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496424c41c
* test(eks): EKS control-plane e2e suite (Phase 1, API-level)
Add tests/e2e/eks/eks_test.go driving the EKS lifecycle against awsgw:
CreateCluster -> ACTIVE (endpoint + CA asserted), kubeconfig artifact
assembly, AccessEntry CRUD, get-token presign decode, DeleteCluster -> gone.
Harness: EKS SDK client on AWSClient + WaitForEKSCluster{Active,Deleted}
pollers. Wire e2e-eks into the Makefile and the single-node CI suite list.
* test(eks): Phase 2 kubectl get-nodes data-plane gate
Add the reachability shim (harness/eks_mgmt.go) that reads the control-plane
VM's br-mgmt IP from the cluster KV meta over NATS, plus a kubectl wrapper
(harness/kubectl.go) that skips when kubectl is absent. KubectlGetNodes points
kubectl at https://<mgmtIP>:6443 (insecure-skip-tls-verify; cert SANs the NLB
DNS, not the mgmt IP) with an aws eks get-token exec block and polls until the
control-plane node is Ready — the get-token webhook auth regression gate.
IRSA pod + the real NLB/Route53 passthrough are deferred to a follow-up.
* test(eks): tolerate doubled NotFound code + dial loopback NATS
DeleteCluster detection matched the SDK constant ResourceNotFoundException,
but awsgw emits ResourceNotFoundExceptionException on the wire — match the
NotFound code by substring so deletion is detected immediately instead of
timing out. The mgmt-IP shim dialed NATS.Host verbatim (0.0.0.0:4222), which
the serving cert does not SAN; rewrite the wildcard bind to loopback.
Validated live: all 6 subtests green, kubectl get nodes shows the
control-plane node Ready via the get-token webhook auth path.
* feat: build system images with libguestfs (no host block devices)
Replace the qemu-nbd + sudo mount + chroot + /dev-bind flow in
build-system-image.sh with libguestfs (virt-customize / virt-resize /
guestfish). Every operation runs in an isolated userspace appliance VM with
its own kernel, so the build touches no host block device, no host mount, and
needs no sudo — removing the failure class that wiped the host's /dev on shared
CI runners (a leaked /dev bind traversed by rm -rf).
Applies to all distros: alpine resizes via guestfish e2fsck+resize2fs, ubuntu
via virt-resize; customization (packages, binaries, files, setup script,
service enable, cache cleanup) is one ordered virt-customize invocation.
LIBGUESTFS_BACKEND=direct (no libvirt on runners).
Wire the eks-node AMI into the single-node e2e job: the runner builds the
device-free raw, ships it to the VM, and the VM imports it (predastore/NATS are
VM-only) so the eks suite's CreateCluster has an AMI to boot.
* feat(eks): bootstrap + state-report via AWS gateway broker
Converge the EKS control-plane → host channel onto the ELBv2 lb-agent model:
the K3s server VM publishes its bootstrap envelopes and periodic state reports
via SigV4-signed HTTPS POST to the AWS gateway, instead of dialing core NATS
directly. A new gateway action (PublishInternal, POST
/clusters/{name}/internal-publish) relays the payload verbatim onto the
existing eks.bus.* / eks.state.* subjects, so the daemon-side subscriber, KV
persistence/encryption, and reconciler are unchanged.
This removes the VM's need to reach NATS at all, so NATS can stay
cluster-internal behind its bind/firewall/mTLS controls — the prior direct
path broke when NATS was not VM-reachable (e2e CreateCluster timeout) and was
DDIL-fragile (fire-and-forget nats pub, no ack/retry).
- gateway/eks: PublishInternal broker + route; closed-set channel/kind validation
- cmd/eks-gateway-publish: one-shot SigV4 publisher (retry-until-ack) baked into
the eks-node AMI; replaces the nats-cli publisher in k3s-first-boot.sh and
mulga-eks-state-report.sh
- handlers/eks + daemon: hand the K3s server VM the mgmt-reachable gateway URL +
system (Predastore) SigV4 creds + gateway CA instead of NATS URL/token/CA;
new resolveSystemGatewayBaseURL (mgmt-bridge-first)
- eks-node image: build/install eks-gateway-publish, drop nats-cli download
* feat: migrate eks-token-webhook to the AWS gateway broker
The TokenReview webhook dialed core NATS directly (STS verify + AccessEntry
KV read). On a mgmt-only control-plane VM with NATS bound off-subnet that
fails, so the webhook exited at startup, the apiserver token-webhook
kubeconfig was never written, and the apiserver crash-looped — the cluster
never reached ACTIVE.
Converge it onto the same gateway-broker model as bootstrap/state-report and
ELBv2's lb-agent: the webhook SigV4-signs an HTTPS POST {accountId,token} to
/clusters/{name}/token-review, and the gateway runs the verify + lookup
host-side and returns the resolved identity. The VM now speaks no core NATS.
- internal/eksgw: shared on-VM SigV4 client (also adopted by
eks-gateway-publish).
- handlers/eks/token_review.go: Authenticate decision core (moved from the
webhook binary) + ResolveTokenReview host-side wiring.
- gateway/eks token-review route + WebhookTokenReview handler.
- webhook: drop NATS, relay via eksgw.Client; broker fault -> 503 (retryable)
not a silent deny.
- initd: export EKS_GATEWAY_* / EKS_ACCESS_* creds, not SPINIFEX_NATS_*.
* fix: build eks-node helpers with GOFIPS140; cover token-review broker
eks-gateway-publish blank-imports internal/fipsboot, whose init() panics
unless the binary is built with GOFIPS140=v1.0.0. The eks-node AMI build
omitted the flag, so the binary paniced at first boot right after k3s came
up — k3s-first-boot (set -eu) died before publishing the bootstrap token and
the cluster never reached ACTIVE. Build both eks-node helpers with
GOFIPS140=v1.0.0, matching cmd/lb-agent.
