Anso ef164f0e5b fix: enforce the originating user's role on remote WebSocket connections (#1508) ...

A remote WebSocket upgrade was forwarded to the target node before any role
check, and the forwarder authenticates the connection to the remote as an
admin-gated console_session. A non-admin could therefore open a remote
container-exec or host-console socket that the local handlers reject.

The hub now applies the same gate before forwarding: logs and notifications
stay open to any authenticated user, every other path (container exec, host
console) is admin-only, and machine node_proxy tokens are rejected on the
interactive paths. This covers proxy-mode and pilot-agent remotes, which share
the forward path.

2026-06-28 18:21:13 -04:00

..

generic.ts

fix(deploy-progress): decouple deploys from the live progress stream (#1246)

2026-05-28 20:51:45 -04:00

hostConsole.ts

feat(pricing): collapse to two tiers (#1309)

2026-06-04 17:45:53 -04:00

logs.ts

refactor(backend): extract remote proxy, WebSocket upgrade handler, and server factory (phase 3) (#733)

2026-04-23 19:31:16 -04:00

meshProxyTunnel.ts

fix(mesh): route peer→central traffic over the existing forward WS (#1094)

2026-05-17 22:00:31 -04:00

notifications.ts

refactor(backend): extract remote proxy, WebSocket upgrade handler, and server factory (phase 3) (#733)

2026-04-23 19:31:16 -04:00

pilotTunnel.ts

fix(pilot): harden outbound reverse-tunnel against resource exhaustion (#979)

2026-05-07 21:28:35 -04:00

reject.ts

refactor(backend): extract remote proxy, WebSocket upgrade handler, and server factory (phase 3) (#733)

2026-04-23 19:31:16 -04:00

remoteForwarder.ts

feat(pricing): collapse to two tiers (#1309)

2026-06-04 17:45:53 -04:00

upgradeHandler.ts

fix: enforce the originating user's role on remote WebSocket connections (#1508)

2026-06-28 18:21:13 -04:00