Replace unsynchronized getDisks swaps with backing disk-list updates under
erasureDisksMu, matching the existing GetDisks reader lock. Apply the same
helper to capacity and read-fault adapters while preserving nested restore
ordering.
Add a regression that overlaps fixture changes with the real IAM Walk
reader, and run the conditional PUT suite under the race detector in CI.
The regression reproduces the old fixture race; ten fixed race iterations
pass without warnings. Production conditional PUT behavior is unchanged.
Refs #199
Signed-off-by: Feng Ruohang <rh@vonng.com>
Serialize release and finalize work by tag, replace only one unfinalized Draft, refuse published or finalized release state, and pin GoReleaser to the checked-out tag. Add fail-closed release-state fixtures to the release pipeline.
Signed-off-by: Feng Ruohang <rh@vonng.com>
Standardize the related SILO components on Go 1.27 tooling, etcd 3.7.1, current Go-maintained modules, shared runtime versions, and explicit security and portability pins.
Keep the shared package Go 1.26 consumer floor, isolate lint tooling from product dependency selection, and preserve upstream-compatible import paths.
GPG-signing the RPMs rewrites their bytes after release.yml has already
generated SBOMs, the packages checksum manifest, and attestations from
the as-built files. The new workflow_dispatch-only finalize-release lane
runs between signing and publishing: it refuses non-Draft releases,
verifies the signed RPMs against their sha256 sidecars and the committed
PGSTY public key, confirms every other package still matches the
original manifest, regenerates the RPM SBOMs and the manifest from the
published bytes, cosign-signs the manifest under the workflow identity,
and attests the finalized set before replacing the assets in place.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The substring grep for the archive line also captured the archive's
.sbom.json entry, whose file is deliberately not downloaded in this
lane, so the sha256sum check failed on every run. awk now matches the
manifest filename column exactly.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The rpm carried a bare -1 release while the deb carried none. Both now
ship the PGDG-style 1PGSTY segment: silo-VER-1PGSTY.arch.rpm and
silo_VER-1PGSTY_arch.deb, with nfpm rendering it as the RPM Release tag
and the Debian revision respectively. The apk stays bare because Alpine
pkgrel admits only -r<integer>.
sign-release-rpms.sh declares the value once as expected_release;
package-release.sh names artifacts from its own PKG_RELEASE copy, and
test-release.yml evals the signing script's value and asserts both the
download names and the packaged RPM Release/DEB Version against it, so
the copies cannot drift apart silently.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Findings from an adversarial review (Codex, gpt-5.6-sol at max effort)
of 2ff594f4b and 4c34d2309, each independently verified before fixing:
- SBOM generation: buildx attaches a provenance attestation, so every
per-arch digest names an OCI index; Syft's platform default on an
amd64 runner cannot resolve an arm64-only index and the step dies.
Pass --platform explicitly on all four Syft calls (the two classic
lanes had the same latent defect - the renamed workflow has not run
yet, which is why it never fired).
- Release ordering: the HEALTHCHECK survival check now runs against
the pushed architecture image before the versioned and rolling
multi-arch manifests are created, so a broken health config blocks
their promotion; the comment now states honestly that the
arch-suffixed tags are already public at that point.
- Gate assertions: tar's member-argument mode exits non-zero on any
missing name, which under pipefail masked a found forbidden file
when exactly one of them existed; -tv prints symlinks as
'name -> target', defeating $-anchored greps; and the licenses
check proved only one-of-three. Export the rootfs once and assert
every required and forbidden entry individually (busybox/sh and
usr/bin/mc[li] now covered), and match the image healthcheck as an
exact array instead of a substring.
- Probe target vs CLI-configured servers: a probe process cannot see
PID 1's argv, so --url gains EnvVar MINIO_HEALTHCHECK_URL as the
documented way to point the baked-in HEALTHCHECK at a server whose
address/TLS comes from command-line arguments (verified end to end:
server on --address :9010, env var alone turns the container
healthy). Baseline regenerated for the new env token.
