
"label": "Switched",
"value": "{{switched_to_battery.timestamp}}",
"format": "timestamp"
}
]
},
"tags": [
"device",
"power",
+22 -1
View File
@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@
"description": "Detects that the device completed a sleep, hibernate or Modern Standby episode of at least 5 minutes while the enrollment was running (system_sleep_episode event from the agent's system timeline watcher, recorded retroactively at wake from the Windows event log). The watcher also backfills pre-agent episodes from the last 24 h for timeline context (backfilled=true); those ended before the enrollment started and are excluded via the same-event filter backfilled equals false — a separate condition could not do that, because each condition scans all events on its own and a pre-session hibernate would still satisfy the duration test. A single required condition keeps the match pinned to one event instance so the interpolated duration is the matched value. Short Modern Standby screen-off scenarios (under 60 s of real sleep) never emit the event, and this rule adds a 5-minute floor so brief lid-close moments do not fire it.",
"severity": "info",
"category": "device",
"version": "1.1.0",
"version": "1.2.0",
"enabled": true,
"evaluateOn": [
"enrollment_end",
@@ -42,6 +42,27 @@
}
],
"markSessionAsFailedDefault": false,
"presentation": {
"role": "context",
"summary": "The device went to sleep during setup",
"subject": {
"kind": "device",
"key": "power",
"name": "Power"
},
"facts": [
{
"label": "Asleep for",
"value": "{{slept_during_enrollment.value}}",
"format": "duration"
},
{
"label": "Recorded",
"value": "{{slept_during_enrollment.timestamp}}",
"format": "timestamp"
}
]
},
"tags": [
"device",
"power",
+17 -1
View File
@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@
"description": "Detects that the Windows quality update page at the end of OOBE (Enrollment Status Page setting \"Install Windows quality updates\") reported a failed download or install and recorded no successful install afterwards — the page's own failure names on the oobe_update_page events. Setup usually continues, so the failure is otherwise invisible: the device finishes OOBE without the monthly security update. An OS build change across a restart (os_build_changed) vetoes the finding, and so does the agent's names_capped marker — once the page's event names were capped, a missing success name proves nothing. A downloadInstallFailureHelper entry alone is no failure: updates that installed fine log it too.",
"severity": "warning",
"category": "device",
"version": "1.0.0",
"version": "1.1.0",
"enabled": true,
"evaluateOn": [
"enrollment_end"
@@ -109,6 +109,22 @@
}
],
"markSessionAsFailedDefault": false,
"presentation": {
"role": "context",
"summary": "The Windows quality update at the end of OOBE failed",
"subject": {
"kind": "device",
"key": "oobe-update",
"name": "OOBE quality update"
},
"facts": [
{
"label": "Failed step",
"value": "{{update_failure.value}}",
"format": "code"
}
]
},
"tags": [
"device",
"windows-update",
+22 -1
View File
@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@
"description": "Detects that the Windows quality update page at the end of OOBE found no update to install although the device is out of date, on a device whose update page counts an earlier failed download or install (oobe_update_page: NDUPDownloadInstallPreviousFailureCount above 0, osUpdatesWithNDUPPI false, getDaysOutOfDateSucceeded above 0). No failure and no install success are recorded in this session — a failure in this session is ANALYZE-DEV-013 — and the agent's names_capped marker vetoes the finding, because a missing name proves nothing once the page's names were capped. The device finishes OOBE without the monthly security update.",
"severity": "warning",
"category": "device",
"version": "1.0.0",
"version": "1.1.0",
"enabled": true,
"evaluateOn": [
"enrollment_end"
@@ -110,6 +110,27 @@
}
],
"markSessionAsFailedDefault": false,
"presentation": {
"role": "context",
"summary": "No quality update was offered although the device is {{days_out_of_date.value}} days out of date",
"subject": {
"kind": "device",
"key": "oobe-update",
"name": "OOBE quality update"
},
"facts": [
{
"label": "Days out of date",
"value": "{{days_out_of_date.value}}",
"format": "number"
},
{
"label": "Earlier update failures",
"value": "{{previous_failures.value}}",
"format": "number"
}
]
},
"tags": [
"device",
"windows-update",
+17 -1
View File
@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@
"description": "Detects that the Windows quality update page at the end of OOBE started its Windows Update scan but ended without a scan result (oobe_update_page: startWUScanStartedSuccedded, an OobeNDUP stop and no ExpeditedUpdate_getUpdateResults name), on a device that is out of date and allowed to update. In the observed sessions the page ended two minutes after the scan started, on devices more than a year behind. The device finishes OOBE without the monthly security update. The agent's names_capped marker vetoes the finding: once the page's event names were capped, a missing scan result proves nothing.",
"severity": "warning",
"category": "device",
"version": "1.0.0",
"version": "1.1.0",
"enabled": true,
"evaluateOn": [
"enrollment_end"
@@ -108,6 +108,22 @@
}
],
"markSessionAsFailedDefault": false,
"presentation": {
"role": "context",
"summary": "The OOBE update check ended without a result",
"subject": {
"kind": "device",
"key": "oobe-update",
"name": "OOBE quality update"
},
"facts": [
{
"label": "Days out of date",
"value": "{{days_out_of_date.value}}",
"format": "number"
}
]
},
"tags": [
"device",
"windows-update",
+30 -9
View File
@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@
"description": "Detects when the Autopilot enrollment has explicitly failed.",
"severity": "critical",
"category": "enrollment",
"version": "1.1.2",
"version": "1.2.0",
"enabled": true,
"baseConfidence": 95,
"conditions": [
@@ -57,19 +57,40 @@
"confidenceFactors": [
{ "signal": "failed_app", "condition": "exists", "weight": 5 }
],
"explanation": "The Autopilot enrollment has explicitly failed.\n\n**Key facts extracted from this session's events:**\n\n- **Failure reason:** `{{reason}}`\n- **First failed app:** `{{appName}}`\n- **ESP failed subcategory:** `{{failedSubcategory}}`\n- **ESP HRESULT:** `{{errorCode}}`\n\nWhen an ESP Apps-subcategory failure is paired with HRESULT `0x87D1041C`, the device-side install most likely completed but the Intune detection rule did not match afterwards — see the **App Detection Failure During ESP** rule (ANALYZE-APP-013) in this same analysis for the actionable root cause and remediation steps. Any field still shown as a literal `{{…}}` placeholder was simply not recorded for this session — for example, a non-ESP failure path has no ESP failed-subcategory or HRESULT.",
"explanation": "The Autopilot enrollment has explicitly failed.\n\n**Key facts from this session's events:**\n\n- **Failure reason:** `{{reason}}`\n- **First failed app:** `{{appName}}`\n- **ESP step that failed:** `{{failedSubcategory}}`\n- **ESP error code:** `{{errorCode}}`\n\nA more specific finding in this analysis usually names the cause, such as an app, ESP or timeout finding.",
"remediation": [
{
"title": "Investigate enrollment failure",
"title": "Find the cause",
"steps": [
"Start with the more specific ANALYZE-APP-* / ANALYZE-ESP-* rules that fired alongside this one — they correlate specific HRESULTs to actionable causes (e.g. 0x87D1041C → detection rule mismatch in ANALYZE-APP-013)",
"Read the `reason` field on the enrollment_failed event for the immediate trigger (e.g. esp_terminal_failure, hello_timeout, max_lifetime)",
"If a HRESULT is present, look it up against the ESP error catalog (Microsoft Learn: Autopilot ESP error codes)",
"Review other analyze rule results for correlated issues (disk space, network, app failures)",
"Check the device event timeline for the sequence of events leading to failure",
"Verify the Autopilot profile and ESP configuration in Intune"
"Open the finding in this analysis that names the cause (an app, ESP or timeout finding) and follow its steps",
"If no other finding fired, look up the ESP error code and check the failed ESP step in the session timeline",
"Verify the Autopilot profile and the ESP settings in Intune"
]
}
],
"presentation": {
"role": "outcome",
"summary": "The enrollment failed at the ESP step {{esp_failure_subcategory.value}} with {{esp_failure_errorcode.value}}",
"facts": [
{
"label": "Reason",
"value": "{{enrollment_failed_reason.value}}",
"format": "code"
},
{
"label": "ESP step",
"value": "{{esp_failure_subcategory.value}}"
},
{
"label": "ESP error",
"value": "{{esp_failure_errorcode.value}}",
"format": "errorCode"
},
{
"label": "First failed app",
"value": "{{failed_app.appName}}"
}
]
},
"tags": ["enrollment", "failed", "critical"]
}
+25 -3
View File
@@ -2,10 +2,10 @@
"$schema": "../schema/analyze-rule.schema.json",
"ruleId": "ANALYZE-ENRL-002",
"title": "Session Timed Out",
"description": "Detects when the enrollment session was force-failed by the server-side inactivity timeout (no agent telemetry for the configured SessionTimeoutHours window) without ever completing or explicitly failing.",
"description": "Detects when the server-side inactivity timeout closed the enrollment session (no agent telemetry for the configured SessionTimeoutHours window) before it ever completed or explicitly failed.",
"severity": "high",
"category": "enrollment",
"version": "1.2.0",
"version": "1.4.0",
"enabled": true,
"baseConfidence": 80,
"preconditions": [
@@ -20,6 +20,12 @@
"eventType": "enrollment_failed",
"operator": "not_exists",
"description": "Suppress when an explicit enrollment_failed exists — that path is already covered by ANALYZE-ENRL-001; avoid double-reporting the same session."
},
{
"source": "event_data",
"eventType": "device_blocked",
"operator": "not_exists",
"description": "Suppress when the platform blocked the session's device: the silence is the refused uploads, which ANALYZE-ENRL-006 explains — 'the agent died or the device went offline' would be wrong."
}
],
"conditions": [
@@ -58,7 +64,7 @@
"required": false
}
],
"explanation": "The enrollment session was force-failed by the server-side maintenance sweep after `{{timeoutHours}}` hour(s) of agent inactivity — the device stopped sending telemetry and never reported completion or an explicit failure.\n\nThis usually means the agent process died or the device went offline mid-enrollment (power off, network loss, bluescreen, reimage) rather than a clean enrollment failure. Because there is no terminal `enrollment_failed` event, the more specific app/ESP rules cannot pinpoint a cause — the evidence simply stops at the last event before the gap.\n\n**If the evidence shows the user desktop was reached and all tracked apps completed**, the device most likely got all its content but the ESP never signaled completion — on hybrid-joined devices the usual culprit is the user session never establishing Entra affinity (Account Setup re-running on every logon). Check whether the hybrid user-affinity finding also fired for this session.",
"explanation": "The server-side maintenance sweep closed this session after `{{timeoutHours}}` hour(s) of agent inactivity — the device stopped sending telemetry and never reported completion or an explicit failure.\n\nThis usually means the agent process died or the device went offline mid-enrollment (power off, network loss, bluescreen, reimage) rather than a clean enrollment failure. Because there is no terminal `enrollment_failed` event, the more specific app/ESP rules cannot pinpoint a cause — the evidence simply stops at the last event before the gap.\n\n**If the evidence shows the user desktop was reached and all tracked apps completed**, the device most likely got all its content but the ESP never signaled completion — on hybrid-joined devices the usual culprit is the user session never establishing Entra affinity (Account Setup re-running on every logon). Check whether the hybrid user-affinity finding also fired for this session.",
"remediation": [
{
"title": "Investigate the silent session",
@@ -78,5 +84,21 @@
]
}
],
"presentation": {
"role": "outcome",
"summary": "No completion or failure arrived within {{timeoutHours.value}} hours",
"facts": [
{
"label": "Timeout (hours)",
"value": "{{timeoutHours.value}}",
"format": "number"
},
{
"label": "Desktop reached",
"value": "{{desktop_was_reached.timestamp}}",
"format": "timestamp"
}
]
},
"tags": ["enrollment", "timeout", "stalled"]
}
+22 -1
View File
@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@
"description": "A TPM-attestation-related error code documented in the Microsoft Autopilot known-issues list was observed (0x800705B4, 0x801C03EA, 0x81039001, 0x81039023, 0x81039024, 0x80070490). These block self-deploying and pre-provisioning deployments during 'Securing your hardware'. Observability: attestation precedes MDM enrollment, so in the normal deployment model (agent installed via IME after enrollment) these codes are rarely visible — the rule primarily serves bootstrap-token deployments.",
"severity": "high",
"category": "enrollment",
"version": "1.1.0",
"version": "1.2.0",
"author": "Autopilot Monitor",
"enabled": true,
"evaluateOn": [
@@ -80,6 +80,27 @@
}
],
"markSessionAsFailedDefault": false,
"presentation": {
"role": "cause",
"summary": "TPM attestation failed with a known Autopilot error code",
"subject": {
"kind": "device",
"key": "tpm",
"name": "TPM attestation"
},
"facts": [
{
"label": "Error code",
"value": "{{tpm_hresult_esp_failure.value}}",
"format": "errorCode"
},
{
"label": "Error code",
"value": "{{tpm_hresult_esp_advisory.value}}",
"format": "errorCode"
}
]
},
"tags": [
"enrollment",
"tpm",
+22 -1
View File
@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@
"description": "An enrollment-blocking error code documented in the Microsoft Autopilot known-issues/troubleshooting pages was observed (0x80180014, 0x80180018, 0xC1036501, 0x801C03F3, 0x80070774). Each has a specific, documented cause and fix. Observability: a blocked MDM enrollment normally means no agent gets installed at all (IME install happens after enrollment) — this rule can realistically only fire for bootstrap-token deployments (pre-MDM reporting) or mixed retry scenarios.",
"severity": "high",
"category": "enrollment",
"version": "1.1.0",
"version": "1.2.0",
"author": "Autopilot Monitor",
"enabled": true,
"evaluateOn": [
@@ -78,6 +78,27 @@
}
],
"markSessionAsFailedDefault": false,
"presentation": {
"role": "cause",
"summary": "MDM enrollment was blocked with a known Autopilot error code",
"subject": {
"kind": "device",
"key": "mdm-enrollment",
"name": "MDM enrollment"
},
"facts": [
{
"label": "Error code",
"value": "{{enrl_hresult_esp_failure.value}}",
"format": "errorCode"
},
{
"label": "Error code",
"value": "{{enrl_hresult_esp_advisory.value}}",
"format": "errorCode"
}
]
},
"tags": [
"enrollment",
"mdm",
+22 -1
View File
@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@
"description": "A Microsoft Entra hybrid join Autopilot deployment hit error 0x80004005 — a documented build-dependent known issue, resolved by KB5065789 (25H2, build >= 26200.6725), KB5065426 (24H2, build >= 26100.6584), and KB5070312 (23H2, build >= 22631.6276).",
"severity": "high",
"category": "enrollment",
"version": "1.1.0",
"version": "1.2.0",
"author": "Autopilot Monitor",
"enabled": true,
"evaluateOn": [
@@ -103,6 +103,27 @@
}
],
"markSessionAsFailedDefault": false,
"presentation": {
"role": "cause",
"summary": "Hybrid join hit 0x80004005, a known timeout fixed by Windows updates",
"subject": {
"kind": "device",
"key": "hybrid-join",
"name": "Hybrid join"
},
"facts": [
{
"label": "Error code",
"value": "{{e_fail_esp_failure.value}}",
"format": "errorCode"
},
{
"label": "Error code",
"value": "{{e_fail_esp_advisory.value}}",
"format": "errorCode"
}
]
},
"tags": [
"enrollment",
"hybrid-join",
+107
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,107 @@
{
"$schema": "../schema/analyze-rule.schema.json",
"ruleId": "ANALYZE-ENRL-006",
"title": "Monitoring Paused by a Protective Limit",
"description": "Detects when the platform blocked the session's device — automatically after an unusually high event volume, or by the platform operator — so the session's telemetry stopped reaching Autopilot Monitor.",
"severity": "warning",
"category": "enrollment",
"version": "1.0.0",
"author": "Autopilot Monitor",
"enabled": true,
"evaluateOn": [
"enrollment_end",
"on_event:device_blocked"
],
"trigger": "single",
"baseConfidence": 90,
"confidenceThreshold": 50,
"conditions": [
{
"signal": "device_blocked",
"source": "event_type",
"eventType": "device_blocked",
"operator": "exists",
"value": "",
"required": true
},
{
"signal": "event_count",
"source": "event_data",
"eventType": "device_blocked",
"dataField": "eventCount",
"operator": "exists",
"value": "",
"required": false
},
{
"signal": "event_limit",
"source": "event_data",
"eventType": "device_blocked",
"dataField": "threshold",
"operator": "exists",
"value": "",
"required": false
},
{
"signal": "blocked_until",
"source": "event_data",
"eventType": "device_blocked",
"dataField": "blockedUntil",
"operator": "exists",
"value": "",
"required": false
}
],
"explanation": "Autopilot Monitor stopped accepting telemetry from this session. A protective limit keeps a single device that sends far more events than an enrollment normally does from distorting your fleet data or overloading the platform. When a session crosses it, the device's uploads are paused for a limited time; in severe cases the agent ends monitoring and removes itself. The platform operator can apply the same pause by hand.\n\nA pause does not affect the enrollment itself: the agent keeps running and only holds back its uploads, so Windows Autopilot and Intune carry on as usual. While the pause lasts, no events from this session reach Autopilot Monitor, so the timeline and the final status reflect the last state the agent reported before it. A paused session does not affect the device's next enrollment, which starts unblocked. When the agent ended monitoring, the device stays unmonitored until the end time shown on the session page, new enrollments included.",
"remediation": [
{
"title": "Find what made the session so busy",
"steps": [
"Open the event timeline and look at which event type repeats most often before the pause — for example a network connection that drops and reconnects every few minutes, or a download that reports progress continuously",
"Fix the underlying condition (for example a loose dock, cable or Wi-Fi), then re-enroll the device if you need a complete record of the enrollment",
"If no event type stands out, report the session from its page so it can be looked at"
]
},
{
"title": "What happens next",
"steps": [
"A pause ends on its own at the time shown on the session page; an agent that is still running then resumes uploading",
"After a pause, a new enrollment on this device starts unblocked",
"After the agent ended monitoring, wait for the end time shown on the session page before re-enrolling if you want the new enrollment monitored"
]
}
],
"relatedDocs": [
{
"title": "Autopilot Monitor: Protective Limits",
"url": "https://docs.autopilotmonitor.com/concepts/protective-limits"
}
],
"presentation": {
"role": "outcome",
"summary": "Monitoring was paused by a protective limit",
"facts": [
{
"label": "Paused at",
"value": "{{device_blocked.timestamp}}",
"format": "timestamp"
},
{
"label": "Events in this session",
"value": "{{event_count.value}}",
"format": "number"
},
{
"label": "Event limit",
"value": "{{event_limit.value}}",
"format": "number"
},
{
"label": "Paused until",
"value": "{{blocked_until.value}}",
"format": "timestamp"
}
]
},
"tags": ["enrollment", "protective-limit", "blocked"]
}
+22 -1
View File
@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@
"description": "Detects when the DeviceSetup phase of the ESP took longer than 30 minutes, indicating a stuck or very slow blocking app. Confidence increases when the phase exceeds 60 minutes.",
"severity": "high",
"category": "esp",
"version": "1.2.0",
"version": "1.3.0",
"enabled": true,
"evaluateOn": [
"enrollment_end",
@@ -47,6 +47,27 @@
]
}
],
"presentation": {
"role": "cause",
"summary": "Device setup took {{esp_stalled.durationFormatted}}",
"subject": {
"kind": "esp",
"key": "{{esp_stalled.phase}}",
"name": "Device setup"
},
"facts": [
{
"label": "Duration",
"value": "{{esp_stalled.durationSeconds}}",
"format": "duration"
},
{
"label": "Started",
"value": "{{esp_stalled.phaseStartTimestamp}}",
"format": "timestamp"
}
]
},
"tags": [
"esp",
"blocking",
+17 -1
View File
@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@
"description": "Detects when the Certificates subcategory of the Enrollment Status Page reported a failure, even if the enrollment later appears to have succeeded. Users can click 'Continue anyway' on an ESP error, which masks the underlying certificate provisioning failure — this rule surfaces the transition so it stays visible.",
"severity": "high",
"category": "esp",
"version": "1.1.0",
"version": "1.2.0",
"author": "Autopilot Monitor",
"enabled": true,
"evaluateOn": [
@@ -58,6 +58,22 @@
}
],
"markSessionAsFailedDefault": false,
"presentation": {
"role": "cause",
"summary": "The ESP certificates step failed",
"subject": {
"kind": "esp",
"key": "Certificates",
"name": "Certificates"
},
"facts": [
{
"label": "Failed at",
"value": "{{certificates_subcategory_failed.timestamp}}",
"format": "timestamp"
}
]
},
"tags": [
"esp",
"certificates",
+26 -1
View File
@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@
"description": "Detects an ESP terminal failure where the ESP gave up while a blocking app was still installing (the agent's own esp_apps_timeout verdict — no per-app HRESULT was reported) on a profile that allows 'Continue anyway'. The enrollment is reported as failed, but the user most likely dismissed the error screen and reached the desktop — a soft failure rather than an unusable device. An ESP failure that carries a specific error code (a failed installer, a detection mismatch) is a different case and stays with the rule that explains that code.",
"severity": "warning",
"category": "esp",
"version": "1.1.0",
"version": "1.2.0",
"enabled": true,
"baseConfidence": 80,
"conditions": [
@@ -81,5 +81,30 @@
]
}
],
"presentation": {
"role": "cause",
"summary": "The ESP gave up while {{appName.value}} was still installing ('Continue anyway' allowed)",
"subject": {
"kind": "app",
"key": "{{appName.appId}}",
"name": "{{appName.value}}"
},
"facts": [
{
"label": "ESP error",
"value": "{{enrollment_failed.errorCode}}",
"format": "errorCode"
},
{
"label": "ESP time limit (min)",
"value": "{{espSyncFailureTimeoutMinutes.value}}",
"format": "number"
},
{
"label": "ESP step",
"value": "{{failedSubcategory.value}}"
}
]
},
"tags": ["esp", "timeout", "continue-anyway", "soft-failure", "enrollment"]
}
+26 -1
View File
@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@
"description": "Attributes an observed enrollment reboot to device-assigned MDM policies that Windows flagged as reboot-required. Fires ONLY when both facts are present in the session: at least one actually-observed reboot (system_reboot_detected) AND reboot-required policy flags (mdm_policy_reboot_required). Policy flags alone — e.g. from a user-policy sync during AccountSetup — force no reboot and stay advisory-silent.",
"severity": "warning",
"category": "esp",
"version": "1.3.0",
"version": "1.4.0",
"author": "Autopilot Monitor",
"enabled": true,
"evaluateOn": [
@@ -94,6 +94,31 @@
}
],
"markSessionAsFailedDefault": false,
"presentation": {
"role": "context",
"summary": "A device policy forced a restart during setup: {{reboot_forcing_policy_uri.value}}",
"subject": {
"kind": "policy",
"key": "{{reboot_forcing_policy_uri.value}}"
},
"facts": [
{
"label": "First policy",
"value": "{{reboot_forcing_policy_uri.value}}",
"format": "code"
},
{
"label": "Policies",
"value": "{{multiple_reboot_uris.value}}",
"format": "number"
},
{
"label": "Restarts",
"value": "{{reboot_observed.count}}",
"format": "number"
}
]
},
"tags": [
"esp",
"reboot",
+29 -1
View File
@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@
"description": "Detects the recovery story: the ESP reported a terminal failure (typically DeviceSetup/Apps), the user most likely pressed 'Try again' on the failure page, the failed step re-ran and completed successfully. The earlier failure did not stick — the enrollment continued past it.",
"severity": "info",
"category": "esp",
"version": "1.1.0",
"version": "1.2.0",
"enabled": true,
"evaluateOn": [
"enrollment_end",
@@ -98,6 +98,34 @@
]
}
],
"presentation": {
"role": "context",
"summary": "The ESP failed in the {{category.value}} phase, then recovered",
"subject": {
"kind": "esp",
"key": "{{failedSubcategory.value}}",
"name": "{{failedSubcategory.value}}"
},
"facts": [
{
"label": "ESP phase",
"value": "{{category.value}}"
},
{
"label": "ESP step",
"value": "{{failedSubcategory.value}}"
},
{
"label": "Likely apps",
"value": "{{likelyCulpritApps.value}}"
},
{
"label": "Recovered after (min)",
"value": "{{minutesSinceFailure.value}}",
"format": "number"
}
]
},
"tags": [
"esp",
"recovery",
+10 -1
View File
@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@
"enrollment_end",
"whiteglove_sealed"
],
"version": "1.3.0",
"version": "1.4.0",
"baseConfidence": 75,
"conditions": [
{
@@ -55,6 +55,15 @@
]
}
],
"presentation": {
"role": "advisory",
"summary": "The expected machine certificate was not found",
"subject": {
"kind": "device",
"key": "machine-certificate",
"name": "Machine certificate"
}
},
"tags": [
"identity",
"certificates",
+45 -1
View File
@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@
"description": "Detects when the LocalAdminAnalyzer flags unexpected local user accounts or profile directories on the device. This is a known Autopilot bypass technique where admin accounts are created before or during enrollment to gain persistent local admin access.",
