* refactor: move telemetry file naming to contract
* docs: record telemetry contract move
* refactor: move aws xml response helpers
* docs: record aws xml helper move
* refactor: move aws tag projections to foundation
* docs: record aws tag projection move
* refactor: move account key to state foundation
* docs: record account key state move
* refactor: move host privilege escalation to runtime
* docs: record host privilege move
* chore: resolve lint findings from package-boundary moves
* refactor: move process supervision helpers to runtime host
* docs: record process supervision move
* refactor: move nbd endpoint helpers to compute runtime
* docs: record nbd endpoint move
* refactor: move image catalogue to operator
* docs: record image catalogue move
* refactor: move resource id generation to aws foundation
* docs: record resource id move
* refactor: move predastore role to runtime roles
* docs: point service manifest at acm domain
* docs: record predastore role move
* refactor: move northstar role to runtime roles
* docs: record northstar role move
* refactor: move awsgw role to runtime roles
* docs: record awsgw role move
* refactor: move error payload helpers to aws errors
* docs: record error payload move
* refactor: move account identifiers to aws identifiers
* docs: record account identifier move
* refactor: move NATS transport to messaging foundation
* docs: record NATS transport move
* refactor: move system instance contract to EC2 domain
* docs: record system instance move
* refactor: move system VPC builder to network domain
* docs: record system VPC move
* refactor: move instance metadata service to EC2 domain
* docs: record guest metadata move and dependency-rule debt
* refactor: move DNS control plane to DNS domain
* docs: record DNS domain move
* refactor: move base zone bootstrap to DNS domain
* docs: record base zone bootstrap move
* refactor: replace SystemAccountID with GlobalAccountID
* docs: record SystemAccountID removal
* refactor: extract CA key-pair loader to foundation pki
* docs: record foundation pki extraction
* refactor: move tenant CA paths to ACM domain
* docs: record tenant CA path move
* refactor: move IPsec certificate handling to network host
* docs: record IPsec certificate move
* refactor: move Ochre serving lifecycle to the Ochre domain
handlers/bedrock becomes domains/ochre. Ochre is the platform service;
Bedrock names only its AWS API surface. Persisted and observable
identifiers keep their bedrock names.
* docs: record Ochre domain move
* refactor: move Ochre vector store to the Ochre domain
handlers/ochrevector becomes domains/ochre/vector. Callers import it as
ochrevector because vector is a common local name in the gateway.
* docs: record Ochre vector store move
* refactor: move Hugging Face Hub client to the Ochre domain
gateway/bedrock/hfhub becomes domains/ochre/hfhub. Its only caller is
the spx admin ochre weights pull.
* docs: record Hugging Face Hub client move and Ochre gateway debt
* refactor: move EC2 tag mutation helpers to the EC2 domain
utils/tagmirror.go becomes domains/ec2/tagmirror. It is EC2-wide tag
mutation behaviour, and the tags resource package cannot host it
without a resource-to-resource import cycle.
* docs: record EC2 tag mutation move and migrate split finding
* refactor: move network packages under the network domain
Move spinifex/network/* to spinifex/domains/network/* as one enclosing
move so the L0-L5 layer invariants keep classifying every package from
a single root. Package names and dependency direction are unchanged;
invariant scan roots, the RG-10 sudo allow-list path, CODEOWNERS and
the repo-root walk in the IMDS netns unit test follow the new path.
* docs: record network domain move
* refactor: move standalone EC2 resource packages to the EC2 domain
Move handlers/ec2/{account,key,launchtemplate,placementgroup,
spotinstance,volumestate} to domains/ec2/<resource>. Each package is
named after its directory and callers import it as ec2<resource>;
volumestate already carried its directory name.
* docs: record standalone EC2 resource moves
* refactor: move EC2 VPC networking packages to the EC2 domain
Move handlers/ec2/{vpc,eigw,eip,igw,natgw,routetable} to
domains/ec2/<resource>, each named after its directory and imported as
ec2<resource>. The reconcile drift-watch source scan now matches the
ec2<resource> bucket qualifiers; its rule is unchanged.
* docs: record EC2 VPC networking moves
* refactor: move EC2 compute and storage packages to the EC2 domain
Move handlers/ec2/{instance,volume,snapshot,image,tags} to
domains/ec2/<resource>, each named after its directory and imported as
ec2<resource>, which empties handlers/ec2. The daemon's e2e suite
selection now lists the moved EC2 resource paths in place of
handlers/ec2, so EC2-only changes select the daemon suites again.
* docs: record EC2 compute and storage moves
* refactor: move ECR credential provider to the EKS agent tree
Move the kubelet exec credential provider implementation from
cmd/ecr-credential-provider to agents/eks/credentialprovider, exposing
one Main(in, out) entry point. The binary keeps its name and FIPS boot
import as a thin main. Moving out of cmd/ brings the code under gosec;
the one G101 hit on the kubelet API version constant is annotated.
* docs: record ECR credential provider move
* refactor: move EKS gateway publish helper to the EKS agent tree
Move the eks-gateway-publish implementation to agents/eks/gatewaypublish
behind Run(ctx, Config) error. The binary keeps flag definitions,
environment defaults, parsing, its log prefix and exit code; each former
fatal site returns an error with the same text. The retry wait now also
honours context cancellation, which the binary never triggers.
* docs: record EKS gateway publish move
* refactor: move EKS gateway fetch helper to the EKS agent tree
Move the eks-gateway-fetch implementation to agents/eks/gatewayfetch
behind Run(ctx, Config) error, writing its TSV to Config.Out. The binary
keeps flag definitions, environment defaults, parsing, its log prefix and
exit code; each former fatal site returns an error with the same text.
* docs: record EKS gateway fetch move
* refactor: move EKS webhook cert helper to the EKS agent tree
cmd/eks-webhook-cert keeps flag parsing, the log prefix and the exit;
agents/eks/webhookcert owns Config and Run. Output, error text, file
modes and exit codes are unchanged.
* docs: record EKS webhook cert move
* refactor: move EKS konnectivity cert helper to the EKS agent tree
cmd/eks-konnectivity-cert keeps flag parsing, the log prefix and the
exit; agents/eks/konnectivitycert owns Config and Run. Output, error
text, file modes and exit codes are unchanged.
* docs: record EKS konnectivity cert move
* refactor: move EKS token webhook to the EKS agent tree
cmd/eks-token-webhook keeps the -addr flag, environment-derived
config, logging setup and exits; agents/eks/tokenwebhook owns Config
and Run. The handlers/eks TokenReview result type stays as recorded
temporary debt.
* docs: record EKS token webhook move
* refactor: move ECS agent runtime and credentials packages to the ECS agent tree
* docs: record ECS agent subpackage move
* refactor: move ECS agent implementation to the ECS agent tree
cmd/ecs-agent keeps process lifecycle: signal context, the separate New
and Run calls, both failure log lines, the exit and the ldflags-set
build version, now passed in through Config.AgentVersion.
agents/ecs/agent owns Config, LoadConfig and the agent.
* docs: record ECS agent move
* refactor: move RDS guest agent to agents/rds/agent
* docs: record RDS guest agent move
* refactor: move installer packages to operator/installer
* docs: record installer move
* refactor: move spx command tree to operator/cli
Moving the command tree out of cmd/ brings it under errcheck and gosec.
Flag and config wiring now fails loudly instead of silently dropping a
binding, listing commands fail when they cannot write their table, and
the formation server's unauthenticated TLS is annotated as a known gap.
* docs: record spx command tree move
* chore: accept known vulnerabilities with an expiry
The vulnerability scan failed preflight on a containerd advisory that dev
already carries and that is deferred to a separate dependency update. The
gate now passes only reachable findings listed with an expiry date, fails
on any new one or on an expired acceptance, and warns when an acceptance
is no longer needed.
