mirror of
https://github.com/mulgadc/spinifex.git
synced 2026-10-19 02:43:17 +00:00
cae76ba1b6
* test(volume): assert chunk GC stays wired on in CreateVolume GCEnabled was zero-valued at every viperblock construction site for a long time and no test noticed. It is not part of viperblock.VBState, so it never round-trips through a saved config.json and cannot be observed by reading volume state back. Extract the viperblock.VB assembly out of CreateVolume into buildVBConfig so the GC wiring is assertable directly against the returned config, without a live viperblock or S3 backend. The config is returned by pointer because viperblock.VB carries atomic.Uint64 fields that vet's copylocks check rightly refuses to see copied. * test(e2e): snapshot backend byte accounting before volume purge DeleteVolume purges a volume's entire backend prefix, including any chunks a leak left behind, before anything measures it. That is the same masking that hid the storage-growth leak in production: a passing E2E cannot fail on backend growth when the evidence is deleted first. Snapshot the volume's backend chunk footprint in EnsureVolume's cleanup closure, immediately before DeleteVolume, so every volume the shared teardown path purges is measured rather than silently discarded. The snapshot is always taken and logged; the hard ratio check additionally runs for callers that registered a guest-written-bytes baseline, since most callers never attach or write to the volume they create and so have no baseline to compare against. The tolerance is the RS(2,1) erasure floor widened for per-chunk header and tail-chunk overhead. It is sized to distinguish unbounded growth from a footprint settling at the floor, not to catch bounded residual garbage. The check is non-fatal inside the cleanup callback: t.Fatalf's runtime.Goexit would abort the DeleteVolume call queued behind it and turn a reported leak into a real one. * test(e2e): add memory-constrained concurrent-write durability regression The existing durability tests write one 4MiB sentinel, sequentially, on a comfortably sized guest, which is the exact inverse of the known-open data-loss bug: acked writes read back zero-filled after a cold reread when a guest is memory-starved during concurrent writeback. No happy-path test can reach it, because the fault lives in the intersection of memory pressure, write concurrency and cache-cold reread. Add a suite that encodes those three conditions together: a guest discovered at or below the working set, N parallel large writers launched as background jobs in a single command so they genuinely overlap, swap disabled, then sync and drop_caches before rereading. Assertions are per stream rather than aggregate so a failure names the losing writer instead of leaving whoever reads it to re-derive which of N writers lost data from one combined digest. GuestExec gains a timeout-parameterised variant. Its fixed two-minute default is sized for sub-second payloads, and a multi-gigabyte write to a network-backed volume would exceed it, so the suite would have failed by timeout while looking like it had caught the corruption. The budget scales with the working set, and a deadline is reported distinctly from a data mismatch so the two red states are never confused. The suite is dispatchable but deliberately absent from the default SUITES: the bug it reproduces is still open, so it is expected to fail and must not sit in a merge-gating path. It is registered in the workflow allow-list so it stays discoverable rather than being buried behind a skip. Also record on the live IAM instance-profile test why its assertions were not moved down to the integration tier, so the trace is not repeated. * test(e2e): drop backend byte accounting, assert a node-wide delta instead The accounting helper listed the internal predastore bucket to attribute bytes per volume. That listing is refused unconditionally: predastore authorises bucket access by same-account ownership, and the bucket belongs to the service account, so a test caller gets 403 no matter what it holds. Granting the test a service credential would invert the trust boundary to buy a measurement, which is the wrong trade. Replace it with what the S3 surface actually permits: sample node-wide allocated bytes either side of the write and bound the delta against the bytes the guest wrote. Coarser, but it measures something real rather than depending on a call that cannot succeed. The tolerance moves into the suite that uses it. It encodes RS(2,1)'s 1.5x expansion floor plus headroom; a cluster running the recommended RS(3,2) has a 1.667x floor and only ~12% of margin left, so the constant needs revisiting if the encoding changes. * revert: drop memdurability e2e suite The suite asserted the guest read back what it wrote after a memory-constrained concurrent write, but the assertion could not fail for the reason it claimed: it compared the guest's own read against the guest's own write with the page cache still warm, so it passed whether or not the data reached the backend. A test that is green on a build with a known-open durability bug is worse than no test — it advertises coverage that does not exist. Removes