"severity": "high",
"category": "identity",
"version": "1.3.0",
"version": "1.4.0",
"author": "Autopilot Monitor",
"enabled": true,
"evaluateOn": [
@@ -41,6 +41,30 @@
"operator": "equals",
"value": "error",
"required": false
},
{
"signal": "unexpected_accounts",
"source": "event_data",
"eventType": "local_admin_analysis",
"dataField": "checks.unexpected_accounts",
"operator": "not_equals",
"value": "",
"filterField": "finding",
"filterOperator": "equals",
"filterValue": "unexpected_local_admins_detected",
"required": false
},
{
"signal": "unexpected_admin_members",
"source": "event_data",
"eventType": "local_admin_analysis",
"dataField": "checks.unexpected_admin_members",
"operator": "not_equals",
"value": "",
"filterField": "finding",
"filterOperator": "equals",
"filterValue": "unexpected_local_admins_detected",
"required": false
}
],
"confidenceFactors": [
@@ -85,6 +109,26 @@
}
],
"relatedDocs": [],
"presentation": {
"role": "advisory",
"summary": "Unexpected local accounts: {{unexpected_accounts.value}}",
"subject": {
"kind": "account",
"key": "{{unexpected_accounts.value}}"
},
"facts": [
{
"label": "Unexpected accounts",
"value": "{{unexpected_accounts.value}}",
"format": "code"
},
{
"label": "In Administrators",
"value": "{{unexpected_admin_members.value}}",
"format": "code"
}
]
},
"tags": [
"identity",
"security",
+22 -1
View File
@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@
"description": "Fires when the vulnerability correlation finds critical-severity CVEs or CISA KEV entries in installed software. This indicates the device has software with known, actively exploited vulnerabilities.",
"severity": "critical",
"category": "security",
"version": "1.1.0",
"version": "1.2.0",
"author": "Autopilot Monitor",
"enabled": true,
"evaluateOn": [
@@ -72,6 +72,27 @@
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/"
}
],
"presentation": {
"role": "advisory",
"summary": "Installed software has {{critical_vulnerabilities.value}} critical vulnerabilities",
"subject": {
"kind": "device",
"key": "vulnerabilities",
"name": "Installed software"
},
"facts": [
{
"label": "Critical CVEs",
"value": "{{critical_vulnerabilities.value}}",
"format": "number"
},
{
"label": "Known exploited",
"value": "{{kev_matches.value}}",
"format": "number"
}
]
},
"tags": [
"vulnerability",
"cve",
+50 -1
View File
@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@
"description": "On a hybrid-joined device the real user reached the desktop, but the Intune Management Extension never acquired a Microsoft Entra user token for that user within the wait window — repeatedly across reboots when the warning recurs. Without a user token the signed-in user has no Entra user affinity: user-targeted apps and policies cannot apply, Windows Hello for Business cannot provision, and with a user ESP the Account Setup page re-runs on every logon.",
"severity": "high",
"category": "identity",
"version": "2.0.0",
"version": "2.1.0",
"author": "Autopilot Monitor",
"enabled": true,
"trigger": "correlation",
@@ -44,6 +44,24 @@
"operator": "not_exists",
"value": "",
"required": true
},
{
"signal": "token_failure_count",
"source": "event_data",
"eventType": "entra_user_affinity_pending",
"dataField": "tokenFailureCount",
"operator": "exists",
"value": "",
"required": false
},
{
"signal": "token_failure_codes",
"source": "event_data",
"eventType": "entra_user_affinity_pending",
"dataField": "tokenFailureCodes",
"operator": "not_equals",
"value": "",
"required": false
}
],
"confidenceFactors": [
@@ -96,5 +114,36 @@
}
],
"markSessionAsFailedDefault": false,
"presentation": {
"role": "cause",
"summary": "The user reached the desktop, but Entra user affinity never formed",
"subject": {
"kind": "account",
"key": "entra-user-affinity",
"name": "Entra user affinity"
},
"facts": [
{
"label": "Token failures",
"value": "{{token_failure_count.value}}",
"format": "number"
},
{
"label": "Token error codes",
"value": "{{token_failure_codes.value}}",
"format": "code"
},
{
"label": "Reported in agent runs",
"value": "{{user_affinity_pending.count}}",
"format": "number"
},
{
"label": "Desktop reached",
"value": "{{user_desktop_reached.timestamp}}",
"format": "timestamp"
}
]
},
"tags": ["identity", "hybrid-join", "entra-id", "user-affinity", "esp"]
}
+10 -1
View File
@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@
"description": "Detects diagnostics package uploads that were answered by a security appliance's HTML block page instead of the Autopilot Monitor backend. A forward proxy / secure web gateway (SWG) with SSL inspection is intercepting the upload endpoint, so exactly the sessions where diagnostics matter most (OnFailure uploads) are the ones losing them.",
"severity": "warning",
"category": "network",
"version": "1.0.0",
"version": "1.1.0",
"author": "Autopilot Monitor",
"enabled": true,
"baseConfidence": 75,
@@ -71,6 +71,15 @@
"url": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/autopilot/networking-requirements"
}
],
"presentation": {
"role": "advisory",
"summary": "A web security gateway blocked the diagnostics upload",
"subject": {
"kind": "network",
"key": "security-gateway",
"name": "Web security gateway"
}
},
"tags": [
"network",
"proxy",
+17 -1
View File
@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@
"description": "Detects when the Microsoft 365 Apps (Office Click-to-Run) install failed. The V2 OfficeInstallDetector watches the C2R client directly (registry, Delivery Optimization, process) and emits office_install_failed when the C2R INSTALL scenario records an error code. Completion is proven by the core Office binaries on disk; an install window that closes without that proof ends silently, never as a failure. This catches Office failures the deployment status hides: the Intune built-in app type is marked done once the configuration is delivered, and a Win32 or RealmJoin package once its installer exits, while C2R keeps installing in the background.",
"severity": "warning",
"category": "apps",
"version": "1.1.1",
"version": "1.2.0",
"enabled": true,
"evaluateOn": [
"enrollment_end",
@@ -52,6 +52,22 @@
]
}
],
"presentation": {
"role": "cause",
"summary": "Microsoft 365 Apps failed to install",
"subject": {
"kind": "app",
"key": "office-c2r",
"name": "Microsoft 365 Apps"
},
"facts": [
{
"label": "Error",
"value": "{{error_code_present.value}}",
"format": "errorCode"
}
]
},
"tags": [
"apps",
"office",
+30 -1
View File
@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@
"description": "Detects devices where the Windows UEFI CA 2023 certificate has not been deployed to the Secure Boot DB. The 2011 certificates expired in June 2026 — affected devices no longer receive Secure Boot security updates until the 2023 certificate is deployed. Since v3 the agent reads the firmware db/KEK variables directly: when the firmware itself confirms the 2023 certificate, the rule is suppressed even if the Windows servicing status has not caught up yet.",
"severity": "warning",
"category": "security",
"version": "3.1.0",
"version": "3.2.0",
"enabled": true,
"evaluateOn": [
"enrollment_end",
@@ -132,6 +132,35 @@
"url": "https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/topic/kb5036210"
}
],
"presentation": {
"role": "advisory",
"summary": "The Windows UEFI CA 2023 certificate is not deployed",
"subject": {
"kind": "device",
"key": "secure-boot",
"name": "Secure Boot"
},
"facts": [
{
"label": "CA 2023 status",
"value": "{{ca2023_not_updated.value}}",
"format": "code"
},
{
"label": "Error",
"value": "{{ca2023_error.value}}",
"format": "code"
},
{
"label": "CA 2023 in firmware DB",
"value": "{{db_ca2023_firmware_missing.value}}"
},
{
"label": "KEK 2023 in firmware",
"value": "{{kek_2023_missing.value}}"
}
]
},
"tags": [
"security",
"secureboot",
+10 -1
View File
@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@
"description": "Fires when the AutoLogon analyzer reports a DefaultPassword value present in Winlogon. A plaintext AutoLogon password stored in the registry is readable by any local administrator and is a credential exposure — more severe than AutoLogon alone (the Sysinternals Autologon tool deliberately avoids this by storing the secret in the LSA instead).",
"severity": "high",
"category": "security",
"version": "1.1.0",
"version": "1.2.0",
"enabled": true,
"evaluateOn": [
"enrollment_end",
@@ -49,6 +49,15 @@
"url": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/autologon"
}
],
"presentation": {
"role": "advisory",
"summary": "A plaintext AutoLogon password is stored in the registry",
"subject": {
"kind": "device",
"key": "autologon",
"name": "AutoLogon"
}
},
"tags": [
"security",
"autologon",
+16 -1
View File
@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@
"description": "Optional kiosk allow-list for AutoLogon. Fires when AutoLogon is enabled for a default user that is NOT on your configured list of approved kiosk / shared-device accounts. Disabled until configured because a normal Autopilot enrollment leaves Windows' own ESP auto-logon for the enrolling user (AutoLogon enabled, a default user, no plaintext password) — so AutoLogon-enabled alone is not graded by default; only a plaintext DefaultPassword on disk (ANALYZE-SEC-003) is. Enable this rule with your expected kiosk account name(s) if you want to surface AutoLogon configured for any other user.",
"severity": "warning",
"category": "security",
"version": "1.1.0",
"version": "1.2.0",
"enabled": false,
"evaluateOn": [
"enrollment_end",
@@ -59,6 +59,21 @@
"url": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/troubleshoot/windows-server/user-profiles-and-logon/turn-on-automatic-logon"
}
],
"presentation": {
"role": "advisory",
"summary": "AutoLogon is enabled for an unexpected user: {{unexpected_autologon_user.value}}",
"subject": {
"kind": "account",
"key": "{{unexpected_autologon_user.value}}"
},
"facts": [
{
"label": "AutoLogon user",
"value": "{{unexpected_autologon_user.value}}",
"format": "code"
}
]
},
"tags": [
"security",
"autologon",
+22 -1
View File
@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@
"description": "Detects provisioning packages (PPKG) that are not on the built-in allow-list. The agent emits one or more provisioning_package_scan events whose artifacts[] arrays list every PPKG (registry package, .ppkg file, or Recovery\\Customizations residue; a large set is split across several events). This rule iterates that array across all of them and fires for any artifact whose identity does not match the allow-list regex. The default allow-list covers the Windows OS-inbox packages (Cosa, Power.EnergyEstimationEngine, Power.Settings, SecureStart) plus common OEM factory-preload families (Intel PPM power profiles, AMD Power profiles, Lenovo ThinkPad power/battery packages, Microsoft Surface defaults and carrier packages) so clean factory devices stay quiet. OEM imaging leftovers (e.g. USMT.PPKG, InstallOrder.ini) and generically named packages deliberately still alert — on a pure-Autopilot device they are worth a look. To allow your own vendor/recovery packages, enable the template rule ANALYZE-SEC-006, extend its allow-list, then disable this rule.",
"severity": "warning",
"category": "security",
"version": "2.2.0",
"version": "2.3.0",
"enabled": true,
"evaluateOn": [
"enrollment_end",
@@ -38,6 +38,27 @@
]
}
],
"presentation": {
"role": "advisory",
"summary": "Provisioning package not on the allow list: {{ppkg_not_allowlisted.value}}",
"subject": {
"kind": "device",
"key": "provisioning-packages",
"name": "Provisioning packages"
},
"facts": [
{
"label": "Package",
"value": "{{ppkg_not_allowlisted.value}}",
"format": "code"
},
{
"label": "Unexpected packages",
"value": "{{ppkg_not_allowlisted.matchCount}}",
"format": "number"
}
]
},
"tags": [
"security",
"provisioning-package",
+22 -1
View File
@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@
"description": "Template version of ANALYZE-SEC-005 with a customizable allow-list. Iterates the provisioning_package_scan artifacts[] array and fires for any PPKG whose identity is not on YOUR allow-list regex. The placeholder ships with the same OS-inbox defaults as ANALYZE-SEC-005 — extend it with your own vendor/recovery packages. This rule is OFF by default: enable it, set your allow-list, then disable ANALYZE-SEC-005 so only packages outside your list alert.",
"severity": "warning",
"category": "security",
"version": "2.2.0",
"version": "2.3.0",
"enabled": false,
"evaluateOn": [
"enrollment_end",
@@ -45,6 +45,27 @@
]
}
],
"presentation": {
"role": "advisory",
"summary": "Provisioning package not on the allow list: {{ppkg_not_allowlisted.value}}",
"subject": {
"kind": "device",
"key": "provisioning-packages",
"name": "Provisioning packages"
},
"facts": [
{
"label": "Package",
"value": "{{ppkg_not_allowlisted.value}}",
"format": "code"
},
{
"label": "Unexpected packages",
"value": "{{ppkg_not_allowlisted.matchCount}}",
"format": "number"
}
]
},
"tags": [
"security",
"provisioning-package",
+10 -1
View File
@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@
"description": "Fires when the provisioning-package scan hit a per-source collection cap (too many .ppkg files, registry packages, or Recovery\\Customizations residue files to capture them all). When that happens the allow-list rules (ANALYZE-SEC-005/006) could not evaluate every package, so a non-allow-listed package may have gone unseen. A device with that many provisioning packages is itself unusual and worth a manual look.",
"severity": "warning",
"category": "security",
"version": "1.1.0",
"version": "1.2.0",
"enabled": true,
"evaluateOn": [
"enrollment_end",
@@ -36,6 +36,15 @@
]
}
],
"presentation": {
"role": "advisory",
"summary": "The provisioning package scan hit its capture limit",
"subject": {
"kind": "device",
"key": "provisioning-packages",
"name": "Provisioning packages"
}
},
"tags": [
"security",
"provisioning-package",
+10 -1
View File
@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@
"description": "Detects devices enrolling with Secure Boot turned off. Secure Boot is a firmware-level protection against boot-time malware and is a prerequisite for several Windows security features (VBS/Credential Guard, device health attestation) and common Intune compliance policies. Devices that support Secure Boot but have it disabled should be flagged during enrollment. Legacy BIOS devices (no Secure Boot capability) are excluded — the agent marks those with a note field when the SecureBoot registry state key is absent.",
"severity": "warning",
"category": "security",
"version": "1.1.0",
"version": "1.2.0",
"author": "Autopilot Monitor",
"enabled": true,
"evaluateOn": [
@@ -82,6 +82,15 @@
"url": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-hardware/manufacture/desktop/disabling-secure-boot"
}
],
"presentation": {
"role": "advisory",
"summary": "Secure Boot is disabled",
"subject": {
"kind": "device",
"key": "secure-boot",
"name": "Secure Boot"
}
},
"tags": [
"security",
"secureboot",
+1271 -63
View File
File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff
+78
View File
@@ -133,6 +133,7 @@
"items": { "$ref": "#/$defs/relatedDoc" },
"default": []
},
"presentation": { "$ref": "#/$defs/rulePresentation" },
"tags": {
"type": "array",
"description": "Tags for filtering and categorization.",
@@ -352,6 +353,83 @@
"required": ["title", "url"],
"additionalProperties": false
},
"rulePresentation": {
"type": "object",
"description": "How a finding of this rule is shown: its role, a one-line summary, what it is about and its key facts. Every string is a {{token}} template resolved from the finding's evidence when it is rendered; a fact whose value was not recorded is left out.",
"properties": {
"role": {
"type": "string",
"enum": ["outcome", "cause", "context", "advisory"],
"description": "outcome: restates the session outcome (shown in the verdict, not as a finding row). cause: can explain why a session failed or is stuck. context: a circumstance such as standby, a restart or battery power. advisory: hygiene or security without bearing on the outcome."
},
"summary": {
"type": "string",
"minLength": 1,
"maxLength": 160,
"description": "One line for the finding row, for example \"{{install_retry_loop.appName}} was started {{install_retry_loop.count}} times\". When a token was not recorded, the first sentence of the explanation is shown instead."
},
"subject": { "$ref": "#/$defs/ruleSubject" },
"facts": {
"type": "array",
"description": "Key facts shown as label/value pairs, in this order.",
"maxItems": 6,
"items": { "$ref": "#/$defs/ruleFact" }
}
},
"required": ["role"],
"additionalProperties": false
},
"ruleSubject": {
"type": "object",
"description": "What the finding is about. Findings with the same kind and resolved key are grouped, for example every finding about one app. Use qualified tokens of one signal for key and name, such as {{failed_app.appId}} and {{failed_app.appName}}, so both come from the same event.",
"properties": {
"kind": {
"type": "string",
"enum": ["app", "policy", "account", "script", "device", "network", "esp", "session"],
"description": "The kind of thing the key identifies."
},
"key": {
"type": "string",
"minLength": 1,
"maxLength": 200,
"description": "Template of the grouping key."
},
"name": {
"type": "string",
"minLength": 1,
"maxLength": 200,
"description": "Template of the display name; the key is shown when it is missing."
}
},
"required": ["kind", "key"],
"additionalProperties": false
},
"ruleFact": {
"type": "object",
"description": "One key fact of a finding.",
"properties": {
"label": {
"type": "string",
"minLength": 1,
"maxLength": 40,
"description": "Short label, for example \"Install starts\"."
},
"value": {
"type": "string",
"minLength": 1,
"maxLength": 200,
"description": "Template of the value, for example {{install_retry_loop.count}}."
},
"format": {
"type": "string",
"enum": ["text", "code", "errorCode", "duration", "number", "timestamp"],
"description": "How the value is shown. errorCode adds the error-code catalog meaning, duration reads seconds, timestamp an ISO 8601 time.",
"default": "text"
}
},
"required": ["label", "value"],
"additionalProperties": false
},
"templateVariable": {
"type": "object",
"description": "A variable in a rule condition that must be customized per-tenant before the rule can be used.",
@@ -0,0 +1,991 @@
# Integration tests (Pester 5+) for the bootstrap chain: the real loader and installer, each
# started the way Intune and the bootstrap MSI start them -- powershell.exe -File, in a process
# of its own -- against a scratch ProgramData and TEMP. Loader 1.2 and the MSI 1.0.x runner run
# from TestData, frozen from git: devices keep running them until customers replace them.
#
# What these tests do not cover is swapped out by global aliases, which win over cmdlets and
# over functions a script defines: downloads (served from a scratch folder), signatures, the
# catalog check, the guard decision, the deployment marker, the agent task, the agent's
# --install (a real program start from PowerShell's location, with the agent's work left out)
# and sleeps. Every swap writes a trace line, and the tests check the lines they rely on, so a
# swap that stops working turns a test red instead of reaching the real machine.
#
# Run elevated (CI also runs it as SYSTEM), the folder permissions are the real ones. Without
# elevation the test account may not make Administrators the owner, so the protected DACL is
# swapped for one without that owner change, and folders the account owns count as ours.
# Entries whose name starts with "foreign" count as another account's.
#
# This file MUST remain pure ASCII (PS 5.1 reads BOM-less files as ANSI).
BeforeAll {
$script:repoRoot = (Resolve-Path (Join-Path $PSScriptRoot '..\..')).Path
$script:loaderPath = Join-Path $PSScriptRoot 'Start-AutopilotMonitor.ps1'
$script:installerPath = Join-Path $PSScriptRoot 'Install-AutopilotMonitor.ps1'
$script:loader12Path = Join-Path $PSScriptRoot 'TestData\Start-AutopilotMonitor-1.2.ps1'
$script:msiRunnerPath = Join-Path $PSScriptRoot 'TestData\Invoke-BootstrapDownload-1.0.ps1'
# The backend's pin of the generated OOBE script, test values filled in.
$script:oobeScriptPath = Join-Path $script:repoRoot 'src\Backend\AutopilotMonitor.Functions.Tests\TestData\oobe-bootstrap-golden.ps1'
$script:powershell = Join-Path $env:SystemRoot 'System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe'
$script:isElevated = (New-Object System.Security.Principal.WindowsPrincipal([System.Security.Principal.WindowsIdentity]::GetCurrent())).IsInRole([System.Security.Principal.WindowsBuiltInRole]::Administrator)
$script:payloadFiles = @('AutopilotMonitor.Agent.Core.dll', 'AutopilotMonitor.Agent.cat', 'AutopilotMonitor.Agent.exe', 'AutopilotMonitor.Agent.exe.config')
# The agent package: text files under the agent's names. --install is swapped out, so
# nothing in it ever runs.
$payload = Join-Path $TestDrive 'payload'
New-Item -ItemType Directory -Path $payload | Out-Null
foreach ($name in $script:payloadFiles) { Set-Content -LiteralPath (Join-Path $payload $name) -Value "stub $name" }
$script:agentZip = Join-Path $TestDrive 'AutopilotMonitor-Agent.zip'
Compress-Archive -Path (Join-Path $payload '*') -DestinationPath $script:agentZip
$script:agentZipSha256 = (Get-FileHash -LiteralPath $script:agentZip -Algorithm SHA256).Hash.ToLowerInvariant()
$script:wrapperText = @'
$global:HarnessDir = $PSScriptRoot
$global:HarnessOptions = [System.IO.File]::ReadAllText((Join-Path $PSScriptRoot 'options.json')) | ConvertFrom-Json
function global:Write-HarnessTrace {
param([string]$Name, [string]$Detail)
[System.IO.File]::AppendAllText((Join-Path $global:HarnessDir 'trace.txt'), "$Name|$Detail`r`n")
}
function global:Get-HarnessServerFile {
param([string]$Uri)
$source = Join-Path $global:HarnessOptions.Server ($Uri.Substring($Uri.LastIndexOf('/') + 1))
if (-not [System.IO.File]::Exists($source)) { throw "The remote server returned an error: (404) Not Found. ($Uri)" }
return $source
}
function global:HarnessInvokeWebRequest {
[CmdletBinding()]
param([string]$Uri, [string]$OutFile, [switch]$UseBasicParsing, [int]$TimeoutSec, [string]$Method)
Write-HarnessTrace 'Invoke-WebRequest' $Uri
[System.IO.File]::Copy((Get-HarnessServerFile $Uri), $OutFile, $true)
}
function global:HarnessInvokeRestMethod {
[CmdletBinding()]
param([string]$Uri, [switch]$UseBasicParsing, [int]$TimeoutSec)
Write-HarnessTrace 'Invoke-RestMethod' $Uri
return ([System.IO.File]::ReadAllText((Get-HarnessServerFile $Uri)) | ConvertFrom-Json)
}
function global:HarnessGetAuthenticodeSignature {
[CmdletBinding()]
param([string]$FilePath, [byte[]]$Content, [string[]]$SourcePathOrExtension)
Write-HarnessTrace 'Get-AuthenticodeSignature' $(if ($Content) { "content:$($Content.Length)" } else { $FilePath })
return [pscustomobject]@{
Status = $global:HarnessOptions.SignatureStatus
SignerCertificate = [pscustomobject]@{ Subject = $global:HarnessOptions.SignerSubject; Thumbprint = 'HARNESS' }
}
}
function global:HarnessTestFileCatalog {
[CmdletBinding()]
param([string]$Path, [string]$CatalogFilePath, [string[]]$FilesToSkip, [switch]$Detailed)
Write-HarnessTrace 'Test-FileCatalog' $Path
return [pscustomobject]@{
Status = $(if ($global:HarnessOptions.CatalogValid) { 'Valid' } else { 'ValidationFailed' })
Signature = [pscustomobject]@{ Status = 'Valid'; SignerCertificate = [pscustomobject]@{ Subject = 'CN=glueckkanja AG, O=glueckkanja AG, C=DE' } }
CatalogItems = @{}
PathItems = @{}
}
}
function global:HarnessGetBootstrapDecision {
param([int]$MaxBootstrapWindowHours, [int]$OobeProfileMaxAgeMinutes)
Write-HarnessTrace 'Get-BootstrapDecision' "MaxBootstrapWindowHours=$MaxBootstrapWindowHours"
$install = [bool]$global:HarnessOptions.Install
return [pscustomobject]@{ Install = $install; ReasonCode = $(if ($install) { $null } else { 'ProfilesFound' }); RelaxActive = $false }
}
function global:HarnessGetRegistryValue64 {
param([string]$SubKey, [string]$Name)
Write-HarnessTrace 'Get-RegistryValue64' "$SubKey\$Name"
if ($SubKey -eq 'SOFTWARE\AutopilotMonitor' -and $Name -eq 'Deployed') { return $global:HarnessOptions.Marker }
return $null
}
function global:HarnessGetScheduledTask {
[CmdletBinding()]
param([string]$TaskName)
Write-HarnessTrace 'Get-ScheduledTask' $TaskName
if ($global:HarnessOptions.TaskPresent) { return [pscustomobject]@{ TaskName = $TaskName } }
throw (New-Object System.Management.Automation.ErrorRecord((New-Object System.Exception "No MSFT_ScheduledTask objects found with property 'TaskName' equal to '$TaskName'."), 'CmdletizationQuery_NotFound_TaskName,Get-ScheduledTask', [System.Management.Automation.ErrorCategory]::ObjectNotFound, $TaskName))
}
function global:HarnessInvokeAgentInstallMode {
param([string]$ExePath, [string[]]$Arguments = @('--install'))
Write-HarnessTrace 'Invoke-AgentInstallMode' ('{0} {1} exists={2}' -f $ExePath, ($Arguments -join ' '), [System.IO.File]::Exists($ExePath))
# A real program start from PowerShell's own location, as the agent start is: a location
# that no longer exists fails here with error 267, as it did on the MSI channel. With
# AgentStartFails the stub payload itself is started, a text file that never runs.
if ($global:HarnessOptions.AgentStartFails) {
& $ExePath @Arguments | Out-Host
return $LASTEXITCODE
}
& "$env:SystemRoot\System32\cmd.exe" /c "exit $([int]$global:HarnessOptions.InstallExitCode)" | Out-Host
return $LASTEXITCODE
}
function global:HarnessGetProcess {
[CmdletBinding()]
param([string[]]$Name)
if ($Name -contains 'AutopilotMonitor.Agent') {
Write-HarnessTrace 'Get-Process' 'AutopilotMonitor.Agent'
return [pscustomobject]@{ Id = 4242; StartTime = Get-Date }
}
return Microsoft.PowerShell.Management\Get-Process @PSBoundParameters
}
function global:HarnessStartSleep {
[CmdletBinding()]
param([int]$Seconds, [int]$Milliseconds)
Write-HarnessTrace 'Start-Sleep' "$Seconds s $Milliseconds ms"
}
function global:HarnessTestIsElevated {
Write-HarnessTrace 'Test-IsElevated' "$($global:HarnessOptions.Elevated)"