* refactor: move EC2 account action adapters to domains/ec2/awsapi
* refactor: move EC2 capacityreservation action adapters to domains/ec2/awsapi
* refactor: move EC2 key action adapters to domains/ec2/awsapi
* refactor: move EC2 launchtemplate action adapters to domains/ec2/awsapi
* refactor: move EC2 placementgroup action adapters to domains/ec2/awsapi
* docs: record EC2 standalone action adapter moves
* refactor: move EC2 zone action adapters to domains/ec2/awsapi
* refactor: move EC2 vpc action adapters to domains/ec2/awsapi
* refactor: move EC2 eigw action adapters to domains/ec2/awsapi
* refactor: move EC2 eip action adapters to domains/ec2/awsapi
* refactor: move EC2 igw action adapters to domains/ec2/awsapi
* refactor: move EC2 natgw action adapters to domains/ec2/awsapi
* refactor: move EC2 routetable action adapters to domains/ec2/awsapi
* docs: record EC2 VPC networking action adapter moves
* refactor: move EC2 image action adapters to domains/ec2/awsapi
* refactor: move EC2 snapshot action adapters to domains/ec2/awsapi
* refactor: move EC2 volume action adapters to domains/ec2/awsapi
* refactor: move EC2 tags action adapters to domains/ec2/awsapi
* docs: record EC2 storage and tag action adapter moves
* refactor: move EC2 resource authorization scopes to domains/ec2/awsapi
* refactor: move EC2 idempotency adapter to domains/ec2/awsapi
* refactor: move EC2 instance action adapters to domains/ec2/awsapi
* refactor: move EC2 spotinstance action adapters to domains/ec2/awsapi
* docs: record EC2 instance action adapter moves
* refactor: move AWS REST-JSON router to ingress/aws/rest
* refactor: move SigV4 auth-failure rate limiter to ingress/aws/ratelimit
* docs: record AWS ingress helper moves and tooling conformance
* docs: correct historical lifecycle references
* test: characterize ECR control-plane dispatch before registration seam
* feat: add AWS ingress service registration contract
* docs: record ingress registration phases 0 and 1
* refactor: route registered AWS services through the ingress dispatch registry
The gateway now consumes ingress/aws/dispatch. A registered service is
accepted by the auth gate, resolves its own action label, renders errors in
its declared envelope and is dispatched with an authenticated Invocation
(account, region, policy authorisation and a lazy verified actor). Every
other service keeps the existing switch, now named as the legacy path.
The awsgw role wires an empty registry and refuses to start if a registered
name is also served by the legacy table. No service is registered yet, so
behaviour for every existing service is unchanged.
* docs: record ingress dispatch registry consumption
* refactor: register the ECR control plane from its domain
domains/ecr/awsapi now registers the "ecr" AWS JSON 1.1 surface with the
ingress dispatch registry: action resolution, resource scope, authorisation
through the invocation, the composed capabilities and the success writer all
live with the domain. The awsgw role is the only serving composition point;
the gateway no longer imports the ECR API package and ECR leaves the legacy
service table, JSON error table and dispatch switch. The OCI /v2 route is
unchanged.
Operation coverage reads ECR's declared inventory, which the registration
uses verbatim; coverage.json is byte-identical.
* docs: record ECR control-plane registration
* fix: compose the ECR control plane in the integration harness
The harness stopped wiring ECR's composed capabilities when the
authorization-token action was composed, so every integration test that
creates a repository or mints a token got ServerInternal. It now composes
ECR as the awsgw role does, sharing the OCI registry, meta store and token
issuer the /v2 data plane uses.
* docs: record ingress pipeline deferral
* refactor: extract AWS error envelope rendering to ingress
ingress/aws/envelope owns the EC2, IAM-style and S3 XML error envelopes, the
AWS JSON 1.1 error body and X-Amzn-Errortype value, the JSON-protocol header
detector and the two error content types. Each shape keeps its own builder.
The gateway error writers, ErrorHandler and the legacy per-service envelope
selection stay in gateway and call the new package; gateway/eks renders its
JSON errors through it directly. A 140-case status/header/body golden
comparison across services and error writers was identical before and after.
* docs: record error envelope extraction
* refactor: move AWS service selection into ingress dispatch
Selector answers served, action, error protocol, registered entry and
startup overlap. The gateway supplies its legacy tables through the
dispatch.Legacy interface; legacy dispatch and invocation building stay
in gateway.
* docs: record ingress service selection move
* test: characterize ACM control-plane dispatch before registration
Pins full-pipeline error envelopes, a successful action, target parsing
agreement between dispatch and telemetry, authorization before the NATS
call, 413 and 503 paths, throttle/trace/audit action and the inventory.
* refactor: register ACM control plane from its domain
domains/acm/awsapi registers the acm JSON 1.1 surface through the
ingress dispatch registry, wired by the awsgw role. The gateway drops
ACM_Request, the ACM action table and every legacy acm entry; the
import invariant now covers each registered domain.
* docs: record ACM registration
* docs: record ECS, EKS and RDS source inventory and first-resource ranking
* docs: record EKS control-plane secrets persisted in the cluster record
* chore: drop containerd advisory acceptance now that dev ships v2.4.1
* test: characterize RDS DB subnet group lifecycle before extraction
* docs: record RDS DB subnet group lifecycle contract
* refactor: extract the RDS DB subnet group lifecycle owner
domains/rds/subnetgroup owns the db-subnet-groups/{name} record, member
subnet validation and the delete in-use guard. handlers/rds keeps AWS
validation, projection and paging and binds two consumer-owned
capabilities: the owner's Dependants (instances naming the group) and the
instance side's subnetGroupPlacement. Stored shape and behaviour are
unchanged.
* docs: record RDS DB subnet group owner extraction
* docs: correct RDS subnet group tagging debt and conformance scope
* test: characterize ECS task definition lifecycle before extraction
* docs: record ECS task definition lifecycle contract
* refactor: extract ECS task definition owner into domains/ecs/taskdefinition
Move the task definition record, container types, keys, reference parsing,
ARN helpers and the register/deregister/resolve/list logic into a resource
owner package. Stored JSON field names and KV keys are unchanged, and
revision allocation keeps its existing non-atomic read-then-write.
The owner declares its own PortMapping and SystemControl persisted types so
it no longer depends on handlers/ecs/bus; the handler translates them onto
the assign payload. Task and service launches reach task definitions only
through a launch-side taskDefinitionResolver. AWS conversion, the guest
projection and tags stay in handlers/ecs, and gateway authz only switches to
the moved reference/ARN helpers.
List handlers/ecs and the new package under spinifex_daemon so ECS-only
changes select e2e-ecs.
* docs: record ECS task definition owner extraction
* test: characterize EKS access entry lifecycle before extraction
* docs: record EKS access entry lifecycle contract
* refactor: extract EKS access entry owner into domains/eks/access
Move the access entry record, associated policy and scope types, keys,
PrincipalARNHash, the policy catalogue and group mapping into a resource
owner package. Stored JSON field names and KV keys are unchanged.
Owner is the only writer: Create, SeedCreatorAdmin, Update, Associate,
Disassociate and Delete carry the existing logic verbatim, and the put,
compare-and-set and delete primitives are private. The handler keeps AWS
validation, the cluster existence check, error mapping and projection.
Token review still reads records through the exported Get, and the cluster
prefix purge still sweeps entry keys.
List handlers/eks and the new package under spinifex_daemon so EKS-only
changes select the EKS suites.
* docs: record EKS access entry owner extraction
* test: characterize RDS engine catalogue before extraction
* fix: return InvalidParameterValue for a missing RDS master password
ValidateMasterUserPassword built the empty-password error with a bare
errors.New carrying the code only in its text, which awserrors does not
resolve, so CreateDBInstance without MasterUserPassword returned HTTP 500
ServerInternal. Build it with awserrors.Errorf like the other branches so
the gateway returns 400 InvalidParameterValue, and cover the full gateway
to RDS service path with a regression test.
* docs: record RDS engine catalogue boundary and evidence
* refactor: extract RDS engine catalogue into domains/rds/engine
Move engine identity and validation, the per-engine parameter catalogues,
effective-parameter resolution, db.* instance classes and engine/orderable
selection into an engine package. Behaviour, error codes and ordering are
unchanged.
The package imports no EC2 package: instance-class memory comes from an
immutable Sizing value built from an engine-declared InstanceTypes
interface, backed by the fixed instance-type table in handlers/rds.
Effective parameters leave as an engine-owned Setting, converted to
Parameter in handlers/rds. AWS output building, paging, apply-method
mapping, storage limits and the gateway runnable check stay in the
adapter path.
The RDS agent declares its own EngineCatalog interface and types and
receives an engine-backed implementation from cmd/rds-agent, so agent
code does not import the catalogue. Cross-engine tests use the two real
engines instead of a registered fake.
* docs: record RDS engine catalogue owner move
* test: characterize RDS DB parameter group lifecycle before extraction
* docs: record RDS DB parameter group lifecycle contract
* refactor: extract RDS DB parameter group owner
Move the parameter group and override records, keys and listing into
domains/rds/parametergroup behind an Owner. Delete asks an owner-declared
Dependants interface; instance-side resolution reads through its own
parameterGroupValues interface. SetOverrides refuses an unknown group so
no override key is written without its group. Stored shape, keys, public
errors and propagation are unchanged.
* docs: record RDS DB parameter group owner extraction
* test: characterize EKS add-on lifecycle and guest wire
Pin the persisted record and manifest layout, create/update/delete and
status-report transitions, the ignored client token and report version,
the missing serviceAccountRoleArn PassRole check, and the exact internal
add-ons HTTP body and agent TSV output as they stand today.
* docs: record EKS add-on lifecycle contract
* fix: require iam:PassRole for EKS add-on service account role
CreateAddon and UpdateAddon now pass serviceAccountRoleArn through the
existing EKS PassedRoleARNs path, so the caller needs iam:PassRole on the
role for eks.amazonaws.com, matching CreateCluster and CreateNodegroup.
