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Anso
2435da232b
* fix(api-tokens): scope per-token rate limits to live tokens Forged or token-shaped Authorization headers no longer mint their own rate-limit budget. The key generator now grants a per-token budget only to a real, active token and falls back to per-IP keying for anything else, so a single source cannot evade the global limiter by rotating fake tokens. The validated token is memoized on the request, so authentication reuses it without a second database lookup. Token validation (format, checksum, lookup, revocation, expiry) is now a single shared helper used by the HTTP auth middleware, the WebSocket upgrade handler, and the rate-limit key generator, replacing two near-identical inline copies that could drift apart. The last-used timestamp write is throttled so a busy token no longer writes to the database on every request. * fix(api-tokens): surface token list-load failures with a retry A failed load of the API tokens list was swallowed: a server error rendered the empty "no tokens yet" state with no sign that anything went wrong. The list now shows an error card with a Retry action and raises a toast on any non-ok response or network error, matching the create and revoke flows. Adds a troubleshooting entry for the error. * test(api-tokens): seed tokens via the shared test helper The new hardening and WS-scope suites computed sha256 of a raw token directly, which CodeQL flags as js/insufficient-password-hash (a false positive: these are 256-bit CSPRNG opaque tokens, not passwords). Route token creation through the existing apiTokenTestHelper and read the stored token_hash back from the row, so the suites no longer hash anything themselves. Also removes the duplicated createToken helpers. * fix(api-tokens): key the rate limiter by the same credential auth uses The rate-limit key generator checked the session cookie before the Authorization bearer, while authMiddleware authenticates bearer-over-cookie (bearerToken || cookieToken). A request could send a Bearer API token plus a forged cookie and be keyed by the cookie's (forgeable, rotatable) username, sidestepping the per-token / per-IP keying the limiter applies to API tokens: a valid token would lose its own bucket, and a forged token-shaped bearer would no longer collapse to per-IP. Reorder the generator to mirror auth: process the bearer first (validate the API token and key per-token or fall back to per-IP; otherwise decode the JWT by username/sub), and consult the cookie only when there is no bearer. Regression tests cover a valid and a forged sen_sk_ bearer, each sent with a forged cookie.