return [bool]$global:HarnessOptions.Elevated
}
# The protected DACL without the owner change a standard account may not make.
function global:HarnessNewProtectedDirectorySecurity {
$security = New-Object System.Security.AccessControl.DirectorySecurity
$security.SetAccessRuleProtection($true, $false)
$inherit = [System.Security.AccessControl.InheritanceFlags]'ContainerInherit, ObjectInherit'
$propagation = [System.Security.AccessControl.PropagationFlags]::None
foreach ($sid in @([System.Security.Principal.WindowsIdentity]::GetCurrent().User, (New-Object System.Security.Principal.SecurityIdentifier('S-1-5-18')))) {
$security.AddAccessRule((New-Object System.Security.AccessControl.FileSystemAccessRule($sid, 'FullControl', $inherit, $propagation, 'Allow')))
}
$security.AddAccessRule((New-Object System.Security.AccessControl.FileSystemAccessRule((New-Object System.Security.Principal.SecurityIdentifier('S-1-5-32-545')), 'ReadAndExecute', $inherit, $propagation, 'Allow')))
return $security
}
function global:HarnessTestIsOwnedByUs {
param([string]$Path)
if ([System.IO.Path]::GetFileName($Path) -like 'foreign*') { return $false }
try {
$owner = (Get-Item -LiteralPath $Path -Force -ErrorAction Stop).GetAccessControl([System.Security.AccessControl.AccessControlSections]::Owner).GetOwner([System.Security.Principal.SecurityIdentifier])
return ($owner.Value -eq 'S-1-5-18' -or $owner.Value -eq 'S-1-5-32-544' -or $owner -eq [System.Security.Principal.WindowsIdentity]::GetCurrent().User)
} catch {
return $false
}
}
$swaps = @{
'Invoke-WebRequest' = 'HarnessInvokeWebRequest'
'Invoke-RestMethod' = 'HarnessInvokeRestMethod'
'Get-AuthenticodeSignature' = 'HarnessGetAuthenticodeSignature'
'Test-FileCatalog' = 'HarnessTestFileCatalog'
'Get-BootstrapDecision' = 'HarnessGetBootstrapDecision'
'Get-RegistryValue64' = 'HarnessGetRegistryValue64'
'Get-ScheduledTask' = 'HarnessGetScheduledTask'
'Invoke-AgentInstallMode' = 'HarnessInvokeAgentInstallMode'
'Get-Process' = 'HarnessGetProcess'
'Start-Sleep' = 'HarnessStartSleep'
'Test-IsOwnedByUs' = 'HarnessTestIsOwnedByUs'
}
if ($global:HarnessOptions.SwapElevation) { $swaps['Test-IsElevated'] = 'HarnessTestIsElevated' }
if ($global:HarnessOptions.SwapDacl) { $swaps['New-ProtectedDirectorySecurity'] = 'HarnessNewProtectedDirectorySecurity' }
foreach ($name in $swaps.Keys) { Set-Alias -Name $name -Value $swaps[$name] -Scope Global -Force }
# The bootstrap MSI's action is a -Command line; the OOBE script arrives as irm | iex, which
# ignores #Requires.
if ($global:HarnessOptions.CommandText) {
Invoke-Expression $global:HarnessOptions.CommandText
} elseif ($global:HarnessOptions.Iex) {
Invoke-Expression ([System.IO.File]::ReadAllText($global:HarnessOptions.Script))
} else {
& $global:HarnessOptions.Script @args
}
exit $LASTEXITCODE
'@
# A ZIP with exactly these entry names.
function New-ZipWithEntries {
param([string]$Path, [string[]]$Names)
Add-Type -AssemblyName System.IO.Compression
Add-Type -AssemblyName System.IO.Compression.FileSystem
$archive = [System.IO.Compression.ZipFile]::Open($Path, [System.IO.Compression.ZipArchiveMode]::Create)
try {
foreach ($name in $Names) {
$writer = New-Object System.IO.StreamWriter($archive.CreateEntry($name).Open())
try { $writer.Write("content of $name") } finally { $writer.Dispose() }
}
} finally { $archive.Dispose() }
}
# Serves a package with one entry that points outside the payload folder, with the
# matching manifest hash, under the stable names.
function Set-EscapingPackage {
param($Scenario)
$zip = Join-Path $Scenario.Server 'AutopilotMonitor-Agent.zip'
Remove-Item -LiteralPath $zip
New-ZipWithEntries -Path $zip -Names @('AutopilotMonitor.Agent.exe', 'AutopilotMonitor.Agent.cat', '../../../outside.txt')
$sha = (Get-FileHash -LiteralPath $zip -Algorithm SHA256).Hash.ToLowerInvariant()
Set-Content -LiteralPath (Join-Path $Scenario.Server 'version.json') -Value ('{"version":"2.0.9999","sha256":"' + $sha + '"}')
}
function New-Scenario {
$root = Join-Path $TestDrive ('s' + [guid]::NewGuid().ToString('N').Substring(0, 7))
$scenario = [pscustomobject]@{
Root = $root
ProgramData = Join-Path $root 'ProgramData'
Base = Join-Path $root 'ProgramData\AutopilotMonitor'
ProgramFiles = Join-Path $root 'ProgramFiles'
Temp = Join-Path $root 'Temp'
Server = Join-Path $root 'Server'
Outside = Join-Path $root 'Outside'
Ime = Join-Path $root 'Ime'
}
foreach ($dir in @($scenario.ProgramData, $scenario.Temp, $scenario.Server, $scenario.Outside, $scenario.Ime)) {
New-Item -ItemType Directory -Path $dir -Force | Out-Null
}
Copy-Item -LiteralPath $script:installerPath -Destination (Join-Path $scenario.Server 'Install-AutopilotMonitor.ps1')
Copy-Item -LiteralPath $script:agentZip -Destination (Join-Path $scenario.Server 'AutopilotMonitor-Agent.zip')
Set-Content -LiteralPath (Join-Path $scenario.Server 'version.json') -Value ('{"version":"2.0.9999","sha256":"' + $script:agentZipSha256 + '"}')
return $scenario
}
function Invoke-Scenario {
param(
$Scenario,
[string]$Script,
[string[]]$Arguments = @(),
[string]$WorkingDirectory,
[hashtable]$Options = @{}
)
$settings = @{
Script = $Script
Server = $Scenario.Server
Install = $true
Marker = $null
TaskPresent = $false
InstallExitCode = 0
SignatureStatus = 'Valid'
SignerSubject = 'CN=glueckkanja AG, O=glueckkanja AG, C=DE'
CatalogValid = $true
Elevated = $true
Iex = $false
CommandText = $null
AgentStartFails = $false
}
foreach ($key in $Options.Keys) { $settings[$key] = $Options[$key] }
$script:promiseScenario = $Scenario
$settings.SwapElevation = ([bool]$settings.Elevated -ne $script:isElevated)
$settings.SwapDacl = -not $script:isElevated
$harness = Join-Path $Scenario.Root 'Harness'
New-Item -ItemType Directory -Path $harness -Force | Out-Null
$tracePath = Join-Path $harness 'trace.txt'
if (Test-Path -LiteralPath $tracePath) { Remove-Item -LiteralPath $tracePath }
[System.IO.File]::WriteAllText((Join-Path $harness 'options.json'), ($settings | ConvertTo-Json))
[System.IO.File]::WriteAllText((Join-Path $harness 'run.ps1'), $script:wrapperText)
$psi = New-Object System.Diagnostics.ProcessStartInfo
$psi.FileName = $script:powershell
$quoted = @($Arguments | ForEach-Object { if ($_ -match '\s') { '"' + $_ + '"' } else { $_ } })
$psi.Arguments = ('-NoProfile -ExecutionPolicy Bypass -File "{0}" {1}' -f (Join-Path $harness 'run.ps1'), ($quoted -join ' ')).Trim()
$psi.WorkingDirectory = $(if ($WorkingDirectory) { $WorkingDirectory } else { $Scenario.Root })
$psi.UseShellExecute = $false
$psi.RedirectStandardOutput = $true
$psi.RedirectStandardError = $true
$psi.EnvironmentVariables['ProgramData'] = $Scenario.ProgramData
$psi.EnvironmentVariables['ALLUSERSPROFILE'] = $Scenario.ProgramData
$psi.EnvironmentVariables['TEMP'] = $Scenario.Temp
$psi.EnvironmentVariables['TMP'] = $Scenario.Temp
$psi.EnvironmentVariables['ProgramW6432'] = $Scenario.ProgramFiles
$process = [System.Diagnostics.Process]::Start($psi)
$stdout = $process.StandardOutput.ReadToEndAsync()
$stderr = $process.StandardError.ReadToEndAsync()
if (-not $process.WaitForExit(300000)) { $process.Kill(); throw 'The harness run did not end within five minutes.' }
$process.WaitForExit()
return [pscustomobject]@{
ExitCode = $process.ExitCode
StdOut = $stdout.Result
StdErr = $stderr.Result
Trace = @(if (Test-Path -LiteralPath $tracePath) { Get-Content -LiteralPath $tracePath })
}
}
# Every entry below $Root, links as links and never followed; run-folder ids as <id>.
# -Content adds a hash per file, for "exactly as it was".
function Get-Tree {
param([string]$Root, [switch]$Content)
$entries = New-Object System.Collections.Generic.List[string]
$walk = {
param([string]$Folder)
foreach ($entry in [System.IO.Directory]::GetFileSystemEntries($Folder)) {
$relative = $entry.Substring($Root.Length + 1) -replace '-[0-9a-f]{8}(?=\\|$)', '-<id>'
$attributes = [System.IO.File]::GetAttributes($entry)
if (($attributes -band [System.IO.FileAttributes]::ReparsePoint) -ne 0) { $entries.Add("$relative -> link"); continue }
if (($attributes -band [System.IO.FileAttributes]::Directory) -ne 0) { $entries.Add("$relative\"); & $walk $entry; continue }
if ($Content) { $relative += ' ' + (Get-FileHash -LiteralPath $entry -Algorithm SHA256).Hash.Substring(0, 16) }
$entries.Add($relative)
}
}
if ([System.IO.Directory]::Exists($Root)) { & $walk $Root }
return (Join-Tree $entries)
}
function Join-Tree {
param([string[]]$Entries)
$sorted = [string[]]@($Entries | Where-Object { $_ })
[System.Array]::Sort($sorted, [System.StringComparer]::Ordinal)
return ($sorted -join "`n")
}
# The promise every run keeps, whatever the scenario asserts about ProgramData: nothing of
# ours anywhere else. The scenario's own fixture folders are the only other entries.
function Assert-NothingOutsideProgramData {
param($Scenario)
$fixtures = @('ProgramData', 'ProgramFiles', 'Temp', 'Server', 'Outside', 'Ime', 'Harness')
$others = @([System.IO.Directory]::GetFileSystemEntries($Scenario.Root) | ForEach-Object { [System.IO.Path]::GetFileName($_) } | Where-Object { $_ -notin $fixtures })
$others | Should -BeNullOrEmpty -Because 'the scripts write nowhere but ProgramData'
Get-Tree $Scenario.ProgramFiles | Should -BeNullOrEmpty -Because 'nothing of ours stays under Program Files'
Get-Tree $Scenario.Temp | Should -BeNullOrEmpty -Because 'the scripts never stage in the shared temp folder'
}
# Every Describe runs this after each test: the last run of the test kept the promise.
function Assert-PromiseOfLastRun {
if (-not $script:promiseScenario) { return }
$scenario = $script:promiseScenario
$script:promiseScenario = $null
Assert-NothingOutsideProgramData $scenario
}
function Get-StdErrLines {
param($Run)
return @($Run.StdErr -split "`r?`n" | Where-Object { $_ })
}
function New-Junction {
param([string]$Link, [string]$Target)
cmd.exe /c mklink /J "$Link" "$Target" | Out-Null
}
function Add-File {
param([string]$Path, [string]$Value = 'x')
New-Item -ItemType Directory -Path (Split-Path $Path) -Force | Out-Null
Set-Content -LiteralPath $Path -Value $Value
}
# A base with what earlier bootstrap versions and agents could leave behind, plus a file
# no version knows yet and a junction out of it.
function Add-Leftovers {
param($Scenario)
Add-File (Join-Path $Scenario.Base 'Install-AutopilotMonitor.ps1')
Add-File (Join-Path $Scenario.Base 'Logs\bootstrap-loader.log')
Add-File (Join-Path $Scenario.Base 'Logs\bootstrap-script.log')
Add-File (Join-Path $Scenario.Base 'Agent-Install\Agent\AutopilotMonitor.Agent.Core.dll')
Add-File (Join-Path $Scenario.Base 'future-version-file.bin')
Add-File (Join-Path $Scenario.Outside 'target\sentinel.txt') 'must survive'
New-Junction -Link (Join-Path $Scenario.Base 'linked') -Target (Join-Path $Scenario.Outside 'target')
}
$script:installedTree = @(
'AutopilotMonitor\'
'AutopilotMonitor\Agent\'
'AutopilotMonitor\Agent\AutopilotMonitor.Agent.Core.dll'
'AutopilotMonitor\Agent\AutopilotMonitor.Agent.cat'
'AutopilotMonitor\Agent\AutopilotMonitor.Agent.exe'
'AutopilotMonitor\Agent\AutopilotMonitor.Agent.exe.config'
'AutopilotMonitor\Logs\'
)
}
Describe 'loader 1.4' {
AfterEach { Assert-PromiseOfLastRun }
It 'installs and leaves only the agent folder, with its log carried over' {
$s = New-Scenario
$run = Invoke-Scenario $s -Script $script:loaderPath -Arguments @('-MaxBootstrapWindowHours', '24')
$run.ExitCode | Should -Be 0
$run.StdErr | Should -BeNullOrEmpty
Get-Tree $s.ProgramData | Should -Be (Join-Tree ($script:installedTree + 'AutopilotMonitor\Logs\bootstrap-loader.log' + 'AutopilotMonitor\Logs\bootstrap-script.log'))
Get-Tree $s.Temp | Should -BeNullOrEmpty
$run.Trace | Should -Contain 'Get-BootstrapDecision|MaxBootstrapWindowHours=24'
$run.Trace | Should -Contain 'Invoke-WebRequest|https://download.autopilotmonitor.com/agent/Install-AutopilotMonitor.ps1'
$run.Trace | Should -Contain 'Invoke-WebRequest|https://download.autopilotmonitor.com/agent/AutopilotMonitor-Agent.zip'
$run.Trace | Should -Contain 'Invoke-RestMethod|https://download.autopilotmonitor.com/agent/version.json'
@($run.Trace | Where-Object { $_ -like 'Test-FileCatalog|*' }).Count | Should -Be 1
@($run.Trace | Where-Object { $_ -like 'Invoke-AgentInstallMode|*\AutopilotMonitor\Agent\AutopilotMonitor.Agent.exe --install exists=True' }).Count | Should -Be 1
$run.StdOut | Should -Match 'Bootstrap Completed Successfully'
Get-Content -LiteralPath (Join-Path $s.Base 'Logs\bootstrap-loader.log') -Raw | Should -Match '=== Autopilot Monitor bootstrap loader v1\.4 started'
if ($script:isElevated) {
(Get-Item -LiteralPath $s.Base).GetAccessControl('Owner').GetOwner([System.Security.Principal.SecurityIdentifier]).Value | Should -Be 'S-1-5-32-544'
}
}
It 'skips and leaves nothing behind, also what older versions left and files no version knows' {
$s = New-Scenario
Add-Leftovers $s
$run = Invoke-Scenario $s -Script $script:loaderPath -Options @{ Install = $false }
$run.ExitCode | Should -Be 0
$run.StdErr | Should -BeNullOrEmpty
Get-Tree $s.ProgramData | Should -BeNullOrEmpty
Get-Content -LiteralPath (Join-Path $s.Outside 'target\sentinel.txt') | Should -Be 'must survive'
$run.StdOut | Should -Match 'No agent on this device: .* removed\.'
@($run.Trace | Where-Object { $_ -like 'Invoke-WebRequest|*Agent.zip' }).Count | Should -Be 0
}
It 'leaves the folder of an agent exactly as it is, self-update leftovers included' {
$s = New-Scenario
Add-File (Join-Path $s.Base 'Agent\AutopilotMonitor.Agent.exe') 'running agent'
Add-File (Join-Path $s.Base 'Agent\AutopilotMonitor.Agent.Core.dll.old') 'previous version'
Add-File (Join-Path $s.Base 'Updates\AutopilotMonitor-Agent-Update.zip') 'update'
Add-File (Join-Path $s.Base 'Agent-Update\AutopilotMonitor.Agent.Core.dll') 'staged'
Add-File (Join-Path $s.Base 'Logs\agent.log') 'agent log'
Add-File (Join-Path $s.Base 'State\session.id') 'session'
$before = Get-Tree $s.ProgramData -Content
$run = Invoke-Scenario $s -Script $script:loaderPath
$run.ExitCode | Should -Be 0
$run.StdErr | Should -BeNullOrEmpty
Get-Tree $s.ProgramData -Content | Should -Be $before
$run.StdOut | Should -Match 'Agent present \(agent executable\)'
@($run.Trace | Where-Object { $_ -like 'Invoke-AgentInstallMode|*' }).Count | Should -Be 0
}
It 'leaves the folder alone when only the deployment marker <Case>' -TestCases @(
@{ Case = 'is there (logs kept after enrollment)'; Options = @{ Marker = '2026-10-01T08:00:00Z' } }
@{ Case = 'is missing but the agent task exists'; Options = @{ TaskPresent = $true } }
) {
$s = New-Scenario
Add-File (Join-Path $s.Base 'Logs\agent.log') 'kept log'
$before = Get-Tree $s.ProgramData -Content
$run = Invoke-Scenario $s -Script $script:loaderPath -Options $Options
$run.ExitCode | Should -Be 0
$run.StdErr | Should -BeNullOrEmpty
Get-Tree $s.ProgramData -Content | Should -Be $before
}
It 'keeps its log when the installer fails; a later run removes it, a run within the hour leaves it' {
$s = New-Scenario
Remove-Item -LiteralPath (Join-Path $s.Server 'version.json')
$failed = Invoke-Scenario $s -Script $script:loaderPath
$failed.ExitCode | Should -Be 0
@(Get-StdErrLines $failed).Count | Should -Be 1
$failed.StdErr | Should -Match '^AutopilotMonitor bootstrap failed: No SHA-256 hash available'
Get-Tree $s.ProgramData | Should -Be (Join-Tree @(
'AutopilotMonitor-Loader-<id>\'
'AutopilotMonitor-Loader-<id>\bootstrap-loader.log'
'AutopilotMonitor\'
'AutopilotMonitor\Logs\'
'AutopilotMonitor\Logs\bootstrap-loader.log'
'AutopilotMonitor\Logs\bootstrap-script.log'
))
Set-Content -LiteralPath (Join-Path $s.Server 'version.json') -Value ('{"version":"2.0.9999","sha256":"' + $script:agentZipSha256 + '"}')
$kept = (Get-ChildItem -LiteralPath $s.ProgramData -Directory -Filter 'AutopilotMonitor-Loader-*').FullName
# Minutes later the folder may still belong to a running loader: it stays.
$soon = Invoke-Scenario $s -Script $script:loaderPath
$soon.ExitCode | Should -Be 0
$soon.StdErr | Should -BeNullOrEmpty
Test-Path -LiteralPath $kept | Should -BeTrue
Get-Tree $s.Base | Should -Be (Join-Tree ((@($script:installedTree) | ForEach-Object { $_ -replace '^AutopilotMonitor\\', '' } | Where-Object { $_ }) + 'Logs\bootstrap-loader.log' + 'Logs\bootstrap-script.log'))
[System.IO.Directory]::SetCreationTimeUtc($kept, [System.DateTime]::UtcNow.AddHours(-2))
$later = Invoke-Scenario $s -Script $script:loaderPath -Options @{ Install = $false }
$later.ExitCode | Should -Be 0
Test-Path -LiteralPath $kept | Should -BeFalse
}
It 'runs nothing it cannot verify: <Case>' -TestCases @(
@{ Case = 'unsigned'; Options = @{ SignatureStatus = 'NotSigned' }; Edit = $null }
@{ Case = 'another publisher'; Options = @{ SignerSubject = 'CN=Somebody Else, O=Somebody Else Ltd, C=US' }; Edit = $null }
@{ Case = 'an installer below 2.8'; Options = @{}; Edit = @('$ScriptVersion = "2.9"', '$ScriptVersion = "2.7"') }
@{ Case = 'not the installer'; Options = @{}; Edit = @('$ScriptRole = "AutopilotMonitor-Installer"', '$ScriptRole = "AutopilotMonitor-Other"') }
) {
$s = New-Scenario
if ($Edit) {
$served = Join-Path $s.Server 'Install-AutopilotMonitor.ps1'
$text = [System.IO.File]::ReadAllText($served)
$text.Contains($Edit[0]) | Should -BeTrue
[System.IO.File]::WriteAllText($served, $text.Replace($Edit[0], $Edit[1]))
}
$run = Invoke-Scenario $s -Script $script:loaderPath -Options $Options
$run.ExitCode | Should -Be 0
$run.StdErr | Should -BeNullOrEmpty
@($run.Trace | Where-Object { $_ -like 'Invoke-WebRequest|*Install-AutopilotMonitor.ps1' }).Count | Should -Be 3
@($run.Trace | Where-Object { $_ -like 'Get-BootstrapDecision|*' }).Count | Should -Be 0
Get-Tree $s.ProgramData | Should -Be (Join-Tree @('AutopilotMonitor-Loader-<id>\', 'AutopilotMonitor-Loader-<id>\bootstrap-loader.log'))
}
It 'refuses to run without SYSTEM or administrator rights and creates nothing' {
$s = New-Scenario
$run = Invoke-Scenario $s -Script $script:loaderPath -Options @{ Elevated = $false }
$run.ExitCode | Should -Be 0
@(Get-StdErrLines $run) | Should -Be 'AutopilotMonitor loader: not running as SYSTEM or administrator; nothing was downloaded or changed.'
Get-Tree $s.ProgramData | Should -BeNullOrEmpty
@($run.Trace | Where-Object { $_ -like 'Invoke-WebRequest|*' }).Count | Should -Be 0
}
}
Describe 'installer assigned directly' {
AfterEach { Assert-PromiseOfLastRun }
BeforeEach {
$s = New-Scenario
$imeCopy = Join-Path $s.Ime '0f1e2d3c-4b5a-6978-8796-a5b4c3d2e1f0.ps1'
Copy-Item -LiteralPath $script:installerPath -Destination $imeCopy
}
It 'installs, and the copy IME runs stays where IME put it' {
$run = Invoke-Scenario $s -Script $imeCopy
$run.ExitCode | Should -Be 0
$run.StdErr | Should -BeNullOrEmpty
Get-Tree $s.ProgramData | Should -Be (Join-Tree ($script:installedTree + 'AutopilotMonitor\Logs\bootstrap-script.log'))
Test-Path -LiteralPath $imeCopy | Should -BeTrue
Get-Tree $s.Temp | Should -BeNullOrEmpty
}
It 'skips and leaves nothing behind' {
Add-Leftovers $s
$run = Invoke-Scenario $s -Script $imeCopy -Options @{ Install = $false }
$run.ExitCode | Should -Be 0
$run.StdErr | Should -BeNullOrEmpty
Get-Tree $s.ProgramData | Should -BeNullOrEmpty
Get-Content -LiteralPath (Join-Path $s.Outside 'target\sentinel.txt') | Should -Be 'must survive'
}
# An agent that ran owns its folder, even after a failed --install; one that never started
# leaves only payload, which a later run would take for an agent.
It 'fails with exit code 1 and exactly one line on stderr: <Case>' -TestCases @(
@{ Case = 'the download fails'; Missing = 'AutopilotMonitor-Agent.zip'; Options = @{}; Message = 'AutopilotMonitor bootstrap failed: The remote server returned an error: (404) Not Found.*'; AgentFolder = 'gone' }
@{ Case = 'the payload fails its catalog'; Missing = $null; Options = @{ CatalogValid = $false }; Message = 'AutopilotMonitor bootstrap failed: Payload verification FAILED*'; AgentFolder = 'gone' }
@{ Case = 'the agent install fails'; Missing = $null; Options = @{ InstallExitCode = 7 }; Message = 'AutopilotMonitor bootstrap failed: Agent install failed with exit code 7'; AgentFolder = 'stays' }
@{ Case = 'the agent does not start'; Missing = $null; Options = @{ AgentStartFails = $true }; Message = "AutopilotMonitor bootstrap failed: Program 'AutopilotMonitor.Agent.exe' failed to run*"; AgentFolder = 'gone' }
) {
if ($Missing) { Remove-Item -LiteralPath (Join-Path $s.Server $Missing) }
$run = Invoke-Scenario $s -Script $imeCopy -Options $Options
$run.ExitCode | Should -Be 1
@(Get-StdErrLines $run).Count | Should -Be 1
@(Get-StdErrLines $run)[0] | Should -BeLike $Message
Get-Tree $s.ProgramData | Should -Not -Match 'Agent-Install'
Test-Path -LiteralPath (Join-Path $s.Base 'Agent') | Should -Be ($AgentFolder -eq 'stays')
Test-Path -LiteralPath (Join-Path $s.Base 'Logs\bootstrap-script.log') | Should -BeTrue
}
It 'refuses an agent package with an entry outside the payload folder and writes nothing outside' {
Set-EscapingPackage $s
$run = Invoke-Scenario $s -Script $imeCopy
$run.ExitCode | Should -Be 1
@(Get-StdErrLines $run).Count | Should -Be 1
@(Get-StdErrLines $run)[0] | Should -BeLike 'AutopilotMonitor bootstrap failed: The agent package has an entry that would be written outside the payload folder*'
Get-Tree $s.Root | Should -Not -Match 'outside\.txt'
Get-Tree $s.ProgramData | Should -Be (Join-Tree @('AutopilotMonitor\', 'AutopilotMonitor\Logs\', 'AutopilotMonitor\Logs\bootstrap-script.log'))
}
It 'refuses to run without SYSTEM or administrator rights and changes nothing' {
Add-File (Join-Path $s.Base 'Logs\bootstrap-script.log') 'earlier run'
$before = Get-Tree $s.ProgramData -Content
$run = Invoke-Scenario $s -Script $imeCopy -Options @{ Elevated = $false }
$run.ExitCode | Should -Be 1
@(Get-StdErrLines $run) | Should -Be 'AutopilotMonitor bootstrap: not running as SYSTEM or administrator; nothing was changed.'