- IPv6 zone identifiers: serialize probe URLs via url.URL.String()
so [fe80::1%eth0]:9000 becomes a valid %25-escaped URL (tests added).
- Boolean flags: read --json/--quiet via Bool() so --json=false is
false, instead of IsSet() which treats any occurrence as true.
- Docker's HEALTHCHECK timeout raised to 10s: an outer deadline equal
to the probe's own 5s always SIGKILLed the probe before it could
print its diagnostic line.
- test-release path filter now also triggers on cmd/healthcheck-main.go
and cmd/main.go, so subcommand regressions run the image gate.
Not adopted: require_text's comment-insensitivity in verify-rebrand.sh
(snapshot-tripwire by design, consistent with its other assertions -
the semantic check lives in the CI gate now), and full
staging-then-promote tag publishing (a workflow-wide redesign shared
with the classic lanes, tracked as follow-up).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Publish pgsty/silo:<RELEASE>-distroless (and a rolling :distroless tag)
alongside the classic image: gcr.io/distroless/static-debian12 plus
exactly one program, the silo binary. No shell, no mc, no curl, no
entrypoint script - the binary is the ENTRYPOINT and the baked-in
exec-form HEALTHCHECK runs 'silo healthcheck ready'. The classic image
and its mc-based health checks are deliberately unchanged.
Design: silo.pgsty.com/compatibility/feature/healthcheck/
/data is created in the image layer, world-writable, because Docker
seeds fresh volumes from the layer mountpoint and no entrypoint exists
to repair ownership at runtime (issue #55); the parent directory is
copied from a throwaway busybox stage since COPY of a directory copies
contents rather than the entry itself, which would silently leave
/data at root:0755 and break every non-root run. The MINIO_USERNAME
drop-user path is not supported in this variant; use --user.
test-release.yml now builds the real Dockerfile.distroless on every
gate run (it has no download stages, so it stays offline) and asserts:
the HEALTHCHECK survives into the image config, /data ships 0777, no
shell and no /usr/bin/minio are present, Docker's health state turns
healthy from the baked probe alone, the probe binary execs without a
shell, and SIGTERM still stops the server gracefully - as root and as
--user 1001:1001. docker-release.yml gains the distroless build lanes,
multi-arch manifests, SBOM and provenance attestations, and a
release-blocking check that the pushed manifest still carries the
HEALTHCHECK (a Docker extension absent from the OCI image spec).
Verified locally on linux/arm64: full gate assertions plus bare
'docker run ... healthcheck' exit-code semantics and --version
passthrough.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The RPM, DEB and APK payloads carried no license material at all, and
the OCI image copied LICENSE and CREDITS but not NOTICE. For an AGPL
distribution that is not defensible packaging. Every delivery channel
now carries the same license set:
- nfpm packages install LICENSE and NOTICE under /usr/share/doc/silo/.
The entries are declared once per packager because nfpm only honors
type: license on rpm and silently drops such entries from deb and apk
-- the rpm keeps its %license flag, deb and apk carry plain files at
the same path. CREDITS stays out of the OS packages deliberately: at
1.8MB it would dominate an otherwise ~40MB payload.
- The OCI image gains /licenses/NOTICE next to the existing LICENSE and
CREDITS, in the Dockerfile and in both context-staging paths (the
make docker target and docker-release.yml).
- The GoReleaser archives list their files explicitly; the default
globs would keep missing NOTICE.
NOTICE's first line now reads 2015-2025 to match the banner constants
fixed in b57275be3 -- it had kept upstream's stale 2015-2023 claim --
and verify-rebrand.sh pins both NOTICE copyright lines.
The payload locks move in the same commit: sign-release-rpms.sh expects
the six-file listing, and the test-release validation asserts presence,
count, the rpm %license flag, and sha256 equality of the packaged
LICENSE and NOTICE against the repository files across all three
formats and both architectures.