the suite and its Makefile/workflow wiring, plus DiscoverInstanceTypeAtLeastMemory, which had no other caller. GuestExecTimeout stays: GuestExec now delegates to it, and the old two-minute hard cap it replaced was a latent trap for any long guest command. * test(e2e): add partial-block concurrent-write durability suite Replaces the removed memdurability suite, which passed on a build that still carried the bug it claimed to test. The engine reaches its read-modify-write path only for a partial block; a fully covered block takes a full-overwrite branch that reads nothing and can lose nothing. The old workload wrote through ext4 with 1 MiB buffers, which the filesystem coalesced into aligned full-block requests: block-layer tracing recorded zero unaligned and zero sub-4096 requests, so the path under test never ran, and writers 4 MiB apart could not collide on a block even in principle. This suite writes the shape the defect needs. Two writers issue concurrent O_DIRECT writes into disjoint halves of the same 4096-byte blocks on a raw, unformatted device, stamping every half with the round number, then drop the page cache and reread with O_DIRECT asserting every half carries the final round. One half reading back at an earlier round is the signature of the lost update. The old suite also could not fail even had it reached the path: its write phase ended in 'wait; sync; sha256sum' and reported sha256sum's exit status, while bare wait returns 0 unconditionally, so writer errors were invisible and a backend ENOSPC presented as a pass. Here each writer's exit status and exact byte count are asserted before any durability claim is made. Working set is 8 MiB rather than 2048 MiB, and the volume is deleted on teardown; the predecessor left roughly 3 GiB of backend per run and twice drove a node under the nearfull watermark. Dispatchable but not in the default suite list until a green run and a demonstrated fail-first against a pre-fix engine exist. * test(e2e): let the fixture own the working-set volume delete The suite deleted the volume in its own cleanup and the fixture deleted it again on close, so every run ended with an InvalidVolume.NotFound from the second attempt. Detach stays — DeleteVolume against a still attached volume is what leaks volumes on teardown — and the delete is left to the fixture so the volume is released exactly once. * test(e2e): gate merges on the partial-block durability suite Verified on one node with the same test binary and workload, varying only the engine: 1758 of 8192 halves reverted a generation against the pre-fix build, 0 of 8192 against the fixed one. That is the fail-first evidence the suite needed before it could be trusted to gate anything. Adding it to the default suite list rather than leaving it dispatchable is the point. Its predecessor sat outside every path that runs, which is how it survived long enough to be discovered green on a build that still lost data. * test(integration): cover the ECR data plane in the front gate The live ecr/ suite drove docker, crane and skopeo against a real registry, yet none of it boots a guest: it needs a registry, an object store and an HTTP client. The in-process gateway already serves the OCI Distribution v2 surface on an ephemeral port with a memory-backed object store, so these run here in 0.18s instead of behind full provisioning. Covers the three claims the live tests made beyond authorization, which is already down here: a push/pull round trip asserting blobs and manifests read back byte-identical, refusal to auto-create a repository on push, and retagging an existing manifest without disturbing the original tag. Content is compared rather than status codes alone. A registry that stores a blob under the wrong digest, truncates it, or serves a different one answers 200 to every request in the sequence. The capacity/load leg deliberately stays live: it exists to put real parallel pressure on a real predastore, and a memory-backed object store cannot make that claim. * fix(e2e): make volume teardown release the volume before deleting it Fixture cleanups drain LIFO, so a suite that creates its instance before its volume tears the volume down first, while it is still attached. DeleteVolume answered VolumeInUse, nothing retried, and the volume was stranded on the node. Reordering the chain cannot fix this — registration order has no way to express the instance/volume dependency. Instead teardown is now self-sufficient for any creation order: it force-detaches, waits for the volume to reach available, and only then deletes. Instance teardown waits for terminated for the same reason, since TerminateInstances returns as soon as the request is accepted. Two things kept the leak invisible. A failing cleanup was logged and forgotten, so a run stayed green with resources left behind; failures are now reported as leaks, failing the bound test or surfacing through Close() for TestMain to fail the run. And a panic in one cleanup aborted the whole chain, stranding every resource behind it; each callback is now isolated. RegisterVolumeTeardown and the fixture had grown separate teardown paths, only one of which detached. Both now share it.