Get-Tree $s.ProgramData -Content | Should -Be $before
}
It 'does not install into a folder that holds another account''s entries, and leaves them' {
Add-File (Join-Path $s.Base 'foreign-planted.dll') 'planted'
Add-File (Join-Path $s.Base 'Logs\bootstrap-script.log') 'earlier run'
$run = Invoke-Scenario $s -Script $imeCopy
$run.ExitCode | Should -Be 1
@(Get-StdErrLines $run).Count | Should -Be 1
$run.StdErr | Should -Match 'holds entries another account created'
Get-Tree $s.ProgramData | Should -Be (Join-Tree @('AutopilotMonitor\', 'AutopilotMonitor\foreign-planted.dll'))
@($run.Trace | Where-Object { $_ -like 'Invoke-WebRequest|*' }).Count | Should -Be 0
}
It 'leaves another account''s entries and their folder when it skips' {
Add-File (Join-Path $s.Base 'foreign-planted.dll') 'planted'
Add-File (Join-Path $s.Base 'Logs\bootstrap-script.log') 'earlier run'
$run = Invoke-Scenario $s -Script $imeCopy -Options @{ Install = $false }
$run.ExitCode | Should -Be 0
$run.StdErr | Should -BeNullOrEmpty
Get-Tree $s.ProgramData | Should -Be (Join-Tree @('AutopilotMonitor\', 'AutopilotMonitor\foreign-planted.dll'))
}
It 'never follows an agent folder that is a link: <Case>' -TestCases @(
@{ Case = 'install'; Install = $true; ExitCode = 1 }
@{ Case = 'skip'; Install = $false; ExitCode = 0 }
) {
Add-File (Join-Path $s.Outside 'target\sentinel.txt') 'must survive'
New-Junction -Link $s.Base -Target (Join-Path $s.Outside 'target')
$run = Invoke-Scenario $s -Script $imeCopy -Options @{ Install = $Install }
$run.ExitCode | Should -Be $ExitCode
Get-Tree $s.ProgramData | Should -Be 'AutopilotMonitor -> link'
Get-Tree (Join-Path $s.Outside 'target') | Should -Be 'sentinel.txt'
}
}
Describe 'loader 1.2, frozen' {
AfterEach { Assert-PromiseOfLastRun }
It 'installs with the current installer, which removes its copy and keeps the loader start line' {
$s = New-Scenario
$run = Invoke-Scenario $s -Script $script:loader12Path
$run.ExitCode | Should -Be 0
$run.StdErr | Should -BeNullOrEmpty
Get-Tree $s.ProgramData | Should -Be (Join-Tree ($script:installedTree + 'AutopilotMonitor\Logs\bootstrap-loader.log' + 'AutopilotMonitor\Logs\bootstrap-script.log'))
$log = @(Get-Content -LiteralPath (Join-Path $s.Base 'Logs\bootstrap-loader.log'))
$log[0] | Should -Match '^\[\d{4}-\d\d-\d\d \d\d:\d\d:\d\d\] === Autopilot Monitor bootstrap loader v1\.2 started \(carried over by the bootstrapper\) ===$'
}
It 'leaves the folder of an agent as it is, but not the copy the old loader saved there' {
$s = New-Scenario
Add-File (Join-Path $s.Base 'Agent\AutopilotMonitor.Agent.exe') 'running agent'
Add-File (Join-Path $s.Base 'Logs\agent.log') 'agent log'
$run = Invoke-Scenario $s -Script $script:loader12Path
$run.ExitCode | Should -Be 0
$run.StdErr | Should -BeNullOrEmpty
Get-Tree $s.ProgramData | Should -Be (Join-Tree @(
'AutopilotMonitor\', 'AutopilotMonitor\Agent\', 'AutopilotMonitor\Agent\AutopilotMonitor.Agent.exe'
'AutopilotMonitor\Logs\', 'AutopilotMonitor\Logs\agent.log', 'AutopilotMonitor\Logs\bootstrap-loader.log'
))
Get-Content -LiteralPath (Join-Path $s.Base 'Agent\AutopilotMonitor.Agent.exe') | Should -Be 'running agent'
}
It 'skips with the current installer and leaves nothing behind' {
$s = New-Scenario
Add-Leftovers $s
$run = Invoke-Scenario $s -Script $script:loader12Path -Options @{ Install = $false }
$run.ExitCode | Should -Be 0
$run.StdErr | Should -BeNullOrEmpty
Get-Tree $s.ProgramData | Should -BeNullOrEmpty
Get-Content -LiteralPath (Join-Path $s.Outside 'target\sentinel.txt') | Should -Be 'must survive'
}
}
Describe 'bootstrap MSI layouts, started in the folder the MSI installed' {
AfterEach { Assert-PromiseOfLastRun }
It '<Name> skips and leaves <Left>' -TestCases @(
@{ Name = 'MSI 1.3 (loader in Program Files)'; File = 'Start-AutopilotMonitor.ps1'; Source = 'loader'; Location = 'program-files'; Arguments = @('-LogFileName', 'bootstrap-msi.log'); Left = 'nothing'; Tree = @() }
@{ Name = 'MSI 1.2 (loader 1.3)'; File = 'Start-AutopilotMonitor.ps1'; Source = 'loader'; Arguments = @('-LogFileName', 'bootstrap-msi.log'); Left = 'nothing'; Tree = @() }
@{ Name = 'MSI 1.1 (loader 1.2)'; File = 'Start-AutopilotMonitor.ps1'; Source = 'loader12'; Arguments = @('-LogFileName', 'bootstrap-msi.log'); Left = 'nothing'; Tree = @() }
@{ Name = 'MSI 1.0 (own runner)'; File = 'Invoke-BootstrapDownload.ps1'; Source = 'msiRunner'; Arguments = @(); Left = 'only the log the runner holds open'; Tree = @('AutopilotMonitor\', 'AutopilotMonitor\Logs\', 'AutopilotMonitor\Logs\bootstrap-msi.log') }
) {
$s = New-Scenario
$msi = if ($Location -eq 'program-files') { Join-Path $s.Root 'ProgramFiles\AutopilotMonitor\Bootstrap' } else { Join-Path $s.Base 'Msi' }
New-Item -ItemType Directory -Path $msi -Force | Out-Null
$sourcePath = @{ loader = $script:loaderPath; loader12 = $script:loader12Path; msiRunner = $script:msiRunnerPath }[$Source]
Copy-Item -LiteralPath $sourcePath -Destination (Join-Path $msi $File)
$run = Invoke-Scenario $s -Script (Join-Path $msi $File) -Arguments $Arguments -WorkingDirectory $msi -Options @{ Install = $false }
$run.ExitCode | Should -Be 0
$run.StdErr | Should -BeNullOrEmpty
Get-Tree $s.ProgramData | Should -Be (Join-Tree $Tree)
if ($Location -eq 'program-files') { $run.StdOut | Should -Match 'Bootstrap removed, and with it the empty' }
}
# MSI 1.3 installed its loader under Program Files, where nothing of ours belongs; the
# installer takes it away in every outcome, also when an agent is present.
It 'MSI 1.3 leaves nothing under Program Files when an agent is present' {
$s = New-Scenario
$msi = Join-Path $s.ProgramFiles 'AutopilotMonitor\Bootstrap'
New-Item -ItemType Directory -Path $msi -Force | Out-Null
Copy-Item -LiteralPath $script:loaderPath -Destination (Join-Path $msi 'Start-AutopilotMonitor.ps1')
Add-File (Join-Path $s.Base 'Logs\agent.log') 'kept log'
$before = Get-Tree $s.ProgramData -Content
$run = Invoke-Scenario $s -Script (Join-Path $msi 'Start-AutopilotMonitor.ps1') -Arguments @('-LogFileName', 'bootstrap-msi.log') -WorkingDirectory $msi -Options @{ Marker = '2026-10-01T08:00:00Z' }
$run.ExitCode | Should -Be 0
$run.StdErr | Should -BeNullOrEmpty
Get-Tree $s.ProgramData -Content | Should -Be $before
Test-Path -LiteralPath (Join-Path $s.ProgramFiles 'AutopilotMonitor') | Should -BeFalse
$run.StdOut | Should -Match 'Agent present \(deployment marker\): .* is left as it is\.'
$run.StdOut | Should -Match 'Bootstrap removed, and with it the empty'
}
It '<Name> installs' -TestCases @(
@{ Name = 'MSI 1.3 (loader in Program Files)'; File = 'Start-AutopilotMonitor.ps1'; Source = 'loader'; Location = 'program-files'; Arguments = @('-LogFileName', 'bootstrap-msi.log') }
@{ Name = 'MSI 1.2 (loader 1.3)'; File = 'Start-AutopilotMonitor.ps1'; Source = 'loader'; Arguments = @('-LogFileName', 'bootstrap-msi.log') }
@{ Name = 'MSI 1.1 (loader 1.2)'; File = 'Start-AutopilotMonitor.ps1'; Source = 'loader12'; Arguments = @('-LogFileName', 'bootstrap-msi.log') }
@{ Name = 'MSI 1.0 (own runner)'; File = 'Invoke-BootstrapDownload.ps1'; Source = 'msiRunner'; Arguments = @() }
) {
$s = New-Scenario
$msi = if ($Location -eq 'program-files') { Join-Path $s.Root 'ProgramFiles\AutopilotMonitor\Bootstrap' } else { Join-Path $s.Base 'Msi' }
New-Item -ItemType Directory -Path $msi -Force | Out-Null
$sourcePath = @{ loader = $script:loaderPath; loader12 = $script:loader12Path; msiRunner = $script:msiRunnerPath }[$Source]
Copy-Item -LiteralPath $sourcePath -Destination (Join-Path $msi $File)
$run = Invoke-Scenario $s -Script (Join-Path $msi $File) -Arguments $Arguments -WorkingDirectory $msi
$run.ExitCode | Should -Be 0
$run.StdErr | Should -BeNullOrEmpty
Get-Tree $s.ProgramData | Should -Be (Join-Tree ($script:installedTree + 'AutopilotMonitor\Logs\bootstrap-msi.log' + 'AutopilotMonitor\Logs\bootstrap-script.log'))
if ($Location -eq 'program-files') { $run.StdOut | Should -Match 'Bootstrap removed, and with it the empty' }
}
}
# MSI 1.4 installs the loader copy under <base>\Msi and runs this command as SYSTEM from
# System32: read the copy once, check our signature on those bytes, run those bytes. The
# command is taken from Package.wxs and formatted as Windows Installer formats it (measured
# on the built MSI, 2026-10-23); the wrapper runs it where the stubs apply.
Describe 'bootstrap MSI 1.4: the action checks the loader copy and runs what it read' {
AfterEach { Assert-PromiseOfLastRun }
BeforeAll {
$wxs = [xml][System.IO.File]::ReadAllText((Join-Path $script:repoRoot 'src\Agent\AutopilotMonitor.BootstrapMsi\Package.wxs'))
$action = @($wxs.Wix.Package.CustomAction) | Where-Object { $_.Id -eq 'RunBootstrap' }
if ($action.ExeCommand -notmatch ' -Command "(.*)"$') { throw 'Package.wxs: the action has no -Command argument.' }
$script:actionCommand = $Matches[1]
# What the build bakes in: the hash of the loader the package embeds, here the one served.
$script:loaderSha256 = (Get-FileHash -LiteralPath $script:loaderPath -Algorithm SHA256).Hash.ToLowerInvariant()
function Format-MsiAction {
param([string]$Text, [string]$InstallFolder)
return $Text.Replace('$(var.LoaderSha256)', $script:loaderSha256).Replace('[\[]', '[').Replace('[\]]', ']').Replace('[\{]', '{').Replace('[\}]', '}').Replace('[INSTALLFOLDER]', $InstallFolder)
}
function Add-MsiCopy {
param($Scenario)
$msi = Join-Path $Scenario.Base 'Msi'
New-Item -ItemType Directory -Path $msi -Force | Out-Null
Copy-Item -LiteralPath $script:loaderPath -Destination (Join-Path $msi 'Start-AutopilotMonitor.ps1')
}
function Invoke-MsiAction {
param($Scenario, [hashtable]$Options = @{})
$command = Format-MsiAction -Text $script:actionCommand -InstallFolder ((Join-Path $Scenario.Base 'Msi') + '\')
return Invoke-Scenario $Scenario -WorkingDirectory "$env:SystemRoot\System32" -Options ($Options + @{ CommandText = $command })
}
$script:copyOnlyTree = @('AutopilotMonitor\', 'AutopilotMonitor\Msi\', 'AutopilotMonitor\Msi\Start-AutopilotMonitor.ps1')
}
It 'is PowerShell that parses, with every bracket and brace escaped for Windows Installer' {
# Without the [\x] escapes, the only bracket left is the one property reference.
($script:actionCommand -replace '\[\\.\]', '').Replace('[INSTALLFOLDER]', '') | Should -Not -Match '[{}\[\]]'
@([regex]::Matches($script:actionCommand, '\[[A-Za-z0-9_.]+\]') | ForEach-Object { $_.Value } | Sort-Object -Unique) | Should -Be @('[INSTALLFOLDER]')
$errors = $null
[System.Management.Automation.Language.Parser]::ParseInput((Format-MsiAction -Text $script:actionCommand -InstallFolder 'C:\ProgramData\AutopilotMonitor\Msi\'), [ref]$null, [ref]$errors) | Out-Null
@($errors) | Should -BeNullOrEmpty
}
It 'installs, and the copy goes with the emptied agent folder' {
$s = New-Scenario
Add-MsiCopy $s
$run = Invoke-MsiAction $s
$run.ExitCode | Should -Be 0
$run.StdErr | Should -BeNullOrEmpty
Get-Tree $s.ProgramData | Should -Be (Join-Tree ($script:installedTree + 'AutopilotMonitor\Logs\bootstrap-msi.log' + 'AutopilotMonitor\Logs\bootstrap-script.log'))
@($run.Trace | Where-Object { $_ -like 'Get-AuthenticodeSignature|content:*' }).Count | Should -Be 1
@($run.Trace | Where-Object { $_ -like 'Get-BootstrapDecision|*' }).Count | Should -Be 1
$run.StdOut | Should -Match 'Bootstrap Completed Successfully'
Get-Content -LiteralPath (Join-Path $s.Base 'Logs\bootstrap-msi.log') -Raw | Should -Match '=== Autopilot Monitor bootstrap loader v1\.4 started'
}
It 'skips and leaves nothing behind' {
$s = New-Scenario
Add-MsiCopy $s
$run = Invoke-MsiAction $s -Options @{ Install = $false }
$run.ExitCode | Should -Be 0
$run.StdErr | Should -BeNullOrEmpty
Get-Tree $s.ProgramData | Should -BeNullOrEmpty
$run.StdOut | Should -Match 'No agent on this device: .* removed\.'
}
It 'leaves nothing behind when only the deployment marker is there' {
$s = New-Scenario
Add-MsiCopy $s
$run = Invoke-MsiAction $s -Options @{ Marker = '2026-10-01T08:00:00Z' }
$run.ExitCode | Should -Be 0
$run.StdErr | Should -BeNullOrEmpty
Get-Tree $s.ProgramData | Should -BeNullOrEmpty
$run.StdOut | Should -Match 'Agent present \(deployment marker\): .*\\Msi removed, and with it the empty'
@($run.Trace | Where-Object { $_ -like 'Invoke-WebRequest|*Agent.zip' }).Count | Should -Be 0
}
It 'removes the copy and leaves the folder of an agent as it is' {
$s = New-Scenario
Add-File (Join-Path $s.Base 'Agent\AutopilotMonitor.Agent.exe') 'running agent'
Add-File (Join-Path $s.Base 'Logs\agent.log') 'agent log'
Add-MsiCopy $s
$run = Invoke-MsiAction $s
$run.ExitCode | Should -Be 0
$run.StdErr | Should -BeNullOrEmpty
Get-Tree $s.ProgramData | Should -Be (Join-Tree @('AutopilotMonitor\', 'AutopilotMonitor\Agent\', 'AutopilotMonitor\Agent\AutopilotMonitor.Agent.exe', 'AutopilotMonitor\Logs\', 'AutopilotMonitor\Logs\agent.log'))
$run.StdOut | Should -Match 'Agent present \(agent executable\): .*\\Msi removed\.'
@($run.Trace | Where-Object { $_ -like 'Invoke-AgentInstallMode|*' }).Count | Should -Be 0
}
It 'runs nothing it cannot verify: <Case>' -TestCases @(
@{ Case = 'unsigned'; Options = @{ SignatureStatus = 'NotSigned' }; Append = $null }
@{ Case = 'changed after signing'; Options = @{ SignatureStatus = 'HashMismatch' }; Append = $null }
@{ Case = 'another publisher'; Options = @{ SignerSubject = 'CN=Somebody Else, O=Somebody Else Ltd, C=US' }; Append = $null }
@{ Case = 'not the loader the package embeds, however validly signed'; Options = @{}; Append = "`r`n# one more line" }
) {
$s = New-Scenario
Add-MsiCopy $s
if ($Append) { [System.IO.File]::AppendAllText((Join-Path $s.Base 'Msi\Start-AutopilotMonitor.ps1'), $Append) }
$run = Invoke-MsiAction $s -Options $Options
$run.ExitCode | Should -Be 0
$run.StdErr | Should -BeNullOrEmpty
Get-Tree $s.ProgramData | Should -Be (Join-Tree $script:copyOnlyTree)
@($run.Trace | Where-Object { $_ -like 'Get-AuthenticodeSignature|content:*' }).Count | Should -Be 1
@($run.Trace | Where-Object { $_ -like 'Invoke-WebRequest|*' }).Count | Should -Be 0
@($run.Trace | Where-Object { $_ -like 'Get-BootstrapDecision|*' }).Count | Should -Be 0
}
}
Describe 'OOBE script, as the backend generates it' {
AfterEach { Assert-PromiseOfLastRun }
It 'installs the agent with the bootstrap token and leaves only the agent folder' {
$s = New-Scenario
Add-Leftovers $s
$run = Invoke-Scenario $s -Script $script:oobeScriptPath -Options @{ Iex = $true }
$run.ExitCode | Should -Be 0
$run.StdErr | Should -BeNullOrEmpty
Get-Tree $s.ProgramData | Should -Be (Join-Tree ($script:installedTree + 'AutopilotMonitor\Logs\oobe_bootstrap.log'))
Get-Tree $s.Temp | Should -BeNullOrEmpty
Get-Content -LiteralPath (Join-Path $s.Outside 'target\sentinel.txt') | Should -Be 'must survive'
$run.Trace | Should -Contain ('Invoke-AgentInstallMode|' + $s.Base + '\Agent\AutopilotMonitor.Agent.exe --install --no-auth --bootstrap-token 22222222-2222-2222-2222-222222222222 --tenant-id 11111111-1111-1111-1111-111111111111 exists=True')
@($run.Trace | Where-Object { $_ -like 'Test-FileCatalog|*' }).Count | Should -Be 1
}
It 'only runs --install again when the agent is there' {
$s = New-Scenario
Add-File (Join-Path $s.Base 'Agent\AutopilotMonitor.Agent.exe') 'running agent'
Add-File (Join-Path $s.Base 'State\session.id') 'session'
$run = Invoke-Scenario $s -Script $script:oobeScriptPath -Options @{ Iex = $true }
$run.ExitCode | Should -Be 0
Get-Tree $s.ProgramData | Should -Be (Join-Tree @(
'AutopilotMonitor\', 'AutopilotMonitor\Agent\', 'AutopilotMonitor\Agent\AutopilotMonitor.Agent.exe'
'AutopilotMonitor\Logs\', 'AutopilotMonitor\Logs\oobe_bootstrap.log', 'AutopilotMonitor\State\', 'AutopilotMonitor\State\session.id'
))
@($run.Trace | Where-Object { $_ -like 'Invoke-WebRequest|*' }).Count | Should -Be 0
@($run.Trace | Where-Object { $_ -like 'Invoke-AgentInstallMode|*' }).Count | Should -Be 1
}
It 'refuses an agent package with an entry outside the payload folder and writes nothing outside' {
$s = New-Scenario
Set-EscapingPackage $s
$run = Invoke-Scenario $s -Script $script:oobeScriptPath -Options @{ Iex = $true }
$run.ExitCode | Should -Be 1
$run.StdOut | Should -Match 'The agent package has an entry that would be written outside the payload folder'
Get-Tree $s.Root | Should -Not -Match 'outside\.txt'
Get-Tree $s.ProgramData | Should -Be (Join-Tree @('AutopilotMonitor\', 'AutopilotMonitor\Logs\', 'AutopilotMonitor\Logs\oobe_bootstrap.log'))
}
It 'refuses to run without SYSTEM or administrator rights and creates nothing' {
$s = New-Scenario
$run = Invoke-Scenario $s -Script $script:oobeScriptPath -Options @{ Iex = $true; Elevated = $false }
$run.ExitCode | Should -Be 1
$run.StdOut | Should -Match 'Run this script from PowerShell as SYSTEM or administrator\. Nothing was changed\.'
Get-Tree $s.ProgramData | Should -BeNullOrEmpty
}
}
Describe 'publish pipeline and dev channel' {
AfterEach { Assert-PromiseOfLastRun }
BeforeAll {
$script:rendered = Join-Path $TestDrive 'rendered'
$script:pwsh = (Get-Command pwsh -CommandType Application -ErrorAction Stop | Select-Object -First 1).Source
$script:publish = Join-Path $script:repoRoot '.github\scripts\Publish-BootstrapScripts.ps1'
# Output read as text from a process of its own: a stderr line must not become an error
# record, which ends the test under the 'Stop' preference CI runs with.
function Invoke-Publish {
param([string[]]$Arguments)
$psi = New-Object System.Diagnostics.ProcessStartInfo
$psi.FileName = $script:pwsh
$psi.Arguments = ('-NoProfile -File "{0}" {1}' -f $script:publish, ($Arguments -join ' ')).Trim()
$psi.UseShellExecute = $false
$psi.RedirectStandardOutput = $true
$psi.RedirectStandardError = $true
$process = [System.Diagnostics.Process]::Start($psi)
$stdout = $process.StandardOutput.ReadToEndAsync()
$stderr = $process.StandardError.ReadToEndAsync()
$process.WaitForExit()
return [pscustomobject]@{ ExitCode = $process.ExitCode; Output = @(($stdout.Result + "`n" + $stderr.Result) -split "`r?`n") }
}
$dryRun = Invoke-Publish @('-DryRun', '-SignedOutputDir', ('"' + $script:rendered + '"'))
if ($dryRun.ExitCode -ne 0) { throw "Publish dry run failed: $($dryRun.Output -join [Environment]::NewLine)" }