Also dropped the unit's WorkingDirectory=/usr/local, a leftover from
upstream's /usr/local/bin install layout. Debian policy 9.1.2 keeps
packages out of /usr/local entirely; the binary already installs to
/usr/bin and the service does not depend on its working directory.
Verified locally with nfpm v2.47.0 (the CI-pinned version): built all
six packages via package-release.sh, then ran the test-release
validation step verbatim (extracted from the workflow YAML) and the
signing script's payload comparison against them in an Ubuntu 24.04
container -- both pass. Built the arm64 image from the real
Dockerfile.goreleaser and confirmed /licenses holds CREDITS, LICENSE
and NOTICE. make rebrand-guard passes with the new NOTICE pins.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: Feng Ruohang <rh@vonng.com>
Brings the server in line with the contribution and copyright policy
already adopted in pgsty/mc.
Copyright terms were derived from the clock: startupBanner overwrote the
ldflags-injected CopyrightYear with time.Now().Year() and printed it as
the end of MinIO, Inc.'s term, so every January would have extended the
upstream copyright claim past the 2025 end of upstream development, and
release builds silently discarded the injected year. Both banners now
credit MinIO, Inc. for 2015-2025 and PGSTY from 2025 through the
release-stamped year, falling back to the current year in source builds.
NOTICE names PGSTY as the holder of the fork's modifications, matching
the banners and the packaging vendor field.
Contributions are accepted inbound=outbound under AGPL-3.0-or-later with
no CLA - the core is Copyright MinIO, Inc., so the combined work can
never be relicensed and a CLA would buy nothing. What a fork carrying a
downstream delta does need is provenance, so DCO 1.1 sign-off is now
mandatory and enforced by a workflow that rejects unsigned non-bot
commits. CONTRIBUTING documents sign-off, repair, cherry-pick provenance,
dual copyright headers, trailer preservation across squash merges, and
that assistive-tooling trailers carry no authorship or copyright claim.
verify-rebrand.sh pins the copyright split and the policy files so
neither can regress.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: Feng Ruohang <rh@vonng.com>
actions/checkout@v4 and actions/setup-go@v5 declare runs.using: node20, so
every Go CI job printed the runner's Node 20 deprecation warning. The
release, test-release and docker-release workflows carried six more node20
actions that never appeared in that warning only because those workflows
run on a tag or a dispatch rather than on every push: upload-artifact v4,
goreleaser-action v6, build-push v6 and the docker qemu/buildx/login v3
line. All of them move to the current majors, which declare node24. The
SHA-pinned rest already qualified -- attest and sbom-action are node24,
cosign-installer is composite.
Checked against what those majors removed. build-push v7 dropped
DOCKER_BUILD_NO_SUMMARY and DOCKER_BUILD_EXPORT_RETENTION_DAYS and
setup-buildx v4 dropped its deprecated inputs, none of which are used here.
checkout v7 refuses to check out fork PRs under pull_request_target and
workflow_run, and no workflow here triggers on either.
setup-go v6 exports GOTOOLCHAIN=local, the one change with teeth. go.mod
declares `go 1.26.5` and carries no toolchain directive, every job resolves
that same version through go-version-file, and nothing in the module graph
asks for more, so there is nothing left for the go command to fetch:
`go build ./...` passes under GOTOOLCHAIN=local. The tools installed from
outside the module are in range too -- nfpm v2.47.0 requires 1.26.4 and
govulncheck v1.6.0 requires 1.25.0 -- and golangci-lint arrives as a
prebuilt binary from upstream's install script, not through the toolchain.
The runner floor that comes with node24 (v2.327.1) is met by GitHub-hosted
runners, and every job here is ubuntu-latest.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The transitional references land in one commit, because they are only correct
together: the repository is pgsty/silo, its default branch is main, and nothing
in the tree should point a user at the old names.
