The extra hint line under the search field made the header say the same
thing three times (subheadline, placeholder, hint). The Cloud PC guidance
now rides on the input's title attribute — the plain browser tooltip on
hover, no cursor change — and the subheadline no longer repeats the input
format. Same guidance is documented in the customer docs (Windows 365
Cloud PCs, Progress Portal).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The placeholder carried the Cloud PC instruction ("Cloud PC: the name shown
in the Windows App") and was clipped by the input width, so end users saw a
truncated sentence they could not read. Placeholder is now short ("Serial
number or device name..."), the Cloud PC guidance moved to a permanent hint
line below the field (wired via aria-describedby), the subheadline mentions
the device name as an accepted input, and the button no longer wraps on
narrow viewports.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The shutdown run allowed every logged-in user (explorer.exe owner) dynamically, so a backdoor account created after the startup scan and signed in before enrollment completed was scored 0. The WMI inventory is now read first and a logged-in name that is a local account is rejected for the account and the profile check (reported as logged_in_local_accounts); only Entra/domain identities — the only ones seen in real sessions — remain dynamically allowed for their profile folder.
Built-ins are recognised by RID 500/501/503/504 on the machine SID in addition to their English names: since disabled accounts are inventoried (88dfd331), localized Gast/Invité/Administrateur would otherwise flag every non-English device. kioskUser0 (Assigned Access autologon) joins the built-in list; the profile check skips junctions and $<32 hex> folders (cannot be an account name, pure payload noise). ANALYZE-ID-002 1.3.0 explanation mentions the new field.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The path guards, the enumeration's reparse-point skip and the per-file attribute check all judged path strings, while the FileStream feeding the ZIP opened that string later (after earlier files were compressed). Under any recursive source folder a local user can write to, a subdirectory turned into a junction in that window made SYSTEM copy the junction target into the tenant-uploaded package.
PinnedSourceFolder holds each section folder open for the whole section (final path must equal the validated path, 8.3-expanded; FILE_LIST_DIRECTORY without delete share, so NTFS refuses renaming it or any ancestor) and opens each candidate with FILE_FLAG_OPEN_REPARSE_POINT, requiring the handle's final path to be exactly <canonical folder>\<relative path>; the archive is fed from that same handle. Manifest: FOLDER REJECTED (...) / SKIPPED (resolved outside validated folder) / FAILED (open). The race is pinned by a test that swaps the directory from the BeforeSourceFileOpen seam; on the previous code the same test copies the junction target.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
A crafted /sessions?id=x%2F..%2F..%2Fglobal%2Fy%23 deep link let the victim's browser resolve
dot-segments into a different API route and truncate builder suffixes via '#', turning UI
actions into attacker-chosen authenticated same-origin requests. Hydration now also requires
the returned sessionId to match the requested one.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The tenant hardware whitelist is stored as a CSV and split on ',' at
enforcement time. Manufacturer/model strings in the Rejected-Hardware
insights come from unauthenticated distress signals, so a value like
"Dell Inc.,*" added via "+ Mfr" appended a standalone "*" and silently
turned the manufacturer gate into allow-all.
- Web: shared hardwareWhitelist helper; "+ Mfr"/"+ Model" and the manual
editor neutralize ',' to the single-char wildcard '?' so a value can
never split the list.
- Backend: TenantConfigValidation.ValidateHardwareWhitelist in ValidateModel
(PUT + patch) rejects blank items, control chars, over-long/too many entries.
- Shared: ParseWhitelist trims entries so enforcement matches the editor view.
- Tests: 8 xUnit + 5 vitest.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
SubmitSessionReport built the report blob name from the raw route sessionId. Route values are
percent-decoded, so an encoded '/'+'..' reached Azure.Storage.Blobs, which keeps separators, and
System.Uri collapsed the dot segments into a write outside the session-reports container.