$script:publishOutput = $dryRun.Output
}
# A loader that went live first would refuse the installer still being served.
It 'puts both installers before both loaders' {
$order = @($script:publishOutput | Where-Object { $_ -match '\[dry-run\] (\S+\.ps1) ' } | ForEach-Object { $Matches[1] })
$order[0..3] | Should -Be @('Install-AutopilotMonitor.ps1', 'Install-AutopilotMonitor-Dev.ps1', 'Start-AutopilotMonitor.ps1', 'Start-AutopilotMonitor-Dev.ps1')
@($script:publishOutput | Where-Object { $_ -like '*Installer accepted: AutopilotMonitor-Installer v*' }).Count | Should -Be 2
}
It 'refuses to publish an installer the loader would refuse: <Case>' -TestCases @(
@{ Case = 'below the minimum version'; Old = '$ScriptVersion = "2.9"'; New = '$ScriptVersion = "2.7"' }
@{ Case = 'without its role line'; Old = '$ScriptRole = "AutopilotMonitor-Installer"'; New = '# no role' }
@{ Case = 'with a second version line'; Old = '$ScriptVersion = "2.9"'; New = "`$ScriptVersion = `"2.9`"`n`$ScriptVersion = `"3.0`"" }
) {
$root = Join-Path $TestDrive ('repo' + [guid]::NewGuid().ToString('N').Substring(0, 6))
New-Item -ItemType Directory -Path (Join-Path $root 'scripts\Bootstrap') -Force | Out-Null
Copy-Item -LiteralPath $script:loaderPath -Destination (Join-Path $root 'scripts\Bootstrap')
$text = [System.IO.File]::ReadAllText($script:installerPath)
$text.Contains($Old) | Should -BeTrue
[System.IO.File]::WriteAllText((Join-Path $root 'scripts\Bootstrap\Install-AutopilotMonitor.ps1'), $text.Replace($Old, $New))
$refused = Invoke-Publish @('-DryRun', '-Channel', 'dev', '-RepoRoot', ('"' + $root + '"'))
$refused.ExitCode | Should -Not -Be 0
($refused.Output -join "`n") | Should -Match 'The loader would refuse Install-AutopilotMonitor-Dev\.ps1'
($refused.Output -join "`n") | Should -Not -Match '\[dry-run\]'
}
It 'the dev loader fetches the dev installer, which installs the dev agent' {
$s = New-Scenario
Copy-Item -LiteralPath (Join-Path $script:rendered 'Install-AutopilotMonitor-Dev.ps1') -Destination $s.Server
Copy-Item -LiteralPath $script:agentZip -Destination (Join-Path $s.Server 'AutopilotMonitor-Agent-dev.zip')
Set-Content -LiteralPath (Join-Path $s.Server 'version-dev.json') -Value ('{"version":"2.0.9999","sha256":"' + $script:agentZipSha256 + '"}')
Remove-Item -LiteralPath (Join-Path $s.Server 'Install-AutopilotMonitor.ps1'), (Join-Path $s.Server 'AutopilotMonitor-Agent.zip'), (Join-Path $s.Server 'version.json')
$devLoader = Join-Path $s.Ime 'Start-AutopilotMonitor-Dev.ps1'
Copy-Item -LiteralPath (Join-Path $script:rendered 'Start-AutopilotMonitor-Dev.ps1') -Destination $devLoader
$run = Invoke-Scenario $s -Script $devLoader
$run.ExitCode | Should -Be 0
$run.StdErr | Should -BeNullOrEmpty
@($run.Trace | Where-Object { $_ -like 'Invoke-*' }) | Should -Be @(
'Invoke-WebRequest|https://download.autopilotmonitor.com/agent/Install-AutopilotMonitor-Dev.ps1'
'Invoke-RestMethod|https://download.autopilotmonitor.com/agent/version-dev.json'
'Invoke-WebRequest|https://download.autopilotmonitor.com/agent/AutopilotMonitor-Agent-dev.zip'
('Invoke-AgentInstallMode|' + $s.Base + '\Agent\AutopilotMonitor.Agent.exe --install exists=True')
)
Get-Tree $s.ProgramData | Should -Be (Join-Tree ($script:installedTree + 'AutopilotMonitor\Logs\bootstrap-loader.log' + 'AutopilotMonitor\Logs\bootstrap-script.log'))
}
It 'the stable loader in its published form runs the stable installer in its published form' {
$s = New-Scenario
Copy-Item -LiteralPath (Join-Path $script:rendered 'Install-AutopilotMonitor.ps1') -Destination $s.Server -Force
$loader = Join-Path $s.Ime 'Start-AutopilotMonitor.ps1'
Copy-Item -LiteralPath (Join-Path $script:rendered 'Start-AutopilotMonitor.ps1') -Destination $loader
[System.IO.File]::ReadAllText($loader).Contains("`r`n") | Should -BeTrue
$run = Invoke-Scenario $s -Script $loader
$run.ExitCode | Should -Be 0
$run.StdErr | Should -BeNullOrEmpty
$run.StdOut | Should -Match 'Installer accepted: AutopilotMonitor-Installer v2\.9'
$run.StdOut | Should -Match 'Bootstrap Completed Successfully'
}
}
File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff
File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff
@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@
# The script under test is dot-sourced; its entry guard prevents the loader from
# executing, so loading it here is side-effect free. Network and signature checks
# are mocked -- what is verified is the DECISION: what does the loader accept, what
# does it refuse, and how often does it retry.
# does it refuse, how often does it retry, and what does it leave behind.
#
# Run under Windows PowerShell 5.1 to match the IME runtime:
# powershell.exe -NoProfile -Command "& { $c = New-PesterConfiguration; $c.Run.Path = 'scripts\Bootstrap'; $c.Output.Verbosity = 'Detailed'; Invoke-Pester -Configuration $c }"
@@ -20,6 +20,20 @@ BeforeAll {
} else { $null }
return [pscustomobject]@{ Status = $Status; SignerCertificate = $cert }
}
# Arguments as PowerShell hands them to a script, names marked as names; an array of
# plain strings would bind by position instead.
function ConvertTo-ScriptArguments { return , $args }
function Get-ScriptAst {
param([string]$Path)
$tokens = $null; $errors = $null
$ast = [System.Management.Automation.Language.Parser]::ParseFile($Path, [ref]$tokens, [ref]$errors)
return [pscustomobject]@{ Ast = $ast; Tokens = $tokens; Errors = $errors }
}
$script:loaderPath = Join-Path $PSScriptRoot 'Start-AutopilotMonitor.ps1'
$script:installerPath = Join-Path $PSScriptRoot 'Install-AutopilotMonitor.ps1'
}
Describe 'Test-BootstrapSignature' {
@@ -69,22 +83,110 @@ Describe 'Test-BootstrapSignature' {
}
}
Describe 'Get-InstallerIdentity' {
BeforeAll {
$script:roleLine = '$ScriptRole = "AutopilotMonitor-Installer"'
}
It 'reads the role and the version of LF text' {
$id = Get-InstallerIdentity -Text ("param()`n`$ScriptVersion = `"2.7`"`n" + $script:roleLine + "`n")
$id.Role | Should -BeExactly 'AutopilotMonitor-Installer'
$id.Version | Should -Be ([version]'2.7')
}
It 'reads CRLF text that ends in an Authenticode signature block' {
$text = (@('$ScriptVersion = "2.7"', $script:roleLine, '# SIG # Begin signature block', '# MIIFxwYJKoZIhvcNAQcCoIIFuDCCBbQCAQExCzAJBgUrDgMCGgUAMGkGCisGAQQB', '# SIG # End signature block') -join "`r`n") + "`r`n"
(Get-InstallerIdentity -Text $text).Version | Should -Be ([version]'2.7')
}
It 'compares versions as numbers, so 2.10 is above 2.7' {
$id = Get-InstallerIdentity -Text ("`$ScriptVersion = `"2.10`"`n" + $script:roleLine + "`n")
$id.Version -gt [version]'2.7' | Should -BeTrue
}
It 'returns nothing for <Case>' -TestCases @(
@{ Case = 'a missing role line'; Lines = @('$ScriptVersion = "2.7"') }
@{ Case = 'a missing version line'; Lines = @('$ScriptRole = "AutopilotMonitor-Installer"') }
@{ Case = 'a role line in a comment'; Lines = @('# $ScriptRole = "AutopilotMonitor-Installer"', '$ScriptVersion = "2.7"') }
@{ Case = 'an indented version line'; Lines = @('$ScriptRole = "AutopilotMonitor-Installer"', ' $ScriptVersion = "2.7"') }
@{ Case = 'a second version line'; Lines = @('$ScriptRole = "AutopilotMonitor-Installer"', '$ScriptVersion = "2.7"', '$ScriptVersion = "9.9"') }
@{ Case = 'a second role line'; Lines = @('$ScriptRole = "AutopilotMonitor-Installer"', '$ScriptRole = "Other"', '$ScriptVersion = "2.7"') }
@{ Case = 'a pre-release version'; Lines = @('$ScriptRole = "AutopilotMonitor-Installer"', '$ScriptVersion = "2.7-beta"') }
@{ Case = 'a version line with more code'; Lines = @('$ScriptRole = "AutopilotMonitor-Installer"', '$ScriptVersion = "2.7"; $x = 1') }
) {
Get-InstallerIdentity -Text (($Lines -join "`n") + "`n") | Should -BeNullOrEmpty
}
# The pair the loader and the installer in this repository must keep: the published
# installer has to pass the loader that ships with it.
It 'accepts the installer in this repository' {
$id = Get-InstallerIdentity -Text ([System.IO.File]::ReadAllText($script:installerPath))
$id.Role | Should -BeExactly $ExpectedInstallerRole
$id.Version -ge $MinimumInstallerVersion | Should -BeTrue
}
}
Describe 'Test-InstallerIdentity' {
BeforeEach {
Mock Write-Log { }
$script:candidate = Join-Path $TestDrive ("installer-" + [guid]::NewGuid().ToString('N') + '.ps1')
}
It 'accepts version <Version>' -TestCases @(@{ Version = '2.8' }, @{ Version = '2.10' }, @{ Version = '3.0.1' }) {
[System.IO.File]::WriteAllText($script:candidate, "`$ScriptVersion = `"$Version`"`n`$ScriptRole = `"AutopilotMonitor-Installer`"`n")
Test-InstallerIdentity -Path $script:candidate | Should -BeTrue
}
# Every installer the publisher ever signed keeps a valid signature; the minimum keeps the
# older ones from running.
It 'refuses an installer below the minimum version' {
[System.IO.File]::WriteAllText($script:candidate, "`$ScriptVersion = `"2.7`"`n`$ScriptRole = `"AutopilotMonitor-Installer`"`n")
Test-InstallerIdentity -Path $script:candidate | Should -BeFalse
Should -Invoke Write-Log -ParameterFilter { $Message -like '*below the minimum 2.8*' }
}
# The publisher signs other scripts too.
It 'refuses another role' {
[System.IO.File]::WriteAllText($script:candidate, "`$ScriptVersion = `"2.8`"`n`$ScriptRole = `"AutopilotMonitor-Uninstaller`"`n")
Test-InstallerIdentity -Path $script:candidate | Should -BeFalse
}
It 'refuses a script without the identity lines' {
[System.IO.File]::WriteAllText($script:candidate, "Write-Host 'signed, but not the installer'`n")
Test-InstallerIdentity -Path $script:candidate | Should -BeFalse
}
It 'refuses a file it cannot read' {
Test-InstallerIdentity -Path (Join-Path $TestDrive 'missing.ps1') | Should -BeFalse
}
}
Describe 'Get-VerifiedBootstrapScript' {
BeforeEach {
Mock Write-Log { }
Mock Start-Sleep { }
Mock Invoke-WebRequest { }
Mock Invoke-WebRequest { [System.IO.File]::WriteAllText($OutFile, 'downloaded') }
Mock Test-InstallerIdentity { $true }
# The test account owns the folder; the loader asks for SYSTEM or Administrators.
Mock Test-IsOwnedByUs { $true }
$script:run = Join-Path $TestDrive ('run-' + [guid]::NewGuid().ToString('N').Substring(0, 8))
New-Item -ItemType Directory -Path $script:run | Out-Null
$script:dest = Join-Path $script:run 'Install-AutopilotMonitor.ps1'
$RunState = [pscustomobject]@{ LogFile = $null; Installer = $null }
}
AfterEach {
if ($RunState.Installer) { $RunState.Installer.Dispose() }
}
It 'returns after the first attempt when the download verifies' {
Mock Test-BootstrapSignature { $true }
Get-VerifiedBootstrapScript -Url 'https://example.invalid/s.ps1' -Destination 'TestDrive:\s.ps1' | Should -BeTrue
Get-VerifiedBootstrapScript -Url 'https://example.invalid/s.ps1' -Destination $script:dest -RunFolder $script:run | Should -BeTrue
Should -Invoke Invoke-WebRequest -Times 1 -Exactly
}
It 'gives up after three attempts when verification keeps failing' {
Mock Test-BootstrapSignature { $false }
Get-VerifiedBootstrapScript -Url 'https://example.invalid/s.ps1' -Destination 'TestDrive:\s.ps1' | Should -BeFalse
Get-VerifiedBootstrapScript -Url 'https://example.invalid/s.ps1' -Destination $script:dest -RunFolder $script:run | Should -BeFalse
Should -Invoke Invoke-WebRequest -Times 3 -Exactly
}
@@ -93,27 +195,247 @@ Describe 'Get-VerifiedBootstrapScript' {
It 'retries a failed verification and accepts a later attempt' {
$script:calls = 0
Mock Test-BootstrapSignature { $script:calls++; return ($script:calls -ge 2) }
Get-VerifiedBootstrapScript -Url 'https://example.invalid/s.ps1' -Destination 'TestDrive:\s.ps1' | Should -BeTrue
Get-VerifiedBootstrapScript -Url 'https://example.invalid/s.ps1' -Destination $script:dest -RunFolder $script:run | Should -BeTrue
Should -Invoke Invoke-WebRequest -Times 2 -Exactly
}
It 'retries a transport failure' {
$script:downloads = 0
Mock Invoke-WebRequest { $script:downloads++; if ($script:downloads -eq 1) { throw 'connection reset' } }
Mock Invoke-WebRequest { $script:downloads++; if ($script:downloads -eq 1) { throw 'connection reset' }; [System.IO.File]::WriteAllText($OutFile, 'downloaded') }
Mock Test-BootstrapSignature { $true }
Get-VerifiedBootstrapScript -Url 'https://example.invalid/s.ps1' -Destination 'TestDrive:\s.ps1' | Should -BeTrue
Get-VerifiedBootstrapScript -Url 'https://example.invalid/s.ps1' -Destination $script:dest -RunFolder $script:run | Should -BeTrue
Should -Invoke Invoke-WebRequest -Times 2 -Exactly
}
It 'never executes anything when no attempt verifies' {
It 'refuses a validly signed script that is not the current installer' {
Mock Test-BootstrapSignature { $true }
Mock Test-InstallerIdentity { $false }
Get-VerifiedBootstrapScript -Url 'https://example.invalid/s.ps1' -Destination $script:dest -RunFolder $script:run | Should -BeFalse
Should -Invoke Invoke-WebRequest -Times 3 -Exactly
}
# The identity lines count only once the signature proves they are the publisher's.
It 'reads the identity only after the signature passed' {
Mock Test-BootstrapSignature { $false }
Get-VerifiedBootstrapScript -Url 'https://example.invalid/s.ps1' -Destination 'TestDrive:\s.ps1' | Should -BeFalse
Get-VerifiedBootstrapScript -Url 'https://example.invalid/s.ps1' -Destination $script:dest -RunFolder $script:run | Should -BeFalse
Should -Invoke Test-InstallerIdentity -Times 0 -Exactly
}
It 'stops without downloading when the run folder is no longer a folder of ours' {
Mock Test-IsOwnedByUs { $false }
Mock Test-BootstrapSignature { $true }
Get-VerifiedBootstrapScript -Url 'https://example.invalid/s.ps1' -Destination $script:dest -RunFolder $script:run | Should -BeFalse
Should -Invoke Invoke-WebRequest -Times 0 -Exactly
}
# The file that was checked is the file that runs: nobody can replace it in between.
It 'keeps the verified file open, so it cannot be replaced or deleted' {
Mock Test-BootstrapSignature { $true }
Get-VerifiedBootstrapScript -Url 'https://example.invalid/s.ps1' -Destination $script:dest -RunFolder $script:run | Should -BeTrue
$RunState.Installer | Should -Not -BeNullOrEmpty
{ [System.IO.File]::WriteAllText($script:dest, 'replaced') } | Should -Throw
{ [System.IO.File]::Delete($script:dest) } | Should -Throw
[System.IO.File]::ReadAllText($script:dest) | Should -Be 'downloaded'
}
It 'holds nothing when no attempt verifies' {
Mock Test-BootstrapSignature { $false }
Get-VerifiedBootstrapScript -Url 'https://example.invalid/s.ps1' -Destination $script:dest -RunFolder $script:run | Should -BeFalse
$RunState.Installer | Should -BeNullOrEmpty
{ [System.IO.File]::Delete($script:dest) } | Should -Not -Throw
}
}
Describe 'Get-DownloadSecurityProtocol' {
It 'keeps the system default, which includes TLS 1.3' {
Get-DownloadSecurityProtocol -Current ([Net.SecurityProtocolType]::SystemDefault) | Should -Be ([Net.SecurityProtocolType]::SystemDefault)
}
It 'adds TLS 1.2 to an explicit list' {
Get-DownloadSecurityProtocol -Current ([Net.SecurityProtocolType]'Ssl3, Tls') | Should -Be ([Net.SecurityProtocolType]'Ssl3, Tls, Tls12')
}
}
Describe 'Remove-LoaderRunFiles' {
BeforeEach {
Mock Write-Host { }
$run = Join-Path $TestDrive ("run-" + [guid]::NewGuid().ToString('N'))
New-Item -ItemType Directory -Path $run | Out-Null
$installer = Join-Path $run 'Install-AutopilotMonitor.ps1'
$log = Join-Path $run 'bootstrap-loader.log'
Set-Content -Path $installer -Value 'downloaded'
Set-Content -Path $log -Value 'log'
$RunState = [pscustomobject]@{ LogFile = $log; Installer = $null }
}
It 'removes the download, the log and the folder' {
Remove-LoaderRunFiles -RunFolder $run -InstallerPath $installer
Test-Path -LiteralPath $run | Should -BeFalse
$RunState.LogFile | Should -BeNullOrEmpty
}
It 'releases the held download before deleting it' {
$RunState.Installer = New-Object System.IO.FileStream($installer, [System.IO.FileMode]::Open, [System.IO.FileAccess]::Read, [System.IO.FileShare]::Read)
Remove-LoaderRunFiles -RunFolder $run -InstallerPath $installer
Test-Path -LiteralPath $run | Should -BeFalse
$RunState.Installer | Should -BeNullOrEmpty
}
It 'keeps the log and the folder with -KeepLog, but never the download' {
Remove-LoaderRunFiles -RunFolder $run -InstallerPath $installer -KeepLog
@(Get-ChildItem -LiteralPath $run -Force | ForEach-Object Name) | Should -Be @('bootstrap-loader.log')
}
It 'leaves a folder that holds anything else, without throwing' {
Set-Content -Path (Join-Path $run 'other.txt') -Value 'other'
{ Remove-LoaderRunFiles -RunFolder $run -InstallerPath $installer } | Should -Not -Throw
@(Get-ChildItem -LiteralPath $run -Force | ForEach-Object Name) | Should -Be @('other.txt')
Should -Invoke Write-Host -ParameterFilter { "$Object" -like 'INFO: run folder*' }
}
}
Describe 'Start-BootstrapLoader' {
BeforeEach {
$script:savedProgramData = $env:ProgramData
$env:ProgramData = Join-Path $TestDrive ("pd-" + [guid]::NewGuid().ToString('N'))
New-Item -ItemType Directory -Path $env:ProgramData | Out-Null
$script:runFolder = Join-Path $env:ProgramData 'AutopilotMonitor-Loader-0a1b2c3d'
$script:marker = Join-Path $TestDrive ("ran-" + [guid]::NewGuid().ToString('N') + '.txt')
$RunState = [pscustomobject]@{ LogFile = $null; Installer = $null }
$InstallerArguments = @()
Mock Write-Host { }
Mock Start-Sleep { }
Mock Test-IsElevated { $true }
# A standard user cannot make Administrators the owner, so the run folder is a plain
# one here; New-RunFolder itself is tested with the installer, which shares it.
Mock New-RunFolder { [System.IO.Directory]::CreateDirectory($script:runFolder) | Out-Null; return $script:runFolder }
}
AfterEach {
$env:ProgramData = $script:savedProgramData
}
It 'refuses to run without SYSTEM or administrator rights and creates nothing' {
Mock Test-IsElevated { $false }
$stderr = New-Object System.IO.StringWriter
$previous = [Console]::Error
[Console]::SetError($stderr)
try { Start-BootstrapLoader } finally { [Console]::SetError($previous) }
$stderr.ToString() | Should -Match 'not running as SYSTEM or administrator'
Should -Invoke New-RunFolder -Times 0 -Exactly
@(Get-ChildItem -LiteralPath $env:ProgramData -Force).Count | Should -Be 0
}
It 'runs nothing and keeps only its log when no download verifies' {
Mock Get-VerifiedBootstrapScript { [System.IO.File]::WriteAllText($Destination, "Set-Content -LiteralPath '$($script:marker)' -Value ran"); $false }
Start-BootstrapLoader
Test-Path -LiteralPath $script:marker | Should -BeFalse
@(Get-ChildItem -LiteralPath $script:runFolder -Force | ForEach-Object Name) | Should -Be @('bootstrap-loader.log')
Get-Content -LiteralPath (Join-Path $script:runFolder 'bootstrap-loader.log') -Raw | Should -Match 'Nothing was executed'
}
It 'runs the verified installer with the passed arguments by name and removes its folder after exit 0' {
$agentLog = Join-Path $env:ProgramData 'AutopilotMonitor\Logs\agent.log'
New-Item -ItemType Directory -Path (Split-Path $agentLog) -Force | Out-Null
Set-Content -Path $agentLog -Value 'agent'
Mock Get-VerifiedBootstrapScript {
[System.IO.File]::WriteAllText($Destination, "param([string]`$AgentDownloadUrl = 'default', [int]`$MaxBootstrapWindowHours = 12)`nSet-Content -LiteralPath '$($script:marker)' -Value `"`$AgentDownloadUrl `$MaxBootstrapWindowHours`"`nexit 0`n")
$true
}
$InstallerArguments = ConvertTo-ScriptArguments -MaxBootstrapWindowHours 24
Start-BootstrapLoader
Get-Content -LiteralPath $script:marker | Should -Be 'default 24'
Test-Path -LiteralPath $script:runFolder | Should -BeFalse
Get-Content -LiteralPath $agentLog | Should -Be 'agent'
}
It 'keeps its log but not the installer when the installer fails' {
Mock Get-VerifiedBootstrapScript { [System.IO.File]::WriteAllText($Destination, "exit 1`n"); $true }
Start-BootstrapLoader
@(Get-ChildItem -LiteralPath $script:runFolder -Force | ForEach-Object Name) | Should -Be @('bootstrap-loader.log')
Get-Content -LiteralPath (Join-Path $script:runFolder 'bootstrap-loader.log') -Raw | Should -Match 'Installer finished \(exit code 1\)'
}
It 'keeps its log when the installer throws' {
Mock Get-VerifiedBootstrapScript { [System.IO.File]::WriteAllText($Destination, "throw 'installer broke'`n"); $true }
Start-BootstrapLoader
Get-Content -LiteralPath (Join-Path $script:runFolder 'bootstrap-loader.log') -Raw | Should -Match 'Installer threw: installer broke'
}
# An installer that ends without an exit code must not inherit a 0 from earlier work.
It 'does not take an earlier exit code for the installer''s' {
Mock Get-VerifiedBootstrapScript { [System.IO.File]::WriteAllText($Destination, "Write-Output 'no exit code'`n"); $true }
$global:LASTEXITCODE = 0
Start-BootstrapLoader
Test-Path -LiteralPath (Join-Path $script:runFolder 'bootstrap-loader.log') | Should -BeTrue
}
It 'names its version first in its log, in the form the installer carries over' {
Mock Get-VerifiedBootstrapScript { $false }
Start-BootstrapLoader
$first = (Get-Content -LiteralPath (Join-Path $script:runFolder 'bootstrap-loader.log'))[0]
$first | Should -Match '^\[\d{4}-\d\d-\d\d \d\d:\d\d:\d\d\] === Autopilot Monitor bootstrap loader v\d+(\.\d+){0,3} started'
}
}
Describe 'loader contract' {
BeforeAll {
$script:loader = Get-ScriptAst $script:loaderPath
}
It 'parses without errors' {
$script:loader.Errors.Count | Should -Be 0
}
# Unbound arguments reach the installer only while the script is not an advanced one.
It 'stays a plain script, so unbound arguments are kept for the installer' {
$script:loader.Ast.ParamBlock.Attributes.Count | Should -Be 0
@($script:loader.Ast.ParamBlock.Parameters.Attributes | Where-Object { $_.TypeName.Name -eq 'Parameter' }) | Should -BeNullOrEmpty
}
# The six functions also run in the installer and, embedded, in the OOBE script.
It 'carries the shared functions word for word as the installer has them' {
$installer = Get-ScriptAst $script:installerPath
foreach ($name in @('Test-IsElevated', 'New-ProtectedDirectorySecurity', 'Test-IsReparsePoint', 'Test-IsOwnedByUs', 'New-RunFolderName', 'New-RunFolder')) {
$mine = $script:loader.Ast.Find({ param($a) $a -is [System.Management.Automation.Language.FunctionDefinitionAst] -and $a.Name -eq $name }, $true)
$theirs = $installer.Ast.Find({ param($a) $a -is [System.Management.Automation.Language.FunctionDefinitionAst] -and $a.Name -eq $name }, $true)
$mine | Should -Not -BeNullOrEmpty -Because $name
$mine.Extent.Text | Should -BeExactly $theirs.Extent.Text -Because $name
}
}
It 'calls no command beyond the few it needs' {
$own = @($script:loader.Ast.FindAll({ param($a) $a -is [System.Management.Automation.Language.FunctionDefinitionAst] }, $true) | ForEach-Object { $_.Name })
$allowed = $own + @('Add-Content', 'ForEach-Object', 'Get-AuthenticodeSignature', 'Get-Date', 'Get-Item', 'Invoke-WebRequest', 'Join-Path', 'New-Object', 'Out-Null', 'Start-Sleep', 'Test-Path', 'Write-Host')
$used = @($script:loader.Ast.FindAll({ param($a) $a -is [System.Management.Automation.Language.CommandAst] }, $true) | ForEach-Object { $_.GetCommandName() } | Where-Object { $_ } | Sort-Object -Unique)
@($used | Where-Object { $allowed -notcontains $_ }) | Should -BeNullOrEmpty
}
It 'deletes only the download, its log and its own empty folder' {
$deletes = @($script:loader.Ast.FindAll({ param($a) $a -is [System.Management.Automation.Language.InvokeMemberExpressionAst] -and $a.Member.Extent.Text -eq 'Delete' }, $true))
$deletes.Count | Should -Be 3
foreach ($delete in $deletes) {
if ($delete.Expression.Extent.Text -eq '[System.IO.Directory]') {
$delete.Arguments[1].Extent.Text | Should -Be '$false'
} else {
$delete.Expression.Extent.Text | Should -Be '[System.IO.File]'
}
}
}
It 'never names the agent folder' {
$strings = @($script:loader.Tokens | Where-Object { $_ -is [System.Management.Automation.Language.StringToken] } | ForEach-Object { $_.Value })
@($strings | Where-Object { $_ -match '(^|\\)AutopilotMonitor($|\\)' }) | Should -BeNullOrEmpty
}
}
Describe 'publish contract' {
BeforeAll {
$script:loaderText = Get-Content (Join-Path $PSScriptRoot 'Start-AutopilotMonitor.ps1') -Raw
$script:loaderText = Get-Content $script:loaderPath -Raw
}
# Publish-BootstrapScripts.ps1 renders the -Dev loader by substituting this exact
@@ -127,7 +449,7 @@ Describe 'publish contract' {
# The publisher parses this to write version.json.loaderVersion and to run the
# version-bump guard.
It 'declares a parsable ScriptVersion' {
$script:loaderText -match '\$ScriptVersion\s*=\s*"([\d\.\-a-zA-Z]+)"' | Should -BeTrue
$script:loaderText -match '(?m)^\$ScriptVersion = "\d+(\.\d+){1,3}"\r?$' | Should -BeTrue
}
It 'pins the expected publisher by subject, not by thumbprint' {
@@ -144,4 +466,16 @@ Describe 'publish contract' {
$wxs.Contains('[INSTALLFOLDER]Start-AutopilotMonitor.ps1') | Should -BeTrue
$wxs.Contains('-LogFileName bootstrap-msi.log') | Should -BeTrue
}
# Everything of ours lives under ProgramData, so the copy the MSI installs does too, where
# the installer removes it. A standard user could have created that folder first, so the
# action never runs the file as such: it checks the signature on the bytes it read and runs
# those bytes, from System32.
It 'is installed by the bootstrap MSI under ProgramData and run only after the check' {
$wxs = Get-Content (Join-Path $PSScriptRoot '..\..\src\Agent\AutopilotMonitor.BootstrapMsi\Package.wxs') -Raw
$wxs | Should -Match '<StandardDirectory Id="CommonAppDataFolder">'
$wxs | Should -Not -Match 'ProgramFiles'
$wxs.Contains('Get-AuthenticodeSignature -Content $b -SourcePathOrExtension ''.ps1''') | Should -BeTrue
$wxs.Contains('Directory="System64Folder"') | Should -BeTrue
}
}
+220 -111
View File
@@ -1,107 +1,174 @@
<#
.SYNOPSIS
Stage 1 of the Autopilot Monitor bootstrap: fetches the current installer and runs it.