* docs: record EKS add-on PassRole check
* refactor: extract EKS add-on owner
Move the add-on catalogue, record and manifest keys, CAS, status
transitions and staging into domains/eks/addon behind an Owner that is
the sole writer. The handler keeps AWS validation, error mapping and
projection; the cluster reconciler delegates reports through the narrow
addonReports interface; node groups call EnsureGPUDevicePlugin. Stored
keys, JSON shape, wire types and lifecycle behaviour are unchanged.
* docs: record EKS add-on owner extraction
* refactor: extract EKS add-on guest wire contract
Move the add-on status subject, delivery phase, status report, staged
manifest and internal add-ons response into contracts/eks/v1 and use it
from the handler, gateway and gatewayfetch, replacing the agent's
duplicate. Wire bytes are unchanged, including the internal add-ons body
that the SDK renderer emits with Go field names; compatibility tests pin
the JSON, the guest printf form and the TSV.
* docs: record EKS add-on wire contract extraction
* docs: update EKS add-on inventory and remaining edges
* docs: draft EKS add-on lifecycle correction design for review
* chore: run contracts tests in the default test, coverage and race targets
* docs: apply review decisions to EKS add-on lifecycle design
* test: characterize EKS add-on v1 compatibility with added fields
Pin which owner writes drop unknown record and manifest fields, that
reads and deletes ignore or erase them, that one undecodable entry fails
a listing, and that v1 wire consumers ignore extra fields.
* docs: add EKS add-on executor, bundle, v1 compatibility and release inventories
* docs: draft EKS add-on v2 guest contract design for review
* docs: qualify historical architecture references
* docs: apply review decisions and ADR-0006 to EKS add-on v2 design
* fix(eks): bind internal report publishing to the caller's cluster
PublishInternal was authorised by IAM policy alone, with its resource
built from the body accountId and the URL cluster. The control-plane
role grants it on "*", so any control-plane VM session, any tenant
holding eks:*, or static system credentials could publish cluster
state, bootstrap and add-on reports for another cluster or account.
PublishInternal now passes the existing internal-route gate: the caller
must be a control-plane instance-role session that is a member of the
URL cluster in the body account. The gate and the handler decode the
body through one shared decoder, so the account checked is the account
the subject is built from. Every unauthorised target returns the same
AccessDenied, and invalid account or cluster names are treated as not
found. Valid publishes keep their subjects and payload bytes.
* fix(eks): bind webhook token review to the caller's cluster
WebhookTokenReview took its account from the request body and was
authorised by IAM policy alone, with the control-plane role granting it
on "*". A control-plane VM, any tenant holding eks:*, or static system
credentials could resolve a token against another cluster or account
and learn the Kubernetes groups it maps to there. Error responses also
distinguished absent accounts from absent clusters.
WebhookTokenReview now passes the same internal-route gate as
PublishInternal: a control-plane instance-role session that is a member
of the URL cluster in the body account. The gate and the handler share
one body decoder, each body-scoped internal route must declare its
reader, and every unauthorised target returns the same AccessDenied
without reaching STS verification. Same-cluster responses are unchanged.
* fix(eks): validate add-on serviceAccountRoleArn syntax
CreateAddon and UpdateAddon stored serviceAccountRoleArn without
checking it was an ARN, and the guest renders the value into the
add-on's manifests. A non-empty value must now be syntactically an IAM
role ARN (12-digit account, no region, role resource, IAM name and path
rules); anything else returns InvalidParameterException before any
record is written or manifest staged.
The syntax check is foundation/aws/arn.ValidateRoleARN. iam:PassRole at
the gateway remains the permission and existence check. Stored values
are not rewritten, and an UpdateAddon that omits the field still
succeeds on a record holding a legacy value.
* docs: record EKS internal-route and role-ARN security corrections
* docs: add EKS add-on release membership and activation case study
* fix: point UI build, CI and lint rules at moved package paths
* docs: record EKS add-on activation review decisions
* refactor: move quota admission to domains/admission/quota
Relocate the quota service, live counters and vCPU records from
handlers/quota to domains/admission/quota. Package renamed from
handlers_quota to quota; callers with a local quota identifier import it
as admissionquota. KV buckets, subjects and error codes are unchanged, and
the package's existing debt edges move with it unchanged.
* docs: reconcile package-boundary record for ADR-0001 close-out
Add the missing slice rows (the commits that dissolved spinifex/types, the
ECR repository projection, the stale-path fix and the quota move), correct
stale entries, record the dependency-rule breaks found in the import graph
with removal conditions, add the close-out table of remaining legacy paths
with their decided target owners, recount the mulga-side follow-ups, and
fix stale old-path references in docs and comments.
* test: move KV migration engine tests to foundation/state/migrate
The Registry and RunKV tests exercise foundation/state/migrate exclusively
but lived in spinifex/migrate's test file. Relocate them, with their NATS
helpers, to the package that owns the engine. No test name, assertion or
behaviour changes.
* refactor: move config and object-store upgrade workflow to operator/upgrade
Relocate spinifex/migrate, the operator-driven config-file and object-store
upgrade workflow behind spx admin upgrade, to operator/upgrade. Package
renamed to upgrade (imported as opupgrade where a local upgrade identifier
exists). It stays distinct from foundation/state/migrate, the generic KV
migration engine; no registry types, migration names, versions, file
formats or command names change.
* docs: record migrate move to operator/upgrade
* test: enforce ADR-0001 layering with a blocking ratchet
Add spinifex/architecture/layering, a test-only package that parses the
module's import graph, maps every production package to an ADR-0001
layer and checks each dependency rule as its own subtest. Existing
violations are allow-listed against their recorded debt; a new forbidden
edge, an unmapped package, a stale allowlist entry or a new package
under a frozen legacy root fails local preflight and CI.
Record the nine edges the test found missing from the migration record
(quota -> EC2 instance types, STS/Ochre/ELBv2 -> IAM, ELBv2
cross-domain, installer UI -> admin), name the importers of the utils
residuals and gateway/ec2_idempotency.go, and correct the handlers/iam
consumer list.
* refactor: drop the legacy handlers_ecr import alias
Import domains/ecr under its package name, or as ecrdomain where the
file also imports the AWS SDK ecr package, matching acmdomain. Also fix
a stale daemon file reference in the integration ECR daemon comment.
* chore: mark spf13/pflag as a direct dependency
operator/cli/wiring.go imports pflag directly. Same version; no upgrade.
* docs: record test-package-check and nilaway as unverified gates
* refactor: move the layering test to module-root architecture/
The ADR-0001 layering ratchet is repository governance tooling, not
Spinifex product code, so it sits beside tests/ rather than under the
spinifex/ product tree. make test, test-cover and test-race now include
./architecture/..., and the graph walk excludes architecture/.
* fix: update paths left stale by the package moves
The MariaDB image stamp test read the RDS engine from
handlers/rds/engine_mariadb.go, so test-images failed in CI; it now reads
domains/rds/engine/mariadb.go. Comments citing moved files now name
their new locations.
* refactor: move the default-VPC subject into contracts/ec2/v1
utils.SubjectEnsureDefaultVpc becomes ec2v1.EnsureDefaultVpcSubject, the
request/reply route between gateway account creation and the daemon.
Only the subject moves; the request and reply bodies are still anonymous
structs on each side and are recorded as such in the contract README.
The layering freeze now allows two utils files.
* docs: qualify the migrate split and record admin and Viperblock findings
The migrate row is a split, not an exact ADR-0001 map row, and needs a map
clarification. Correct the stale admin consumers, record the operator-only
admin files as movable, the vbwire prerequisite for the Viperblock adapter
and the capability decision encryption.go needs.
* refactor: move operator-only admin code to operator/admin
Config generation, certificate issuance, host discovery, telemetry,
email validation and image import/removal/orphan-volume tooling move
to operator/admin. Legacy admin keeps only the symbols with
non-operator consumers: default account identifiers, AWS credential
generators and system image promotion.
foundation/pki and the tenant ACM CA are unchanged. The readAMI
helper and the removal test fixtures are duplicated privately in
legacy admin rather than shared across the split. The now-stale
operator/installer/ui -> admin layering allowlist entry is removed.
* docs: record operator/admin split in package-boundary migration
* test: pin viperblockd fence, abandon and dirty-marker wire shapes
Characterization tests against the current vbwire package, before it
moves to contracts/viperblockd/legacy/v1: both subject forms for the
fenced and abandon routes, golden JSON for VolumeFencedEvent,
VolumeAbandonRequest, VolumeAbandonResponse and DirtyRecord, the dirty
bucket name, and the volume-key pattern shared by the lease and dirty
stores.
* refactor: move viperblockd fence, abandon and dirty-marker vocabulary to contracts
Move the fence and abandon subjects/DTOs, the dirty bucket name,
DirtyRecord and the shared volume-key pattern out of vbwire and into
contracts/viperblockd/legacy/v1, alongside the package's existing
mount/unmount/delete/sync/config-update routes. vbwire keeps only the
I/O helpers (BindDirtyBucket, ListUnsealedVolumes), now built on the
contract vocabulary instead of defining it.
