Files
sencho/backend/src/routes/ssoConfig.ts
T
Anso 4e5ba17710 refactor(backend): sanitize user input before logging to close CRLF injection (#807)
* refactor(backend): sanitize user input before logging to close CRLF injection

Adds a small sanitizeForLog helper that strips CR, LF, tab, and ASCII
control characters (0x00-0x1F, 0x7F) from a value before it is embedded
in a console.log/warn/error/debug call. Wraps every call site where a
user-controlled value (req.params, req.body, req.query, or a value
derived from them) flows into a log message.

Closes the bulk of the open CodeQL alerts in this family:
- 96 js/log-injection
- 28 js/tainted-format-string

The helper is in backend/src/utils/safeLog.ts. Routes still pre-validate
input at the request boundary; this is the second line of defense and
gives static analyzers a sanitizer they can trace through. JSON
responses, Docker filter labels, and other non-log call sites are
intentionally left unwrapped.

* refactor(backend): printf-style format strings for tainted-log call sites

CodeQL's js/tainted-format-string rule flags template literals in the first
arg of console.X when any interpolated value is user-controlled, regardless
of whether each value is sanitized inline. The canonical mitigation is to
use a static format string and pass values as positional args.

Converts the 28 flagged template literals to printf-style ("%s") format
strings, with sanitizeForLog applied to each positional arg. Also fills in
the log-injection wraps on 9 sites where a user-controlled value was
missed in the first sweep (agents, fleet, gitSources, imageUpdates,
GitSourceService).

No behavior change at runtime. Node's util.format substitutes %s tokens
identically to template-literal interpolation.

* fix(backend): wrap nodeId/snapshotId in fleet restore debug log

CodeQL flagged the unwrapped numeric args even though they cannot
contain control chars in practice. Apply the sanitizer for taint-flow
recognition.
2026-04-27 10:47:23 -04:00

132 lines
5.4 KiB
TypeScript

import { Router, type Request, type Response } from 'express';
import { DatabaseService } from '../services/DatabaseService';
import { SSOService, type SSOProviderConfig } from '../services/SSOService';
import { requireAdmin, requireTierForSsoProvider } from '../middleware/tierGates';
import { rejectApiTokenScope } from '../middleware/apiTokenScope';
import { sanitizeForLog } from '../utils/safeLog';
const VALID_SSO_PROVIDERS = ['ldap', 'oidc_google', 'oidc_github', 'oidc_okta', 'oidc_custom'] as const;
const SSO_SCOPE_MESSAGE = 'API tokens cannot access SSO configuration.';
/** Reject unknown provider ids before any tier check so invalid inputs 400 rather than leaking a tier-specific 403. */
function rejectInvalidProvider(provider: string, res: Response): boolean {
if ((VALID_SSO_PROVIDERS as readonly string[]).includes(provider)) return false;
res.status(400).json({ error: 'Invalid SSO provider' });
return true;
}
function stripSecrets<T extends object>(config: T): Partial<T> {
const copy: Partial<T> = { ...config };
delete (copy as { ldapBindPassword?: unknown }).ldapBindPassword;
delete (copy as { oidcClientSecret?: unknown }).oidcClientSecret;
return copy;
}
export const ssoConfigRouter = Router();
ssoConfigRouter.get('/', (req: Request, res: Response): void => {
if (rejectApiTokenScope(req, res, SSO_SCOPE_MESSAGE)) return;
if (!requireAdmin(req, res)) return;
try {
const configs = DatabaseService.getInstance().getSSOConfigs();
const result = configs.map(c => {
const parsed = JSON.parse(c.config_json);
return { ...stripSecrets(parsed), provider: c.provider, enabled: c.enabled === 1 };
});
res.json(result);
} catch (error) {
console.error('[SSO] Failed to fetch SSO configs:', error);
res.status(500).json({ error: 'Failed to fetch SSO configuration' });
}
});
ssoConfigRouter.get('/:provider', (req: Request, res: Response): void => {
if (rejectApiTokenScope(req, res, SSO_SCOPE_MESSAGE)) return;
if (!requireAdmin(req, res)) return;
const provider = String(req.params.provider);
if (rejectInvalidProvider(provider, res)) return;
if (!requireTierForSsoProvider(provider, req, res)) return;
try {
const config = SSOService.getInstance().getProviderConfig(provider);
if (!config) {
res.status(404).json({ error: 'Provider not configured' });
return;
}
res.json(stripSecrets(config));
} catch (error) {
console.error('[SSO] Failed to fetch SSO config:', error);
res.status(500).json({ error: 'Failed to fetch SSO configuration' });
}
});
ssoConfigRouter.put('/:provider', (req: Request, res: Response): void => {
if (rejectApiTokenScope(req, res, SSO_SCOPE_MESSAGE)) return;
if (!requireAdmin(req, res)) return;
const provider = String(req.params.provider);
if (rejectInvalidProvider(provider, res)) return;
if (!requireTierForSsoProvider(provider, req, res)) return;
try {
const config = { ...req.body, provider } as SSOProviderConfig;
if (config.enabled) {
const missing: string[] = [];
if (provider === 'ldap') {
if (!config.ldapUrl?.trim()) missing.push('Server URL');
if (!config.ldapSearchBase?.trim()) missing.push('Search Base');
} else {
if (!config.oidcClientId?.trim()) missing.push('Client ID');
if ((provider === 'oidc_okta' || provider === 'oidc_custom') && !config.oidcIssuerUrl?.trim()) {
missing.push('Issuer URL');
}
}
if (missing.length > 0) {
res.status(400).json({ error: `Missing required fields: ${missing.join(', ')}` });
return;
}
}
SSOService.getInstance().saveProviderConfig(config);
console.log(`[SSO] Config updated: ${sanitizeForLog(provider)} ${config.enabled ? 'enabled' : 'disabled'}`);
res.json({ success: true, message: 'SSO configuration saved' });
} catch (error) {
console.error('[SSO] Failed to save SSO config:', error);
res.status(500).json({ error: 'Failed to save SSO configuration' });
}
});
ssoConfigRouter.delete('/:provider', (req: Request, res: Response): void => {
if (rejectApiTokenScope(req, res, SSO_SCOPE_MESSAGE)) return;
if (!requireAdmin(req, res)) return;
const provider = String(req.params.provider);
if (rejectInvalidProvider(provider, res)) return;
if (!requireTierForSsoProvider(provider, req, res)) return;
try {
SSOService.getInstance().deleteProviderConfig(provider);
console.log(`[SSO] Config deleted: ${sanitizeForLog(provider)}`);
res.json({ success: true, message: 'SSO configuration deleted' });
} catch (error) {
console.error('[SSO] Failed to delete SSO config:', error);
res.status(500).json({ error: 'Failed to delete SSO configuration' });
}
});
ssoConfigRouter.post('/:provider/test', async (req: Request, res: Response): Promise<void> => {
if (rejectApiTokenScope(req, res, SSO_SCOPE_MESSAGE)) return;
if (!requireAdmin(req, res)) return;
const provider = String(req.params.provider);
if (rejectInvalidProvider(provider, res)) return;
if (!requireTierForSsoProvider(provider, req, res)) return;
try {
if (provider === 'ldap') {
const result = await SSOService.getInstance().testLdapConnection();
res.json(result);
} else {
const result = await SSOService.getInstance().testOidcDiscovery(provider);
res.json(result);
}
} catch (error) {
console.error('[SSO] Connection test failed:', error);
res.status(500).json({ success: false, error: 'Connection test failed' });
}
});