Add NATS-backed unit tests for ResolveTokenReview and the WebhookTokenReview
gateway handler (verify responder + account KV) to cover the new broker path.
* fix: export first-boot env so eks-gateway-publish child sees it
k3s-first-boot.sh and mulga-eks-state-report.sh sourced /etc/spinifex-eks/
first-boot.env but never exported the vars, so the eks-gateway-publish child
process inherited an empty environment and exited '--account-id is required'.
The control-plane VM came up healthy but never published its bootstrap
envelopes, so the cluster never reached ACTIVE. Wrap the source in set -a /
set +a so the KEY=value lines export to child processes.
* fix: make awsgw start --host override actually bind
The 'awsgw start --host' override printed 'Overwriting awsgw host' but the
assignment was commented out, so AWSGW always bound the spinifex.toml host
(a specific WAN IP, e.g. 192.168.0.10). A system instance (EKS K3s control
plane, internal LB agent) has a mgmt-only NIC on-link to the br-mgmt IP with
no route to the WAN IP, so its SigV4 POSTs to the gateway were refused and the
cluster never bootstrapped. Honour --host (e2e passes 0.0.0.0:9999) so AWSGW
listens on all interfaces incl. br-mgmt; the serving cert already SANs every
local interface IP, and WAN clients still reach it.
* test(eks): install kubectl on e2e VM so KubectlGetNodes runs
The eks data-plane subtest (TestEKS/KubectlGetNodes) drives the full
aws eks get-token -> kubectl -> apiserver -> token-webhook -> gateway broker
-> STS verify path — the only end-to-end exercise of the token-review broker.
The e2e binaries run on the VM, where kubectl was absent, so
harness.NewKubectl t.Skip'd it and the path went unvalidated. Install a
checksum-verified kubectl (pinned to the k3s server version) on the VM,
gated on e2e-eks.
104 lines
3.1 KiB
Go
104 lines
3.1 KiB
Go
// Package eksgw is the on-VM SigV4 client EKS control-plane helpers use to
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// reach the AWS gateway, instead of dialing core NATS. Both eks-gateway-publish
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// (bootstrap + state relay) and eks-token-webhook (TokenReview relay) sign with
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// the system (Predastore) credentials for service "eks" and POST over HTTPS;
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// the gateway authorizes via IAM and relays to the host-side NATS/STS/KV.
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package eksgw
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import (
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"bytes"
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"crypto/sha256"
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"crypto/tls"
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"crypto/x509"
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"encoding/hex"
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"fmt"
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"io"
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"net/http"
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"os"
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"strings"
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"time"
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"github.com/mulgadc/predastore/auth"
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"github.com/mulgadc/spinifex/internal/tlsconfig"
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)
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// Client posts SigV4-signed requests to the AWS gateway for the "eks" service.
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type Client struct {
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baseURL string
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accessKey string
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secretKey string
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region string
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httpClient *http.Client
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}
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// New builds a client. caPath optionally pins the gateway TLS CA; when empty the
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// client relies on the system trust store. region defaults to us-east-1 when
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// empty (SigV4 requires a non-empty region).
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func New(baseURL, caPath, accessKey, secretKey, region string) (*Client, error) {
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if baseURL == "" {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("eksgw: baseURL is required")
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}
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if accessKey == "" || secretKey == "" {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("eksgw: access key and secret key are required")
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}
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if region == "" {
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region = "us-east-1"
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}
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tlsCfg := &tls.Config{
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MinVersion: tls.VersionTLS13,
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CurvePreferences: tlsconfig.Curves,
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}
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if caPath != "" {
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pem, err := os.ReadFile(caPath)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("eksgw: read gateway CA %q: %w", caPath, err)
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}
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pool := x509.NewCertPool()
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if !pool.AppendCertsFromPEM(pem) {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("eksgw: gateway CA %q has no usable certificates", caPath)
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}
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tlsCfg.RootCAs = pool
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}
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return &Client{
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baseURL: strings.TrimRight(baseURL, "/"),
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accessKey: accessKey,
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secretKey: secretKey,
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region: region,
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httpClient: &http.Client{
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Timeout: 10 * time.Second,
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Transport: &http.Transport{TLSClientConfig: tlsCfg, MaxIdleConns: 2, IdleConnTimeout: 30 * time.Second},
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},
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}, nil
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}
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// Post SigV4-signs and sends a single POST of body to path (e.g.
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// "/clusters/alpha/token-review"). It returns the response body on a 2xx, or an
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// error (including the gateway status + body) otherwise. No retry — callers that
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// need it wrap Post in their own loop.
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func (c *Client) Post(path string, body []byte) ([]byte, error) {
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req, err := http.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, c.baseURL+path, bytes.NewReader(body))
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if err != nil {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("create request: %w", err)
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}
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req.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/x-amz-json-1.1")
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sum := sha256.Sum256(body)
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if err := auth.SignReq(req, c.accessKey, c.secretKey, hex.EncodeToString(sum[:]), "eks", c.region); err != nil {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("sign request: %w", err)
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}
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resp, err := c.httpClient.Do(req)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("send request: %w", err)
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}
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defer resp.Body.Close()
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respBody, _ := io.ReadAll(resp.Body)
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if resp.StatusCode < 200 || resp.StatusCode >= 300 {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("gateway returned %d: %s", resp.StatusCode, strings.TrimSpace(string(respBody)))
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}
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return respBody, nil
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}
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