Record the approved dirty-marker ownership boundary in the contract
README: the Viperblock adapter is the sole producer, viperblockd was
only its transitional custodian. Document the fence and abandon routes
and the dirty bucket in docs/service-interfaces.yaml.
* refactor: split the Viperblock EBS adapter out of services/viperblockd
Move the EBS provider adapter (volume lease, fence, dirty marker,
nbdkit recovery, provider handlers, encryption key loading) to
providers/ebs/viperblock. services/viperblockd keeps only process
lifecycle and the NATS subscription wiring that starts and stops it.
The dirty-bucket read path moves to providers/ebs/viperblock/dirty as
a read-only ListUnsealedVolumes capability; the adapter's write, clear
and purge logic stays unexported in the adapter package. Delete
services/viperblockd/vbwire now that its vocabulary lives in
contracts/viperblockd/legacy/v1 and its I/O helpers live in dirty.
Update operator/cli, the runtime service registry, qemunbdd's config
comment and the integration test harness to the new import paths, and
drop the now-stale architecture/layering allowlist and frozen-package
entries for the deleted package. Behaviour, persisted keys and NATS
subjects are unchanged.
* refactor: move the viperblockd role to runtime/roles/viperblockd
With the EBS adapter in providers/ebs/viperblock, services/viperblockd
holds only role supervision and the opt-in live data-path tests, so it
joins the other runtime roles. It was the last package under services/;
the frozen legacy list drops it.
* docs: record viperblockd contract, adapter and role moves
* test: characterise vpc.* network-realisation routes
Pin every vpc.* subject, JSON payload shape and the request/reply
{success,error} ack envelope exactly as they exist today, ahead of
introducing contracts/network/v1. Covers the 22 subjects registered
by domains/network/subscribers, the vpc.igw-attach/detach subjects
and InternetGatewayEvent already owned by contracts/ec2/v1, the
utils.AddNAT/PublishNATEvent client wire behaviour including the
delete-nat retry-on-ErrNoResponders budget, and the EC2-side NATEvent
and SGEvent/SGRule duplicates in domains/ec2/vpc.
Also adds the six vpc.* route-table and system-egress subjects that
were missing from service-interfaces.yaml despite being live
production routes (vpc.add/delete-igw-route, vpc.gate/ungate-subnet-
egress, vpc.add/delete-system-egress).
* feat: add contracts/network/v1 for vpc.* realisation routes
Declare the versioned wire vocabulary for the vpc.* control-plane-to-
network-realisation boundary: subjects, payload types, the shared
{success,error} ack envelope and the vpcd-workers queue group, one
file per route family. No NATS I/O, no consumer switched over yet;
the package coexists with the fragmented originals pinned in the
prior characterization commit until slice 3 migrates call sites.
* refactor: use contracts/network/v1 for vpc.* producers and consumers
Switch every vpc.* producer (domains/ec2/vpc, eip, instance, natgw,
routetable, igw, handlers/elbv2, handlers/eks, daemon, systemvpc) and the
network/subscribers consumer onto contracts/network/v1 subjects, event
types and the shared AckEnvelope. contracts/network/v1 becomes the sole
owner of vpc.igw-attach/detach, replacing the duplicate definitions in
contracts/ec2/v1.
Deletes the duplicated local subject constants and event structs:
subscribers' Topic* consts and event structs, vpc.NATEvent and SGEvent,
eip's natEvent, natgw's natGatewayEvent, and eks's systemEgressEvent.
domains/ec2/vpc.SGRule survives because EC2 persists it directly in
SecurityGroupRecord; contracts/network/v1.SecurityGroupRule was expanded
in slice 2 to match it field-for-field so wire bytes are unchanged.
No lifecycle or reliability changes: the NAT add barrier, delete
retry-on-ErrNoResponders, and the inconsistent per-call-site NAT
delivery modes (EIP AssociateAddress and DeleteNetworkInterface both stay
fire-and-forget with no ack) are preserved exactly, as are the golden
wire literals pinned in the characterization tests.
* refactor: replace utils/vpcd_event.go with a typed network projection client
Every vpc.* call site now goes through domains/network/projection's
operation-specific methods instead of utils.AddNAT, utils.PublishNATEvent
or utils.RequestEvent, so no caller passes a bare subject string. Each
method states today's delivery mode by name: AddNAT stays strict,
AddNATBestEffort and AnnounceNATAdd/AnnounceNATDelete keep the gaps those
call sites already had, and RemoveNAT keeps the ErrNoResponders retry.
utils/vpcd_event.go and its tests are deleted; the behaviour they pinned
(wire shape, ack envelope, retry-on-no-responders) moved into the
projection package's own golden and nat tests, unchanged. utils/ now
holds only encryption.go, which this does not touch.
* refactor: route the remaining fire-and-forget vpc.* producers through projection
CreateVPC/DeleteVPC, CreateSubnet/DeleteSubnet, AttachInternetGateway/
DetachInternetGateway, AddNATGateway/RemoveNATGateway, AddIGWRoute/
RemoveIGWRoute, GateSubnetEgress/UngateSubnetEgress and RemoveSystemEgress
were still publishing through natsmsg.PublishEvent or a raw nc.Publish
call with a bare subject string, left over from the mechanical slice 3
pass. Each now goes through its named projection.Client method instead,
so every vpc.* producer in the tree uses the typed client.
* refactor: move EBS encryption posture to domains/ec2/ebs/encryption and delete utils
The master-key loader was used only by EC2 image, instance and volume to
derive the AWS-visible Encrypted flag. It becomes ebsencryption.Enabled,
EC2's temporary reading of the provider's key-file setting; the cache,
empty-path meaning, error text and each caller's error handling are
unchanged (image still reports unencrypted when the key will not load).
Its successor is a providers/ebs capability reporting volume encryption
posture.
utils/ is now empty and deleted. The layering test drops utils and
services from the legacy roots, removes their allowlist entries and fails
if either retired root regains files. The S7 subject scan follows the
vpc.* literals from utils to contracts/network so its gap list stays
complete.
* docs: record the network contract, projection client and utils removal
* test: characterise instance-state persistence, recovery and generation handling
Pin the current local-file bytes and schema failure modes, the instance
bucket configuration, record key and wire form, the bucket version gate,
generation preservation across every KV writer and the VM conversion, and
what a returning node does for a missing, foreign, terminal or unreadable
canonical record. These describe current behaviour, not the ADR-0007 target.
* test: freeze direct instance-state consumers
Add an AST ratchet over production code that fails when a new file names
the daemon's instance-state bucket, record keys, local-file API, the raw
vm.InstanceRecord or its conversion, or a JetStreamManager instance-state
method. Today's 73 uses form a shrink-only allowlist keyed to the slice 0
inventory; stale entries fail, and a synthetic-source self-test proves the
matcher detects each kind of use and ignores declarations.
* docs: record ADR-0007 slice 0 instance-state inventory
Record the instance-state persistence formats, the nineteen direct
consumers by process and access kind, the characterised recovery and
schema outcomes, the generation-preservation matrix and the ratchet that
freezes the consumer set. Nothing conforms to ADR-0007 yet and vpcd stays
blocked.
* test: narrow the instance-state ratchet to instance-state access
Stop freezing the JetStreamManager type and constructor, which also serve
cluster state; flag only instance-state methods, bucket and key identifiers,
record codecs and local-state access. The cluster-state-only consumers in
daemon_mgmt_ip.go and operator/cli/cluster.go leave the allowlist (73 to 67).
The self-test now proves a cluster-state use is ignored and an instance-state
method call is caught. Record the owner's disposition of the KV-unavailable
restore result in the migration record.
* docs: record the narrowed instance-state ratchet commit
* docs: design the instance-state transition record and activation gate
* docs: record the instance-state transition-record design commit
* docs: record slice 1a activation-gate decisions
* feat: add instance transition-record codec with format marker
Adds DecodeTransitionRecord and TransitionRecord.Encode in the record's owner
package. A top-level format member selects the shape: absent or 1 decodes the
legacy record and is never given a marker on write; 2 also decodes the new
assignment and observation sections; an integer above 2 decodes its legacy
fields read-only and Encode refuses it; anything else is refused on decode.
Encode applies only the typed paths that differ from the decode-time snapshot
onto the input, so unknown members at every object level and unchanged known
fields keep their read form. A changed array is replaced whole. Decode refuses
malformed JSON, duplicate keys at any depth, keys that alias a known field by
case, trailing data and a non-object record, each with its own sentinel.
No production reader or writer uses the codec yet; the new types are not
part of vm.InstanceRecord, so every existing record encodes unchanged. The
codec file is registered as an owner file of the instance-state ratchet.
* docs: record slice 1b step 1 codec and awsgw rollout qualification
Records the codec added in e62f921d2 as design Section 10 (C1 to C7): its
surface, preservation at every object level, the changed-array limitation,
marker handling, the rejection classes and its capable-writers-only scope. C2
supersedes P1's top-level-only preservation for the codec. G19 records that
old read-only gateway consumers remain safe but DescribeInstanceStatus gains
unconfirmed/degraded visibility only after awsgw upgrades. The migration record
gains the commit row and states that no production path uses the codec yet.