Downloads the current Autopilot Monitor installer and runs it.
.DESCRIPTION
This is the file an administrator assigns in Intune, and the same file the bootstrap MSI
installs and runs -- one implementation for both delivery channels; the MSI is only the
packaging. It carries no enrollment logic at all: it downloads the published
Install-AutopilotMonitor.ps1, proves that it was signed by Autopilot Monitor, and runs it
in this process.
Assign this script in Intune once; the bootstrap MSI runs the same script. It downloads
Install-AutopilotMonitor.ps1 from download.autopilotmonitor.com and runs it only when the
file carries a valid signature from glueckkanja AG and is installer version 2.7 or later.
Because the installer is fetched on every run, this script does not need replacing when
the installer changes.
Why two stages: the installer holds every guard, relax rule and download path, and those
change. Whoever assigns the installer directly has to replace their Intune copy each
time; whoever assigns this loader never does, because the part that changes lives on the
server. Assigning the installer directly stays supported and unchanged.
The download and the log go into %ProgramData%\AutopilotMonitor-Loader-<random>, which only
SYSTEM and administrators can change. The loader keeps the downloaded file open from the
check to the end of the run, so what it checked is what runs. After a successful run the
folder is removed; after a failure it keeps the log for diagnosis, and a later installer
run removes it.
This file is deliberately boring. It is the one piece that cannot be fixed remotely, so
it does the least it can: download, verify, invoke, log.
The exit code is always 0, so the loader never fails enrollment. Without SYSTEM or
administrator rights it stops with an error and changes nothing.
Verification is by Authenticode publisher, not by hash. A hash oracle would have to be
fetched from the same host as the script itself, so it could not survive a compromise of
that host, while the expected publisher below travels with this file. It pins the
certificate SUBJECT and not a thumbprint, so a certificate renewal does not brick a
loader that is already deployed on devices.
Fail-soft: the loader always exits 0 and never throws into the caller. A device that
cannot reach the download endpoint is a device without monitoring, never a failed
enrollment step. Verification failures are the same: nothing runs, and the reason is in
the log. Refusing to execute unverified code as SYSTEM is the point of this file.
This file MUST remain pure ASCII (PS 5.1 reads BOM-less files as ANSI).
Any other arguments are passed to the installer, for example -MaxBootstrapWindowHours 24.
.PARAMETER BootstrapUrl
Installer URL. Defaults to the published stable installer; the -Dev variant of this
loader is rendered from that default at publish time.
Installer to download. Default: the published installer.
.PARAMETER LogFileName
Log file inside the agent log directory. The MSI channel passes bootstrap-msi.log so the
delivery channel stays visible in a diagnostics package; the diag tooling keys on these
names, so do not rename them.
.PARAMETER BootstrapArguments
Everything else is passed through to the installer unchanged, so any parameter the
installer accepts can be set here without this file knowing about it.
.EXAMPLE
.\Start-AutopilotMonitor.ps1
.EXAMPLE
.\Start-AutopilotMonitor.ps1 -MaxBootstrapWindowHours 24
Name of the log file. Default: bootstrap-loader.log.
.NOTES
Author : Oliver Kieselbach (autopilotmonitor.com)
Runtime : Windows PowerShell 5.1, SYSTEM context, during Autopilot enrollment
.CHANGELOG
2026-09-08 v1.2 Log the signer CN instead of the full EV subject; the full subject is
logged only when the publisher is why a script was rejected.
2026-09-08 v1.1 Also used by the bootstrap MSI, which replaced its own copy of this
logic; -LogFileName keeps the channel visible in diagnostics.
2026-09-08 v1.0 Initial version: two-stage bootstrap, publisher-pinned verification.
Requires Windows PowerShell 5.1.
Changes: https://docs.autopilotmonitor.com/changelog/platform-changelog
#>
[CmdletBinding()]
param(
[Parameter(Mandatory = $false)]
[string]$BootstrapUrl = "https://download.autopilotmonitor.com/agent/Install-AutopilotMonitor.ps1",
[Parameter(Mandatory = $false)]
[ValidatePattern('^[A-Za-z0-9._-]+$')]
[string]$LogFileName = "bootstrap-loader.log",
[Parameter(Mandatory = $false, ValueFromRemainingArguments = $true)]
[string[]]$BootstrapArguments
[string]$LogFileName = "bootstrap-loader.log"
)
# Script version (bump on meaningful changes; see .CHANGELOG above)
$ScriptVersion = "1.2"
# Unbound arguments reach the installer by name. [CmdletBinding()] or a [Parameter()]
# attribute would reject them instead.
$InstallerArguments = $args
# The publisher every downloaded stage-2 script must carry. A -like pattern on the subject,
# NOT a thumbprint: certificates are renewed, deployed loaders are not.
$ScriptVersion = "1.4"
# A subject pattern, not a thumbprint, so a certificate renewal keeps deployed loaders working.
$ExpectedPublisher = "*O=glueckkanja AG*"
$LoaderBasePath = "$env:ProgramData\AutopilotMonitor"
$LoaderLogPath = "$LoaderBasePath\Logs"
$LogFile = "$LoaderLogPath\$LogFileName"
$BootstrapPath = "$LoaderBasePath\Install-AutopilotMonitor.ps1"
$ExpectedInstallerRole = "AutopilotMonitor-Installer"
$MinimumInstallerVersion = [version]"2.8"
$RunFolderPrefix = "AutopilotMonitor-Loader-"
$DownloadAttempts = 3
$RetryDelaySeconds = 10
# Write-Host as well as the file: the Intune script output is what an administrator sees in
# the portal, the file is what a support case reads.
# The log file, and the handle that keeps the verified installer unchanged until the run ends.
$RunState = [pscustomobject]@{ LogFile = $null; Installer = $null }
function Write-Log {
param([string]$Message)
$timestamp = Get-Date -Format "yyyy-MM-dd HH:mm:ss"
$logMessage = "[$timestamp] $Message"
Write-Host $logMessage
Add-Content -Path $LogFile -Value $logMessage -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
if ($RunState.LogFile) {
Add-Content -Path $RunState.LogFile -Value $logMessage -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
}
}
# True only when the file is signed, the signature validates against the machine's trust
# chain, and the signer is us. Any error is a false -- an unreadable signature is an
# unverified script.
### Shared with Install-AutopilotMonitor.ps1, word for word.
function Test-IsElevated {
$identity = [System.Security.Principal.WindowsIdentity]::GetCurrent()
return (New-Object System.Security.Principal.WindowsPrincipal($identity)).IsInRole([System.Security.Principal.WindowsBuiltInRole]::Administrator)
}
function New-ProtectedDirectorySecurity {
$security = New-Object System.Security.AccessControl.DirectorySecurity
$security.SetAccessRuleProtection($true, $false)
$inherit = [System.Security.AccessControl.InheritanceFlags]'ContainerInherit, ObjectInherit'
$propagation = [System.Security.AccessControl.PropagationFlags]::None
$system = New-Object System.Security.Principal.SecurityIdentifier([System.Security.Principal.WellKnownSidType]::LocalSystemSid, $null)
$admins = New-Object System.Security.Principal.SecurityIdentifier([System.Security.Principal.WellKnownSidType]::BuiltinAdministratorsSid, $null)
$users = New-Object System.Security.Principal.SecurityIdentifier([System.Security.Principal.WellKnownSidType]::BuiltinUsersSid, $null)
$security.AddAccessRule((New-Object System.Security.AccessControl.FileSystemAccessRule($system, 'FullControl', $inherit, $propagation, 'Allow')))
$security.AddAccessRule((New-Object System.Security.AccessControl.FileSystemAccessRule($admins, 'FullControl', $inherit, $propagation, 'Allow')))
$security.AddAccessRule((New-Object System.Security.AccessControl.FileSystemAccessRule($users, 'ReadAndExecute', $inherit, $propagation, 'Allow')))
$security.SetOwner($admins)
return $security
}
function Test-IsReparsePoint {
param([string]$Path)
return (([System.IO.File]::GetAttributes($Path) -band [System.IO.FileAttributes]::ReparsePoint) -ne 0)
}
function Test-IsOwnedByUs {
param([string]$Path)
try {
$owner = (Get-Item -LiteralPath $Path -Force -ErrorAction Stop).GetAccessControl([System.Security.AccessControl.AccessControlSections]::Owner).GetOwner([System.Security.Principal.SecurityIdentifier])
return ($owner.IsWellKnown([System.Security.Principal.WellKnownSidType]::LocalSystemSid) -or
$owner.IsWellKnown([System.Security.Principal.WellKnownSidType]::BuiltinAdministratorsSid))
} catch {
return $false
}
}
function New-RunFolderName {
$bytes = New-Object byte[] 4
$generator = [System.Security.Cryptography.RandomNumberGenerator]::Create()
try { $generator.GetBytes($bytes) } finally { $generator.Dispose() }
return -join ($bytes | ForEach-Object { $_.ToString('x2') })
}
function New-RunFolder {
param([string]$Parent, [string]$Prefix)
for ($attempt = 1; $attempt -le 3; $attempt++) {
$path = Join-Path $Parent ($Prefix + (New-RunFolderName))
if (Test-Path -LiteralPath $path) { continue }
[System.IO.Directory]::CreateDirectory($path, (New-ProtectedDirectorySecurity)) | Out-Null
if (-not (Test-IsReparsePoint $path) -and (Test-IsOwnedByUs $path)) { return $path }
}
throw "Could not create a run folder under $Parent."
}
### End of the shared functions.
# Keeps the system default (0, which includes TLS 1.3); otherwise adds TLS 1.2.
function Get-DownloadSecurityProtocol {
param([Net.SecurityProtocolType]$Current)
if ([int]$Current -eq 0) { return $Current }
return ($Current -bor [Net.SecurityProtocolType]::Tls12)
}
# Exactly one role line and one version line, each at the start of a line; $null otherwise.
function Get-InstallerIdentity {
param([string]$Text)
$roles = [regex]::Matches($Text, '(?m)^\$ScriptRole[ \t]*=[ \t]*"([A-Za-z0-9.-]+)"[ \t]*\r?$')
$versions = [regex]::Matches($Text, '(?m)^\$ScriptVersion[ \t]*=[ \t]*"(\d+(?:\.\d+){1,3})"[ \t]*\r?$')
if ($roles.Count -ne 1 -or $versions.Count -ne 1) { return $null }
return [pscustomobject]@{ Role = $roles[0].Groups[1].Value; Version = [version]$versions[0].Groups[1].Value }
}
# Runs after the signature check, so the lines it reads are signed.
function Test-InstallerIdentity {
param([string]$Path)
try {
$identity = Get-InstallerIdentity -Text ([System.IO.File]::ReadAllText($Path))
}
catch {
Write-Log "Identity check failed to run: $($_.Exception.Message)"
return $false
}
if ($null -eq $identity) {
Write-Log "REJECTED: the script does not declare exactly one role line and one version line."
return $false
}
if ($identity.Role -ne $ExpectedInstallerRole) {
Write-Log "REJECTED: role '$($identity.Role)' is not '$ExpectedInstallerRole'."
return $false
}
if ($identity.Version -lt $MinimumInstallerVersion) {
Write-Log "REJECTED: installer version $($identity.Version) is below the minimum $MinimumInstallerVersion."
return $false
}
Write-Log "Installer accepted: $($identity.Role) v$($identity.Version)."
return $true
}
# A valid signature from the expected publisher; any error counts as unverified.
function Test-BootstrapSignature {
param([string]$Path)
@@ -118,9 +185,7 @@ function Test-BootstrapSignature {
return $false
}
# The full subject of an EV certificate is a line of street address and registration
# numbers. The CN answers the only question the log has to answer; the full subject is
# logged when it is the reason for a rejection.
# The CN is enough for the log; the full subject is logged when it causes a rejection.
$subject = if ($sig.SignerCertificate) { $sig.SignerCertificate.Subject } else { "<unsigned>" }
$signer = if ($subject -match 'CN=([^,]+)') { $Matches[1] } else { $subject }
Write-Log "Signature status: $($sig.Status). Signer: $signer"
@@ -138,20 +203,28 @@ function Test-BootstrapSignature {
return $true
}
# Downloads the installer and returns $true once a downloaded copy passes verification.
# Verification lives inside the retry loop on purpose: a truncated or proxy-mangled body
# fails the signature check, and that is worth another attempt.
# A download that fails verification, such as a truncated one, is retried too. The run folder
# is checked before every attempt: one that is no longer a real folder of ours stops the run.
# The downloaded file is opened for reading before it is checked and stays open until the run
# ends, so no one can change or replace what was checked.
function Get-VerifiedBootstrapScript {
param([string]$Url, [string]$Destination)
param([string]$Url, [string]$Destination, [string]$RunFolder)
for ($attempt = 1; $attempt -le $DownloadAttempts; $attempt++) {
if ((Test-IsReparsePoint $RunFolder) -or -not (Test-IsOwnedByUs $RunFolder)) {
Write-Log "REJECTED: the run folder $RunFolder is no longer a folder of ours. Nothing was downloaded."
return $false
}
try {
Write-Log "Download attempt $attempt/$DownloadAttempts from $Url"
Invoke-WebRequest -Uri $Url -OutFile $Destination -UseBasicParsing -TimeoutSec 60 -ErrorAction Stop
if (Test-BootstrapSignature -Path $Destination) {
$held = New-Object System.IO.FileStream($Destination, [System.IO.FileMode]::Open, [System.IO.FileAccess]::Read, [System.IO.FileShare]::Read)
if ((Test-BootstrapSignature -Path $Destination) -and (Test-InstallerIdentity -Path $Destination)) {
$RunState.Installer = $held
return $true
}
$held.Dispose()
}
catch {
Write-Log "Download attempt $attempt failed: $($_.Exception.Message)"
@@ -165,51 +238,87 @@ function Get-VerifiedBootstrapScript {
return $false
}
# Main flow. Only invoked when the script is run directly (see entry guard at the bottom),
# so the Pester suite can dot-source this file without bootstrapping anything.
function Start-BootstrapLoader {
New-Item -ItemType Directory -Force -Path $LoaderLogPath -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue | Out-Null
Write-Log "=== Autopilot Monitor bootstrap loader v$ScriptVersion started (user=$env:USERNAME, pid=$PID) ==="
# PS 5.1 on an OOBE device still defaults to TLS 1.0 for this process.
# The download always goes. After an installer exit 0 the log and the folder go too;
# otherwise they stay for diagnosis.
function Remove-LoaderRunFiles {
param([string]$RunFolder, [string]$InstallerPath, [switch]$KeepLog)
if ($RunState.Installer) {
$RunState.Installer.Dispose()
$RunState.Installer = $null
}
try {
[Net.ServicePointManager]::SecurityProtocol = [Net.ServicePointManager]::SecurityProtocol -bor [Net.SecurityProtocolType]::Tls12
if ([System.IO.File]::Exists($InstallerPath)) { [System.IO.File]::Delete($InstallerPath) }
if ($KeepLog) { return }
$logFile = $RunState.LogFile
$RunState.LogFile = $null
if ($logFile -and [System.IO.File]::Exists($logFile)) { [System.IO.File]::Delete($logFile) }
[System.IO.Directory]::Delete($RunFolder, $false)
}
catch {
Write-Log "INFO: could not raise the TLS protocol: $($_.Exception.Message)"
}
if (-not (Get-VerifiedBootstrapScript -Url $BootstrapUrl -Destination $BootstrapPath)) {
Write-Log "No verified installer available after $DownloadAttempts attempt(s). Nothing was executed."
return
}
Write-Log "Executing $BootstrapPath"
# Same process, so the execution policy this loader runs under applies to stage 2 as
# well and no second policy decision can strand the installer. Splatting an array of
# remaining arguments keeps this file free of any knowledge about the installer's
# parameters.
$arguments = @()
if ($BootstrapArguments) { $arguments = $BootstrapArguments }
try {
& $BootstrapPath @arguments
Write-Log "Installer finished (exit code $LASTEXITCODE)."
}
catch {
Write-Log "Installer threw: $($_.Exception.Message)"
Write-Host "INFO: run folder $RunFolder was not fully removed: $($_.Exception.Message)"
}
}
# Entry guard: dot-sourcing (Pester) loads the functions without running the loader.
function Start-BootstrapLoader {
if (-not (Test-IsElevated)) {
$message = "AutopilotMonitor loader: not running as SYSTEM or administrator; nothing was downloaded or changed."
Write-Host $message
[Console]::Error.WriteLine($message)
return
}
try {
[Net.ServicePointManager]::SecurityProtocol = Get-DownloadSecurityProtocol -Current ([Net.ServicePointManager]::SecurityProtocol)
}
catch {
Write-Host "INFO: could not adjust the TLS protocols: $($_.Exception.Message)"
}
try {
$runFolder = New-RunFolder -Parent $env:ProgramData -Prefix $RunFolderPrefix
}
catch {
Write-Host "AutopilotMonitor loader: no run folder ($($_.Exception.Message)). Nothing was downloaded or executed."
return
}
$RunState.LogFile = Join-Path $runFolder $LogFileName
Write-Log "=== Autopilot Monitor bootstrap loader v$ScriptVersion started (user=$env:USERNAME, pid=$PID) ==="
Write-Log ("PowerShell {0}, {1}, language mode {2}, run folder {3}" -f $PSVersionTable.PSVersion, $(if ([Environment]::Is64BitProcess) { '64-bit' } else { '32-bit' }), $ExecutionContext.SessionState.LanguageMode, $runFolder)
$installerPath = Join-Path $runFolder 'Install-AutopilotMonitor.ps1'
$succeeded = $false
try {
if (-not (Get-VerifiedBootstrapScript -Url $BootstrapUrl -Destination $installerPath -RunFolder $runFolder)) {
Write-Log "No verified installer available after $DownloadAttempts attempt(s). Nothing was executed."
return
}
Write-Log "Executing $installerPath"
# Same process, so the execution policy that admitted this script covers the installer.
# The exit code is reset so that an installer that throws cannot report an older one.
$global:LASTEXITCODE = $null
try {
& $installerPath @InstallerArguments
Write-Log "Installer finished (exit code $LASTEXITCODE)."
$succeeded = ($LASTEXITCODE -eq 0)
}
catch {
Write-Log "Installer threw: $($_.Exception.Message)"
}
}
finally {
Remove-LoaderRunFiles -RunFolder $runFolder -InstallerPath $installerPath -KeepLog:(-not $succeeded)
}
}
# Dot-sourcing (tests) loads the functions without running the loader.
if ($MyInvocation.InvocationName -ne '.') {
try {
Start-BootstrapLoader
}
catch {
# Nothing above should throw; if it does, it must not become a failed Intune script.
Write-Log "Loader failed: $($_.Exception.Message)"
}
exit 0
+44 -11
View File
@@ -1,9 +1,9 @@
# Autopilot Monitor Bootstrap Guard Test
# Dry-run only: does not exit, does not install, only reports what WOULD happen.
# Mirrors Install-AutopilotMonitor.ps1 (v2.3) incl. the relax exemption for
# Mirrors Install-AutopilotMonitor.ps1 (v2.7) incl. the relax exemption for
# guards 2+3, triggered by "Windows Backup for Organizations" (OOBE InProgress)
# or a positively identified Windows 365 Cloud PC, and the guard 4 (uptime)
# exemption while the Cloud PC relax is active.
# or a positively identified Windows 365 Cloud PC, the guard 4 (uptime)
# exemption while the Cloud PC relax is active, and the agent check.
param(
[string]$AgentBinPath = 'C:\ProgramData\AutopilotMonitor\Agent',
@@ -29,20 +29,47 @@ function Write-Step {
Write-Host "$prefix $Message"
}
# HKLM through the 64-bit view, as the installer reads it: a 32-bit host would read WOW6432Node.
function Get-RegistryValueSafe {
param(
[string]$Path,
[string]$SubKey,
[string]$Name
)
try {
return (Get-ItemProperty -Path $Path -Name $Name -ErrorAction Stop).$Name
$hive = [Microsoft.Win32.RegistryKey]::OpenBaseKey([Microsoft.Win32.RegistryHive]::LocalMachine, [Microsoft.Win32.RegistryView]::Registry64)
try {
$key = $hive.OpenSubKey($SubKey)
if ($null -eq $key) { return $null }
try { return $key.GetValue($Name) } finally { $key.Close() }
} finally {
$hive.Close()
}
}
catch {
return $null
}
}
function Test-RegistryKeySafe {
param([string]$SubKey)
try {
$hive = [Microsoft.Win32.RegistryKey]::OpenBaseKey([Microsoft.Win32.RegistryHive]::LocalMachine, [Microsoft.Win32.RegistryView]::Registry64)
try {
$key = $hive.OpenSubKey($SubKey)
if ($null -eq $key) { return $false }
$key.Close()
return $true
} finally {
$hive.Close()
}
}
catch {
return $false
}
}
# Positive OOBE check via WinRT Windows.System.Profile.SystemSetupInfo.OutOfBoxExperienceState.
# Requires Windows 10, version 1809 (10.0.17763.0). Older builds / errors -> $false (SKIP-safe).
# Docs: https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/uwp/api/windows.system.profile.systemsetupinfo
@@ -58,7 +85,7 @@ function Test-OobeInProgress {
# Positive Windows 365 Cloud PC detection: two local markers, BOTH required (AND),
# because each alone has look-alikes. Mirrors Test-IsCloudPc in the bootstrapper.
$cloudPcRegMarker = Test-Path 'HKLM:\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows365'
$cloudPcRegMarker = Test-RegistryKeySafe -SubKey 'SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows365'
$cloudPcSvcMarker = $null -ne (Get-Service -Name 'CloudManagedDesktopExtension' -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue)
$isCloudPc = ($cloudPcRegMarker -and $cloudPcSvcMarker)
@@ -73,7 +100,7 @@ Write-Host '=== Autopilot Monitor Bootstrap Guard Test (Dry Run) ==='
Write-Host ''
# Guard 1: Agent was already deployed on this device (survives self-destruct)
$deployed = Get-RegistryValueSafe -Path 'HKLM:\SOFTWARE\AutopilotMonitor' -Name 'Deployed'
$deployed = Get-RegistryValueSafe -SubKey 'SOFTWARE\AutopilotMonitor' -Name 'Deployed'
if ($deployed) {
Write-Step -Status 'SKIP' -Message "Guard 1: Agent was previously deployed at '$deployed'."
$wouldInstall = $false
@@ -146,7 +173,7 @@ if ($profilePaths.Count -gt 0 -and -not $oobeRelax) {
}
# Guard 3: LastLoggedOnUser (unless OOBE-relax holds)
$lastLoggedOnUser = (Get-ItemProperty -Path 'HKLM:\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Authentication\LogonUI' -Name 'LastLoggedOnUser' -EA SilentlyContinue).LastLoggedOnUser
$lastLoggedOnUser = Get-RegistryValueSafe -SubKey 'SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Authentication\LogonUI' -Name 'LastLoggedOnUser'
if ($lastLoggedOnUser -and $lastLoggedOnUser -notmatch 'defaultuser\d*' -and -not $oobeRelax) {
Write-Step -Status 'SKIP' -Message "Guard 3: LastLoggedOnUser found ($lastLoggedOnUser). Device appears productive."
$wouldInstall = $false
@@ -183,13 +210,19 @@ catch {
Write-Step -Status 'WARN' -Message 'Guard 4: Could not determine LastBootUpTime / uptime.'
}
# Guard 5: Agent binary already present
# Agent check: an installed agent (its executable or its task; the marker is guard 1) is
# left as it is.
$agentTask = Get-ScheduledTask -TaskName 'AutopilotMonitor-Agent' -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
if (Test-Path $AgentExePath) {
Write-Step -Status 'SKIP' -Message "Guard 5: Agent already installed at '$AgentExePath'."
Write-Step -Status 'SKIP' -Message "Agent check: Agent already installed at '$AgentExePath'."
$wouldInstall = $false
$reasons.Add("Agent binary already present: $AgentExePath")
} elseif ($agentTask) {
Write-Step -Status 'SKIP' -Message "Agent check: Agent task 'AutopilotMonitor-Agent' exists."
