mirror of
https://github.com/mulgadc/spinifex.git
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joshsiv-mulga
7003168bc5
Move spinifex/network/* to spinifex/domains/network/* as one enclosing move so the L0-L5 layer invariants keep classifying every package from a single root. Package names and dependency direction are unchanged; invariant scan roots, the RG-10 sudo allow-list path, CODEOWNERS and the repo-root walk in the IMDS netns unit test follow the new path.
67 lines
2.5 KiB
Go
67 lines
2.5 KiB
Go
//go:build integration
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package integration
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import (
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"context"
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"testing"
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"github.com/aws/aws-sdk-go/aws"
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"github.com/aws/aws-sdk-go/service/ec2"
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"github.com/mulgadc/spinifex/spinifex/domains/network/topology"
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"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
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)
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// TestVPCD_SecurityGroupReachesOVN asserts the synchronous half of the
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// handler-to-vpcd contract against a real responder. The SG topics use
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// utils.RequestEvent, so unlike the topology events these need no polling: by
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// the time the SDK call returns, vpcd has already committed to OVN.
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//
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// This is the case the tier previously faked outright with a canned
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// {"success":true} — the API call succeeded whether or not any OVN work was
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// possible, let alone correct.
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func TestVPCD_SecurityGroupReachesOVN(t *testing.T) {
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vpcd, c := startVPCDStack(t)
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ctx := context.Background()
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vpcID := createScratchVPC(t, c, "10.44.0.0/16")
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sgOut, err := c.CreateSecurityGroup(&ec2.CreateSecurityGroupInput{
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VpcId: aws.String(vpcID),
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GroupName: aws.String("integration-sg"),
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Description: aws.String("vpcd integration tier"),
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})
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require.NoError(t, err, "create-security-group in %s", vpcID)
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sgID := aws.StringValue(sgOut.GroupId)
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require.NotEmpty(t, sgID, "GroupId empty")
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pgName := topology.SecurityGroupPortGroup(sgID)
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pg, err := vpcd.OVN.GetPortGroup(ctx, pgName)
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require.NoError(t, err, "SG port group %s absent after create-security-group", pgName)
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baseACLs := len(pg.ACLs)
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_, err = c.AuthorizeSecurityGroupIngress(&ec2.AuthorizeSecurityGroupIngressInput{
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GroupId: aws.String(sgID),
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IpPermissions: []*ec2.IpPermission{{
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IpProtocol: aws.String("tcp"),
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FromPort: aws.Int64(22),
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ToPort: aws.Int64(22),
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IpRanges: []*ec2.IpRange{{CidrIp: aws.String("10.44.0.0/16")}},
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}},
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})
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require.NoError(t, err, "authorize-security-group-ingress on %s", sgID)
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// The rule count is the assertion, not the ACL match text: that the rule
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// crossed the wire at all is this tier's claim, while the match expression
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// it compiles to belongs to policy's own tests.
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pg, err = vpcd.OVN.GetPortGroup(ctx, pgName)
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require.NoError(t, err, "SG port group %s after authorize", pgName)
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require.Greater(t, len(pg.ACLs), baseACLs,
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"authorize-security-group-ingress added no ACL to port group %s", pgName)
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_, err = c.DeleteSecurityGroup(&ec2.DeleteSecurityGroupInput{GroupId: aws.String(sgID)})
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require.NoError(t, err, "delete-security-group %s", sgID)
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_, err = vpcd.OVN.GetPortGroup(ctx, pgName)
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require.Error(t, err, "SG port group %s still present after delete-security-group", pgName)
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}
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