* refactor: move the instance transition-record codec to domains/ec2/instance/state
The codec defines how the canonical persisted instance record evolves, with
its assignment and observation sections, which is EC2 instance ownership rather
than node-local VM supervision. It moves unchanged into its own package and
keeps wrapping the legacy vm.InstanceRecord alias and its spec and status
types, which stay in runtime/compute/vm for now.
The domain-to-runtime import is recorded as new dependency-rule debt with its
removal condition and allow-listed against that entry. The instance-state
ratchet now names the new file as an owner file; its allowlist is unchanged.
* fix: refuse array changes that would drop element extensions
A changed array is replaced whole by the writer's value, which silently lost
any member a newer writer had added inside its elements. Encode now inspects
the array as read: if any element carries a member its typed schema does not
know, at any depth, it returns ErrRecordExtensionConflict naming the array and
the first such member. Arrays without such members are still replaced whole,
unchanged arrays are still kept verbatim, and arrays inside unknown members are
never inspected.
* docs: record the codec move and the array extension-conflict rule
Records 8db9771fb and c617914a1. T1 and Section 10 now name
domains/ec2/instance/state as the eventual owner of the persisted instance
record and its evolution, with vm.InstanceRecord as the temporary legacy type
it wraps. C3 replaces the changed-array limitation with the refusal: a changed
array with element extensions fails with ErrRecordExtensionConflict and is never
silently dropped. P2 stays a conservative rule until finalisation.
* fix: refuse removals that would drop record extension fields
A capable writer may no longer remove or replace a known object, map entry or
array when its stored value carries members the writer's schema does not know.
The check that guarded changed arrays now runs wherever the merge drops or
overwrites a stored value instead of merging into it: a known member deleted or
set to null, a map entry removed or stored under a key the typed decode
rewrote, a value of another JSON kind, and a changed array. Encode returns
ErrRecordExtensionConflict naming the changed container and the first unknown
member. Removal stays allowed when the stored value has no extensions, and a
change merged member by member still keeps unknown members.
* docs: record the uniform extension-conflict rule
Adds design clause C8 for 0d7b4266d: a capable writer may not remove or
replace a known object, map entry or array whose stored value carries unknown
structured extension fields; removal without extensions stays allowed. C3 and
C5 point at it. The migration record gains the commit row, updated subsection
wording and a pointer-bump follow-up deferring make docs-portal to the Mulga
gitlink PR so the portal evaluates the proposed Spinifex revision.
* refactor: inject vpcd's IMDS instance-state readers from the instance state boundary
* docs: cite the vpcd reader injection commit in the migration record
* refactor: move vpcd to runtime/roles/vpcd
* docs: cite the vpcd move commit in the migration record
* refactor: move the ECS agent wire vocabulary to contracts/ecs/v1
Move handlers/ecs/bus to contracts/ecs/v1 (package ecsv1) with no legacy
shim. Subject strings, JSON fields and types are byte-identical; the old-agent
compatibility test moves unchanged and golden pins cover the remaining
message types. The README route table records that only service-reconcile
has a live producer today; the agent reuses these payload types through the
gateway actions. service-interfaces.yaml lists ecs.bus.* under the daemon.
* refactor: move system-image promotion to domains/ec2/image
Move images_promote.go and its tests from admin to domains/ec2/image:
SystemOwnerAlias, PromoteImageOpts/PromoteImageResult, PromoteSystemImage,
GetAMIMetadata and the private snapshot reader. Storage, ordering, errors and
promotion behaviour are unchanged; the daemon, gateway/spx and operator CLI
callers import ec2image. admin now holds only account IDs and key generators.
* docs: record the ECS contract and image-promotion moves and the remaining-roots matrix
* refactor: move the bootstrap account identifiers to foundation/aws/identifiers
DefaultAccountID and DefaultAccountName join GlobalAccountID as the fixed,
platform-reserved identity of the first human-facing bootstrap account.
Names and values are unchanged and stay fixed. Callers in daemon, gateway,
awsgw, accountteardown and the operator CLI use awsidentifiers; admin now
holds only the IAM credential generators.
* docs: cite the bootstrap account identifier move in the migration record
* refactor: inject the STS cluster JWKS lookup from handlers/eks
handlers/sts declares ClusterJWKSResolver and keeps JWKS decoding and
InvalidIdentityToken mapping; handlers/eks implements it as
OIDCJWKSReader beside the bucket and key layout helpers. awsgw and the
integration harness inject the reader. STS no longer imports any EKS
package, including tests, and the handlers/sts -> handlers/eks layering
exception is removed.
* docs: cite the STS JWKS resolver cut in the migration record
* refactor: move the AWS credential-format generators to foundation/aws/credentials and retire admin
GenerateAWSAccessKey and GenerateAWSSecretKey move unchanged to
foundation/aws/credentials as a stateless format primitive. handlers/iam
and operator/cli import it directly. The admin legacy root is deleted
and joins the retired roots so it cannot return.
* docs: cite the admin retirement in the migration record
* revert: remove the uncalled ADR-0007 codec and design stack from the ADR-0001 checkpoint
The instance transition-record codec, its tests and the slice 1a design
had no production caller. They leave this package-boundary checkpoint
and will be reapplied on a dedicated ADR-0007 branch. Slice 0
characterisation and the vpcd IMDS readers in
domains/ec2/instance/state stay.
* docs: cite the ADR-0007 codec revert in the migration record
* fix: declare the ECS action subjects in service-interfaces.yaml
Declaring ecs.bus.* made ecs a managed prefix for manifest-lint, which then
failed on the 34 ECS action subjects the daemon registers. Declare them as
ecs.*, the same wildcard convention as rds.*.
* chore: run manifest-check and manifest-lint in preflight
CI runs both, but preflight did not, so manifest drift could pass local
checks and still fail Build and Test.
* docs: record resumed preflight enforcement and dev merge ports
* fix: restore dev changes dropped by earlier merges
Reapplies the slices.ContainsFunc rewrite in nodeFitsCustomerInstance and the DeleteDBSubnetGroup doc comment, both lost when their files were refactored.
* docs: record accountteardown as a frozen legacy root pending cleanup capabilities
---------
Co-authored-by: Julian Sommer <115516918+juliansommer@users.noreply.github.com>
title, seoTitle, description, category, tags, resources
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| Oracle Cloud Infrastructure (OCI) | Run Spinifex on Oracle Cloud Infrastructure — Spinifex Docs | Deploy Spinifex on Oracle Cloud Infrastructure end to end with Terraform, on one node or three, and give guests real public addresses through OCI's own API. | Cloud Install |
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Running Spinifex on Oracle Cloud Infrastructure
Run the AWS surface (EC2, EBS, S3, VPC) inside your own OCI tenancy, with guests that get real, publicly reachable addresses through OCI's API.
Table of Contents
- Overview
- Prerequisites
- 1. Clone the Spinifex repository
- 2. OCI Credentials for Spinifex
- 3. Choose deployment method
- 4. Write your Terraform inputs
- 5. Deploy
- 6. Check it worked
- 7. Set up your cluster
- Harden it before production
- Next steps
- Removing the deployment
- Troubleshooting
Overview
Spinifex is an open-source infrastructure platform that brings core AWS services to bare-metal, edge, and on-prem environments. It serves the EC2, EBS, S3, VPC, IAM and STS APIs over a SigV4 endpoint of your own, so the AWS CLI, the AWS SDKs and the AWS Terraform provider all work against it unmodified. Nothing a tenant has written has to be rewritten to run on it.
This guide installs Spinifex on Oracle Cloud Infrastructure, on one instance or three, with guests that get real public addresses from OCI's own pool. The install is the same product you would put on your own servers, so Single-Node Install and Multi-Node Install describe the same formation, storage and networking. What differs here is the layer underneath, because a VCN is not an Ethernet segment and public addresses come from an API rather than a range you choose.
Why run it on OCI:
- Cost. OCI prices compute and block storage below the large US clouds, and one Spinifex node serves a tenant's whole fleet as QEMU guests on hardware you are billed for once.
- Egress. Oracle's outbound-transfer allowance and per-GB rate are far cheaper than the majors, and guest-to-guest traffic rides the private plane, where it is not billed as internet egress at all.
- Portability. Your tenants code against Spinifex, not against OCI, so the same workloads move to your own rack or an edge site later as a deployment decision rather than a rewrite.
- Real public addresses. Spinifex registers each guest's address with OCI, so a guest is reachable on the internet rather than hidden behind a shared NAT.
What gets installed, on every node:
- Spinifex daemon and CLI
- QEMU/KVM for guests
- OVN and Open vSwitch for VPC networking
- Predastore, S3-compatible object storage
- Viperblock, EBS-compatible block storage
- The OCI public-address allocator, which is the one component specific to this platform
Nodes run Ubuntu 26.04, resolved at plan time as the newest Canonical platform image for your shape and region. Oracle Linux support as the host OS to run Spinifex is under active development.