231 lines
9.1 KiB
Go
231 lines
9.1 KiB
Go
//go:build e2e
|
|
|
|
// Package storagegrowth drives guest workloads that make predastore's backing
|
|
// store grow faster than the data it holds, so an external step can measure the
|
|
// gap. Data should settle at ~1.5x its logical footprint — the RS 2+1 erasure
|
|
// floor (data=2 parity=1 yields three half-size shards, which is not 3x
|
|
// replication) — plus a small AES-GCM fragment-framing overhead. Anything above
|
|
// that, and especially anything that grows monotonically, is a leak.
|
|
//
|
|
// It exists to isolate the *unreferenced-live* leak, which only a real guest
|
|
// workload can produce: viperblock mints chunk objects under unique monotonic
|
|
// keys, so they are never overwritten. It simply stops referencing an old chunk
|
|
// and never issues a Delete. predastore is behaving correctly by its own lights
|
|
// — nobody told it the object is garbage — so it counts those bytes LIVE.
|
|
//
|
|
// That is a different fault from the *overwrite-orphan* leak, where a key is
|
|
// rewritten in place and the superseded extent is never tombstoned, so
|
|
// compaction can never find it. Keeping the two apart matters for attributing
|
|
// blame within a leak, and that attribution is why this package's own
|
|
// in-process check stops at a coarse pass/fail gate rather than a full
|
|
// breakdown. The two leaks are distinguished precisely by predastore's own
|
|
// live-versus-dead split: unreferenced-live bytes inflate live totals,
|
|
// overwrite-orphan bytes inflate dead totals. A host-side `du` reports one
|
|
// number that mixes them, which cannot separate the target from the confound
|
|
// — and this workload drives both at once, because the drain each pass
|
|
// forces also rewrites the checkpoint map in place. Splitting that mix
|
|
// requires a tool that reads predastore's live-versus-dead accounting
|
|
// directly; that tool does not exist in a standalone spinifex checkout, and
|
|
// depending on it here would break this suite's CI.
|
|
//
|
|
// What this package's own tests DO assert on, in-process, is the coarser
|
|
// signal a node-wide `du` delta across the workload can still catch: the
|
|
// combined live+dead footprint growing well beyond the RS-erasure floor
|
|
// (see assertNPassBackendByteDelta in storage_growth_test.go). A per-volume
|
|
// S3 listing of the volume's own chunk prefix — what this suite originally
|
|
// used, and what the external tool below also reads — turned out to be
|
|
// unusable against a live deployment: the internal chunk bucket is owned by
|
|
// a system account distinct from the tenant-scoped identity this harness
|
|
// authenticates as, and predastore's same-account bucket-ownership check has
|
|
// no cross-account bucket-policy escape hatch, so every such listing fails
|
|
// closed with AccessDenied regardless of IAM grants. `du` needs no S3
|
|
// credential at all, only SSH to the node, which is why it is what this
|
|
// package can actually run itself.
|
|
//
|
|
// The division of labour: this package drives the guest, runs its own
|
|
// coarse node-wide gate, and reports what it did (see npassWorkload); an
|
|
// external measurement step reads that record for the measured denominator
|
|
// and supplies the fine-grained live-versus-dead backend breakdown this
|
|
// package cannot produce on its own. Run standalone, the workload still
|
|
// asserts every guest-side invariant, and the coarse gate, that it can see
|
|
// on its own.