Changed:
- Workflow branch filters. go.yml and vulncheck.yml gated on `branches: master`
for both push and pull_request, so renaming the default branch would have
taken automatic CI offline with no error and no signal - the workflows would
simply never trigger again. They now name main.
- Release target. goreleaser's `release.github.name` becomes silo, which is
what actually decides where a tagged build publishes. sign-release-rpms.sh's
GH_REPO default follows.
- The OCI `image.source` label, the Helm chart `sources` entry, the security
advisory link in the issue-template config, and the go.mod comment citing the
LDAP TLS fix.
- 115 occurrences across README, README_ZH, SECURITY, CONTRIBUTING and 30 docs
pages, including 72 links that also carried the master branch in their path.
Those matter most: GitHub redirects clone, fetch, push and web URLs after a
rename, but raw.githubusercontent.com does not, and neither follows a branch
rename - every one of those links would 404 twice over.
- Three error strings in cmd/erasure-sets.go, cmd/storage-errors.go and
internal/config/errors.go that print an issue URL to operators. These are Go
string literals inside rebrand-guard's brand allowlist, so the baseline is
regenerated. The regeneration removes exactly those three entries and adds
none; all twelve other protected sets, including the 9014 exported symbols,
are byte-identical.
- The transitional-naming disclaimers in README, README_ZH, SECURITY and
CONTRIBUTING are dropped, since they no longer describe anything.
Deliberately unchanged, all three because they exist to reject or freeze the old
name rather than to point at it:
- buildscripts/minio-upgrade.sh pins pgsty/minio@sha256:b6bfe72... - the frozen
pre-rebrand image is the control group for the MinIO-to-Silo upgrade test.
- helm-migration-guard rejects any rendered container still pulling pgsty/minio.
- verify-rebrand.sh rejects the same in the delivery surfaces.
Also unchanged: docs/config/README.md links to pgsty/mc/blob/master, and that
repository's default branch really is still master. It moves when mc does.
verify-rebrand.sh gains three assertions so this cannot silently regress: no
source reference may name pgsty/minio outside the three allowlisted guards, no
link may target pgsty/silo's master branch, and go.yml and vulncheck.yml must
filter on main. Both new rejections were negative-tested - reintroducing a
master branch filter and adding a pgsty/minio URL each fail the gate with the
specific message.
This commit assumes the rename actually happens. Until the GitHub branch and
repository renames are executed, the links it introduces do not resolve.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
A rebrand of this size cannot be reviewed by reading the diff. The risk is not
what was renamed but what was renamed by accident: an environment variable, a
metric, a header, a route, a storage marker or an exported symbol that some
deployment depends on. So the invariants get a machine check.
rebrand-guard extracts the identifiers a product rename must not touch - the
go.mod module path, github.com/minio/* imports, MINIO_* variables, minio_*
metric literals, x-minio-* headers, route string literals, the hardcoded grid
routes in internal/grid/manager.go, the reserved bucket root, .minio.sys
markers, arn:minio and minio:s3 policy values, every exported symbol in cmd/
and internal/, and every branded string literal - and compares them to a
checked-in baseline. Any removal or addition fails the build, in both
directions, so a future change cannot quietly drop one either.
The recorded delta against the pre-rebrand tree is: module path, 137 imports,
19 metrics, 15 storage markers, 58 policy values and all 9014 exported symbols
byte-identical; environment 437 -> 436, headers 85 -> 84, routes 331 -> 330.
Each of those three is accounted for. MINIO_CONFIG_DIR and MINIO_VERSION were a
shell local and a compose variable in test scripts, never server settings.
x-minio-common was a docker-compose extension key, never an HTTP header.