Terraform does the whole deployment: the VCN, the block volumes, both VNICs per node, the Spinifex install, the cluster formation and the allocator. Six steps below, one command, about ten minutes for a single node.
What sits underneath is in Architecture and Operations, which also carries the IAM policy, the quotas, every variable and the troubleshooting.
Prerequisites
| An OCI compartment OCID | This deploys into a compartment that already exists. Creating one needs tenancy-root rights the API user must not have |
OCI credentials in ~/.oci/config |
For Terraform, to build the infrastructure. oci setup config writes one, or write it by hand |
| A runtime credential for the nodes | Separate from the above, and the subject of step 2: either an instance principal or a scoped API key. Without one a node comes up healthy and still cannot give any guest a public address |
Terraform or OpenTofu, git, Python 3 |
On your workstation. The Python helper is standard library only, so there is nothing to pip install |
Check two quotas before you start, because both refuse at apply time rather than at plan time. Reserved public IPs are capped at 50 per region across the whole tenancy, and the compute limit for your shape starts at zero for bare metal on many new tenancies. Quotas has the commands.
For the workstation (Linux, MacOS, Windows [WSL]) that will be used to deploy Spinifex on OCI the following prerequisites are required.
OCI CLI tool
Ensure the oci CLI tool is pre-installed. Follow the install guide at: https://docs.oracle.com/en-us/iaas/Content/API/Concepts/cliconcepts.htm
Once installed configure your OCI credentials (~/.oci/config) which will be used in later steps in the installation tutorial.
oci setup config
That writes a [DEFAULT] profile, which every command below reads with no flag. If your config holds named profiles instead, name the one to use once:
export OCI_CLI_PROFILE=my-profile
Spinifex's Terraform helper reads the same variable, so this one export covers the CLI commands here and the deployment in step 5.
OCI Compartment
Now set $CID to the compartment you are deploying into. It is used throughout this guide and again as compartment_ocid in step 4, so set it once and keep the same shell.
Which OCID to use depends on how your tenancy is laid out.
A tenancy with compartments in it. List compartments in OCI and pick one where to deploy Spinifex. The OCID is in the id column:
oci iam compartment list --compartment-id-in-subtree true --access-level ACCESSIBLE --all \
--query 'data[?"lifecycle-state"==`ACTIVE`].{name:name,id:id}' --output table
A tenancy with nothing but the root. The command above will return nothing, which is correct rather than broken: it lists the children of your tenancy and never the tenancy itself. To deploy into the root by using the tenancy OCID, which is the tenancy= line of your ~/.oci/config, or ask the CLI for it:
oci iam availability-domain list --query 'data[0]."compartment-id"' --raw-output
Next, specify your tenancy as CID:
export CID="ocid1.compartment.oc1..xxx"
Confirm the credential and the compartment together:
oci compute shape list --compartment-id $CID
Expected output to confirm API key and compartment works as expected:
{
"data": [
{
"baseline-ocpu-utilizations": null,
"billing-type": "PAID",
...
}
]
}
Install Terraform / OpenTofu
The next prerequisite is to install Terraform or OpenTofu to deploy the Spinifex stack on OCI.
- Terraform - https://developer.hashicorp.com/terraform/install
- OpenTofu - https://opentofu.org/docs/intro/install/
The deployment scripts of Spinifex will automatically detect to use Terraform or OpenTofu depending what is setup in your environment.
Instructions
1. Clone the Spinifex repository
To begin the deployment of Spinifex on OCI deploy the repository:
git clone https://github.com/mulgadc/spinifex.git
cd spinifex/scripts/terraform/oci-spx
Note
To deploy the development branch instead of the release, add
git switch devbefore thecd, and pass--channel devin step 5. The two choose different things: the branch chooses the Terraform and the deploy driver, and--channelchooses which Spinifex build lands on the nodes. Use the release for anything you intend to keep.
Then make a new SSH keypair the deploy installs on every Spinifex node which you can login with:
ssh-keygen -t ed25519 -f ~/.ssh/oci-spx -N '' -C spinifex-oci
Terraform reads your OCI credential from ~/.oci/config which is a prerequisites step above, taking the tenancy, the user, the fingerprint, the key and the region from the profile. A config holding a single [DEFAULT] profile, which is what oci setup config writes, needs nothing further.
Optionally with more than one profile you can define one using the environment variable OCI_CLI_PROFILE
export OCI_CLI_PROFILE=customprofile
2. OCI Credentials for Spinifex
Spinifex calls the OCI API at runtime to register each guest's public address, so every node needs a credential that can manage private and public IPs in your compartment.
There are two ways to provide OCI API access to Spinifex, and they differ in who has to authorise them rather than in what Spinifex is allowed to do. Both grant the same four permissions.
| 2.1 Instance principal | 2.2 OCI IAM user | |
|---|---|---|
| Key material | None. Each node authenticates as itself | A private key on every node, at /etc/spinifex/oci/ |
| Who can set up | A tenancy admin, once per tenancy | Anyone with identity rights in the tenancy |
| Rotation | Nothing to rotate | Yours to rotate and redistribute |
| What you set | export SPX_PRINCIPAL=adopt, read by step 4 |
Nothing extra; step 5 installs the key for you |
Use 2.1 if you are a tenancy admin. It is the better of the two because there is no key to leak, rotate or forget about, and a replaced node needs no handoff. Use 2.2 when your compartment was allocated to you inside someone else's tenancy, which is the common case and the reason 2.2 exists at all.
Both routes below need $CID from the prerequisites step, so confirm it is still set in this shell:
echo "${CID:?set it as shown under OCI CLI tool}"
Do one of the two authentication methods below, not both, then continue to step 3.
2.1 Instance principal (preferred)
Each node authenticates with the certificate its own metadata service serves at /opc/v2/identity/cert.pem, so no key is written anywhere. Authorising that takes a dynamic group and a policy, and both are tenancy-root resources — a compartment-scoped user cannot create them, and the attempt fails with 404-NotAuthorizedOrNotFound on CreateDynamicGroup, which reads like a misconfiguration and is not one.
Create them once, with a tenancy-admin OCI profile, then set one variable:
./setup-identity.sh --dry-run # always first
./setup-identity.sh
export SPX_PRINCIPAL=adopt
That is all of it. Step 4 writes SPX_PRINCIPAL into your Terraform inputs and step 5 reads it back from there, so neither step needs anything extra from you. Keep the same shell for both, as with $CID.
The dynamic group matches on the compartment, so it covers every node you build there and needs no update when a node is replaced. Its Terraform state goes in .identity/, separate from the deployment's — keep that directory, as it is the only record of what was created.
Only setup-identity.sh needs tenancy-admin rights. Every deployment afterwards runs as your ordinary compartment user.
To remove the group and policy again, ./setup-identity.sh --destroy. Every node configured for adopt loses its credential the moment you do.
2.2 OCI IAM user with scoped permissions
This route creates a dedicated OCI user holding only the three permissions Spinifex needs, and installs its key on each node. It needs identity rights in the tenancy but no tenancy-root rights, so it works in an allocated compartment.
Skip this section if you have enabled the instance principal authentication path.
Generate the key
openssl genrsa -out ~/.oci/oci_api_key_spx.pem 2048
chmod 600 ~/.oci/oci_api_key_spx.pem
openssl rsa -pubout -in ~/.oci/oci_api_key_spx.pem -out ~/.oci/oci_api_key_spx_public.pem
openssl rsa -pubout -outform DER -in ~/.oci/oci_api_key_spx.pem | openssl md5 -c
The last command prints the fingerprint, which is how OCI names a key everywhere it refers to one. Keep it; you need it in the config file at the end of this step.
Create a user and a group for it
Both of these are identity resources, so they are created in the tenancy rather than in your compartment. This step requires the prerequisite oci CLI tool to be installed and configured with an API scope that includes creating new user accounts and groups.
Replace admin@yourdomain.com with your administrator email which will be linked to the new OCI user account.
export ADMIN_EMAIL=admin@yourdomain.com
USER_OCID=$(oci iam user create --name spinifex-allocator \
--email $ADMIN_EMAIL \
--description "Spinifex external-address allocator" \
--query 'data.id' --raw-output)
GROUP_OCID=$(oci iam group create --name SpinifexOperators \
--description "May manage the private and public IPs behind Spinifex external addresses" \
--query 'data.id' --raw-output)
oci iam group add-user --group-id "$GROUP_OCID" --user-id "$USER_OCID"
On success the output will include:
{
"data": {
"compartment-id": "ocid1.tenancy.oc1..xxx",
"group-id": "ocid1.group.oc1..xxx",
"id": "ocid1.groupmembership.oc1..axxx",
"inactive-status": null,
"lifecycle-state": "ACTIVE",
"time-created": "2026-10-05T19:39:48.478000+00:00",
"user-id": "ocid1.user.oc1..xxx"
}
}
An email will be sent to the designated $ADMIN_EMAIL defined, you are required to click the "Activate Your Account" link to fully activate the new account in OCI.