|
|
//
|
|
// This is its own package rather than living in single/ or multinode/:
|
|
// single/ shares one singleton instance across the whole package that a
|
|
// multi-pass, multi-MiB workload would wreck for sibling tests, and
|
|
// multinode/'s fixture hard-skips outside ModeMultinode — meaningless on
|
|
// the single-node topology this fault was observed on. It is also
|
|
// deliberately excluded from the default e2e run and from
|
|
// docs/service-interfaces.yaml: like gpu/, select-suites never selects it
|
|
// automatically, so it is driven only by its own `make e2e-storagegrowth`
|
|
// target. Nothing under tests/e2e/harness/ is modified by this suite —
|
|
// that path is an infra glob, and editing it forces the full CI matrix on
|
|
// every change.
|
|
package storagegrowth
|
|
|
|
import (
|
|
"bufio"
|
|
"fmt"
|
|
"os"
|
|
"path/filepath"
|
|
"strings"
|
|
"sync"
|
|
"testing"
|
|
|
|
"github.com/mulgadc/spinifex/tests/e2e/harness"
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
var (
|
|
pkgFixOnce sync.Once
|
|
pkgFix *Fixture
|
|
pkgFixErr error
|
|
pkgSkipReason string
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
func TestMain(m *testing.M) {
|
|
code := m.Run()
|
|
if pkgFix != nil {
|
|
if pkgFix.Harness != nil {
|
|
// A leaked resource fails the run: the suite may have passed, but it
|
|
// left state on the node that the next run will trip over.
|
|
if err := pkgFix.Harness.Close(); err != nil {
|
|
fmt.Fprintf(os.Stderr, "e2e teardown: %v\n", err)
|
|
code = 1
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
if pkgFix.TmpDir != "" {
|
|
_ = os.RemoveAll(pkgFix.TmpDir)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
os.Exit(code)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Fixture carries per-process state shared across storage-growth tests.
|
|
type Fixture struct {
|
|
Env *harness.Env
|
|
AWS *harness.AWSClient
|
|
Harness *harness.Fixture // memoized Ensure* fixture; spans the whole process.
|
|
TmpDir string // package-scoped scratch dir; survives every Test* in the package.
|
|
|
|
// PoolMode mirrors single/'s detectPoolMode. external_mode="pool" is
|
|
// required for this suite to run at all: EIP allocation is what makes
|
|
// guest SSH reachable, and guest SSH is the only channel for measuring
|
|
// the guest-side denominator. A nat-mode env has no EIP and no inbound
|
|
// path, so GuestExec is unusable and the suite skips outright.
|
|
PoolMode bool
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// ArtifactDir returns the artifact directory for the *currently running*
|
|
// test. Derived per-call from the live t (not memoized on the singleton
|
|
// Fixture): the process fixture is built lazily during whichever test runs
|
|
// first, so a stored dir would freeze to that test's name.
|
|
func (f *Fixture) ArtifactDir(t *testing.T) string {
|
|
t.Helper()
|
|
return harness.ArtifactDir(t, f.Env)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// requireStorageGrowthFixture returns the package-scoped Fixture singleton,
|
|
// building it on first call. Skips the calling test when:
|
|
// - SPINIFEX_E2E is unset
|
|
// - SPINIFEX_MODE is not "single"
|
|
// - external_mode is not "pool" (no EIP → no guest SSH → nothing to measure)
|
|
func requireStorageGrowthFixture(t *testing.T) *Fixture {
|
|
t.Helper()
|
|
pkgFixOnce.Do(func() {
|
|
if os.Getenv("SPINIFEX_E2E") == "" {
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
env := harness.LoadEnv(t)
|
|
if env.Mode != harness.ModeSingle {
|
|
pkgSkipReason = "storagegrowth suite requires SPINIFEX_MODE=single"
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
// Guard against harness.NewAWSClient calling t.Fatal (which exits via
|
|
// runtime.Goexit and corrupts the Once state for subsequent tests) when
|
|
// no CA cert is resolvable. ResolveCACert uses the same candidate
|
|
// paths NewAWSClient falls back to, so a failure here gives a clean
|
|
// skip with an actionable message — but only when NewAWSClient would
|
|
// actually take that path: SPINIFEX_AWS_INSECURE=1 makes it skip CA
|
|
// resolution entirely (see harness/aws.go), which is how a
|
|
// runner-resident scenario reaches a remote cluster that doesn't
|
|
// have the spinifex cert on disk.