/api/health/upload was the SUBNET upload path in the deleted callhome.go.
verify-rebrand.sh covers what the identifier guard cannot see: that the retired
upstream delivery paths stay deleted, that the packaging and container files
name silo, that silo.service keeps its Conflicts and both EnvironmentFile
lines, that silo.env contains no active assignment that would shadow the legacy
file, that no active delivery surface still publishes pgsty/minio, and that no
non-test Go source contains a dl.min.io, subnet.min.io, api.min.io,
slack.min.io or play.min.io URL.
Both, plus the entrypoint argv test, run in go.yml, release.yml and
test-release.yml. test-release.yml also gets the path filters right: it was
watching minio.service, which no longer exists, so the packaging gate would
have gone silently dormant. It now watches the unit, defaults, sysusers,
lifecycle scripts, helm chart and both guards, and asserts the four-file
payload, the absence of any cross-name Provides/Obsoletes/Conflicts, and that a
container started with the legacy `minio server` argv really runs silo as PID 1.
release.yml and docker-release.yml additionally verify that the checked-out
revision matches GITHUB_SHA before building. GitHub's OIDC certificate records
GITHUB_SHA, not the ref passed to actions/checkout, so a manual dispatch from
the wrong ref would have produced provenance describing different source from
the bytes being published. They now emit SBOMs and attestations for archives,
packages and images, and docker-release verifies the release workflow's
attestation on every artifact it consumes. Images publish to pgsty/silo.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The release image (Dockerfile.goreleaser) was only ever built by
docker-release.yml, which is workflow_dispatch only - so the runtime layer and
entrypoint were never exercised by CI until an actual publish, where a broken
COPY path or a signal-handling regression would surface at the worst possible
moment. MC already covers this in its test-release; the server did not.
Add an offline, deterministic smoke: assemble a minimal image from the
linux/amd64 binary goreleaser already built and the real entrypoint, then start
the server and `docker stop` it on both the default and the MINIO_USERNAME
drop-privilege paths, asserting PID 1 is minio, the exit is 0, the shutdown is
sub-timeout, and the "Exiting on signal" log is present. The mcli-download build
stage is skipped deliberately - it hits the GitHub API and would make this gate
flaky and non-reproducible; its simple, checksum-guarded logic still runs at
publish time.
This is the regression guard for the exec-into-chroot entrypoint fix. Also add
dockerscripts/docker-entrypoint.sh to the pull_request paths so an entrypoint
change actually triggers this pipeline. Verified locally end to end: the fixed
entrypoint passes both paths; reverting the exec makes the drop-privilege path
time out to exit 137 and the step fails.
Co-authored-by: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
Three gate-correctness fixes:
- lint: `command typos && typos ./ || echo skipping` ran typos twice (POSIX
`command` executes it) and, via `&& ... || echo`, turned a real typo finding
(nonzero exit) into the "not installed" message with exit 0 - so spelling
issues could never fail the gate. Use `command -v` to test presence and run
typos once, letting its findings surface.
- getdeps: `curl -sSfL ... | sh` took the pipeline's exit from sh, and make's
/bin/sh has no pipefail, so a failed or partial download of the golangci-lint
installer was reported as success and a truncated script could run. Download
to a temp file under `set -e` (with a trap to clean it up) and execute that,
so a curl failure aborts the target. Verified: a 404 now exits nonzero
instead of silently continuing.
- release: workflow_dispatch checked out github.ref (the branch it ran from)
while naming artifacts after the input tag, so a release could be built from
one ref and published under another. Pin checkout to the requested tag.
Not addressed here: the server's release container image is still only built
by the publish-time docker-release workflow, never in CI (MC covers this in
its test-release). Flagged for a separate decision.
Co-authored-by: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
nFPM placed minio.service at /lib/systemd/system. On merged-usr EL/Fedora the
file lands correctly through the symlink, but the RPM database records /lib/...,
so `rpm -qf` disowns it and - more importantly - systemd's
%transfiletriggerin watches /usr/lib/systemd/system, so the path recorded as
/lib/... never fires the automatic `daemon-reload` on install or removal. Move
the unit to the canonical /usr/lib/systemd/system, which both restores that
trigger and makes the package own the path it ships.
