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b2390fb398
TestMultinodeIPSec asserts: - OVS DB on every node carries certificate/private_key/ca_cert pointers and other_config:ipsec_encapsulation=true (what daemon.enableOVNIPSec writes). - ip xfrm state on every node has at least one AEAD SA in AES-GCM mode (rfc4106(gcm(aes)) or gcm(aes)) within 90s. - tcpdump catches ESP (ip proto 50) on the underlay (best-effort — logged only; geneve may be idle during the 5s capture window). Skips cleanly when the cluster was bootstrapped with --ipsec=false (no ipsec_encapsulation key on first node). Read-only over SSH; runs in the parallel bucket alongside the other non-mutating multinode tests.
115 lines
4.1 KiB
Go
115 lines
4.1 KiB
Go
//go:build e2e
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package multinode
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import (
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"context"
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"fmt"
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"strings"
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"testing"
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"time"
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"github.com/mulgadc/spinifex/tests/e2e/harness"
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)
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// runIPSec verifies OVN native IPsec is live on every node. Three checks:
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//
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// 1. OVS DB on each node carries the cert/key/CA pointers plus
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// other_config:ipsec_encapsulation=true. This is what
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// daemon.enableOVNIPSec writes; if any node lost it (rolling restart,
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// manual ovs-vsctl unset, missing peer cert) the SAs below would
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// silently drop to plaintext.
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//
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// 2. `ip xfrm state` on each node shows at least one AEAD SA negotiated
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// in AES-GCM mode. ovs-monitor-ipsec drives strongSwan to bring SAs up
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// against every peer ovn-controller has a Geneve tunnel to, so on a
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// 3-node mesh we expect 2N SAs per node (in+out per peer) — but the
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// test only asserts >=1 to stay tolerant of ovs-monitor-ipsec startup
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// ordering quirks.
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//
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// 3. Best-effort tcpdump for ESP (proto 50) traffic on the underlay.
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// Logged only — geneve_sys_6081 may be idle during the capture window
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// if no overlay VMs are running yet.
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//
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// Skips cleanly if the cluster was bootstrapped with --ipsec=false (no
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// other_config:ipsec_encapsulation key on the first node).
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func runIPSec(t *testing.T, fix *Fixture) {
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harness.Phase(t, "Multinode — OVN Native IPsec")
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ssh := harness.NewPeerSSH()
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first := fix.Cluster.Nodes[0]
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probeCtx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 10*time.Second)
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defer cancel()
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out, err := ssh.Run(probeCtx,
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first.Addr,
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"sudo ovs-vsctl --if-exists get Open_vSwitch . other_config:ipsec_encapsulation 2>/dev/null || true",
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)
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("probe ovs-vsctl on %s: %v", first.Name, err)
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}
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if !strings.Contains(string(out), "true") {
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t.Skipf("IPsec not enabled on cluster (%s reports %q): skip", first.Name, strings.TrimSpace(string(out)))
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}
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harness.Step(t, "OVS DB carries cert pointers + ipsec_encapsulation=true on every node")
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required := []string{"certificate=", "private_key=", "ca_cert=", "ipsec_encapsulation=\"true\""}
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for _, n := range fix.Cluster.Nodes {
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c, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 10*time.Second)
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raw, err := ssh.Run(c, n.Addr, "sudo ovs-vsctl get Open_vSwitch . other_config")
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cancel()
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("%s ovs-vsctl get other_config: %v", n.Name, err)
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}
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s := strings.TrimSpace(string(raw))
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for _, key := range required {
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if !strings.Contains(s, key) {
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t.Fatalf("%s OVS other_config missing %q: %s", n.Name, key, s)
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}
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}
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harness.Detail(t, "node", n.Name, "other_config", s)
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}
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harness.Step(t, "xfrm SAs with AES-GCM established on every node")
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harness.EventuallyErr(t, func() error {
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for _, n := range fix.Cluster.Nodes {
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c, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 10*time.Second)
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raw, err := ssh.Run(c, n.Addr, "sudo ip xfrm state")
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cancel()
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if err != nil {
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return fmt.Errorf("%s ip xfrm state: %w", n.Name, err)
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}
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s := string(raw)
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if !strings.Contains(s, "aead") {
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return fmt.Errorf("%s xfrm has no AEAD SAs:\n%s", n.Name, strings.TrimSpace(s))
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}
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// Kernel renders the GCM AEAD as either `rfc4106(gcm(aes))`
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// (RFC 4106 ESP AES-GCM, what strongSwan negotiates by default)
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// or the bare `gcm(aes)` template name. Accept either.
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if !strings.Contains(s, "gcm(aes)") {
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return fmt.Errorf("%s xfrm SAs not AES-GCM:\n%s", n.Name, strings.TrimSpace(s))
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}
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}
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return nil
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}, 90*time.Second, 5*time.Second)
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harness.Step(t, "tcpdump ESP traffic on underlay (best-effort)")
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for _, n := range fix.Cluster.Nodes {
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c, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 15*time.Second)
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raw, err := ssh.Run(c, n.Addr,
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"sudo timeout 5 tcpdump -i any -nn -c 5 'ip proto 50' 2>&1 || true",
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)
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cancel()
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if err != nil {
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t.Logf("WARN: %s tcpdump ESP capture failed: %v", n.Name, err)
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continue
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}
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s := strings.TrimSpace(string(raw))
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if strings.Contains(s, "ESP") {
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harness.Detail(t, "node", n.Name, "esp_capture", "observed")
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} else {
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t.Logf("WARN: %s tcpdump saw no ESP traffic in 5s window (geneve may be idle):\n%s", n.Name, s)
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}
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}
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}
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