|
|
if os.Getenv("SPINIFEX_AWS_INSECURE") != "1" {
|
|
if _, err := harness.ResolveCACert(env); err != nil {
|
|
pkgSkipReason = "no Spinifex CA cert found: " + err.Error() +
|
|
" — provision a local node first (ansible-playbook ansible/playbooks/dev-reset.yml), " +
|
|
"or target a remote cluster with SPINIFEX_AWS_INSECURE=1 (skips CA verification; see harness/aws.go)"
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
awsCli := harness.NewAWSClient(t, env)
|
|
|
|
h, err := harness.NewProcessFixture(awsCli)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
pkgFixErr = err
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
tmpDir, err := os.MkdirTemp("", "storagegrowth-pkgfix-*")
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
pkgFixErr = err
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
harness.EnsureDefaultSGOpen(t, awsCli)
|
|
pkgFix = &Fixture{
|
|
Env: env,
|
|
AWS: awsCli,
|
|
Harness: h,
|
|
TmpDir: tmpDir,
|
|
PoolMode: detectPoolMode(env),
|
|
}
|
|
})
|
|
if pkgFixErr != nil {
|
|
t.Fatalf("storagegrowth fixture init: %v", pkgFixErr)
|
|
}
|
|
if pkgFix == nil {
|
|
if pkgSkipReason != "" {
|
|
t.Skip(pkgSkipReason)
|
|
}
|
|
t.Skip("SPINIFEX_E2E unset")
|
|
}
|
|
if !pkgFix.PoolMode {
|
|
t.Skip("storagegrowth suite requires external_mode=pool — a nat env has no EIP and cannot reach guest SSH, the only channel for the guest-side denominator")
|
|
}
|
|
return pkgFix
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// detectPoolMode reads external_mode from spinifex.toml. Defaults to false
|
|
// (dev_networking). Copied from single/'s helper rather than imported —
|
|
// tests/e2e/harness/** is deliberately never touched by this suite (see
|
|
// package doc), and this predicate is package-local everywhere it already
|
|
// exists.
|
|
func detectPoolMode(env *harness.Env) bool {
|
|
cfg := os.ExpandEnv("$HOME/spinifex/config/spinifex.toml")
|
|
if env.ConfigDir != "" {
|
|
cfg = filepath.Join(env.ConfigDir, "spinifex.toml")
|
|
}
|
|
f, err := os.Open(cfg)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return false
|
|
}
|
|
defer f.Close()
|
|
|
|
scanner := bufio.NewScanner(f)
|
|
inNetwork := false
|
|
for scanner.Scan() {
|
|
line := strings.TrimSpace(scanner.Text())
|
|
if strings.HasPrefix(line, "[") {
|
|
inNetwork = line == "[network]"
|
|
continue
|
|
}
|
|
if !inNetwork || !strings.HasPrefix(line, "external_mode") {
|
|
continue
|
|
}
|
|
// external_mode = "pool" — quoted value; only "pool" enables this suite.
|
|
if _, rhs, ok := strings.Cut(line, "="); ok {
|
|
val := strings.Trim(strings.TrimSpace(rhs), "\"'")
|
|
return val == "pool"
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
return false
|
|
}
|