The destination is asserted verbatim in several places, all updated in lockstep
so the packaging gate still passes: the six name/payload/sha checks in
test-release.yml (rpm/deb/apk) and expected_payload in sign-release-rpms.sh.
Verified by building a real deb with the new config: the unit is at
./usr/lib/systemd/system/minio.service.
Also drop the `# Built for ${project.name}...` line from minio.service. nFPM
expands variables in content src paths, not file bodies, so that pkger-era
placeholder was being written verbatim into every installed unit.
Not addressed here, deliberately: the package still does not create the
minio-user account the unit references. That matches upstream MinIO's own
packages (both rely on the documented manual useradd) and is not a fork
regression, so it stays a documentation step rather than a scriptlet.
Co-authored-by: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
The compute step spliced ${{ github.event.inputs.tag }} straight into the
run: body, so a dispatch tag containing shell metacharacters was parsed as
script - arbitrary code in a job holding a contents:write token. Pass the
input through the environment instead (INPUT_TAG), the same shape
docker-release.yml already uses, so the value reaches bash as data.
Second vector: the old format check compared the sed output against the input
to decide validity, and sed anchors ^...$ per line. A tag carrying a newline
passed the check on its first line and the remaining lines flowed into
$GITHUB_ENV, setting arbitrary variables (PATH, LD_PRELOAD, ...) for every
later step. Replace it with a bash =~ whitelist anchored to the whole string,
which rejects any multi-line value up front.
Verified: a legal RELEASE.* tag is accepted and yields the right PKG_VERSION;
a `"; touch ...; #` injection and a newline-carrying PATH/LD_PRELOAD payload
are both rejected; an empty input falls back to the git ref name.
Co-authored-by: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
Make the repository's actual quality contract visible in CI. Check formatting, build and vet the tree, run cmd and internal tests, enforce pinned lint and generated-file cleanliness, exercise S3 Select under the race detector, and cross-compile every supported target.
Keep each concern in a separate job so failures identify the missing guarantee instead of hiding behind a single aggregate test result.
Co-authored-by: ChatGPT <noreply@openai.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
The release workflow built and pushed the container images in the same
run that created the draft, so pgsty/minio:latest moved to a build
nobody had signed or published yet. Abandoning that draft left latest
pointing at it with no way to notice, and the images were the one
artifact of a release that escaped the draft gate entirely.
Image publishing moves to its own dispatch-triggered workflow that
takes a tag and refuses to touch anything that is not a published,
non-prerelease release, and that is not the latest one - since it moves
the latest image tag, running it for an older release would silently
roll users back. It builds from the archives attached to that release,
checked against the published checksums, rather than rebuilding from
source: the image then contains the same binary the tarball does, by
construction rather than by assumption.
GoReleaser loses its dockers and docker_manifests sections along with
the QEMU, buildx and registry-login steps that only existed to serve
them, and the release job drops packages: write, which was granted for
a GHCR push that never happened.
Releasing now has one more manual step. That is the point: tagging no
longer moves docker latest, so the tag can be cut, inspected, signed
and published before anything reaches users who pull by tag.
Co-authored-by: ChatGPT <noreply@openai.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
Refuse dirty release checkouts and verify that every GoReleaser binary records the tagged revision with vcs.modified=false before packaging or publication.
Exercise the complete nFPM output in the release test pipeline: assert the six public names, validate every checksum and package identity field, and prove that RPM, DEB, and APK payloads contain the exact source binary and systemd unit. Validate release scripts and make their identity expectations the single source of truth.
Co-authored-by: ChatGPT <noreply@openai.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
Replace minio/pkger's hard-coded upstream identity with an in-tree nFPM configuration. Packages now name PGSTY as vendor and maintainer, use the SILO homepage and SPDX license, and preserve the established package names, versions, payload paths, modes, and checksum format.