Note
If these fail with
NotAuthorizedOrNotFound, you do not have identity rights in the tenancy, which is normal when someone allocated you a compartment inside theirs. Ask whoever owns the tenancy to grant you the required permissions.
Grant the group its four permissions
Spinifex calls ten operations, and these four statements are what authorise them. This attaches the policy to $CID, the compartment you are deploying into.
oci iam policy create --compartment-id "$CID" --name SpinifexOperators \
--description "Spinifex external-address allocation" \
--statements '[
"Allow group SpinifexOperators to use vnics in compartment id '"$CID"'",
"Allow group SpinifexOperators to manage private-ips in compartment id '"$CID"'",
"Allow group SpinifexOperators to manage public-ips in compartment id '"$CID"'",
"Allow group SpinifexOperators to use subnets in compartment id '"$CID"'"
]'
Note
If this fails with
NotAuthorizedOrNotFound, confirm$CIDis the compartment you are deploying into. It is aocid1.compartment.oc1..OCID, or your tenancy OCID if you deploy into the root compartment. An identity-domain OCID is a different resource and will not work here.
Upload the public key to that user
oci iam user api-key upload --user-id "$USER_OCID" \
--key-file ~/.oci/oci_api_key_spx_public.pem
This will output:
{
"data": {
"fingerprint": "xxx",
"inactive-status": null,
"key-id": "ocid1.tenancy.oc1..xxx",
"key-value": "-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----xxxx-----END PUBLIC KEY-----",
"lifecycle-state": "ACTIVE",
"time-created": "2026-10-05T19:51:58.843000+00:00",
"user-id": "ocid1.user.oc1..axxx"
},
"etag": "xxx"
}
Write the profile and prove it works
The Spinifex nodes authenticate with an OCI SDK config under the profile name spinifex. Write that profile on your workstation first, because it is both what the nodes get and the only way to test the credential before a deployment depends on it:
# ~/.oci/config
[spinifex]
user=<the USER_OCID from above>
fingerprint=<the fingerprint from above>
tenancy=<your tenancy OCID, the same one your DEFAULT profile uses>
region=<your region, e.g. ap-sydney-1>
key_file=~/.oci/oci_api_key_spx.pem
Then confirm the key, the user, the group and the policy all line up. This call needs exactly the public-ips grant above, so it fails in the same way a node would:
oci network public-ip list --compartment-id "$CID" --scope REGION --all --profile spinifex
An empty response is a pass, because the permission is what is being tested rather than the contents. NotAuthorizedOrNotFound means the policy is not in force: check that the statements name the compartment by compartment id, and that the user is actually in the group.
Do this before step 5. confirm the new OCI account can correctly authenticate and issue the required API calls for Spinifex to function correctly once installed.
Warning
Do not set
OCI_CLI_PROFILE=spinifex. That variable chooses the profile Terraform builds the infrastructure with, and this one cannot: creating a VCN, a subnet and instances is far outside the three grants above, so the apply fails on the first resource. The nodes find thespinifexprofile by name without being told.
Validate deployment
Prior to running the Terraform scripts to deploy Spinifex, verify the OCI configuration and environment is correctly setup:
./spx-oci-config.sh --dry-run ~/.ssh/oci-spx
Expected output:
[spx-oci-config] credential: the [spinifex] profile in ~/.oci/config
[spx-oci-config] user: ocid1.user.oc1..aaaa...
[spx-oci-config] fingerprint: a1:b2:...
[spx-oci-config] region: ap-sydney-1
[spx-oci-config] would write /etc/spinifex/oci/config and /etc/spinifex/oci/oci_api_key.pem as 0640 root:spinifex on: (no hosts given)
Step 5 runs this script for real, over SSH, once the nodes are formed. Those two files are what the allocator authenticates with, and the spinifex profile name in the second one is what it looks for.
The credential: line is the one to check. It has to name the [spinifex] profile. If instead it prints two WARNING: lines about falling back to "the credential Terraform builds with", the profile was not found and your nodes would get your full-access credential rather than the scoped one you just made.
3. Choose deployment method
Choose how to deploy Spinifex on OCI, either as a single node, or at minimum a three node cluster for added resiliency and redundancy.
| Single node | Three nodes | |
|---|---|---|
node_count |
1 |
3 |
| Survives losing a node | No | Yes. NATS keeps quorum, predastore RS(2,1) keeps the data readable, the OVN raft keeps a leader |
| Public addresses available | 64 | 192, three VNICs' worth, still bounded by the regional quota |
| Fault domains | One | Three, one per node, chosen by Terraform |
| Use it for | Evaluation, a lab, an edge site with one box | Production. Multi-node resiliency |
4. Write your Terraform inputs
The next step is to define a terraform.auto.tfvars configuration file with your desired deployment method for Spinifex on OCI.
Recommended compute shapes for a VM deployment:
VM.Standard.E6.Flex- Higher performance, 5th Gen AMD EPYC processorVM.Standard.E5.Flex- Base-line performance, 4th Gen AMD EPYC processor
Recommended bare metal shapes, preferred for large-scale production workloads:
BM.Standard.E5.192- 192 OCPU / 2304 GB RAM. Higher performance, 4th Gen AMD EPYC processorBM.Standard3.64- 64 OCPU / 1024 GB RAM. Baseline, Intel Xeon Platinum 8358BM.Standard.E2.64- 64 OCPU / 512 GB RAM. Legacy, 1st Gen AMD EPYC processor
cat > terraform.auto.tfvars <<EOF
compartment_ocid = "$CID"
deployment_name = "spinifex"
# How the nodes authenticate to OCI, from step 2. "off" is an API key, which is
# what step 2.2 installs; "adopt" is the instance principal from step 2.1.
instance_principal = "${SPX_PRINCIPAL:-off}"
# Shape and size.
# Bare metal is preferred for large scale production usage.
compute_shape = "VM.Standard.E5.Flex"
compute_ocpus = 8 # OCI counts an OCPU as a full core, 1 OCPU = 2vCPU
compute_memory_in_gbs = 32
# 1 for a single node, 3 required for a cluster.
node_count = 1
# The block volume behind /var/lib/spinifex, attached over iSCSI.
data_volume_size_in_gbs = 256
data_volume_vpus_per_gb = 120 # 120 = Ultra High Performance
# Firewall. A list, so it can hold several ranges. Read the note below before
# narrowing it.
node_client_cidr_allow_list = ["0.0.0.0/0"]
EOF
The heredoc delimiter is unquoted, which is what lets $CID expand from the variable you exported in step 2. Check the file rather than assume, because a literal $CID in there fails at plan time with an unhelpful message about an invalid OCID:
grep compartment_ocid terraform.auto.tfvars
This file is what decides the deployment. compute_ocpus and compute_memory_in_gbs size a VM flex shape and are ignored on a fixed bare-metal one, which comes at one fixed size with all available OCPU/memory.
Every Terraform variable has the full list.
Note
Leave
node_client_cidr_allow_listat its0.0.0.0/0default for now. It is an OCI security-list rule covering the whole public subnet, and your guests' public addresses cross it too, so narrowing it to your own address cuts internet access to every guest rather than just to the node. Harden it before production locks the node down in the layer that can tell the two apart.
5. Deploy
Choose the deployment method below:
vm-single- Single node instance (best for testing/development)vm-multi- A recommended 3-node cluster (production)bm- Bare metal for larger scale production use.
export TOPOLOGY=vm-single
Next deploy Spinifex on OCI:
./validate-topology.sh \
--topology "$TOPOLOGY" \
--credential-hook ./spx-oci-config.sh \
--skip-workload \
--keep
The same command covers both credential routes. It reads instance_principal from the tfvars you wrote in step 4, so an instance-principal deployment needs no extra argument and --credential-hook is simply ignored.
One command builds the infrastructure, installs Spinifex, forms the cluster, configures OCI public addressing and verifies that the address allocator came up.
| Argument | What to pass |
|---|---|
--topology |
vm-single for one VM, vm-multi for three, bm for one bare-metal host. Required, with no default, so a command cannot be aimed at the wrong one by omission. It supplies a shape and a node count only where your tfvars is silent |
--channel |
Nothing, normally. It defaults to latest, the published release. Pass dev to install the newest pre-release instead, or --version <tag> to pin an exact build |
--credential-hook |
./spx-oci-config.sh, which installs the step 2.2 credential on every node. Not used when your tfvars set instance_principal, because there is then no key to install |
--skip-workload |
Stop once the cluster is verified. Drop it and the driver also runs the published Terraform workbooks on the node, which launches real guests on public addresses and tears each one down again |
--keep |
This is what makes it a deployment rather than a test. Without it the driver destroys everything at the end, which is right for CI and testing a deployment |
Your terraform.auto.tfvars outranks the topology, so --topology bm with compute_shape = "BM.Standard.E5.192" in that file deploys on that shape.