$wouldInstall = $false
$reasons.Add("Agent task present: AutopilotMonitor-Agent")
} else {
Write-Step -Status 'PASS' -Message "Guard 5: Agent binary not present at '$AgentExePath'."
Write-Step -Status 'PASS' -Message "Agent check: No agent binary at '$AgentExePath' and no agent task."
}
Write-Host ''
@@ -0,0 +1,55 @@
# Invoke-BootstrapDownload.ps1 - thin runner embedded in the Bootstrap MSI.
#
# The MSI is only a delivery vehicle (MDM LOB channel installs earlier than the IME
# script/app batches during Autopilot Device Preparation). This runner downloads the
# CURRENT Install-AutopilotMonitor.ps1 from the download endpoint and executes it, so
# every piece of real bootstrap logic (guards, relax rules, agent download) stays
# server-updatable without re-shipping the MSI.
#
# Fail-soft by design: the runner always exits 0 so a transient network failure never
# marks the LOB install as failed; diagnostics go to bootstrap-msi.log.
# ASCII only - no special characters in this file.
$ErrorActionPreference = 'Stop'
$baseDir = Join-Path $env:ProgramData 'AutopilotMonitor'
$logDir = Join-Path $baseDir 'Logs'
New-Item -ItemType Directory -Force -Path $logDir | Out-Null
$log = Join-Path $logDir 'bootstrap-msi.log'
function Write-Log([string]$message) {
Add-Content -Path $log -Value ("[{0}] {1}" -f (Get-Date -Format 'yyyy-MM-dd HH:mm:ss'), $message)
}
try {
Write-Log "MSI bootstrap runner started (user=$env:USERNAME, pid=$PID)."
if (Test-Path 'HKLM:\SOFTWARE\AutopilotMonitor\Deployed') {
Write-Log 'Deployed marker present - skipping, another channel already installed the agent.'
exit 0
}
[Net.ServicePointManager]::SecurityProtocol = [Net.SecurityProtocolType]::Tls12
$url = 'https://download.autopilotmonitor.com/agent/Install-AutopilotMonitor.ps1'
$dest = Join-Path $baseDir 'Install-AutopilotMonitor.ps1'
for ($attempt = 1; $attempt -le 3; $attempt++) {
try {
Invoke-WebRequest -UseBasicParsing -Uri $url -OutFile $dest
break
} catch {
Write-Log "Download attempt $attempt failed: $_"
if ($attempt -eq 3) { throw }
Start-Sleep -Seconds 10
}
}
Write-Log "Bootstrap script downloaded to $dest - executing."
# PS 5.1 file redirection (*>>) writes UTF-16LE, which garbles a log otherwise
# written via Add-Content (ANSI). Route through Add-Content for one encoding.
& $dest *>&1 | ForEach-Object { $_.ToString() } | Add-Content -Path $log
Write-Log "Bootstrap script finished (exit code $LASTEXITCODE)."
exit 0
} catch {
Write-Log ("MSI bootstrap runner failed: " + ($_ | Out-String))
exit 0
}
@@ -0,0 +1,216 @@
<#
.SYNOPSIS
Stage 1 of the Autopilot Monitor bootstrap: fetches the current installer and runs it.
.DESCRIPTION
This is the file an administrator assigns in Intune, and the same file the bootstrap MSI
installs and runs -- one implementation for both delivery channels; the MSI is only the
packaging. It carries no enrollment logic at all: it downloads the published
Install-AutopilotMonitor.ps1, proves that it was signed by Autopilot Monitor, and runs it
in this process.
Why two stages: the installer holds every guard, relax rule and download path, and those
change. Whoever assigns the installer directly has to replace their Intune copy each
time; whoever assigns this loader never does, because the part that changes lives on the
server. Assigning the installer directly stays supported and unchanged.
This file is deliberately boring. It is the one piece that cannot be fixed remotely, so
it does the least it can: download, verify, invoke, log.
Verification is by Authenticode publisher, not by hash. A hash oracle would have to be
fetched from the same host as the script itself, so it could not survive a compromise of
that host, while the expected publisher below travels with this file. It pins the
certificate SUBJECT and not a thumbprint, so a certificate renewal does not brick a
loader that is already deployed on devices.
Fail-soft: the loader always exits 0 and never throws into the caller. A device that
cannot reach the download endpoint is a device without monitoring, never a failed
enrollment step. Verification failures are the same: nothing runs, and the reason is in
the log. Refusing to execute unverified code as SYSTEM is the point of this file.
This file MUST remain pure ASCII (PS 5.1 reads BOM-less files as ANSI).
.PARAMETER BootstrapUrl
Installer URL. Defaults to the published stable installer; the -Dev variant of this
loader is rendered from that default at publish time.
.PARAMETER LogFileName
Log file inside the agent log directory. The MSI channel passes bootstrap-msi.log so the
delivery channel stays visible in a diagnostics package; the diag tooling keys on these
names, so do not rename them.
.PARAMETER BootstrapArguments
Everything else is passed through to the installer unchanged, so any parameter the
installer accepts can be set here without this file knowing about it.
.EXAMPLE
.\Start-AutopilotMonitor.ps1
.EXAMPLE
.\Start-AutopilotMonitor.ps1 -MaxBootstrapWindowHours 24
.NOTES
Author : Oliver Kieselbach (autopilotmonitor.com)
Runtime : Windows PowerShell 5.1, SYSTEM context, during Autopilot enrollment
.CHANGELOG
2026-09-08 v1.2 Log the signer CN instead of the full EV subject; the full subject is
logged only when the publisher is why a script was rejected.
2026-09-08 v1.1 Also used by the bootstrap MSI, which replaced its own copy of this
logic; -LogFileName keeps the channel visible in diagnostics.
2026-09-08 v1.0 Initial version: two-stage bootstrap, publisher-pinned verification.
#>
[CmdletBinding()]
param(
[Parameter(Mandatory = $false)]
[string]$BootstrapUrl = "https://download.autopilotmonitor.com/agent/Install-AutopilotMonitor.ps1",
[Parameter(Mandatory = $false)]
[ValidatePattern('^[A-Za-z0-9._-]+$')]
[string]$LogFileName = "bootstrap-loader.log",
[Parameter(Mandatory = $false, ValueFromRemainingArguments = $true)]
[string[]]$BootstrapArguments
)
# Script version (bump on meaningful changes; see .CHANGELOG above)
$ScriptVersion = "1.2"
# The publisher every downloaded stage-2 script must carry. A -like pattern on the subject,
# NOT a thumbprint: certificates are renewed, deployed loaders are not.
$ExpectedPublisher = "*O=glueckkanja AG*"
$LoaderBasePath = "$env:ProgramData\AutopilotMonitor"
$LoaderLogPath = "$LoaderBasePath\Logs"
$LogFile = "$LoaderLogPath\$LogFileName"
$BootstrapPath = "$LoaderBasePath\Install-AutopilotMonitor.ps1"
$DownloadAttempts = 3
$RetryDelaySeconds = 10
# Write-Host as well as the file: the Intune script output is what an administrator sees in
# the portal, the file is what a support case reads.
function Write-Log {
param([string]$Message)
$timestamp = Get-Date -Format "yyyy-MM-dd HH:mm:ss"
$logMessage = "[$timestamp] $Message"
Write-Host $logMessage
Add-Content -Path $LogFile -Value $logMessage -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
}
# True only when the file is signed, the signature validates against the machine's trust
# chain, and the signer is us. Any error is a false -- an unreadable signature is an
# unverified script.
function Test-BootstrapSignature {
param([string]$Path)
try {
$sig = Get-AuthenticodeSignature -FilePath $Path -ErrorAction Stop
}
catch {
Write-Log "Signature check failed to run: $($_.Exception.Message)"
return $false
}
if ($null -eq $sig) {
Write-Log "Signature check returned nothing."
return $false
}
# The full subject of an EV certificate is a line of street address and registration
# numbers. The CN answers the only question the log has to answer; the full subject is
# logged when it is the reason for a rejection.
$subject = if ($sig.SignerCertificate) { $sig.SignerCertificate.Subject } else { "<unsigned>" }
$signer = if ($subject -match 'CN=([^,]+)') { $Matches[1] } else { $subject }
Write-Log "Signature status: $($sig.Status). Signer: $signer"
if ($sig.Status -ne 'Valid') {
Write-Log "REJECTED: expected signature status 'Valid'."
return $false
}
if ($subject -notlike $ExpectedPublisher) {
Write-Log "REJECTED: signer does not match the expected publisher. Full subject: $subject"
return $false
}
Write-Log "Signature accepted (thumbprint $($sig.SignerCertificate.Thumbprint))."
return $true
}
# Downloads the installer and returns $true once a downloaded copy passes verification.
# Verification lives inside the retry loop on purpose: a truncated or proxy-mangled body
# fails the signature check, and that is worth another attempt.
function Get-VerifiedBootstrapScript {
param([string]$Url, [string]$Destination)
for ($attempt = 1; $attempt -le $DownloadAttempts; $attempt++) {
try {
Write-Log "Download attempt $attempt/$DownloadAttempts from $Url"
Invoke-WebRequest -Uri $Url -OutFile $Destination -UseBasicParsing -TimeoutSec 60 -ErrorAction Stop
if (Test-BootstrapSignature -Path $Destination) {
return $true
}
}
catch {
Write-Log "Download attempt $attempt failed: $($_.Exception.Message)"
}
if ($attempt -lt $DownloadAttempts) {
Start-Sleep -Seconds $RetryDelaySeconds
}
}
return $false
}
# Main flow. Only invoked when the script is run directly (see entry guard at the bottom),
# so the Pester suite can dot-source this file without bootstrapping anything.
function Start-BootstrapLoader {
New-Item -ItemType Directory -Force -Path $LoaderLogPath -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue | Out-Null
Write-Log "=== Autopilot Monitor bootstrap loader v$ScriptVersion started (user=$env:USERNAME, pid=$PID) ==="
# PS 5.1 on an OOBE device still defaults to TLS 1.0 for this process.
try {
[Net.ServicePointManager]::SecurityProtocol = [Net.ServicePointManager]::SecurityProtocol -bor [Net.SecurityProtocolType]::Tls12
}
catch {
Write-Log "INFO: could not raise the TLS protocol: $($_.Exception.Message)"
}
if (-not (Get-VerifiedBootstrapScript -Url $BootstrapUrl -Destination $BootstrapPath)) {
Write-Log "No verified installer available after $DownloadAttempts attempt(s). Nothing was executed."
return
}
Write-Log "Executing $BootstrapPath"
# Same process, so the execution policy this loader runs under applies to stage 2 as
# well and no second policy decision can strand the installer. Splatting an array of
# remaining arguments keeps this file free of any knowledge about the installer's
# parameters.
$arguments = @()
if ($BootstrapArguments) { $arguments = $BootstrapArguments }
try {
& $BootstrapPath @arguments
Write-Log "Installer finished (exit code $LASTEXITCODE)."
}
catch {
Write-Log "Installer threw: $($_.Exception.Message)"
}
}
# Entry guard: dot-sourcing (Pester) loads the functions without running the loader.
if ($MyInvocation.InvocationName -ne '.') {
try {
Start-BootstrapLoader
}
catch {
# Nothing above should throw; if it does, it must not become a failed Intune script.
Write-Log "Loader failed: $($_.Exception.Message)"
}
exit 0
}
@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@
This script removes all traces of the Autopilot Monitor agent:
- Stops and removes the Scheduled Task
- Deletes C:\ProgramData\AutopilotMonitor folder
- Deletes C:\ProgramData\AutopilotMonitor-Loader-* folders that a failed loader run kept
Normally the agent self-destructs after enrollment completion.
Use this script only for manual cleanup or troubleshooting.
@@ -16,7 +17,8 @@
.NOTES
- Requires Administrator privileges
- Safe to run multiple times
- No Registry cleanup needed (agent doesn't use Registry)
- Keeps HKLM\SOFTWARE\AutopilotMonitor\Deployed: the bootstrap reads it and never
installs the agent on this device again
#>
[CmdletBinding()]
@@ -67,6 +69,17 @@ catch {
Write-Host " [INFO] You may need to manually delete: $AgentBasePath" -ForegroundColor Yellow
}
# Delete loader run folders kept by failed runs
foreach ($runFolder in @(Get-ChildItem -Path $env:ProgramData -Directory -Filter 'AutopilotMonitor-Loader-*' -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue)) {
try {
Remove-Item -LiteralPath $runFolder.FullName -Recurse -Force -ErrorAction Stop
Write-Host " [OK] Loader run folder deleted: $($runFolder.FullName)" -ForegroundColor Green
}
catch {
Write-Host " [FAIL] Error deleting $($runFolder.FullName): $($_.Exception.Message)" -ForegroundColor Red
}
}
Write-Host ""
Write-Host "===== Cleanup Completed =====" -ForegroundColor Cyan
Write-Host "Autopilot Monitor agent has been removed from this device." -ForegroundColor Green
@@ -0,0 +1,171 @@
using System;
using System.IO;
using System.Linq;
using System.Reflection;
using System.Text;
using System.Text.RegularExpressions;
using System.Xml.Linq;
using AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Runtime;
using AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Security;
using AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests.Harness;
using AutopilotMonitor.Shared;
using Xunit;
namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests.Bootstrap
{
/// <summary>
/// What the bootstrap scripts and the agent must agree on: the names by which the installer
/// recognizes an installed agent, the folders and log files, and the log lines the agent reads
/// back as its provenance. Every script value is read from the script's own text, so a rename
/// on either side fails here. The bootstrap script gates run this class on every change to
/// the scripts.
/// </summary>
[Trait("Category", "BootstrapContract")]
public sealed class BootstrapContractTests : IDisposable
{
private static readonly string BootstrapDir = Path.Combine(RepoPaths.Root(), "scripts", "Bootstrap");
private static readonly string Installer = File.ReadAllText(Path.Combine(BootstrapDir, "Install-AutopilotMonitor.ps1"));
private static readonly string Loader = File.ReadAllText(Path.Combine(BootstrapDir, "Start-AutopilotMonitor.ps1"));
private static readonly string OobeScript = File.ReadAllText(Path.Combine(
RepoPaths.Root(), "src", "Backend", "AutopilotMonitor.Functions.Tests", "TestData", "oobe-bootstrap-golden.ps1"));
private static readonly string Wxs = File.ReadAllText(Path.Combine(
RepoPaths.Root(), "src", "Agent", "AutopilotMonitor.BootstrapMsi", "Package.wxs"));
private readonly string _logs = Path.Combine(Path.GetTempPath(), "apm-bootstrap-contract-" + Guid.NewGuid().ToString("N"));
public BootstrapContractTests() => Directory.CreateDirectory(_logs);
public void Dispose()
{
try { Directory.Delete(_logs, recursive: true); } catch { /* best effort */ }
}
/// <summary>The value of the one top-level <c>$Name = "value"</c> line of a script.</summary>
private static string Assignment(string script, string name)
{
var matches = Regex.Matches(script, @"(?m)^\$" + name + @"[ \t]*=[ \t]*""([^""]*)""[ \t]*\r?$");
Assert.True(matches.Count == 1, $"expected exactly one top-level ${name} line, found {matches.Count}");
return matches[0].Groups[1].Value;
}
private static string ScriptPath(string agentPath) => agentPath.Replace("%ProgramData%", "$env:ProgramData");
private static string AgentSubdirectory() =>
(string)typeof(AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Program)
.GetField("DefaultAgentSubdirectory", BindingFlags.NonPublic | BindingFlags.Static)
.GetRawConstantValue();
private void WriteLog(string name, string line) =>
File.WriteAllText(Path.Combine(_logs, name), line + "\r\n", Encoding.ASCII);
[Fact]
public void The_installer_recognizes_an_agent_by_the_names_the_agent_uses()
{
Assert.Equal(DeploymentMarker.RegistryKeyPath, Assignment(Installer, "DeploymentMarkerKey"));
Assert.Equal(DeploymentMarker.RegistryValueName, Assignment(Installer, "DeploymentMarkerValue"));
Assert.Equal(Constants.ScheduledTaskName, Assignment(Installer, "AgentTaskName"));
Assert.Equal(typeof(AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Program).Assembly.GetName().Name + ".exe", Assignment(Installer, "AgentExeName"));
}
[Fact]
public void The_installer_works_in_the_folders_the_agent_uses()
{
var basePath = Assignment(Installer, "AgentBasePath");
Assert.Equal(ScriptPath(Constants.AgentDataDirectory), basePath);
Assert.Equal(ScriptPath(Constants.LogDirectory), Assignment(Installer, "AgentLogPath").Replace("$AgentBasePath", basePath));
Assert.Equal(basePath + "\\" + AgentSubdirectory(), Assignment(Installer, "AgentBinPath").Replace("$AgentBasePath", basePath));
}
[Fact]
public void Every_bootstrap_logs_under_the_name_the_agent_reads()
{
Assert.Equal("$AgentLogPath\\" + BootstrapProvenanceReader.InstallerLogName, Assignment(Installer, "LogFile"));
Assert.Matches(@"\[string\]\$LogFileName = """ + Regex.Escape(BootstrapProvenanceReader.LoaderLogName) + @"""", Loader);
Assert.Contains("$LogFile = \"$AgentLogPath\\" + BootstrapProvenanceReader.OobeLogName + "\"", OobeScript);
Assert.Contains("-LogFileName " + BootstrapProvenanceReader.MsiLoaderLogName, Wxs);
}
// The bootstrap MSI installs its loader copy where the installer removes it, starts
// PowerShell in System32, and runs only bytes it has checked against the publisher pin
// the loader applies to the installer. Windows Installer formats the command, so every
// bracket and brace is escaped and the only property references are the two paths.
[Fact]
public void The_msi_puts_the_loader_copy_where_the_installer_removes_it_and_runs_only_what_it_checked()
{
XNamespace ns = "http://wixtoolset.org/schemas/v4/wxs";
var package = XDocument.Parse(Wxs).Root.Element(ns + "Package");
Assert.Equal("1fbe5515-d346-445c-b8b8-14ee79f97522", (string)package.Attribute("UpgradeCode"));
var root = package.Elements(ns + "StandardDirectory").Single();
Assert.Equal("CommonAppDataFolder", (string)root.Attribute("Id"));
var chain = root.Descendants(ns + "Directory").Select(d => (string)d.Attribute("Name")).ToArray();
Assert.Equal("INSTALLFOLDER", (string)root.Descendants(ns + "Directory").Last().Attribute("Id"));
var transport = Assignment(Installer, "MsiTransportPath").Replace("$AgentBasePath", Assignment(Installer, "AgentBasePath"));
Assert.Equal("$env:ProgramData\\" + string.Join("\\", chain), transport);
var action = package.Elements(ns + "CustomAction").Single(a => (string)a.Attribute("Id") == "RunBootstrap");
Assert.Equal("System64Folder", (string)action.Attribute("Directory"));
Assert.Equal("deferred", (string)action.Attribute("Execute"));
Assert.Equal("no", (string)action.Attribute("Impersonate"));
Assert.Equal("ignore", (string)action.Attribute("Return"));
var exeCommand = (string)action.Attribute("ExeCommand");
var command = exeCommand.Substring(exeCommand.IndexOf(" -Command ", StringComparison.Ordinal));
Assert.Contains("-NonInteractive", exeCommand);
Assert.Contains("[\\[]System.IO.File[\\]]::ReadAllBytes('[INSTALLFOLDER]Start-AutopilotMonitor.ps1')", command);
Assert.Contains("Get-AuthenticodeSignature -Content $b -SourcePathOrExtension '.ps1'", command);
Assert.Contains("$h -eq '$(var.LoaderSha256)' -and $s.Status -eq 'Valid' -and $s.SignerCertificate.Subject -like '" + Assignment(Loader, "ExpectedPublisher") + "'", command);
// The hash is baked in by the build from the loader it embeds; a package built without it must not exist.
Assert.Contains("<?ifndef var.LoaderSha256 ?>", Wxs);
var workflow = File.ReadAllText(Path.Combine(RepoPaths.Root(), ".github", "workflows", "build-msi.yml"));
Assert.Contains("wix build Package.wxs -arch x64 -d LoaderSha256=$loaderSha256", workflow);
Assert.Contains("Get-FileHash -LiteralPath $env:RUNNER_SCRIPT -Algorithm SHA256", workflow);
Assert.Contains("[\\[]scriptblock[\\]]::Create([\\[]System.Text.Encoding[\\]]::UTF8.GetString($b))", command);
Assert.DoesNotContain("-File", command);
// Without the [\x] escapes, the only bracket left is the one property reference.
var unescaped = Regex.Replace(command, @"\[\\.\]", "");
Assert.DoesNotMatch(@"[{}\[\]]", unescaped.Replace("[INSTALLFOLDER]", ""));
Assert.Equal(new[] { "[INSTALLFOLDER]" }, Regex.Matches(command, @"\[[A-Za-z0-9_.]+\]").Cast<Match>().Select(m => m.Value).Distinct().ToArray());
var custom = package.Element(ns + "InstallExecuteSequence").Elements(ns + "Custom").Single();
Assert.Equal("RunBootstrap", (string)custom.Attribute("Action"));
Assert.Equal("NOT Installed", (string)custom.Attribute("Condition"));
}
[Fact]
public void The_agent_reads_the_versions_the_current_scripts_write()
{
var installerVersion = Assignment(Installer, "ScriptVersion");
var loaderVersion = Assignment(Loader, "ScriptVersion");
Assert.Contains("Write-Log \"Bootstrap script version: v$ScriptVersion\"", Installer);
Assert.Contains("Write-Log \"=== Autopilot Monitor bootstrap loader v$ScriptVersion started (user=$env:USERNAME, pid=$PID) ===\"", Loader);
WriteLog(BootstrapProvenanceReader.InstallerLogName, $"[2026-10-22 10:00:01] Bootstrap script version: v{installerVersion}");
WriteLog(BootstrapProvenanceReader.LoaderLogName, $"[2026-10-22 10:00:00] === Autopilot Monitor bootstrap loader v{loaderVersion} started (user=SYSTEM, pid=4242) ===");
var provenance = BootstrapProvenanceReader.Read(_logs);
Assert.Equal(installerVersion, provenance.ScriptVersion);
Assert.Equal("loader", provenance.LoaderLog);
Assert.Equal(loaderVersion, provenance.LoaderVersion);
}
// The installer carries only the start line over from loaders before 1.3, rebuilt from a
// pattern; the agent has to read that line as the loader's version.
[Fact]
public void The_agent_reads_the_start_line_the_installer_carries_over_from_an_older_loader()
{
const string suffix = " (carried over by the bootstrapper) ===`r`n";
Assert.Contains("$starts[$starts.Count - 1].Value + \"" + suffix + "\"", Installer);
WriteLog(BootstrapProvenanceReader.MsiLoaderLogName, "[2026-10-22 10:00:00] === Autopilot Monitor bootstrap loader v1.2 started (carried over by the bootstrapper) ===");
var provenance = BootstrapProvenanceReader.Read(_logs);
Assert.Equal("msi", provenance.LoaderLog);
Assert.Equal("1.2", provenance.LoaderVersion);
}
}
}
@@ -50,6 +50,7 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests.Configuration
nameof(AgentConfigResponse.MaxBatchSize),
nameof(AgentConfigResponse.MaxAuthFailures),
nameof(AgentConfigResponse.AuthFailureTimeoutMinutes),
nameof(AgentConfigResponse.InterceptedRegistrationRetryBoots),
// Merge reads two Collectors knobs (AgentMaxLifetimeMinutes, HelloWaitTimeoutSeconds);
// the remaining CollectorConfiguration flags flow untouched to DefaultComponentFactory.
nameof(AgentConfigResponse.Collectors),
@@ -55,6 +55,7 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests.Configuration
UnrestrictedMode = true,
MaxAuthFailures = 7,
AuthFailureTimeoutMinutes = 15,
InterceptedRegistrationRetryBoots = 2,
EnableImeMatchLog = true,
Collectors = new CollectorConfiguration
{
@@ -98,6 +99,7 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests.Configuration
Assert.Equal(45, agent.HelloWaitTimeoutSeconds);
Assert.Equal(7, agent.MaxAuthFailures);
Assert.Equal(15, agent.AuthFailureTimeoutMinutes);
Assert.Equal(2, agent.InterceptedRegistrationRetryBoots);
Assert.NotNull(result);
Assert.True(result.UnrestrictedModeChanged);
@@ -468,6 +470,50 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests.Configuration
Assert.Equal(0, agent.AgentMaxLifetimeMinutes);
}
// ============================================================= Intercepted-registration buffer
[Theory]
[InlineData(0)] // clean up at the first intercepted registration
[InlineData(3)]
public void Merge_copies_intercepted_registration_retry_boots(int remoteValue)
{
var agent = NewAgentConfig();
var remote = FullRemote();
remote.InterceptedRegistrationRetryBoots = remoteValue;
RemoteConfigMerger.Merge(agent, remote);
Assert.Equal(remoteValue, agent.InterceptedRegistrationRetryBoots);
}
[Fact]
public void Merge_keeps_the_agent_default_when_the_backend_sends_no_intercepted_registration_retry_boots()
{
var agent = NewAgentConfig();
var remote = FullRemote();
remote.InterceptedRegistrationRetryBoots = null; // backend that predates the field
RemoteConfigMerger.Merge(agent, remote);
Assert.Equal(1, agent.InterceptedRegistrationRetryBoots);
}
[Theory]
[InlineData(-1, 0)]
[InlineData(int.MinValue, 0)]
[InlineData(6, 5)]
[InlineData(int.MaxValue, 5)]
public void Merge_clamps_intercepted_registration_retry_boots_to_zero_through_five(int remoteValue, int expected)
{
var agent = NewAgentConfig();
var remote = FullRemote();
remote.InterceptedRegistrationRetryBoots = remoteValue;
RemoteConfigMerger.Merge(agent, remote);
Assert.Equal(expected, agent.InterceptedRegistrationRetryBoots);
}
// ============================================================= Guard
[Fact]
@@ -214,6 +214,23 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests.Configuration
Assert.Null(loaded.LatestAgentSha256);
}
[Theory]
[InlineData(0)]
[InlineData(3)]
[InlineData(null)] // backend that predates the field — the agent keeps its default
public void RoundTrip_preserves_intercepted_registration_retry_boots(int? value)
{
// An intercepted start gets no live config, so the registration buffer it decides on
// is the cached value: it must survive the write + read strip untouched.
var probe = NewProbe();
probe.DoCache(new AgentConfigResponse { InterceptedRegistrationRetryBoots = value });
var loaded = probe.DoLoad();
Assert.NotNull(loaded);
Assert.Equal(value, loaded.InterceptedRegistrationRetryBoots);
}
// ── Helpers ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
private CacheProbe NewProbe()
@@ -7,6 +7,7 @@ using AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Logging;
using AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Transport;
using AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Security;
using AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests.Harness;
using AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests.Transport;
using AutopilotMonitor.Shared.Models;
using Xunit;
@@ -101,6 +102,28 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests.Configuration
Assert.Equal(401, svc.LastFetchAuthStatusCode);
}
[Fact]
public async Task FetchConfig_InterceptedAnswer_FallsBack_WithoutCounting_AndReportsOnce()
{
// A 403 something on the network path answered (TLS inspection): same fallback as an
// auth failure, but the tracker does not count it — it sends ClientCertificateNotReceived.
var distress = new FakeDistressReporter();
var tracker = new AuthFailureTracker(maxFailures: 5, timeoutMinutes: 0,
AutopilotMonitor.DecisionCore.Engine.SystemClock.Instance, _logger, distress);
var svc = NewService(BackendBehaviour.AlwaysIntercepted403, tracker);
var result = await svc.FetchConfigAsync(retryOnTransientErrors: true);
Assert.NotNull(result);
Assert.Equal(RemoteConfigFetchOutcome.UsedDefaults, svc.LastFetchOutcome);
Assert.Equal(1, svc.LastFetchAttempts);
Assert.Equal(403, svc.LastFetchAuthStatusCode);
Assert.Equal(0, tracker.ConsecutiveFailures);
var call = Assert.Single(distress.Calls);
Assert.Equal(DistressErrorType.ClientCertificateNotReceived, call.ErrorType);
Assert.StartsWith("agent/config http 403 client_certificate_required", call.Message);
}
[Fact]
public async Task FetchConfig_RetryDisabled_OneAttemptOnly()
{
@@ -252,10 +275,11 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests.Configuration
/// <summary>All 4 initial attempts fail; the NEXT call (the recovery fetch) succeeds.</summary>
FailAllThenSucceed,
AlwaysAuthFailure401,
AlwaysIntercepted403,
AlwaysReturnNull,
}
private FakeRemoteConfigService NewService(BackendBehaviour behaviour)
private FakeRemoteConfigService NewService(BackendBehaviour behaviour, AuthFailureTracker? tracker = null)
{
// Pass a throwaway BackendApiClient — the fake overrides CallBackendAsync
// before it ever hits the wire.