- SubmitSessionReport / SubmitDiagFilesReport: 400 unless sessionId/tenantId are GUIDs
- SessionReportService: EnsureValidGuid at entry of both submit paths
- New Security/BlobNameGuard (flat-name invariant) applied in SessionReportService,
SessionReportDiagnosticsArchiveCopier (pre-check + upload) and the GA download function
- Tests: BlobNameGuardTests, copier rejects non-flat destination without storage calls
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
TenantConfiguration.Disabled/DisabledUntil was checked solely in AuthFunction.BuildAuthResult
(GET /api/auth/me), so a direct REST caller with a valid token kept full read/write access for
the whole suspension window and during an offboarding wipe. DecideAsync now denies 403
TenantSuspended when the caller's home tenant or the request's target tenant is currently
disabled (cached, side-effect-free config read). GA/GlobalReader bypass to administer the
tenant; device/anonymous routes keep their SecurityValidator gate.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Welcome/farewell mails rendered DomainName unencoded while the full-model
config PUT persisted it verbatim, letting a tenant admin ship attacker HTML
in a signed product mail to an arbitrary recipient. Encode at Render() and
the built-in builders, preserve DomainName from the stored row on PUT for
every caller, and only seed a strict DNS host name at first login.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
EffectRunner posts ClassifierVerdictIssued from inside DecisionStepProcessor.ApplyStep,
i.e. on the SignalIngress worker thread. With the bounded channel (256) full, Post's
back-pressure slow path blocked the channel's only consumer as a producer: nothing could
ever drain, every collector Post blocked behind it, and the whole decision/monitoring
pipeline froze silently until the max-lifetime watchdog.
Post now detects a call from the worker thread itself and routes the item to a
worker-local follow-up queue that WorkerLoop drains (iteratively, ahead of the channel)
right after the current item. Same processing path — ordinals, SignalLog, emit,
reduce, ApplyStep — just never blocking. Worker posts are accepted during the Stop
drain too, since the verdict belongs to the step being finished. ReentrantPostCount
exposed for observability/tests.
Tests: full channel + worker post releases a blocked foreign producer and processes the
verdict before the next channel item (fails against the previous code by hanging);
follow-up chain drained in order without recursion; verdict posted during Stop drain is
not lost. Docs: agent/decision-engine.md, agent/overview.md, log.md.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Agent endpoints authenticated per tenant but authorized session writes on a caller-supplied
session id. Sessions rows now carry the creating device identity (cert thumbprint + Intune
device id from the CN, or bootstrap code + serial) in primary-only Owner* columns.
SessionOwnershipPolicy evaluates register / telemetry / error-report requests against it;
SessionOwnerBindingObserver records the outcome on the request row, as a warning and as a
throttled SessionOwnerMismatch ops event. Nothing is rejected in this stage.
Agent: errorCode parsing on 401/403, one-shot session rotation on session_owner_mismatch
without feeding the auth-failure tracker, spool drop, agent_started.sessionRotated.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
SecurityValidator accepted certificate bytes from X-Client-Certificate when X-ARR-ClientCert was
absent. That header is client-writable, and certificate content alone carries no proof of private-key
possession — the TLS handshake does. On platform-cert-enforced routes the fallback was unreachable,
but /api/bootstrap/* is excluded from the platform cert requirement and an EMPTY X-Bootstrap-Token
passed the function gate (Headers.Contains) while the validator treated it as no token and fell
through to the certificate stage, where the fallback header was parsed (live-verified 2026-08-29).
- Only X-ARR-ClientCert is read; the platform strips inbound copies even on excluded paths.
- IsBootstrapRoute (path prefix mirroring the exclusion entry): missing/empty token or unwired
BootstrapSessionService => 401 before the certificate stage.
- GetBootstrapToken treats an empty header as absent; the three bootstrap functions use it.
- Tests: BootstrapRouteFailClosedTests. Docs: client-cert-tenant-binding.md transport section.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Oliver Kieselbach