Add --dry-run to print the plan and change nothing.
Note
If
--channel devfails to download, pass a tag instead.devis the one channel that resolves through an unauthenticated GitHub API call, so it can be rate-limited by Github. Take the newest tag from the releases page and swap--channel devfor--version <tag>, which resolves by redirect and cannot trip the same limit. A tag is also what to use for a repeatable deployment, where you want the build pinned rather than current.
6. Check it worked
The stages print as they finish, and all of these have to appear:
[validate-vm-single] building
[validate-vm-single] VM.Standard.E5.Flex, 1 node(s), oci_auth from a key file
[validate-vm-single] waiting for cloud-init on each node
[validate-vm-single] installing Spinifex on each node
[validate-vm-single] initializing the single node
[validate-vm-single] running the credential hook
[validate-vm-single] credential hook ok
[validate-vm-single] configuring the IMDS remap and the external pool
[validate-vm-single] checking the allocator came up
[validate-vm-single] 150.230.13.131 allocator ready
[validate-vm-single] cluster membership
[validate-vm-single] --skip-workload: stopping before the workbook
[validate-vm-single] --keep: leaving the infrastructure up, no verdict recorded
[validate-vm-single] ssh in with: ssh -i ~/.ssh/oci-spx ubuntu@public.ip
[validate-vm-single] destroy it with: ./validate-topology.sh --topology vm-single --destroy-only
allocator ready is the line to look for. Every line above it also prints on a node that cannot allocate a public address, and that failure stays silent until a guest asks for one.
running the credential hook is spx-oci-config.sh, and its own output is captured rather than printed. If the deploy stops there, read credential-hook.log in the state directory the driver names at startup — its credential: line says which credential went onto the nodes. On the instance-principal route those two lines are absent, because there is no handoff to make.
Access the Spinifex node
The deploy's last line is the command to get in, so you can paste it straight back. The addresses are also on disk, one per line, which is what to read from a script:
cat ".validate-$TOPOLOGY/hosts"
ssh -i ~/.ssh/oci-spx ubuntu@"$(head -1 ".validate-$TOPOLOGY/hosts")"
$TOPOLOGY is the variable you exported in step 5, so this is the same command whether you deployed one VM, three, or bare metal. The first line is the node the cluster formed on.
Then call the AWS surface with the [spinifex] profile that spx admin init wrote into ~/.aws/credentials:
export AWS_PROFILE=spinifex
aws ec2 describe-instance-types
{
"InstanceTypes": [
{
"InstanceType": "c7a.12xlarge",
"CurrentGeneration": true,
...
}
]
}
If this returns a list of available instance types, your installation is working.
Console access
Next login to the Spinifex console at:
https://YOURIP:3000/
Fetch your generated AWS credentials via SSH and login to the console using your new Spinifex account.
ubuntu@spinifexnode01:~$ cat ~/.aws/credentials
[spinifex]
aws_access_key_id = XXXX
aws_secret_access_key = XXXX
Congratulations! Spinifex is installed.
7. Set up your cluster
Spinifex is running, but it holds nothing yet — no machine images, no networks, no instances.
Continue to Setting Up Your Cluster to import an AMI, create an SSH key pair, create a VPC with a public subnet, and launch your first instance.
Harden it before production
The deployment comes up usable, not locked down. Three layers filter traffic here and the first job is telling them apart, which Firewalls, in all three layers does in full. The short version:
1. Arm the Spinifex host firewall. It is installed but not armed on this path. Arming it gives you the proper policy: the public plane open, the cluster plane scoped to peers only, and SSH scoped to a list you own.
# On every node.
sudo env SETUP_STAGES=firewall /usr/local/share/spinifex/setup.sh --firewall on
2. Narrow SSH. It is open to the world until you do, which comes from the Ubuntu image's own rules rather than from ours. Edit the one file the installer creates and never overwrites:
# /etc/spinifex/firewall/custom.nft
define trusted_ssh_peers = { 203.0.113.10/32 }
sudo nft -c -f /etc/spinifex/firewall/spinifex.nft # check, then apply
sudo /usr/local/lib/spinifex/spinifex-firewall-apply
3. Decide about the console on port 3000. The S3 gate (8443) and the AWS gateway (9999) are the product's public surface and should stay public. The web console need not be.
Leave the OCI security list open. Guest public addresses cross it, so narrowing node_client_cidr_allow_list breaks your tenants instead of protecting the node. The host firewall above is the layer that can tell a node's listener from a guest's.
Full detail, including which port serves what and why forming a cluster starts by turning the policy off, is in Host Firewall.
Next steps
Set up your cluster. It is running but holds nothing yet: no images, no networks, no instances. Setting Up Your Cluster imports an AMI, creates a key pair and a VPC, and launches your first instance.
Run your existing Terraform against it. Everything above builds infrastructure on OCI with the OCI provider. From here you use the AWS provider, unmodified from the registry, pointed at your own cluster. Your aws_vpc, aws_instance, aws_db_instance, aws_ecs_service and aws_eks_cluster resources stay as they are in git. Three things differ, and only three:
provider "aws" {
region = "ap-southeast-2"
access_key = var.access_key
secret_key = var.secret_key
endpoints {
ec2 = var.spinifex_endpoint # https://<node private IP>:9999
s3 = var.predastore_endpoint # https://<node private IP>:8443
iam = var.spinifex_endpoint
sts = var.spinifex_endpoint
}
s3_use_path_style = true
skip_metadata_api_check = true
skip_region_validation = true
}
Use the node's private address, not its public one. The node certificate carries no SAN for the public address, because that address is never on the wire: OCI NATs it to a private one. A call to
https://<public IP>:9999fails TLS verification with hostname doesn't match. Run Terraform from a node, or from anything else inside the VCN.
The Terraform workbooks we ship are the worked examples. e2e-cloudvendor-nightly runs them on a single VM, on three VMs and on bare metal, publishing a table per topology on its own run page, so read that for the build you are installing.
Oracle Linux guests. Four Oracle Linux images are in the catalog, so you can run the distro your Oracle support contract covers:
sudo spx admin images import --name oracle-10.1-x86_64 --config /etc/spinifex/spinifex.toml
The four are oracle-10.1-x86_64, oracle-10.1-arm64, oracle-9.8-x86_64 and oracle-9.8-arm64. All of them boot UEFI, so launch them into a shape that boots UEFI or the failure looks like a hung boot rather than a rejected image. Log in as cloud-user, not opc. These are the generic KVM cloud images from yum.oracle.com, which refuse opc, oracle and ec2-user alike. The UI's instance detail page shows the right user per AMI.
Removing the deployment
./validate-topology.sh --topology vm-single --destroy-only
It destroys whatever that topology's Terraform state holds, so it can only remove what this configuration created.
Check for leftover public IPs afterwards
Terraform does not own the addresses Spinifex allocates, so a destroy can leave them behind.
A reserved public IP and the private IP under it are created by the running node when a guest asks for an address, not by this configuration.
They are in no Terraform state, so --destroy-only cannot see them and does not try.
Each one bills, and each holds one of the tenancy's 50 reserved-public-IP slots.
A tenancy at that ceiling refuses every later launch with AddressLimitExceeded, on every deployment in it and not only the one that leaked.
A running node collects its own: the allocator reconciles every ten minutes and deletes detached addresses carrying the spinifex- prefix that no binding claims.
Destroying the node is what defeats that, because the sweep goes away with the host that ran it.
So list them after a teardown:
oci network public-ip list --compartment-id "$COMPARTMENT_OCID" --scope REGION --lifetime RESERVED --all \
--query 'data[?starts_with("display-name", `spinifex-`)].{ip:"ip-address",name:"display-name",attached:"private-ip-id",created:"time-created"}' \
--output table
A row with a non-empty attached is not garbage.
It is bound to a VNIC, which means either a guest is receiving traffic on it or another deployment in the same compartment holds it.
Only rows with an empty attached are candidates, and then one at a time:
oci network public-ip delete --public-ip-id <ocid> --force
Use the limits API rather than a count to judge the headroom, because the two disagree and only one of them is what the service enforces:
oci limits resource-availability get --service-name vcn \
--limit-name reserved-public-ip-count --compartment-id "$TENANCY_OCID"
Troubleshooting
The deploy stops at the first failure and names the log it wrote, all under .validate-<topology>/. Add --keep-on-fail to leave a failed deployment up so you can log in and look. It keeps billing until you run --destroy-only.
Troubleshooting covers the symptoms worth knowing in advance, several of which point at the wrong layer on first reading:
- If a deploy stage fails, and which log holds the answer
- A guest's public address is unreachable
- A node that was fine and then was not, where one command answers all of it
- Guests cannot reach instance metadata, because OCI and AWS guests want the same address
- Addresses and quotas, including why a detached address still bills
Installing by hand instead of with Terraform is Deploying without Terraform.