Resolve both the release binary and systemd unit independently of the caller's working directory. The release and test workflows share the same package script, while the signing script consumes the same final metadata contract.
Co-authored-by: ChatGPT <noreply@openai.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
GitHub Actions cannot hold the Pigsty RPM signing key, so the release workflow must stop before publication. Create releases as append-only drafts, refuse to overwrite existing assets, and make publication an explicit action after local signing and review.
Add a maintainer-side signing command that downloads the two RPMs, verifies checksums and package identity, signs them with the Pigsty key, regenerates checksums, and only replaces draft assets when --upload is explicitly requested. Published releases are never modified.
Co-authored-by: ChatGPT <noreply@openai.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
Require Go 1.26.5, gRPC 1.82.1, and x/text 0.39.0 while retaining the dependency graph's existing pins wherever MVS permits. Restore the blocking govulncheck job and correct the documented security advisories.
We maintain our own release pipeline (release.yml, test-release.yml)
and have no use for the upstream test/lint/integration workflows.
They reference infrastructure and secrets we don't have, and the
PR-triggered jobs never fire since we don't take external pull requests.
Closes#14
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Rework Dockerfile.goreleaser to download the latest mcli binary from
pgsty/mc GitHub releases, verify its SHA-256 checksum, and install both
mcli and mc (symlink) into the final image alongside minio and curl.
Also add download-static-curl.sh to goreleaser extra_files and enable
workflow_dispatch for the release workflow.
This commit removes FIPS 140-2 related code for the following
reasons:
- FIPS 140-2 is a compliance, not a security requirement. Being
FIPS 140-2 compliant has no security implication on its own.
From a tech. perspetive, a FIPS 140-2 compliant implementation
is not necessarily secure and a non-FIPS 140-2 compliant implementation
is not necessarily insecure. It depends on the concret design and
crypto primitives/constructions used.
- The boringcrypto branch used to achieve FIPS 140-2 compliance was never
officially supported by the Go team and is now in maintainance mode.
It is replaced by a built-in FIPS 140-3 module. It will be removed
eventually. Ref: https://github.com/golang/go/issues/69536
- FIPS 140-2 modules are no longer re-certified after Sep. 2026.
Ref: https://csrc.nist.gov/projects/cryptographic-module-validation-program
Signed-off-by: Andreas Auernhammer <github@aead.dev>
Golang http.Server will call SetReadDeadline overwriting the previous
deadline configuration set after a new connection Accept in the custom
listener code. Therefore, --idle-timeout was not correctly respected.
Make http.Server read/write timeout similar to --idle-timeout.
This PR fixes a regression introduced in https://github.com/minio/minio/pull/19797
by restoring the healing ability of transitioned objects
Bonus: support for transitioned objects to carry original
The object name is for future reverse lookups if necessary.
Also fix parity calculation for tiered objects to n/2 for n/2 == (parity)
Tests if imported service accounts have
required access to buckets and objects.
Signed-off-by: Shubhendu Ram Tripathi <shubhendu@minio.io>
Co-authored-by: Harshavardhana <harsha@minio.io>
readParts requires that both part.N and part.N.meta files be present.
This change addresses an issue with how an error to return to the upper
layers was picked from most drives where a UploadPart operation
had failed.
Go's net/http is notoriously difficult to have a streaming
deadlines per READ/WRITE on the net.Conn if we add them they
interfere with the Go's internal requirements for a HTTP
connection.
Remove this support for now
fixes#19853
precondition check was being honored before, validating
if anonymous access is allowed on the metadata of an
object, leading to metadata disclosure of the following
headers.
```
Last-Modified
Etag
x-amz-version-id
Expires:
Cache-Control:
```
although the information presented is minimal in nature,
and of opaque nature. It still simply discloses that an
object by a specific name exists or not without even having
enough permissions.
Feng Ruohang