@@ -269,7 +293,7 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests.Configuration
bootstrapToken: null,
agentVersion: "0.0.0",
logger: _logger);
return new FakeRemoteConfigService(apiClient, _logger, behaviour);
return new FakeRemoteConfigService(apiClient, _logger, behaviour, tracker);
}
private sealed class FakeRemoteConfigService : RemoteConfigService
@@ -277,8 +301,8 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests.Configuration
private readonly BackendBehaviour _behaviour;
private int _calls;
public FakeRemoteConfigService(BackendApiClient apiClient, AgentLogger logger, BackendBehaviour behaviour)
: base(apiClient, "00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000001", logger)
public FakeRemoteConfigService(BackendApiClient apiClient, AgentLogger logger, BackendBehaviour behaviour, AuthFailureTracker? tracker)
: base(apiClient, "00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000001", logger, authFailureTracker: tracker)
{
_behaviour = behaviour;
}
@@ -305,6 +329,9 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests.Configuration
throw new HttpRequestException("simulated network failure");
case BackendBehaviour.AlwaysAuthFailure401:
throw new BackendAuthException("Unauthorized", 401);
case BackendBehaviour.AlwaysIntercepted403:
throw new BackendAuthException("The device certificate did not reach the backend.", 403,
classification: InterceptionFixtures.CertificateRequired());
case BackendBehaviour.AlwaysReturnNull:
return Task.FromResult<AgentConfigResponse>(null!);
default:
@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
using System.Security.Principal;
using Xunit;
namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests.Harness
{
/// <summary>
/// A fact that needs an elevated process, such as making the Administrators group the owner
/// of a folder. Skipped in a non-elevated local run; the CI runners are elevated.
/// </summary>
public sealed class ElevatedFactAttribute : FactAttribute
{
public ElevatedFactAttribute()
{
using (var identity = WindowsIdentity.GetCurrent())
{
if (!new WindowsPrincipal(identity).IsInRole(WindowsBuiltInRole.Administrator))
Skip = "needs an elevated process (assigning Administrators as the folder owner)";
}
}
}
}
@@ -0,0 +1,43 @@
using System;
using System.Collections.Generic;
using System.Threading.Tasks;
using AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Transport;
using AutopilotMonitor.Shared.Models;
namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests.Harness
{
/// <summary>
/// Records every distress dispatch instead of sending it. The real anti-flood rules of
/// <see cref="DistressReporter"/> are bypassed on purpose: tests assert what the caller dispatched.
/// </summary>
internal sealed class FakeDistressReporter : DistressReporter
{
public sealed class Call
{
public DistressErrorType ErrorType { get; set; }
public string Message { get; set; } = default!;
public int? HttpStatusCode { get; set; }
public string? TpmVersion { get; set; }
public DistressDeviceContext? Context { get; set; }
}
public List<Call> Calls { get; } = new List<Call>();
/// <summary>
/// The send each dispatch returns; null = already completed. Lets a test keep a send in
/// flight to prove a caller waits for it (or stops waiting at its bound).
/// </summary>
public Func<Task>? Send { get; set; }
public FakeDistressReporter()
: base(baseUrl: "https://example.test", tenantId: "t", manufacturer: "m", model: "d", serialNumber: "s", agentVersion: "0.0.0", logger: null!)
{
}
public override Task TrySendAsync(DistressErrorType errorType, string message, int? httpStatusCode = null, DistressDetail? detail = null)
{
Calls.Add(new Call { ErrorType = errorType, Message = message, HttpStatusCode = httpStatusCode, TpmVersion = detail?.TpmVersion, Context = detail?.Context });
return Send?.Invoke() ?? Task.CompletedTask;
}
}
}
@@ -0,0 +1,82 @@
using System.Collections.Generic;
using AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Enrollment.SystemSignals;
using Xunit;
namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests.Monitoring
{
/// <summary>
/// The ESP phase a report names, derived from the three ESP registry values. Both value shapes
/// Windows writes are covered: flat status texts (older builds) and nested subcategory objects.
/// </summary>
public sealed class EspPhaseSnapshotTests
{
private const string DoneFlag = "{\"categorySucceeded\":true}";
private const string FailedFlag = "{\"categorySucceeded\":false}";
private const string NestedRunning =
"{\"SecurityPoliciesSubcategory\":{\"subcategoryState\":\"succeeded\",\"subcategoryStatusText\":\"Complete\"}," +
"\"AppsSubcategory\":{\"subcategoryState\":\"inProgress\",\"subcategoryStatusText\":\"Installing (1 of 3)\"}}";
private const string NestedAllDoneNoFlag =
"{\"SecurityPoliciesSubcategory\":{\"subcategoryState\":\"succeeded\"},\"AppsSubcategory\":{\"subcategoryState\":\"notRequired\"}}";
private const string NestedFailedNoFlag =
"{\"SecurityPoliciesSubcategory\":{\"subcategoryState\":\"succeeded\"},\"AppsSubcategory\":{\"subcategoryState\":\"failed\"}}";
private const string FlatRunning = "{\"CertificatesSubcategory\":\"Certificates (0 of 1 applied)\",\"AppsSubcategory\":\"Identifying\"}";
private static string Derive(string? preparation, string? deviceSetup, string? accountSetup)
=> EspPhaseSnapshot.Derive(new List<string> { preparation!, deviceSetup!, accountSetup! });
[Fact]
public void No_value_is_none()
{
Assert.Equal("none", Derive(null, null, null));
}
[Fact]
public void Running_category_names_its_phase()
{
Assert.Equal("device_preparation", Derive(NestedRunning, null, null));
Assert.Equal("device_setup", Derive(DoneFlag, NestedRunning, null));
Assert.Equal("account_setup", Derive(DoneFlag, DoneFlag, NestedRunning));
}
[Fact]
public void Flat_status_texts_are_read_too()
{
Assert.Equal("device_setup", Derive(DoneFlag, FlatRunning, null));
}
[Fact]
public void Done_categories_name_the_last_one_reached()
{
Assert.Equal("device_preparation_done", Derive(DoneFlag, null, null));
Assert.Equal("device_setup_done", Derive(DoneFlag, DoneFlag, null));
Assert.Equal("esp_done", Derive(DoneFlag, DoneFlag, DoneFlag));
}
[Fact]
public void All_subcategories_done_counts_as_done_without_the_flag()
{
// Some builds never set categorySucceeded although every subcategory finished.
Assert.Equal("esp_done", Derive(DoneFlag, NestedAllDoneNoFlag, NestedAllDoneNoFlag));
}
[Fact]
public void A_failure_wins_over_everything_after_it()
{
Assert.Equal("device_setup_failed", Derive(DoneFlag, FailedFlag, NestedRunning));
Assert.Equal("account_setup_failed", Derive(DoneFlag, DoneFlag, NestedFailedNoFlag));
}
[Fact]
public void Unparseable_value_counts_as_running()
{
Assert.Equal("device_setup", Derive(DoneFlag, "{not json", null));
}
[Fact]
public void Read_on_this_machine_returns_a_known_token()
{
var phase = EspPhaseSnapshot.Read();
Assert.Matches("^[a-z_]+$", phase);
}
}
}
@@ -0,0 +1,85 @@
using System.Linq;
using AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring;
using AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Telemetry.Periodic;
using Xunit;
namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests.Monitoring
{
/// <summary>
/// The local network fingerprint a failed registration is stored with: SHA-256 over the
/// connection type and gateway <see cref="NetworkChangeDetector"/> captures, cut to 16 hex
/// characters; unknown (null) whenever either input is missing. Gateways are documentation
/// addresses (RFC 5737).
/// </summary>
public sealed class NetworkFingerprintTests
{
private static NetworkChangeDetector.NetworkStateSnapshot State(string? connectionType, string? gateway, bool hasNetwork = true) =>
new NetworkChangeDetector.NetworkStateSnapshot
{
HasNetwork = hasNetwork,
ConnectionType = connectionType,
Gateway = gateway,
};
[Fact]
public void Same_connection_type_and_gateway_give_the_same_short_hex_fingerprint()
{
var first = NetworkFingerprint.Of(State("WiFi", "192.0.2.1"));
var second = NetworkFingerprint.Of(State("WiFi", "192.0.2.1"));
Assert.Equal(first, second);
Assert.Equal(NetworkFingerprint.Length, first!.Length);
Assert.True(first.All(c => (c >= '0' && c <= '9') || (c >= 'a' && c <= 'f')), first);
}
[Theory]
[InlineData("WiFi", "198.51.100.1")] // another gateway
[InlineData("Ethernet", "192.0.2.1")] // another connection type
public void Another_gateway_or_connection_type_is_another_network(string connectionType, string gateway)
{
Assert.NotEqual(
NetworkFingerprint.Of(State("WiFi", "192.0.2.1")),
NetworkFingerprint.Of(State(connectionType, gateway)));
}
[Fact]
public void Unknown_network_has_no_fingerprint()
{
Assert.Null(NetworkFingerprint.Of(null));
Assert.Null(NetworkFingerprint.Of(State("WiFi", "192.0.2.1", hasNetwork: false)));
Assert.Null(NetworkFingerprint.Of(State("WiFi", null)));
Assert.Null(NetworkFingerprint.Of(State(null, "192.0.2.1")));
}
[Theory]
[InlineData("aaaa", "aaaa", false)]
[InlineData("aaaa", "bbbb", true)]
public void Differs_compares_known_fingerprints(string before, string after, bool expected)
{
Assert.Equal(expected, NetworkFingerprint.Differs(before, after));
}
[Theory]
[InlineData(null, "aaaa")]
[InlineData("aaaa", null)]
[InlineData(null, null)]
public void Differs_is_unknown_when_either_side_is(string? before, string? after)
{
Assert.Null(NetworkFingerprint.Differs(before, after));
}
[Fact]
public void TryCapture_reads_this_machine_without_throwing()
{
// Machine-dependent: either no active interface (null) or a well-formed fingerprint
// that matches the detector's own capture.
var captured = NetworkFingerprint.TryCapture();
if (captured != null)
{
Assert.Equal(NetworkFingerprint.Length, captured.Length);
Assert.Equal(NetworkFingerprint.Of(NetworkChangeDetector.CaptureInterfaceState()), captured);
}
}
}
}
@@ -0,0 +1,199 @@
using System;
using System.Collections.Generic;
using System.IO;
using System.Linq;
using System.Text;
using AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Runtime;
using Xunit;
namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests.Monitoring.Runtime
{
/// <summary>
/// The bootstrap provenance in <c>agent_started</c>. Fixture lines are the scripts' real
/// formats: installer <c>[ts] Bootstrap script version: vX.Y</c>
/// (Install-AutopilotMonitor.ps1), loader <c>[ts] === Autopilot Monitor bootstrap loader vX.Y
/// started (user=..., pid=...) ===</c> (Start-AutopilotMonitor.ps1), the MSI's downloader before
/// the loader <c>[ts] MSI bootstrap runner started (user=..., pid=...).</c>.
/// </summary>
public sealed class BootstrapProvenanceReaderTests : IDisposable
{
private readonly string _dir = Path.Combine(Path.GetTempPath(), "apm-provenance-" + Guid.NewGuid().ToString("N"));
public BootstrapProvenanceReaderTests() => Directory.CreateDirectory(_dir);
public void Dispose()
{
try { Directory.Delete(_dir, recursive: true); } catch { /* best effort */ }
}
private void Write(string name, params string[] lines) =>
File.WriteAllText(Path.Combine(_dir, name), string.Join("\r\n", lines) + "\r\n", Encoding.ASCII);
private static string InstallerRun(string version) => $"[2026-10-13 09:00:00] Bootstrap script version: v{version}";
private static string LoaderRun(string version) =>
$"[2026-10-13 08:59:58] === Autopilot Monitor bootstrap loader v{version} started (user=SECRETUSER, pid=4242) ===";
[Fact]
public void Loader_path_reports_installer_and_loader_versions()
{
Write(BootstrapProvenanceReader.LoaderLogName, LoaderRun("1.2"), "[2026-10-13 08:59:59] Installer signature verified");
Write(BootstrapProvenanceReader.InstallerLogName, "[2026-10-13 09:00:00] ===== Autopilot Monitor Bootstrap Started =====", InstallerRun("2.5"));
var p = BootstrapProvenanceReader.Read(_dir);
Assert.True(p.ScriptLogPresent);
Assert.Equal("2.5", p.ScriptVersion);
Assert.Equal("loader", p.LoaderLog);
Assert.Equal("1.2", p.LoaderVersion);
Assert.False(p.OobeLogPresent);
}
[Fact]
public void The_last_run_wins_when_the_log_grew_over_several_runs()
{
Write(BootstrapProvenanceReader.InstallerLogName, InstallerRun("2.3"), "x", InstallerRun("2.4"), "y", InstallerRun("2.5"), "z");
Assert.Equal("2.5", BootstrapProvenanceReader.Read(_dir).ScriptVersion);
}
[Fact]
public void A_directly_assigned_installer_has_no_loader_log()
{
Write(BootstrapProvenanceReader.InstallerLogName, InstallerRun("2.4"));
var p = BootstrapProvenanceReader.Read(_dir);
Assert.Equal("2.4", p.ScriptVersion);
Assert.Null(p.LoaderLog);
Assert.Null(p.LoaderVersion);
}
[Fact]
public void An_installer_from_before_the_version_line_is_present_but_without_version()
{
Write(BootstrapProvenanceReader.InstallerLogName, "[2026-03-01 09:00:00] ===== Autopilot Monitor Bootstrap Started =====");
var p = BootstrapProvenanceReader.Read(_dir);
Assert.True(p.ScriptLogPresent);
Assert.Null(p.ScriptVersion);
}
[Fact]
public void An_installer_from_before_the_log_rename_is_read_under_its_old_name()
{
Write(BootstrapProvenanceReader.LegacyInstallerLogName, InstallerRun("2.3"));
var p = BootstrapProvenanceReader.Read(_dir);
Assert.True(p.ScriptLogPresent);
Assert.Equal("2.3", p.ScriptVersion);
}
[Fact]
public void With_both_installer_logs_the_most_recently_written_one_counts()
{
Write(BootstrapProvenanceReader.InstallerLogName, InstallerRun("2.6"));
Write(BootstrapProvenanceReader.LegacyInstallerLogName, InstallerRun("2.3"));
File.SetLastWriteTimeUtc(Path.Combine(_dir, BootstrapProvenanceReader.InstallerLogName), DateTime.UtcNow.AddDays(-3));
File.SetLastWriteTimeUtc(Path.Combine(_dir, BootstrapProvenanceReader.LegacyInstallerLogName), DateTime.UtcNow.AddMinutes(-1));
Assert.Equal("2.3", BootstrapProvenanceReader.Read(_dir).ScriptVersion);
}
[Fact]
public void The_msi_downloader_from_before_the_loader_counts_as_msi_without_version()
{
Write(BootstrapProvenanceReader.LegacyMsiLoaderLogName, "[2026-08-01 09:00:00] MSI bootstrap runner started (user=SECRETUSER, pid=4242).");
var p = BootstrapProvenanceReader.Read(_dir);
Assert.Equal("msi", p.LoaderLog);
Assert.Null(p.LoaderVersion);
}
[Fact]
public void The_msi_loader_log_is_told_apart_from_the_intune_loader()
{
Write(BootstrapProvenanceReader.MsiLoaderLogName, LoaderRun("1.1"));
var p = BootstrapProvenanceReader.Read(_dir);
Assert.Equal("msi", p.LoaderLog);
Assert.Equal("1.1", p.LoaderVersion);
}
[Fact]
public void With_both_loader_logs_the_most_recently_written_one_counts()
{
Write(BootstrapProvenanceReader.LoaderLogName, LoaderRun("1.0"));
Write(BootstrapProvenanceReader.MsiLoaderLogName, LoaderRun("1.2"));
File.SetLastWriteTimeUtc(Path.Combine(_dir, BootstrapProvenanceReader.LoaderLogName), DateTime.UtcNow.AddDays(-3));
File.SetLastWriteTimeUtc(Path.Combine(_dir, BootstrapProvenanceReader.MsiLoaderLogName), DateTime.UtcNow.AddMinutes(-1));
var p = BootstrapProvenanceReader.Read(_dir);
Assert.Equal("msi", p.LoaderLog);
Assert.Equal("1.2", p.LoaderVersion);
}
[Fact]
public void The_oobe_go_script_is_recognised_by_its_log()
{
Write(BootstrapProvenanceReader.OobeLogName, "[2026-10-13 09:00:00] ===== Autopilot Monitor OOBE Bootstrap =====");
Assert.True(BootstrapProvenanceReader.Read(_dir).OobeLogPresent);
}
[Fact]
public void Only_the_tail_of_a_large_log_is_read()
{
var filler = Enumerable.Repeat(new string('.', 200), 600).ToArray(); // ~120 KB
var lines = new List<string> { InstallerRun("2.1") };
lines.AddRange(filler);
lines.Add(InstallerRun("2.5"));
Write(BootstrapProvenanceReader.InstallerLogName, lines.ToArray());
Assert.Equal("2.5", BootstrapProvenanceReader.Read(_dir).ScriptVersion);
}
[Fact]
public void A_missing_directory_reads_as_unknown_and_never_throws()
{
var p = BootstrapProvenanceReader.Read(Path.Combine(_dir, "does-not-exist"));
Assert.False(p.ScriptLogPresent);
Assert.Null(p.ScriptVersion);
Assert.Null(p.LoaderLog);
Assert.False(p.OobeLogPresent);
}
[Fact]
public void The_event_keys_carry_versions_only_never_the_account_name()
{
Write(BootstrapProvenanceReader.LoaderLogName, LoaderRun("1.2"));
Write(BootstrapProvenanceReader.InstallerLogName, InstallerRun("2.5"));
var data = new Dictionary<string, object>();
BootstrapProvenanceReader.Read(_dir).AddTo(data);
Assert.Equal(true, data["bootstrapScriptLogPresent"]);
Assert.Equal("2.5", data["bootstrapScriptVersion"]);
Assert.Equal("loader", data["bootstrapLoaderLog"]);
Assert.Equal("1.2", data["bootstrapLoaderVersion"]);
Assert.Equal(false, data["oobeBootstrapLogPresent"]);
Assert.DoesNotContain(data.Values, v => v is string s && s.Contains("SECRETUSER"));
}
[Fact]
public void Keys_that_were_not_found_are_left_out()
{
var data = new Dictionary<string, object>();
BootstrapProvenanceReader.Read(_dir).AddTo(data);
Assert.Equal(new[] { "bootstrapScriptLogPresent", "oobeBootstrapLogPresent" }, data.Keys.OrderBy(k => k).ToArray());
}
}
}
@@ -0,0 +1,101 @@
using System;
using System.Collections.Generic;
using System.IO;
using AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Monitoring.Runtime;
using AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Security;
using Xunit;
namespace AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core.Tests.Monitoring.Runtime
{
/// <summary>
/// Step 5b of the self-update: the staged payload must match its signed catalog before a
/// single file is swapped in. The verifier is replaced through the static hook; each test
/// restores it, as in <see cref="SelfUpdaterGracefulShutdownTests"/>.
/// </summary>
public sealed class SelfUpdaterPayloadCatalogTests : IDisposable
{
private const string StagingDir = @"C:\ProgramData\AutopilotMonitor\Agent-Update";
private readonly Func<string, PayloadCatalogVerdict> _savedVerifier;
private readonly List<string> _log = new List<string>();
public SelfUpdaterPayloadCatalogTests()
{
_savedVerifier = SelfUpdater.VerifyPayloadCatalog;
}
public void Dispose() => SelfUpdater.VerifyPayloadCatalog = _savedVerifier;
[Fact]
public void Production_default_is_the_real_verifier()
{
Assert.Equal(typeof(PayloadCatalogVerifier), _savedVerifier.Method.DeclaringType);
Assert.Equal(nameof(PayloadCatalogVerifier.Verify), _savedVerifier.Method.Name);
}
[Fact]
public void Accepted_payload_lets_the_update_continue()
{
string? checkedDir = null;
SelfUpdater.VerifyPayloadCatalog = dir => { checkedDir = dir; return PayloadCatalogVerdict.Accept(); };
var ok = SelfUpdater.VerifyStagedPayload(StagingDir, _log.Add, out var reason);
Assert.True(ok);
Assert.Null(reason);
Assert.Equal(StagingDir, checkedDir);
Assert.Contains(_log, line => line.Contains("payload catalog verified"));
}
[Fact]
public void Rejected_payload_stops_the_update_and_hands_over_the_reason()
{
SelfUpdater.VerifyPayloadCatalog = _ =>
PayloadCatalogVerdict.Reject("payload differs from catalog (missing: none; extra: evil.dll; changed: none)");
var ok = SelfUpdater.VerifyStagedPayload(StagingDir, _log.Add, out var reason);
Assert.False(ok);
Assert.Contains("extra: evil.dll", reason);
Assert.Contains(_log, line => line.Contains("REJECTED"));
}
[Fact]
public void A_throwing_verifier_is_a_rejection_not_a_pass()
{
SelfUpdater.VerifyPayloadCatalog = _ => throw new InvalidOperationException("runspace broke");
var ok = SelfUpdater.VerifyStagedPayload(StagingDir, _log.Add, out var reason);
Assert.False(ok);
Assert.Contains("runspace broke", reason);
}
[Fact]
public void The_catalog_check_runs_before_any_file_is_swapped()
{
// Source-level pin: CheckAndApplyUpdateAsync has no seam for the download, so the
// ordering that makes the check meaningful is pinned on the source itself.
var source = File.ReadAllText(Path.Combine(FindRepoRoot(),
"src", "Agent", "AutopilotMonitor.Agent.V2.Core", "Monitoring", "Runtime", "SelfUpdater.cs"));
var check = source.IndexOf("if (!VerifyStagedPayload(stagingDir, log, out var catalogRejection))", StringComparison.Ordinal);
var swap = source.IndexOf("var swapOk = SwapFiles(agentDir, stagingDir, log);", StringComparison.Ordinal);
Assert.True(check > 0, "step 5b not found in SelfUpdater.cs");
Assert.True(swap > check, "SwapFiles must come after the catalog check");
Assert.Contains("WriteSkipMarker(\"catalog_rejected\"", source);
}
private static string FindRepoRoot()
{
var dir = new DirectoryInfo(AppContext.BaseDirectory);
while (dir != null && !File.Exists(Path.Combine(dir.FullName, "AutopilotMonitor.sln")))
{
dir = dir.Parent;
}
Assert.NotNull(dir);
return dir.FullName;
}
}
}

Some files were not shown because too many files have changed in this diff Show More